asian survey 1978 year end assessment of burma rohingya persecution

8/12/2019 Asian Survey 1978 Year End Assessment of Burma Rohingya Persecution

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Burma 1978: The Thirtieth Year of IndependenceAuthor(s): William L. Scully and Frank N. TragerSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1978: Part II (Feb., 1979), pp. 147-156Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643781 .Accessed: 15/08/2013 11:13

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BURMA1978: THE THIRTIETH EAR OFINDEPENDENCE

William L. Scully and Frank N. Trager

AMONG THE COUNTRIES in Asia that regained politicalfreedom from a colonial power in the nationalist aftermath of WorldWar II, Burma is among those few that, on the whole, have faredpoorly. Burma is basically a moderately well-endowed country. Thelargely literate population of approximately 33 million should be ableto enjoy their reasonably rich resource base of land, water, and mineral

wealth. The population growth rate is a comparatively moderate 2.2%per annum. For better or worse, in good times and bad, Burma, a cen-tralized, in part federalized republic, has had only two sets of leaderssince independence in 1948-the one civilian, 1948-1962 and the othermilitary, 1962 to the present-both stemming from the same anti-colonial, nationalist struggle for independence.

These favorable factors-proportionate, ample resources; moder-ate density and growth of population; relatively high literacy rate;continuity of leadership; ethnic diversity within a dominant, homo-

geneous, Buddhist culture; pursuit of what has been rightfully calledits own version of economic nationalism with almost total singlemind-

edness; I proper membership in the United Nations, World Bank, andAsian Development Bank; and careful avoidance since shortly after in-dependence of any international political alignment-should havemade Burma what many Burmese have called their country: TheHappy Golden Land. Gold here represents not only the precious metalwith which the Burmese adorn their many religious shrines but alsothe hundreds of miles of ripening golden-hued rice spreading across

1 Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, Southeast Asian Affairs 1977 (Singapore,1977), p. 34.

147

f 1979 by the Regents of the University of California0004-4687/79/020 147 + 10$00.50

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148 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XIX, No. 2, February 1979

the extraordinary river deltas at harvest time. For Burma was once-it no longer is-the predominant rice exporter among the other ex-porting rice-bowl countries of mainland Southeast Asia. This once po-

tential Camelot is now, at best, a legend of the past.There is no single explanation for this unwanted, indeed origi-nally unpredicted (unpredictable?) failure. All the elements which willappear briefly in the following annual account have occurred in onecombination or another in previous years. The older of the authors haslived, worked in, and visited Burma scores of times since 1950; theyounger since the early 1970s. Our investigations and our perceptions,however variant in sympathies and friendships, do not otherwise vary.What we continue to find is that (1) leadership, though benefitting

from continuity, does not add cubits to its stature or its country'sstature, and has not provided for democratic succession; (2) resourcesare developed but not better developed; (3) economic nationalism,whatever it is called, does not provide material or spiritual gain to orfor the people nor does it prevent stagflation from occurring withinthe economy; (4) honest nonalignment-even forms of internationalisolationism-does not bring domestic peace and tranquility; (5) poli-tical intervention and externally promoted insurgency-mostly fromthe communist states-add high and continuous costs in lives and

treasure to maintaining the ship of state afloat during attacks that be-gan and have never stopped since the third month of independence in1948. And so it goes. Let us look at these factors at work during 1978.

Domestic Politics

Between January 1 and 15, 1978, some 16 million eligible voters,according to official sources, participated in the election of 464 mem-bers of the constitutionally highest organ of state power, the PyithuHluttaw (People's Congress or Assembly), as well as the selection ofover 178,000 members of the People's Council chosen at State, Division,Ward, Township and Village-tract levels. Concurrently, 250 membersof the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party(BSPP), the sole legal party, were also elected. By early March, follow-ing the first session of the Pyithu Hluttaw, a new Council of State,Council of Ministers, and other state organs, as well as the budget esti-mates, were approved. As expected, General Ne Win retained the posi-tion of President of the State and Chairman of the Council of State,while General San Yu remained as Secretary of the Council of State,and U Maung Maung Kha as Prime Minister.

The election of the BSPP Central Committee, the Council ofMinisters, and other organs of state power discloses the recurrent andpreponderant influence of the military in Burmese political life. Ac-cording to one estimate, more than 80 serving military officers andabout as many, if not more, retired military personnel serve on the



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TABLE 1: Council of Ministers

U Maung Maung Kha(retired colonel) Prime Minister

U Tun Tin Deputy Prime Minister (as of October 25)& Minister for Planning & Finance

General Kyaw Htin Minister for DefenseCol. Sein Lwin Minister for Home and Religious AffairsU Ye Goung Minister for Agriculture and ForestsCol. Tint Swe Minister for Industry (1)Dr. Khin Maung Win Minister for EducationCol. Maung Cho Minister for Industry (2)Col. Khin Maung Gyi Minister for Trade (as of October 25)Col. Sein Tun Minister for Co-operativesU Mahn San Myat Shwe Minister for Social Welfare and LabourBrig.-Gen. Myint Maung Minister for Foreign AffairsU Mya Maung Minister for Information & CultureBrig.-Gen. Hla Tun Minister for ConstructionCol. Khin Ohn Minister for Transport & CommunicationsCol. Win Maung Minister for HealthCol. Than Tin Minister for Mines

SOURCE: The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), March 4, 1978.

new Central Committee.2 Further evidence of this military preponder-ance can be seen in the newly elected Council of Ministers (see Table 1).Other prominent state positions are likewise held by military figures,as for example the Chairmanship of the Council of People's Justices aswell as that of the Council of People's Attorneys.

Paramount among the deliberations of these newly-elected bodieshas been the subject of administrative discipline and personal respon-sibility. In late February, the BSPP Central Committee, obviously re-sponding to recent and past allegations of corruption among high partyand state officials, directed that all its members declare their familyassets, their cash and real estate holdings, and business interests. Thisdeclaration similarly applies to about 300 party executive committeemembers throughout the country. In a corresponding move, a motionto make property declarations mandatory on all elected members ofthe government from the Council of State down to all levels of thePeople's Councils was also adopted during the first meeting of the newPyithu Hluttaw.3 During the second session, which commenced on Oc-tober 13, further disciplinary control was exercised in the passing of aResignation and Replacement Bill.

2 M. C. Tun, The military line holds firm, Far Eastern Economic Review(FEER), January 27, 1978, p. 28.

3 In this regard, one should note that U Hla Aye, Burmese Trade Minister,had been suspended pending investigation into alleged irregularities involving adeliberate understatement of the price of a house he recently sold. More seriously,it was alleged that when Hla Aye recently purchased rivercraft for the Ministry heincurred extra costs by buying through a private firm rather than through the man-ufacturers. See FEER, July 21, 1978, p. 5.



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Insurgency and Other Instabilities

As always when discussing the political atmosphere within Burmathe ever-recurring issue of insurgency is of paramount importance. Theprincipal rebellious and destructive force has been and continues to bethe Peking-backed Burma Communist Party (BCP), which operates pri-marily in the northeast sector of the Shan State. The People's Republicof China (PRC) has always justified its support for the BCP on theground that it was and is a matter between the communist parties ofChina and Burma, and does not affect government-to-government rela-tions between Peking and Rangoon.

Since his seizure of power in 1962, President Ne Win has, on nu-merous occasions, visited Peking hoping to convince the Chinese toreduce if not desist in their support for the BCP. Speculation had itthat on the occasion of the visit of Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping toRangoon in late January 1978 Ne Win once again pressed his case.However, the general consensus among observers was that nothing ofa substantive nature was accomplished. In early March 1978, one re-port indicated that the BCP again appeared poised to launch a majormilitary offensive against two towns in northeast Burma-Kunlong,which lies on the west bank of the Salween River, and Hsenwi, located

fifty miles west.This

offensive appeared designed to give the BCP notonly a secure foothold west of the Salween but more importantly asetting off point for operations into the Irrawaddy River plain, the

heartland of the country. 4 Final corroborating evidence was given inlate March when the Rangoon authorities announced publicly thatBCP forces, during February and March, had entered Kunlong andTang-yan, a town southeast of Lashio, in the Northeast Command areabordering China. Official Burmese estimates counted more than 800rebels dead, while Tatmadaw (Burmese) forces suffered 135 men dead,

with a further 229 wounded and 124 missing.5 Apparently, as a resultof the Army's successful operation, BCP forces retreated to the easternbank of the Salween, considered by most to be a secure BCP strong-hold.

In mid-June 1978 various reports and rumors from Peking, Bang-kok, and Hongkong were cautiously being analyzed for possible signsof an impending breakthrough in the insurgent problem. Some observ-ers pointed to the high-level military talks being conducted in earlyJune between a 10-man Burmese delegation, led by Defence Minister

Kyaw Htin, and a Chinese delegation, which included Hua Kuo-feng,Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chinaand Premier of the PRC State Council, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Vice Premierof the State Council and Minister for National Defence, and Wu Hsiu-

4 Frank Hennessy, Peking Comfort for Rebels, FEER, March 3, 1978, p. 20.Some observers saw Teng's visit as a courtesy acknowledgement of Ne Win's visitto Democratic Kampuchea in November 1977.

5 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), March 27, 1978.



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BURMA 151

chaung, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff. Considering that the stated aim ofthe meeting was to further the close paukphaw relations between thetwo countries, 6 there is no doubt that the BCP insurgency was a promi-nent issue of discussion. At the same time, according to reports fromBangkok, the BCP had now parted company with its traditional ally,the Shan State Army (SSA). It appears that the BCP, in an attempt totake full administrative control of the liberated areas of the north-east, was antagonizing SSA leaders and other segments of the popula-tion, most specifically the powerful Burmese monks. Finally, reports outof Hongkong indicated that the Chinese were on the verge of cuttingtheir links with the BCP.7

The above-mentioned factors must obviously be viewed within thewider context of the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute as it relates to South-east Asia, and most particularly to Vietnam. Since Vietnam's open con-flict with the PRC in May 1978 and its admission into the Soviet Blocorganization COMECON on June 29 there has been very little doubtabout its increasingly intimate ties with the Soviet Union; these tieswere further solidified by signing of a 25-year Treaty of Friendship andCooperation on November 3, 1978. The wooing of noncommunist statesin Southeast Asia by Vietnam in 1978 is a further indication of Hanoi'sattempt to garner support for its position vis-a-vis the PRC. The court-

ship of Burma by Hanoi is a case in point. On the occasion of the 30thanniversary of Burmese independence, Nhan Dan, the official newspa-per of Vietnam, stated:

Burma pursues a policy of positive neutrality and is opposed to im-perialism, old and neo-colonialism and racism. It has established eco-nomic and cultural relations with the socialist and developing countriesand supports the forces of genuine peace, independence and neutralityin Southeast Asia.8

Furthermore, in June 1978 Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister, VoDong Giang, invited the UN Mission chiefs of Burma, Laos, andASEAN nations to put forward a proposal for a zone of peace, indepen-dence, and neutrality. It is within this context that the reports emanat-ing from Peking, Bangkok, and Hongkong concerning the BCP mustbe viewed.

Whether or not the above-mentioned factors would indicate adefinitive shift in PRC policy towards the BCP is difficult to say at thistime. It should be noted, however, that this seemingly is the conclu-sion reached by Moscow. In mid-June 1978, Pravda accused the Chi-nese of sowing discord among various ethnic groups in Burma and oftrying to force Burma to follow policies favorable to Peking. 9

6 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), June 7, 1978.7 A Breakthrough for Burma?, ASIA WEEK, June 23, 1978, p. 15.8 The Wooing Has Begun, ASIA WEEK, January 20, 1978, p. 14.9 A Breakthrough for Burma?, ASIA WEEK, June 23, 1978, p. 16.



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Problems in the Arakan

From the early days of the British Raj the border area between theBengali Muslim society of Chittagong/Dacca (Bangladesh) and theBuddhist Arakanese at Akyab and the Naaf River Estuary has been,and continues to be, the locus of a law-and-order and illegal immigra-tion problem. Either the Bengali Muslim population seeks better timesin the Arakan or the Burmese Arakanese seek political relief across theborder in what is now Bangladesh. At this writing, it would appear thathard times in Bangladesh substantially increased the Muslim popula-tion of the Arakan and led to new measures of immigration and aliencontrol from Rangoon.

Beginning in 1977, the Burmese government initiated a Kyats 140million (US$20 million) project, code-named the Naga Min (DragonKing) operation, to update its demographic information in Arakan,Chin, and Kachin states and in Mandalay and Sagaing divisions. Morespecifically, this was an attempt by the Immigration and ManpowerDepartment in Rangoon to register all residents, classify them cate-gorically as either Burmese citizens or foreigners, register them, andissue them with certificates of registration. Reportedly the operationbegan in the Kachin and Shan states in May 1977, followed by surprise

checks in parts of Rangoon and the Mon state in the south. The opera-tion reached Arakan in February 1978 when sections of Akyab townshipcame under scrutiny.

On February 11, 1978 it appears that some 200 immigration offi-cers, having been dispatched from Rangoon, entered the Muslim areasof Akyab. One estimate claims that some 1734 persons were arrestedthat evening and moved into an improvised detention center. Less thana week later an opposing demonstration was reportedly forcibly sup-pressed, resulting in widespread panic among the Muslim populace.10

As the operation was extended forward north of Akyab, the Muslimpopulation was seen to move increasingly hindwards to the Naaf RiverEstuary. During the next several months, prior to a Burmese naval andarmy blockade along the river in late May, it was unofficially estimatedthat some 200,000 refugees had crossed the border into Bangladesh andwere encamped in makeshift centers relatively near the Burmese border.The principal refugee camp was at Cox Bazaar, a beach resort some 95miles southeast of Chittagong. - Responding to the problem and mostparticularly to the intolerable conditions within the camps, the UNlaunched a six-month contingency assistance program.

10 William Mattern, Burma's Brand of Apartheid, FEER, July 14, 1978, p. 31.This, however, conflicts with an earlier report in Far Eastern Economic Review(May 26, 1978) which stated that all went well when the urban population waschecked. Trouble erupted when officials moved into some 66 villages in late March(p. 30).

11 Eleven other camps, some at Gundhum, Nhila, and Whaikyaung, were hastilyset up along the sixty mile road south of Cox Bazaar.



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BURMA 153

With the situation becoming more unbearable as each day passedand fearing that a major religious clash might ensue involving someof the Islamic nations of the Middle East, Foreign Secretary TobaraqHusain of Bangladesh led a delegation to Burma in early June. OnJuly 9, 1978 an agreement on repatriation was finally reached betweenBurma and Bangladesh. In essence the agreement provided that Burmawould repatriate the refugees in various stages. During the first stagerepatriation was to be extended to all those with National Registrationcertificates.12 The remaining, including those without papers but whocould provide evidence of residency, were to be returned at a later date.Eleven staging camps were to be set up and the return of the refugeeswas scheduled to commence on August 30, 1978. Early reports, however,

indicated that the repatriation program was not working well. Thesmall number of returnees was considered attributable not only to acertain degree of bureaucratic mismanagement within the receptionand transit camps, but also to a prevalent fear among the Muslim pop-ulation that the Burmese authorities were intent upon eliminatingthem in the Arakan.

This fear, real or imaginary, is in part attributable to the still un-confirmed reports of brutality and atrocities waged against the Muslimpopulation during the early stages of the evacuation. The Rohingya

Patriotic Front, on the one hand, accused Rangoon of religious per-secution, racial discrimination and systematic apartheid, 1'3 while, onthe other hand, Rangoon retorted that the refugees were victims oftheir own self-induced panic.'4 Was it panic or was it systematic apar-theid and terror? We concur with William Mattern that the answermost probably lies somewhere between these two contradictory claims.'5

In a related development, two high treason trials, one of whichinvolved a conspiracy to create a separate Arakanese state and govern-ment, were formally concluded in late February 1978. The defendants

were all found guilty of treason. The alleged leader of the plot, UHtein Lin, a former township unit BSPP chairman in Arakan until1975, and Mahn Ngwe Aung, a Karen national, received the death sen-tence, while the three remaining defendants received terms rangingfrom life imprisonment to ten years at hard labor.

12 Some observers say that 100,000 have registration cards, while others put thefigure much lower. See FEER, July 21, 1978, p. 20. The situation is further compli-

cated in that the refugees claim that neither registration cards nor foreign registra-tion cards have been issued since 1962. See FEER, July 14, 1978, pp. 30-32.13 FEER, November 3, 1978, p. 32.14 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon) for July 12, 1978 stated: The present

immigration problem arose not because of any religious or social discrimination butbecause of the instigation of unsavoury elements who were against the collection ofdata being carried out for the purpose of implementing the social system. See alsoForward (Rangoon), XVI:ll (August 1978), pp. 10-11 and 14-15 for further Burmeseviews.

15 William Mattern, Burma's Brand of Apartheid, p. 30.



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BURMA 155

Burma's Five-Year Development Program (1977-1978 to 1981-1982).According to Tun Tin's analysis, the policies and measures taken bythe government over the past several years have begun to show positive

results: overall production and exports have expanded, the budgetaryposition has improved, and inflation has subsided somewhat. Thegovernment will continue to increase the level of its investment, par-ticularly in agriculture, forestry, mining, and transport; improve itspricing policies, thus generating greater production incentives; stimu-late exports and liberalize imports; enhance the efficiency of its Stateenterprises; and promote fiscal and monetary stability. Furthermore,special measures were to be introduced for the purpose of enlargingthe absorptive capacity of the public sector for new investments as well

as support, both technical and financial, to cooperatives and privateenterprises. The government needed external capital and technicalassistance in its efforts to accelerate the country's economic develop-ment and was hopeful that the international community would respondpositively to the program it had proposed.

The group welcomed the statement and endorsed the government'sprogram to increase the level of its investment by no less than 20% peryear under the Five-Year Plan. Finally, the government was assured thatin this effort the various members of the group would be responsive to

Burma's needs for external capital and technical assistance.18In this respect, it should be noted that Burma, with the assistance

of the World Bank, has been conducting a series of feasibility surveysto choose projects in the agricultural, transport, power, and industrialsectors to speed up economic development in the 1980s. These feasibil-ity studies are incorporated within one omnibus measure called theBurma Umbrella Programme, and are financed by a US$2.5 milliontechnical assistance grant from the United Nations Development Pro-gramme. Other noteworthy developments include: (1) an agreementsigned between the Petro Chemical and National Gas Industries Corpo-ration and the Mitsubishi Company of Japan for the construction ofan oil refinery capable of processing 25,000 barrels of crude oil daily;(2) Myanma Oil Corporation has finalized a US$10 million syndicatedloan with a group of banks headed by Chase Manhattan Asia Limitedand Wardley Limited for the purpose of purchasing four onshore oildrilling rigs; (3) a Czech assistance loan of US$140 million to increaseproduction of tractors, tires, and diesel injection pumps and nozzles toenable Burma to boost production of engines and parts for Zwe tractorsby 96%; and (4) a US$24 million venture has been proposed to updateBurma's telecommunications network. US$21 million will be allocatedfor domestic purposes.

Since more than half of Burma's annual foreign exchange derives

18 Since the establishment of the Aid Group in November 1976, commitmentsby member nations had amounted to over US$200 million.



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from its rice exports, it is essential to review the 1977-1978 crop harvestas well as the projected estimates for 1978-1979. The 1977-1978 cropharvest, estimated by government sources at 454 million baskets (ap-

proximately 9.2 million metric tons), appeared to be the smallest since1974X1975.19Unofficial observers, however, claim that the harvest wasconsiderably less than officially reported, possibly as low as 8.7 millionmetric tons.20 The 1977-1978 state procurement program, some observ-ers believe, may have netted less than 120 million baskets, perhaps aslittle as 100 million.21 This setback was caused by a variety of factors:an extensive drought in the north, floods in the main surplus area inthe south, smuggling, and the fixed price policy of the government. Theeffect on Burma's rice export earnings this past year are estimated to

be only US$70 million compared to US$105.7 million for the previousyear.22

Both official and unofficial sources suggest that the 1978-1979 cropwill be healthy. According to official estimates, the crop should yield480 million baskets of paddy, or approximately 10 million metric tons.Of this the state paddy procurement target has been set at 168 millionbaskets-35% of the total harvest-compared with 160.7 million dur-ing the past year.

Possibly as a response to a critical World Bank Study completedin 1977, an Australian consulting consortium will help improve thecrop yields of the country. This four-year project will cost an estimatedUS$11 million. Financing will be by the Burmese government, withsupport from the United Nations Development Programme throughthe International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

19 Asia Research Bulletin, Section IV-Commodities and Primary Industries,8:3 (August 31, 1978), p. 476. The figure for 1974-1975 was 8.4 million metric tons.

20 Ibid. See also FEER, October 27, 1978, where the harvest was considered to bepossibly 8.9 million metric tons (p. 56).

21 FEER, October 27, 1978, p. 56.22 Asia Research Bulletin, Section IV-Commodities and Primary Industries,

8:3 (August 31, 1978), p. 476.

WILLIAM L. SCULLY is Research Associate Professor, National Security EducationProgram, and Senior Research Analyst, Burma Research Project, New York Univer-sity. FRANK N. TRAGER is Professor of International Affairs and Director of theNational Security Education Program and Burma Research Project, New York Uni-versity.

asian survey 1978 year end assessment of burma rohingya persecution

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