Assessment IIBackward Design and Alignment

ReflectionClarissa Dirks

https://theintentionalworkplace.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/brains‐460x3071.jpg?w=500

General Goals

Measurable Objectives

Summative Assessments(Exams)

Formative Assessments(Instruction)

Did your group follow backward design?

Did you actually create a summative assessment BEFORE designing your teaching module?

LearningObjectives

SummativeAssessments

(exams)

FormativeAssessments(instruction)

Lower Order Cognitive Skills = LOCSHigher Order Cognitive Skills = HOCS

LOC

HOC

LOC

HOC

LOC

HOC

What about the alignment?

In your group, discuss whether the  objectives, summative assessments (exam questions) and formative assessments (teaching activities) of your module are aligned with respect to cognitive level.

Before we start the next session, please elect 3 NEW people from your group to go join 

another group (just like yesterday).

Take 2 minutes to introduce yourselves at your new table.

H5N1 Transmissibility Experiments

Nancy Connell

Clarissa Dirks

The Controversy About The Experiments

(not ours)

http://www.nature.com/news/work‐resumes‐on‐lethal‐flu‐strains‐1.12266

3 M AY 2 0 1 2 | VO L 4 8 5 | N AT U R E | 1 3 

The Ferrets

The Virus

Learning Objectives

• Participants will be able to:– Describe the details of the experiments in question– Explain why the research is considered as “dual use”– Examine the role of scientists in society 

Activity 1(15 min)

Research the steps in influenza replication & create a poster to explain your part

• Groups 1 & 2:Virus  attachment and cell entry• Groups 3 & 4: nuclear entry, transcription and replication• Groups 5 & 6: assembly and budding • Group 7: Reassortment versus mutations in Influenza infections

•www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18255•www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2794490/•www.rapidreferenceinfluenza.com/chapter/B978‐0‐7234‐3433‐7.50009‐8/aim/virus‐replication

Valuable websites (but there are many others)

Linda Stannard http://www.rapidreferenceinfluenza.com/chapter/B978‐0‐7234‐3433‐7.50009‐8/aim/virus‐replication

H5N1 viruses Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus –is avirus that occurs mainly in birds, is highlycontagious among birds, and can be deadly tothem, especially domestic ones. Few sporadichuman infections with this virus have occurred andcaused serious illness and death.

Summary of the issuesStudies by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center inRotterdam, Netherland and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at theUniversity of Wisconsin, USA, aimed to answer a question“whether H5 influenza viruses can achieve sustainableaerosol transmission in ferrets?”

http://www.inferno‐guide.net/chapitre102/

Ron FouchierYoshihiro Kawaoka

• They did repeat passage and replication of H5N1 inferrets, a well established animal model for thestudy of influenza transmission.

• Ferrets are also more likely than humans to havedisseminated, multiorgan influenza diseaseincluding neurologic sequelae (consequences)resulting from virus replication in the brain (ZitzowLA, et al, 2002).

• Their results showed that mutant strains of H5N1can achieve sustainable aerosol transmission inferrets

3 M AY 2 0 1 2 | VO L 4 8 5 | N AT U R E | 1 3 

The Kawaoka Experiments 

Random mutation produced about 2.1 million strains –one could now bind the human/ferret receptor

That H5N1 was reassorted with the 2009 H1N1 virus (mix two viruses)  and injected into ferrets – a third mutation 

led to airborne transmission

3 M AY 2 0 1 2 | VO L 4 8 5 | N AT U R E | 1 3 

A fourth mutation that stabilized virus entry caused effective airborne transmission between ferrets

Time line of H5N1 dual use events

MALTAmeetingSept 2011

OCTOBERmanuscripts arrive at NSABB*

NSABB advises Redaction/limitedAccess Nov 21

Jan 2060 dayvoluntary moratorium

WHO opposesredactionFeb 17

Mar 30NSABBReversesdecision 

May 2 Kawaokapaper published

Jul 31 Flu meeting NYCNIH (Fauci) advises that moratorium be continued

2011‐2012

Jun 21 Fouchierpaper published

Dec 17‐18NIH meetingon flu researchregulations

*National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity

Jan 23 2013 controversy ended bythe resumption of research

Oct 17, 2014

Activity 2Role playing

Groups 1 & 2: The authors, who support and justify the research approach

Groups 3 : The NSABB*, who opposed the publication of experimental details

Groups 4: The public, who are frightened and skeptical

Groups 5: The Media, who overreact to the issue 

*National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity

Jigsaw model (4 groups)

Authors(Group 1 ) 

NASBB(Group 2&3)

Public(Group 4&5)

Media(Group 6&7)

Conclusion 

• Rearrange yourselves such that there is at least one representative of each topic at every table.

Conclusion 

• Scientists should understand that their research may be misused or misapplied to harm society.

• Scientists must take into consideration the essential procedures to minimize and prevent the misuse of their research.