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AD-AB9 713 CALIFORNIA UNIV SAN DIEGO LA JOLLA CENTER FOR HUMAN -ETC FIG 5/10ATTENTION TO ACTION: WILLED AND AUTOMATIC CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR. (U)

UCDEC go D A NORMAN, T SHALLICE NOOII#79-C-0323UNCLASSIFIED CHIP-99 NL

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ATTENTION TO ACTION: WILLED AND AUTOMATIC.

CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR

.00

Donald A. Norman and Tim Shallice

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0-edw'f wsd 00 0 001066660

CENTER FOR HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING

-'Research support for D. A. Norman was provided by the Personnel and Training Research Programs, Psychological Sciences Division,'office of Naval Research, under Contract Number N0001J4-79-C-0323, Contract Authority Identifcation Number, NR 157-437 Thecollaboration was made possible by a grant from the Sloan Foundation to the Program in Cognitive Science at UCS!). Support was alsoprovided by grant MH-1 5828 from the National Institute of Mental Health to the Center for Human Information Processing. The views

J' ad conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be Interpreted as necessarily representing theofficial policies, either expressed or implied, of the Office of Naval Research. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

v'Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. REPORTNO. 8006

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNA, SAN DIEGO CHIP 9~,LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA 92093 DECEMBER 1980

81 206_ 064i1

rIAttention to Action: Willed and Automatic Control of Behavior

Donald A. Norman

Program in Cognitive ScienceCenter for Human Information ProcessingUniversity of California, San Diego

La Jolla, California 92093

Tim Shallice

Medical Research Council

Applied Psychology Unit15 Chaucer Road

Cambridge, CB2 2EF England

Copyright Q Donald A. Norman and Tim Shallice

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,

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8006 A hkt1E 5~t~n Subtitle)E

Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Febmp&79-Decewwm8h- Control of Behavior, d- . -_ __ 1

7. AUTHOR(&) -. CNR4tsA:-MIR#

/0 Donald A. )Norman 1 N0014-79-C-0f23'--Tim/Shallice 1

9. PERFORMIN ORGANI1ZATION NAME AND ADDRESS lV. FRZAWr-MENT. PROJECT, TASK(

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University of California, San Diego N 5-3La Jolla, California 92093

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III. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

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Attention Time-sharingResources ActionWill SkillConsciousness Automaticity

;O. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side It necessary and identify by block number)

The major theme of the paper is that the primary role of attention is in thecontrol of action. The basic idea is that human action sequences can runthemselves off, efficiently, smoothly, without any need for deliberateattention. However, when modifications in a plan must be made, or when it isdesired that some novel alternative action sequence be followed, or when itis desired to prevent some habitual act from occurring, then it is necessaryfor deliberate attentional intervention into the process.

D D I AN7 1473 E0DITION OF NO4V 65 IS OBSOLETE (\ UNCLASSIFIEDS/N O1O.LF.O~.66O1 ttutiYLASl ATlON OF THIS Is &CI (Whom Dole Enter"d)

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'We argue that most attentional conflicts occur with the initiation rather

than the execution of actions. We suggest two levels of control: acontention scheduling mechanism that selects from among competing schemas;a supervisory attentional mechanism that biases the selection process.We propose that the supervisory attentional system is required where theaction sequences are ill-learned or novel, where the action is highlycritical or dangerous, or where planning is required. In other cases,selection is by contention scheduling alone. The result is three modesof the control of performance: automatic, contention scheduling withoutdeliberate direction, and deliberate conscious control. Will becomesthe application of attentional resources to the control of action.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .. .................. ............... 2

The Structure of the Paper .. .................. ..... 4

Automatic performance. .. ................... .. 4

Relationship to previous work .. .. ................. 5

A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Attention .. ..... ..... 5

Schemas and processing structures .. .... ............. 5

Horizontal threads .. .................... ... 6

Schema selection mechanisms .. .... ................ 7

Vertical threads .. ................... ..... 10

Attentional resources. .. .................. 10

Motivation. ... ..................... 12

Contention scheduling. .. .................... 12

Trigger conditions .. .................... 13

The selection mechanism. .. ................. 13

Fine timing of operations. .. ............... 15

The Interpretation of the Phenomena. .. .............. 16

The experimental literature. .. ................. 16

Simultaneous tasks .. .................... 16

Attentional demands at the initiation of actions......18

Experimental phenomena .. .................... 19

Automatic performance. .. .................. 19

Contention scheduling without deliberate direction . . . . 20

Deliberate conscious control .. .............. 21

Neuropsychological phenomena: The frontal lobes .. .......23

Will .. .................... ... ...... 24

Summary . . . ... ............. Aoessi0. For . . . .. .. 26

DTIO T4R

Justif ICr)t i-.1___

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MEL.

Norman/Shallice Attention to ActionDecember 10, 1980 2

Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Control of Behavior

Donald A. Norman and Tim Shallice

Abstract

The major theme of the paper is that the primary role of attention

is in the control of action. The basic idea is that human actionsequences can run themselves off, efficiently, smoothly, without any

need for deiiberate attention. However, when modifications in a planmust be made, or when it is desired that some novel alternative action

sequence be followed, or when it is desired to prevent some habitual actfrom occurring, then it is necessary for deliberate attentional inter-

vention into the process.

We argue that most attentional conflicts occur with the initiation

rather than the execution of actions. We suggest two levels of control:a contention scheduling mechanism that selects from among competing

schemas; a supervisory attentional mechanism that biases the selectionprocess. We propose that the supervisory attentional system is required

where the action sequences are ill-learned or novel, where the action ishighly critical or dangerous, or where planning is required. In other

cases, selection is by contention scheduling alone. The result is threemodes of the control of performance: automatic, contention scheduling

without deliberate direction, and deliberate conscious control. Will

becomes the application of attentional resources to the control ofaction.

Norman/Shallice Attention to Action

December 10, 1980 3

Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Control of Behavior*

Donald A. NormanUniversity of California, San Diego

La Jolla, California 92093

Tim Sballice

Medical Research CouncilApplied Psychology Unit

Cambridge, England

During the performance of a complex action sequence, many differentaction components are likely to be active at any moment. This resultsfrom the fact that any particular action sequence is apt to be comprised

of numerous components that are to be performed at different times.Moreover, in the conduct of their normal everyday activities, peopleoften interweave a number of action sequences, doing several activitiesduring overlapping time periods. Thus, an activity such as writing a

letter can occupy considerable duration, and it is performed whileengaged in other activities--listening to music, conversation, eating,

or drinking. The writing of the letter itself has many different levelsof operation, ranging from organizational aspects to the detailed motormovements that cause the appropriate marks to appear on the paper.

The initiation of any individual action component can be relativelystraight-forward; do the action as soon as the appropriate triggeringconditions occur. Complications occur in setting up the appropriate

conditions and analyses. Complications also occur when numerous actioncomponents compete for overlapping use of some of some limited resource

or for related structures, or when the processing structures and condi-tions are not set up sufficiently precisely that they will perform prop-erly without some other level of monitoring and control. In this paperwe propose a mechanism that allows for several control structures tointeract in order to achieve smooth non-conflicting operation of thenumerous action components that might be simultaneously awaiting their

turn for action. We consider separately several different aspects ofthe situation: first, the nature of the knowledge structures that con-

trol actions; then what we call the "horizontal threads" that specify

*Research support to D.A. Norman was provided by the Office of NavalResearch under contract N00014-79-C -0323. The collaboration was madepossible by a grant from the Sloan Foundation to the Program in Cogni-tive Science at UCSD. Support was also provided by grant MH-15828 fromthe National Institute of Mental Health to the Center for Human Informa-

tion Processing. We thank members of the "Skills" group of the Cogni-tive Science Laboratory at UCSD, ospecially David Rumelhart, GeoffreyHinton, Wynne Lee, Jonathan Grudin, and Bernie Baars. We appreciatethoughtful reviews and comments by Roy D'Andrade, Steve Keele, John

Long, George Mandler, and Peter McLeod. Approved for public release;distribution unlimited.


December 10, 1980 4

attentional control; and finally, a mechanism for conflict resolution.

The Structure of the Paper

Our goal in this paper is to provide an account for both theexperiential and the experimental phenomena of attention. We do this byexamining what is known of the phenomena of attention and proposing a

theoretical framework. The framework is structured around the notion ofa set of active schemas, organized according to the particular action

sequences of which they are a part, awaiting the appropriate set of con-ditions so that they can become selected to control action. Theanalysis is therefore centered around actions, primarily externalactions, but the same principles apply to internal actions -- actions

that involve only the cognitive processing mechanisms. The organizationof this paper is first to specify the theoretical framework that willguide the later analysis, then to examine some of the phenomena ofattention, first the experimental, then experiential, and finally, the

neuropsychological. But before we start the theoretical framework, abrief review of some of the experiential phenomenology that surrounds

the use of the term "automatic" is appropriate, for this conceptionplays a major role in the development of our ideas.

Automatic Performance

The term "automatic" is one of the more ubiquitous in the

phenomenology of attention. However, the term has a number of dif-ferent, though related, meanings. Experientially, there are at least

three different meanings to the term. First, there is the way that cer-tain tasks can be executed, without awareness of their performance (as

in walking along a short stretch of flat safe ground). Second, actionsmay be both initiated and performed without deliberate attention or

awareness (as in the automatic brushing away of an insect from one'sarm). Third are cases like the orienting response, in which attention

is drawn "automatically" to something, with no deliberate control overthe direction of attention.

In addition, there are cases in which one can be passively aware of

performing the actions, but without placing deliberate attention tothem, and without any attempt to control them; an example of this latter

type occurs in the performance of a skilled athletic task, where onemight consciously be attending to the opponent, but be fully aware of

the "automatic" hitting of the ball. Finally, within contemporary cog-nitive psychology, the term "automatic" is often defined operationally

to refer to situations in which a task is performed without interferingwith other tasks. In this situation, automatic is defined to mean thatthe task is performed without the need for limited processing resources(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).

The different uses of the term "automatic" require different expla-nations. We return to this point after we have outlined the theoreticalframework. Basically, however, the model that we propose presumes that

many action sequences are performed without any need for consciousawareness or attentional resources. It is only during the initiation or


termination of sequences that attention is apt to be required, and thenonly with ill determined, or poorly learned tasks, or when the situation

is determined to be critical or dangerous. The different senses of theterm reflect different aspects of the mechanism, resulting from whetherthe control is entirely without attentional resources, or requiressupervisory control, or attentional monitoring.

Relationship to Previous Work

The theoretical ideas developed in this model are consistent with anumber of developments in the psychological literature on attention andthe control of action. The emphasis that attentional limitations willhave their major effect at the action end of analysis, with considerableparallel and non-conflicting processing prior to the initiation ofaction, is related to work of Keele (see the chapter by Keele & Neill,1978). The basic notion that attentional processes play an overseeingrole, activating whatever processing component is in need of supervisoryassistance, has been suggested by LaBerge (1975), LaBerge and Samuels(1974); and Klein (1976). It is related to Posner's views of atten-tional biases providing costs and benefits in the production ofresponses (Posner, 1978). Our resource notions originate with Kahneman(1973), elaborated by Norman and Bobrow (1975) and Navon and Gopher(1979). Shallice's earlier work on the role of consciousness and actionsystems (Shallice, 1972, 1978), Norman (1981) on schemas and controlstructures, and Rumelhart and Norman (Note 3) on typing have playedmajor roles in the theory that we have developed. The notion of schemahas, of course, been around for a while, being introduced for motoractions by Bartlett (1932) and used for this purpose by Schmidt (1975).A more complete view of the views of schemas consistent with our usageis presented by Rumelhart and Ortony (1977).

A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Attention

Schemas and Processing Structures

Action sequences are complex ensembles of coordinated motorresponses, oftentimes requiring some mental computation and decisionmaking and considerable use of knowledge from the memory systems. Weassume that specification of the components of actions and processing isdone by means of numerous memory schemas, some organized into hierarchi-cal or sequential patterns, others in heterarchical or independentparallel (but cooperating) patterns. Any given action sequence that hasbeen well-learned is represented by an organized set of schemas, withone -- the source schema -- serving as the highest order control. The

term "source" is chosen to indicate that the other component-schemas ofan action sequence can be activated via the source. The procedural

aspects of schemas require processing structures that carry out theoperations specified, resulting in actions either upon an internal data

base or upon the outside environment via the limbs and speech organs.

Conflicts in action sequences can arise for numerous reasons:

several actions might require incompatible use of the same processing


December 10, 1980 6

structures (as in simultaneously attempting to raise and to lower the

hand); an action might require a difficult and unpracticed use ofrelated structures (as in reaching for an object vhile making a precise

movement of the leg); the action could require resources in excess ofthe capacity of a particular structure (as when attempting to do complex

mental arithmetic while also retaining some items in short-term memory);or the result of one activity might preclude successful completion ofanother (as when eating dinner at location A precludes eating dinner atlocation B). Part of the difficulty in selection and scheduling of

action components is to avoid incompatible or conflicting use of pro-cessing structures and to prevent the joint occurrence of other competi-

tive activity We propose that this occurs through selection, competi-tion, and negotiation among schemas.

In the model there are three different states of a schema: dormant,

activated, and selected. The state of dormancy is the normal, neutralstate of the schema: a schema is dormant when it resides within thepermanent memory structure, playing no role in the ongoing active pro-cessing of the moment. A schema is activated when it is set up, brought

to a state of readiness and given an activation value. The activationvalue is determined by the combination of several factors, including the

value given to it at set up by its source schema, the results of deli-berate attentional activation or of motivation, the influence of the

interaction with other activated schemas, and the goodness of match ofthe conditions within the trigger data base to the trigger conditions

specified for the individual schema which determine the conditions underwhich it should be invoked. A schema is selected when its activation

value is- sufficiently high to exceed its own threshold. A selectedschema controls actions, both internal processing and external movements

of effectors.

We now describe these aspects in more detail and introduce an

interaction of horizontal and vertical thread structures, and schedulingmechanisms.

Horizontal Threads

Start by considering a simple, self-contained, well-learned actionsequence, perhaps the act of depressing a response switch upon theflashing of a particular light. This action sequence can be represented

by a set of component schemas, triggered by the arrival of the appropri-ate perceptual event and resulting in the selection of the proper body,

arm, hand, and finger movements to depress the button. Some or all ofthis processing sequence could be set up in advance by activation of the

appropriate source schemas which in turn activates the detailed com-ponent schemas for carrying through the desired sequence of action uponthe specified flash of light. I Whenever the action sequence is set up,

I. Just how much of the details of an action square can be preset is a

point that needs to be empirically examined. The observation that thelatency of a response is proportional to its complexity argues against


its representation by means of action schemas constitutes a horizontalthread. The important point is that the processing structure can in

principle be well specified.

The general nature of the processing structure for a simple actionsequence is shown in Figure 1. The essential components are shown inthe horizontal grouping of component schemas for an action sequence:

this is a horizontal thread of processing structures. In this example,four component schemas are shown, receiving information about sensoryand motor activity from a "trigger data base" and making use of "psycho-logical processing structures" in transforming their outputs intoactions. For many actions, the specific processing units involved wouldbe much more complex. Thus in the skilled operation of a motor skillsuch as writing to dictation, a complex set of specific processing unitswould be involved, including storage buffers of various sorts (seeEllis, 1980; Morton, 1980; Wing, 1978). Moreover in such skills, theconceptual relations among processing units and the initiation and exe-cution of component schemas would be considerably more complex than thelinear relation shown in Figure 1. However, we let the schematic con-ceptualization of the horizontal thread symbolize the specification ofthe processing structures, regardless of their actual complexity. Ahorizontal thread, therefore, stands for the specification of the com-ponents of the processing structures that control the over-learnedaspects of action.

In general, there will be a number of different action sequencesbeing performed at any given time, each specified by its own horizontalthread structure, as shown in Figure 2. The operations performed bythe component schemas that comprise the horizontal threads includeinternal operations upon a memory data base, the formation and set up ofother schemas or processing threads, and external operations such asspeech or movement. Different component schemas might all access a com-mon memory data base, and they might need to use the same processingmechanisms (e.g., the same memory structures or particular musclegroups). As a result, the different threads may interact with oneanother, as symbolized by the lines in Figure 2 interconnecting thethreads. These interactions are important for the contention schedulingmechanism (to he described later).

Schema Selection Mechanisms

When numerous schemas are activated at the same time, some meansneeds to be provided for selection of a particular schema when it isrequired for its action sequence. At times, however, there will be con-

flicts among potentially relevant schemas, and so some sort of conflictresolution procedure must be provided. This is a common problem in any

information processing system where, at any one moment, several

full, detailed specification of the motor schemas prior to the triggersignal (Kerr, 1975; Sternberg, Monsell, Knoll, & Wright, 1978). Ourconcern is independent of this consideriition.


December 10, 1980 8

Sensoryt External and

SENSORY- TRIGGER ' ---- -Intern [

PERCEPTUAL DATA ACfi nns

STRUCTURES BAE L--------------------FSOURCE SCHEMA

PSYCHO LOGIC ALPROCESSING STRUCTURES

Figure 1. A Horizontal Thread. For well-learned, habitual tasks an

autonomous, self-sufficient strand of processing structures and pro-

cedures can usually carry out the required activities, without the needfor conscious or attentional control. Selection of component schemas is

determined, in part, by how well the "trigger conditions" of the schemamatch the contents of the "trigger data base." Such a sequence can often

be characterized by a (relatively) linear flow of information among thevarious psychological processing structures and knowledge schemas in-

volved: a horizontal thread.


December 10, 1980 9

SCHEMAS

SRS ..... External andI"°" i ,,IT RPIGGER - Inere"- S-' E N SOR Y-

PERCEPTUAL DATA -- - Actions

PSYCHOLOGICALPROCESSING SrRUCTURES

Figure 2. Simultaneous Horizontal Threads. A person often performs

several tasks at the same time, with the Individual components of each

task either being simultaneous or overlapping in time. Moreover, any

given task may last for a considerable amount of time. This figure

shows 5 different horizontal threads that might be active at one time.

Some means of selecting the individual schemas at appropriate times

while providing some form of conflict resolution becomes necessary. The

interaction among the various horizontal threads needed for this purpose

is indicted by the lines that interconnect schemas from different

threads.


December 10, 1980 10

potential candidates for operation might require access to the same

resources or might result in incompatible actions. (McDermott & Forgy,1978, discuss this issue for production systems and Bellman, Note 1,

discusses the problem with respect to animal behavior.)

The procedure we propose is constrained by the desire to transmitpriorities by means of the single variable of amount of activation, aconcept consistent with current psychological theory. We propose that

the individual component schemas of the horizontal threads each have anactivation value that is determined by a combination of factors, somethat operate among schemas, some that result from special processes thatoperate upon the schemas.

We divide the activational influences upon a schema into threesets: vertical thread influences, contention scheduling influences, andtrigger condition influences. Horizontal threads determine the organi-

zational structure of the schemas and processing mechanisms for a par-ticular action sequence. Vertical threads determine biases acting uponthe selection process. Trigger conditions determine the appropriatetiming for the initiation of schemas, and the contention schedulingmechanism combines these various influences and selects between candi-date schemas where appropriate.

Vertical Threads

The horizontal thread specifies the organizational structure forthe desired action sequence. However, a scheme may not be availablethat can achieve control of the desired behavior, especially when the

task is novel or complex. In these cases, some additional controlstructure is required. The vertical thread influences provide one

source of control upon the selection of schemas, operating entirelythrough the application of activation values to the schemas that can

bias their selection by the contention scheduling mechanisms. There aretwo major vertical factors: motivational variables and attentional con-

trol. It is this latter factor that is the focus of this paper. Theoverall system is shown in Figure 3.

Attentional resources. Deliberate attentional control is the mostimportant of the vertical thread influences. Here we postulate that asupervisory attentional mechanism is capable of monitoring the overall

activity, then of supplying an increase or decrease in the activationvalues of the relevant schemas. Note that this is an indirect means ofcontrol of action. Attentional control is directed only at activationvalue, not directly at the selection. Moreover, it is control overlaidon top of the horizontal thread organization. Wh-n attentional activa-tion of a schema ceases, the activational value will revert to its nor-

mal value.

Allport (1980) has criticized a wide range of attention theories

for succumbing to what he calls the "GPLCCP" belief in a "General-Purpose Limited Capacity Central Processor." We agree with much of his

criticism, and our proposal is meant, in part, to overcome these



ATTENTIONAL RESOURCESPO CESN T HRE,-ADD TO OR DECREASE

PROCESSING THREADS ACTIVATION VALUES

Il I IAExternal and

-- SENSORY- TRIGGER InternalPERCEPTUAL| DATA Action

STRUCTURES BASE

PSYCHOLOGICALPROCESSING STRUCTURES

L ------------- UVERTICAL THREADS

MOTIVATIONALINFLUENCE 0NACTIVATION

Figure 3. Vertical Threads. When attention to particular tasks is

required, either because the components of the relevant horizontalthreads are not sufficiently well specified or because some critical or

dangerous situation Is involved, then vertical thread activation comesinto play. Attention operates upon schemas only through manipulation of

activation values, increasing the values for desired schemas, decreasing

(inhibiting) the values for undesired ones. Thus, attentional processes

oversee and bias ongoing action by alteration of activation values.

Motivational variables are assumed to play a similar role in the control

of activation, but working over longer time periods.

Norman/Shall ice Attention to ActionDecember 10, 1980 12

criticisms. The horizontal processing threads represent particularstrategies for performing tasks, making use of whatever processingstructures seem needed. Several such threads may operate simultaneouslyprovided that no related processing structures are simultaneouslyrequired and provided all the schemas involved are well-learned. Hor-izontal thread control is not subject to Central Processor limitations.

The model does contain a general purpose limited capacity mechan-ism, a supervisory attentional mechanism whose influence is felt bythreading its way vertically across the active schemas. Mechanisms thatare concerned with planning or monitoring of actions as contrasted withthe detailed execution of the task solution can play important roles inoverseeing the satisfactory operation of complex systems. Thus, suchmechanisms have been incorporated into a number of models of problem

solving programs (Boden, 1977; Fahlman, 1974; Sussman, 1975). In thepresent model, this mechanism only serves as a mediating influence; itcan only modulate the flow of processing. Oftentimes, this modulationis critical for the successful operation, and whenever this is the case,central processing limitations can occur. But we presume the wholeaction system refines itself through experience, developing and adjust-ing the horizontal thread structures to minimize the need for central,vertical thread modulation.

Motivation. A second vertical thread component results from theeffects of motivational factors. We take this to be a relatively slowlyacting system, working primarily to bias the operation of the horizontalthread structures towards the long-term goals of the organism byactivating source schemas (and through their selection, component sche-mas). Memory organizational procedures, for both storage and retrieval,are themselves horizontal thread structures, and so are susceptible tomotivational biases.

Contention Scheduling

Simultaneously performed actions are sometimes in conflict with oneanother, but at other times can be jointly performed by cooperativeaction. In the case of conflict, when one task is started, something

must prevent simultaneous performance of the other. But with coopera-tive tasks, the situation is quite different. Oftentimes the lower-level activities required for a single, higher level task are bothcooperative and in conflict. To see this, consider how a skilled typisttypes the word "very" (using a standard typewriter keyboard): the posi-tioning of the hands and fingers is both cooperative and competitive.The typing of the "v", "e", and "y" is cooperative; as the left indexfinger positions itself to type the "v", the middle finger of the lefthand can start its movement towards the "e" and the right index fingercan position itself for the "y". The hands and arm position themselvesso as to assist in the finger movements. In contrast, the typing of the"v" and the "r" is competitive, both requiring conflicting use of thesame finger. Analyses of high speed moving films of skilled typistsindicates that both competitive and cooperative interactions occur(Gentner, Grudin, & Conway, Note 2).


To permit simultaneous action of cooperative acts and prevent

simultaneous action of conflicting ones is a difficult job, for oftenthe details of how the particular actions are performed determine

whether or not they conflict with one another. Thus, whether or notseveral objects can be picked up at one time with the same hand isdetermined by the shape and location of the objects, the exact use thatis made of the fingers, and the skill and experience of the person.

Some sort of conflict resolution mechanism must come into play toresolve these issues.

We propose that the scheduling of actions takes place through whatwe call "contention scheduling," in which active schemas interact withone another through inhibition and, to a lesser extent, excitation of

activation values. The result is competition for selection, modulatedby the vertical thread activations, preventing competitive use of common

or related structures and negotiating cooperative, shared use of commonstructures or operations where that is possible. (This principle isused by Rumelhart & Norman, Note 3, in a model of the hand and fingerinteractions in skilled typing.)

We assume that the initial activation values of component schemas

are determined by means of their source schema. For example, when thesource schema for a task such as driving an automobile has beenselected, all its component schemas become activated, including schemasfor such acts as steering, stopping, accelerating, slowing, overtaking,

and turning. Each of these component schemas acts as a source schema,activating its component schemas (braking, changing gear, signalling).

The one remaining consideration for the selection process is the satis-faction of the contention trigger conditions.

Trigger conditions. The determination of the activation level of aschema from higher-level systems is normally not sufficient to provideadequate timing of its selection. A particular action must be done at atime dependent upon the occurrence of appropriate environmental events.We propose that proper timing of schema selection depends upon thesatisfaction of trigger conditions that specify the exact conditions

under which selection is appropriate. Trigger conditions then contri-bute to the overall activation of the schema. How well the existing

conditions match those trigger specifications determines the amount ofactivation contributed by this factor. (Attentional or motivational

influences on activation value can override the effect of the triggerconditions, causing selection even in the absence of appropriate

triggering conditions, or inhibiting selection even when there is per-fect match of triggering conditions.)

The selection mechanism. There are two basic principles of thecontention scheduling mechanism: first, the sets of potential sourceschemas compete with one another in the determination of their activa-tion values; second, the selection takes place on the basis of activa-tion value alone -- a schema is selected whenever its activation exceeds

a threshold value. The threshold can be specific to the schema, and


could become lower with use of the schema.

The competition is effected through lateral activation and inhibi-tion among activated schemas. What degree of lateral inhibition existsbetween schemas on the model remaiLs an open issue. Schemas whichrequire the use of any common processing structures will clearly need toinhibit each other. Yet the degree of inhibition cannot be determinedsimply a priori. Thus some aspects of the standard refractory periodphenomena can be plausibly attributed to such inhibition between sche-mas; explanations based upon conflicts in reponse selection fit the datawell (Kahneman, 1973). However, one cannot just assume that responsesby each of the two hands inevitably involve a common processing struc-ture, as refractory period effects can disappear if highly compatibletasks are used (Greenwald & Shulman, 1973). On the model, as a task

becomes better learned, the schemas controlling it could become morespecialized in their use of processing structures, reducing potential

structural interference and minimizing the need for mutual inhibitionamong schemas. At the same time, a factor that may operate to broadenlateral inhibitory interactions among schemas is the possibility ofinteractions among anatomically related subsystems, even when they arefunctionally distinct (Kinsbourne & Hicks, 1978).

Simultaneous selection of two schemas is unlikely for two reasons.First, if the two are at all incompatible, lateral inhibitory processeswill tend to reduce the chance of at least one reaching threshold, assuch effects magnify existing activation differences. The decrementswill be greater the less well learned and, hence, the less specific theschemas are. Second, if deliberate attention is required to activatethem sufficiently for selection, there will be competition for the lim-ited resources of the supervisory attentional mechanism. This will beespecially the case when tasks are not well learned. An ill-learnedschema is itself a poorly integrated group of element schemas, and thesupervisory attention mechanism will need to boost all the elementsrather than the single whole. 2

Note that the operation of a selected schema continues, unlessactively switched off, regardless of what value its activation may havefallen to, until it has satisfied its goal, completed its operations, oruntil it is blocked when some resovrce or information is either lacking

2. Although simultaneous selection of two schemas is unlikely, simul-taneous and synchronized performance of two action sequences is quitepossible. If a person needs to perform two action sequences concurrent-ly, both of which require conscious attention, then the simplest way toaccomplish this is to establish a sinele. hiRher-order source schemathat oversees both actions. Then, "attention" need be directed only ata single schema. If the underlying component schemas are automated (sothey need not pass through contention scheduling), the result will besynchrony in action. Thus, in general, actions that require attentionalcontrol must either be performed with exact synchrony or in alternation,first one, then the other.



or is being utilized by some more highly activated schema. The activa-

tion value is important primarily in the selection process and when theselected schema must compete for shared resources, or in providing com-

ponent schemas with initial activation values.

The scheduling is therefore quite simple and direct. No direct

attentional control of selection is required (or allowed). Deliberateattention exerts itself indirectly through its effect on activation

values. All the action, therefore, takes place in the determination ofthe activation values of the schemas.

Fine timing of operations. A critical component of the performance

of many skills is fine timing of the operations. As the selection

mechanism is now constituted, it cannot be counted upon to respond as

precisely as is required. Even if triggering conditions were the same

on different occasions, the contention selection mechanism would be apt

to lead to variability in selection time, in part because it would be

unreasonable to assume that other factors affecting activation level

were constant.

One possibility is for the contention scheduling mechanism to be

used only for initial selection of schemas and for crude timing. Pre-

cise timing would then be handled by means of specific triggering condi-

tions at appropriate (low) levels of component schemas. Component sche-

mas would then specify precise triggering conditions required for the

actions under their control so that this level of control would not bedone by the contention scheduling mechanism. This assumption also

allows negotiations among schemas that are simultaneously operating to

take place at this same level, so that one schema operates in such a way

as to allow as much as possible of the other schema to be realized.Thus, if both a paper-picking-up schema and a pencil-picking-up schema

are operative, the hand and finger configuration used for picking up thepaper is likely to be modified so as to allow for the picking up of the

pencil with the unoccupied fingers.



The Interpretation of the Phenomena

A key component of our theory is the role of attention to action.However, many of the experiments that have been performed to examine

attentional phenomena have concentrated upon the role of attention inperception. As a result, many of these experiments do not test ourideas directly, but rather require explanations that cut across theseveral theoretical mechanisms that we describe.

One major class of phenomena do fit reasonably directly into thetheoretical structure of the model. These are certain of the phenomeno-logical aspects of attention, which are subject to reasonable agreementamong observers, but available only through introspection rather thenhard experimental evidence. In this section of the paper we discussboth the experimental and the introspective, phenomenological evidence.

The Experimental Literature

According to our framework for the control of action, simultaneous

tasks interfere with one another in one of two ways: structuralinterference, when two horizontal threads overlap in their demands forprocessing structures; and attentional or resource interference, whenattentional capacity is required from the vertical thread. One canattempt to control both these forms of intcrference, the structuralinterference through the appropriate design of th,2 tasks that are to beperformed at the same time, the attentional int,,rference through suffi-cient (albeit lengthy and tedious) training on the tasks so that theycan be performed "automatically," without the need for attentional bias-ing of the contention scheduling mechanism.

The best way to assess these ideas would be to have experimentsthat separate cleanly the demands placed upon horizontal and verticalthread components. We expect attentional limitations to effect onlyvertical thread processes and structural interference to affect only

horizontal thread influences. However, as we discussed earlier, thestructural interference between any pair of tasks cannot readily be

determined a priori. Thus, the existence of interference between tasksdoes not speak directly to the theory. Rather, the more important pred-ictions concern the conditions for which there will be no interferencebetween tasks, as this requires that there be neither structural (hor-izontal) nor attentional (vertical) interference.

Simultaneous tasks. On the model, satisfactory performance of

several simultaneous tasks depends upon lack of conflict of these tasksfor any of several kinds of resources. The major prediction is that

parallel dual-task performance should be most easily possible where onlya single action sequence has to be initiated, that is, where only oneschema has to be selected by contention scheduling. This fits with theresults on monitoring (for review see Duncan, 1980). Thus Moray andFitter (1973) and Sorkin and Pohlmann (1973) showed that monitoring forone of several possible signals (or signals over several possible


channels) could be done satisfactorily, and that performance sufferedonly when simultaneous target detection and responding was required (in

our terms, when there was initiation of actions).

Effective multiple channel monitoring depends on the activation ofappropriate schemas by triggers that have been set up previously. Therecan, however, be difficulties in setting up the schema trigger condi-tions so as to match the expected signals unambiguously. For instance,how novel may the set of trigger conditions be? The Shiffrin andSchneider experiment (1977) in which the "automatic" attention was notpossible when the target distractor relation was varied from trial totrial indicates that considerable practice is required to set up sometrigger conditions. A second problem is that activation-based processesare liable to result in selection induced by stimuli similar to targets.The experiments by Treisman and Gelade (1980) seem to indicate that somesituations which require the integration of "separable features" (wherethe background distractors may also contain these same features) presentspecial difficulties of this sort. Thus, in some cases, effective tar-get selection cannot be performed without internal processing actions.

On the current model this is apt to require attentional activation ofthe processing schemas, thus forcing deliberate serial attention to bedirected at the parts of the signal.

Simultaneous performance of tasks which require production ofseparate response streams is possible when two conditions are satisfied:first, the horizontal thread structures must be sufficiently developed

that they can control the action sequences without deliberate supervi-sion; second, there cannot be any structural interference. The first

condition is obviously most apt to be satisfied when there has been con-siderable practice at the tasks. The second condition requires minimi-zation of the overlap of use of common processing or control mechanisms.These conditions have been satisfied in a number of experiments thathave examined performance of highly skilled, well-practiced people(Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; McLeod, 1977; Spelke, Hirst, &

Neisser, 1976).

Even in these situations, performance often deteriorates somewhatwhen a second task is added, although there appears to be no obviousgrounds for structural or attentional interference. A common explana-tion of this finding is that there is an excess "overhead" associatedwith the performance of two tasks rather than one, an overhead thatleads to a performance decrement regardless of the nature of the tasks(e.g., Allport, 1980). The model provides a possible source for thisextra overhead: the supervisory attentional mechanisms. Unless thesecond task is extremely well-learned, there will be a need for extrasource and component schemas that require vertical thread activation intheir setup and in their selection. Thus, as Allport (1980) pointedout, in experiments involving piano playing conducted by Allport,Antonis, & Reynolds (1972), the one subject who showed no interference'was also the most competent of our pianists." The other subjects allfound some technical challenge in the music such that "moments of emer-gency occurred," where recovery required some relatively unpracticed



applications of keyboard technique and therefore, on our model, atten-tional resources.

Attentional demands at the initiation of actions. A major theme of

the model is that attention is used primarily at the initiation ofactions. This property of the model fits with the results of probe stu-

dies during the movement, where responses to probes at the start or endof movement are more delayed than those during execution (Posner &

Keele, 1969; Ells, 1973). Indeed under certain conditions, although thestart of the response shows the expected interferences, the large stagesof response execution may not delay responses to probes at all (Posner &Keele, 1969). In interpreting these results it is important to realizethat both the starting and stopping of a response requires selection bycontention scheduling since, at one level, they involve different sche-

mas. To stop a physical motor response requires that the limb motion behalted, which requires initiation of the action of muscle groups that

can counter the momentum of the movement. It is just as hard to stop amovement as it is to start it. The exception is when movement issLopped by an external "stop." In this case, one would not expectattentional effects at the termination of the movement which is exactly

what is found.

Moreover, attentional influences act only to bias the selection

mechanisms, not to do the selection. One relevant study was performedby McLean and Shulman (1978) who found that when attention was first

directed to the possibility of a signal and then distracted, there was aresidual bias that remained from the initial investment of attention.

We believe this finding to be more consistent with the view that atten-tion can only bias processing actions than with the more usual view that,3rtention selects processing.

A related prediction made by the model is that if the triggering

potential of one type of stimulus is much stronger than that of a secondtype, then the former will be selected in contention scheduling even

though the latter is being deliberately attended to. In this situation,triggering activation is more powerful than activation from the super-

visory attentional mechanisms. One set of such findings comes from theliterature on selective attention in which an attempt is made to keep

the subject concentrating upon a primary task while other signals arepresented. A classic example of the d~fficulty of doing this is the

Stroop phenomenon. Certain classes of words presented upon a secondarychannel can intrude upon or bias primary task performance, such as aword that fits within the context of the primary channel, or that hasbeen conditioned to electric shock, or that has high emotional value

(such as one's own name). Performance of the other task is impairedwhen the interrupt occurs. In terms of our model, these "intrusions"result from data-driven entry of action schemas into the contentionscheduling mechanism and their selection there due to the stronglyactivating properties of such triggers. These intrusions, therefore,are similar to the form of action slip found in "capture errors," to be

discussed later.


Experiential Phenomena

An important aspect of attention and the control of action is itsphenomenology. The role of the conscious awareness of directed, con-trolled attention to events and to actions, and the nature of those

situations in which one can act without awareness or deliberate inten-tion to act, are all of direct relevance to the theoretical structures

described here. Indeed, the theory was developed with explanation ofthe experiential aspects of attention as much of a goal as the results

of controlled experimentation.

Phenomenal reports of action provide evidence for qualitative dis-tinctions amcng different types of experience. We do not discuss thecorrespondence between consciousness and information processing mechan-

isms and functions (but see Shallice, 1972, 1978). To make differentia-tions between types of experience, it is sufficient to assume that the

supervisory attentional mechanism has the possibility for access toinformation about the schemas selected in contention scheduling, and

that reflection on action involves this process.

Automatic performance. In an earlier section we identified severaldifferent aspects of the term "attention." On the model, there arecorrespondences for all these related aspects of the term. Some

actions, such as the decision to walk across a certain path, might beinitiated with directed attention and clear awareness, but the perfor-mance need not depend upon the supervisory attentional mechanism norinterfere with any other activated schema in contention scheduling;

hence, the automatic nature of the performance. In other actions, suchas the brushing away of an insect, even the initiating of the act

(through data-driven excitation of a source schema) might not dependupon the supervisory attentional mechanism. In this case, there could

be a complete lack of awareness of both the initiation and the action.These cases also correspond to the operational definition, for there isno demand upon the attentional resources.

There are, however, cases in which one experiential sense of"automatic" does not correspond to "automatic" in the operational sense.Thus, the orienting response is phenomenologically automatic, as there

is no deliberate attentional control over schema activation and selec-tion. However, schema selection may very well interfere in contention

scheduling with the operation of tasks being performed at the same time;in these cases, the operational criterion for automaticity is not met.

A specially interesting case of automaticity is where at one timethe action did require conscious direction for its performance, but nowno longer does so. As William James (1890) pointed out at some length,the common denominator of such actions is that they are habitual, fre-

quently performed, usually in a relatively fixed format. Why should theability to perform such tasks automatically only occur when they arewell learned? On the model, this is because newly learned actions areapt to be ill-specified. Their schemas are relatively small, encompass-

ing relatively specialized sub-actions. Moreover, their triggering

Norman/Shal lice Attention to Action


conditions are apt to be ill-specified, not well matched to the actual

conditions that occur. As a result, continual monitoring is required bythe attentional mechanisms, and selection must often be forced (ordelayed) by the application of deliberate attentional activation.Well-learned actions are apt to be well specified, with their schemas

encompassing large, organized units of behavior, and with their trigger-ing conditions well-matched to the situation. As a result, once theirschemas have been selected, they can maintain control effectively forlonger periods.

The amount of interference that a task presents to other tasks per-formed at the same time will also decrease as learning improves. Thisdecrease comes about for three different reasons. First, as the schemas

become better specified, there will be fewer gaps and fewer weaknessesthat need the supervisory processes for proper control. Second, as thetriggering conditions become better matched to the situation, they areless likely to need supervisory attentional resources. Third, generalschemas are apt to make more general demands on processing structures,making it more likely that there will be conflicts with other actionsequences. As the actions become specified more precisely, they involvea smaller fraction of the psychological processing structures. This tooreduces the conflicts in performance, by decreasing the possibility oflateral inhibitory conflicts during contention scheduling.

Contention scheduling without deliberate direction. It is possibleto be aware of performing an action without paying active, directed

attention to it. This corresponds to situations in which the selectionof a schema is accomplished by contention scheduling without theinvolvement of the supervisory attentional mechanism. The most generalsituation of this type is in the initiation of routine actions.Phenomenally, this corresponds to the state that Ach (1905) describes asoccurring after practice in reaction time tasks. Over the first fewtrials, he said, the response is preceded by awareness that the actionshould be made, but later there is no such awareness, except if prepara-tion has been inadequate. By then, the stimulus triggers the appropri-ate schema without the involvement of the supervisory attentionalmechanisms. In well-learned tasks, the subject experiences the responseas proceeding with "an awareness of determination" even if it is notimmediately preceded by any experience of intention to act. In ourterms, this is because the schema controlling action had previously been

activated using the supervisory attentlonal mechanisms. but then theschema selection occurs automatically when the proper stimulus condi-tions occur.

Whenever contention scheduling takes place without any present or

prior involvement of the supervisory attentional mechanisms, even the"awareness of determination" is absent. Data-driven triggers act in

this way. Because there is no involvement of the supervisory atten-tional mechanism, and hence no monitoring, errors can easily occur. Two

such errors are the form labelled "data-driven errors" and "captureerrors" (Reason, 1979; Norman, 1981). Both classes of errors occur whenthe schema that was intended to control action is replaced by another


one, leading t an unintentional result. In the case of "data-driven"errors, the unintended schema is activated by perceptual information (bynewly arriving sensory data). In the case of "capture errors," theunintended schema shares considerable features with the intended one,and in addition, is the more frequently performed action sequence. Ineither case, one may find oneself doing a totally unexpected set ofactions, much to one's own dismay.

Take for example, Reason's description of the person who went tothe garage to drive to work and found that he had "stopped to put on myWellington boots and gardening jacket as if to work in the garden" (Rea-son, 1979). Or take the person described by William James who went tothe bedroom to change for dinner and ended up undressed, ready for bed.Students of abnormal behavior may wish to point out that there is seldoma single explanation for behavior, that there are many interactingcauses. Thus, the person who found himself gardening might also have(subconsciously) wished to avoid going to work. So too with the persondescribed by James; the dinner may have been unwelcome. Our contentionscheduling system is deliberately designed with these issues in mind.We postulate that selection results from the combination of numerousfactors. Thus, it is quite possible that the sight of the gardeningboots or the act of undressing (to change one's clothes) would not bythemselves have been sufficient to have selected the discrepantbehavior. Similarly, the hidden wishes, whether conscious or not, wouldnot by themselves have been sufficient to cause the behavior. But thefortuitous combination of the wishes and the situation were sufficientto cause selection of the schemas.

Deliberate conscious control. A critical separation on the modelis between action initiated through contention scheduling without theinvolvement of the supervisory attentional mechanism, and action ini-tiated with the involvement of this mechanism. This distinctioncorresponds closely to William James's (1890) distinction between"ideo-motor" and "willed" acts. To James, "wherever movement followsunhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the mind, we haveideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing between the conceptionand the execution." These "ideo-motor" actions (a category which doesnot exclude "awareness of determination") corresponds directly to ouridea of contention scheduling without conscious direction. His conceptof actions involving "an additional conscious element in the shape of afiat, mandate, or expressed consent" corresponds to cases where webelieve the supervisory attentional mechanism to be operative.

Experientially, a number of different sorts of tasks appear torequire a considerable amount of deliberate attentional resources.These tasks fit within the following categories:

(a) they involve planning or decision-making,

(b) they involve components of trouble shooting,

Lm



(c) they are ill-learned or contain novel sequences of actions,

(d) they are judged to be dangerous or technically difficult,

(e) they require overcoming a strong habitual response or resist-

ing temptation.

The general principle involved is that these are special situations in

which the uncontrolled application of a horizontal processing threadthrough the contention scheduling mechanism is apt to lead to error.

The supervisory attentional mechanisms allow more control over the

sequence of actions to be performed than is possible through horizontal

thread direction alone.

Vertical thread influences are necessary because individual schemas

are limited in what they can foresee and control. Further, although the

contention scheduling mechanism allows selection among schemas, it does

not allow for integration of information across them. Given the varieLy

and power of human capacities, it would appear that mechanisms must

exist which have available to them information about the varied needs

and capacities of the organism, including source schema, the ability to

monitor the operation of schemas, and the power to initiate the con-

struction of new schemas out of existing ones.

Planning and decision making are processes that operate in the for-

mation of intentions that are not routine. In our terms, we plan or

decide when it is clear that no existing schemas are sufficient to

satisfy a particular goal. In these cases, information must be from

more than one schema, or new schemas must be formed. This requires

involvement of the supervisory attentional mechanisms. We assume

though, that these general powers are bought at the cost of speed. Use

of the supervisory attentional mechanisms then provides both benefits

and costs. The benefits derive from the increased processing power

brought to bear on the problem at hand; in general, judgments which it

controls will be superior to the unguided selections of contention

scheduling. The costs result from the slowness, leading to difficulty

in the control of rapid, skilled actions, and to seriality in the con-

trol of what would otherwise be parallel acts.

We define trouble shooting to be the application of planning and

decision-making processes to actions already in progress. It occurs

when an unexpected error occurs in the operation of an action (see

Mandler, 1975). When a particular, specialized component schema has

failed, one solution Is to replace it with a more general one. More

general schemas are apt to require selection through contention schedul-

ing and vertical thread control by the supervisory attentional mechan-

isms.

The performance of ill-learned or novel skills requires what Fitts

and Posner (1967) called "the early or cognitive phase ... in which it

is necessary to attend to cues, events, and responses that later go


unnoticed" (pp.11-12). These are situations which require attentionalcontrol because neither appropriate schemas nor their triggers have beendeveloped. With dangerous and technically difficult situations, erroris relatively costly. In this situation, one wishes to guard againstthe vagaries of contention scheduling and enforce selection of the mostappropriate schema by means of strong activation. Similarly, in over-

coming habitual responses or in resisting temptation, the appropriateschema must be strongly activated and the others strongly inhibited,else a more usual, but inappropriate act, might be selected by the nor-mal operation of contention scheduling.

There can be costs in using deliberate control in a task that isnormally performed automatically. Activation of schemas in contentionscheduling by the supervisory attentional mechanism has the effect of

reducing the influence of activation from triggering stimuli and otherschemas in the selection process: subtle environmental control is lost.

In addition, action execution must proceed unit by unit, each schemaawaiting its turn for receiving attentional biases. The result is alack of smoothness and a slowing of performance.

Neuropsychological Phenomena: The Frontal Lobes

There are strong correspondences between functions of our super-visory attentional mechanism and those ascribed by Luria (1966) to theprefrontal regions of the brain. If the supervisory attentional mechan-ism were damaged, the resulting behavior would be similar to the

behavior of patients with lesions to the prefrontal regions.

A deficit in planning corresponds to Luria's clinical characteriza-

tion of the frontal lobe syndrome, which has been supported in a numberof experimental studies involving maze learning, complex visual-

constructive tasks, and complex arithmetical problem-solving (see Walsh,1978). The simplest example of a planning disorder is the finding ofGadzhiev (see Luria, 1966) that frontal patients when presented with aproblem tend to miss out the initial assessment of the situation. Fron-tal lobe patients have also been characterized clinically as havingdeficits in initiative, in dealing with novelty, anu of judgment (Pen-

field & Evans, 1935; Goldstein, 1936).

Patients with frontal lobe lesions have difficulties with error

correction. The Wisconsin card-sorting test Involves multi-dimensionalstimuli where the patient must switch from sorting according to onedimension to sorting according to another. In this task frontalpatients show a strong tendency to perseverate in sorting on the previ-

ously correct dimension, even when they are told they are wrong (Milner,1964; Nelson, 1976). Perret (1974) found that patients with frontallobe lesions are the most impaired group on the Stroop test. This is atask in which the usual response to a stimulus is not the desired one --habitual responses must be suppressed. In this situation deliberateattentional control is required, but this in general presents especial

difficulty for frontal lobe patients.



The failure to overcome an habitual response tendency is one side

of the general effect that should occur on our model if the supervisoryattentional mechanisms are damaged. In this case, behavior will be left

under the control only of the horizontal thread structures, plus conten-tion scheduling. In the examples above where one schema is more

strongly activated than the others, it will be difficult to prevent itfrom controlling behavior. By contrast, when several schemas have simi-

lar activation values one should obtain another clinical characteristicof frontal patients: an instability of attention and heightened dis-

tractability (see Walsh, 1978). This apparent contradiction betweenincreased perseveration and increased distractability results from

failure of a single mechanism. Both results are observed in animalswith prefrontal lesions (see Brush, Mishkin, & Rosvold, 1961; Pribram,1973).

If the properties of the supervisory attentional mechanism seem to

correspond fairly well with neuropsychological evidence, does the sameapply to the properties of contention scheduling? One possible relationis between the lateral inhibitory and threshold properties of contentionscheduling and certain properties of the basal ganglia, thought becauseof their role in the aetiology of Parkinson's disease to be involved inthe initiation of action (see also Stein, 1978). Moreover the basal

ganglia are innervated by dopamine systems, which it has recently beenclaimed mediate the selection of behaviors through a lateral inhibitorymechanism somewhat analogous to contention scheduling (see Joseph,Frith, & Waddington, 1979) and which when they malfunction (as in amphe-tamine psychosis) lead to disorders which could well be at the level ofthe selection of action (see Lynn & Robbins, 1975).

Will

We propose that "will" be the direction of action by direct cons-

cious control through the supervisory attentional mechanism. Thisdefinition is consistent both with the popular meaning of the term andwith the discussions of will in the earlier psychological literature.Thus, strongly resisting a habitual or tempting action or strovgly forc-ing performance of an action that one is loathe to perform s, ems to beprototypical examples of the application of will. The former would

appear co result from deliberate attentional inhibition of an actionschema, the latter from deliberate activation. James (1890) drew the

contrast between "what happens in deliberate action" where will isinvolved and actions that do not require will, where the responses fol-lowed "unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the mind"(ideo-motor actions). Situations in which there is no need for will arethose where there "seems to be the absence of any conflicting idea."

In our view, will varies along a quantitative dimension correspond-

ing to the amount of activation or inhibition required from the super-visory attentional mechanisms. The assumption that this activationvalue lies on a continuum explains why the distinction between willedand ideo-motor actions seems quite clear when considering extremeactions, but becomes blurred when considering those that require very



little attentional effort. Thus, introspection fails in determiningwhether or not will is involved in the voluntary lifting of the arm.But there is no need to make a distinction if this act is simply identi-

fied as being near the zero point of the quantitative scale of atten-tional activation.

The idea that will corresponds to the output of the supervisoryattentional mechanisms has certain other useful consequences. Considerthe errors that occur with brief lapses of attention, when there is afailure to sustain will adequately. One type of error results followinga decision not to do a step within a habitual sequence of actions. Toeliminate the step requires deliberate (willful) inhibition of therelevant schema. If there is a momentary lapse of attention to thedeliberate inhibition, the step may get done anyway. Closely related isthe error that occurred to one of us. Having decided not to take

another bite of a delicious, but extremely rich dessert, with only abrief lapse of attention, the cake got eaten.

Certain aspects of will require elaboration of our approach. Insome circumstances an action may seem to require no will at all, yet at

other times, require extreme demands. Thus, getting out of bed in themorning is at times an automatic act, at other times requires greatexertion of will. One explanation for this observation is that activa-tion of an action schema by the attentional mechanisms necessarilyinvolves knowledge of consequences. When these are negative, they leadto inhibition of the source schemas which then must be overcome. Insome cases, the self-inhibition can be so intense as to prevent or atleast make very difficult the intended act. Thus, inflicting deliberate

injury to oneself (as in pricking one's own finger in order to drawblood) is a difficult act for many people.

The elicitation of strong activation from the supervisory atten-tional mechanism is not necessarily unpleasant. Indeed, many sports andgames seem to be attractive because they do necessitate such strongactivation. In this case "concentration" is perhaps the more appropri-ate experiential equivalent rather than "will." In addition, will isnot just a matter of attention to actions. As Roy D'Andrade (personal

communication) has pointed out, a willed act demands not only strongattentional activation, it also depends on the existence of a "mandated

decision," independent of one's attending, a conscious knowledge thatthe particular end is to be attained. This mandate, in our view, would

be required before the supervisory attentional mechanisms will producetheir desired activation output. However the critical point for thepresent argument is that the phenomenal distinction between willed andideo-motor acts flow from separation of the supervisory attentionalmechanisms from the systems they oversee. The phenomenology of atten-tion can be understood through a theory of mechanism.


Summary

We present a possible framework for considering the role of atten-

tion in the control of action. In this, we have emphasized severalthings. First, because people usually do numerous activities during a

given time period, a major concern for the control of action becomes how

the selection of the individual components occurs at appropriate times,

allowing co-operative actions to co-occur and avoiding conflicting ones.Second, there is the importance of the initiation of action. We assign

the basic role of the attentional mechanisms to the initiation of action(as opposed to perceptual analysis -- where the bulk of the experiments

have been performed -- or to thought and decision processes). By"action" we include the initiation of both internal processing actions

and external control of effectors. Third, we emphasize that manyactivities can be carried out autonomously, without the need for cons-

cious or attentional control, by means of well-specified, horizontal

thread processing components. It is only in cases where the action

sequences are ill-specified, or in situations that are judged to be

critical or dangerous that deliberate attentional control is required.

In this case, we suggest that supervisory attentional mechanisms of lim-

ited capacity oversee the operation of the system, monitoring for the

success of the activity, and biasing the selection and suppression of

component schemas by altering the activation values of those schemas.

We specify that such attentional control does not act directly, but only

indirectly through the mediation of activation value.

By this scheme, there are two forms of interference likely to beencountered in the production of simultaneous tasks. The two forms

correspond to (a) interference among horizontal threads when they mustcompete for use of overlapping processing mechanisms and to (b)

interference among the vertical thread activations when they must be

produced by the supervisory attentional mechanism. The first form of

interference -- horizontal thread interference -- is related to "struc-

tural interference," but on our approach this is mediated by the opera-

tion of a mechanism, contention scheduling, that selects from poten-

tially competing actions using only the activation levels of the schemas

that control them. The second form of interference -- vertical thread

interference -- is more a form of "resource interference."

There are two different modes for the control of action and, like

the distinction between forms of interference, they also correspond to

the difference between horizontal and vertical thread control. Thus,

when processing sequences are sufficiently well specified that they can

be controlled entirely by horizontal thread operations, they correspond

to "automatic" actions. When conditions do not permit unsupervised hor-

izontal control (or when the person deliberately invokes attentional

processes to the action sequence), then the operations correspond to

processing under "conscious control" or "willed" action.

Norman/ShallIce Attention to Action


Reference Notes

1. Bellman, K. The conflict behavior of the lizard, SceloporusOccidentalis, and its implication for the organization of motorbehavior. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Cali-fornia, San Diego, 1979.

2. Gentner, D. R., Grudin, J., & Conway, E. Finger movements in tran-

scription typing. Center for Human Information Processing, Univer-sity of California, San Diego. CHIP Technical Report, 1980.

3. Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. Simulating a skilled typist: Astudy of skilled cognitive-motor performance. Unpublished

manuscript, The University of California, San Diego, 1980.

!1



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CHIP Technical Report List

1. David M. Green and William J. McGill. On the equivalence of detection probabilities and well known statis-tical quantities. October, 1969.

2. Donald A. Norman. Comments on the information structure of memory. October, 1969.

3. Norman H. Anderson. Functional measurement and psychophysical judgment. October, 1969.

4. James C. Shanteau. An additive decision-making model for sequential estimation and inference judgments.October, 1969.

5. Norman H. Anderson. Averaging model applied to the size-weight illusion. October, 1969.

6. Norman H. Anderson and James C. Shanteau. Information integration in risky decision making. Novembex, 1969.

7. George Mandler, Richard H. Meltzer, Zena Pearlstone. The structure of recognition. Effects of list tagsand of acoustic and semantic confusion. November, 1969.

8. Dominic W. Massaro. Perceptual processes and forgetting in memory tasks. January, 1970.

9. Daniel Graboi. Searching for targets: The effects of specific practice. February, 1970.

10. James H. Patterson and David M. Creen. Discrimination of transient signals having identical energy spectra.

February, 1970.

11. Donald A. Norman. Remembrance of things past. June, 1970.

12. Norman HI. Anderson. Integration theory and attitude change. August, 1970.

13. A.D. Baddeley and J.R. Ecob. Reaction time and short-term memory: A trace strength alternative to the high-speed exhaustive scanning hypothesis. November, 1970.

14. A.D. Baddeley. Retrieval rules and semantic coding in short-term memory. December, 1970.

15. Roy D. Patterson. Residue pitch as a function of the number and relative phase of the component sinusoids.

March, 19-1.

16. George Mandler and Marilyn A. Borges. Effects of list differentiation, category membership and prior recallon recognition. May, 1971.

17. David L. Rumelhart, Peter I. Lindsay, and Donald A. Norman. A process model for long-term memory. May, 1971.

18. David L. Rumelhart and *tele A. Abrahamson. Toward a theory of analogical reasoning. July, 1971.

19. Martin F. Kaplan. How r:-,soonse dispositions integrate with stimulus information. August, 1971.

20. Martin F. Kaplan and Norman H1. Anderson. Comparison of information integration and reinforcement models forinterpersonal attraction. August, 1971.

:. idvi lree:i .ud P. IhnL an nteC. Speed-accuracy tradeoff in auditory detection. September, 1971.

, uIn(elhart. A nilticomponent theory of confusion amon, briefly exposed alphabetic characters.N.nei' liern lql.I

2:. \or,':n i. andr' rod i rthnr .J. J:!rkas. New light on order effects in attitude change. March, 1972.

2-1. Nrr:mn I. Nmi!,..n, . Information integration theory: A brief survey. April, 1972.

-, on.I .A. %'rr, 1. i"'r ,rv, Inotledge, and the answerinp of questions. May, 1972.

,. vid I. lmis. Avn,.raminm': An empirical validity criterion for magnitude estimation.

\orman Ii. Andmrson. iross-task validation of functional measurement. June, 1972.

S. 'a,.id I. Pumelhart and Patricia Siple. The process of recognizing tachistoscopically presented words.A pust . 19'2.

2s. Ibbe Ii. l1bhsn and lichard Bowers. The effects of proportion of risky to conservative arguments iii a

group discussion on risky shift. September, 1972.

Lbc B. 'esen ild Michael Haney. Flirting with death: Variables affecting risk taking or. our nation's

h i phwa, . Sept ember, 1972.

30. Norman I. Aners,,i. Algebraic models in perception. November, 1972.

31. Norman H1. Anlerson. Conitive algebra: Information integration applied to social attribution. December,

1972.

32. Jean 'I. !!aridler ind ;ancy I.. Stein. Recall recognition of pictures by children as a function of organiza-

tion amd of ditractor similarity. January, 1973.

33. David I.. Rurelhart inid Donald A. Norman. Active semantic networks as a model of human memory.

Marc Flisenstadt ard Yaakov Kareev. Towards a model of human game playing. June, 1973.

34. (;eoree Mandler. ' enorv storaye and retrieval: Some limits on the reach of attention and consciousness.

July. 1973.

35. Kent L. Norman. A method of maximum likelihood estimation for stimulus integration theory. August, 1973.

36. Yjakov Kareev. A model of human game playing. Aueust, 1973.

37. Ponald A. Norman. (opnitive organization and learning. August, 1973.

3i8. The (enter for Human Information Processing: A Five Year Report - 1968-73.

39. Larry D. Rosen and J. Edward Russo. Binary processing in multi-alternative choice. October, 1973.

40. Samuel Himmelfarb and Norman H. Anderson. Integration theory analysis of opinion attribution. December,1973.

41. George Mandler. Consciousness: Respectable, useful, and probably necessary. March, 1974.

42. Norman H. Anderson. The problem of change-of-meaning. June, 1974.

43. Norman It. Anderson. Methods for studying information integration. June, 1974.

44. Norman H. Anderson. Basic experiments in person perception. June, 1974.

45. Norman H. Anderson. Algebraic models for information integration. June, 1974.

46. Ebbe B. Ebbesen and Vladimir J. Kone~ni. Cognitive algebra in legal decision making. September, 1974.

47. Norman H. Anderson. Equity judgments as information integration.Arthur J. Farkas and Norman H. Anderson. Input summaion and equity summation in multi-cue equity judgments.

December, 1974.

48. George Mandler and Arthur Graesser II. Dimensional analysis and the locus of organization. January, 1975.

49. James L. McClelland. Preliminary letter identification in the perception of words and nonwords. April, 1975.

S0. Donald A. Norman and Daniel G. Bobrow. On the role of active memory processes in perception and cognition.May, 1975.

51. J. Edward Russo. The value of unit price information. An information processing analysis of point-of-purchasedecisions. June, 1975.

52. Elissa L. Newport. Motherese: The speech of mothers to young children. August, 1975.

53. Norman H. Anderson and Cheryl C. Graesser. An information integration analysis of attitude change in group

discussion. September, 1975.

54. lynn A. Cooper. Demonstration of a mental analog of an external rotation.lynn A. Cooper and Peter Podgorny. Mental transformations and visual comparison processes: Effects of com-

plexity and similarity. October, 1975.

55. David E. Rumelhart and Andrew Ortony. The representation of knowledge in memory. January, 1976.

56. David E. Rumelhart. Toward an interactive model of reading. March, 1976.

57. Jean M. Mandler, Nancy S. Johnson, and Marsha DeForest. A structural analysis of stories and their recall:From "Once upon a time" to "Happily ever after". March, 1976.

58. David E. Rumelhart. Understanding and summarizing brief stories. April, 1976.

59. Lynn A. Cooper and Roger N. Shepard. Transformations on representations of objects in space. April, 1976.

60. George Mandler. Some attempts to study the rotation and reversal of integrated motor patterns. May, 1976.

61. Norman H. Anderson. Problems in using analysis of variance in balance theory. June, 1976.

62. Norman 11. Anderson. Social perception and cognition. July, 1976.

63. David L. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. Accretion, tuning and restructuring: Three modes of learning.August, 1976.

64. George Mandler. Memory research reconsidered: A critical view of traditional methods and distinctions.September, 1976.

65. Norman H. Anderson and Michael D. Klitzner. Measurement of motivation.Michael P. Klitzner and Norman H. Anderson. Motivation x expectancy x value: A functional measurement ap-

proach. November, 1976.

66. Vladimir J. Koneni. Some social, emotional, and cognitive determinants of aesthetic preference for melodiesin complexity. December, 1976.

67. Hugh Mehan, Courtney B. Cazden, LaDonna Coles, Sue Fisher, Nick Maroules. The social organization of class-room lessons. December, 1976.

67a. Hugh Mehan, Courtney B. Cazden, LaDonna Coles, Sue Fisher, Nick Maroules. Appendices to the social organiza-tion of classroom lessons. December, 1976.

68. Norman H1. Anderson. Integration theory applied to cognitive responses and attitudes. December, 1976.

69. Norman II. Anderson and Diane 0. Cuneo. The height + width rale in children's judgments of quantity. June,1977.

Norman II. Anderson and Clifford H. Butzin. Children's judgments of equity. June, 1977.

70. Donald R. (;entner and Donald A. Norman. The FLOW tutor: Schemas for tutoring. June, 1977.

71. George Mandler. Organization and repetition: An extension of organizational principles with special referenceto rote learning. May, 1977.

72. Manuel leon. Coordination of intent and consequence information in children's moral judgements. August, 1977.

73. Ted Supalla and Elissa L. Newport. How many seats in a chair? The derivation of nouns and verbs in AmericanSign Language. November, 1977.

74. Donald A. Norman and Daniel G. Bobrow. Descriptions: A basis for memory acquisition and retrieval. November,1977.

75. Michael D. Williams. The process of retrieval from very long term memory. September, 1978.

76. Jean M. Mandler. Categorical and schematic organization in memory. October, 1978.F 77. James L. McClelland. On time relations of mental processes: A framework for analyzing processes in cascade.October, 1978.

78. Jean M. Mandler and Marsha DeForest. Developmental invariance in story recall. November, 1978.Jean M. Mandler, Sylvia Scribner, Michael Cole, and Marsha DeForest. Cross-cultural invariance in story

recall. November, 1978.

79. David E. Rumelhart. Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. December, 1978.80. Nancy S. Johnson and Jean M. Mandler. A tale of two structures: Underlying and surface forms in stories.

January, 1979.81. David E. Rumelhart. Analogical processes and procedural representations. February, 1979.82. Ross A. Bott. A study of complex learning: Theory and methodologies. March, 1979.83. Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition. Toward a unified approach to problems of culture and cognition.

May, 1979.84. George Mandler and Lawrence W. Barsalou. Steady state memory: What does the one-shot experiment assess?

May, 1979.

85. Norman H. Anderson. Introduction to cognitive algebra. June, 1979.86. Edited by Michael Cole, Edwin Hutchins, James Levin and Naomi Miyake. Naturalistic problem solving and

microcomputers. Report of a Conference. June, 1979.87. Donald A. Norman. Twelve issues for cognitive science. October, 1979.88. Donald A. Norman. Slips of the mind and an outline for a theory of action. November, 1979.89. The Center for Human Information Processing: A Description and a Five-Year Report (1974-1979). November,

1979.

90. Michael Cole and Peg Griffin. Cultural amplifiers reconsidered. December, 1979.91. James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart. An interactive activation model of the effect of context in

perception. Part 1. April, 1980.92. James L. McClelland and J.K. O'Regan. The role of expectations in the use of peripheral visual information

in reading. February, 1980.

93. Edwin Hutchins. Conceptual structures of Caroline Island navigation. May, 1980,94. Friedrich Wilkening and Norman H. Anderson. Comparison of two rule assessment methodologies for studying

cognitive development. June, 1980.

95. David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland. An interactive activation model of the effect of context inperception. Part I1. August, 1980.

96. Jean M. Mandler. Structural invariants in development. September, 1980.

97. David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman. Analogical processes in learning. October, 198,).98. James A. Levin and Yaakov Kareev. Personal computers and education: The challenge t' schools. November,

1980.

99. Donald A. Norman and Tim Shallice. Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior.December, 1980.

Note: Requests for CHIP reports should be addressed to the author. Reports are also available through theLibrary Loan Service of the University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093.

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