assistance coordination unit

Information Management Unit

The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) aims to strengthen the decision-making capacity of aid actors responding to the Syrian crisis. This is done through collecting, analyzing and sharing information on the humanitarian situation in Syria. To this end, the Assistance Coordination Unit through the Information Management Unit established a wide network of enumerators who have been recruited de-pending on specific criteria such as education level, association with information sources and ability to work and communicate under various conditions. IMU collects data that is difficult to reach by other active international aid actors, and publishes different types of in-formation products such as DYNAMO needs assessment, IDP camps monitoring reports, thematic reports, red flag, online Interactive reports, monthly food price index and maps.

Assistance Coordination Unit

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SummaryIntroductionMethodologyBackgroundAr-Raqqa City Tell Abiad DistrictPossible Scenarios of the Upcoming BattleA. From the westB. From the NorthC. Besieging Ar-Raqqa CityRoad Accessibility Status DemographyHealthMedical StaffHealth PrioritiesFood SecurityFood SeverityBakeriesFood PrioritiesEducation SectorEducation PrioritiesWater, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector - WASHWASH PrioritiesShelter SectorShelter PrioritiesNon-Food Items SectorNon-Food Items PrioritiesAgriculture and Livestock SectorServices SectorConclusionAnnex A: Medicament Needs

CONTENTS


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020607080924

Figure 01: Population and IDP NumbersFigure 02: Number of DoctorsFigure 03: Health PrioritiesFigure 04: Food Severity in Ar-Raqqa GovernorateFigure 05: Food PrioritiesFigure 06: Number of SchoolsFigure 07: Number of Teachers in Tell AbiadFigure 08: Education PrioritiesFigure 09: Validity of Drinking WaterFigure 10: WASH PrioritiesFigure 11: Percentage of Damaged HousesFigure 12: Shelter PrioritiesFigure 13: Non-Food Items SeverityFigure 14: NFI PrioritiesFigure 15: Problems of Agriculture

Figure 16: Percentages of Applied IrrigationFigure 17: Problems of Livestock Methods

Map 1: Ar_Raqqa GovernorateMap 2: Scenario 1Map 3: Scenario 2Map 4: Scenario 3Map 5: Road Accessibility StatusMap 6: Light Night Mabs

LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF Maps

ACUBMSGoSIDP

IMUINGO

ISILNFI

NSANSAG

PCPiNPKK

WASHWHO

Assistance Coordination UnitBreast Milk SubstituteGovernment of SyriaInternally Displaced PersonInformation Management Unit

International Non-Governmental OrganizationIslamic State of Iraq and LevantNon-Food ItemNon-State ArmedNon-State Armed GroupProduction CapacityPeople in Need

Kurdistan Worker’s PartyWater, Sanitation, and Hygiene

World Health Organization

LIST OF ACRONYMS

For more than three years, no humanitarian actions were implemented in the governorate of Ar_Raqqa, where all international organizations and donating parties have stopped providing any kind of assistance leading to the deterioration of the living and humanitarian situation there.

In the near future, it is likely that military forces will attempt to liberate Ar_Raqqa Gover-norate from ISIL control, which will lead for further conflict and will cause significant dis-placement of the population in the area. If this occurs, the liberation of this governorate and the transition of all its affairs to civil associations will enable greater accessibility of humanitarian organizations, who will be able to resume their work.

In anticipation of this upcoming military campaign, the Information Management Unit (IMU) of the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) has developed a report on the current situation in Ar_Raqqa Governorate. Three possible displacement scenarios are presented in this report depending on the direction of advance of forces engaged in the conflict. The report as well covers the road situation and associated accessibility inside and outside the governorate.

Drawing on primary data collected over the last 3 months by the IMU for the DYNAMO 6 report, this report addresses a number of areas of humanitarian concern. This is so that those humanitarian organizations considering supporting the population of the Ar_Raqqa Governorate after the conflict subsides and access becomes possible can develop more considered plans. The report covers the areas of demography, health, food security, edu-cation, WASH, Shelter, Non Food Items, agriculture and livestock, electricity and commu-nications.

The current population of Ar-Raqqa Governorate is 1,316,947 individuals, where more than 60% of the population in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts have been deliberately displaced. The lack of a blood bank in the governorate is a major issue as is the lack of medical facili-ties in the sub-districts of Jurneyyeh, Karama, and Mansura, where residents need to travel to Ar_Raqqa City for medical treatment. The population of Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts are facing a severe food security situation. This is in contrast to ISIL-held areas, where the majority of the bakeries are functioning and provide bread to the population at subsidized prices. In addition, none of the schools in Ar_Raqqa Governorate are currently working, with the exception of 20 poorly performing schools in Tell Abiad Sub-district, with 2,300 students.

Summary

01


Ar-Raqqa

Aleppo

Homs

Deir-ez-Zor

Hama

Al-Hassakeh

Suluk

Kisreh

Sokhneh

MansuraSabka

Sarin

Ar-Raqqa

Al-Khafsa

Deir-ez-Zor

Ras Al Ain

Karama

Tabni

Oqeirbat

Ein Issa

Menbij

Jurneyyeh

Muhasan

As-Saan

Ain al Arab

Maskana

Tell Abiad

Jarablus

Areesheh

Abu Qalqal

Tadmor

Khanaser

Lower Shyookh

Al-Hasakeh

Maadan

Jeb Ej-JarrahAl Mayadin

Al-Thawrah

Rasm Haram El-Imam

Suruç

HarranKarkamış

Akçakale

SerêkaniyêCeylanpınarTurkey

Homs

Aleppo

Deir-ez-ZorHama

Al-Hassakeh

Ar-Raqqa

Rural Damascus

Idleb

Dar'aAs-Sweida

Lattakia

Tartous

QuneitraDamascus IRAQ

JORDAN

TURKEY

International boundariesGovernorate boundaries

Sub-district boundariesAr-Raqqa Sub-district

Map 1: Ar_Raqqa Governorate

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The Information Management Unit (IMU) has four enumerators in Ar-Raqqa Governorate, namely Suluk, Ein Issa, Tell Abiad, and Ar-Raqqa City, who are working undercover for security reasons in those areas. Primary data was collected using the DYNAMO 6.0 ques-tionnaire to assess the humanitarian situation during the months of August, September, and October 2016 from four sub-districts namely Suluk, Ein Issa, Tell Abiad, and Ar-Raqqa City. Questions were structured to gain a sense of priorities and needs of residents. Addi-tionally, EWARN and WASH programs at Assistance Coordination Unit have provided data for WASH and Health sectors in the other unassessed six sub-districts by IMU enumera-tors. Therefore, Demography, health, and WASH sectors cover the whole Governorate of Ar-Raqqa with its ten sub-districts. Whereas, Food Security, Education, Shelter, NFIs and Services sectors cover the four previously mentioned sub-districts.

Ar-Raqqa Governorate is located in the North of Syria on Syrian-Turkish borders; it is divided into three districts that contain ten sub-districts. According to 2011 statistics, the approximate number of its population is 833,293 people, but it should be noted that Ar-Raqqa Governorate contained many people from other governorates, so the actual number is much bigger than the mentioned number. Ar-Raqqa and new Al- Thawrah cities were highly populated, especially after building Euphrates Dam, as there were many civilians from other governorates who were employed in the dam facilities but registered in other areas.

The Syrian Regime did not expect that the population of Ar_Raqqa City will be engaged in the civil uprising against him. Therefore, he had transferred all his forces from Ar-Raqqa to another governorate, which facilitated the control of this governorate by NSAG Opposition factions.

This thematic report presents the current situation of Ar-Raqqa Governorate, including the succession of events since the beginning of Syrian crisis in March 2011 and till the moment of writing this report. Three possible scenarios of the upcoming battle in Ar-Raqqa City are presented, the possible displacement movement directions from the city of Ar-Raqqa, and the findings which represent a general account of the humanitarian situation only in the assessed sub-districts. The presented key findings are analyzed using the collected primary data by IMU enumerators with DYNAMO 6 questionnaire.

Methodology

Background

Introduction

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Ar-Raqqa City

Tell Abiad District

Ar-Raqqa City went out of the regime’s control on March 4, 2013, and was controlled by NSAG forces. GoS has used barrel bombs, long-distance rockets and all kinds of possible weapons to bomb this city targeting its civilian population in markets and gathering places to kill the biggest number of residents.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have appeared in the city as a control force after fighting with armed opposition groups since August 15, 2013, which ended with the retreat of opposition forces from the city. As of December 29, 2013, ISIL forces have started to control the whole city of Ar-Raqqa and threw out all NSAG factions from there, ending up with the complete control of ISIL forces of Ar-Raqqa City.

As of August 1, 2012, Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG) took control over Suluk Sub-dis-trict located in Ar-Raqqa Governorate from Government of Syria (GoS) forces. Tell Abiad border crossing which is strategically significant was controlled by NSAG forces as well, on 19 September 2012. On 1 November 2012 GoS forces had targeted Turkish Akja Town with artillery killing a whole family, Turkish forces reacted and targeted the source of bombing leading to the retreat of artillery troop from Ali Bajelieh village to brigade 93 within Ein Issa sub-district.

As of 10 May 2013 ISIL and some NSAG forces clashed ending with imposing ISIL influence of Tell Abiad district, afterward ISIL forces started arresting the rebel fighters in the area. On 14 January 2014, ISIL took full control of the whole district eliminating any presence of NSAG forces in the area.

ISIL control has expanded towards Ain Al Arab Sub-district in Aleppo Governorate con-trolling more than 70% of the Ain Al Arab City (Kobany) and reached Morshed Binar border crossing. The International Coalition had started shelling ISIL-held areas to enable regain-ing control of Kobany by the Kurds. Afterward, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) control has expanded with the support of coalition air strikes to Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts on 10 June 2015. The International Coalition had been targeting villages with bombing and heavy artillery before the advance of PKK forces there, considering that PKK had deliberately displaced 90% of those sub-districts’ populations under the premise of the “war on terror.” There are around 4,500 civilians detained in PKK prisons located in Ras Al Ain in Al-Ha-sakeh Governorate; Tell Abiad in Ar-Raqqa Governorate; and Ain Al Arab in Aleppo Gov-ernorate. Additionally, PKK fighters were intentionally depopulating many villages after looting and robbing them.

04Information Management Unit

Possible Scenarios of the Upcoming Battle and the Expected Displace-ment Movements

In Case of the Beginning of the Battle, The Displacement Movement Will Depend on the Advance Direction of the Forces that will Participate in Taking Control over Ar-Raqqa City

Ar-Raqqa is the second important city for ISIL after Mosul City in Iraq, and the most im-portant city in Syria, therefore, ISIL will not give up this city without fighting. Fears rise among the civilian population and IDPs in Ar-Raqqa City from the war that may menace over this territory, especially under the current circumstances and the foreign statements which predict a long-term battle in Ar-Raqqa City.

Ar-Raqqa City is considered one of the newly-built cities in Syria and contains huge orga-nized residential blocks that help ISIL fighters mobilize and defend themselves for a long time. It is difficult to besiege this city, as it is flat land bounded by the Euphrates River on the south. After the city had gone out of regime’s control on 4 March 2013, the military zones of squad 17 and brigade 93 remained under the control of Syrian regime until 25 July 2014, and still, the civilians and opposition factions were moving freely and found al-ternative ways to enter the city. It should be noted that the city contains a big number of foreign fighters who had settled in houses delivered from ISIL forces, so it is difficult to pull them out of there.

The majority of the population of Ar-Raqqa City is from the surrounding villages who own farms. Then they will move back to their place of origin in case the battle starts. This situa-tion is similar to the displacement movement that had started during the NSAG control of the city. Only the original population will remain in the city of Ar-Raqqa, whose percentage does not exceed 30%.

The second displacement depends on the conflicting forces direction progress; here we have three possible scenarios:

From the west, NSA Dir ’ Al Furat Forces might fight on a large land area including the Eastern Aleppo countryside, to be able to reach Jurneyyeh Sub-district located in the east of Ar-Raqqa City. This possible battle will push the civilian population to be displaced towards the Northern countryside of Ar-Raqqa, i.e., to the Kurdish-held sub-districts of Suluk, Ein Issa, and Tell Abiad. A small part of the civilians may move towards the western countryside of Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, and another part may move towards Al-Hasakeh Countryside. Most probably that GoS and ISIL checkpoints will prevent the civilians to move towards Rural Hama.

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Information Management Unit 04

Governorate center

District center

Sub-district center

Communities

Displacement direction Forces progress direction

Kurdish forces

ISIL

FSA

Contested area

Map 2: Scenario 1

Kisreh

MansuraSabka

Sarin

Sokhneh

Ar-Raqqa

Ras Al Ain

Deir-ez-Zor

Karama

Tabni

Al-Khafsa

Oqeirbat

Menbij

Ain al Arab

Maskana

Al-Khafsa

Muhasan

As-Saan

Areesheh

Abu Qalqal

Tal Tamer

Lower Shyookh

Al-Hasakeh

MaadanAl-Thawrah

Khanaser

Khasham

Suruç

HarranKarkamış

Akçakale

SerêkaniyêCeylanpınar

Hama

Sahl

Ayuj

Tawi

Kanu

Hora

Amin

Akel

Hiba

Alia

Iweh

Tiba

Dadu

Zazu

Jaber

Daama

ModarNasraBader

Rahbi

Jabli

Ojeil

Laqta

Ghota

Hadba

Jalaa

Faraa

Fteih

Kalta

Royan

Abadi

Elleh

Safra

Hamra

Krein

Laqta

Fatsa

Mohra

Umaya

Sufan

Dehiz

Makef

Aysha

MalehArbid

Kisum

KatunZaydi

Farja

HardanSweida

Leksun

Shaher

DahlehRaddeh

Rabyeh

Yaarub

Kardus

Milsun

AbbaraSafyan

Hettin

Yarmuk

Yamama

Zahera Berani

Widyan

Hisheh

Kinana

Jeiber

DahwehRamleh

Wasta

Madhir

Madlaj Hanano

Maghar

Zenbaq

Haksha

Kattar

Shakil

HawasiThiban

Yabseh AbatinSaideh

Masarra

Moezleh

Kdeiran

Andalus

Rohayat

Rabee'a

Tweilah

Hazimeh

Atshana

Khayala

Mreiran

Zarzuri

Shreian

Bisrawi

Dukhan

Mweileh

Nafileh

Emeirat MansuraSefsafa

Jeidine

Ramthan

Kafifeh

Saramda

Thadyen

Ghizlan

Bteiman

Bir Asi

Bweider

Shalkhi

BreighiKhabura

BaladiyaAkeirshi

Tishrine

Mashrafa Bir Said

Bir ArabSehrijeh

Ajajiyeh

Mahmudli

Ghamamiz

Sharkrak

Bir Khat

Hijazieh

Nasriyeh

Bir Issa

Ghweilan

Abu Haya

Rgheilan

Khneifis

Abu Haye

Ras Kbir

Ojet Btir

Abu Touta

Rahmaniya

Abu Suseh

Adnaniyeh

Hilo Abed

Abu RajabKatuniyeh

Mustadira

Thaheriya

Fakhikheh

Bir Enbaj

Farhaniya

Sabe Jfar

Shamandur

Tal Hamam

Um Harmal

Rashidiyeh

Jamailiyeh

Falah Rabu

Abu Sakhra

Tal Othman

Bir Hadleh

Big Yamama

Qaysariyeh

Um Elhweyeh

Tawi Rumman

Rajm Halawa

Shams Eldin

Bir Shallal

Bir Khattab

Debsi Afnan

Abu Horaira

Debsi Faraj

Abu Nituleh

Arida Ojeil

Bab Elkheir

Big Maghalla

Upper Khneiz

Shahid EllahRajm Elhamam

Bir Elkhozam

Big Khweireh

Eastern Serb

Jdidet Khabur

Hweijet Shnan

Thulth Khneiz

Big Sweidiyeh

Talet Elansar

Bir Abu Kubra

Sheib Eldakar

Abu Misnatein

Kherbet Hadla

Hteil Elhomor

Al-Malikeyyeh

Bir Elsabkhawi

Western Jaabar

Badiat Elshoaa

Hweijet Halawa

Bir Elatshaneh

Eastern Zamleh

Wastet Elhijan

Kherbet Elnaqa

Mjeibnet Elamya

Eastern Jaabar

Eastern Ghazala

Kherbet Elbeida

Abu Haye El Hoz

Qadessiyeh Kajla

Abu Kbee - West

Tal Elsamen DahhamZarijiyet Shams Eldin

Sfin - Kisret Mohammed Agha

Maadan

Ein Issa

Governorate boundaries

Turkey

Homs

Aleppo

Deir-ez-ZorHama

Al-Hassakeh

Ar-Raqqa

Rural Damascus

Idleb

Dar'aAs-Sweida

Lattakia

Tartous

QuneitraDamascus

IRAQ

JORDAN

TURKEY Governorate centerDistrict centerSub-district centerCommunitiesKurdish forcesISILFSAContested area

Displacement directionForces progress direction

Deir-ez-zor Governorate

HamaGovernorate

JarablusTell Abiad

Ein Issa Suluk

Jurneyyeh

Al-HasakehGovernorate

06Information Management Unit

From the North, namely from Tell Abiad progress. In this case, the possible ongoing clashes, within the second displacement stage, will force the civilians to be displaced towards the western countryside of Deir-ez-Zor Governorate and the Al-Hasakeh Countryside. The residents will not be able to move towards the Northern countryside of Ar-Raqqa Governorate. On the other hand, this military option may allow the displacement of the civilians towards Jarablus Sub-district, but not through Kurdish-held territories. NSAG-held Jarablus Sub-district is considered the best pos-sible option for displacement, as it is not targeted with bombing and relatively secure at this time.

b

Suluk

MansuraSabka

Sarin

Kisreh

Al-Khafsa

Sokhneh

Ar-Raqqa

Karama

Tabni

Deir-ez-Zor

Ras Al Ain

Oqeirbat

Menbij

Ein Issa

Jurneyyeh

As-Saan

Khanaser

Ain al Arab

Maskana

Abu QalqalA'rima

Ghandorah

Tadaf

Lower Shyookh

As Safira

Muhasan

Maadan

Ar-Ra'ee

Dayr Hafir

Rasm Haram El-Imam Areesheh

Al-Thawrah

Jeb Ej-Jarrah

Al Bab

SuruçNizip

Harran

Birecik

Karkamış

Akçakale


Hama

Sahl

Ayuj

Tawi

Kanu

Hora

Amin

Akel

Hiba

Alia

Iweh

Tiba

Dadu

Zazu

Daama

ModarNasraBader

Rahbi

Jabli

Ojeil

Laqta

Ghota

HadbaJalaa

Faraa

Fteih

Kalta

Royan

Abadi

Elleh

Safra

Hamra

Krein

Laqta

Fatsa

Mohra

Umaya

Sufan

Dehiz

Makef

AyshaMaleh

Arbid

Kisum

KatunZaydi

Farja

HardanSweida

Leksun

Shaher

DahlehRaddeh

Rabyeh

Yaarub

Kardus

Milsun

AbbaraSafyan

Hettin

Yarmuk

Yamama

Zahera Berani

Widyan

Hisheh

Kinana

Jeiber

DahwehRamleh

Wasta

Madhir

MadlajHanano

Maghar

JahjahZenbaq

Kattar

Shakil

HawasiThiban

Yabseh AbatinSaideh

Masarra

Moezleh

Kdeiran

Andalus

Rohayat

Rabee'a

Tweilah

Hazimeh

Atshana

Khayala

Zarzuri

Shreian

Bisrawi

Dukhan

Mweileh

Nafileh

Emeirat Mansura

Jeidine

Ramthan

Kafifeh

Saramda

Thadyen

Ghizlan

Bteiman

Bir Asi

Bweider

Shalkhi

BreighiKhabura

BaladiyaAkeirshi

Tishrine

Mashrafa Bir Said

Bir ArabSehrijeh

Ajajiyeh

Mahmudli

Ghamamiz

Sharkrak

Bir Khat

Nasriyeh

Ghweilan

Abu Haya

Rgheilan

Khneifis

Abu Haye

Ras Kbir

Ojet Btir

Abu Touta

Rahmaniya

Abu Suseh

Adnaniyeh

Abu Rajab

Thaheriya

Fakhikheh

Bir Enbaj

Farhaniya

Sabe Jfar

Shamandur

Tal Hamam

Um Harmal

Rashidiyeh

Jamailiyeh

Falah Rabu

Abu Sakhra

Tal Othman

Bir Hadleh

Big Yamama

Um Elhweyeh

Tawi Rumman

Shams Eldin

Bir Shallal

Bir Khattab

Abu Horaira

Debsi Faraj

Abu Nituleh

Bab Elkheir

Big Maghalla

Upper Khneiz

Rajm Elhamam

Eastern Serb

Hweijet Shnan

Thulth Khneiz

Big Sweidiyeh

Bir Abu Kubra

Sheib Eldakar

Abu Misnatein

Kherbet Hadla

Hteil Elhomor

Al-Malikeyyeh

Bir Elsabkhawi

Western Jaabar

Badiat Elshoaa

Hweijet Halawa

Bir Elatshaneh

Eastern Zamleh

Kherbet Elnaqa

Mjeibnet Elamya

Eastern Jaabar

Kherbet Elbeida

Qadessiyeh Kajla

Abu Kbee - West

Aslim Elbarashmeh

Maadan

Ein Issa

Turkey

Homs

Aleppo

Deir-ez-ZorHama

Al-Hassakeh

Ar-Raqqa

Rural Damascus

Idleb

Dar'aAs-Sweida

Lattakia

Tartous

QuneitraDamascus

IRAQ

JORDAN

TURKEY

Kurdish forcesISILFSASyrian regimeContested area


Governorate boundaries Governorate centerDistrict centerSub-district centerCommunities


Jarablus

Tell Abiad


Map 3: Scenario 2

07


Besieging Ar-Raqqa City, this possibility may work in case of the agreement of all control forces in Al-Hasakeh Governorate, Northern Ar-Raqqa Countryside, and the Eastern Aleppo Country-side, namely the NSA Kurdish Forces and Dir ’ Al Furat Forces. Hence, the displacement move-ments will be towards the western countryside of Deir-ez-Zor Governorate only.

The third and the least possible option is the alliance of NSAG and Kurdish forces, as clashes are still ongoing between those adversaries till now.

c

Map 4: Scenario 3

Suluk

MansuraSabka

Sarin

Kisreh

Al-Khafsa

Sokhneh

Ar-Raqqa

Karama

Tabni

Deir-ez-Zor

Ras Al Ain

Oqeirbat

Menbij

Ein Issa

Jurneyyeh

As-Saan

Khanaser

Ain al Arab

Maskana

Abu QalqalA'rima

Ghandorah

Tadaf

Lower Shyookh

As Safira

Muhasan

Maadan

Ar-Ra'ee

Dayr Hafir

Rasm Haram El-Imam Areesheh

Al-Thawrah

Jeb Ej-Jarrah

Al Bab

SuruçNizip

Harran

Birecik

Karkamış

Akçakale


Hama

Sahl

Ayuj

Tawi

Kanu

Hora

Amin

Akel

Hiba

Alia

Iweh

Tiba

Dadu

Zazu

Daama

ModarNasraBader

Rahbi

Jabli

Ojeil

Laqta

Ghota

HadbaJalaa

Faraa

Fteih

Kalta

Royan

Abadi

Elleh

Safra

Hamra

Krein

Laqta

Fatsa

Mohra

Umaya

Sufan

Dehiz

Makef

AyshaMaleh

Arbid

Kisum

KatunZaydi

Farja

HardanSweida

Leksun

Shaher

DahlehRaddeh

Rabyeh

Yaarub

Kardus

Milsun

AbbaraSafyan

Hettin

Yarmuk

Yamama

Zahera Berani

Widyan

Hisheh

Kinana

Jeiber

DahwehRamleh

Wasta

Madhir

MadlajHanano

Maghar

JahjahZenbaq

Kattar

Shakil

HawasiThiban

Yabseh AbatinSaideh

Masarra

Moezleh

Kdeiran

Andalus

Rohayat

Rabee'a

Tweilah

Hazimeh

Atshana

Khayala

Zarzuri

Shreian

Bisrawi

Dukhan

Mweileh

Nafileh

Emeirat Mansura

Jeidine

Ramthan

Kafifeh

Saramda

Thadyen

Ghizlan

Bteiman

Bir Asi

Bweider

Shalkhi

BreighiKhabura

BaladiyaAkeirshi

Tishrine

Mashrafa Bir Said

Bir ArabSehrijeh

Ajajiyeh

Mahmudli

Ghamamiz

Sharkrak

Bir Khat

Nasriyeh

Ghweilan

Abu Haya

Rgheilan

Khneifis

Abu Haye

Ras Kbir

Ojet Btir

Abu Touta

Rahmaniya

Abu Suseh

Adnaniyeh

Abu Rajab

Thaheriya

Fakhikheh

Bir Enbaj

Farhaniya

Sabe Jfar

Shamandur

Tal Hamam

Um Harmal

Rashidiyeh

Jamailiyeh

Falah Rabu

Abu Sakhra

Tal Othman

Bir Hadleh

Big Yamama

Um Elhweyeh

Tawi Rumman

Shams Eldin

Bir Shallal

Bir Khattab

Abu Horaira

Debsi Faraj

Abu Nituleh

Bab Elkheir

Big Maghalla

Upper Khneiz

Rajm Elhamam

Eastern Serb

Hweijet Shnan

Thulth Khneiz

Big Sweidiyeh

Bir Abu Kubra

Sheib Eldakar

Abu Misnatein

Kherbet Hadla

Hteil Elhomor

Al-Malikeyyeh

Bir Elsabkhawi

Western Jaabar

Badiat Elshoaa

Hweijet Halawa

Bir Elatshaneh

Eastern Zamleh

Kherbet Elnaqa

Mjeibnet Elamya

Eastern Jaabar

Kherbet Elbeida

Qadessiyeh Kajla

Abu Kbee - West

Aslim Elbarashmeh

Maadan

Ein Issa

Turkey

Homs

Aleppo

Deir-ez-ZorHama

Al-Hassakeh

Ar-Raqqa

Rural Damascus

Idleb

Dar'aAs-Sweida

Lattakia

Tartous

QuneitraDamascus

IRAQ

JORDAN

TURKEY

Kurdish forcesISILFSASyrian regimeContested area


Governorate boundaries Governorate centerDistrict centerSub-district centerCommunities


Jarablus

Tell Abiad


AleppoGovernorate

Road Accessibility StatusAll roads within Ar-Raqqa Governorate which are under the control of one military party considered accessible and passable, but any road will be cut off when moving between areas which are under the control of different dominant forces. All public roads that connect between Kurdish-held and ISIL-held areas are cut off due to the ongoing clashes.

Map 5 shows the road situation and contains marks for the listed roads above.

(R1) Ein Issa – Sarin Road: that is under the control of Kurdish forces is passable but contains several checkpoints(R2) Tell Abiad – Ras Al Ain Road: that is under the control of Kurdish forces is passable, this road is used by all humanitarian organizations and military forces coming from Al-Hasakeh Governorate. (R3) Ein Issa – Ras Al Ain Road: is cut off due to ongoing clashes between ISIL and Kurdish forces in Sharkrak and Hisheh villages. (R4) Ar-Raqqa – Tell aBiad road: is cut off due to ongoing clashes between ISIL and Kurdish forces in Sharkrak and Hisheh villages. (R5) Ar-Raqqa – Suluk road: is cut off at Upper Khneiz point due to ongoing clashes between ISIL and Kurdish forces.All roads to and from the sub-districts of Karama, Ath- Thawrah, Jurneyyeh, and Sabka are passable and fully con-trolled by ISIL forces. However, those roads are targeted with shelling all the time.

Tell Abiad

Ar-Raqqa

Suluk

Karama

Sabka

Al-Thawrah

Jurneyyeh

Hama

Sahl

Ayuj

Badi

Tawi

Kanu

Hora

Amin

Akel

Hiba

Alia

Iweh

Tiba

Dadu

Zazu

JaberDaama

ModarNasraBader

Rahbi

Jabli

Ojeil

Laqta

Ghota

HadbaJalaa

Faraa

Fteih

Kalta

HtashRoyan

Abadi

Elleh

Safra

Hamra

Krein

Laqta

Fatsa

Mohra

Umaya

Sufan

Dehiz

Makef

AyshaMaleh

Arbid

Kisum

KatunZaydi

Farja

HardanNamisa

Sweida

Leksun

Shaher

DahlehRaddeh

Rabyeh

Yaarub

Kardus

Milsun

AbbaraSafyan

Hettin

Yarmuk

Yamama

Zahera Berani

Wihdeh

Widyan

Hisheh

Kinana

Jeiber

DahwehRamleh

Wasta

Madhir

Karadi

Madlaj Hanano

Maghar

Zenbaq

Kattar

Shakil

HawasiThiban

YabsehAbatin

Saideh

Masarra

Moezleh

Kdeiran

Andalus

Rohayat

Rabee'a

Tweilah

Hazimeh

Atshana

Khayala

Mreiran

ZarzuriShreian

Bisrawi

Dukhan

Mweileh

Nafileh

Emeirat MansuraSefsafa

Jeidine

Ramthan

Kafifeh

Saramda

Thadyen

Ghizlan

Bteiman

Bir Asi

Bweider

Shalkhi

Breighi

BaladiyaAkeirshi

Tishrine

Mashrafa Bir Said

Bir Arab Sehrijeh

Ajajiyeh

Mahmudli

Ghamamiz

Sharkrak

Bir Khat

Nasriyeh

Ghweilan

Abu Haya

Rgheilan

Khneifis

Abu Haye

Ras Kbir

Ojet Btir

Abu Touta

Rahmaniya

Abu Suseh

Adnaniyeh

Abu Rajab

SarajiyehBanat Ali

Thaheriya

Fakhikheh

Bir Enbaj

Farhaniya

Sabe Jfar

Shamandur

Tal Hamam

Um Harmal

Khamisiyeh

Rashidiyeh

Falah Rabu

Abu Sakhra

Tal Othman

Bir Hadleh

Big Yamama

Um Elhweyeh

Tawi Rumman

Shams Eldin

Bir Shallal

Bir Khattab

Abu Horaira

Debsi Faraj

Abu NitulehArida Ojeil

Bab Elkheir

Upper Khneiz

Shahid EllahRajm Elhamam

Eastern Serb

Hweijet Shnan

Thulth Khneiz

Big Sweidiyeh

Talet Elansar

Bir Abu Kubra

Sheib Eldakar

Abu Misnatein

Kherbet Hadla

Hteil Elhomor

Al-Malikeyyeh

Bir Elsabkhawi

Western Jaabar

Badiat Elshoaa

Hweijet Halawa

Bir Elatshaneh

Eastern Zamleh

Wastet Elhijan

Kherbet Elnaqa

Mjeibnet Elamya

Eastern Jaabar

Kherbet Elbeida

Qadessiyeh Kajla

Abu Kbee - West

Aslim Elbarashmeh

Msheirfet Eljerniyeh

Ein Issa

Menbij

JarablusRas Al Ain

Ain Al Arab

Tabni

Sarin

Al-Khafsa

Abu Qalqal

Rasm Haram El-Imam

Suruç

Harran

Birecik

Serêkaniyê

Contested roadsPrimary roads under ISIL controlSecondary roads under ISIL controlPrimary roads under Kurdish forces controlSecondary roads under Kurdish forces control

Turkey

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

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Map 5: Road Accessibility Status


Demography Ar-Raqqa City had witnessed since the beginning of the Syrian crisis big displacement movements from other governorates. As Ar-Raqqa City was the only City Center in the eastern areas controlled by the Syrian Government, therefore, civilians were traveling to Ar-Raqqa City to complete their official and governmental documents and submit exams.

The population of Ar-Raqqa City had increased three folds since 2011, especially after Deir-ez-Zor City went out of the GoS control. The city had witnessed the building of big new residential blocks for the coming displaced civilians.

In March 2013, Ar-Raqqa City went out of the GoS control without heavy clashes, as the city was nearly free of GoS military forces except for some security guards. At that time, no massive displacement movements took place, with the NSAG control of the city. Thus, Ar-Raqqa Governorate becomes the first Syrian governorate fully out of Syrian Government control.

Massive displacement waves took place towards Ar-Raqqa Governorate after it went out of the regime control. The majority of IDPs were coming from Deir-ez-Zor Governorate as it was suffering from dangerous security situation. Since ISIL forces took control over the governorate, the displacement movements were much less, but many civilians who were pursued by ISIL because of their civilian or revolutionary activities were displaced.

A surge in a bombing on Ar-Raqqa Governorate caused an increase in displacement waves within the governorate towards the Northern sub-districts, especially border Tell Abiad Sub-district. In mid-2015, the Kurdish forces controlled the sub-districts of Suluk, Ein Issa, and Tell Abiad and deliberately displaced the majority of its civilian population.

Until the moment of writing this report, the population in Ar-Raqqa Governorate is 1,316,947 individuals including 362,700 IDPs. The majority of the IDPs are living in Ar-Raqqa City, followed by the Southern territories, whereas the Kurdish-held Northern sub-districts is almost empty of IDPs and even its original population.

Figure: It should be noted that the percentage of deliberate displacement in Northern sub-districts of Ar-Raqqa exceeds 60%.

Figure 01: Population and IDP Numbers

PopulationIDP Numbers

HealthAr-Raqqa City contains most of the hospitals of Ar-Raqqa Governorate, including public hospitals and some private ones. Those hospitals used to contain all medical specialists and nurses. The medical sector witnessed progress at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in Ar-Raqqa City, as this city was receiving all medical cases and injuries from all eastern areas because all Deir-ez-Zor hospitals rendered out of service and the hospitals of Damascus Capital are hard to reach.

International Organizations were providing support for many Ar-Raqqa hospitals after this governorate went out of GoS control. Afterward, when ISIL forces took control of Ar-Raqqa Governorate, the INGOs’ support was halted completely, and many doctors and medical specialists migrated out of the governorate and out of Syria sometimes; leading to the deterioration of the health situation in this governorate.Till the moment of writing this report, Ar-Raqqa City contains eight hospitals, two of them were owned by the public sector before and now administered by the control forces and six private hospitals.

The sub-districts of Jurneyyeh, Karama, and Mansura suffer from the complete absence of hospitals, so the civilians are forced to travel to Ar-Raqqa City to get treatment, as well as the majority of civilians from eastern Aleppo countryside resort to those hospitals causing an additional burden on city’s hospitals.

Regarding the health situation in Kurdish-held Northern areas of Ar-Raqqa Governorate, there are no hospitals at all in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts, and the health services are limited to polyclinics only. Civilians in those sub-districts are forced to travel to Tell Abiad Sub-district to get treatment. Considering that there are two functioning hospitals in Tell Abiad, but it is difficult to reach them from Suluk and Ein Issa, because of the checkpoints set up by the Kurdish control forces to monitor Tell Abiad residents.

According to WHO, every doctor treated 1,455 people in Syria, in 2010 statistics . This situation has deteriorated in Syria during the past six years in general and in Ar-Raqqa Governorate in particular. The table below shows that the number of individuals per one doctor has decreased by more than 11,000 in the second half of 2016.

1-http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A1444

THE ONLY BLOOD BANK IN AR-RAQAA GOVERNORATE WAS BOMBED AND REN-DERED OUT OF SERVICE MOSQUES CALL FOR CIVILIANS FOR BLOOD DONATIONS AT HOSPITALS, AFTER BOMBING AND THE INJURY OF MANY CITIZENSNO AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT TO STORE BLOOD AND TRANSFER IT FOR INJUREDBLOOD DONATIONS ARE INSTANTLY TRANSFERRED FOR THE INJURED

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT

Table 01: Number of Medical Centers in Ar-Raqqa Governorate

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Figure 03: Health Priorities

Medical Staff

Health Priorities in Ar-Raqqa Governorate

There are 55 doctors of different medical specialties in Ar-Raqqa City. The existing doctors were counted in all sub-districts except dentists; those doctors should be capable of providing first medical aid and diagnosis in some cases with the lack or unavailability of hospitals and polyclinics. This is the case in Jurneyyeh sub-district, where civilians depend on those doctors only because of complete unavailability of hospitals and polyclinics. Ar-Raqqa City suffers from a big gap in medical staff, as many doctors and nurses were displaced from the city. ISIL forces had established a faculty of medicine in Ar-Raqqa City in an attempt to compensate this lack in health staff, but in few months the faculty was closed. A persistent need for nurses pushed some civilians to practice this profession without any training.

Despite the bad health situation in Ar-Raqqa Governorate, vaccination teams were able to reach the children in all sub-districts via its stationary or mobile clinics, so vaccinations were not a priority in Ar-Raqqa compared to other Syrian governorates. On the other hand, there is a persistent need for medicine, and medical requirements in several sub-districts of Ar-Raqqa Governorate, especially after organizations stopped providing medical assistance, so medicine came as first priority. Taking into consideration that medicine and medical materials are put under monitoring, so it is hard to trade with them especially to anyone who tries to enter those substances may be accused of financing extremist terrorist groups. The high prices of these materials constitute a burden on hospitals and even patients who get treatment in private hos-pitals; therefore the need arises for monetary aid for the health sector. The majority of medical staff in hospitals work with a very low cost which does not correspond to daily living require-ments of any worker, due to the severe decrease in the value of Syrian Pound to US dollar and the increase in daily living costs. Some nurses and doctors volunteer and are not getting paid, so the need for operational costs for medical centers came as a second priority because there is no party that currently provides salaries for medical workers in all ISIL-held territories .

Figure 02: Number of Doctors in Ar-Raqqa Sub-districts

2-Annex A on page 26 that contains a list of required medicine for Ar_Raqqa Governorate for a period of 3 months

Food Security

Food Severity

Ar-Raqqa Governorate is considered an agricultural territory with fertile soil and contained many planted lands before the crisis in 2011. Land cultivation continued after the gover-norate went out of the GoS control, despite its high costs.

The ongoing clashes between the parties to the conflict in this area have negatively af-fected the agriculture, and land cultivation has been totally stopped in most of Ar-Raqqa sub-districts particularly in the Kurdish-held Northern areas. The trading has stopped as well in ISIL-held Ar-Raqqa City due to the difficulty of moving between Ar-Raqqa and other governorates. All those mentioned factors influenced the purchase ability of the civilian population in Ar-Raqqa City, especially that all working organizations have stopped providing food assistance for civilians for more than three years. The humanitarian work was limited to Ar-Raqqa relief kitchen that had continued functioning by cooking meals for PiNs in the city. Some expatriate philanthropists funded this kitchen, but ISIL forces had closed it in July 2015.

The food commodities status in Ar-Raqqa Governorate is evaluated by an indicator that consists of the intersection of 3 main criteria. The first criterion indicates to the food qual-ity; the second one indicates to food quantity in terms of its availability; the third criterion refers to food prices in terms of its relevance to the purchase ability of the majority of the civilian population.

The analysis results show that food severity in both of Ar-Raqqa City and Tell Abiad Sub-dis-trict is moderate where two criteria out of 3 were achieved, the food quality and availability there was high. On the other hand, the food situation is severe in both Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts, the three criteria were not achieved; food quality was bad, the food was not available, and the food prices were high and did not correspond to the purchase ability of the residents in those sub-districts.

It should be noted that the food basket price in September 2016 in Ar-Raqqa and Tell Abiad sub-districts has doubled, comparing with its price in September 2015, according to the Food Price Index Dashboard V. 27 issued by IMU on a monthly basis. The comparison is not possible in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts due to the unavailability of most of the food basket items at the local markets.

Figure 04: Food Severity in Ar-Raqqa Governorate

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3-http://www.acu-sy.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Dashborad-food-price-indexSep2016-_ISSUE-27_251016_GIS_FPR_ENG.pdf


Bakeries

Food Priorities

Ar-Raqqa Governorate contains 91 bakeries distributed over its sub-districts, where only 37 bakeries are functional. The majority of the bakeries in ISIL-held areas are functioning and provide bread at subsidized prices to the citizens. Those bakeries’ production capacity is proportionate to the population, considering that ISIL forces manage those bakeries.

The deliberate displacement in Suluk and Ein Issa rendered all bakeries out of service. As well as, Kurdish fighters looted many bakeries and moved some of those bakeries to Al-Hasakeh Governorate. Kurdish-held Tell Abiad Sub-district has three functioning bak-eries with a production capacity that is sufficient for its population. Part of the produced bread is moved to Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts and the merchants sell it there with very high prices, which makes an additional burden on Tell Abiad bakeries that produce bread for its population only. Basically, the majority of the civilians prepare bread at their homes.

Monetary aid came as the first priority in Food Security sector in all assessed sub-districts, due to the deterioration of the living situation of the civilian population and weak purchase power. Bread came as the second priority in both Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts where no functioning bakeries are available. Tell Abiad Sub-district suffers from a lack of baby food supplements and breast milk substitute (BMS). As well as, the regular food Baskets are required in all sub-districts.

Table: Bakeries Status and Their Production Capacity

Figure 05: Food Priorities

Education SectorThere was no education at all in the whole of Ar-Raqqa Governorate since ISIL took control over it, which means that children are deprived of education for the 4th successive year, and all schools stopped functioning there.

ISIL had authorized opening ten private schools in October 2016 in Ar-Raqqa City, but with ISIL impose of certain curricula that should be taught in those schools. However, those schools were not popular for several reasons mainly the curricula that call for Jihad and the absence of the recognition of those schools by any party outside ISIL-held territories.

Almost all civilians were displaced from Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts after the Kurds control of the Northern sub-districts of Ar-Raqqa Governorate. All schools stopped func-tioning, and some of them were changed to military barracks resulting in looting and damaging the schools. The assessed sub-districts contain 396 schools distributed as in the following figure.

Kurdish forces have opened ten schools at the beginning of the academic year 2016-2017 in Tell Abiad sub-district that work according to the laws that were enacted by the Kurds. Curricula were written for the first three grades of the primary education level in Kurdish language only, and two lessons of Kurdish language were added to the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades school program.

GoS cut off the monthly salaries of the teachers in Tell Abiad Sub-district, most of those teachers did not show up in those schools. Therefore, Tell Abiad schools suffered from a lack of teachers, as only 50 teachers were working in 20 schools that contain 2,300 students. In this case, Kurdish forces have tried to compensate this gap by assigning not qualified teachers, where some of them have only middle school or high school degree.

It should be noted that it is difficult to obtain accurate statistics on the percentage of stu-dents’ enrolment because the student’s attendance is irregular, though the percentage of attending students does not exceed 25% of the total students.

Figure 06: Number of Schools

Figure 07: Number of Teachers in Tell Abiad Sub-District

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Figure 08: Education Priorities

Education PrioritiesAll assessed sub-districts were suffering from the same problems in education sector despite the dominant forces. Provision of security and protection for both students and teachers came as the first education priority because the schools are considered danger-ous places; the teachers are being threatened, and the children are being influenced all the time by the control forces.

Additionally, all assessed sub-districts have demanded the provision of scientific curricula written in the language that is spoken by those areas’ residents by specialists and far from control forces mentality.

School support came as a priority as well, through maintaining and repairing school build-ing and providing salaries for educational staff in the four assessed sub-districts. Whereas, teachers are not getting paid unless they are loyal to the control forces.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector (WASH)Ar-Raqqa Governorate contains the basin of Euphrates River, and a big part of its lands was immersed in water before building the Euphrates dam. Therefore, all Northern lands particularly contain wells, and most of its water is valid for drinking.

The data gathered data shows that all assessed sub-districts contain big water amounts, as the daily water share per capita was more than 20 liters. Additionally, the water ex-traction costs were not expensive, as the price of 1 cubic meter of water is less than 400 SYP which is less than 1$. The fuel is available with appropriate prices so the costs of well water extraction, transfer, or shifting the water of Euphrates River to other areas, are suitable compared to another Syrian governorate.

The analysis shows that all Ar-Raqqa sub-districts undergo lab tests for water validity for drinking except Suluk and Ein Issa. Whereas, there are several Kurdish-held villages in those two sub-districts where the water is not being tested because the control forces prohibit access to those areas, and the population there believes that the water is not valid for drinking.

Ar-Raqqa and Ath- Thawrah cities are newly built cities and contain structured water networks and several water stations that pump water to all neighborhoods, and water in those cities is valid with more than 95% for drinking.

Figure 09: Validity of Drinking Water

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WASH Priorities in Ar-Raqqa GovernorateAlthough the analysis results showed that the majority of sub-districts contain drinkable water, there is an acute need in WASH sector for chemical materials for sterilization as chlorine in all its forms. The water stations in large cities that depend on networks in transferring water need to add chlorine to the water before it is pumped into the net-works. As well as, chlorine tablets should be added to the extracted water from the wells within the areas that depend on wells’ water.

The need for electrical and mechanical equipment came as the second priority to ex-tract and pump water in all assessed sub-districts, as the majority of water stations need maintenance or replace some electrical generators and pumps. The water stations con-tain huge equipment, and it is hard to find maintenance tools for it in the local markets. The majority of workers in Ar-Raqqa and Ath- Thawrah sub-districts work with very low wages, and some of them are not getting paid, after the GoS cut off their salaries after losing control of this governorate. ISIL supports workers with salaries, but it does not correspond to the living costs of the population.

Figure 10: WASH Priorities

Shelter Sector

Shelter Priorities

Ar-Raqqa Governorate with the majority of its sub-districts is considered newly built, especially Ar-Raqqa and Ath- Thawrah cities, as mentioned before in this report. This governorate did not witness severe clashes, so heavy damage was nearly avoided and limited to windows and doors damage with 24%, as shown in the figure below, and this slight damage was largely noticed in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts because of the on-going clashes between ISIL and Kurdish forces.

Moderate damage was recorded with 7% in the four assessed sub-districts. Ar-Raqqa City suffered from a moderate damage to its buildings due to the bombing, present-ed in roof and walls damage with less than 30%. There are many destroyed houses in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts after Kurdish forces had removed a big part of villages’ houses in the pretext of mines existence that was planted by ISIL fighters or the loyalty of villagers to ISIL.

Number of IDPs in Ar-Raqqa Governorate exceeds 350,000 who came from other gov-ernorates, in addition to a big number of internal IDPs who were displaced out of their villages. As well as, the damage in doors, windows, and walls made monetary aid as the first priority in shelter sector.

A big part of the sub-districts that contained damaged houses reported shelter rehabil-itation as their first priority, especially in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts after most of the houses were robbed by Kurdish fighters and in some cases, those fighters disassembled the doors and windows and sold them in other areas.

Provision of safe shelters came as a priority in case of bombing or clashes that may take place in those areas in the next upcoming days. Tell Abiad Sub-district demanded the provision of temporary shelter places, because this sub-district is located along with the Turkish border and many IDPs try to cross it despite its being close.

Figure 11: Percentage of Damaged Houses

Figure 12: Shelter Priorities

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Non-Food Items SectorNFIs Severity

Non-Food Items Priorities

The NFI severity in Ar-Raqqa Governorate is evaluated by an indicator that consists of the intersection of 3 main criteria. The first criterion indicates to NFIs quality; the second one indicates to NFIs quantity in terms of its availability, and the third criterion refers to NFIs’ prices in terms of its relevance to the purchase ability of the majority of the civilian population.

The analysis results show that NFI severity in both of Ar-Raqqa City and Tell Abiad Sub-district is moderate where two criteria out of 3 were achieved, the NFIs quality and availability there were high. On the other hand, the NFIs situation is severe in both Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts, the three criteria were not achieved; NFIs quality was bad, NFI items were not available, and the NFIs prices were high and did not correspond to the purchase ability of the residents in those sub-districts. This bad situation can be attribut-ed to the fact that most of the population in those sub-districts’ villages was deliberately displaced and do not contain markets at all, and some loyal merchants to the dominant forces in that areas had monopolized the trading operations of all items.

Markets are the only source of NFI items for civilians, due to the total absence of hu-manitarian organizations interventions in Ar-Raqqa Governorate. Therefore, the weak purchase power made monetary aid is the first NFI priority.

With the advent of winter, the second priority was winter equipment like heaters and fuel in all assessed sub-districts.

Figure 14: NFI Priorities

Figure 13: Non-Food Items Severity

Agriculture and Livestock SectorAr-Raqqa Governorate contains large areas of fertile flat lands that are valid for planting all kinds of crops, and it is famous with wheat planting on a large scale. The availability of cattle in this governorate is high as well.

Agriculture

Irrigation Methods

The Northern Kurdish-held areas of Ar-Raqqa Governorate contain vast areas of lands that were planted with wheat in the past year, but the landowners could not harvest their crops because Kurdish control forces had prevented the farmers from cropping their lands. On the other hand, the Kurdish forces had harvested large areas of lands and had burned other lands that they could not crop in the pretext of the support of the local population to ISIL during its control, despite that ISIL forces had killed and arrested many residents during their dominance.

Basically, the four assessed sub-districts suffer from the high overall cost of land cultiva-tion, in addition to security problems as all farmers fear from clashes or control change in the area, so they will not be able to complete the cultivation process or harvesting after they spent big amounts of money for their crops.

Tell Abiad Sub-district had suffered from the absence of markets to sell their products due to the monopoly of some traders of purchasing and selling the agriculture crops with prices that don’t correspond to its high costs.

Rainwater is the main method for irrigating the wheat planted lands in almost all areas of Ar-Raqqa Governorate. On the other hand, those areas depend on groundwater or surface water to irrigate seasonal vegetables, despite the high costs of extracting the groundwater or shifting the water of the Euphrates River. The figure below shows the percentages of applied irrigation methods in the four assessed sub-districts.

Figure 15: Problems of Agriculture

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Figure 16: Percentages of Applied Irrigation Methods


Livestock Farming The sub-districts of Suluk, Ein Issa, and Tell Abiad had lost big numbers of livestock due to the deliberate displacement of the civilians. Therefore, all animal raisers had sold their cattle fearing from the ongoing clashes or its confiscation by the Kurdish forces.

Livestock within Ar-Raqqa Governorate suffer from many difficulties mainly the high pric-es or the complete absence of fodder. As well as, the lack of veterinarians and veterinary centers resulted in the spread of diseases among the animals along with the scarcity of required medicaments.

Figure 17: Problems of Livestock

Services Sector

The Euphrates River Dam located in Ath- Thawrah Sub-district was the main electricity source for Ar-Raqqa and other governorates before the beginning of Syria crisis. This dam was gen-erating huge amounts of electricity power, but as a result of not maintaining the dam’s turbines anymore most of them rendered out of service, so the produced power became not sufficient even for Ar-Raqqa Governorate need of electricity.

After ISIL had taken control of Ar-Raqqa Governorate, the electricity was distributed to ISIL-held areas only for limited hours per day due to the decrease of the production capacity of Euphrates dam. The number of hours with electricity availability from the public network in Ar-Raqqa City reached 8 hours daily, and the electricity is available for 4 hours from private networks (Ambers), which are huge generators that produce electricity for the civilian popula-tion for cash. Some residents depend on small private generators to produce electricity.

The Kurdish forces acquire electricity from Tishreen dam located in the Eastern Aleppo Coun-tryside towards the sub-districts of Suluk, Ein Issa, and Tell Abiad, and there is an electricity line that is shifted from Al-Hasakeh Governorate. The electricity from the regular network is avail-able within Kurdish-held areas for 12 hours per day, and it is available from private generators for around 7 to 10 hours a day.

The border sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa Governorate depend on the Turkish mobile network, and the communication is available in the sub-districts of Suluk, Ein Issa, and Tell Abiad, whereas the internet network is weak from this mobile network within Suluk and Ein Issa.

ISIL forces had reactivated the landline network in Ar-Raqqa City within the controlled areas. This kind of communication is considered local within the phone operator only or between the connected phone operators. Satellite Internet is available as well in the city of Ar-Raqqa for external calls or social media websites, but this kind of communications is available only within internet cafes which are authorized by ISIL forces which keep it under strict surveillance.

Figure 18: Electricity Sources and Number of Hours

Figure 19: Type of Communications

Electricity

Communications

23


The light night maps below show the change in light between September 2012 and September 2016. It is clear that lightening is decreased in all Syrian governorates with various degrees. It is noticeable that there is a significant reduction in lightening in Ar_Raqqa Governorate in September 2016 where the electricity is concentrated in Ar_Raqqa and Ath-Thawrah Cities.

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Homs

Aleppo

Deir-ez-ZorHama

Al-Hassakeh

Ar-Raqqa

Rural Damascus

Idleb

Dar'aAs-Sweida

Lattakia

Tartous

Quneitra

Damascus

Turkey

Lebanon

Jordan

Ar-Raqqa

Aleppo

Deir-ez-Zor

Al-Hassakeh

HomsHama

Homs

Aleppo

Deir-ez-ZorHama

Al-Hassakeh

Ar-Raqqa

Rural Damascus

Idleb

Dar'aAs-Sweida

Lattakia

Tartous

Quneitra

Damascus

Turkey

Lebanon

Jordan

Ar-Raqqa

Aleppo

Deir-ez-Zor

Al-Hassakeh

HomsHama

September 2016

September 2012

Map 6: Light Night Maps

Conclusion

Ar_Raqqa Governorate is considered ethnically diverse, and prior the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, no ethnic conflicts had taken place. However, the foreign agendas in the area and the donors’ search for local partners without taking into account their plans, led to the emerge of ethnic struggle. As the existence of PKK party with its separatist plans resulted in the deliberate displacement of the population in Northern sub-districts of Ar_Raqqa Governorate.

Ar_Raqqa battle, in case of its outset, may last for several months. Therefore, the Interna-tional Community needs to setup a humanitarian plan along with any military strategy that may be applied on this territory, to confront any possible humanitarian disaster that may happen during the anticipated war.

It is important to engage the local civilian population in any expected military action in this area, and they have to participate in setting plans and making crucial decisions. After liberating any area, it should be delivered to civil associations that will be formed locally. Considering that Ar_Raqqa Governorate had shown a role model of civil organizing during the prior period of ISIL control.

There is a sufficient number of hospitals in the assessed sub-districts of Ar_Raqqa, and there is a need to provide ambulances in the sub-districts that suffer from the absence of hospitals as a rapid and temporary solution of this problem. Still the health situation is considered bad due to lack of medicine and doctors. The fact of children not receiving education for three successive years led to the presence of a big percentage of illiterate children who need new curricula to be written for them to handle this problem and register students in classes that correspond to their age within a specific period. The food security sector can be supported by funding the agriculture and livestock sectors especially with the availability of some bakeries with production capacity that is proportionate to popu-lation numbers.

25


Parenteral AntibioticsCeftriaxoneCeftriaxoneCefotaximLincomycinOral Suspension Antibiotics Amoxicillin Amoxicillin Amoxicillin Amoxicillin/Clavulanate 156 Amoxicillin/Clavulanate 312 Amoxicillin/Clavulanate 457 Amoxicillin/Clavulanate CefiximeAzithromycineAzithromycineClarythromucinClarythromucinClarythromucinAnti-DiarrheaFlagylBactrimAnalgesics/Anti-PyriticsIbuprofenIbuprofenIbuprofenParacetamolParacetamolParacetamoleParacetamolAnti-Tussivebronchicum Prospan

Generic Name ConcentrationQuantityper Basket

Quantityper Center Total

PharmaceuticalForm / Size ofthe Unit

1 Vial1 Vial1 Vial1 Amp

capsyrsyrSusp: 60 mlSusp: 60 mlSusp: 60 mlcapSusp: 60 mlcapSusp 15 mlTabSyrSyr

Susp 100 mlSusp 100 ml

syrtabSusp 100 mlSusp 100 mltabSyrSUPP

Susp 100 mlSYR 100 ML

500 mg1 g500 MG300 mg

500 mg125 mg250 ml156 mg /5 ml312 mg /5 ml457 mg /5 ml1g100 mg / 5 ml250 mg200 mg / 5 ml500 mg125 mg250 mg

200 mg / 5 ml200 mg + 40 mg / 5 ml

200 mg400 m.g100mg / 5 ml120 mg / 5 ml500 mg125 mg250 mg

60604060

20303020202020151520152020

2025

35353535404035

3530

120012008001200

400600600400400400400300300400300400400

400500

700700700700800800700

700600

240000240000160000240000

8000012000012000080000800008000080000600006000080000600008000080000

80000100000

140000140000140000140000160000160000140000

140000120000

Annex A: Medicament Needs for Ar_Raqqa Governorate for a Period of 3 Months

26

Anti-Cold PreparationsActified ( yellow )panadol flu

BronchodialatoVentolinAtroventSalbutamol serum

DexametazoneDexametazoneCortiventCortiventPrednisolone

Oral Anti-HistamineLoratidineCetrizineLoratidine

Anti-diarrheaFlagylSulfamethoxazole / Trimethoprim

paroxitineamytriptilinetrazodonelorazepambiogabalinerisperidonephenoparbitalmethimazole




Syrup 100 mltab

nebulizersnebulizers inhaler 15 mlwater for solution

TabSyrnebulizersnebulizersSusp 100 ml

Tabs 20’sTabs 20’ssyrup

Tabs 20’sTabs 10’s

tabtabtabtabtabtabamptab

500 mg

5 mg / ml20ml

2 mg0.5 mg0.25 mg0.5 mg5 mg / 5 ml

10 mg10 mg5 mg

500 mg800 mg / 160 mg / tab

2010,25500.5,1,250,75,100,1501,2,41305 mg

3040

2301510

2530201530

402025

1520

25522521

600800

40600300200

500600400300600

800400500

300400

4010010040401004020

120000160000

80001200006000040000

1000001200008000060000120000

16000080000100000

6000080000

20005000500020002000500020001000

27


prednisolonemethylprednisoloneimepenemtargocidlinzolideclindamycinepiperacillin/tazobactamacyclovirnitroglicirinedopaminefactor IX recombinantfactor VIII recombinantstreptokinasesurfactant (beractant)nimodipinenorepinephrinenitroprusside sodiumsodium chloridehydralazinedobutamineatracoriummedazolampropofolcolchicineferrousalendronatecalcium carbonatedeferoxaminemethotrexatehydroxy chloroquinevitamine B12calcitriolmannitolalbuminefludrocortisone




tabvialvialvialvialampvialvialampampvialvialvialsuspsyrampampampampampampampamptabamptabtabvialtabtabamptabampamptab

5, 20500, 1000 mg5004002003004.5 g1,000252001000-2000 IU750- 2000 IU1500000 IU25 mg\ml60 mg\20ml8 mg25 mg\ml020 mg\ml250 mg1005200510075500500, 2000 mg2.5 mg200 mg1000 mcg0.5 mcg20200

522225525111111115225410121522222522

1004040404010010040100202020202020202010040401008020020402010040404040401004040

500020002000200020005000500020005000100010001000100010001000100010005000200020005000400010000100020001000500020002000200020002000500020002000

28

assistance coordination unit

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