assessing presidential character

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Review: Assessing Presidential CharacterAuthor(s): Alexander L. GeorgeSource: World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan., 1974), pp. 234-282Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009901

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Review QAirticlesASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER

By ALEXANDERL. GEORGE*JamesDavid Barber,The Presidential haracter: redicting erformancein the WhiteHouse. Englewood liffs, .J., rentice-Hall,972, 479pp.,

$I0.00.

S ORTLY after ames orrestalesigneds Secretaryf Defensein late March 949, the nationwas shocked o learn that he wasunder reatmentor severemental llness.Within fewmonths or-restal ommitteduicide.This tragicoccurrence, omingafterFor-restal'shighly uccessful areer n government, irectly hallengedthe ong-standingental-health ythologyrevalentn Washington.The essence f themyth,s notedbyAlbertDeutsch t thetime,'wasthebelief hat no Very mportant erson, nderany circumstances,can possiblyufferrom psychosis. he denial of thispossibilityin official ashingtonwas of a piecewithwidely haredbeliefs hatto suffer mental llnesswas a disgrace hatautomaticallynd per-manentlyenderedneunfit orpublicoffice.It wouldgo muchtoofarto say that new set of attitudes as re-placedthe mental-health ythology revalent wenty-fiveears go.Nonetheless,herehas been some change n this respect, artly s aresult f a better nderstandingf the natureof mental llnessandmentalhealth, ndwideracceptance fmodern reventivend thera-peutic pproaches.n addition, hedisposition o challenge he men-tal-health ythologyas beenstrengthenedy concern ver the pos-sibilityhat n unbalancedpolitical r militaryeader mighttriggerthermonuclearar.2

* Copyright 974 byAlexander . George.For extensivend helpful omments n an earlierdraft f this review am in-debted oFred Greenstein. remain olely esponsible,f course, orthecontents.naddition, ames avid Barberkindly fferedn extensivend useful ritiquewhichenabledme toclarifymanypoints nd to avoid nadvertent isrepresentations.ow-ever, n a numberf mportantssueswe have notbeen able to reach greement.1Deutsch's emarks,elivered t a meeting f the American sychiatric ssociation,arequoted nArnoldA. Rogow,James orrestal: Study f Personality,olitics, ndPolicy (New York 963), 44.2The possibilityhatmental llness ouldstrike olitical r militaryeaders n theera ofpush-buttonarfareas beendramatizednfilms nd novels uch s Dr. Strange-


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 235Thepossibilityhatmajor sychiatricmpairmentn an importantofficial aynotbe detectedr controlledntime opreventpolicydisasters a matteror egitimateoncern; onethelesst identifiesonly part-some ould ay nly small art-of he roblem.hereremainshebroadernd murkieruestionfthe dverseffectshatthepersonalitiesf eaders hoarenot llmay xertnpublic olicyand the onduct f the ffairsfstate. hus,paradoxically,hecon-ventional isdom hat everymanhas hisbreaking oint ervesoobscure rom iewthefact hat ewpoliticaleaders ctuallyreakdown nderhe tressfmaking ifficultecisionsr under he vengreatertressfhavingocopewith he dverseonsequencesfde-cisionslreadymade.Certainly e needto knowmore bout sychologicalndinstitu-tional opingmechanismshathelppoliticaleaderso remainmo-tionallyntact,nablinghem o continueunctioningespitecuteorpersistenttressfvariousinds. arrowlyonstrued,nindividualwho opeswith tress ithoutreakingown anbesaid oenjoyde-quatemental ealth. ut inceweare oncernederewith ndividualswhooccupy igh oliticalffice,e cannotimit ttentionothe on-sequencesf a leader's erformancender tressolely orhis ownemotional ell-being. e mustbe at least qually oncerned iththe onsequencesor thersfthewaysnwhich ecopeswith atentoractual ersonaltressesfpolicymakingndother asks. opingdeviceshat refunctionalor he ndividual ay ometimesave adysfunctionalmpactnpolicyndpolitical utcomes.Forthis eason,roaderriteriareneeded han hose raditionallyapplied ypsychologistsndpsychiatristsn udgingwhethern in-dividualopesdequatelyith tress.ut odevelopnd pply roadercriterias not, sweshall ee, neasy ask. orone thing,he nvesti-gator'swnpolitical alues aneasilyolor is udgmentstowhethera leaderopes uccessfullyith tressfulasks romhe tandpointfthepolity. hus,for xample, henthe nvestigatorisagrees iththe olicy leaderontinuesopursueespitevidencef tsmountinglove, evenDaysin May,andNight of CampDavid. A sober tatementf this tarkpossibilityas alsoofferedy political cientist rnoldRogow n hisperceptive iog-raphy f Forrestalfn. ), 346.In a laterpublication ogownoted that the seriousconsequencesf llnessesuchas Forrestal's orpolicydecisionsendto be checked yvarious uilt-inafeguardsfofficeholdingn a hierarchical,ureaucraticorm f gov-ernment:Mostkeypolicydecisions re distributedvera number fpersons nd avarietyf agencies, nd there s a tendency ithin hebureaucracyto remove rreduce hedecision-makinguthorityf thesickofficial hile eavinghim in office.Privatellness nd PublicPolicy:The Cases ofJames orrestal nd JohnWinant,American ournalf Psychiatry,xxv (February969), i096.


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236 WORLD POLITICScosts, e is more ikely o judgethat eader s rigid nd stubbornthanwhenhe supportshat olicy. imilarly,leaderwhotakesfirmtandnddrawshe ine ndisputes ith oliticalpponentsaybe udged obeengagednhighlydaptiveehavioryan investiga-torwhobelieveshat uchbehaviorsrequiredythe ituation;utthesamebehaviormaybe judged obe irrationallyggressiveyadifferentnvestigatorhose ystemfvalues eads o a differenter-ceptionf he equirementsnddangersmplicitnthe ame ituation.The intrusionfthe nvestigator'swnpolitical alues andistortboth hevalidityndreliabilityfhis udgmentsegardingpoliticalleader'ssychologicalitnessor ffice.hiswasalltooevidentntheresponsessychiatristsade oa pollbyFACT magazine uringhepresidentialampaignf i964. Among hequestionsskedwas thefollowing:Do youbelieve arry oldwaterspsychologicallyit oserve s PresidentftheUnited tates? he questionnaire,ent oall 12,356psychiatristsn theUnited tates, s listedn the currentdirectoryftheAmerican edicalAssociation,as returnedy ,417(about 9.5 per ent).Ofthese,,i89 saidhewasnotfit nd657 aidhewasfit. n the ther and, lmostoo ndicatedheywere nabletoanswerecausehey idnotknow noughboutGoldwater.Inaddition,ommentsere olunteeredy ome62 ofthepsychia-trists horespondedothemail urvey.nhisanalysisfthese om-mentsas reproducedn FACT magazine), avidRaynotes hatthere asvirtuallyoagreementmong hepsychiatristsnquestionaboutwhat ualities ouldmake leader sychologicallyit rpsycho-logicallynfit.Moreover,herewasevidencen thecommentshatevaluationsfGoldwater'sitnesserenfluencedy he iagnosticians'ownpolitical alues. n quitea fewcases, sychiatristsxplicitlyrimplicitlyinked heirudgmentsboutGoldwater'ssychologicalit-ness oendorsementsrrepudiationsfthepolitical alues hey t-tributedoGoldwater.3t ssoberingorecall,s Rayremindss,thatalmost,000 psychiatristserewilling n this ccasionoclaim ndexpressrofessionalxpertisena situationnwhich heywere learlyunjustifiedndoing o.It should e noted hat ACT's survey asrepudiatedyboth heAmerican edicalAssociation,hich eferredto tas anexamplefyellowournalism, ndtheAmericansychi-atricAssociation,hichdismissedt as a hodge-podgefpersonalpoliticalpinion ather hanprofessionaliagnosis. 4

3David Ray, The Psychiatriccreeningf PoliticalLeaders:The Goldwater aseand Beyond, eminar aper,Political cienceDepartment,tanford niversity972.See alsothebriefccountnArnoldRogow,ThePsychiatristsNew York 970), I25-27.Despite these dmonitions,alphGinzburg publisher f FACT, whichhad since


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 237Weare onfronted,herefore,ith he uestion hethert sfeasibleto assess hepersonalitiesf candidatesorpoliticalfficendtopre-dict heir erformancenways hatwillsatisfyhecriteriafobjec-tivity,eliability,ndvalidity.onsiderationf thisquestionmustdealwith oth he cope f uch valuationsndthe dequacyfpro-ceduresormakinguchudgments.ndiscussinghe cope fpsycho-logical ssessments,useful istinctionanbe madebetweenetectionofmajormentalllnessnthe nehand nd ssessmentfpsychologicalfitnessor particularfficen the ther. o focus valuationxclusive-lyondetectionfa current entalllnessmakes he ask fdiagnosismoremanageable,ut t eaves hedoor pen o esser ersonalityis-turbancesr characteristicshatmayentailhighpolitical isks.Al-thought s ncreasinglyuestionedhether entalllness an bere-garded sanentity,hemanifestationsfat east ome everellnessesarerelativelylearcut nd moreeasily dentifiablehanthe widerrange fpersonalityharacteristicshatmaymake person nfit orhigh oliticalffice.Thedistinctionetweencreeningandidatesor fficendmonitor-ing hehealthfofficialss alsoonetokeep nmind. f an officialuf-fered disablingmentalllness, heproblem ouldbe to obtaincompetent edical ertificationnd eitheropersuadeheofficialoresignr oput nto ffectrovisionsor emovingim rom isofficialduties,itheremporarilyrpermanently.ofar s a Presidents con-cerned,uch procedureould e muchmore ifficulthan or lesserofficial,nd t sproblematicalhetherhe 5th amendmentfferssatisfactoryolutionor uch contingency.Thescreeningf andidatesor lected fficencounterspecial iffi-culties.hequestionobeasked boutandidatessnotmerelyhethertheyurrentlyuffer ajormentalllness, utalsowhetherhey relikelyodevelopne aternoffice.utpredictionfa majormentalillnesss not nlymore ifficultndmore ncertainhan tsdiagnosis;it alsoraises ery ifficultdecisionule problems: hatdegree frisk f future ental reakdownhould eregardedsunacceptableand sgroundsor isqualifyingcandidate,ndwho houldmake his

judgment?ince ery ew ersonsre ikely obecertifiedsaltogetherexpired,nd nowpublisher fAvant Garde) announced our years aterthatmorethan ,000 psychiatristsad responded o questions bout thepsychologicalitness fPresident ohnson. he results, owever,wereneverpublished, erhapsbecause ofJohnson'snnouncementhathewould not be a candidate orreelection. ogow (fn.3), I28. Also, n i968 SenatorGoldwaterued the publishersf FACT for ibel andwas awarded judgmentf$75,000 in punitive amagesbya FederalDistrict ourt.The judgment assubsequentlypheldon appeal.


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238 WORLD POLITICSinvulnerableo therisk f futurementalllness, conservativeeci-sion ulewould liminate ost andidates,hereas more ermissiveone would cceptmany andidatesorwhom omerisk f a futuremental reakdownouldnotbeexcluded.Where hould he inebedrawn?Andbywhom?Because f these everal ifficulties,ewob-serversofurtherhan osuggesthat andidateshould oluntarilysubjecthemselvesoappropriateedicalxaminationsndrelease heresultso thepublic othat tcanvote nwhateveray tdeems p-propriate.5The task fdesigningalid ndacceptableroceduresor creeningcandidatesecomesppreciablyore omplicatedfthe cope f theevaluations broadenedocover sychologicalitnessnddetectionfcharacterlaws.twould eextremelyifficulto udgewhether oti-vationaltructuresndcoping atternsmbeddednthepersonalityfa candidate ill turn ut tobe acutely ysfunctionaln performingthe uties f n office.hetheriven ersonalityharacteristicsillbedisruptivefrational ecisionmakingr affecterformancedverselyinotherwaysslikelyobe a matterfdegree swellas of circum-stance. or a leader'serformance,hedisruptiveotentialfcertainpersonalityatternss ikelyobe highlyituation-specific,nd a cop-ing strategyhat ends o producedverse oliticalonsequencesncertainituationsay equite unctionalnotherituations.t wouldbe allthemore ifficult,herefore,o draw line s tothe evel friskjudged o beacceptabletheproblemfdecisionule lready lludedto).6Additionalbservationsnproblemsf creeningndmonitoringwillbepresentedn the oncludingectionf this eview.

IIWith hese onsiderationsnmind,we turnoJames avidBarber'seffortodevisemeans orpredictingerformancen thePresidencywell nougho ssistnthe valuationnd electionf andidateso hatoffice.arbercknowledgeshat this ind fpredictions noteasyandrecognizeshat predictingith ven pproximateccuracys go-5 ublicdiscussionfthispossibilityas triggeredy the disclosure,fter is nomi-nation s Vice President n theDemocratic arty icket, hat SenatorEagletonhadbeentreated ordepressionn several ccasions arliern his career. ee, for xample,MichaelJ.Halberstam, .D., Who's Medically it forthe WhiteHouse? New YorkTimesMagazine,October2, I972, pp. 39ff; ames eston, The Need for System fHealthChecks, eprintedn San Francisco undayHerald Examiner nd Chronicle,August , I972.6 The preceding aragraphs raw in part upon the seminardiscussion f DavidRay'spaper nwhichDr. RudolfMoos and Dr. JohnAdams,M.D., of the PsychiatryDepartment,tanfordMedicalCenter, articipated.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 239ing to require ome harp ools nd closeattentionntheir se (p. 6).Barber oesnotclaimtohave produced finely onedtheoryorthispurpose. onetheless,e published isbook,which ontains hundred-page analysis fRichardNixon entitled The Nixon Prediction, arlyin 1972 forpossible sein thepresidentiallection; nd he followedtup, after enatorMcGovern's omination ytheDemocratic arty, itha brief nalysis fhispersonalitynd expected erformancen thePresi-dency.7 arber ustified is decisionto do so not onlyon practicalgrounds, utalso withreferenceo thepossibilityhat ttemptstpre-diction an serve o sharpen hetheoryp. 6; also p. vii).Barber asbeen criticizedor ntroducingheunfinished,s yetun-tested esults f his scholarshipntothe political rena.This is a criti-cismwith which happento sympathize,nd which I will discussfurtherntheconcluding ection. t thesame time,however, arber'scriticsmust ometo gripswiththe serious ntellectualffortnd con-siderable esearchhathas gone nto he onstructionf histheory. or,inmarked ontrasto thepseudo-scientific,ndeed ntiscientificharac-ter fFACT's muckrakingpproach o assessing oldwater's sycho-logical itnessn i964, Barber's ook reflectshemanyyears f ntensiveresearch e has devoted o developing rich and complex heory ftheways nwhich hepersonalityf political eaders an expresstselfin their olitical ehavior.Besides,t s possiblehatBarber's heory,ts imitationsotwithstand-ing,enabledhim-or at least encouraged im-to make a predictioninhisbook regarding he ikelihood f a majorpolitical atastrophefRichardNixonwerereelected hichmay turn ut n somerespectsobe a correct rediction. ertainly heWatergate candaland the otherillegal ctivitiesndertaken y members f the Administration,hichhavecometolight inceMarch, 973, constitutepolitical atastropheofthefirst agnitude. he question emains, owever, hetherhiswasthekindofcatastrophearber redicted; dditionally, hethernd towhat xtent he ventsnquestion an be explainednterms fNixon'scharacter;nd, fso, whethern terms f Barber's heory f character,somemodificationf it, or some otherpersonalityheory. hese arelikely obe difficultuestions orqualified, bjective sychohistorianstoanswer ven tsomepoint nthefuture, hen thecrisis ngenderedby Watergate as run ts course nd thehistoricalecord s fuller nd

7 TheQuestion f Presidentialharacter, aturday eviewoftheSociety,V (Oc-tober972), 62-66. n this rticle, enatorMcGovern s diagnosed s exemplifyingneof Barber's our haracterypes, he active-positive,hichpresents im in a favorablelight;however, arber lso notedpossible imitationsn McGovern's erformancefelectedPresident.


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240 WORLD POLITICSmore ccessible.8emust lsokeep n mind hatBarber'sredictionof a character-inducedragedyorNixon s an open-endedne, ndthat tmayreceive onfirmationntheremainderf thePresident'sseconderm.I shall ttemptoprovides coherentnexpositionfBarber's orkaspossiblendto strike balancedppraisal.f I focus n theweak-nesses fhis heorys see hem,t s norderotry o showhowthiskindofresearchanbeputon a more olid, umulativeooting.tmust esaid t the utsethat he ask fevaluatingarber'sheorysrendered ore ifficultytheway nwhich e haschosen opresentit nthis ook. n order oreach broaderublic uringhe lectionyear, arberpparentlyecided opopularizehepresentationfhistheoryomewhat.nany ase, he ook snot stightlyrguedndcer-tainly ot s adequatelyocumenteds twouldhave obe norder opersuade specializedrofessionaludiencef hemeritsfhis heory.Rather,hebookreflectsnefforto combineensitivelinical-literaryinsightsith trongormativempulsesoward inding ratherm-mediateandle-the rocessf electingPresident-forealingwithsome fthedilemmasfour ra.Barber'studys better nderstoodndmorefairlyudgedwhenviewednthe ontextfhisearlier ork,o which e calls he tten-tion fthe eaderp. 455).Barbersamong hosecholars hohavedemonstratedhat ttemptso absorb llpoliticaleadersnto singlepersonalityype-whichollowedrom misreadingf HaroldLass-well's arlier ritings-werenjustifiedndshould e abandoned.nThe awmakersi965), towhichweshall eturnater, arberkillfullydifferentiatedvarietyfmotivationalatternshat eda diverseroupof ndividualsoenter heConnecticuttateegislature.e identifiedfour ypesf egislators- Lawmaker,Spectator,Advertiser,ndReluctant -andfferednsightfulpeculativenalysesf theway nwhich hedistinctiveersonalityonfigurationsssociated ith achtypeffectedheir rientationo andactivityntheroleof egislator.Thissetofhypotheses,ith mportantdaptationso be notedater,wascarried ver ndappliednBarber's ork npresidentialeader-

8 Speculationn thesemattersn mid-Julyf I973, whenI had an opportunityorevise n earlier raft hathad beenwritten efore heWatergatecandalbegantounraveln Marchof I973, seemednotonlyhazardous nd premature,ut also neces-sarily f imited alueto thosewhowouldreadthisreview ome six ormoremonthslater.Accordingly,n revisinghemanuscriptdecided omakeno alterationsn thesubstance fmyearlier ssessmentf Barber's ook whichmight enefitn somewayfromWatergate indsight. owever, havepermitted yselfo add a fewobserva-tionsthat have cometo mind sincethen n reflectingn the emergingWatergatescandals.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 241ship,nwhich e hasbeen ngaged or lmost decade. heorigins,development,ndempirical-theoreticaloundationsfBarber'studyofpresidentialharacterremoremplyeportedn his arlierublica-tions; hese hould e consultedy readers howishtounderstandbetter,ndtoevaluate,he cholarlyaseonwhich hepresentookrests.This s not o ay hathe ifficultroblemsftheoryndmethodol-ogy, nwhich arber asrelativelyittle osay nPresidentialhar-acter, avebeen dequatelyealtwithnhis earlier ublications,n-abling im omove asily ndcomfortablyothe ask fmaking isfindingsvailable or moregeneral udience.ndeed, residentialCharactersentirelyxplicitnacknowledginghe entative,ncertainnaturefthe heory.arberecognizeshat he mbitiousaskhehassetforhimselfarries ith t a most omplexnd difficultetof re-quirements.etusturn,herefore,otheway nwhich eattemptsodefinendmeet hese equirements.Inkeeping ith he mphasisn modernheoriesfpersonality,ar-beravoids narrow reoccupationithunconsciouseeds ndegodefenses,nd nsteadpts or broadergo-psychologicaliew fper-sonality.nhisPreface,arberndicateshat ehaseschewedpsycho-analyticnterpretationst thesymbolicevel nd has employednapproachhat s muchloser othe sychologyf daptationp. vi).He definesersonalityn terms f three omponents:character,world iew, nd style. ll three fthese omponentsfpersonality-especially worldview and style -highlighthe developmentalandadaptive acets fpersonality.n addition,orBarber and others),character rovidest least linkto,and a reflectionf,unconsciousneeds, godefenses,ndpsychodynamics.To employ ersonalityariables or xplainingrpredicting Presi-dent's olitical ehavior equires ituationalnalysis-or,morespecifi-cally, omeway of analyzing r anticipatinghe complex, wo-wayinterplayetween ersonalitynd situationalactors.ut ituationalac-tors ffectingresidentialerformancerenumerous ndcomplex, ndthey nclude ariabless well as constants;o the taskofassessing he

interactionetween ersonalitynd situationannotbe easily ccom-plished. he investigatorust ssessnotonly heways nwhich itua-tional actorsonstrainhebehavior fa President,ut also theways nwhich hePresident'sersonalityndbehaviorhapethe ituation vertime.Barber oesmakeat leastgeneral rovision or ituational actorsinhistheoreticalramework.e postulates hat President'sersonal-ity nteracts ith a) thepower ituation i.e., the support e has


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242 WORLD POLITICSfromhe ublicnd nterestroups,he artyalance nCongress,hethrustf upremeourtpinion p.8]), and lsowithb) the limateof xpectationsi.e., the redominanteeds hrustpto himbythepeople, ocusinground eeds uch sthedemand or eassurance,sensefprogressnd ction,nd sense f egitimacyrom,nd n, hePresidencyp. 9]).Howeveruggestivend richnits mplications,his onceptualiza-tion f ituationalonstraintsnpresidentialerformances, s Barberrecognizesp. vii), nly startingoint or evelopinghekind frichtypologyf thevarietyf situations ithinwhichpresidentialer-formanceakes lace.9And, ndeed,hedescriptionf bothpowersituationnd climate fexpectationss elaboratedn the ndividualprofilesfthePresidents.Theway n whichBarber efinesndoperationalizesach of thethreeomponentsfpersonalityust e discussedurther.hemostvisibleart fa politicaleader's ersonalityshis style, hichBar-berdefiness his habitual ayofperforminghree olitical oles:rhetoric,ersonalelations,ndhomeworkp. 7). A clearerxplica-tion f hismportantacetfpersonalitysprovidedn Barber'sarlierpublications.n ndividual'stylesa creativedaptationhat mergesfrom confluencen ate dolescencerearlydulthoodfhismotives(orneeds),he esourcesskillsndcompetences)epossesses,ndtheopportunitieshe nfoldingituationffersim, omewhatortuitously,tomake omethingfhimself,o find omethinghat works orhimselfndinfuseself-confidencend a sense fcompetence.hediscoveryf a style rovideshe ndividual ith wayof relatinge-lectivelyndproductivelyothe nvironmentna manner hatsex-pected o yield atisfaction.husunderstood,arber's otion fstyleandhisrelated otion f firstndependentoliticaluccess s remi-niscent,s he hasnoted arlier,10fparts fErikErikson'sonceptionof dentityrisis nd of what havecalledtheprocess fdefining,carving ut, rdiscoveringsphere fcompetenceorperformanceas anadult.Barber'sonceptf tyle rovidesparticularlyseful ayofbridg-ing ole ndpersonalityariablesnstudyingleader's ehaviornanyposition.ne of the imitationsftraditionalole theory rom hisstandpointas been hat ypologiesfroleorientationsand/or ole

9WithWatergate indsight, would emphasize hispoint ven more.Someaspectsof Nixon's behaviorwhichappearto have contributedubstantiallyo the crisisofhisPresidencyccurredn situationalontextsther han hose hatBarber ingled utas beingmostgermane.10Barber, Classifyingnd Predicting residentialtyles:Two 'Weak' Presidents,JournalfSocial ssues, xiv July968), 62, 78.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 243definitions)ave een ouched ith eferenceo the asks rfunctionsofa particularosition. 1hus thevariousunctions,r role asks,fa Presidentave een raditionallyescribednterms fchief-of-state,commander-in-chief,artyeader,tc.Muchmore seful or tudyingthe nteractionetweenersonalitynd role s Barber'sngeniousayof dentifyingole unctionsnmore eneralerms,ndependentf heidiosyncraticeaturesf ny articularosition.hethree eneraloledemandsrfunctionshat arberdentifies-rhetoricwords), usiness(work), ndpersonal elationspeople)-arise, s henotes,n someway nanypoliticalosition.Bydefiningtyles thepersonality'scquisitionf a characteristicway futilizing ords, ork,nd/oreople or daptingoenviron-mental emandsndopportunities,arber rovidess with n inci-sive ut lexibletartingoint or ssessinghe fit etweenneaspectofpersonalityi.e., tyle) ndthe pecificole emandsf given osi-tion. ince ifferentoliticalositionsenerateifferentoledemands,it spossibleor henvestigatoronotewhetherleader'style, hichhasbeen ighlydaptivenoneposition,s ikelyobeequallydaptive-or perhapsvenmaladaptive-indifferentosition.Collectiveiographicalnalysesmployingtheoreticalrameworkare are. arber'srenchantnalysisf he tylesf he levenresidentsdiscussednhisbook and, n anearlierssay,12fAndrew ohnson'sstyle) ontributesuchto an understandingf their ifferentp-proacheso thePresidencynd their ehaviornthat ffice.learly,the nalysisfstyles alsorelevantor ssessingome spectsftheexpectederformancefcandidatesor hePresidency.style uch sLyndon .Johnson's,hichwashighlydaptiveothe ole fSenateMajorityeader ndresultedn a brillianterformanceyhim nthatposition,aspredictablyess uited othedifferentoledemandsfthe residency.heresultingtrain,r ackoffit, elps oaccountorseriouseficienciesnLBJ's erformancenthePresidency.13

See, forexample, hewell-developedypologiesf the variousfunctionsn theroleof egislator,nd thetypologiesftheways nwhich achof thesefunctionsanbedefined y therole-incumbent..Wahlke nd others, he LegislativeystemNewYork 962).Whileuseful or differentiatedtudy f thevariancen roleorientationsdoptedby egislators,hese ypologiesre notrelevant or tudy f theroledefinitionsfotherpolitical ositions; ordo they rovide direct nd usefulway, s Barber's oncept fstyle oes, or ssessinghe nteractionetween oleandpersonalityn the ncumbent'sperformancen the egislature.12 Barber, Adult dentityndPresidentialtyle:The Rhetoricalmphasis, aeda-lus, xcvii (Summer i968), 938-68.18 Thispointsemphasized articularlyy PhilipGeyelin, BJ nd theWorld NewYork i966); see also NelsonW. Polsby,Congress nd the PresidencyEnglewoodCliffs, .J. 971), 33-4i, 64-66.


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244 WORLD POLITICSThe possibleackoffit etweenn individual'sersonalityndthedemandsfhisrolehas ongbeenrecognizeds one of the ourcesfrole train, ut thasnot een asy o findatisfactoryays f tudy-ing t andassessingts ctual r expectedmpact nperformancendpoliticalutcomes.14arber'sonceptualizationfstyles thereforenimportantheoreticalontribution.ven houghhenotion f tylee-mains implendundeveloped,achof the hreemodes fadaptativeactivity-towardords, ork, nd people-iscapable f elaboration.(I shall efer,or hemoment,iscussionftheneed or substantialelaborationfBarber'sonceptfstyle.)World iew, notheromponentfpersonalitynBarber'sheory,consistsf the ndividual'sprimary,oliticallyelevant eliefs, ar-ticularlyis onceptionsf ocial ausality,uman ature,ndthe en-tralmoral onflictsf the ime pp. 7-8). Worldviewrefersothefundamentalhilosophicalnd deologicaleliefsndpremiseseldbypoliticaleaders hat hape heir ehavior. utonly few f these relisted ndemployedyBarber.ForBarber,he ore fpersonalityies n character. e definestas theway he residentrients imselfowardife-not or hemo-ment, ut nduringlyp. 8). Characteras tsmaindevelopmentnchildhoodwhereas orld iew mergesn adolescence,ndstylenearly dulthood)ndremainselativelytable hereafter.Thestancetowardife callcharacter,arberxplains,grows utofthe hild'sexperimentsnrelatingoparents,rothersndsisters,ndpeers tplay nd nschool,swell s tohis wnbody nd he bjectsroundt(p. io). Further,f thethree omponentsfpersonality,characterprovideshemain hrustndbroad irection-buttdoesnot etermine,inanyfixedense, orld iew nd style p. II; Barber'smphasis).WhatBarberppearsobesaying-and ertainlyt s ustified-ishatone's haracter illconstrainheworld iew nd style e will adoptlater,ut hat heresstill oom orvariationntheworld iew ndstylehatwill mergescongruentith givenype fcharacter.Barber'sheoryequiresnunderstandingf the nterplayetweenthesehreeomponentsf leader's ersonalitynshaping isbehavior.Although e emphasizeshis nd disavowseductionistxplanationsintermsfcharacter,he ore fhistheorynd tsuse n explanation

14 Particularlyseful pproaches or conceptualizingherelationship etweenper-sonalitynd role areto be found n EdwinJ.Thomas, RoleTheory, ersonality,ndthe ndividual, n E. R. Borgatta nd W. Lambert, ds.,Handbook of PersonalityTheory nd ResearchNew York i968); R. C. Hodgsonand others, he ExecutiveRole Constellation: n Analysis f Personalitynd Role Relations n Management(Boston 965).


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246 WORLD POLITICShepresides.nthemost eneralense, President'sognitivetyleon-strainshenaturefhisparticipationith thersnsmall-groupeci-sionmakingndshapes isorientationothe rganizationalrocessesofsearch,valuation,ndchoice,ndtothephenomenonfbureau-craticolitics ithinhe rganization.se ofthe onceptfcognitivestyle illfacilitatehatHaroldLasswell eferredomanyyearsgoas impactnalysis -theechniquef tudyinghekinds fmenwithwhom leaderurroundsimselfndthewaysn whichheyerve isvarious eeds.15Insum, oth eliefystemndcognitivetylere spectsfpersonal-ity hatplayan importantole n determiningerformancen thePresidency.hesevariablesndtheirnfluencerenot gnorednthebiographicalrofilesfPresidentshat omprisehebulkof Barber'sbook, uttheyre dealtwith n an impressionisticndfragmentaryway.Moreover,heresnoexplicitrovisionor ealingwith uchm-portantersonalityariablesnBarber'sramework.isconceptualiza-tion fpersonality,herefore,n terms fcharacter,orld iew, ndstyle,emainsncomplete.heemphasisn characternhistheorydoesnotmake pfor heneglectfbeliefystemnder world iewandthe dditionaleglectfcognitivetylenhisotherwisedmirableandhighlysefulotionf style.nsteadf mplifyingndelaborat-inghis onceptnthese irections,owever,arberegan everal earsagoto shiftrom isearliermphasisnstyleostressnthe mpor-tance fcharactersa basis or xplainingndpredictingresidentialperformance.Inshiftingmphasisromtyleocharacter,arberoesnothave headvantagef nheritingromhework fpersonalityheoristsfirm,well-establishedandle ncharacter.heconcepts not tallwellde-fined rconsistentlyefined ithinherealm fpersonalityheory.

15 HaroldD. Lasswell, ower ndPersonalityNew York 948), ioi-4. The adverseimpact mall-groupynamicsan have on political ecisionmaking s intensivelyx-ploredby rving . Janis, ictims fGroupthinkBoston 972).16The shift femphasis rom tyle o characteran be seenbycomparing hetwoarticles arber ublishedn i968 (bothofwhich ocus nstylewithhardly nymentionofcharacter)with his paper, The Presidentnd His Friends, iven at theannualmeeting f theAmerican olitical cienceAssociationn New York,September969,in which he mportancefcharacteregins o be stressed. furtherhift n emphasisfrom tyle o character-and heconversion f his earlier ypology f style ntothepresent neofcharacter-tooklaceduring herevision f thisAPSA paper,for ub-sequentpublication nder new title, The Interplay f PresidentialharacterndStyle:A Paradigm nd Five Illustrations,n Fred I. Greensteinnd MichaelLerner,eds.,A SourceBookfor heStudy fPersonalityndPolitics Chicago 971), 384-408.See also Barber's Some Consequences f Pluralizationn Politics, n HarveyS.Perloff,d., The Futureof the UnitedStatesGovernment: oward the Year 2000(New York 971).


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 247Although ntended o refer o a fundamentalr corecomponent fpersonality,he erm character n practices applied ooselynd meansmanydifferenthings.

It is notsurprising,herefore,hat hough pparentlynfluencedyKarenHorney'swritingsn particular,arbervoids eaning ooheavilyor explicitlyn anyofthe xtantharacterheories.1 ather, e formu-lates n eclectic onceptualizationfcharacter hat s ostensiblyuiteparsimonious. arber hooses o settle orfourcharacterypes fhisownwhichhe evolves rom wodimensions- activity-passivityndpositive-negativeffect owardone'sactivity. hese twodimensions(whichhe sometimeseferso as variables r baselines ) efer ohowmuch nergyn individualnvestsnhisactivitynd howhe feels boutwhathedoes p. ii). I shallreturnater o someoftheambiguityndother ifficultiesssociatedwiththetwo dimensions.Barber efends is conceptualizationf charactery assertinghathistwodimensionsapwhat s essential nd common omost heoriesofpersonality.'8ut neithernPresidential haracter or nhisearlierwritingsoesheattemptoshowhowhistwodimensionsregroundedinthe pecializediteraturen personality. oreover,tisverymuchtothepoint hat s his workhasprogressed,arberhasmodifiedhedefinitionfoneof histwodimensions,20ndalso hasmovedfrom n

17 Onecansympathize ithhisdesire o avoidbecoming rawn ntothequagmireofcompetingnd unsatisfactoryheoriesf character.arber s not thefirstnorwillhe be the ast) political cientisto discover hat the taskof borrowing esponsiblyfrom heneighboringield f psychologyannot e discharged y attemptingo finda single, eatly ackaged, uthoritativeookor articlewritten y a psychologisthattellsyou all you needto know about heproblem.For a review fdevelopmentsnpsychoanalyticonceptionsfcharacter,ee chap.ofErnstPrelinger nd Carl N. Zimet,An Ego-Psychological pproach o CharacterAssessmentNew York 964).18 Whymightwe expect hese wo imple imensionsooutline hemain charactertypes? ecause hey tandfortwocentral eaturesf anyone's rientationoward ife.In nearly very tudy fpersonality,omeform ftheactive-passiveontrasts critical;thegeneral endencyo actorbe actedupon s evidentn suchconceptss dominance-submission,xtraversion-introversion,ggression-timidity,ttack-defense,ight-flight,n-gagement-withdrawal,pproach-avoidancep. i2).19The brief tatementn AppendixA of The LawmakersNew Haven and Lon-don i965) was cautious, arefullyualified, nd, tmustbe said, only smallstep nthisdirection.n it,Barber uggestedhatone can find somereflections,ome com-monthemes imilar o his own typesn theaccounts f those who have observedhumans ctingn similar ircumstances. e referredhereaderto specific ortionsof some hirtytudieswhere relevantvidence r theory ould be found.However,limitationsfspacedid notpermit arber o quote, ummarize,r analyzethesema-terials; hus hereaderwas left opursue hematter orhimself.20 The second imension positive-negativeffectoward ne'sactivity ) onstitutesa significanteformulationfwhatBarber alled commitmentotheoffice or will-ingnessoreturn )n The Lawmakers,bid., 8, 2I2. This reformulationnd recon-ceptualizationf theseconddimension,s Fred Greensteinuggests personal om-munication], as apparently ecessaryn orderto accommodateo the fact thatthe


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248 WORLD POLITICSinitially odestmploymentf he wo imensionsn TheLawmakersfordescribingerelyhephenomenologicalayer fbehaviorothepresent, uchmore mbitiousse ofthem ortapping nderlyingfacetsfcharacter.InPresidentialharacter,arbercknowledgeshat istwodimen-sions are rude lues o character. onetheless,e assertshat theyare eads nto our asic haracteratternsong amiliarnpsychologicalresearchp. 12). Notonly oes he tatementackdocumentation;oeffortsmade oargue hat he amiliarityfthe haracteratternsnthe iteratureouchsafesor heiralidityndthe setowhich e willputthem.

By rossingndcombininghe wodichotomousimensions,arberobtainsourharacterypes:he ctive-positive,he ctive-negative,hepassive-positive,nd thepassive-negative.t first lance, herefore,whateverlsemay esaid bout ts implicity,his our-foldharactertypologyeemst east obederiveduite ystematicallyromhe woexplicit imensions.ut, n fact, hefour ypesre muchricherncontentndfarmore omplexhan hiswould ndicate.or,as thereaderuickly indsut, o ach f he ourharacter-typeabels arberadds great ealof dditionalersonalityheoryhat oeswellbeyondthe nitialmeaningsivenothe ctive-passivendthe ositive-negativedimensions.e insertsdistinctivesychodynamicnddevelopmentalpatternntohisdescriptionf eachcharacterype. hus,brieflyara-phrasingndquoting rom p. 2-I3, theresultsre as follows:The active-positiveharacters adaptive. He displays con-gruencebetweenmuchof his activity nd the enjoyment f it,

therebyindicatingelativelyighself-esteemndrelativeuccessinrelating o theenvironment. e shows an orientationowardproductivenesss a valueand an ability o use his styles lexibly,adaptively.... He seeshimselfs developing vertimerelativelywell defined ersonal oals, and emphasizes rationalmastery.The active-negativeharacters compulsive. e experiencesa contradiction.. between elativelyntenseffortndrelativelylow emotional ewardforthateffort. is activity as a com-pulsive, ompensatoryharacter; he seemsambitious,trivingupward, ower-seeking.. he has a persistentroblemnmanaginghis aggressive eelings.His self-images vague and discontinu-ous ... .'

vicissitudesfpresidentialecruitmentre ikely o screenut hose houtterlyejectthepresidentialole.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 249The passive-positiveharacters compliant. He is recep-tive nd other-directed,personalitywhose ife s a search oraffections a rewardforbeingagreeable nd cooperativeather

thanpersonallyssertive. e experiences contradiction . .between ow self-esteemon grounds f beingunlovable, nat-tractive)nd a superficialptimism.The passive-negativeharacters withdrawn. e is orientedtoward oingdutiful ervice; his ompensatesor owself-esteembasedon a sense f uselessness. is tendencys towithdraw,oescape romhe onflictnduncertaintyfpolitics yemphasizingvagueprinciplesespecially rohibitions)ndproceduralrrange-ments....Given herichnessndimplicationsfthese haracterypes, e shallwant to keep in mindtheproblems f constructinguchtypologiesand theproblemsfusing hemforpurposes fexplanationndpre-diction f presidentialerformance.

IIIPredictionf theexpected erformancef a candidatewho exem-plifies neofthese haracterypes equireshe nvestigatoroenvisagehowthecandidatewould nteract ith hemajorrole demands f thePresidencys these,nturn, reshapedby theconstraintsfthemanysituationalonfigurationse canbe expected oencounternthatposi-tion.How, then,does Barber rrive t and justify is judgments e-garding heexpected erformanceffacets fthe presidentialole bythefourdifferentharacterypes?He adopts n inductive rocedureofsomewhat omplexproportions.he reviewermustproceedwithcaution nattemptingograspBarber's esearchtrategynd to recon-structheoftenmplicitogicof inquirymbeddedn thestudy.The inductiveomponentfhisprocedureonsistsnfirst xplainingsome mportantspects ftheperformancef pastPresidentsn termsoftheir haracterypes,ndthen xtrapolatingrom heresults f thesehistoricalxplanationsomegeneral ypothesesotheeffecthat andi-

dateswithsimilar haracterypes an be expected o performhoseaspectsfthe ole imilarly,t east na generalway,under omparablecircumstances.romthis nductive roceduremergegeneralpredic-tions or ach of his four haracterypes.21 Post-Watergateindsight akesmorenoticeable heimportancef old-fashionedmoral haracterndthedifficultyf ncorporatinghis onceptntocharacterypologiessuch s Barber's.


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250 WORLD POLITICSThus,theactive-positivesFDR, Truman,Kennedy) displayper-sonal strengthspecially ttuned o thePresidency,trengths hichenabled hem o make of thatoffice n engineofprogress p. 2IO).

While emphasizing he virtues f the active-positiveype n general,Barber oes note npassing ertain angers r risks orthistype.Al-thoughBarber vidently oes not consider herisksassociatedwithactive-positiveresidentso be equal to those o which active-negativecharactersre prone, hehistoricalxamplehe cites f FDR's effortopack the SupremeCourt s hardly eassuringn thisrespect. ndeed,commenting n this event,Barberobserves hat active-positives,intheirhaste omakethings appen,maytooquickly nd easilyknockdownthe formalities'hathold thedemocraticrder nplace (p. 246).The active-negativesWilson,Hoover, LBJ) have character-rootedneedsthat invade nd dominate, o an unusualdegree, heir oliticalhabits ndperceptions p. I40). Theytendto persevere igidlyn adisastrousolicy p. 95).Passive-negativesCoolidge,Eisenhower) pose a differentanger... the danger f drift p. I45). Theyleave vacant heenergizing,initiating,timulatingossibilitiesftherole (p. I73). Yet in certainhistorical ircumstanceshistypecan providea needed breathingspell for ecoveryfter periodoffranticolitics p. i45).Passive-positivesTaft,Harding) are, ike thepassive-negatives,re-sponders,ot nitiatorsrpushers . . (p. i74). Yet, for people nsearchof community,heyprovidea refreshing opefulnessnd atleast ome ense fsharingndcaring p. 206).

We now turn o someoftheproblemsnd issues aisedbyBarber'sinductive esearch trategy,ot all ofwhich can assesswith confi-dence. n order o discuss hesemattersn the necessary etail, willfocus nonly ne of Barber's our ypes,he ctive-negative,ndforegoattentionothe nterestinghapters e presentsn theother hree.A. USING THE CHARACTER TYPOLOGY FOR DIAGNOSING PRESIDENTS

Quite obviously, he inductiveproceduredepends, among otherthings,nthe orrectnessfthediagnosis feach President'sharacter.SomeofBarber's iagnoseseemmore ptthan thers. here reseveralreasons or his.While the four ypes resharply rawn at the outsetand arestated s iftheyweremutuallyxclusive,n fact very ersonis,as Barber ecognizes,omemixture f all four. his complicates hetaskofusing the typologyo diagnose Presidentnd leads Barberto lookforthe dominant ype-tendencyisplayed yeach.Even that


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 251isdifficultoestablishnoccasion.We shallreturnothis roblemlater.) till notherource fdifficultytems rom hefact hat hehistoricalata vailableor he iagnosesarynquantityndquality.It appearsome that n occasion arbernterpretshe vailable atarathereavilyoreach ome fhisdiagnoses. ore o thepoint,hediagnosticroceduresnotoperationalizedo the xtenthatt isob-jectivenoughnall respectso offerssurancehat cceptableevelsofreliability-noto speakofvalidity-can e achievedn scoringjudgments.Scholarspecializingnoneoranotherf hese residentsmay isagreeith arber'sharacteriagnosisf hatndividual.)Some omponentsrattributesf ach haracteryperemore asilyapplied han thers.t must e rememberedn this onnectionhatBarber'sonceptualizationfcharacters very omplex;tdealsnotmerely ith urfacemanifestationsfactivity-passivityndpositive-negativeffect,ut lsowith nderlyingsychodynamicatterns,asicself-esteem,ndpersonalityeeds or ower,ffection,espect,ndsoforth.he twodimensionsreeasiest ouse for urposesfdiagnosissincehey ap he urfacerphenomenologicalayer fbehavior.hedata renot lwayssgood orendingtrongupportoBarber'sddi-tional ontentionhat President ho s,for xample,n active-posi-tive r passive-negativenthe urfacelsodisplayshe sychodynamicpatterns,eeds, tc. aid to be associated ith hat ypen Barber'scharacterheory.Barber'siagnosesfpast residentsayhelp oestablishhevalid-ity f ach fhis haracterypes. hat sparticularlynneed fvalida-tion sthe riticalremisehatneachofBarber'sharacterypeshevariouseaturesttributedothatype oindeed otogether,ndonlywith ach ther.ach of histypesspresenteds a highly istinctivecompositerclusterfcharacteristics.he theoreticalndempiricalbasis or hismportantssumptionemainsbscure,otwithstandingBarber'sssurancehathis four haracteratternsave been longfamiliarnpsychologicalesearch p. I2). When Barber urns o thetask fdiagnosinghePresidents,herefore,hereaderwho is con-cerned bouthevalidityfthe haracterypologys interestedo seewhetherarber illbeable o how hat llcomponentsf charactertype re learlyresentn the iographyf achPresidentiagnosedsexemplifyinghat ype.ndeed, ne may peculatehatBarberoundhimselfnderome ressureo find uch vidence.feachPresidentclearlyisplayedllofthebehavioralomponentsfone type r an-other,hen hehistoricalrofilesf thePresidents illserve o test


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252 WORLD POLITICSandsupporthevalidityfBarber'sype onstructs;22fnot, he ntiretypologyillneed o be modifiedrdiscarded.23B. EXPLAINING A PRESIDENT S ACTIONS IN TERMS OF HIS CHARACTERThe inductivetrategymployedn thestudys alsosensitive,fcourse,oBarber'sffortso explain arious acetsfa President'sc-tionsntermsfpersonalityrcharacterariables.hemethodological

22 Beforewe can attribute validating unctionf some kind to thecase studies fthePresidents, e have to considerwhether hecharacter-typeonstructshemselveshave beenformulatedn part via induction nd incorporationf findings rom hecase studies. hus, if someof thepostulated sychodynamicsf a generalcharactertype redrawnfrom hehistorical ase studies, n element f circularity aybe in-volved. o the xtent hat hetype onstructsreextractedartly rom hecasestudies,they annot e assessed nd validated y those ase studies.Admittedly,xploratoryesearch nd circularityre oftenhardto distinguish;heissue s of secondarymportance or thedevelopmentnd statementf a theory sagainst tstesting. arbersnottoo clear n indicatingow he arrived t thecompositeof characteristicse imputes o each type.That thecase studies re partof theem-piricalmaterial romwhich hetheorys derived s suggested ysome of the anguageBarber mploysn summarizingnd drawing ogether the main character hemesemergingrom hese hree ases Wilson,Hoover, nd Johnson).He notesthattheactive nd negative ariables hat define histypewere relativelyccessible oeventhecasual observer f thebiographical aterialsn these hree residents. on-tinuing, arber henmakes a statement hich suggests hathe enriched heskeletalactive-negativeategoryia thecase studies f the three residents:Whatmakes hesesimpledimensionsnterestingeyondmeredescriptions theirpower n highlightinga wholerangeofpersonalityualitieswhich merge rom hecase studies nd whichexplainwhywe find n the Presidency en who strive o mightily nd enjoy t solittle p. 95; emphasis dded).23Sometimeshevalidity f the fourcharacter ypes s boldly ssertedn Barber'sbiographical rofiles f thePresidents.hus, for example,Harding s said clearly odisplay the ypical assive-positiveheme: hehunger or ove,the mpelling eed toconfirm ne's lovableness p. i99; emphasis dded). As for Coolidge and Eisen-hower, Bothsharedwithotherpassive-negativeeople in politics propensity orwithdrawal . . (p. I72; emphasis dded). The clear mplicationf suchlanguageis that much argernumber f political eadershave been studiedfromthe samecharacterologicalerspectivend that the resultshave confirmed he clusteringfcharacteristicsndereach of Barber's ypes. or this,however, o documentationsprovided n Presidential haracter.On theotherhand, perhaps uch a claim snotintended nd the statementhouldbe regardedmerely s a rhetoricalmbellish-ment f thedescriptionsf thePresidents.) or can one find dequatedocumentationinBarber's arlier ook,TheLawmakers. hat study ontained ewreferenceso char-acterperse; butsomeof thedistinctiveersonalityharacteristicsarber nferredsbeingassociatedwith his four egislativeypes Lawmakers, Advertisers, Specta-tors nd Reluctants ) o indeedbear closeresemblanceo thecharacteristicse nowimputes ohisfour haracterypes. t shouldbe noted,however, hatthe personalitycharacteristicsssociatedwith his legislative ypeswere impressionisticallyerived,being uggested yBarber's bservationsf Connecticutegislators.ndeed,withexem-plary igor nd explicitaution, arbernoted hat hehypothesese advanced n TheLawmakerswere speculative eneralizations,ot verified esults, nd discussedndetailthemethodologicalroblems f his study pp. 27I, i6). Since thehypothesesadvanced n The Lawmakerswereevidently ot subsequentlyssessed ystematicallyagainst newbodyofdata,theearlier tudy ffers seful mpressionisticupport tbest; t does not contain igorous mpirical vidence n behalf f thevalidity f thefour haracterypes dvanced n his atestwork.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 253problemnsuch xplanationss acute.t s notdifficultofind videncethat subject'sharacter-rootedeeds rmotives,r other spectsfhispersonality,reexpressednhisbehaviorna particularituation.Such vidences a necessaryut nsufficientonditionor stablishingthecriticalausal mportancefthose ersonalityactorsn theex-planationf that ehavior. he fact hat n individualtrivesor rachievesratificationfpersonaleeds rmotivesn hisperformanceof politicaloledoesnot utomaticallyestow ecisiveausalmpor-tance othis ariable.erformancen executiveositionsuch s thePresidencyssensitiveo a varietyfconstraints.acedwith heplayofmultiple,omplexlynteractingausalvariables,he nvestigatorsboundohave reat ifficultynassessingheweightf ny iven actor.Muchbehaviors over-determined,ndoften he most hat anbesaid sthat ersonalityeeds rother ersonalityharacteristicsereamonghemanyontributingactors. hen he ehaviorfthe xecu-tivessubjectocross-pressures,he riticaloleofpersonalityactorsinhisdecisions ay mergemore learly; ut ven nsuch ituationsthe ausalweightrdecisivenessf he ersonalityactor ay e ow.24Anunderstandingfthemany acets,he omplexities,ndthe p-parentnconsistenciesfan individual'sersonalitynot merelyhedominantatternsf he ype emost losely esembles),nda famil-iarity ithhis behaviorn a varietyfpast ituationssnecessarynorder o makemore iscriminatingxplanationsfpastbehaviorndtodealwith he reacherousroblemfprediction.f considerablem-portancenthis espectsthe trengthndoperationf he ndividual'segocontrols-thats,hisabilityo controlndregulatehe xpressionofpersonal eeds, nxieties,nddefensesn order o preventhemfrom istortingis efforto appraiseituationsealisticallynd dealwith hem ffectively.he effectivenessfegocontrolss notto begauged y uccessndenyingny xpressiontall topersonal eedsin one's oliticalunctioning.hiswouldbe impossiblen anycase.Rather,gocontrolshat rewelldevelopednclude hecapacity orharnessingn more onstructiveirectionshe xpressionfone'sper-sonal eedsnpoliticalehavior.25

24For a systematiciscussion f the conditions nder whichpersonalvariabilityamongdifferentctorsmayaffect ehaviorn a given role,see Fred I. Greenstein,PersonalityndPolitics: roblems f Evidence, nference,nd ConceptualizationChi-cago i969), 46-57. ee also Greenstein'siscussion f thecircumstancesnder whichego-defensiveeedsare likely o manifesthemselvesn an actor'spolitical ehavior,ibid., 7-6i.25 During hecourse fan individual'smaturationnd development,e developsvariety f constructivego strategiesn addition o his ego defenses.As BrewsterSmith,Jerome runer, nd RobertWhitenotedmany years go, the earlypsycho-


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254 WORLD POLITICSThus, ersonalmotivesnd needs rousedya particularituationmay erve oalert he ndividualoperceivehe pportunitiesresentedby hat ituation.hepossibilityfgratifyinghese ersonaleedsmayalsohelp to energizehe ndividualo meetdifficultole andsitua-tional equirements.s a result,ersonalityactors ay acilitatendimprove erformancefrolerequirements.tthe ame ime,n in-dividual'sgocontrols ay estrongnougho curb he xpressionfpersonal eeds nless hebehaviorhatwouldgratifyhem s alsore-quired ythe ituationndtheroledemands.n otherwords,n in-dividual'sersonalityeedsmay esubjectedoeffectiveeality-testinganddisciplinedy warenessf ole nd ituationalequirementseforetheyre llowedxpressionnhisperformance.ersonalityanbesaidtohave dysfunctional,dverseffectnthe ndividual'serformanceonlywhen heres reason obelieve hatthas ed him o a distortedor nadequateerceptionfrole ndsituationalequirements,rto achoice f nferiorays fmeetinghem.26Given hedifficultiesfmakinghetype fcomplex istoricalx-planationhat arberttempts,t wouldnotbe reasonableo holdupunusuallyigh tandardsnevaluatingheplausibilityfhisexplana-tions.Many f hem re ndeed lausibleswell sinsightful.wouldhavedifficultyssessingthers ithoutmmersing yselfntherele-vant ut ast istoricalaterialsn each f he residents.onetheless,even sympatheticnd easonablyarefuleadingf hehistoricalhap-terseftmewith he mpressionhatBarber'sxplanationsresome-times trainedndbentnthedirectionf histheory.lternativex-analyticccount f ego defensemechanisms failedto mention he tremendousm-portancef constructivetrategiesemployed y normal ndividuals'] s a means ofavoiding he vicissitudeshatmake crippling efenses ecessary. . . [They] oftenprevent hings romoccurringhatmightdisrupt hemor, more positively,hey... planeventsn sucha way [so as to] operate ffectively. Opinions nd Per-sonalityNew York 956) 283; see also22.26We shouldalso take noteof complicatingactors:i) the role and situationalrequirementshat mpinge n a political ctormaycontain onflictingr ambiguouselements hatmake it more difficultor him to exercise ffectiveontrol nd con-structiveegulationf his personality eeds; (2) thepolitician's olemay itself n-clude aberrantequirements hichactivate ersonality otives nd needs that areordinarilyept nder ontrol.n otherwords, sWillardGaylin,M.D., hasemphasized,the nature fpolitics nd what t takesto be successfuln politics-asin business-mayattractociopathicnd paranoidpersonalityypes: The capacity o be ruthless,driving nd immoral,f also combinedwith ntelligencend imagination,an be awinning ombinationn politics s well as commerce. . . Sociopathic nd paranoidpersonalityraitshat re mostdangerousn peopleofpower repreciselyhose har-acteristics ost uitable ortheattainmentfpower n a competitiveulture uch asours. What'sNormal? , New YorkTimesMagazine,April , I973.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 255planationsor given ehaviorrenot lwaysecognizedradequatelydiscussed.Barber'sheoryndeed ensitizesim-and hroughim he eader-to eeunexpectedacetsf heway nwhich ersonalityxpressestselfinpoliticalehavior.hat sfascinatingndrichlyewardingofaras tgoes.But, acedwith heplay fmultipleausal ariables,arbertends ogive reatereightothe ersonalityariable;nd, acedwiththe hoicef hreeomponentsfhispersonalityonstruct,e squickerto attributeriticalventso theimpact f a President'sharacterthan o that fhisworld iew. orexample,nemightupposehatitwasHoover'seeplyngrainedoliticalhilosophyf ndividualismthat toodnthewayofhisacceptinghenoveldeaofa federal oleas a responseounemployment.orBarber, owever,oover's on-tinuedppositionothepublic ole sclearlyo beexplainedntermsofhischaracter-i.e.,hepeculiar sychodynamicsf rigidificationthathe ctive-negativesdisposedowhen go-involvementstriggeredbyoppositionnd criticism.imilarly,hekey oJohnson'solicy fescalationgainst orthVietnamndhispersistencen thatpolicydespiteisingosts ndpublic riticisms all tooclearlynddecisivelyattributedyBarber oJohnson'sharacteratherhan oworld iew,domesticolitics,rother actors.Thus, lthougharbersfullyware f andwarns gainsthekindofpsychologicaleductionismhat as ongplagued sychobiography,the ifficultyf he ask laces im n eopardyf ommittinghis ardi-nal sinhimself.t the ame ime,t s only air orecognizehat herequirementsfhis nductivetrategyushBarbernto ttemptingnunusuallyargenumber fdifficultistoricalxplanationsithinhespan f a single ook. t hassimply otbeenpossible,s Barberc-knowledgesnhisPreface,or ne nvestigatorodischargeo heavyburden f cholarship.C. VALIDATINGTHE HYPOTHESIS OF THE TRAGEDY-PRONE ACTIVE-NEGATIVE

CHARACTERLetustake closerooknow at Barber'sxplanatoryhesis hat llthreective-negativeresidentsWilson,Hoover, BJ) sufferedo-liticaltragedieshatwere rooted ntheir istinctiveype f char-acter, hich ressedachofthem o persevereigidlyn a disastrouspolicy p. 95; similarormulationslsewhere). hisexplanationscrucialoBarber'snductivetrategy.rom theconcludeshat ctive-negativesreparticularlyisposedodisastrouserformancefelectedto the residency.


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256 WORLD POLITICSAs I noted arlier,t s the nteractionfpersonalityith ituationalvariableshat hapespresidential erformance.or theactive-negativetype, hesituational actor hat reates hepossibilityf a catastrophic

performanceas todowith he pecialnature fpolitical ower nourgovernment.ecallingRichardNeustadt'snalysisfpresidentialow-er asbeinghighly ependent ponthepowertopersuade, arber eestheactive-negativeype s havingparticular ifficultyn adjusting otherequirementsmplicitn this ituational onstraint. e observes ttheoutset fChapter , ThreeTragic Tales, that t is about threePresidents ho seemtohaveforgottenhatpowermeanspersuasion.Continuing, arber tates he inductive eneralization e has drawnfromhis three ase studies: Differents theywere in otherways,WoodrowWilson,HerbertHoover, nd LyndonB. Johnsonametosharentheir residenciescommon attern: process frigidification,a movementrom olitical exterityo narrow nsistence n a failingcourse f action espite bundant vidence f thefailure. ach ofthesethreehelped rrange isowndefeat,nd in thecourse fdoingthat,left henationworseoff han t mighthave been (p. i8; emphasisadded).Threequestionsre relevanto an evaluation f this nductive en-eralization.i) Are thetragediesomparable noughto support hegeneralization?2) Is thecritical ole which Barber ssigns o char-acter n his explanation f each tragedy dequatelydemonstrated?(3) Does a similar sychodynamicattern rigidification )nderlieeach man'sbehavior uring heevents eadingto his disaster?The three ragedies efer o completely ifferentindsof politicalevents:Wilson'sfailure o get Senateratificationf the League ofNations;Hoover'sdissipationf thepublic'sconfidencen him,as aresult f which he failed n hisbid forreelectionn I932; Johnson'sincreasinglyostly nd unpopularVietnampolicy,which led to hisdecision ottostand or eelection. hat scritical or valuating ar-ber'sgeneralizationswhether he tructuref thesituationn eachofthese hree ragic pisodes rought o theforethatpeculiarproblemofpresidentialowerdescribedyNeustadtwhich, s we noted, arberconsidersriticalnexplainingndpredictingragedies or ctive-nega-tivePresidents. situationalonstraintfthiskindwas certainlyres-ent nWilson'stragedy; ndeed, tplaysa very isible nd importantrolein descriptionsnd explanationsf Wilson'sastonishinglynepthandling f theSenate.Wilson's ggressivetubbornnessn that trug-glecanbeplausiblyxplainedwithreferenceo latent sychodynamicpatternsmbeddednhispersonalityhichwere ctivated y this itua-


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 257tion and which, arber ails orecall, adbeen ctivatedn severalearlierccasionsnsimilarlytructuredituations).Since hekindoftragedy redictedyBarber or ctive-negativePresidentsanoccur nly ia an interactionetweenore lementsfthe ctive-negativeharacternda particularindof situationalon-figuration,nequally areful elineationf the tructuref the itua-tion hat acedHoover nd Johnsonouldbe necessaryn order ojudgewhetherhetragedieshey ufferedave explanationsimilartoWilson's. arber'sescriptionsfthe ituationalonfigurationsac-ingHoover nd Johnsonre nadequaten this espect;hey o notenable imtodisplaywith qual visibilityr plausibilityhat heirtragediesevelopedutofaninteractionetweenharacternd situa-tion.Wilson'sffortobring heUnited tatesnto heLeague fNationswaswidely cknowledgedo be a worthwhileoal and enjoyedmorethan ufficientupportoth n the enate nd n the ountryobringttofruition.ilson's ragedyevelopedrom hefact hat isownbe-havior as nstrumentalnpreventinghemminentnd xpectedeali-zationf his oal.Barberails onote hat, f he hreeresidents,nlyWilson natchedefeat romheaws fvictory.he naturefHoover'stragedys muchmore iffuse.arber eems o definet in terms fHoover's rolongedefusaloauthorize public olefor heunem-ployed y he ederalGovernment,hich ed to a loss fpublic onfi-dence ndHoover's efeatnthe lectionf 932. Indeed, he ragedyfor he ublic ay nthe rolongationfthemiseryftheunemployedoccasionedyHoover'sttitudeowards public ole. tisnotwhollysatisfactory,ssome fBarber'sormulationsmply,oregard oover'sdefeatn I932 as thechief omponentfHoover's ersonalragedy,since eseems ot ohave eenmuch nterestednreelectionntil fterhispoliciesnd eadershipame nder trongttack. hepersonalideof he ragedyurelyaymorenthe acthat oover, sincere umani-tarian, onethelessontributedo the ontinued iseryftheunem-ployed yhisoppositiono thepublic ole.Barber'shesiss thatHoover's ontinuedppositionothedole sexplainedythepeculiar sychologicaligidificationowhich ctive-negative ersons re subjectwhenthey erceive olitical ppositionasposingundamentalhreatsotheir owerndrectitude.his nter-pretationould e more lausiblefBarberave videncehat e hadconsideredlternativexplanationsndfound eason oreject hem.Certainlyooverwasstubbornn thematterfa public ole, utheappearsohave tronglypposedtfromhe eginning-beforettacks


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258 WORLD POLITICSonhispolicies osed hreatso hispower ndrectitude-becauseefound he deapeculiarlyntitheticalo hispoliticalhilosophy.nemightonsider,herefore,hy hedoleplayedo importantrole nHoover's ersonaldeology,nd what t hadcome o symbolizeorhim ntermsfhis ownpersonalevelopment.his smerely re-minderhatmany ifferentinds fpersonalitynvolvementsay ieatthe oot f trongly-heldoliticalpinions.tbehooveshe nvestiga-torto considerlternativesychologicalnterpretationsnd to giveevidence hathe hasresistedhetemptationo imposehis favoredpsychologicalheorynthedata implyecausetprovidesplausibleinterpretation.

Barber'snterpretationfHoover's haracter-inducedragedyouldalsogain nplausibilityfhe hadgiven videncefhavingonsidereda purelyognitivexplanationf t ntermsf world iew ndhadfoundtunsatisfactory.ere andelsewherenhis tudy) arberailsto come ogripswith major heoreticalndmethodologicalroblemthatscentralohistheory.Stubborn ehaviort themanifestevelcanhavedifferentnderlyingauses. hus, heunderlyingynamicsof Wilson'stubbornnessn thefightver heLeagueappear ometo bequitedifferentrom oover'snthematter f thepublic ole.Theresstrongvidencef nego-defensive,ggressivesychodynamicpatternnWilson's tubbornnessis-a-visisSenate pponentsvertheformn whichtheir eservationsbouttheLeagueCovenantshould eexpressed.nHoover'sase, hematerialseportedyBarbersuggesthe ossibilityf strongognitiveasis orHoover'sppositiontothedole, ootednhispoliticalhilosophy.oreover,arberecog-nizespp. 8-29) that romhe eginningf hedepressionoover ideverythinge could oencourageeliefor heunemployedhroughprivatendvoluntaryhannels;nd,while pposingpublic olefromWashington,estated orehan nce hatf he ay amewhen olun-tarygencies ere nable ofind esourcesopreventungerndsuf-fering,e would mployederalesources.ndeed, oweverelatedly,he didmove nthis irectionnthe ummer f 932. Barber eportshis(p. 30), butfailsto notethatHoover'spolicyreversalwould seemtocontradicthe hesis hathewasinthegripof a characterologicaligid-ification.27

27 There s ample vidence hat ognitive issonancemechanismsistorted oover'sperceptionfreality is-a-vishescope and depth f thesufferingf theunemployed.Arthur chlesinger,r., otes trikingxamples f Hoover'stendency o downgradeanddismiss eportsfsufferingndmalnutrition,nd tofavormoreoptimisticeports.He alsonotes hat the train fmaintainingisprinciplesn theface of theaccumu-lating vidence fhumanneeddoubtlessedbothtoanxietynd toself-righteousness.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 259A similar olicy eversal ookplace nLBJ'sVietnam olicywhenhede-escalatednd thensuspended hebombing f North Vietnam ni968.This, oo, snoted yBarberpp. I-42), butwithoutecognizing

that t also apparentlyontradicts is thesis egarding igidification.Nor does Barber ake intoaccount hat, n contrast o Hoover andJohnson, ilson did notreverseourse n his battlewith theSenate;rather han acceptrelativelynsignificantompromiseshatwouldhaveassured assageofthetreaty,Wilson accepted ts defeat.Inthis nd other espects,arber'snalysisf the tragic ales fthethree ctive-negativeresidentss marred ya tendencyofocus nthesimilaritiesnd to ignore r downplay hesignificancef thediffer-ences. n his search orgeneralization,arber ppears o have takenan essentiallyorrect xplanationorWilson's ragedynd imposed t,with much ess evidence hat t fits, s an explanation orHoover'sand Johnson'sragedies.28uriously, arber ailstomention he well-known nd well-documentedactthattheLeague tragedywas strik-ingly oreshadowed y Wilson'sdifficultiess President f PrincetonUniversitynd as Governor f New Jersey.29he repetitiveatternfself-defeatingehaviorn his careerprovides trong upport or theinterpretationfWilson.Noteworthys the factthatsuchrepetitiveA. M. Schlesinger,r., heCrisis ftheOld Order Boston 957), 241-43. Butcognitivedissonance ccurs n manycircumstancesther than the typeof characterologicalrigidificationostulated yBarber.Hooverevidentlyxperiencedn acute conflicttthe ognitiveevelbetween is humanitarianalues ndhispolitical hilosophy,hichhe resolvedn favor f the atter. ne cannot xclude, fcourse, hattheconflictx-periencedt thecognitiveevelwas reinforcedy personalityeedsand anxieties. uttheprecise ature fthispersonalitynvolvements,as I havesuggested,nothermat-ter.As thisdiscussionmplies, tudentsf personalityeed to developbetterwaysofdistinguishingnddifferentiatingetween xplanationsfbehaviorn terms fcogni-tivevariablesndexplanationsn terms fpsychodynamicatternsroused ythe itua-tion.n recent ears ttention asfrequentlyeencalled to thedanger fconfoundingthese woexplanatoryariables.n addition o theneed forfindingndicatorshatwillenable he nvestigatoro discriminateetween hetwo, ways mustbe found to in-vestigateherelationshipetween ognitivendpsychodynamicariables.28 Thus,Barber oncludes hechapterThreeTragicTales witha general bserva-tion hat itsnto heexplanationf Wilson's ragedyutnot ntothat f HooverandJohnson.peaking f theway n whichtheprocess f rigidificationeaves the active-negative resident ocked in mortalcombat with an opponentwho personifiesthreatelt t thepersonal evel,Barber tates hatforthebeleaguered residentsur-renders suicide, n admission fguiltandweakness.Having invested ll hismoralcapitaln thecause,hewill-he must-plungeon to theend (p. 57). Sincesuch apredictionouldbe falsifiedytheHooverandJohnson olicy eversals,uestionsreraised egardingheadequacy f Barber'sharacterologicalheorywhich mplies hatan active-negativeresidentoses thepossibilityf controlling r cutting horttheprocessfrigidificationnce thasstarted.29 Rather, e tries o explainwhythecharacterologicalropensitieso rigidificationwerenot videntarliernWilson's as wellas Hoover's nd Johnson's)areers p. 99).


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260 WORLD POLITICStragic atterns ereevidentlyacking n the careers f Hoover andJohnson. he question riseswhetherWilson,though haring ertaincompulsive haracterraitswith Hoover and LBJ,was not also dif-ferentrom hem n importantespects.Finally, s already uggested,ecauseBarberdoes nottake nto ac-count thestrengthnd operation f ego controls, is theory f theactive-negativeharacter oes not offernyhelpin explaining rpre-dictingwhethernd when heprocess frigidification,nceunderway,getsturned ff n personswith thistypeof character. nd yetthispossibilitys central o thetaskofusingthetheoryopredict erform-ance.

IVBarber's nalysis f Nixon isbyfarthe ongest ndmostdetailed fhis presidentialrofiles,ccupyingbouta hundredpages,almostaquarter ftheentire ook. It is testimonyo Barber's espect orevi-denceand his recognitionf thehazardousnatureof theenterprisethathe finallyomes oquestionwhether ixonreally its heactive-negative haracter ellenough osupporthepredictionfa tragedy.But one mustreadtothevery ndofBarber'songanalysispp. 44I-42) to become ware of the fulldimensionsf hisuncertaintyboutNixon.At theoutset, arber ppears obe unequivocal ndquitecon-fident fhisdiagnosis f Nixon and oftheprediction.Nixonwas-and is-an active-negativeype.The danger n his Presidencys thesame as thedangerWilson,Hoover, ndJohnsonuccumbedo: rigidadherence to a failing ine ofpolicy.... In Nixon's case, everyone ofthe lementsoundntheWilson,Hoover, ndJohnsonases spresentanddiscerniblenthehistoryfhispublicyears p. 347). One couldhardly ewrong boutNixon'soverall lacementnthe ctive-negativecategory p. 348).3? The diagnosis nd predictionrerepeated longtheway (pp. 418, 44).A noteof uncertaintynters, owever,when Barberturns o thetaskofinterpretingixon'sperformanceuring he firsterm fhisPresidency.arber cknowledgeshat hekindoftragedy redictedor

Nixon had not materializeds of late-I97L. Instead,Nixon thusfar30Compare Barber'smphasis n Nixon'snegative ffectowardshis activity ithWhiteHouse correspondentugh Sidey'sobservation:Nixonwears thePresidencylike a comfortableoat ofarmor.t has beendentedhereand there nd it has a fewtarnishedpots, ut t fits im anditfeels ood.He lovesthe ob. LifeMagazine,No-vember7, I972, p. 4.BruceMazlish, oo,finds hatNixon obviously njoyshis newrole as President,and that in theoffice f President, ixonbelieves hathis role and his selfhavefinallyometogether. n SearchofNixon (New York I972), 76.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 261appearedo many,ncludingmany trongpponents,s a highlyflexiblexpert oliticianarefullyending iswaythrough tangleof ssues s he approached he 972 campaign p. 418).Havingundertakenhe Nixonpredictionn i968-69 in partas anexperimento testhis theory p. 6), Barberwas confrontedn I97Ibythedifficultaskofdecidingwhether vents ndnon-eventsuringthefirstermervedodisconfirmistheoryratleast mportantartsof it.3 he priorquestion, owever,s whether heprediction f apolitical ragedyan ndeedbe taken s a criticalxperimentotest hetheory. arberppeared othink o at theoutset; utthecontraryiew(whichhe eventuallymbraces),smoredefensible.t is ofsome m-

portance orour purposes o understandwhyhis prediction annotserve he function f a critical estof his theory.Assuming hat atendencyopolitical ragedyspresentntheactive-negativeharacter,whethertdevelops epends n other ariableswhichmayormaynotmaterialize uring he course f a man'sPresidency.or one thing,tdepends n the occurrence f a situation f the kind thatwill triggerrigidification.hatare thecharacteristicsfsuch situation,ndhowlikely s itto occurduring President'sncumbency?t is difficultorBarber o postulate he objective haracteristicsf such a situationwith ny pecificity.It is mucheasier o dentify,s he does, hekindof subjective erception f it by an active-negativeresidentwhichwould lead to or accompany igidification.)Not only ituational ariables ut alsopersonalityariables hat renot ncluded nBarber's onceptualizationfpersonalityre critical ohisprediction. hether heprocess frigidifications triggeredn thefirst lace and whether t proceeds nchecked o produce politicalcatastropheepends n theperson's bility o control uchtendencieswithin imself.he strengthfthese go controls nderdifferingir-cumstancessdifficulto foresee. ven f we assume hevalidity fthetheory fthe ctive-negativeharacter,tdoesnot tellushow thecriti-cal variable f ego controlswill appear n differentndividualswho

31 It maybe noted n passing hatBarber videntlyssumed hatthe kind of po-litical ragedy e predicted ould be plainly isible n public vents. his wouldseemtoexclude rom hescope of the effortfpredictionuchevents s the secret llegalactivitiesfthespecial nvestigationnit Nixon setup in theWhiteHouse in I97I.At first lance,t doesnotappear hat he personalityactors hatmay have enteredintoNixon's uthorizationf such ctivitiesrethe ame as thepsychodynamicrocessofrigidificationostulatedn Barber'sheory. n theotherhand,retrospectivenalysisof these ecentlyisclosed ctivities ayoffer arber n opportunityora correctionbyevidence hatwould attempto showthatthese ctivities,lthoughnot initiallypredictedyhis theory,re at leastconsistent ithan amplifiednd revised ersionof it.


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262 WORLD POLITICSexemplifyhis haracterype. hatcan be deduced-only ithdiffi-culty-fromcarefulnalysisfthe ndividualimselfndthehis-toryf hispastbehavior.necan maginehat ome ctive-negativecharactersre ble oacquiremuch trongerndmore esourcefulon-trols hanothersver hedisruptiveendenciesatent n their er-sonalities.oreover,nindividual'sgocontrolsnd,more enerally,his bilityoengagenunimpairedeality-testinganbestrengthenedor mpeded ythe mall-groupndorganizationalontextsnwhichhe functions.orexample, ith hehelp fclose dvisersndpersonalstaff,n executive aydevelop onsiderableesourcefulnessn struc-turingndmanaginghe mmediatenvironmento as to shield im-self rom tressfulxperienceshat istract,rovoke,atigue,rother-wise ntrudeponhispreferreday fperformingnthe ole.32Forthesendperhapsthereasons,heuse ofsuch predictionotest he heorynd opermithe nvestigatoroproceed,fnecessary,othe audable bjectivef correctionyevidence p. 6) becomeslu-sive. o elusive,erhaps,hat he heorys indangerfnotbeing ub-ject ofalsification,t east ymeans f thekind fprediction-experi-ment arber mploys.arber as ndeedustifiedndecidingottoabandon istheoryn thebasis f the videncefNixon's irsterm.Instead,efound ufficientndicationsfthebehavioralynamicss-sociated ith he ctive-negativeypen Nixon's irsterm o ustifyhiscontinueddherenceoboth he heoryndtheprediction.his sunexceptionalobe sure; ut t the ame imewe must ote hat inceeven henon-occurrencefthepredictionannot e held o nvalidatethetheory, e are eftwithout clear ndicationf what t wouldtake ofalsifyt.Chapter2 ofPresidentialharacters argelyiven ver o the riti-calquestion: asthe residentlreadyhown igns resaginghekindoftragic reezing ilson, oover, nd Johnsonell nto? p. 4I9).Throughout ost fthis hapterpp. 42I-4I), Barbernswers hisquestion ffirmatively,otinghat hePresidentndulgedn aggres-siverhetoric,oncentratedower n his office,ncreasinglysolatedhimself,ndgaveunmistakablevidencentheCarswell aseandtheCambodianenturehathe scored igh on thecore ctive-negativedemand-to ontrolndnotbecontrolled. . (p. 425). Themissingelementor full-blownragedy,arberuggests,as that n hisfirst

32 However, his oping trategy ay n turn reate differentet of risks orper-formancentherole.Longbeforehedisclosuresssociated ith heWatergatecandal,observersalledattentiono thedangers f isolation temmingrom hePresident'spreferenceor staffystemftight uffersroundhim.


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 263termNixonhad notyet ound causecomparableo Wilson's rusadefortheLeague, Hoover's tand gainst hedole,or Johnson'sursuitofmilitary ictory. . (p. 425).

A closerook attheCarswell ase and theCambodianventure,ow-ever, aises uestionsoncerningarber's hesis.f these xamples ur-nishhimwith ndicationsthat heunderlying ixon characters stillthere p. 425), as evidenced ythe fact hatNixon threwdownthegauntletn theCarswell ase and reacted o oppositionwith theairof injured ride, heattributionf low motives,nd [a] threateningtone . . (p. 429),33 they lso furnishvidence hatNixon'scontrolsover hese endencies ere trongndeffectivenough o imit nd cutshort heprocess frigidification.34t first,arber gnores hesignifi-canceofthese ontrols, hileattemptingofind basisfor aving ndreformulatingistheory.ut nthe ndhetacitlyecognizeshem ndconcedeshatNixon s a specialvariant fthe ctive-negativeharac-ternthat,withhisremarkablelexibilityegardingssues nd ideolo-gies,Nixoncanbe defeated'ny number ftimes nspecificuestionsofpolicywithout eeling ersonallyhreatened. is investments notinvalues, ot n standing astfor omeprinciple.... His investmentis inhimself,ndNixon'sself s takenup with tsmanagement .(pp. 44I-42;emphasis dded).Nixon'sbehavior ow emerges s so differentromwhatwe havebeen ed to expectfrom ctive-negativeresidentshat one wonderswhetherBarberhas misdiagnosed im or whether he differencesamongactive-negativesre greater fter ll thanthe similaritiesndcommonpatternshatBarberhas emphasized hroughout is study.Thesedifferencesaywellbe crucial oBarber's rediction.s NixonanotherWilson? I thinknot. Some of the differencesave alreadybeennoted; n addition,lthough hey hare compulsiveomponentin their ersonalities,nlyWilsonwas a compulsive eformer.ixonhaslackedWilson'sunquenchable eed for erving s the nstrument

33Mazlish's nterpretationf theHaynsworth-Carswellffairmphasizes venmorethanBarber's hatNixon overreactednd becamepersonallynvolved, xperiencinghisdefeat s a humiliationfn. 30, I27-31).34The backlash gainst heCambodian nvasionwould seemto providepreciselythekindofchallenge oNixon'spower, irtue, tc., hat, ccording o Barber's heory,shouldhavetriggeredheruinous rocess f rigidificationn Nixon. n fact, he op-posite ccurredas Barberreportswithout ecognizingts possible ignificances atest hatdisconfirmsis prediction); orwhen thereaction to the Cambodianventure]xplodedcross he ountry, ixonbegan oback-pedal. n May 5 he pledgedtoCongressionalommittees eeting n theWhiteHouse that heCambodian enturewould be over n three o sevenweeks,with all Americans ithdrawn,nd thathewouldnotordertroops eeper ntoCambodiathan2I mileswithout eekingCon-gressionalapproval . . . (pp. 439-40; emphasis added).


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264 WORLD POLITICSforhighmoralachievementsn thepolitical renawhich,whenthwarted,ouldtriggerigidification.Whether iscommitmentocertainoreignolicy bjectivesonstituteschangen thisrespectremainsobeseen.)Anotherifferences that hepower rivehatBarber ttributesobothmenwasclearly resentnly n theunderlyingeedstructureanddynamicsfWilson's ersonalityandwasaroused,t should eadded, nly nder pecial ircumstances).he case Barber onstructsforNixon's power eed pp.365-74)s notwell-foundedndonlysuperficiallylausible.Whethermore onvincingase ould e madeisproblematicalndmust emainnopen uestion.)Muchof thebe-haviorhatBarberites sevincingpower eedmaywellturn ut,upon losenspection,obe evidenceot fthat, ut atherfNixon'sstrongeedfor espect.35ncertainircumstancestmaybequite m-portantogauge orrectlyhether President'sehaviorsmotivatedby need or espectsagainstneed or ower.fhispersonaltakesina contestedssue ave odo with espectatherhan ower, emayfindteasier-if n appropriatelyeferentialace-savingcenarioanbe mprovisedr sprovidedyopponents-toackdown.ForNixon, owerppearsobe a secondary,nstrumentalalue, ota coreneed fhis haracter.ixondoes how mplenterestnpowerand softenkillfulnpowermaneuvers.ut, s iswellknown,raitsdisplayedtthe urfaceevel fbehavioranhave uite ifferentnder-lying ynamicatterns.sthehistoryfresearchn the uthoritariantypendmuch ther ork npersonalityndicates,t srisky o nferfrom hepresenceftraitstthephenomenologicalayer fbehaviorthat deep-seatedersonalityeed xists or hatkindofbehavior.3635In statinghisreinterpretationf thematerials arberprovides, draw also onanunpublishedtudy fNixon's olitical ersonalityndpoliticaltyle y Richard orn(Stanford970). Bornconcludes hatboth n his prepoliticaleriodand duringhispoliticalareerNixonhasconsistentlyvinced strong eed forrespect atherhanforpower.As criteria hat high value s placedon respect y the person, orn utilizesHaroldD. Lasswell's hreendicatorsf thisneed: (I) constant eedforreassuranceabout how am I doing? ; 2) sensitivityo theadmirationf others; 3) reactions fwoundedprideand resentmento slights, eal or imagined. ee Democratic har-acter, n The PoliticalWritings f Harold D. Lasswell (Glencoe, ll. I951), 499.Whether asswell's ndicatorsre adequate s lessgermane han thefact thatsomesetofexplicitndicatorss necessaryo avoid thedangers f a purelympressionisticjudgment.The difficultroblem f identifyingalid indicators f a powerneed and relatedproblems onnectedwith this concept nd Lasswell's generalhypothesisegardingthecompensatoryature f power need are discussed n George, Power as a Com-pensatoryalueforPolitical eaders, ournal fSocial ssues, xiv July968), 29-49.36 A useful nd incisive ccount f theambiguitieshatplaguedmuchof the earlierresearchn theauthoritarianype,withdirect elevance o theproblems ncounteredin theconstructionfBarber'sharacterypes,s provided yFred I. Greenstein,er-


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 265Manifestehaviorfthe amekind, isplayedydifferentndividuals,may erve ifferentunctionsntheworkingsf their ersonalityys-tems.Morerefined,iscriminatingndicatorsnd instrumentsreneeded o nfereep-seatedharacterologicaleeds rom ehavior. ninterestndskillnpowermaybelearnednddisplayedya personinresponseorole ndsituationalequirements.nd itmaybe em-ployedofacilitateratificationf other inds fpersonalityeeds,such s for espect,chievement,ell-being,tc.UnlikeWilson,whodisplayedoliticalmbitionsrom arly do-lescence,heyoungNixonshowed ittle nterestn politics.Wilsonas an adolescentdentifiedithpolitical tatesmennd consciouslymodeled imselfngreat oliticalrators;ncontrast,oliticaleader-shipforNixon, s Barber otes,justhappened ccidentallyhenhewasapproachingismid-thirtiesp. 359). This n tselfsnotdeci-sive, ince n ndividual'sower rive eednotbedirectedothe renaofpoliticsutmay ind noutletn ome ther ind f ctivitynwhichpoliticalonflictndopportunitiesor xpressingower eeds re vail-able.But f power eed simbeddedn a person'sharacter,neex-pectsofindomendicationnhisearlier earshat epursues oweras a means fcompensationordamagedelf-esteem.o evidence fthis ind spresentedorNixon's arlier ears; ather,isambitionsayoutheemsohave eenmotoredy need or espectndfinancialsecurityatherhan ya power eedper e. Barberecognizes,ore-over, hat ambitions a quality earlyvery oliticianhares ndthat in tsbroadestense tmeansittlemore han trivingtself-forwhateveroal p. 366).

Ambitioner e, hen,snot videncefpower eed rpower rive(thetwotermsreused nterchangeablyere).Nonetheless,arberconfusesvidencefNixon'smbition ith ower rive.Much fthematerialited sevidencef power eed sdrawn romariousventsthat ccurredhileNixonwasVicePresidentnder isenhower.nreviewinghefrustrationsnddilemmas ixonexperienceds VicePresident,arbers too uick oregardspowermaneuversndpowersensitivityixon's ffortso remain n theRepublicanresidentialticketn 952, hisresentmentfslights,ndhiseffortsosurviveheVicePresidencyndpreservepportunitiesorbecominghepresi-dentialandidate.Turningoanotherspect f henterpretation,arberorrectlyre-sonalityndPolitics: roblems fEvidence,nferencend ConceptualizationChicagoi969), chap. 4.


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266 WORLD POLITICSdicts ariousspectsfNixon'stylen the residencynd, urther,hatNixonwouldmove owardower oncentrationatherhan arryuthis tatedntentionfdilutinghehistoricrendowardentralizationofpowerntheWhiteHouse-and,withinhat,n thehands fthePresidentimselfpp. 2I-22). That rend,f ourse,asrootsncom-plexproblemsf modern overnment;hefact ffurtheroncentra-tion fpowerntheWhiteHouseunderNixon annot e takenpsofactosreliablevidencef a characterologicalower eed.Therehasindeed een nusual entralizationfdecision aking y he xecutivebranchn theWhiteHouse.TheNational ecurityouncilwasre-organized yNixon nd Kissingero as to draw hepower o influ-encemajor oreignndnationalecurityolicies wayfrom hede-partmentsnd intothe WhiteHouse. This NSC modelhas beenreplicatedo some xtentnother olicy reas. he result asbeenminiaturizationf the xecutiveranchwithin heWhiteHouse.37Attemptsoexplain evelopmentsfthis ind olely ith eferenceto a President'sresumedower eed arry ith hem hedanger fanoversimplifiedr totallyrroneousxplanation.o bypasshe on-siderationfother ariableshat ffectuchdevelopmentsnfavorfa characterologicalxplanationan only educe heplausibilityfper-sonalitynterpretations.esides, o theextent hat hepersonalityfthe hief xecutives a factor,ariablesther han hepostulatef adeep-seatedower eedmay e nvolved.necanseeNixon's entrali-zation fdecision-makingowern theWhiteHouse s a managementstrategyor opingwith he ver-present,tubbornroblemfbureau-cratic olitics ithin he xecutiveranchwhich n various ays e-duces President'sbilityoengagenpolicynitiatives),nd for b-tainingmplementationfhispolicies y he epartmentsnd gencies.Such managementtrategyayndeed avehadparticularppeal oronewho, ikeNixon, ashad a pronouncedistrustfthe ureaucraticdepartments,anted opreserves much owerspossibleo nfluenceat least hemost mportantolicy roblemsisadministrationustdealwith, oped odealwith olicyrises ith s ittle amage spos-sible ohispersonalolitical osition,ndwhose pproachohisworkhasbeen nfluencedy thespecial ognitivetyle nd conscientious-ness ngendered y the compulsive omponentn his personalmake-up.Ironically, coping strategyhat s designed o deal withcertain

37For iscussionf these evelopmentsee,for xample,homas . Cronin, heState fthePresidencyforthcoming);ichard . Johnson, anaging he WhiteHouse (New York 974).


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ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER 267clearly erceivedroblemsffectingne's bilityogovernmay tselfentail new et fdimlyerceivedisks. smany bserversfNixon'sstylefmanagementave ontinuallyoted,herererealdangersnthe xtentowhich xecutive-branchecisionmaking as beencen-tralizedn theWhite ouse, articularlyhen oupled ith he resi-dent'swell-knownreferenceorsolo decisionmaking.Notwith-standingisdemand orwell-preparedptionsrom is staffndtheconscientiousomeworke engagesnbeforemaking n importantdecision,ixon's endencyo withdrawrom irectonsultationndfrom hegive-and-takefa systemfadversaryroceedingsrmul-tipledvocacysworrisome.t ncreaseshe ikelihoodfpoor ecisionsthatmisjudgealient spects fthesituation.onetheless,oweverseriouslylawed uchdecisionsmaybe on occasion,hepersonalityfactorn the xplanations notnecessarilydeep-seatedharactero-logical ower rive; ordoes hemere nvocationfa presumedeedof his ind larifyr lluminateery ellthoseognitivendpsycho-dynamicariables ithin hepersonalityystemhat re nteractingwith ituationalndrolevariables.I noted arlierhat,whileBarberoncludes is interpretationfNixon's erformancenthefirsterm yacknowledginghatNixonis a special ariantfthe ctive-negativeype, e continueso asserthispredictionf a character-inducedragedy. e emphasizesnotimplausibly,ut ryptically)hat secondermmay ose pecialemp-tationso he residentpp.348, 42, 47), ndfocuses ispredictionfrigidificationn a moreharplyelimitedituation:But etthe ssuereach iscentraloncern,heconcern fself-management,nd thefatmaygo into hefire. hreats o his ndependencenparticular-the ense e is being ontrolledromwithoutecause e cannot etrusted,ecause e is weak or stupid runstable-will all forthstrongnneresponse.Werenot he ppositionsotheCarswell p-pointmentndtotheCambodianenture,nemay sk, reciselyuchthreats?)arberontinues,onlywhen . he cannotscape a crisis]bymovingntosome lternativerisis,ndheexperiencessense fentrapmentshelikelyomove oward he lassic orm frigidifica-tion (p. 442).Havingthusredefined nd reasserted is prediction, arbercloseshisprofilefNixonwith nunexpected edge.Speaking fheroes orwhom Nixonhas expressed dmiration n thepast,Barberobservesthat conceivably ixon couldcome to find n example n anotherman of independence, unheroic Harry Truman . . . (p. 442). Thesignificancefthis rypticemarkiesin thefact hatHarryTruman


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268 WORLD POLITICSisdiagnosedlsewherenthe ook shavingnactive-positiveharac-ter. t would ppear,herefore,hat arber'sncertaintyboutNixon,whom ehas lreadyoncededobe a special ariantf he ctive-nega-tive ype,s such hat e cannot xclude he ossibilityhatNixonmayemerges an active-positive.In view f he oregoing,t s all themore isappointinghat arberhasso ittle osay bout hepossibleignificancef theperiod ollow-ingNixon's withdrawalromoliticsn 962, after isdefeatntheCaliforniaubernatoriallection. as thererowthndchange uringthis eriod? id the ealizationfthe mbitionhwartednhisearlyadulthoodobeacceptednto prestigiousewYorkorWashingtonlawfirm ndtheprocessfstaging successfulomebacknpoliticscontributeo the hapingfa newNixon, s waswidely uggestedat the ime?Barber asses ver his ossibilityery uickly,tressinginsteadhatvidencesf heman's arlierersonalityanbefound ur-inghis firsterm nd that hese re ikelyo overshadowny rans-formationsismoves romNewYorktoWashington ayhaveen-gendered 38 pp. 4V8-i9).Highlightederes a major roblemnBarber'sheoryfpersonal-ity.Whileherecognizeshat haractersnotfirmlyixednchildhood(e.g.,p. io), ineffecteoperates ith notionf charactertructureasbeing enerallytaticor t east hreefhisfourharacterypes,ndinparticularor he ctive-negative.he importantxceptionn thisrespects theactive-positiveypewho,unburdenedy problems fself-esteem,s capable fgrowthhroughxperience.t maybe re-called nthis onnectionhat gopsychologynd thepsychologyfadaptation,nwhich arber raws ffectivelyn other espects,avemuted he earlier otion hat haractertructureetains timelessfixitynce thasbeen hapednchildhood.his mportantheoreticaldevelopmentasnotfoundtsway dequatelyntoBarber'sonceptu-alizationfpersonality.dmittedly,twouldnotbe an easymatterforBarbero ncorporatento isowntheoryrikErikson's otion f

38 Neither oes Barbermentionr refer o thepossible ignificance,f any, f Nixon'sconsultations,hileVice President, ithArnoldHutschnecker, .D., who in i95ihadwritten bookonpsychosomaticedicine-leading orumorsater n thatNixonhad seen a psychiatrist.n an articlewritten n i969

assessing presidential character

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