GANZON V. CA (1991) | SARMIENTO, J.

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials. The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a

member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,

ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city

health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang

Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote: xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the

exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility

worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City;

that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered

trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office

was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the

petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However,

before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders. Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed

by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and

detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the

following day. 3 The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement

before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only

on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel. The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a

postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days. Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again

asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which

were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299. The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted.

However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the

hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his

evidence. On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his

evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention

case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension

was not enforced. 5 Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for

prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty

months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution

certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension

since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in

Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required

confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17 Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary

of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).

As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the

respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation

and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.

The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery

in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public

official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact

restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19 As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given

any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and

based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations

deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law. We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as

the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of

suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of

the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of

their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22 It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we

quote: Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided

by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided

by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg.

337, the Local Government Code, we quote: Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held

within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or

municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the

act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and

other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated

in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time

of suspension. 25 The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the

President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional

language? It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right

or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local

governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations

euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative

responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national

representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally,

that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a

system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all

other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32 As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by

severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local

Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President

mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary

authority as this Court has held, 34 thus: xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to

him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,

means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local

government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... 35

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to

substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The

impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that

the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the

corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed

her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson: The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are

always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45 In Hebron we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of

express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ... 46 In Mondano, the Court held:

... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and

investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,

furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official

integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by

section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. 47

xxx xxx xxx In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative

Code. 48 Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not

exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power

elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner

Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held

that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local

governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has

not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base

of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of

managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the

sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the

autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the

autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 55 The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit

another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office

(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another

question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,

he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of

suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the

constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold

office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of

this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to

prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. 61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period

is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the

accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension

permanent. It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say,

the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably. The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent

Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent

Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the

respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse

of discretion. The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor

Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to

suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act. As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the

Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are

precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence. In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central

government in the manner the law may provide; 2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the

fundamental premise of autonomy; 4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against

local officials; 5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does

not signify "control" (which the President does not have); 6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed

against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future

suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILS V. DENR (2013) | PERALTA, J.

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,1 praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-

Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the

Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan. The Facts are as follows:

On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering

an area of 61,136 hectares situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.2 On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's Application

for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III.3

On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29, 1998.4

On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their

respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area subject of Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.5

On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and affirming the MGB R-III's Order dated April 29, 1998. On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the

PENRO of Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.6

On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo V. Cabantog's memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004 became

final on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon received the said Order, per the Certification dated October 8, 2004 issued by the Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Cainta, Rizal.7

Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director, respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC's) existing valid and prior Application for Exploration

Permit, and the the former area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.8

On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Eugenio F. Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on

which date of denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 is to be considered in the deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the purpose of determining when the land subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be considered open for application. On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion issued a legal opinion

stating that the Order dated July 16, 2004 of the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the Order dated April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998 should be the reckoning period of the denial of the application of

Golden Falcon. On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was

already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.9 On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman

of the PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato

Sembrano).10 On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending to Governor Dela Cruz the approval of the aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale Mining

Permit.11 On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining

Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez.12 Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the

aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first resolving its formal protest; (2) The areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits

fall within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior Application for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry Permit were illegally converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos' ruling that the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004 was

controlling; (5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered areas that were never declared People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron

ore is not considered as one of the quarry resources, as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of an Application for Quarry Permit.13

On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision14 in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary agreed with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the

receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden Falcon's appeal. According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the

resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central Office. He stated that the Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area was still closed to mining location; hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary

declared that AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTCs Application for Exploration

Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the

authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.

The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretarys Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez

are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby CANCELLED.15

Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition. Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares that it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including

the Province of Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments.

Petitioner raises these issues: I

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 24 OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING

UPON THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES. II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL, NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF

ALL PROVINCES.16 To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because

it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level;17 adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare

of the provinces.19 Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate

branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.20 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's

acts.21 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23

In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as

the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No.

7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.24 The pertinent provisions of law sought to be declared as unconstitutional by petitioner are as follows:

R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991) SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to

be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this

Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: x x x x

(3) For a Province:c x x x x

(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the

environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; x x x25 R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)

Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the

Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:

(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining; (b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;

(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners; (d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;

(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and

(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this Act.26 Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR Administrative Order No. 9640

(the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power to

reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the PMRB. The statutes are

also silent as to the power of respondent DENR Secretary to substitute his own judgment over that of the Provincial Governor and the PMRB. Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government

Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the

power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local government units, and grants the local government units autonomy, thus: The 1987 Constitution:

Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and

municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.27

Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional provision is mirrored in the Local Government Code, which states: SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a) Consistent with

the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with

respect to barangays.28 Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local

Government Code of 1991 show that the relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term "control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside

what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the term "supervision" is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in

accordance with law.29 Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision and exercised control when he nullified the small-scale mining permits

granted by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the former substituted the judgment of the latter.

Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved power. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to regulate small-scale mining has been devolved to all provinces. In the exercise of devolved powers, departmental

approval is not necessary.30 Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 granting the power of control to

the DENR/DENR Secretary are not nullified, nothing would stop the DENR Secretary

from nullifying, voiding and canceling the small-scale mining permits that have been issued by a Provincial Governor.

Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of control to respondents is unconstitutional, as the Constitution only allows supervision over local governments and proscribes control by the executive departments.

In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, stated that contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the power to implement the small-

scale mining law is expressly limited in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code, which provides that it must be carried out "pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR." Moreover, the fact that the power to implement the small-scale mining law has not been fully devolved to

provinces is further amplified by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, which provides, among others, that the People's Small-Scale Mining Program shall be implemented by the DENR Secretary.

The petition lacks merit. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the

Constitution31 provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the

Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."

Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned government agencies.

The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to mining activities, which rely heavily on manual labor using simple

implement and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."32 It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733 provides that the DENR is, subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's

constitutional mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces

is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.

Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local

governments," and Section 25 of the Local Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.34

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority.35 It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.36

Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards,37 and those provided by the Local

Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units

and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress38 under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local

government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local

government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."

In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and

responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

x x x x (3) For a Province:c

x x x x (iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of

the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes;39

Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law

and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.40

Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the

DENR, thus: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared of the State to promote, develop, protect and rationalize viable small-scale mining activities in order to

generate more employment opportunities and provide an equitable sharing of the nation's wealth and natural resources, giving due regard to existing rights as herein provided.

x x x x

Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of carrying out the declared policy provided in Section 2 hereof, there is hereby established a People's

Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, hereinafter called the Department, in coordination with other concerned government agencies, designed to achieve an orderly, systematic and rational scheme for the small-scale development and

utilization of mineral resources in certain mineral areas in order to address the social, economic, technical, and environmental problems connected with small-scale mining activities.

x x x x Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review

by the Secretary: (a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;

(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining; (c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;

(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining; (e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and (f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this Act.42

DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the Rules and Regulations to implement R.A. No. 7076, provides:

SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. The following DENR officials shall exercise the following supervisory functions in the implementation of the Program:

21.1 DENR Secretrary direct supervision and control over the program and activities of the small-scale miners within the people's small-scale mining area;

21.2 Director the Director shall: a. Recommend the depth or length of the tunnel or adit taking into account the:

(1) size of membership and capitalization of the cooperative; (2) size of mineralized areas; (3) quantity of mineral deposits; (4) safety of miners; and (5) environmental impact and other considerations;

b. Determine the right of small-scale miners to existing facilities in consultation with the operator, claimowner, landowner or lessor of an affected area upon declaration of a small-scale mining area;

c. Recommend to the Secretary the withdrawal of the status of the people's small-scale mining area when it can no longer be feasibly operated on a small-scale basis; and

d. See to it that the small-scale mining contractors abide by small-scale mines safety rules and regulations.

x x x x SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under R.A. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:

22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush area for small-scale mining; 22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized areas/mineral lands for people's small-scale mining;

22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners cooperative;

22.4 Formulates and implements rules and regulations related to R.A. 7076; 22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party

may appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is considered final and executory; and 22.6 Performs such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and

objectives of R.A. 7076. SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas. The Board created under R.A. 7076 shall have the authority to declare and set aside People's Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for small-scale mining operations subject to review by the DENR Secretary thru the Director.43

DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on August 15, 1995, provides under Section 12344 thereof that small-scale

mining applications should be filed with the PMRB45 and the corresponding permits shall be issued by the Provincial Governor, except small-scale mining applications within the mineral reservations.

Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known as the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on December 19, 1996, provides that

applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through the concerned Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board for areas outside the Mineral Reservations and with the Director though the Bureau for areas within the Mineral Reservations.46 Moreover, it provides that Local

Government Units shall, in coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and subject to valid and existing mining rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry x x x and gravel permits not exceeding five (5) hectares."47

Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR Administrative Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory power of control, but did not confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR

Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board. The contention does not persuade.

The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale mining is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, thus:

Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the

Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:

x x x x (e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people's small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a small mining area; x x x

Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is reflected in Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to wit:

SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:

x x x x 22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90)

days upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is considered final and executory; x x x

In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, the AMTC filed on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the Applications for Quarry Permits of

Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Liberato Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and Gerardo Cruz on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.48 However, on August 8, 2005, the PMRB issued

Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10 and 05-11, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting/issuance of the said permits.49 On August 10, 2005, the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the

Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz based on the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal Officer and the Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.

Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary, appealing from Letter-Resolution No. 05-1317 and Resolution Nos. 05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8, 2005, of the PMRB of Bulacan, which resolutions gave due course and

granted, on August 10, 2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz involving parcels of mineral land situated at Camachin, Doa Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.

The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an administrative body, created under R.A. No. 7076, which cannot be equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be conducted, but it is enough that the parties were given the

opportunity to present evidence. It asserted that the questioned resolutions it issued were in accordance with the mining laws and that the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted were registered ahead of AMTC's Application for Exploration Permit. Further, the Board stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to approve the Small-

Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No. 7160.

The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when is the subject mining area open for mining location by other applicants; and

(2) who among the applicants have valid applications.1wphi1 The pertinent portion of the decision of the DENR Secretary reads: We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open only to mining

location on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the subject Order of July 16, 2004.1wphi1 The filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of Denial issued

on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the Resolution thereof on July 16, 2004. Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance with the procedures

of the PMRB, however, the AQPs were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to mining location. Consequently, the SSMPs granted by the PMRB and the Governor are null and void making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it

having been filed when the area is already open to other mining applicants. Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These are two (2) different applications. The questioned SSMPs were issued in violation of Section 4 of

RA 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale Mining Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.

x x x x WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines

and Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby

CANCELLED.50 The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance

with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.52 It is noted that although AMTC filed a protest with the PMRB regarding its superior and prior Application for Exploration Permit over

the Applications for Quarry Permit, which were converted to Small-Scale Mining Permits, the PMRB did not resolve the same, but issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the

Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting of the said permits. After the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits on August 10, 2005, AMTC appealed the Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the granting

of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor. Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for

Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and,

therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in

controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.53 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A.

No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial

function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by

Beltran v. The Secretary of Health, 54 which held: The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts

thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55 In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the

constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BORJA V. COMELEC (1998) | MENDOZA, J.

This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the

term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30,

1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. 1

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by

June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for

reelection as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of private respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. 3 The majority stated in its decision:

In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before

the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into

office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558

votes against petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and to seek a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.

Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be

considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term.

Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.

This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which

shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):

Sec. 43. Term of Office. . . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not

be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . .

First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the Constitution

reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by

Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the of the succeeding

election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. 4 Monsod warned against "prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose" as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution

contained provisions "recognizing people's power." 5 Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:

The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would

be very wary about this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive

terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service in the case of the President, six years, in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative

districts and from the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent

reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of

because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the people or

politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should

be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice. . . . 6 Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective

officials who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, "why should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want?" 7

Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself." 8

Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by

practically everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?" 9

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the

idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.

It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for

members of Congress: MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second

term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again? MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.

MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will remember was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?

MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular

member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand. 10

Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. 11 To bar the election of a