asean and human rights: resisting western pressure or emulating the west?

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ASEAN and human rights:resisting Western pressure oremulating the West?Hiro Katsumata aa Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,JapanVersion of record first published: 11 Nov 2009.

To cite this article: Hiro Katsumata (2009): ASEAN and human rights: resisting Westernpressure or emulating the West?, The Pacific Review, 22:5, 619-637

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The Pacific Review, Vol. 22 No. 5 December 2009: 619–637

ASEAN and human rights:resisting Western pressure oremulating the West?

Hiro Katsumata

Abstract Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the mem-bers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pur-sue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from West-ern powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, arguesthat such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countrieshave voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is tobe identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate interna-tional status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rightswhich is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the inten-tion of securing ASEAN’s identity as a legitimate institution in the community ofmodern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the samereason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines andnewly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted thatthe progress of ASEAN’s liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strat-egy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members ofASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The develop-ment of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence overthe Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article pro-poses that ASEAN’s external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal re-form, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim ofboosting the concern of its members for ASEAN’s international standing.

Keywords ASEAN; Southeast Asia; human rights; East Asian community; socio-logical institutionalism; isomorphism.

Hiro Katsumata, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Waseda University Institute of Asia-PacificStudies, Japan. He is the author of ASEAN’s Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and In-terests in the ASEAN Regional Forum, Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2010.

Address: Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1-21-1 Nishi-Waseda Building6F, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051, Japan. E-mail: [email protected]

The Pacific ReviewISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online C© 2009 Taylor & Francis

http://www.informaworld.com/journalsDOI: 10.1080/09512740903329731

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620 The Pacific Review

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is today facinga serious challenge – i.e., the implementation of liberal reform, aimed ataddressing liberal agendas such as human rights and democracy. ASEANdiplomacy has traditionally been state-centred, designed to address the in-terests of governments. The challenge now is to address the interests of thepeople of Southeast Asia, some of whom have been under political oppres-sion. This article problematizes what can be regarded as the conventionalview of ASEAN’s liberal reform, and puts forward an alternative view:

• The conventional view: ASEAN resisting Western pressure. The ASEANmembers are reluctant to reform their association, and their main con-cern is to resist pressure from the Western powers for reform. Theychange their human rights practice only when they are under strong pres-sure from external powers. Therefore, to facilitate ASEAN’s liberal re-form, the Western countries should put more pressure on its members.

• The alternative view: ASEAN emulating the West. The Southeast Asiancountries are voluntarily contemplating a liberal reform of ASEAN, andtheir main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – ad-vanced countries with legitimate international status. To facilitate this re-form, ASEAN’s external partners should boost the concern of its mem-bers for ASEAN’s international standing, by openly assessing its humanrights record in global settings.

The conventional view above is inferred from the discourse of human rightswhich is prevalent among policy-makers and human rights activists in theWestern world. Their discourse presupposes that the ASEAN members arereluctant to address human rights issues in Southeast Asia. Many Europeanpolicy-makers, including the members of the British House of CommonsForeign Affairs Committee, hold the view that the UK and other membersof the European Union (EU) should put strong pressure on ASEAN totake a more robust position on human rights abuses in Myanmar (Houseof Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2004: 35–6; Campaign for HumanRights and Democracy in Burma 2005; AFP 2007a). Amnesty International(2007b) has urged the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) to im-pose a comprehensive and mandatory arms embargo on Myanmar. HumanRights Watch has urged North American and European countries to uti-lize their economic leverage to punish several Southeast Asian countriesfor their poor records on human rights (Human Rights Watch 2007b, 2003,2000, 1998a, 1998b; also see Katanyuu 2006: 841–2).

However, this article demonstrates that this conventional view is, at aminimum, too simplistic and, at a maximum, erroneous. It does so by ex-ploring three issues: the way in which the ASEAN members have ap-proached the issue of human rights, why they have taken such an approach,

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H. Katsumata: ASEAN and human rights 621

and what ASEAN’s external partners can do to facilitate the liberal reformof the association.

The main body of this article has three main sections, followed by a con-clusion. The first section focuses on the approach of the issue of humanrights taken by the members of ASEAN. It argues that they have begun topursue liberal agendas. Indeed, they seem to be overly ambitious in plan-ning the liberal reform of their association. They have been setting out anumber of impressive plans for reform, which are disproportionate to whatthey have been able to achieve up to the present in terms of institutionaldevelopment.

The second section explores the motives of the ASEAN members be-hind their pursuit of liberal agendas. This section first reveals the limita-tions of the conventional view that the ASEAN members have been pur-suing liberal agendas because they have been under pressure from theWestern powers. It then offers an alternative explanation, by drawing onthe sociological–institutionalist literature. This explanation holds that theSoutheast Asian countries have been emulating the Western industrializeddemocracies, so as to be identified as advanced and legitimate. In concreteterms, they have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rightswhich is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with theintention of securing ASEAN’s identity as a legitimate institution in thecommunity of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberalagendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries haveluxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute na-tional flags.

The third section makes policy recommendations to members of the in-ternational community in general and ASEAN’s external partners in partic-ular, such as the UN, the US, the EU and Japan. A conventional strategy forfacilitating ASEAN’s liberal reform would be to put more pressure on itsmembers. However, it is argued here that the usefulness of such a strategy isdiminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core com-ponent of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for theWestern powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries.Hence, this section proposes an alternative strategy – that ASEAN’s exter-nal partners ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessingits human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the con-cern of its members for ASEAN’s international standing. The concludingsection underlines the universal applicability of the norm of human rights,thereby suggesting that this globalization strategy is well worth employing.

ASEAN’s human rights practice

In what way have the ASEAN members approached the issue of humanrights? By and large, it is fair to say that they have now begun to pursue lib-eral agendas such as human rights and democracy. Although these agendas

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were largely absent in ASEAN diplomacy until the 1990s, its members havelately begun to address sensitive issues in a relatively open and frank man-ner. Symbolically, in September 2007, the foreign ministers held a meet-ing, whose sole purpose was to address human rights abuses in one mem-ber state, namely, Myanmar. In response to the crushing of pro-democracydemonstrations, in this meeting, they ‘demanded that the Myanmar govern-ment immediately desist from the use of violence against demonstrators’(ASEAN 2007d). It can be said that the notion of human rights adoptedby the ASEAN members underlines not only economic but also politicalrights. In the 1990s, they commonly put more emphasis on the former,claiming that political rights can be curtailed for the sake of rapid economicdevelopment. Today, few in Southeast Asia openly make such a claim.

The ASEAN members have begun to interpret the principle of non-interference, once a sacrosanct component of ASEAN diplomacy, in amore flexible way (Kivimaki 2008: 446; Katsumata 2004). This is significantbecause liberal reform will involve the redefinition of the conception ofsovereignty. On one hand, the ASEAN members, who have practicedstate-centred diplomacy for a long time, have adhered to the Westphalianconception of state sovereignty, with its core element of the principleof non-interference. The Westphalian conception of sovereignty and thenon-interference principle have been fundamental components of ASEANdiplomacy. On the other hand, liberal agendas are associated with a people-centred conception of sovereignty. The pursuit of human rights and democ-racy involves a flexible interpretation of state sovereignty – or the notionthat these issues cannot be considered the internal affairs of states, and thusare not subject to the principle of non-interference.

That said, careful observation reveals a unique feature of the approachof the ASEAN members: they seem to be overly ambitions in planningASEAN’s liberal reform. They have been setting out a number of impres-sive plans for reform, which are disproportionate to what they have beenable to achieve up to the present in terms of institutional development.In other words, they have been making difficult promises, by announc-ing reform plans that are hard to implement under existing circumstances.Therefore, there is a discrepancy between their promises and the actual in-stitutional development of the association – as the rest of this section seeksto demonstrate.

The members of ASEAN have been setting out a number of impres-sive plans for reform, thereby announcing their readiness to pursue liberalagendas. In November 2007 they signed the ASEAN Charter. Salient in itspreamble is a set of liberal principles: the ASEAN members are ‘[a]dheringto the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respectfor and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ In line withthese liberal principles, Article 14 of the Charter stipulates that ‘ASEANshall establish an ASEAN human rights body’ (ASEAN 2007a). Indeed,they have been planning to establish a regional human rights mechanism

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for several years. At the non-official level, they have on a regular basis beenholding workshops on an ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights,and in ASEAN Ministerial Meetings every year they have been reaffirmingtheir commitment to establishing such a mechanism (ASEAN 2005, 2006,2007c).

In addition, they have set out a plan to establish an ‘ASEAN securitycommunity’, whose objectives include the promotion of human rights anddemocracy. In October 2003 they announced this plan for the first time(ASEAN 2003), and in November 2004 they adopted a Plan of Action fora security community, which underlines their ‘shared vision and commonvalues to achieve . . . democracy in the region’. In this respect, they notedthat, in such a community, unconstitutional and undemocratic changes ofgovernment should not be condoned. They say in this action plan that theyare determined to promote a ‘just, democratic and harmonious environ-ment’, to strengthen ‘democratic institutions and popular participation’, toenhance ‘good governance in public and private sectors’, to protect ‘vul-nerable groups including women, children, people with disabilities, and mi-grant workers’, and to promote ‘education and public awareness on humanrights.’ It is worth adding that elements of a security community include‘conflict prevention’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘post-conflict peace building’.These elements can be developed into mechanisms to deal with humanitar-ian crises (ASEAN 2004b, 2004a).

However, in terms of institutional development, the progress ofASEAN’s liberal reform has been modest. Although their reform plansare impressive, the ASEAN members have been slow to implement them.What they have done so far is, at most, to lay the groundwork for insti-tutional development. With regard to the plan to establish a regional hu-man rights mechanism, four countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-pines and Thailand – have set up national human rights commissions.Premised on the belief that an ASEAN Regional Mechanism on HumanRights is to be established by using a network of existing commissions,the national commissions of these four countries have been expandingtheir activities and collaborating with various civil society organizations(see ASEAN 2004c: 29–30, 2006; Forum Asia 2008: 7; Nesadurai 2009:108–9).

Two explanations

Why have the ASEAN members begun to pursue liberal agendas? Whyhave they been so ambitious in planning ASEAN’s liberal reform? Thereare at least two ways of approaching this issue. One is to adopt a mate-rialist view, and to concentrate on the material environment surroundingthe Southeast Asian association. The other is to adopt a sociological–institutionalist perspective, which brings into view the social or normativeenvironment.

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External pressure?

The conventional approach to understanding ASEAN diplomacy is to fo-cus on the material environment surrounding the Southeast Asian associa-tion. The main elements of this environment are the material capabilities ofthe Western powers, such as the US and the EU. From this viewpoint, theASEAN members have been pursuing liberal agendas because they havebeen under pressure from the Western powers. They have been doing soreluctantly because the North American and European powers have uti-lized their material leverage and coerced them to change their practice.The scholarly literature in international relations holds that the materialcapabilities of great powers may facilitate the spread of new norms and thepromotion of international cooperation (Krasner 1993; Mearsheimer 1994;Finnemore 1996: 339–40, 2003: 18–1, 146–7).

On the surface it seems plausible to say that the ASEAN members havebeen under pressure from the Western powers. The main concern of theUS and the EU is ASEAN’s dealings with the issue of Myanmar. Most no-tably, they sometimes threaten to stop negotiating a free trade agreementwith ASEAN unless the Southeast Asian association abandons its engage-ment policy toward Yangon/Nay Pyi Taw. For example, in the wake of thecrushing of pro-democracy demonstrations by the military government inSeptember 2007, these Western powers urged ASEAN to take punitive ac-tion against Yangon/Nay Pyi Taw. The United States Trade Representative(USTR) stated that a US–ASEAN free trade agreement was unimaginablein the existing circumstances, and the European Parliament made it clearthat it would oppose an EU–ASEAN free trade agreement until democ-racy was restored in Myanmar (US Embassy in Singapore 2007; AHN Me-dia Corp 2007).

However, a focus on the material environment would lead to only a lim-ited understanding of the issue under study. The conventional view is in-sufficient, for two reasons. First, a careful study of the policies of the West-ern powers reveals that they have not put a significant level of pressure onmost of the ASEAN members. From the viewpoint of effective materialpressure, their policies are riddled with flaws. While imposing sanctions ofits own on Myanmar, the US has been careful not to disrupt its bilateraleconomic ties with other Southeast Asian countries. Although it may haveexpressed a reservation about a free trade agreement with ASEAN as awhole, it has constantly pursued bilateral trade agreements with Singapore,Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and the Thailand.Even when commenting on the crushing of pro-democracy demonstrationsin Myanmar, the USTR expressed no intention to curtail Washington’s bi-lateral economic relations with these countries (US Embassy in Singapore2007). The EU, for its part, continues to negotiate a free trade agreementwith ASEAN, although it has been critical of the Southeast Asian associa-tion at the rhetorical level (anonymous officials of the ASEAN Secretariat,

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author’s interviews, Jakarta, November 2007 and Brussels, November 2008;also see ASEAN and the EU 2007, 2009). It is worth adding that, in parallelwith these developments at the governmental level, business relations be-tween Western multinational corporations and their Southeast Asian coun-terparts have been sound. The former have been expanding their businessactivities in Southeast Asia for decades by making direct investments, re-gardless of the status of ASEAN’s liberal reform.

Second, ASEAN’s plans are incongruous with the demands of the West-ern powers. What the US and the EU have demanded from ASEAN is totake tough measures against one member state, namely, Myanmar. In con-trast, what the Southeast Asian association has been doing is to pursue acomprehensive set of measures to address human rights issues in general –including the establishment of a security community which puts emphasison liberal agendas, the protection of vulnerable people as part of the ef-fort to manage regional conflicts, and the development of a regional humanrights mechanism which can be split into units to deal with any problemsif they arise in the future. It is worth noting that the Western powers havehardly attempted to coerce ASEAN to set out a plan for a security commu-nity which contains liberal agendas. Nor have they made a specific requestconcerning the content of the ASEAN Charter.

Mimetic adoption of external norm

Our alternative approach is to focus on the social or normative environ-ment surrounding ASEAN. From this viewpoint, in the global commu-nity of modern states today, its core members, the advanced industrializeddemocracies, are championing a set of liberal norms, thereby creating a so-cial environment which defines human rights as an element of legitimacyin this community. In this environment, adopting the norm of human rightsis a prerequisite for any state in securing its identity as a legitimate mem-ber of this community. In such circumstances, the ASEAN members have‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championedby the advanced industrialized democracies, motivated by their desire to beidentified as advanced and legitimate. They have been emulating the West-ern industrialized democracies and setting out liberal reform plans, withthe intention of securing ASEAN’s identity as a legitimate institution in thecommunity of modern states (see Katsumata forthcoming).

The explanation here is founded on the sociological literature on insti-tutional isomorphism. This literature suggests that the mimicking of exter-nal models for the sake of legitimacy explains the isomorphic structuresof various organizations, such as firms, schools, hospitals and nation states.The international social environment – or the world culture – may definevarious things as elements of legitimacy as members of the community ofmodern states. Thus, almost all states have national flags, airlines, and sim-ilar educational systems. They all seek similar high-tech weapons, and have

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tripartite military structures, with an army, air force and navy (DiMaggioand Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Suchman andEyre 1992; Finnemore 1996: 334–7). The international social environmenteven encourages states to ratify human rights conventions (Wotipka andRamirez 2008; Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutui 2005). While inspiredby these findings concerning isomorphism across units at the systemic level,the explanation in this article concentrates on the actors’ side of the story,hoping to shed light on the intentions of the ASEAN members. It doesso in the belief that the existing sociological literature on institutional iso-morphism tends to emphasize structure at the expense of agency, so as toidentify isomorphism across units (Finnemore 1996).

The overly ambitious attitude of the ASEAN members toward liberalreform reflects their intention to display that they have adopted a legiti-mate external model. They have been announcing ambitious reform plans,thereby making difficult promises, because they are trying to display theiradoption of the norm of human rights, an element of legitimacy in thecommunity of modern states. Their intention to display the adoption ofa legitimate external model has resulted in the ‘decoupling’ of their ac-tual practices from such a model. Thus, there is a discrepancy betweenthe actual institutional development of the association and their ambitiouspromises for liberal reform, which are consistent with the external norm.For sociological–institutionalists, decoupling is a common feature of orga-nizations which are copying an external model for the sake of legitimacy(Meyer et al. 1997: 154–6; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott, Meyer, and Asso-ciates 1994).

The desire of the ASEAN members to be identified as advanced andlegitimate has increased strongly in recent years. This is because ASEANhas been losing its credibility since the late 1990s, on the ground that ithas not been able to deal effectively with a set of new challenges, includingthe Asian financial crisis, internal conflicts, terrorism, non-traditional secu-rity issues such as pandemic diseases and, most importantly, human rightsabuses in Myanmar. Thus, it has been imperative for the ASEAN membersto salvage the credibility of their association, or to reverse its trend of losingcredibility.

What is identified here is of common concern for all the ASEAN mem-bers. In other words, their desire to be identified as advanced and legitimateis the factor which unites them in setting out ambitious liberal reform plans.The attitudes of the ASEAN members toward liberal reform vary. Unsur-prisingly, democratic countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines havebeen keen on introducing liberal agendas to ASEAN diplomacy. Some ofthe policy-makers of these countries can be regarded as what constructivistscall ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in that they hold a strong belief in the value ofliberal agendas, and are keen to promote these agendas across SoutheastAsia (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Take, for example, the plan foran ASEAN security community: this was initially conceptualized by the

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Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, and a few researchers ofthe Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Kat-sumata forthcoming). In contrast, the four countries which joined the asso-ciation in the second half of the 1990s – namely, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laosand Cambodia – have been cautious about implementing drastic measuresfor liberal reform. These countries have not even set up national humanrights commissions. This suggests that the norm entrepreneurs have notsucceeded in persuading their counterparts to internalize the value of lib-eralism. Nevertheless, all the policy-makers of the Southeast Asia regionhave been concerned with ASEAN’s international standing. This is whythey have been able to reach a consensus on liberal reform plans.

While the explanation here focuses on the external concern of theASEAN members in the global community, there is no need to gainsaythe relevance of their internal concern in Southeast Asia – i.e., their in-tention to enhance the legitimacy of ASEAN and of their own regimes,by accommodating the voice of the people represented by civil society or-ganizations (CSOs). This kind of internal concern may positively interactwith their external interest. However, its importance should not be overes-timated. Only in the domestic arenas of active members, such as Indonesiaand the Philippines, do such positive interactions seem to take place. Inthese countries, CSOs have actively been calling for liberal agendas (Dosch2008). Yet, at the regional level, CSOs have not figured prominently inASEAN diplomacy. In this respect, it is worth focusing on the case of theASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), the key regional platform for CSO ac-tivities in Southeast Asia. The interface between APA and ASEAN has notbeen institutionalized and, in these circumstances, civil society actors haverefrained from challenging ASEAN, in the belief that doing so would becounterproductive (Morada 2007). It can be concluded that the ASEANmembers have mainly been driven by their external concern in the globalcommunity, united by their desire to be identified as advanced and legiti-mate, or to secure their identities as legitimate members of the communityof modern states.

The plausibility of the set of sociological–institutionalist claims above canbe demonstrated by focusing on the concern of the ASEAN members fortheir international status. Their status concern can be approached from twolevels: general and specific. At the general level, they are constantly seekingto be identified as advanced industrialized countries. Thus, they are greatlyconcerned with categories such as First World or Third World countries.Most notably, the Philippines has recently declared its vision of attaining‘first-world status’ in two decades. For President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,her country is ‘on the way to winning the grand prize of First World sta-tus’ (Presidential Management Staff 2007: 46; Office of the President 2007).Many other ASEAN members also seem to be pursuing a similar aim. Formore than a decade, Malaysia has sought its Vision 2020 – its plan to be-come a ‘fully-developed country’ by 2020 (Mohamad 1991). Thus, its latest

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national development plan aims to put the nation on ‘track to achieve de-veloped nation status by 2020’ (Badawi 2006). For the Thai Deputy PrimeMinister, Somkid Jatusripitak, his country should ‘step forward as part ofthe First World’ (Bangkok Post 2003). Even Singapore takes the issue ofstatus seriously. Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has maintained that Sin-gapore should move from the ‘lower half’ to the ‘upper half’ of the FirstWorld (ChannelNewsAsia 2007). In sum, while some countries in the worldtake for granted their status as developed countries, the Southeast Asiannations regard is as a ‘grand prize’.

At a more specific level, in the area of human rights, the Southeast Asiannations have been greatly concerned about ASEAN’s reputation. With re-gard to the issue of Myanmar, at the ASEAN summit in January 2007, theleaders agreed on the ‘need to preserve ASEAN’s credibility as an effectiveregional organization by demonstrating a capacity to manage important is-sues’ (ASEAN 2007b). Following the crushing of pro-democracy demon-strations in September 2007, the foreign ministers expressed their concernthat the ‘developments in Myanmar had a serious impact on the reputa-tion and credibility of ASEAN’ (ASEAN 2007d). In addition, Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong is concerned about the ‘perception that ASEANhas failed to deal with [the issue of Myanmar]’ (interview with author, Sin-gapore, 27 November 2007). Moreover, the Indonesian Foreign Minister,Hassan Wirajuda, states, ‘the situation in Myanmar affects our credibility.’On the basis of his observation that human rights are still a sensitive topicin Southeast Asia, he raises the question: ‘what kind of message are wesending to the rest of the world?’ (interview with author, Jakarta, 9 January2008).

In addition, with regard to the issue of a regional human rights body,a number of policy-makers have expressed their concern over ASEAN’scredibility. When the ASEAN countries agreed in July 2007 to stipulate inthe Charter the creation of such a body, they were concerned about theirinternational image, according to a few diplomats who took part in the ne-gotiations (AFP 2007b). For the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Alberto Ro-mulo, his government called for the creation of such a body because it wouldgive ASEAN ‘more credibility in the international community’ (AP 2007b).Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar expressed the view that theASEAN members should not be seen to be unsupportive of human rights(AP 2007a).

Policy dilemma: two aspects of ASEAN’s relevance

The two explanations for the ASEAN members’ pursuit of liberal agen-das considered above lead to different interpretations of the discrepancybetween their promises and the actual institutional development of the as-sociation. From the materialist viewpoint, this discrepancy simply reflectstheir reluctance to implement liberal reform. They have taken few concrete

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measures to implement their reform plans simply because they are at heartdisinclined to do so. From the sociological–institutionalist view, however,their intention is more complex. This discrepancy reflects a policy dilemmawhich they are facing today.

The ASEAN members have been seeking two goals which are contradic-tory to each other, thereby placing themselves in a dilemma. To be specific,they have been trying to enhance two aspects of the relevance of their as-sociation – namely, relevance in terms of legitimacy and of weight. On theone hand, they have been trying to enhance ASEAN’s relevance in termsof its international legitimacy, by announcing liberal reform plans and theirreadiness to pursue liberal agendas such as human rights and democracy.On the other hand, they have been trying to enhance ASEAN’s relevancein terms of its weight, by maintaining the unity of the association. For thepurpose of maintaining ASEAN’s unity, the implementation of liberal re-form is undesirable because some of its members are cautious about makingdrastic changes to their existing policies. It is therefore understandable thatthe progress of ASEAN’s liberal reform has been modest, in terms of insti-tutional development.

The need to enhance ASEAN’s weight has increased in the post-ColdWar era, making it difficult for its members to implement their reform plans.During the Cold War era, the significance of the Southeast Asian associa-tion was largely determined by the structure of the East–West confronta-tion. In the post-Cold War era, however, ASEAN has become an indepen-dent player, leading Asia-Pacific security regionalism which involves majorpowers such as China, the US, Japan and Russia. It held the first meetingof the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1994, thereby taking the ini-tiative for the cooperative security of the whole Asia-Pacific region. Sincethen, the ARF has been the most prominent multilateral security arrange-ment in this region. Moreover, today, the Southeast Asian association hasbeen at the centre of East Asian cooperation, within the frameworks ofthe ASEAN Plus Three (APT) – whose first summit meeting was held in1997, involving Japan, China and South Korea – and the East Asia Summit(EAS) – launched in 2005 and linking ASEAN with China, Japan, Korea,Australia, New Zealand and India. Against this new political background,the Southeast Asian association has been trying to enhance its weight asthe leader of regional cooperation in East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific re-gion. By acting as one body and speaking with one voice, the association ofminor powers has been seeking a bigger role than any individual membercould play alone.

In this respect, it is worth noting that, in the second half of the 1990s,the original five, together with Brunei, which joined the association in1984, admitted four countries as new members, namely, Vietnam in1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Since then, thestrengthening of the unity of the 10 countries has been crucial for all ofthem. In the case of Myanmar, the rest of the ASEAN members have been

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careful not to alienate this country. The worst scenario for them is thatMyanmar will become China’s proxy, speaking on behalf of Beijing. In thisrespect, ASEAN needs Myanmar as much as – or perhaps more than –Yangon/Nay Pyi Taw needs the Southeast Asian association.

Both of these two goals – ASEAN’s relevance in terms of legitimacy andof weight – are sensible, although they can only be pursued at each other’sexpense. By announcing ambitious reform plans while taking few concreteactions for their implementation, the ASEAN members have been tryingto strike a balance between these two incompatible goals. The balance be-tween these goals is likely to remain a key to understanding ASEAN diplo-macy in the foreseeable future.

Policy recommendations

What can ASEAN’s external partners do to facilitate the liberal reform ofthe association? The final task of the present article is to make policy rec-ommendations to members of the international community in general andASEAN’s external partners in particular, such as the UN, the US, the EUand Japan. There are, again, two different ways of approaching the subject,and thus there are two strategies to consider. One is to adjust the materialenvironment, and the other is to utilize the social/normative environmentsurrounding the Southeast Asian association.

Greater material pressure?

A conventional strategy for facilitating ASEAN’s liberal reform would beto put more pressure on its members, thereby adjusting the material envi-ronment in Southeast Asia. This strategy is premised on the common be-lief that Western pressure is a prerequisite for changing the human rightspractices of the Southeast Asian countries. Policy-makers and human rightsactivists in the Western world commonly advocate that the US and the EUshould utilize their material leverage and coerce these countries to changetheir policies – as shown in the introductory section.

However, the utility of this materialist strategy is diminishing. In otherwords, the extent to which the Western powers can define ASEAN’s ma-terial environment is lessening. This is due to the development of an EastAsian community, the core element of which is the concordant relations be-tween ASEAN and China. This community insulates ASEAN from West-ern pressure, thereby making it difficult for the North American and Eu-ropean powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Itdoes so by reducing the need for these countries to succumb to Westernpressure. This community is being constructed on the basis of the frame-works of the APT and the EAS, neither of which include the Western pow-ers. In this community, the ASEAN members would always be able to turnto their new partner, China, if the Western powers attempted to coerce

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them to change their practice. Unlike the US and the EU, China does notpick on ASEAN’s human rights practices.

The claim that an East Asian community insulates ASEAN will re-mains valid, regardless of the nature of this community, which is un-clear at present. It may develop into a framework in which the SoutheastAsian countries lead their Northeast Asian partners, thereby extending theASEAN Way of diplomacy from Southeast Asia to the whole East Asianregion. Alternatively, it may become an embodiment of Beijing’s sphere ofinfluence, in which the ASEAN countries secure their interests by adoptinga policy of bandwagoning. In any case, in an East Asian community, therelationship between ASEAN and China becomes close, in various areas,such as trade, investment, development, and security. Indeed, the two par-ties have already agreed to establish a free trade area in 2002, and issued aJoint Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2003, aimed at strengtheningmilitary relations in such areas as high-level bilateral visits and the train-ing of military personnel (ASEAN and China 2003, 2004). Bearing in mindthese developments, the participant countries of the EAS have recognizedthat an East Asian community contributes to the ‘maintenance of peace, se-curity, prosperity and progress in the region and beyond’ (EAS 2005). Thedevelopment of this community is commonly seen as the most promisingproject in the region; however, its impact is double-edged. Although its po-tential is high in security and economic terms, it is seriously problematic inthe light of human security.

Utilizing social environment

Our alternative strategy is to utilize the social/normative environment,which defines human rights as an element of international legitimacy: tofacilitate ASEAN’s liberal reform, its external partners should boost theconcern of its members for ASEAN’s international standing, thereby en-couraging them to emulate the Western industrialized democracies. To thisend, these external partners should adopt what can be regarded as a strat-egy of globalization: they should ‘globalize’ the issue of ASEAN’s liberalreform, by engaging in human rights dialogue with ASEAN on a globalscale, and by openly assessing its human rights record in various interna-tional settings. It is fair to say that they have already globalized the issueof individual countries, in particular, Myanmar. Now they should do thesame for the liberal reform of the Southeast Asian association as a whole.In assessing ASEAN’s human rights record, they should exercise what con-structivists call ‘social influence’. In other words, they should give ‘social re-wards’ for attempts on the part of its members to pursue liberal agendas, byopenly acknowledging such attempts. They should also impose ‘social sanc-tions’ on ASEAN’s shortcomings, by critically pointing them out (Johnston2008: Chap. 3, 2001: 499–502; Finnemore 2003: 158–9; Risse and Sikkink1999: esp. 15). This globalization strategy is premised on the belief that the

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more global the attention paid to ASEAN’s liberal reform, the greater willbe the social rewards for positive developments and the social sanctions forshortcomings – in other words, the higher the stakes for ASEAN (Johnston2008: 90–4, 2001: 503–6). This strategy is derived from the finding of the pre-vious section that the ASEAN members have been emulating the Westernindustrialized democracies and setting out liberal reform plans, motivatedby their desire to be identified as advanced and legitimate.

Various players may pursue this strategy by handling their own tasks.First and foremost, the UN should strengthen its channels of exchange withASEAN, so as to facilitate human rights dialogue at the global level. It mayorganize conferences on human rights, adopt resolutions, exchange dele-gations, and even conclude a cooperation agreement with ASEAN. TheSoutheast Asian association has been seeking an ASEAN–UN Coopera-tion Agreement, having been conferred observer status by this global bodyin December 2006 (ASEAN 2007c). The conclusion of such an agreementcan be recommended, as long as it is accompanied by the enhancement ofhuman rights dialogue. In addition, international non-governmental organi-zations (INGOs) should focus on the progress of ASEAN’s liberal reform.When approaching various INGOs for this research project, the present au-thor had the impression that they tend to concentrate on individual coun-tries – in particular, Myanmar – and pay relatively little attention to theSoutheast Asian association as a whole.

Instances of social rewards and sanctions can be found in the discoursesof some UN agencies and INGOs. Following the ASEAN meeting to ad-dress the Myanmar crisis in September 2007, the UN High Commissionerfor Human Rights ‘welcome[d] the statement of the ASEAN Foreign Min-isters urging Myanmar to desist from the use of violence’ (2007; also see UN2007b). Human Rights Watch (2007a) also ‘welcome[d] ASEAN’s strongstatement . . . on the crackdown upon peaceful protestors’. When the South-east Asian countries signed the ASEAN Charter in November 2007, theUN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN High Commis-sioner for Refugees ‘congratulate[d] ASEAN officials’ and acknowledgedtheir commitment to establishing a regional human rights body. Yet theyalso ‘encourage[d] ASEAN to begin broad consultations on the terms ofreference for the human rights body’ (UN 2007a). Amnesty International(2007a) ‘welcome[d] the inclusion of a commitment within the ASEANCharter . . . to establish a regional human rights body.’ Yet it also pointedout that ‘any commitments . . . will remain empty gestures unless they arefollowed by concrete action’. Likewise, Human Rights Watch (2007a) ‘wel-come[d] the provisions of the Charter . . . enacting a regional human rightsmechanism’ while noting that ‘much more is needed if the Charter’s aims. . . are to be achieved’.

The North American and European countries for their part should utilizeexisting channels of exchange to facilitate human rights dialogue – namely,the ARF, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, the Asia–Europe

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Meeting, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and a set of the ‘ASEANplus one’ frameworks, such as the ASEAN–US Dialogue. They may alsoutilize track-two channels, which are useful for exchanging views on sensi-tive topics. Asia-Pacific region-wide channels at the informal level includethe Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific, and the series ofAsia-Pacific Roundtable conferences, organized by the ASEAN Institutesof Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur every summer (seeBall et al. 2006: 179–80; Kerr 1994: 399–400; Katsumata 2003: esp. 97, 2010:Chap. 5).

When a human rights crisis arises, these external partners may threatento boycott ASEAN meetings, thereby questioning the association’s interna-tional legitimacy and its eligibility to lead Asia-Pacific security regionalism.By so doing, they may put pressure on ASEAN in a social/normative sense,if not in a material one. The absence of the US and the EU in ASEANmeetings is detrimental to the status of the Southeast Asian association asthe legitimate leader of Asia-Pacific security cooperation. Notably, the USSecretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, did boycott the ARF meeting in 2005,recognizing the possibility that the Southeast Asian countries might allowMyanmar to chair the series of ASEAN meetings in 2006–2007. In the fol-lowing year, these countries made it clear that Myanmar would not chairthe meetings, and she therefore attended the ARF. This episode suggeststhat the ASEAN members do take measures to safeguard the legitimacy oftheir association.

The set of social measures discussed above can only bring about grad-ual long term changes. It would be too naıve to expect a drastic change inASEAN’s human rights practice in the immediate future. Our expectationsin this regard should be modest. Nonetheless, these measures are well worthemploying for the reason which will be discussed next.

Conclusions

Amartya Sen disabuses us of the notion that the primacy of human rightsis a peculiar feature of Western culture and thus incompatible with Asianculture, which is associated with authoritarianism. Arguments championingindividual freedoms can be found not only in ancient Greek treatises butalso in the classical literature in Chinese, Sanskrit, Arabic and many otherAsian languages (Sen 1999b: 97–9, 1998; also see 1999a). The finding of thisarticle that the Southeast Asian countries are voluntarily pursuing liberalagendas echoes his argument. Their ambitious reform plans prove that thenorm of human rights is by no means incompatible with Asian culture orvalues. In the 1990s, a number of political actors in Asia advanced the no-tion of Asian values, which prioritizes social harmony over the rights of in-dividuals, in their attempt to fend off international criticism in the areas ofhuman rights and democracy (see Mohamad 1997; Zakaria 1994). Yet it cannow be concluded that their Asian value discourse did not mean anything.

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Moreover, the human rights norm need not even be seen as a unique el-ement of Western values. This norm might appear to be ‘Western’ onlybecause it is promoted by the Western industrialized democracies whichhave achieved high levels of economic development. Nations from variouscultural backgrounds, including the Southeast Asian nations holding Asianvalues or culture, may pursue individual rights. In other words, the norm ofhuman rights is universality applicable.

Yet a caveat is in order about the long-term sustainability of efforts bythe Western powers to facilitate ASEAN’s liberal reform. Unless thesepowers improve their own human rights practice, in the long run, theywill not be able to encourage the Southeast Asian countries to pursueliberal agendas. In the global society today, ‘the West’ is in general los-ing its moral appeal, largely due to its handling of the issues of Islam andthe problems in Iraq. In the area of human rights, the Western countrieshave regularly been accused of adopting double standards. This meansthat the global normative environment which presents the Western in-dustrialized democracies as the champions of human rights has graduallybeen degraded (see AFP 2008b; BBC News 2007; AFP 2008a). Therefore,to facilitate ASEAN’s liberal reform, the first thing the Western powersshould do is to reinforce this normative environment. If they are to expectthe Southeast Asian nations to emulate them, they should first improvetheir own practice, and reaffirm their status as the champions of humanrights.

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