assessment of bmd global capabilities missile defence as a factor in establishing a new security...
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Assessment of BMD Global capabilities
Missile Defence as a Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment
International Conference Moscow, 3-4 May 2012
Colonel-General V.V. Gerasimov
Briefing Objectives
• Presenting the findings from the assessment of global BMD capabilities
• Highlighting the available tech opportunities to respond to missile threats in a joint manner
BMD Information Capabilities
BMD Global Information Capabilities
• modernizing the deployed missile warning radars
• fielding mobile BMD radars
• increasing the capabilities of low orbit satellite grouping
• tapping into the information resources held by allies and partners
Deployment of BMD Information Assets
Conclusions
• The deployed information subsystem covers the entire territory of the Russian Federation
• Impediments are about to emerge and block the employment of Deterrence Forces
• Subsystem’s capacities can be further enhanced • Comprehensine applications of the deployed
information assets solidly beef up the BMD efficiency
BMD Weapons
Conditions
• Missile launch lines feature research purposes• Targets’ positions are hypothetical, though close
to reality• BMD assets performances get estimated
through processing the available data and running comparative analyses
• No use of BMD penetration aids• Calculations are built on computer models
developed by the Ministry of Defense experts
Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the West
Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the Center
Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East
Threats to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force From: the East
Conclusions
• Concept for a BMD posture is global in character
• BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific Region are elements of the global BMD system primarily intended for protection of selected sites in the US territory
• BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force based across Russia
• Deployed BMD assets already have the capability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles
BMD Assets in Poland
Capabilities Assessment
Baseline Data
• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios
• Launch area – south
• Missile range – up to 11000 km
• Targeting – east coast of the USA
• BMD interceptor positions:– Poland (shooters featuring Phase 3 and 4 capabilities)
– Russia (south)
Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories appear to be outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is impossible.
Conclusion. US-bound BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception in possible.
Capabilities That Can Threaten Russia
Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing the killing zone for fourth-phase BMD shooters. Interception is possible.
BMD Assets in Romania
Capabilities Assessment
Baseline Data
• Hypothetical nature of developed scenarios
• Launch area – south
• Missile range – up to 3000 km
• Targeting – South and Central Europe
• BMD positions:– Romania (shooters featuring third-phase capabilities)
– Russia (south)
Conclusion. South Europe-bound trajectories fall within the killing zone for third-phase BMD interceptors. Interception is possible.
Conclusion. Part of the Western Europe-bound trajectories happen to be outside of the killing zone for third-phase BMD shooters. Interception is partial.
Conclusion. Russian BM trajectories would be crossing fourth-phase BMD killing zone. Interception is possible
Conclusions• Romania-based BMD shooters featuring first and
second-phase performances will have limited capabilities to assure protection of South Europe against missiles launched from the south
• Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase performances would pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure protection of the entire Western Europe against the threat of missile strikes from the south
• Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be posing a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force
• There is room for cooperation aimed at developing an effective European-wide BMD system (development of the joint defense area)