article xi tuesday - constitution (updated)
TRANSCRIPT
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On
the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec
violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C,
that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years.
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice.
The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates."
Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance
of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This
is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
Cayetano v. Monsod
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null
and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of
having practiced law for the last ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law.”
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
RENATO L. CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
September 3, 1991 | G.R. No. 100113
Facts:
- President Corazon Aquino Appointed Christian Monsod as
the chairman of COMELEC.
- Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because
according to him, the respondent fall short of the ten year
requirement for the position.
- The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
- June 5, 1991: COA approved the appointment.
- June 18, 1991: Monsod took his oath and assumed office.
- Petitioner prayed for certiorari and prohibition against
Monsod.
Issue: Whether or not Monsod is engaged in the practice of
law for more than ten years.
Held:
Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling
the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission
in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has
been clearly shown.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD
comelec – practice of law
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Cory as
Chairman of Comelec.
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
According to the Consti, members of Comelec must have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
The CA nevertheless confirmed the nomination of Monsod.
He took his oath of office and assumed office as Chair.
Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for
Prohibition, praying tha the confirmation and appointment of
Monsod be declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Monsod possessed the qualification that he
had engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years?
SC: YES.
The practice of law is defined as the rendition of services
requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles
and techniques to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising or
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them
in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising persons as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective before any court,
commission, referee, board, body committee, etc, and in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. As long as the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions, then it is a practice of law.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform the acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generaly, the practice of law is to give notice or render any
kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.
PRIVATE PRACTICE = means an individual or organization
(firm) engaged in the business of delivering legal services. But
most lawyers do not only spend time in litigation or
courtrooms. Substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in courtrooms. General practitioners of law
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time
“business counseling” rather than trying cases.
Background of Atty Monsod:
After graduating from UP College of Law, he worked in the
law office of his father. He then worked for the World Bank as
operations officer in Costa Rica y Panama. After returning to
the Philippines, he worked with Meralco, served as CEO of
bank, and subsequently of a business conglomerate. In 1986,
he has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or adviser. He was also Sec-Gen and
Chairman of Namfrel, and in fact appeared before the
Comelec during the hearing for accreditation. He became a
member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body
investigating on the coup d’etats. He was a member of the
Con-Com, and Chairman of its Committee of Accountability of
Public Officers.
Interpreted in the light of the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into account the liberal construction of
the Constitution, Atty Monsod’s past experience as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-
negotiator, lawyer-legislator, verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement. He has engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years.
Padilla Dissenting:
Practice of law is commonly understood as actual
performance or actual application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge. It
connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action.
It would be like a doctor who is employed and habitually
performing the tasks of a nurse, he cannot be said to be in
the practice of medicine. Just as a CPA who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to be practicing his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or corporate manager, other than as head
or attorney of the legal department, cannot be said to be in
the practice of law.
Gutierrez Dissenting:
To be engaged in the practice of law requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one’s
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
an enterprise, one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with an
intent and attention. The practice envisioned is active and
regular, not isolated, occasional. Seasonal, intermittent, or
extemporaneous.
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
comelec – temporary appointments
President GMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman,3 and Borra
4 and Tuason
5 as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oath of office
and assumed the positions. The Office of the President
submitted to the Commission on Appointments the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
confirmation.6 However, the Commission on Appointments
did not act on said appointments.
President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the
same term of seven years. They took their oaths of office for
a second time. The Office of the President transmitted their
appointments to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments
could act on their appointments.
In his capacity as Comelec Chair, Benipayo issued a
Memorandum, reassigning Matibag to the from the
Education Department to the Law Department
Matibag sought reconsideration, arguing that transfer and
detail of employees are prohibited during the election period,
both by the Election Code and a Civil Service Memorandum
Matibag filed an administrative and criminal case against
Benipayo.
Matibag also questioned the appointment and the right to
remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman
and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner
claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions
on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members.
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can
be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure,
and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the
Commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner
claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in
character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence
of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. The rationale
behind petitioner’s theory is that only an appointee who is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments can
guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed
appointee is beyond the influence of the President or
members of the Commission on Appointments since his
appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior
to his confirmation, the appointee is at the mercy of both the
appointing and confirming powers since his appointment can
be terminated at any time for any cause.
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim
appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their
ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of
office to the same positions violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim
appointee is by-passed by the Commission on Appointments,
his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed
because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner
asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees
who have assumed office, which is the situation of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are
deemed permanent in character.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments
issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first
assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal,
whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments
and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions
violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution;
SC:
1. MATIBAG IS WRONG.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective
until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The
fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly
without basis.
2. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of
lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to
organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one
that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of
Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment of a by-passed appointee. Thus, a by-passed
appointment can be considered again if the President renews
the appointment.
In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be
effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because the
incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive
objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next
adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President
may then issue new appointments - not because of implied
disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction
during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution,
the Commission may affect adversely the interim
appointments only by action, never by omission. If the
adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval of ad
interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President
could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the
Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint
them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said
termination of the ad interim appointments is not the
disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of
the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said
adjournment of the Congress, the President is free to make ad
interim appointments or reappointments."
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved
nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim
appointment because the disapproval is final under Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can
be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is
no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the
appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without
reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four
situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is
where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his
full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to
the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman,
because he will then be actually serving more than seven
years. The second situation is where the appointee, after
confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns
before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot
be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a
vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment
will result in the appointee also serving more than seven
years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed
to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or
resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term.
Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or
chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a
reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more
than seven years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has
previously served a term of less than seven years, and a
vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not
result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment
of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited
because his situation will be similar to those appointed under
the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees
under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than
seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed
under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies
to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.
To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without
reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits
reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term
of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment
of any person previously appointed for a term of five or three
years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the
Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person
previously appointed completes his term of office for the
intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed
by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not
constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a
fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would
mean that the President by his unilateral action could start
and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of
the Commission on Appointments.
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to
one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such
person completes his term of office. There must be a
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
previous appointment before the prohibition on
reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to
absurdities and negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments.
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on
Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad
interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad
interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the
President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim
appointments because most of her appointees will effectively
be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on
Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the
President to make ad interim appointments, a power
intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services.
This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak
havoc on vital government services.
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the
three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present
Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The
first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have
been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served
for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the
members of the three constitutional commissions do not
serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.
As to the transfer of Matibag
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that
every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should
carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body.
Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence
will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en
banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or
reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless.
Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an
approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel,
without need of securing a second approval from the
COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or
reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly
authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure
capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment
of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus,
Benipayo’s order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the
Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Matibag vs Benipayo
GR No. 149036
April 2, 2002
Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality
of the appointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo
(Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora and
Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She questions the legality
of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV
of the Comelec’s EID and reassigning her to the Law
department.
Issues:
1. Instant petition satisfies all requirements
2. Assumption of office by Benipayo, Bora and Tuason; ad
interim appointments amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
3. Renewal of ad interim violated the prohibition on
reappointment under Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution
4. Benipayo’s removal of petitioner is illegal
5. OIC of COMELEC’s Finance Services Department acting in
excess jurisdiction
Matibag’s Argument:
1. Failure to consult for reassignment
2. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 7;
transferring and detailing employees are prohibited during
the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001
3. Reassignment violated Sec 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258
4. Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason
violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of
the COMELEC
5. Illegal removal or reassignment
6. Challenges the designation of Cinco
7. Questions the disbursement made by COMELEC
8. No ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to Civil
Service Commission and COA
9. Sec 1 (2) of Article IX-C; an ad interim appointee cannot
assume office until confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments
Benipayo’s Argument:
1. Comelec Resolution No. 3300
2. Petitioner does not have personal interest, not directly
injured
3. Failure to question constitutionality of ad interim
appointments at the earliest opportunity. She filed only after
third time of reappointments
4. Ad interim is not the lis mota because the real issue is the
legality of petitioner’s reassignment.
Rules of Court:
1. Real issue is whether or not Benipayo is the lawful
Chairman of the Comelec
2. Petitioner has a personal and material stake.
3. It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest
point. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue
is to raise it in the pleading.
4. Questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments which is the earliest opportunity for pleading
the constitutional issue before a competent body.
5. Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn. It is not the nature of appointment but the
manner on which appointment was made. It will avoid
interruptions that would result to prolonged vacancies. It is
limited the evil sought to be avoided.
6. Termination of Ad interim appointment (Sword of
Damocles); (1) disapproval (2) recess
7. Two modes of appointment: (1) in session (2) in recess
8. By-passed appointments – (1) lack of time/failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize, (2) subject of
reconsideration, (3) can be revived since there is no final
disapproval
9. Four situations in for a term of seven years without
replacement: (1) serves his full seven-year term, (2) serves a
part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term,
(3) served the unexpired term of someone who died or
resigned, (4) served a term of less than seven years, and a
vacancy arises from death or resignation. Not one of the four
situation applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason
10. Reappointment cannot be applied; (1) appointed by
president, (2) confirmed by Commission on Appointments
11. Without reappointment means: (first phrase) prohibits
reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term
of seven years (second phrase) prohibits reappointment of
any person previously appointed for a term of 5 or 3 years
pursuant to the first set of appointees
12. Reasons for prohibition of reappointments: (1) prevent
second appointment (2) not serve beyond the fixed term
13. Two important amendments: (1) requiring the consent by
Commission of Appointments (2) prohibition on serving
beyond the fixed term of 7 years
14. Twin Prohibition (ironclad): (1) prohibition of
reappointments (2) prohibition of temporary or acting
appointments
15. Third issue not violation because the previous
appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
16. Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. He is not
required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en
banc.
17. The petitioner is acting only temporary because a
permanent appointment can be issued only upon meeting all
the requirements.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 refers only to COMELEC field
personnel not to head office personnel.
PANGILINAN VS. COMELEC
jurisdiction of comelec
Kiko Pangilinan and Sonny Belmonte were both candidates
for congressman in the 4th
District of QC during the 1992
elections.
Cadano, as registered voter, filed a petition for
disqualification against Belmonte, for allegedly violating Sec
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, by giving money and other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters. (that Belmonte gave sack of rice, medicine, P5000
cash, free trip for 2 to HKG)
Kiko and Cadano filed an urgent motion to suspend the
canvassing and/or proclamation of Belmonte, so that their
petition for disqualification would not become moot and
academic.
During the Canvass, Kiko objected to over 120 election
returns being canvassed, alleging that they were tampered,
altered or spurious.
The City Board of Canvassers overruled the objections of Kiko.
The reason was that under Sec 15 of Ra 7166, pre-
proclamation controversies are not allowed in the election of
Congressmen. Thus the canvassing continued.
Thus, Kiko assailed the constitutionality of RA 7166,
disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of
Congressmen. Kiko argues that this is violative of Sec 3, Art
IX-C of the Constitution which vests in the Comelec the power
to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies without
distinction as to whether the controversy involved the
election of Congressmen, or local elective officials. According
to him, the phrase “pre-proclamation controversies” in Art IX-
C embraces all kinds of pre-proc controversies such as those
of the election of Congressmen.
ISSUE; Does the Comelec have jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies for the election of Congressmen?
SC: NO JURISDICTION.
Sec 2 of Art IX-C vests in the Comelec exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of all elective REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND
CITY OFFICIALS. It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the
House. Under Article VI, it is the HRET who is the sole judge of
all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House.
Thus the phrase “pre-proc controversies” in Art IX-C, should
be construed as referring only to those falling within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of Comelec, that is, election
pertaining to regional, provincial and city officials.
RA 7166 is still VALID.
Since Sonny Belmonte has already been proclaimed winner,
and has taken oath and assumed office, the remedy of Kiko
was to file an electoral protest with the HRET.
SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC
comelec – pre-proc controversies/ division vs. en banc
This is a consolidated special civil action for certiorari seeking
to set aside the various Comelec Resolutions in special cases.
Among the resolutions were:
Ordering the exclusion of election returns from the canvass
Dismissing petitioner’s opposition to the composition of the
Board of Canvassers
Rejecting the petitioner’s objection to certain election
returns.
Petitioners claim that these decisions were in gadalej, and
that the Comelec sitting en banc, took cognizance of the
cases without first referring them to any of its divisions.
Petitioners claim that under Sec 3, Art IX-C, election cases
shall be heard and decided in divisions, provided hat MR of
the decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
ISSUE: Whether the pre-proclamation controversies should
be decided first by division
SC:
It is clear from the provision of the constitution that election
cases included pre-proclamation controversies, and all such
cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Comelec. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
Under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, with respect to pre-
proc controversies, the 2 Divisions of the Comelec are vested
with the authority to hear and decide those special cases. It is
recognized that the appeals from the rulings of the Board of
Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions, to which
they are assigned, and not by the Commission en banc.
A MR on the decision of the Division may be filed within 5
days from its promulgation, after which the clerk of court will
notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall certify the case
to the Comelec En Banc.
Here, the Comelec En Banc acted in gadalej when it resolved
the appeals of petitioners in the special cases without first
referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are
therefore null and void. Consequently, the appeals are
deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral
to a Division.
**Note the cases have been rendered moot and academic
because RA 7116 provides that all pre-proc controversies
pending shall be deemed terminated once the term of office
has begun. The term of office involved in the special cases
commenced at noon of June 30, 1992. Thus, the petitions are
dismissed.
ATIENZA vs. COMELEC Case Digest
ATIENZA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 108533, Dec. 20 1994
Facts:
Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the
Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1998 local elections.
Following Sia’s proclamation, petitioner filed an election
protest with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results
of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality.
Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court,
petitioner obtained a plurality of 12 votes over the private
respondent. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision
declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and
ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the
amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioner’s expenses in
the election protest. Private respondent appealed.
Meanwhile, the Regional trial Court granted petitioner’s
motion for execution pending appeal, which was opposed by
respondent. The Comelec issued a preliminary injunction
stopping the enforcement of the order of execution. The
Comelec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting
aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing
petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of
Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. However,
following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the
Presiding Commissioner of the Comelec’s Second Division
issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioner’s
appeal for being moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the lower court’s judgment.
Held: The dismissal of an appeal in an election protest case
for having become moot and academic due to the election of
new municipal officials referred only to that part of the
appealed judgment which was affected by the election and
not to that portion relating to the award of damages.
However, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in
an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory
damages in the absence of a law expressly providing for
situations allowing for the recovery of the same. This,
petitioner has been unable to do. The intent of the legislature
to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party
for expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence of
a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing
party cannot be gainsaid – in fine, Section 259 of the
Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of
actual and compensatory damages “in accordance with law.”
The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely
recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without
damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a
cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.
Atienza vs. Comelec
FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the
Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1988 local elections
obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival, herein
petitioner Lou A .Atienza.
Following Sia's proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, petitioner fi led an election protest with
the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the
elections in a number of precincts in the municipality.
•
Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court,
petitionerobtained a total of 2,826 votes, a plural ity
of 12 votes over theprivate respondent.
•
On April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court rendered
its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the
municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to
reimburse petitioner the amountof P300,856.19
representing petitioner's expenses in the election
protest.
•
Private respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the
COMELEC raising as errors 1) the computation of the number
of votes received by the candidates; and 2) the alleged award
of "excessive damages" in favor of the petitioner.
The case was docketed and assigned to the COMELEC's
Second Division.
•
The COMELEC,
en banc
, issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and
thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the
Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal.
•
However, following the synchronized elections of May 11,
1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC's Second
Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing
petitioner's appeal for being moot and academic
pursuant to the Commission's decision in Resolution No. 2494
declaring the election protest and appeal cases as well as
petitions for special relief arising out of the January18, 1988
elections dismissed and terminated as of June 30,1992.
•
On January 28, 1993, respondent Commission
en banc
released its questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the dismissal of
the appeal by the Commission(
Second Division ) f o r b e i n g m o o t a n d a c a d e m i c
b e c a u s e o f t h e expiration of the term of office of
the contested posit ion did not thereby revive the
vacated judgment of the Regional Trial Court, said appealed
judgment to remain vacated, not having been resolved on the
merits by the Commission for or against any of the parties;
and the judgment directing the protestee-appellant to
reimburse the protestant-appellee the amount of
P300,856.19 representing his expenses in the election
protest, is hereby REVERSED , said judgment not being in
accordance with law in the absence of any evidence of a n y
w r o n g f u l , o r n e g l i g e n t a c t o r o m i s s i o n o n t h e
p a r t o f t h e protestee appellant to justify the award.
ISSUE(S)/HELD:
Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it issued its Resolution of January 28, 1993 reversing
the lower court's judgment awarding damages to herein
petitioner after it had earlier dismissed for being moot and
academic.
NO.RATIO:
•
The Omnibus Election Code provides: Actual or compensatory
damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo
warranto proceedings in accordance with law.
•
Provisions for actual or compensatory damages
under the law areembodied in various Civil Code articles
allowing claims for damages under specific circumstances.
Thus, Article 2176 provides: Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negl igence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault o rnegligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi
delict , and is governed by the provisionsof this chapter.
•
Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that:
Except asprovided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
•
Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a
party in an election protest case to recover actual or
compensatory damages in the absence of the
conditions specified under Articles 2201 and2202 of
the Civil Code,
or in the absence of a law expressly providingfor situations
allowing for the recovery of the same
. I t f o l l o w s , naturally, that in most election protest
cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on
either a contract or
quasi
-contract or atortious act or omission,
the claimant must be able to point out to a specific
provision of law authorizing a money claim for
election protest expenses against the losing party
. This, petitioner has been unable to do.
•
Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely
provides for the granting of actual and
compensatory damages in accordance with l a w .
T h a t i t w a s t h e i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o
d o a w a y w i t h provisions indemnifying the victorious party
for expenses incurred in an election contest in the
absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly
attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent
,moreover, to do away with such provisions merely
recognizes themaxim, settled in law that a wrong
without damage or damage without wrong neither
constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.
REYES vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996
FACTS
Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an
administrative complaint against incumbent Mayor Reyes of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes
exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall
holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain
checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and
Development Program of the DILG were never received by
the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of
accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of
cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the
charges and ordered his removal from office.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to
vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the office to
the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the
service of the order.
Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the
Comelec but a petition for disqualification was filed against
him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyes’s certificate of
candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the
Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly
disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his
proclamation as municipal mayor. Hence the petition in G.R.
No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave
abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the
decision in the administrative case against petitioner Reyes
was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be
used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the ruling in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his
election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to
Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The
Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer.
ISSUES:
1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not
yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.
2. WON petitioner’s reelection rendered the administrative
charges against him moot and academic
3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver
a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and
his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had
been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by
registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a
judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons
attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the
judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long
as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would
be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive
it. Reyes’s refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be
construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the
decision.
Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather
than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in
accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did
not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days
after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the
elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The
filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent
the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original
action of certiorari is an independent action and does not
interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of
the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action
during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must
be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from
the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at
bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was
subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued
expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no
more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon
petitioner.
2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,
in which it was held that a public official could not be
removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and
that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. But that was because in that case,
before the petition questioning the validity of the
administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided,
the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was
committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term
during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a
public official is not removed before his term of office
expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling
in the two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here,
although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the
decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining
order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result
that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to
appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly
removed from office and, pursuant to § 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for
reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were
decided there was no provision similar to § 40 (b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective position
on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient
opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so.
Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on
the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this
was because he had filed a motion for postponement and
was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern
of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by
his election.
3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be
to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality
of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under the circumstances. The votes cast for Reyes
are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was
qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void,
or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate
the votes cast for him.
● Rule 13, §§ 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the
service of final orders and judgments either personally or by
mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a
copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in
his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his
residence, if his office is not known. Hence service was
completed when the decision was served upon petitioner’s
counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
certified, service by registered mail was also made on
petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision
was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed five
days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for
reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and
the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as
long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him
would be valid were it not for his or his counsel’s refusal to
receive it.
Indeed that petitioner’s counsel knew that a decision in the
administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort
to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
not to have the decision served upon him and his client while
their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was
pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore,
be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the
decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the
party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is
duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to
protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or
apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision
becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a
pleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite
party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him
to its legal effect.
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the
decision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the
service, he should have received the decision and taken an
appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A.
No. 7160, § 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the
decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first
service upon petitioner.
Maquiling Vs. Comelec
On the Selection of the Lawful Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Sur
Arnado used his USA passport after his Renunciation of
American
Citizenship and before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
This positive
act of retraction of his renunciation before the filing of the
Certificate of
Candidacy renders Arnado’s Certificate of Candidacy void ab
initio.
Therefore, Arnado was never a candidate at any time, and all
the votes for
him are stray votes. We reiterate our ruling in Jalosjos v.
COMELEC6
on
this matter
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot
be
proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or
declared ineligible
should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the
first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently
had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a
legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate
of
candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then
legally
the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was
never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-
candidate
are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can
never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of
candidacy void
ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the
election,
prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that
candidate are stray
votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled
one day or
more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should
also be stray
votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the
very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on
the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that
is void ab initio.
Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can
operate to defeat
one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same
position
Garnering the highest number of votes
for an elective position does not cure this defect. l\1aquiling,
the alleged
"second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Amado's ce11iticate
of candidacy was void ah initio. Maquiling is the qualified
candidate
who actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
MISON VS. COA
coa decisions
Mison was the Commissioner of Customs. He declared the
seizure of a Japanese vessel, MV Hyojin as invalid. He thus
ordered the release of said vessel.
However, the vessel was not released. It sank while in the
custody of the Bureau of Customs
Chan then filed a claim with the COA for the value of the
sunken vessel. ($50,000)
By authority of the Acting Chair, Mr. Espiritu (who was the
Manager of the Technical Services), denied the claim.
The claimants thus questioned the authority of Mr. Espiritu in
denying the claim.
Thru their lawyer Atty David, moved for the reconsideration,
writing a letter to the Acting COA Chair Tantuico. He argued
that the decision in the case was rendered only by the
Manager, and not by the Acting Chairman, much less the COA
itself. He contends that the decision is void because the
matter should be acted upon only by the COA duly
constituted (ie, by the Chair and the 2 Comm.) (at this time,
the COA is not yet fully constituted)
Acting COA Chair Tantuico denied the claim as well. Tantuico
adopted the Espiritu decision.
Again, Atty David moved for reconsideration, now arguing
that Acting Chair Tantuico also had no authority to act on the
case. He requested that the same be submitted for resolution
by the COA itself, after the appointment of 2 commissioners.
Later, the COA was finally fully constituted.
Atty David still wrote another letter, for the payment of their
claims.
In a 4th Indorsement, Chairman Domingo, acting for the
Commission, reconsidered the decision of Acting Chairman
Tantuico. Chairman Domingo granted the claim. He
forwarded the decision to grant the claim to Mison.
Mison now sought clarification on the legal implication of the
4th
Indorsement. He contends that the first COA decision,
although signed only by a Manger – Espiritu, was ratified or
made valid because it was adopted in toto as a decision of the
COA in the subsequent letters.
SC: INVALID.
In the first place, the decision by the Manager Espiritu was
void ab initio. As Manager of the Technical Services, Mr.
Espiritu obviously had no power to render or promulgate a
decision of or for the Commission. Even the Chairman alone,
had not that power. As clearly set out in the Constitution, the
power was lodged in the COA, composed of a Chairman and 2
Commissioners, to decide any case brought before it.
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by
Acting Chair Tantuico was inconsequential. Ratification
cannot validate an act void ab initio because it was done
absolutely without authority. The act has to be done anew by
the person or entity duly endowed with authority to do so.
Further, no proper ratification or validation could have been
effected by Acting Chair Tantuico, since he was not the
Commission, and he himself had no power to decide any case
brought before the COA. That power, is lodged on the in the
COA itself, a collegial body.
(it was argued that how about the hundreds of decisions
signed by Acting Chair Tantuico alone… since at that time
there was an interval during which only he had been
designated and no other Commissioner had been appointed..
what would happen to those decisions?)
SC: The principle should logically apply only to those
particular instances where there was a timely and specific
challenge to the authority of the Acting COA chair in the
exercise of adjudication. It should not affect all other cases
where the parties expressly or by implication accepted the
adjudicative authority of the Acting COA Chair.
(Mison further argued that Atty David already waived the
objection on lack of collegiality when he failed to raise it in his
MR. His MR merely reiterated the arguments on the merits of
the claim, but did not raise the ground of lack of collegiality)
SC: No waiver. Atty David in fact reiterated his challenge to
Tantuico’s authority in his subsequent letters. He insisted that
the same should be submitted for resolution by the COA, only
after full constitution of the COA.
Also, it must be made clear that the Espiritu decision was not
merely technically invalid for lack of collegiality. IT WAS
SUBSTANTIVELY VOID AB INITIO. It was rendered without
jurisdiction, Hence, it has an essential and inherent defect
which could not have been waived.
(Finally, Mison argued that the 4th
INdorsement should also
be invalid because COA Chair Domingo was the only one who
signed it).
SC: 4th
INdorsement VALID.
When the 4th
Indorsement Decision was rendered, there were
already 2 Commissioners (meaning the COA was fully
constituted already), clearly a number sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional requirement for collegial action. Even so, the
4th
Indorsement made it clear that it was the Decision of the
Commission, when Chairman Domingo placed “FOR THE
COMMISSION” in the decision. Records also show that the
other commissioners concurred in the decision.
Mison vs COA
Section 1: Purpose, composition, appointmentDoctrine: COA as a collegial
bodyCase: Mison v COA
Facts:
The case is about customs case no. 813 where the
commissioner of customs,MIson, declaring illegal the seizure
by elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V"Hyojin Maru"
a vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered the release of the
vessel andits cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and
Cheung I.However, the vessel was never released because it
sank while in the custody ofthe bureau of customs and it
could not be salvaged. The claimants filed a claim with
theCommission on Audit for the payment of the vessel.Acting
thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio
B. Espiritu,Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA,
denied the claim for the reasons setforth in his registered
letter to the claimant's lawyer dated November 3, 1977-
captioned"Decision No. 77-142."
In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimant‘s counsel, Mr. David
replied that said Decision No. 77-142-rendered only by the
Manager, Technical Service Office of theCOA, and "not (by)
the Acting Chairman, much less . . . the Commission on Audit"
— was void because the matter could validly be acted upon
only by "the Commission onAudit duly constituted, by the
appointment and qualification of its Chairman and
twoCommissioners," "as specifically provided by Section 2,
Article XII-D of the (1973)Constitution. In a 4th Indorsement
dated June 22, 1987 addressed "to the Auditor,Bureau of
Customs," Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR
THECOMMISSION," reconsidered Decision No. 77-142 of
Acting Commissioner of AuditTantuico,
supra.
He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of the
Bureau ofCustoms, which "should have pre-eminently taken
adequate measures to preserve" itbut did not.; hence, he
declared that "this Commission will interpose no objection"
to theinstant claim, subject to the usual auditing and
accounting requirements." Petitionerseasonably filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari
to nullify said COA Decisionspursuant to Section 7, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution.Issues:Whether or not the decision
to reverse the Espiritu Decision was proper?
Decision:In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void
ab initio. As manager of theCOA Technical Service Office, Mr.
Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to renderand
promulgate a decision of or for the Commission. Indeed, even
the Chairman, alone,had not that power. As clearly set out in
the Constitution then in force, the power waslodged in the
Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman and
woCommissioners."
20 It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as
now, hadthe jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before
it within sixty days from the date ofits submission for
resolution," subject to review by the Supreme Court on
certiorari
21
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by
the Acting COAChairman was inconsequential. Ratification
cannot validate an act void
ab initio because done absolutely without authority. The act
has to be done anew by the personor entity duly endowed
with authority to do so.Moreover, even conceding the
contrary, no proper ratification or validation couldhave been
effected by the Acting Chairman since he was not the
Commission, and hehimself had no power to decide any case
brought before the Commission, that power, torepeat, being
lodged only in the Commission itself, as a collegial body. it
must be madeclear that the Espiritu Decision was not merely
"technically invalid," as the petitionerdescribes it. It was
substantively void ab initio, because rendered without
jurisdiction. Ithad an essential inherent defect that could not
be cured or waived.
PHIIL OPERATIONS VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
Coa – accounts and money claims
PhilOps entered into a barter agreement with the Bureau of
Prisons, where it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill,
complete with diesel engine and a saw, and other
accessories. While the Bureau was to deliver 70,000 feet of
lumber
The receipt that the employee of the Bureau of Prisons issued
for the items disclosed that there were unsatisfactory
conditions on the items (three was no belt in the main saw,
broken frames, lack of hooks, no rope cables, worn out rusty,
etc)
The Bureau of Prisons claim that when the barges were
examined, PhilOps were advised verbally about the defects
therein, and so were they with respect to the parts of the
sawmill when it was found.
Around a year later, it became evident that it was not feasible
for the Bureau of Prisons to deliver lumber. PhilOps proposed
to obtain surplus from the Surplus Property Commission in
lieu of the lumber so as to finally liquidate the obligation
contracted with the Bureau of Prisons.
It turned out however that no equipment could be found in
the Commission which could be usable by PhilOps, so it
proposed that the corporation be credited with an amount of
P70,000 and be allowed to bid in future surplus offerings.
PhilOps later filed a claim with the Auditor General.
The Bureau of Prisons offered to deliver the first installment
of the lumber. But this was rejected by PhilOps on the ground
that the offer came too late, and that it demanded payment
of cash.
The Auditor General denied PhilOps claim for payment. It was
mentioned that the Auditor General did not have jurisdiction.
PhilOps appealed to the SC.
The Auditor General claims that the Commonweal Act 327
which imposed upon the Auditor General the duty of acting
and deciding on cases involving the settlement of accounts or
claims other than those of accountable officers, does NOT
authorize or empower the Auditor General to pass upon the
PhilOps claim for P105,000 because the term “claims” used in
the said Act can refer to no other than liquidated claims. (In
short, the Auditor General claims that it has jurisdiction only
over liquidated claims)
PhilOps on the other hand contend that the Auditor General
had been granted additional power upon any money claim
involving liability arising from contract which could serve as a
basis for civil action between the parties. It also argued that
assuming that the Auditor General has jurisdiction only over
liquidated claims, the claim of P70,000 should be considered
liquidated, since this has been accepted by both parties.
SC:
AUDITOR GENERAL HAS NO JURDXN FOR UNLIQUIDATED
CLAIMS.
The reason for denying jurisdiction over unliquidated claims
for breach of contract is because these claims often involve a
broad filed of investigation and require the application of
judgment and discretion upon the measure of damages and
the weight of conflicting evidence.
The term used in the Commonwealth Act is “moneyed
claims” or only liquidated claims. An account is something
which may be adjusted or liquidated by arithmetic process.
But Treasury officials cannot pass upon accounts where the
amount is not the result of a numerical computation. Claims
for unliquidated damages require for their settlement the
application of the qualities of judgment and discretion. They
are frequently sustained by extraneous proof. The results to
be reached in such cases is not merely an “account” and are
not committed by law to the contro and decision of Treasury
officers.
Another reason why the AG cannot entertain unliquidated
damages is because the liability or non-liability of the
government is put in issue. In these cases, the most
important question to be deterined are judicial in nature,
involving the examination of evide and the use of judicial
discretion.
An administrative officer like the AG cannot assume this
jurisdiction, because it would amount to an illegal act, a
delegation of judicial power to an executive officer.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution fails to
disclose any power vested in or granted to the AG to consider
these claims. All that is vested in the AG is the SETTLEMENT
OF ACCOUNTS (see earlier definition of Accounts).
INSURANCE COMPANY VS. REPUBLIC
money claims
The Plaintiff Insurance Company filed an action for recovery
of P86,000 the insured value of 82 cartons of goods, allegedly
lost in the custody of the carrier, US Lines, or the vessel
operator, Luzon Stevedore, or the arrestre operator, the
Bureau of Customs (an agency of the Republic)
The Republic of the Philippines filed a MTD, claiming the
State immunity from suit.
CFI denied the MTD.
However later, the case was dismissed against the Republic
and the Bureau.
Plaintiff appealed.
ISSUES: Suability of the RP and the BOC
SC: The BOC in operating the arrastre service, does so in the
performance of a necessary incident to the prime
governmental function of taxation. Thus it is not suable for
alleged loses resulting therefrom. Thus, neither is the
Republic suable for said activity.
ISSUE: It is claimed that the money claims that may be filed
with the Auditor General (AG) under Act 3083, are only those
which are subject to liquidation by an arithmetic computation
and only where the liability of the government is no longer an
issue. (a prior case of Tabacos was cited)
SC: It is precisely for the AG to determine whether the same
claim is tenable or not, and if not, to deny the same. The
ruling in the Tabacos case cannot apply in this case, since
there, the issue was the offsetting of an unliquidated claim
for damages against a specific liquidated debt. The ruling in
Tabacos was that offsetting cannot be made. Here, there is
no question of offsetting. The only issue was simply that of
allowing or disallowing a specific and liquidated claim against
the government.
Since in the present case, the amount of claim is already fixed
and readily determined from the bill of lading and other
shipping papers, they can be filed with the AG. Thus, we
sustain the power of the Ag to take cognizance of the claim,
for if the same be found in order and allowable, the amount
recoverable is fixed and liquidated, as determined or readily
determinable from the papers and invoices available to him,
Stated otherwise, where the existence of a specific and fixed
debt is the issue, the AG has the power to act on the claim,
but when not only the existence but also the amount of the
unfixed and undetermined debt is involved, the AG has no
competence to consider such claim.
- in short, the dismissal of the case against the Republic
and the BOC was proper because the claim should have been
filed with the AG.
Section 2: Power and Functions Examine and audit government revenues
Examine and audit government expenditures Doctrine: post-audit
authority Case: Blue Bar Coconut
G.R. No. L-28594 June 30, 1971
EDILBERTO M. RAMOS, PACIANO CAPALONGAN, VICTORINO REYES,
CONSORCIA JOVEN, JOSEFINA COLOMA, JOSE JOAQUIN, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, Provincial Fiscal, Pasig, Rizal, BRIG. GEN.
ROMEO ESPINO, AFP, Commanding General, Philippine Army Fort
Bonifacio, Rizal, respondents-appellees.
A constitutional question with an element of novelty is raised in this appeal
from a lower court order dismissing an action for certiorari and prohibition
against the then respondent Fiscal of Rizal, Benjamin H. Aquino, to prevent
him from conducting a preliminary investigation. It is whether there is an
encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor General if,
after the final approval of certain vouchers by him without an appeal being
made, an inquiry by a provincial fiscal to determine whether criminal
liability for malversation through falsification of public, official and
commercial documents based thereon could lawfully be conducted. The
lower court that a prosecutor could, without offending the constitutional
grant of authority to the Auditor General, do so. We therefore affirm. In the
certiorari and prohibition proceeding filed with the lower court on June 6,
1967, petitioners, 1 now appellants, assailed the jurisdiction of cases
Benjamin Aquino, then Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the alleged commission of malversation through
falsification of public, official and commercial documents imputed to them
by the other respondent, then the Commanding General, Philippine Army,
Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Romeo Espino. The basis for such a motion was that
under the Constitution, the Auditor General is not only vested with the duty
to examine or audit all expenditures of funds of the Government, but also
to audit or investigate and "bring to the attention of the proper
administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which in his
opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." It is their
contention that under the above, it is incumbent on the Auditor General to
determine whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly discovered in
the courage of his audit or examination of the accounts lies. It was further
contended that the decisions of the Auditor-General on the correctness of
the vouchers on which the alleged of cases were based having become
final and irrevocable, not even the courts could substitute its findings.
Otherwise the provision of law that vouchers, claims or accounts "once
finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed except as herein
provided" would be meaningless if the army authorities and respondent
Fiscal were permitted to proceed with the preliminary investigation to
determine whether criminal case could be filed. 2
The above legal objections were brought to the attention of the then cases
Provincial Fiscal by petitioners in a motion to quash which was denied by
him in a resolution of May 23, 1967 on this ground: "The exclusive
jurisdiction of the Auditor General on matters now raised by respondents
refer to auditorial requirements and approval but not to the criminal
liability, if any, of the persons involved in an alleged irregular or anomalous
disbursement of public funds. The authority of the Fiscal to investigate
whether a criminal act has been committed or not in the disbursement of
public funds, and finally of the Courts to try any person involved in the
alleged malversation of public funds is not curtailed or in any way divested
by the administrative findings of the Auditor General. To hold otherwise
would be to arrogate unto the Office of the Auditor General the power
which pertains to the judicial branch of the government." 3
Then came thus petition before the lower court, petitioners praying for a
judgment annulling aforesaid resolution of cases Provincial Fiscal denying
their motion to quash, rendering judgment that he was without petition to
conduct such preliminary investigation and prohibiting him from further
proceeding on the matter. 4 On November 2, 1967, there was a motion to
dismiss by respondent Provincial Fiscal based on the argument that the
amounts subject to the criminal cases were not closed and settled accounts
and that even if they were such, respondent Fiscal could still institute the
appropriation criminal action, there being no need for a certification by the
Auditor General as to any irregularity in the settlement of accounts as an
essential element for a criminal prosecution in malversation cases.
After an opposition was filed by petitioner to the aforesaid motion to
dismiss on November 21, 1967, the lower court, in an order of December
20, 1967, dismissed the petition. In support of such an order, it was set forth
in such order of dismissal: "The Provincial Fiscal is only studying whether or
not, as complained of, from these accounts or vouchers which have already
been passed in audit by the Auditor General or his representatives more
than three years ago, there is a crime to be prosecuted in which the
petitioners are answerable. 5 It was further emphasized: Were the theory
of the petitioners to prevail, then the Auditor General will be arrogating
unto himself duties which pertain to the judicial branch of the government.
6 The last ground on which the plea that the prohibition be dismissed was
sustained the principle that one "cannot restrain the Fiscal, by means of
injunction from prosecuting [this] case ...." 7
The matter was duly elevated on appeal to this Court on January 3, 1968.
The brief for petitioners appellants was filed on March 6 of that year. With
the submission of the brief for respondents as appellants on May 3, 1968,
the appeal was deemed submitted. As set forth at the outset, there is no
legal ground for reversing the lower court.
1. Appellants, in their brief, reiterate their principal argument that
the order of the lower court dismissing their motion and thus allowing their
investigation by cases Fiscal to proceed, did amount to an encroachment
on the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor General. Such a
contention lacks merit. It betrays on its face a lack of understanding of the
constitutional provision relied upon. The Auditor General, as noted, is
vested with the power to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenues and receipts from whatever source, and to audit, in
accordance with law and administrative regulations" all expenditures of
funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government as well as
the provinces or municipalities thereof. 8 That is one thing. The
ascertainment of whether a crime committed and by whom is definitely
another.
There is thus a manifest failure on the part of appellants to appreciate
correctly the constitutional objective in the conferment of authority on the
Auditor General. It is based on the fundamental postulate that in the
division of powers, the control over the purse remains with the legislative
branch. There is the explicit requirement then that there be no expenditure
of public founds except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 9
There is need, therefore, for an enactment to permit disbursement from
the public treasury. Nor does fidelity to this constitutional mandated end
there. There must be compliance with the terms of the statute. If it were
not so to, the extent that there is a deviation, there is a frustration of the
legislative will. It is obvious that Congress itself is not in a position to oversee
and supervise the actual release of each and every appropriation. That is
where the Auditor General comes in. It is the responsibility of his office to
exact obedience to any law that allows the expenditure of public funds. He
serves as the necessary check to make certain that no department of the
government, especially its main spending arm, the Executive, exceeds the
statutory limits of the appropriation to which it is entitled. That is the
purpose and end calling for the creation of such an office, certainly not the
enforcement of criminal statutes.
So it has been made clear by the then Delegate, later President, Manuel
Roxas in the Constitutional Convention of 1934. To the question as to the
method or means to determine whether public funds are spent in
accordance with the congressional will, this was his answer: "The only
means provided in our Constitution, as in the constitutions in other
countries, is the office of the auditor; therefore, if the auditor is a check on
the Executive, it is not wise to make the auditor depend on the Executive.
For another ways, the Executive, if he is able to influence the auditor, may
spent the proper checking of the expenditures of the public money." 10 For
such a dignitary to live up to such grave responsibility, he must, according to
Delegate Roxas, be independent, not only of the President but even of
Congress, even if he were in a true and vital sense fulfilling a task
appertaining to it. Thus, "In the United States while the auditor is appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate,
the office is kept as an independent office — independent [of] the
Executive and independent [of] the Legislature, because he has not only to
check the accounts of the Executive, but also the accounts of the Legislature
...." 11
It could be that appellants were not completely oblivious to the force of the
observations. They therefore did seek to lend plausibility to their contention
with reminder that there is likewise included in the constitutional provision
in question the task incumbent on the Auditor General to "bring forth the
attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or
property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or
extravagant." From which, by a process of construction rather latitudinarian
in character, they would imply that on the Auditor General alone rests the
determination of whether or not criminal liability is incurred for any
anomaly discovered in the course of his audit or examination. Such a
conclusion is at war with the controlling doctrine. As construed in Guevara
v. Gimenez, 12 at most such a duty goes no further then requiring him to
call the attention of the proper administrative officer of the existence of
such a situation but does not even extend to the power "to refuse and
disapprove payment of such expenditures, ...." 13 Much less then could it
justify the assertion devoid of any legal justification that even, the
ascertainment of any possible criminal liability is likewise a part and parcel
of such constitutional competence of the Auditor General. How, then, can it
be said that their plea is thereby strengthened?
There is likewise an invocation by appellants of alleged statutory support for
their untenable view. It is likewise in vain. All that appellants have to go on is
the concluding paragraph of section 657 of the Revised Administrative
Code: "Accounts once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed
except as herein provided." The paragraph immediately preceding should
have disabused the minds of appellants of any cause for optimism. All that
set it provides for is that in case any settled account "appears to be infected
with fraud, collusion or error of calculation or when new and material
evidence is discovered, the Auditor General may within three years after
original settlement, open such account, and after a reasonable time for his
reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new balance." The official given
the opportunity for a reply or appearance is the provincial auditor, for
under the first paragraph of this particular section, the Auditor General at
any time before the expiration of three years and the making of any
settlement by a provincial auditor, may, of his own motion, review and
revise the same and certify a new balance. Nowhere does it appear that
such a statutory grant of authority of the Auditor General to open revised
accounts carries with it the power to determine who may be constituted in
the event that in the preparation thereof a crime has been committed. The
conclusive effect of the finality of his decision on the execution of branch of
the government thus relates solely to the administrative aspect of the
matter. 14
From the constitutional, no less than the statutory standpoint then, this
claim of appellants finds no support. It has nothing but novelty to call for
any attention being paid to it. It is singularly unpersuasive. To repeat, it
would be to stretch to unwarranted limits the constitutional power thus
conferred on the Auditor General to accede to such a plea. Nothing is
better settled than that, broad and comprehensive as it is, it does not
include a participation in the investigation of charges to determine whether
or not a criminal prosecution should be instituted. 15 Thus, the first two
errors of the appellants which would impugn the order of dismissal
forreaching a similar conclusion are disposed of.
2. The third assigned error by appellants would find fault with the
lower court's reliance on the well-settled doctrine that as a general
principle, no action lies to enjoin fiscals from conducting investigations to
ascertain whether an offense has been committed. To demonstrate its
equally groundless character, it suffices to refer to Ramos v. Torres, 16
dismissing an original action for prohibition instituted, by five of the six
petitioners, now appellants, 17 to cut short further proceedings on an
information accusing them of malversation through falsification of public
and commercial documents. In the opinion of the present Chief Justice, it is
emphatically affirmed: "Upon a review of the record, we are satisfied that
petitioners herein have not established their right to the writ prayed for.
Indeed, it is well-settled that, as a matter of general rule, the writ of
prohibition will not issue to restrain criminal prosecution." 18 An excerpt
from the opinion of Justice Sanchez in Hernandez v. Albano 19 was then
quoted. Thus: "Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule now of long standing and
frequent application was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution
may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction. Really, if at every
turn investigation of a crime will be halted by a court order, the
administration of criminal justice will meet with an undue setback. Indeed,
the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a tremendous
shrinkage that it may end up in hollow sound rather than as a part and
parcel of the machinery of criminal justice." 20 Nor is the accused person
thereby left unprotected for, as was noted by the Chief Justice, referring to
Gorospe v. Peñaflorida, 21 he could defend himself from any possible
prosecution by establishing that he did not commit the act charged or that
the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based is invalid or in
the event of conviction, he could appeal. While the general rule admits of
exceptions, no showing has been made that petitioners appropriately
invoke them. As they failed in their previous action of prohibition in Ramos
v. Torres, so they must now.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court of December 20, 1967
dismissing the petitioners' action for certiorari and prohibition is affirmed.
With costs against petitioner-appellants.
Phils v Tantuico
Facts:
Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Audit initiated a special audit of coconut end-
user companies, which include herein petitioners, with
respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy
collections and the subsidies they had received. As a result of
the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with
respect only to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA
Chairman directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and the
Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them
(Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and Nof petition) to collect the short
levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to
the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to
remit the amount due.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard
the PCA rules and decions have become moot.
Decision:
In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that
acts were done withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Case dismissed. Petitioners contend that
they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power
which is confined to government-owned or controlled
corporations. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution
provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity
directly or indirectly from or through the Government which
are required by law or the granting institution to submit to
such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity ." (Emphasis
supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long
established rule that private entities who handle government
funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in
their handling of said funds by government auditors. n view
of the above considerations, we apply the principle o
fprimary jurisdiction:In cases involving specialized disputes,
the trend has been to refer the same to an administrative
agency of special competence. As early as 1954, theCourt in
Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc.
(94 Phil.932,941), held that under the sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
aquestion which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statute
administered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee said that "In this era of clogged
court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards
or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to
judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has
become wellnigh indispensable." The court reminds us that
The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly
performed.