Aufsätze Dennis Edwin Showalter

Prussian Cavalry 1806-1871

The Search for Roles

The European cavalryman of the nineteenth century has a wide variety of negative historical images. In an increasingly democratic age, the unabashedly aristocratic tone of the horse soldiers has sharpened academic antagonism. Blue-blooded, wasp-waisted, moustachioed, innocent of thought on subjects more profound than horses and women, the cavalryman can be portrayed as a comic figure. Sinister overtones are added by historians who describe officers obsessed with shock tactics, with the charge as a way of life, incapable of comprehending or responding to the changes wrought in warfare by the Industrial Revolution. From Balaklava to the "colossal, murderous, mismanaged butchery" of the First World War, cavalry generals are held answerable for wasted human lives1. Viewed at closer range, however, a new image begins to emerge. The nineteenth-century cavalryman, like his footslogging comrades, was caught in a double bind imposed by technology. Until the development and refinement of the internal com-bustion engine, cavalry was not a battlefield anachronism. N o other really mobile arm existed. The question was not whether cavalry should be abolished, but how it could best function given the geometrically-increased range and accuracy of modern weapons2. This search for roles involved more than the ability to predict the future -itself a task less easy than is generally assumed when military technology is involved. It also required willingness to learn from past experience and avoid past mistakes. Institutions do not exist in a vacuum, and the problem of combining the skills of the historian and the futurologist to produce a viable military force are clearly illustrated by the experiences of the Prussian cavalry between 1806 and 1871. From the disaster of Jena to the triumph of Sedan, it struggled to do more than fill a niche in the order of battle, to be more than a system of outdoor relief for the lesser aristocracy. In the process it developed an increasingly coherent vision of the role and the nature of modern cavalry. That the vision was inaccurate in many respects, incomplete in many others, does not mean that it can be dismissed as the work of fools or charlatans. Nor can the circumstances contributing to its development be dismissed in a footnote. At least as significant, however, is the cavalry's continued willingness to modify its functions in light of its own experience. The adjustments may have been practical rather than theoretical, marginal instead of drastic. Their existence nevertheless reflects a degree of flexibility generally denied cavalry in general and Prussian cavalry in particular.

I

Like the state and the army, the Prussian cavalry was stunned by the events of 1806. Its reconstruction, however, was far more thoroughgoing than many other Prussian institutions during the Era of Reform. Before Jena and Auerstedt the heavy cavalry was considered a tactical as well as social elite, able to act independently, deciding battles by its mass charges. Light cavalry, initially used for scouting and reconnais-sance, enhanced its prestige at the expense of its traditional skills by assimilating as closely as possible to the cuirassiers operationally and socially. Mounted action was all-important. The flintlock carbines of the light cavalry were deliberately made

7 M G M 1/76 short enough that they could be fired from the saddle with one hand. The pistols

carried by all troopers were considered signalling devices as much as firearms3. It was small wonder that an army joke suggested that an infantryman shot by a caval-ryman had to believe in fate4. The military reformers were determined to change the cavalry's role. To some extent this reflected the fact that a state burdened by heavy indemnities, with an army limited to 42000 men, could not afford large forces of cavalry. More important, however, was the development of new tactical doctrines for the entire army. These doctrines emphasized the close cooperation of all arms to build pressure on an enemy gradually, to wear down his resistance until a decisive attack became possible5. There was no room in this picture for the spectacular charges of a Seydlitz or a Ziethen. Cavalry must function as part of a team, distributed throughout the army in regiments and squadrons to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the infantry and artillery6. This view of the cavalry's future role was further strengthened by the reformers' general emphasis on disciplined initiative as the key to forming modern soldiers. And in the cavalry these qualities were best developed in small units engaged in reconnais-sance, outpost, and patrol duties - the traditional light cavalry. Heavy cavalry, to be effective at all, must function in disciplined masses, immediately responsive to com-mand, trained until their every move was reflex. None of these abilities were partic-ularly valued by the men reshaping the Prussian army between 1807 and 18127. Un-fortunately, they gave the cavalry nothing specific to replace them. The revised cavalry drill regulations issued in 1812 said nothing about controlling more than six squadrons at a time. They gave little freedom of action to regimental commanders. Given the attitudes of the reformers, these omissions were not surpris-ing. Far more serious was the absence of anything beyond elementary rules for cavalry in battle, and of any serious directions for the execution of reconnaissance. Dismounted combat was ignored; cavalry firearms remained inadequate. Instead the regulations stressed riding drill and artificial, complicated small-unit maneuvers. Far from being part of a military team, the cavalry was in practice regarded as an orna-ment to be sent off to a flank and hidden. It was not even supposed to be used in large numbers for scouting8. Whatever the shortcomings of its drill regulations and tactical doctrine, the Prussian cavalry began the campaign of 1813 with a moral ascendancy over its opponent. The French army had returned from Russia with almost no cavalry worthy of the name. In Napoleon's opinion horsemen posed such a threat to his raw conscripts that he ordered his infantry to move only in close order once it entered the German theater of operations9. Yet the Prussians, faithful to the regulations of 1812, distributed half their small force of cavalry in detachments among the mixed brigades of the new army. As a result, in battle the cavalry was usually either in the wrong place at the wrong time, or too weak on the spot to accomplish anything. Nor was the brigade cavalry more successful in the reconnaissance role. Its officers, closely tied to the infantry, did not develop the coup d'oeil of their French opponents. Its outpost work too remained mediocre. The cavalry held in corps and army reserve was initially even less aggressive, on one oc-casion failing to charge a French division surprised in bivouac10. By the time of the Armistice of Pläswitz, moreover, it was apparent that the Prussian cavalry lacked the strength as well as the attitude to take advantage of its opportunities. Good cavalry cannot be improvised, and as the army expanded the strain on existing organizations increased. Most of the twenty regular regiments formed detachments of volunteers, young men able to arm and equip themselves, serving at their own

8 expense. The National Cavalry Regiments, the Mecklenburg Hussars, and various

Freikorps added another twenty or twenty-five reasonably efficient squadrons. The bulk of the newly-raised cavalry, however, came from the Landwehr, the citizen militia created in March, 1813. Most of the 113 squadrons formed by August had a high proportion of old soldiers in their ranks. The subalterns were often ex-officers pensioned or retired after Jena and recalled to duty on mobilization. As many of the recruits, particularly those from the rural areas, were acquainted with horses, the new units had a promising beginning - a beginning marked by a sharp debate over their employment11. Johann v. Scharnhorst, a long-time advocate of the Landwehr, was also a profound admirer of the Russian Cossacks. Initially he hoped to develop the Landwehr cavalry along similar lines, as an irregular force for raiding, scouting, and outpost duties. He even ordered the Landwehr troopers to be issued pikes, in imitation of the Cossacks' lances12. It required, however, little time to demonstrate the difference between men trained to the saddle from childhood and farmhands mounted on cart horses. Few weapons are more difficult to master than the lance. Even when commanding officers could find qualified instructors, its use remained an arcane mystery to most of the troopers13. The rest of Scharnhorst's hope proved equally vain. The commanders of the Land-wehr cavalry were more concerned with training their men to maneuver in squadron and regimental formations than with producing effective scouts and raiders. The tone of most of the Landwehr squadrons was set by men, both officers and other ranks, who had been molded in the active army. They were unable or unwilling to discard the standards of efficiency and excellence which they had learned in the years before Jena. Like the Landwehr infantry, the Landwehr cavalry took the field as a somewhat blur-red carbon copy of the cavalry of the active army — an image it never shed14. During the armistice the Prussian cavalry was at least redistributed to take advantage of the lessons of the spring campaign. Since experience had indicated that the brigades had more cavalry than they could normally use, most of the new squadrons were assigned to their respective corps reserves1S. The reorganization proved itself beyond all question in the autumn campaign. Though not a decisive weapon in the tradition of Murat or Seydlitz, the Prussian cavalry nevertheless proved an important battlefield instrument. It was constantly active, intervening in regimental and brigade strength to support or screen infantry attacks, to strike targets of opportunity, to cover withdrawals, to relieve pressure on infantry or artillery16. Perhaps its finest hour came during the battle of Leipzig. On the evening of October 16, Yorck's corps of the Army of Silesia, its infantry cut to pieces, its artillery running out of ammuni-tion, called on the cavalry to stop the final French counterattack. Led by the corps commander in person, the troopers dispersed the leading French columns, captured thirty-five guns, and turned the tide of battle decisively in the Prussian favor17. With such triumphs before their eyes, it is not surprising that Prussian cavalry com-manders tended more and more to concentrate on their role as a battle force to the neglect of reconnaissance and exploitation18. Units assigned to outpost and patrol duties achieved results spotty at best. The Landwehr in particular, which was just beginning to learn how to operate in large bodies, found it difficult to adjust to the demands of this new assignment. In the words of one of Yorck's brigadiers, they overlooked everything but the taverns. The squadrons of the line were little better -by themselves. Much of the actual scouting was done by the volunteers, who came into their own in a service stressing initiative and intelligence. When the infantry's volunteer detachments were disbanded, the cavalry's remained in existence, too valuable to be sacrificed even to the growing shortage of officers19.

9 A good deal of this seeming indifference was probably due to reliance on the omni-

present Cossacks, whose reputation may have been undeservedly high, but who nevertheless far surpassed most Prussian horsemen in the duties of the little war. Aggressive, independent-minded young officers were also absorbed into the Streif-korps, the closest thing to a guerilla force in the Prussian army. A Streifkorps could be fifty or sixty troopers or a balanced task force of all three arms; it could consist of guardsmen or Landwehr; it could exist for three or four days or for as many months, depending on its mission and its commander. Throughout the campaign they scoured the country ahead of the main armies and on their flanks, cutting off supply trains, cutting up isolated detachments, intercepting dispatches, maintaining contact bet-ween allied formations. But precisely because of their improvised character, any taste for independent action they might have inculcated tended to be lost when the Streifkorps disbanded at the end of the war20.

II

Thoughts of improving the scouting skills of the Prussian cavalry were also forced into the background by the apparent lessons of the Waterloo campaign. The cavalry's energetic pursuit of the French after the climactic battle did not obscure its unsatis-factory leadership and behavior against an undefeated enemy - particularly at Ligny. That the cavalry was in the process of reorganization when the Hundred Days began, that many of its experienced units had been diluted by raw conscripts, was an explana-tion, not a justification21. Postwar troopers tended to blame their shortcomings on their regulations. The Reglement of 1812, it was argued, went too far in making cavalry an auxiliary of infantry and artillery. The battles of the War of Liberation, however, indicated that large forces of cavalry properly handled remained important in modern warfare. Prussian shortcomings in this area had been visible and embarrassing - far more em-barrassing than less obvious deficiencies in reconnaissance and patrolling. After 1815 the Prussian army retained two kinds of cavalry - dragoons and hussars for outpost work, cuirassiers and lancers, big men on heavy horses, for decisive action22. And a number of distinguished wartime generals advocated concentrating these units in complete divisions and corps. Drilled to a razor edge, trained to maneuver rapidly and charge boot to boot, cavalry masses would complete the Prussian order of battle, possibly even deciding future battles in the style of Frederick the Great2 3 . The argument was worth testing. In 1821 and again in 1823, cavalry corps of forty-eight squadrons were assembled for maneuvers. Their formations and movements were so rigidly prescribed and controlled that the exercises have been generally crit-icized as pedantic and artificial24. The exclusive concentration on mounted action has also been described as a backward step. The War of Liberation, however, had shown that enthusiasm was no substitute for careful training at all levels as the basis of efficient cavalry. Where neither regulations nor doctrine existed for the use of cavalry corps in war, exercising units en masse under strict control seemed the best way to begin the process of instruction25. If the maneuvers were regarded as only a beginning, they nevertheless failed to convert those officers who were skeptical of using cavalry in masses. Theorists such as Carl v. Clausewitz tended to ignore the possibility. Practical soldiers like Prince William of Prussia doubted the value of forming large forces of cavalry, as difficult to feed as to command. The regulations of 1812, with their emphasis on close cooperation with in-fantry, remained in force. Tactical doctrine and maneuver practice alike stressed the risks of exposing horsemen to cannon or musket fire, whatever the circumstances.

10 Handbooks and manuals suggested that the cavalry continued to live in the eighteenth

century, with tactics consisting of little more than a charge at the gallop followed by hand-to-hand fighting with poorly-designed weapons26. The cavalry's critics, in short, argued that it must become more flexible. The Russian Dragoon Corps, drilled as both cavalry and infantry, instructed in mounted and dis-mounted fighting, offered a possible model. In 1834, Prince William, then command-ing the Prussian Guard, and his Chief of Staff Carl v. Reyher, observed its maneuvers. Reyher was impressed with the formation's equipment and training, despite its de-ficiencies in skirmishing. Nevertheless, he declared, it was impossible to train men equally well as infantry and cavalry, and the tendency of these dragoons, like their seventeenth-century predecessors, was to assimilate to the regular cavalry. Moreover, experiments which might be easy for a state with an army and a military budget as large as Russia's were impossible for Prussia, where every thaler counted27. A related pro-posal to increase the firepower of cavalry units by attaching to them companies of infantry carried in light wagons got no further than the pages of the military press28. Any improvement in dismounted fighting must come from the cavalry itself. Here again another state offered an example. The Württemberg general Count Fried-rich v. Bismark had drawn different conclusions from the War of Liberation than his Prussian counterparts. Future cavalry, he argued must be the frigates of the army, with their primary roles being reconnaissance and outpost service. He declared that every trooper must be trained to fight on foot, with the best marksmen and skir-mishers of each squadron concentrated in one troop to set an example for the rest. A regiment so organized could combine fire and shock action and thereby respond to a wide variety of tactical situations. Bismark's system was introduced into the Würt-temberg cavalry in 1817. However, the low peace strength, the inferior organization, and the inadequate training facilities of the Württemberg army meant that the marks-men became little more than understudies to the noncommissioned officers, with no real opportunity to practice their dismounted skills to the point of inspiring imitation elsewhere in Germany29 . The suggestion that with proper training cavalry could make good use of firearms was not entirely ignored in Prussia. The elite Demonstration Squadron taught skirmishing and marksmanship as well as equitation30. At the same time the proportion of firearms in the line regiments steadily increased. Every trooper carried a pistol. By 1825 the rank and file of the light cavalry was completely equipped with flintlock carbines, an increasing proportion of them with rifled barrels. By 1843, each cuirassier, lancer, and Landwehr cavalry regiment had eighty carbines distributed to its best marksmen. Carbines and pistols alike were converted to the new percussion lock during the 1840's. These weapons were more remarkable for recoil than accuracy, and their exi-stence did not indicate any major commitment to dismounted action. Nevertheless a Prussian cavalry regiment was in a position to give a better account of itself afoot in 1845 than in 181531. In the minds of would-be reformers, however, dismounted combat was the least of the cavalry's problems. As wartime lessons faded individual regiments spent most of their time practicing parade-ground drill, varied occasionally by impressive but use-less charges at corps maneuvers. The instructions for the use of large cavalry forces, revised by a special commission in 1842, seldom went beyond such obvious recom-mendations as recommending that frontal charges be supplemented by carefully-timed flank attacks32. Such shortcomings would hardly be remedied by improved instruction in marksmanship and skirmishing. Instead cavalry must be trained as cavalry, able to ride and fight as individuals or in masses. In September 1842, the Prussian cavalry held its own maneuvers for the first time in two decades. Under the

11 aggressive, energetic leadership of Baron Wrangel, the regiments involved demon-

strated unheard-of skill in maneuvering, in changing front, in securing their own flanks while threatening the enemy's. The overcontrolling, the artificial formations, of the 1820's, gave way to an emphasis on flexibility and smaller, handier formations, on initiative at all levels. It was not a revolution. It was a significant improvement, inaugurating a new spirit in an arm which would face significant challenges in the near future33 .

Ill

The challenges were not of the battlefield. Cavalry was not used in strength against the insurgents of 1848, even for crowd control. Instead it was generally sent into the field by troops and squadrons, fretting over the elderly excellencies who refused to recog-nize cavalry's proper role34. But the revolution in weapons technology beginning in the 1850's, above all the introduction of long-range, rapid-firing rifles, offered opportuni-ties and threats enough to satisfy the boldest trooper. Conservatives might scorn "Minié-needle-carbines and Minié-needle-pistols and whatever else they may be called." Pistols might be described as useful only when an enemy came near enough to be hit on the head with them35 . Nevertheless as early as 1849 a committee chaired by Prince William had declared the importance of giving the cavalry a useful, modern firearm and recommended developing a carbine model of the breechloading needle gun which had proved so valuable in the hands of the infantry36. The first of these carbines were not issued to the light cavalry until 1859. While shorter and lighter than the infantry rifle, they initially fired the same cartridge. The resulting recoil was so heavy that the powder charge of the cartridge had to be sharply reduced. This in turn diminished the accuracy of the weapon and made good marksmanship depend heavily on skill at deflection shooting37. It was not its firearms, however, which handicapped the cavalry's ability to fight on foot. It was its doctrine. Lead kills. If the value of cavalry charges against smoothbore flintlocks was question-able, it required little prescience to suggest that infantrymen armed with the breech-loading needle gun or the muzzle-loading Minié did not have to be heroes or marks-men to alter significantly the cavalry's role in modern war3 8 . Hindsight, however, gives this argument a force it did not possess to contemporary auditors. Cavalry was still the only mobile arm in existence. Cavalrymen like Wrangel and his foremost pupil, Prince Frederick Charles, agreed that their arm must adopt new weapons and new tactics if it hoped to influence future battle. But conceding the superiority of the new firearms did not mean conceding their supremacy. Accepting the latter conclu-sion meant accepting the virtual end of tactical and operational mobility, the limiting of campaigns to a walking pace, the stagnation of warfare. Pessimists might be right; these developments might be inevitable. Cavalry might have to concentrate on outpost and reconnaissance duties, evading rifle fire whenever possible. Heavy cavalry might possess neither the speed nor the endurance for modern warfare39. But in the context of the 1850's it manifested neither reflex conservatism nor invincible ignorance to sug-gest instead that the greater dispersion made necessary by the new weapons offered cavalry corresponding opportunities to defeat a victorious enemy or destroy a defeated one. N o army of modern size, after all, could deploy exclusively on favorable ter-rain. Some elements of it must be in areas where their firepower might be neutralized by quick, aggressive mounted action40. Cavalry might no longer be able to charge in-fantry in the style of Seydlitz. The concentration of sixty-one squadrons for maneu-vers in 1853 left a general impression that such large forces were unsuited to modern conditions41. Nevertheless the day of the charge was far from over.

12 The keys to the future were dash, speed, and skill at arms. Wrangel continued to focus

on ways of controlling regiments and brigades quickly and easily, but also recom-mended careful training of individual troopers in both marksmanship and mounted combat. While rising from command of a cavalry brigade to that of an army corps, Frederick Charles concentrated on the moral effect of cavalry action. If moral factors could not be measured exactly in peacetime, they were no less vital in war. Pro-perly timed and executed, cavalry charges delivered in close order at the gallop could still achieve decisive results. But this in turn required units whose men and horses were able to maneuver at top speed while remaining under precise control, units in which every man was master of horse, lance, and saber, as skilled in cross-country riding as in paradeground evolutions. And to develop such skills, the cavalry must be allowed more freedom than it had had since 1812. Cooperation with infantry and artillery was important - at least as important as it had been during the War of Liberation. But cooperation did not mean absorption42. The arguments of Wrangel, Frederick Charles, and their like-minded contemporaries had a profound effect on the Prussian cavalry. New drill regulations issued in 1855 broke completely from the pattern of close connection with the infantry established in 1812, stressing instead independent mounted action by large formations43. If offi-cers still remained reluctant to exhaust troop horses by cross-country rides at a fast pace, both light and heavy regiments paid increasing attention to the horsemanship and swordsmanship of the individual trooper, endeavoring to transform him into a warrior rather than part of a lifeless mass. This process was furthered by the introduc-tion of new weapons - lighter, handier thrusting swords for the cuirassiers, and for the light cavalry, sabers with straighter blades and weighted points which could be used for both cutting and thrusting44. And to master adequately these new skills and attitudes, the reformers generally agreed, the modern cavalryman must spend three or four years in the active army. He could not be a militiaman45. Nor did it make sense to sacrifice valuable training time developing inferior infantry. According to the regulations of 1855, only the light cavalry was expected to fight dismounted, and then only in exceptional cases and with no force larger than a squadron. The regulations continued to include instructions for firing the carbine while mounted - an evolution which, western films to the contrary, would tempt an enemy to laugh himself to death before he was shot to death46. The carbines of the heavy cavalry were gradually with-drawn altogether47. As the cavalry adopted to its new role as a specialized battlefield instrument, its other traditional function, reconnaissance, atrophied. A vedette was understood to be two men on horseback looking in different directions. Cavalry out-posts expected to be relieved by infantry at nightfall48. But Prussian troopers con-sidered the sacrifice acceptable - particularly since the maneuver regulations issued in 1861 as a guide to field service went no farther in discussing reconnaissance than pre-scribing the inclusion of cavalry in the vanguard of an advance49. The American Civil War offered no immediate incentive to abandon the new emphasis on shock. German observers tended to describe both Union and Confederate cavalry as a kind of superior mounted infantry, disliking cold steel, unskilled in its use50. Given the Prussian emphasis on the need for long and careful training to produce an efficient trooper, it was neither snobbish nor stupid to be cautious in drawing con-clusions from battles fought between civilians on horseback. Mounted combat might simply demand better soldiers. This conclusion could be debated in light of the Danish campaign of 1864. With seventy Prussian, Austrian, and Danish squadrons involved in the operation, on only five occasions did more than a single squadron engage the enemy. The rest of the troopers blocked roads, consumed forage at alarming rates, and generally proved an encumbrance to generals, quartermasters, and infantry pri-

13 vates alike. Their main functions were outpost and patrol duties - tasks which under

the pressure of war fell to cuirassiers as well as hussars S1 . But again this situation could be ascribed to the nature of the terrain in Denmark, and to a campaign which rapidly settled into a series of sieges and bombardments. The outbreak of war in 1866, with the opportunity to fight in the open countryside of Bohemia, was expected to give the Prussian cavalry a real opportunity to demonstrate its mettle in its new role.

IV

Events belied expectations. If the Prussian cavalry sinned more through omission than comission in 1866, missing opportunities rather than making errors, neverthe-less its overall record was hardly an encouraging portentS2. Yet on closer examination the cavalry's performance reflected its training and experience to a greater extent than contemporary critics were willing to concede. Deficiencies in armament were not significant against Austrian and south German cavalry still equipped with obsolete percussion pistols and muzzle-loading carbines. Prussian sabers and lances proved equal or superior to those of Austria, nor was lack of skill in dismounted tactics a handicap, since none of Prussia's adversaries possessed cavalry better able to fight on foot. Against enemy cavalry, the improved training in mounted combat intro-duced over the preceding decade enabled the Prussians to do better than hold their own against their adversaries - as long as the action was on a small scale. When patrols, squadrons, or even regiments clashed, the Prussians performed well. But in anything beyond these throwbacks to the medieval tournament, their shortcomings were embarrassingly plain S3 . All of the prewar arguments for the value of cavalry in battle were based on the as-sumption that its real mission only began once enemy cavalry was driven from the field. Only then could Prussian troopers strike targets of opportunity, turn stalemate into defeat and defeat into rout. But the Austrian horse, the elite of a fine army, was not easily swept away. When cavalry met cavalry in 1866 the results might furnish material for a generation of songs, stories, and toasts, but were generally more estheti-cally impressive than operationally significant. The Prussian cavalry spent its time checking or being checked by its Austrian opponent. Even in the largest and best known cavalry action of the war at Langenhof on July 3, the Austrians were forced from the field by rifle and cannon fire instead of sabers and lances54. Did wartime experience suggest that cavalry could no longer influence battles directly? Some Prussian horse soldiers argued instead that their shortcomings involved leader-ship rather than doctrine. Too many senior cavalry officers were physically and emo-tionally unfit for the field. Others failed to live up to reputations· gained at maneuvers. The cavalry corps of the First Army was commanded by a man so cautious and unen-terprising that he could not be trusted with operational independence. The Second Army's cavalry division spent the day of Königgrätz watching the battle. At brigade and regimental levels officers let themselves be intimidated by broken terrain, or by generals ignorant of the proper use of cavalry. They were cautious and unenterprising. On July 3, officers pleaded destroyed bridges and lack of fords as an excuse for failing to lead their men across the Bistritz. They committed their units to action piecemeal, or failed to support cavalry already engaged. The thirty-one Prussian squadrons invol-ved in the fighting at Langenhof, for example, were drawn in by twos, threes, fives and sixes. At the same time several regiments, according to Frederick Charles, remained idle, awaiting orders to do what should be second nature to a cavalryman - engage the enemy s s . The young men trained in modern methods had been just too junior for im-

14 portant commands in 1866. The next war would be different.

Organization as well as command required improvement. Frederick Charles had con-centrated most of his army's cavalry in a single strong corps. He argued that this large force, held in reserve for decisive moments, would be able to deliver repeated blows in battle, even against infantry, and still retain enough vitality to pursue a beaten enemy. In fact the Prince's creation never saw action as a unit. Since it was a reserve formation it marched in the rear of the army; even on the morning of July 3 it was initially held in bivouac56. Was this the best possible use of an arm limited in strength by peacetime costs, an arm requiring such long and careful training that it was expected to be diffi-cult to replace wartime losses, to say nothing of expanding its strength? Events in Bo-hemia suggested otherwise. Infantry had been vulnerable to cavalry charges only when it was shaken or surprised57. The number of troopers involved in such attacks had been less important than their availability. The first conclusion from this evidence was that cavalry corps were too cumber-some to be useful. Their transport by rail, moreover, would put a disproportionate strain on a railway network whose ability to move maximum forces into any theater of operations in the shortest possible time was increasingly vital to Prussian military planning. Instead, the high command decided that one regiment should be assigned to each infantry division, with the remaining units organized into independent divisions directly under army headquarters. This did not mean abandoning the use of cavalry in battle. These small, flexible formations were regarded as better able to charge or pur-sue an enemy under modern conditions than the discredited corps. The new cavalry divisions were, however, to have another mission as well - strategic reconnaissance, scouting far ahead of the army to screen its movements and disrupt the enemy's s s . This represented a significant departure from both cavalry tradition and Prussian prac-tice. But in 1866, with most of its cavalry held in the rear, Frederick Charles's army had stumbled blindly through northern Bohemia. The other Prussian armies had been little better served. Despite some notable successes, the cavalry assigned to reconnais-sance duties had possessed neither the strength nor the skills to prevail against the ex-cellent Austrian light horse. Unfortunately the high command took no concrete steps to implement the cavalry's new role59. The instruction for senior officers issued on June 24, 1869 was too vague on the subject, its circulation was too restricted, to foster interest among the Generalität. Moreover, rather than risk disruption of the army's territorial recruiting system, the cavalry brigade was maintained as the largest peace-time organization and subordinated to infantry divisions and corps. This in turn meant that the cavalry divisions formed in 1870 were improvised, without a standard organi-zation. Their staffs were hastily assembled. Their commanders, contrary to prewar expectations, too often remained unequal to their new responsibilities, more concer-ned with possible risks than potential opportunities. They overloaded units with fo-rage rather than take the chances of living off the countryside. They spared tired horses instead of pushing them. Particularly in the opening weeks of the campaign, they failed to keep touch with the retreating French. Messages became lost, or were transmitted to higher headquarters too late to influence command decisions60. To some extent these were the deficiencies of inexperience. The cavalry improved with practice - as did the army commanders, who initially tended to use their cavalry as flank guards and reserves, and were reluctant either to launch it in vigorous pursuit of the French or to give it reconnaissance assignments specific enough to minimize confusion61. But the cavalry's shortcomings were organic as well. There had not been time to consider the ramifications of this new mission before the outbreak of war. The cavalry was still regarded as a specialized arm, too valuable and too small in numbers to be risked on independent raids deep into France62. Its equipment was limited accord-

15 ingly. Regiments, for example, were given neither tools nor explosives for destroying

railroads. As a result French troop trains frequently continued to operate over lines theoretically cut by Prussian horsemen63. Nor was the cavalry trained and armed for dismounted action after 1866. This was not quite as reactionary as it initially appears. Certainly tradition and social convention handicapped serious consideration of the ar-gument that the mounted rifleman of the American Civil War was the prototype of fu-ture cavalry64. But reconnaissance essentially involves obtaining and transmitting in-formation. Combat of any kind can be described as a secondary mission. It might be misguided, but it was hardly stupid, to argue the irresponsibility of risking an unin-formed high command for the sake of successfully exchanging shots with enemy ve-dettes or skirmishers65. Enterprising officers of the light cavalry might lay additional stress on outpost service in their training programs, but saw no reason to emphasize dismounted fighting as well66. The heavy cavalry continued to drill on horseback. If only a minority of extremists continued to insist that true cavalry required nothing but sabers and lances, it nevertheless seemed unimportant to provide more or better fire-arms. The Prussian light cavalry went to war in 1870 still armed with the short-ranged, inaccurate needle carbine. The heavy cavalry carried nothing more lethal than a pistol -and twenty-nine of the forty-six regiments in the cavalry divisions were heavy cavalry. Two divisions, composed entirely of lancer and cuirassier regiments, began the war with no carbines at all67. In a matter of days it became painfully apparent that effective scouting and patrolling in the terrain of eastern France could not be accomplished exclusively from the saddle. The heavy cavalry found itself virtually helpless in the face of even a few snipers. It was issued captured French rifles and carbines as soon as possible, but giving unfamiliar weapons to men untrained in their use was no solution68. When light cavalry squad-rons were attached to the heavy regiments to furnish additional skirmishers, this in turn deprived the division of any substantial force able to fight on foot however inef-fectively69. As the pressure of partisan warfare increased, flying columns despatched in pursuit of the elusive French guerrillas achieved virtually no success. Cavalry assigned to protect the lines of communication were used by troops and squadrons over wide areas by local commanders eager for scouts, couriers, and foraging parties. Cattle and chickens, however, proved easier foes than francs-tireurs70. The Prussian cavalry did execute a few successful missions, notably a railway-cutting expedition into the Sologne valley in December71. But to do so they required assistance. Under pressure, the Prussian cavalry reverted to a tradition it had sought to escape for sixty years — close cooperation with other arms. As early as August one cavalry divi-sion reported its troopers so exhausted by constant patrolling that it asked for a few companies of infantry to be assigned to cover its camps at night72. The request was in-dignantly refused, but by the end of September one Prussian army assigned a battalion or two of infantry to each of its cavalry divisions. This pattern prevailed to the end of the war. Initially the infantrymen were given the static role of establishing strong points in the center of each day's patrol area. But as the war expanded into the wooded, broken country in the Loire valley and around Paris - terrain which increasingly re-stricted cavalry to the roads - detachments of infantry, often mounted in commandee-red wagons, began accompanying raids and patrols73. In the Sologne raid, for exam-ple, infantry and pioneers accompanied the cavalry and proved so valuable in scatte-ring ambushes, capturing barricades, and clearing villages that they were often used in the vanguard74. This attachment of infantry to cavalry was widely derided as unnatural. It was con-demned as limiting mobility and crippling the cavalry spirit75. But these improvised combined arms teams had not only been operationally successful, they also offered a

16 solution to the problem of the mounted rifleman. If after 1871 the Prussian cavalry put

little additional stress on dismounted tactics, this was not entirely due to blind faith in th t a rm e blanche. Simple arithmetic played a role as well. When horseholders and re-serves were deducted, a cavalry division of six regiments - which experience suggested was the best establishment - could put little more than the equivalent of an infantry battalion into the firing line. The armament and training of these men, as long as they remained cavalry, would inevitably render them inferior to real infantry. Logic sugge-sted, therefore, that the cavalry divisions needed infantry of their own. The Prussian army had a dozen battalions of Jäger, whose specially-selected replacements included a high proportion of woodsmen and foresters. During the Franco-Prussian War they had been used - and wasted - as ordinary infantrymen. Assigned to the cavalry, their training and talent in marksmanship and skirmishing would in turn enable the troopers to concentrate their efforts on improving their skills in reconnaissance, patrolling, and outpost service. If the cavalry's training in dismounted combat admittedly required improvement, the carbine should nevertheless be used only when necessary. Only in this way would cavalry avoid the risk of becoming a hermaphrodite, able to do nothing well76.

The cavalry's reluctance to dismount did not imply heedless eagerness to charge either French horsemen or French rifles. The regulations of 1855, with their emphasis on shock action, still remained in force. But the effect of modern firepower, of Prussian rifles and Austrian artillery, on infantry attacks in 1866 made the doctrine at least questionable when applied to cavalry. Maneuvers and exercises after 1866 contin-ued to ignore the problems of controlling formations larger than a brigade77. And in the field against France the cavalry was a good deal more conservative tactically than contemporary fire-eaters approved or subsequent scholars accept. One researcher cal-culated that German cavalry charged a total of 165 times during the war. But half of these attacks were in less than squadron strength. Only four involved more than eight squadrons, and all four occurred in the same battle - Vionville-Mars La Tour, on July 16. To advocates of shock tactics this reflected both the inability of senior cavalry offi-cers to concentrate their forces on the battlefield and a deplorable unwillingness to commit them once concentrated. In particular the poorly-organized, poorly-armed infantry of the Republic presented many opportunities for cavalry charges - opportu-nities generally neglected78. The reluctance of Prussian cavalrymen to launch these vigorous charges in fact reflec-ted that ability to learn from others' mistakes which was such a characteristic of the midcentury Prussian army. From the opening of the campaign they had seen what happened when horsemen attacked infantry. At Wörth, at Vionville, at Beaumont and Sedan, Prussian infantry who had been fighting for hours, with officers dead or woun-ded, with tactical formations completely disrupted, shattered the most daring French charges, often without forming square79. The circumstances of these attacks were ad-mittedly hardly those forseen by advocates of the cavalry charge. They were launched over all sorts of unfavorable terrain against advancing troops flushed with victory. Their purpose was to buy time rather than turn the tide of battle. Nevertheless, even the most emphatic protagonists of shock action were willing to concede that when so many heroic attacks were so decisively defeated, it was impossible to speak of chance80. The remarkable success of the Prussian brigade which charged French artil-lery at Vionville might have provided material for forty years of inferior painters and poets, but the glory was a postwar phenomenon. Theorists might express regret that a hundred squadrons had not been available to support the initial attack. Practical men might rewrite drill books and maneuver regulations to facilitate the handling of cavalry divisions in battle 81. Β ut in practice the ruinous casualties suffered in the charge - over

17 fifty per cent - seem to have discouraged would-be imitators. There were no more

death rides in the Franco-Prussian War. Postwar fire-eaters remained unwilling to re-nounce the theoretical possibility of attacking unshaken infantry or artillery; gene-rals with fading memories declared the cavalry's task was to make itself feared by enemy infantry82. But the showy charges which were so often features of the annual maneuvers in the reign of William II were generally recognized as little more than a means of keeping the Kaiser happy. The new drill regulations issued in 1876 strongly recommended that such attacks be made against flank or rear and ridden in dispersed order rather than en masse 8 3 . More significantly, defenders of the charge increasingly tended to agree that cavalry would make its most practical contributions to future batt-les by driving enemy cavalry from the field. Nine-tenths of its attacks would be against other horsemen8 4 . This exchange of knights between opposing chess players was a far cry from the dreams of Wrangel and Frederick Charles. But it also represented a major adjustment to the Industrial Revolution. If the Prussian cavalry remained wedded to horse, lance, and saber, the commitment was not regarded as a suicide pact.

Notes

1 Cf. among many examples C. Woodham-Smith: The Reason Why. New York 1953; B. H. Liddell Hart: The Liddell Hart Memoirs. Vol. 1: 1895-1938. New York 1965, passim; M. Howard: The Franco-Prussian War. London 1962, pp. 7-8 (cit. Howard); A. Vagts: A History of Mili-tarism. Rev. ed. New York 1959, p. 230. Fictional treatments include C .S . Forester: The General. Boston 1967; and on a more popular level, the Flashman novels of George Macdonald Fraser. The quotation is from Men at War. Ed. by E. Hemingway. New York 1958, p. 7.

1 Cf. Β. Bond: Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry, 1870-1914. In: The Theory and Practice of War. Ed. by M. Howard. New York 1966, p. 99; and Howard, p. 8; for clear statements of this thesis.

3 For the Prussian cavalry before 1806 cf. C. Jany: Der Kavalleriedienst vor 1806. ( = Urkund-liche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preußischen Heeres. H . 6.) Berlin 1906; M. Jahns: Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft vornehmlich in Deutschland. Vol. 1—3. München, Leipzig 1889-1891, here vol. 3, pp. 2607ff. ; G. v. Pelet-Narbonne: Geschichte der brandenburg-preußischen Reiterei von den Zeiten des Großen Kurfürsten bis zur Gegenwart. Vol. 1.2. Berlin 1905, here vol. 1, pp. 341 ff. (cit. Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei). Details of its armament are in W. Eckardt and O. Morawietz: Die Handwaffen des brandenburg-preußisch-deutschen Heeres 1640-1945. Hamburg 1957, pp. 27ff . , 54-55, 84-85 (cit. Eckardt/ Morawietz); Das Preußische Heer der Befreiungskriege. Hrsg.: Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II, Großer Generalstab. Vol. 1-3 . Berlin 1912-14, here vol. 1, pp. 176-177 (cit. Das Preußische Heer).

4 Prinz Karl Krafft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen: Militärische Briefe. Vol. 1: Über Kavallerie. 2. Aufl. Berlin 1886, p. 73 (cit. Hohenlohe).

5 The best general account of the development of Prussian tactical doctrine after 1806 is P. Paret: Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815. Princeton 1966, pp. I l l passim.

6 For a clear expression of this viewpoint by a leading reformer see H. v. Boyen: Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen, hrsg. von F. Nippold. Vol. 1-3. Leipzig 1889-90, here vol. 3, pp. 90-91.

7 Cf. Hans-David Yorck's "Instruction for the Light Troops For the Maneuvers of the Year 1810", and "Instruction for the Field Exercises of the Light Troops for the Year 1811". In: C. F. Gumtau: Die Jäger und Schützen des Preußischen Heeres. Vol. 1-3 . Berlin 1834-38, here vol. 3, pp. 79ff. ; and C. v. Clausewitz: Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg. In: Carl von Clausewitz. Schriften-Aufsätze-Studien-Briefe, Dokumente aus dem Clausewitz-Schamhorst- und Gneisenau-Nachlaß sowie aus öffentlichen und privaten Sammlungen. Hrsg. von W. Hahlweg. Göttingen 1966, pp. 208 ff.

8 Cf. the Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie der Königlich Preußischen Armee. Berlin 1812; and the Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie der Königlich Preußischen Armee. Berlin 1812, Section V, "Aufstellung einer Brigade". Useful interpretations of the new regulations include Das Preußische Heer, vol. 1, pp. 180ff.; Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 16ff. ; and C. Jany: Geschichte der Preußischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914. 2. überarb. Aufl. von E. Jany. Vol. 4. Osnabrück 1967, pp. 49-50 (cit. Jany).

9 For the French cavalry in 1813 see D. Chandler: The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York 1966, pp. 867 passim; and W. v. Unger: Blücher. Vol. 2. Berlin 1908, pp. 20-21 (cit. Unger).

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For the work of the Prussian cavalry before the armistice cf. Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 47ff . ; Unger, vol. 2, pp. 46ff . ; and E. v. Colomb: Beiträge zur Geschichte der preußischen Kavallerie seit 1808. Berlin 1880, pp. 7ff. (cit. Colomb). For the expansion of the Prussian cavalry during the armistice see Das Preußische Heer, vol. 2, pp. 125ff.; and R. Friederich: Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges 1813. Vol. 1-3. Berlin 1903-06, here vol. 1, pp. 39, 46 (cit. Friederich). For the organization and training of the Landwehr generally see Errichtung der Landwehr und des Landsturms in Ostpreußen, Westpreußen, am rechten Weichselufer und Litthauen im Jahre 1813. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1846; Geschichte der Organisation der Landwehr in der Kurmark nebst den drei vorpommerschen Kreisen und in der Neumark im Jahre 1813. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1857; and Geschichte der Organisation der Landwehr in Pommern und Westpreußen im Jahre 1813. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1858. A detailed account by a squadron commander is Wider Napoleon! Ein deutsches Reiterleben 1806-1815, hrsg. von F. M. Kircheisen. Vol. 2. ( = Memoiren-bibliothek. Ser. 3. Vol. 15.) Stuttgart 1911, pp. 182ff. (cit. Wider Napoleon). M. Lehmann: Scharnhorst. Vol. 2. Leipzig 1887, p. 541.

Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, p.13; Wider Napoleon, p.185. For a fuller discussion of this tendency see D. E. Showalter: The Prussian Landwehr and Its Critics, 1813-1819. In: Central European History. 4 (1971) 3-33. See Friederich, vol. 1, Ani. 1, 2, 4, for details. Among the best examples are the attacks of Tauentzien's cavalry at Dennewitz, Yorck's reserve cavalry at the Katzbach, and Yorck's cavalry again at La Chaussée. Cf. ibid., vol. 1, pp. 306ff. ; and vol. 2, pp. 143-144; and Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 124ff. Bericht über den Anteil der Reiterabteilung v. Sohn (I. Korps) an der Schlacht bei Möckern; and Bericht der Reserve-Kavallerie des preußischen I. Korps über ihren Anteil an der Schlacht bei Möckern. In: J . von Pflugk-Harttung: Leipzig 1813. Gotha 1913, pp. 333ff . ; Friederich, vol. 3, pp. 97ff. Cf. Unger, vol. 2, pp. 79ff. ; and J . G. Droysen: Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Yorck von Wartenburg. Vol. 1.2. Berlin 1851-52, here vol. 2, p. 148. A. Janson: Geschichte des Feldzuges 1814 in Frankreich. Vol. 1.2. Berlin 1903-05, here vol. 2, pp. 321-322, fn. 4. The best treatment of this subject is in G. Cardinal v. Widdern: Der kleine Krieg und der Etappen-dienst. Vol. 1: Die Streifkorps im Deutschen Befreiungskrieg. 2. Aufl. Berlin 1894 (cit. Cardinal v. Widdern: Die Streifkorps). Cf. F. Meinecke: Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen. Vol. 1.2. Stuttgart 1896-99, here vol. 2, p. 44; Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 157ff.; Jany, vol. 4, pp. 108 ff. Since the territorial organization of the Landwehr made it difficult to maintain this distinction in its local squadrons, the Landwehr cavalry developed after 1815 as a kind of "medium cavalry", armed with the lance to increase its shock power. The efforts at reforming the cavalry after 1815 are summarized in Jany, vol. 4, pp. 158-159; and Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 183-184; and discussed in detail in Lt. Col. Kaehler: Die Preußische Reiterei von 1806-1876 in ihrer inneren Entwicklung. Berlin 1879, pp. 9 ff. (cit. Kaehler). Cf. the detailed discussion in Kaehler, pp. 25ff . ; the summaries in Colomb, pp. 51 ff.; and Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 184 ff. ; and the report based on the maneuvers of 1821 in Militärische Schriften weiland Kaiser Wilhelm des Großen, hrsg. vom Kgl. Pr. Kriegsministerium. Vol. 1.2. Berlin 1897, here vol. 1, pp. 17ff. (cit. Kaiser Wilhelm). Colomb, p. 53. Cf. ibid., pp. 54-55; General der Infanterie v. Ollech: Carl Wilhelm Friedrich Reyher. Part 4. Berlin 1879, pp. 61-62 (cit. Ollech); Die Bewaffnung der Kavallerie. In: Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung (AMZ). 1832, No. 35-36; Η. ν. Brandt: Grundzüge der Taktik der drei Waffen, Infanterie, Kavallerie, Artillerie. 2. Aufl. Berlin 1842, pp. 46-47. Ollech, pp. 72ff. For a brief discussion of the Russian dragoons see J . S. Curtiss: The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855. Durham, N. C. 1965, pp. 138ff. E. v. L . : Entwurf zur Errichtung fahrender Jäger. In: AMZ, 1837, No. 73-77. General Graf v. Bismark: Feld-Dienst der Reuterey. Karlsruhe 1820; id.: Felddienst-Instruktion für Schützen und Reuter. Karlsruhe 1821 and id.: Vorlesungen über die Taktik der Reuterey. Karlsruhe 1826. For the introduction and fate of the marksmen see v. Hausler: Beschreibung der Kriegs-Ubungen des VIII. deutschen Armee-Corps, abgehalten im September 1840. Ludwigsburg 1840, pp. 18-19; and P. Sauer: Das Württembergische Heer in der Zeit des Deutschen Bundes. Freiburg, Phil. Diss. 1956, pp. 84-85. Ο. v. der Osten-Sacken: Preußens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Vol. 1-3. Berlin 1911-14, here vol. 2, p. 273 (cit. Osten-Sacken). Eckardt/Morawietz, pp. 67ff. Instruktion für die Aufstellung und den Gebrauch größerer Kavalleriemassen. In Colomb, pp. 154ff.; and Kaehler, pp. 139ff.; also Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 195-196. Cf. the reports and analyses of the maneuvers in Kaiser Wilhelm, vol. 1, pp. 518 ff. ; G. E. v.

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Natzmer: Zur Geschichte der Kavallerie-Manöver im Jahre 1843. In: Neue Militärische Blätter. 40 (1892) 110-122; and Kaehler, pp. 148ff. Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 199ff. For examples cf. E. ν. Hagen: Geschichte des Neumärkischen Dragoner-Regiments Nr. 3. Berlin 1885, pp. 294ff. ; and v. Bredow: Geschichte des 2. Rheinischen Husaren-Regiments Nr. 9. Berlin 1889, pp. 34ff. Uber Ausrüstung und Bewaffnung der Kavallerie. In: AMZ, 1859, No. 17-18. Kaiser Wilhelm, vol. 2, pp. 72-73. Eckardt/Morawietz, pp. 126-127. Welcher Zukunft geht die Reiterei entgegen? In: AMZ, 1855, No. 23-26. Cf. Nur eine Gattung Reiterei. In: AMZ, 1862, No. 11-12; Noch ein Wort über die Zukunft der Kavallerie. Ibid., 1863, No. 18-23. General v. Wrangel: Uber Ausbildung und Gebrauch der Kavallerie. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1851, is excerpted in Kaehler, pp. 165 ff. Prince Frederick Charles's extensive memoranda are discussed in W. Foerster: Prinz Friedrich Karl von Preußen. Denkwürdigkeiten aus seinem Leben. Vol. 1.2. Stuttgart, Leipzig 1910, here vol. 1, pp. l lOff. (cit. Foerster). Cf. among many expressions of similar attitudes in the periodical literature, Welcher Zukunft geht die Reiterei entgegen? In: AMZ, 1855, No. 17-18; and Über die deutsche Reiterei unserer Tage. Ibid., No. 69-72. The maneuvers are described in Kaehler, pp. 178ff.; and Colomb, pp. 70-71. Foerster, vol. 1, pp. 144ff.; Graf v. Haeseler: Zehn Jahre im Stabe des Prinzen Friedrich Karl. Erinnerungen. Vol. 1-3. Berlin 1910-15, here vol. 1, pp. 44ff . , 52ff. (cit. Haeseler). Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie der Königlich Preußischen Armee. Berlin 1855 (cit. Ex.-Regl. f. d. Kav.), and the discussions in Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 197-198; and Kaehler, pp. 183ff. Eckardt/Morawietz, pp. 71 ff. The continued distinction between heavy and light cavalry was motivated partly by tradition, but also reflected the fact that men and horses differ in size. As late as 1914, when regular cavalry in Europe all had essentially the same function, most armies continued to preserve the distinction on the grounds of operational efficiency. Cf. Noch ein Wort über die Zukunft der Cavallerie. In: AMZ, 1863, No. 18-23; Über die dreijährige Dienstzeit bei der Preußischen Kavallerie. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1848. Ex.-Regl. f. d. Kav., part II, Paragraphs 10, 35, 64. Eckardt/Morawietz, p. 126. Haeseler, vol. 1, pp. 39ff . ; Colomb, p. 78. Ordonnance Royale sur les grandes manoeuvres de l'armée prussienne 29 Juin 1861, traduit par Pitois. Paris 1868. Cf. the evaluation in Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, p. 228. J . Luvaas: The Military Legacy of the Civil War. Chicago 1959, pp. 55ff. , 125ff. (cit. Luvaas); evaluates the conclusions drawn by these observers and their limited impact on German military thought. Cf. W. Rüstow: Die Lehre vom Gefecht aus den Elementen neu entwickelt für die Gegenwart und nächste Zukunft. Zürich 1865, p. 411; Frhr. v. Rotenhan: Die neuere Kriegsgeschichte der Kavallerie vom Jahre 1859 bis heute. Vol. 1. München 1891, pp. 183-184 (cit. Rotenhan). Uber die Thätigkeit und Verwendung der Kavallerie im Feldzuge 1866 in Böhmen und am Main. Berlin 1870, pp. 2 -4 (cit. Kavallerie 1866). Cf. ibid., pp. 49-92; Rotenhan, pp. 236ff . ; Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 283-284. The clearest narrative of this confusing action is in G. Craig: The Battle of Königgrätz. Philadelphia, New York 1956, pp. 154ff. Cf. O. v. Lettow-Vorbeck: Geschichte des Krieges von 1866. Vol. 1-3. Berlin 1892-99, here vol. 2, pp. 502ff. (cit. Lettow-Vorbeck); T. Fontane: Der deutsche Krieg von 1866. Vol. 1.2. Berlin 1871-72, here vol. 1, pp. 61 ff.; and Das Kavallerie-Korps Prinz Albrecht in der Schlacht bei Königgrätz. Hrsg. von A. Schmidt. In: Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte. 39 (1927) 260-274 (cit. Schmidt). Cf. Osten-Sacken, vol. 3, p. 167; Lettow-Vorbeck, vol. 2, pp. 81 ff.; Colomb, pp. 91 ff.; Schmidt, passim; Foerster, vol. 2, p. 86 passim; Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 239 passim. Cf. Foerster, vol. 2, pp. 25ff . , 86ff. ; Colomb, pp. 87ff. A point suggested in Hohenlohe, pp. 37ff. ; and Kavallerie 1866, pp. 83ff. P. Bronsart v. Schellendorff: Der Dienst des Generalstabes. Vol. 1.2. Berlin 1875-76, here vol. 2, pp. 4-5 (cit. Bronsart ν. Schellendorff); Kavallerie 1866, pp. 86-87; Colomb, p. 100; Hohenlohe, pp. 4 ff. ; J . ν. Wickede: Die Heeresorganisation und Kriegführung nach den Berechtigungen der Gegenwart. Jena 1867, pp. 154ff.; Rotenhan, pp. 331ff. Cf. Graf H. v. Moltke: Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869. In: Moltkes Militärische Werke. Abt. 2 : Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs im Frieden, hrsg. vom Großen Generalstab, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung. Vol. 1-3. Berlin 1895-1906, here vol. 2, pp. 201 ff.; with his comments on the performance of the Prussian cavalry in 1866 (ibid., pp. 102 ff.). Moltke was by no means an opponent of cavalry charges. He only believed that they would be on a smaller scale than previously. Cf. G. Cardinal v. Widdern: Verwendung und Führung der Kavallerie 1870 bis zur Kapitulation

bei Sedan. P. 1-8. Berlin 1903-08; G. v. Pelet-Narbonne: Die Reiterei der Ersten und Zweiten deutschen Armee in den Tagen vom 7. zum 15. August 1870. Berlin 1899; Die Thätigkeit der 5. Kavallerie-Division in den Tagen vom 10. bis 16. August 1870. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1892 (cit. Die Thätigkeit der 5. Kavallerie-Division); H . Kunz: Die Thätigkeit der deutschen Reiterei vom 19. August bis zum 1. September 1870. Berlin 1892; Erlebnisse Heinrich von Schönfels' als Generalstabsoffizier bei der Avantgarden-Cavallerie 1866 und 1870. Hrsg. von L. v. Schönfels. Berlin 1903, pp. 71 ff.

Cf . H. Kunz: Die Deutsche Reiterei in den Schlachten und Gefechten des Krieges von 1870/1871. Berlin 1895, pp. 61 ff. (cit. Kunz: Die Deutsche Reiterei); Hohenlohe, pp. l l f f . ; Foerster, vol. 2, pp. 139-140; Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 340ff. For a more critical evaluation of a single operation, see F. Hoenig: Gefechtsbilder aus dem Kriege 1870/1871. Vol. 1: Die Gefechte von la Garionnière und Villechauve am 7. Januar 1871. Berlin 1891, pp. 106 passim.

Hohenlohe, pp. 21 ff. ; Cardinal v. Widdern: Die Streifkorps, p. 53. Die Thätigkeit der 5. Kavallerie-Division, pp. 248-249. Luvaas, p. 125. Even with the advantage of hindsight armies took a similar view of mechanized cavalry's role in the twentieth century, organizing specialized reconnaissance units expected to fight only when necessary to fulfi l l their primary mission - a doctrine enduring until well into World War II despite overwhelming evidence that pure reconnaissance missions were only a small fraction of the cavalry's role in combat. For typical descriptive justifications of the reconnaissance concept in the U . S . army cf. R . G . Ferguson: The Division Reconnaissance Troop and Squadron. In: The Cavalry Journal . 51 (1942) Nov./Dec.: 63-69; B. S. Cook : The Reconnaissance Squadron in the Motorized Division. Ibid. 52 (1943) May/June: 51-54; and B. C. Palmer: New Battle Lessons on Reconnaissance. Ibid. 52 (1943) Sept./Oct.: 36-37. Representative critiques include F. M. v. Senger und Etterlin: Die Panzergrenadiere. München 1961, pp. I l l ff . ; Mary Lee Stubby and Stanley Russell Connor: Armor-Cavalry . Part 1: Regular Army and Army Reserve. Washington, D. C. 1961, pp. 70ff . ; St. J . Seborer: Modem Cavalry Organization. In: Armored Cavalry Journal . 56 (1947) March/April : 23-25.

G. v. Pelet-Narbonne: General Karl v. Schmidt. Eine Skizze seines Lebens und Wirkens. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1902, pp. 530ff. (cit. Pelet-Narbonne: General Schmidt). In 1869 the 120 best marksmen in each regiment armed with needle carbines were given extra ammunition for "special exercises" - fifteen rounds each, an amount hardly indicating increased commitment to fire action (Armee-Verordnungsblatt. 1869, No. 88, pp. 118-119). Colomb, pp. 100 passim. Jany , vol. 4, p. 263. Infanteriedienst bei Kavallerie-Divisionen, insbesondere die Thätigkeit der in den Monaten September, Oktober und November 1870 der 4. , 5., und 6. Kavallerie-Division zugetheilten Bayerischen Infanterie. In: Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. No. 11. Berlin 1889, p. 5-50 (cit. Infanteriedienst bei Kavalleriedivisionen). G. Cardinal v. Widdern: Der Krieg an den rückwärtigen Verbindungen der deutschen Heere und der Etappendienst. Vol. 1 -5 . Berlin 1893-99, here vol. 2, pp. 72 passim, 185 ff., vol. 3, part 1, pp. 193-195. Der Zug der 6. Kavallerie-Division durch die Sologne vom 6. bis 15. Dezember 1870. In: Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. No. 3. Berlin 1884, pp. 126ff. (cit. Der Zug der 6. Kavallerie-Division durch die Sologne). W. v. Hahnke: Feldzug 1870-71. Die Operationen der III. Armee. Berlin 1873, p. 77. Infanteriedienst bei Kavallerie-Divisionen, pp. 551 ff . ; Der Vorpostendienst bei dem I. Bayerischen Armee-Korps . . .12. Oktober bis 8. November 1870. In: Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. No. 11. Berlin 1889, pp. 61 If f . Der Zug der 6. Kavallerie-Division durch die Sologne, pp. 140ff. ; Pelet-Narbonne: Brandenburg-preußische Reiterei, vol. 2, pp. 374ff. suggests that after this raid the division commander, Karl v. Schmidt, encouraged his men to use their carbines when they could not fight mounted. He continued, however, to regard this as a secondary task of proper cavalry. Kaehler, pp. 221 ff . ; Pelet-Narbonne: General Schmidt, pp. 597 passim.

Cf . Ansichten über die Zutheilung fahrender Schützen zu den Reiterdivisionen. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1872; Bronsart v. Schellendorff, vol. 2, pp. 5ff. ; K. v. Schmidt: Instructions for the Training, Employment, and Leading of Cavalry , ed. by Captain v. Vollard-Bockelberg, tr. by C. W. Bowdler Bell. Reprint ed. New York 1968, pp. 186-187. Cf. Hohenlohe, pp. 137ff. ; H. Kunz: Die Thätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Batail lone im Kriege von 1870-71. Berlin 1896, pp. 180ff. ; Schmidt, pp. 187-188; L. v. Besser: Aus der Campagne 1870-71. Der Ehrentag der Deutschen Kavallerie am 16. August 1870 bei Vionville und Mars la Tour. In: Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine. 6 (1873) Jan . : 1-55, esp. pp. 51—53 (cit. Besser). Proposals to convert the Jäger into mounted infantry were countered by the argument that then they could bring no more rifles into action than ordinary dismounted cavalry. Cf . Zeitgemäße Ansichten über Kavallerie. Ibid. 4 (1872) Ju l y : 33-35; and Ueber die Be-waffnung der Kavallerie. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1872, pp. 105-116. Lest this line of argument be dismissed as special pleading it should be noted that the U . S. cavalry dismounted

to fight its Plains Indian adversaries not only for tactical reasons, but because it was not trained to fight from horseback. Its short-range carbines and the need to protect the horses made it, moreover, "indifferent infantry". Robert M. Utley: A Chained Dog. The Indian-Fighting Army. In: The American West. 10 (1973) July: 21. See the brief discussion in J . Hoffmann: Wandlungen im Kriegsbild der preußischen Armee zur Zeit der nationalen Einigungskriege. In: M G M 3 (1968) 16-17, 26. (cit. Hoffmann). Cf. Kunz: Die deutsche Reiterei, pp. 29ff. Ibid., pp. 383-384. Kunz's statistics, at least in regard to larger attacks, can be substantiated by checking the German official history. The best summary of these attacks from a German perspective, written by an advocate of cavalry shock, is H. Kunz: Attacken französischer Kavallerie auf deutsche Infanterie und Artillerie. Berlin 1897 ( = Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele aus dem deutsch-französischen Kriege von 1870/71. 5.) - cit. Kunz: Attacken französischer Kavallerie. Cf. the briefer narratives in Howard,

pp. 111-112, 155ff„ 215-216. Kunz: Attacken französischer Kavallerie, p. 81. Cf. Frhr. ν. Bissing: Ausbildung, Führung und Verwendung der Reiterei. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1895, pp. 49-75; Divisions-Uebungen der Kavallerie des 4. Armee-Korps vom 15. bis 23. August 1873; Die Uebungen der Garde-Kavallerie im Herbst 1873; Kavallerie-Uebung bei Buxtehude; all in ibid., 1874, pp. 1-73; and the general discussions in Hohenlohe, pp. 15 ff. ; and Hoffmann, pp. 26 ff. Cf. C. Frhr. v. d. Goltz: The Nation in Arms. A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War. 5th ed. London 1906, pp. 316 ff. ; and G. v. Pelet-Narbonne: Die Aussichten der Kavallerie im Kampfe gegen die Infanterie und die Artillerie. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1898, pp. 105-128. Hoffmann, pp. 27-28. Cf. among many examples Besser, p. 48; Kunz: Attacken französischer Kavallerie, pp. 56-57; G. v. Pelet-Narbonne: Die Lehren für die Kavallerie aus dem Mand-schurischen Feldzuge. In: Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt. 1908, pp.1-34. Compare these with the accounts of mass cavalry attacks in Die Manöver im September 1897 bei Homburg v. d. Höhe, ibid., 1898, pp. 279-320; and Das Kaisermanöver 1899, ibid., 1900, p. 222. Hohenlohe, pp. 130 ff.