article 8 criminal law

8/6/2019 Article 8 Criminal Law

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Article 8.Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. - Conspiracy and proposal to commitfelony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penaltytherefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning thecommission of a felony and decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes itsexecution to some other person or persons.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in

defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads ofsocietal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits onindividuality beyond which the State cannot tread-asserting that "individual spontaneity"must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritablyacknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation,which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor towithhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which tnankind is warranted, individually or collectitlely, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. Theonly purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mcl11ber of a

civilized cotnmunity, against his will, is to prevent harnl to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-pteservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic,it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to itscollecti"e wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wroughtchanges in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and


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duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In theprocess, the web of rights and State impositions : became tangled and obscured, enmeshedin threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism oftenoutright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealousattempts by its members to preserve of their individuality and dignity, irievitably followed.It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put

to its severest test.Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing theCrime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2

wishes to impress upon us that the, assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crossesthat thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. Hetherefore makes a stringent callfor this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible ofconstitutionality-mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice ofvagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminalprosecutions;and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under TheRevised Penal Code, allof which are purportedly clearviolations of the fundamental rights

of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusationagainst him.

Specifically, the provisions of the PlunderLaw claimed by petitioner to have transgressedconstitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 Clnd 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two

(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of thefollowing means or similar Schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of publicfunds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks Or any other form of pecuniary" benefit from any

person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project

or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assetsbelonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or

instrumentalities, or government "owned or controlled corporations andtheir subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the

promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies orother combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to


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benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the

expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people anti theRepublic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. -Any public officer who, byhimself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity orconsanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,

accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overtor criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or

total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of thecrime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person

who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense

contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. Inthe imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of

mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Codeshall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gottenwealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and

shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of

the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule ofEvidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, itshall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in

furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-

gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of

overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy

(underscoring supplied).

On 4 Apri12001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.26558, for violation of RA 7080, asamended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation ofSecs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), ofRA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials andEmployees); (d) Crim. Case No.26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 ofThe Revised Penal Code);and, (e) Crim. Case No.26565, for illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No.142, as amended by RA6085).1wphi1.nt

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to theOmbudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges inthe Information in Crim. Case No.26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of theoffenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to filecounter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause.Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purportedambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged werenever raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility


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Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the partychallenging the validity of the.statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt thatthere is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can beno finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As

tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserablyfailed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of

constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditionsrequired or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certaintyand particularity. Thus -

1, That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in Connivance withmembers of his family, relatives by affinity or i coll.C;llllguinity, businessassociates, subordinates or other persons;

2, That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through acombination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through

misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on

the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any

person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by

reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulentconveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of

its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled

corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly

or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest orparticipation including the promise of future employnlent in any business enterprise

or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial

monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and ordersintended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (j) by' taking

advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to file damage andprejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3, That the aggregate anlount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth, amassed,accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide orrule thatwouldinform those whoare subject to it what conduct wouldrender thcm liable to itspenalties, its validity willbesustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defendingone chargedwith its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realmof the proscribedconduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what theassailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill- gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of actsenumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of thePlunderLaw.


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In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicatingwith reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioneris allegedtohave committed:

"The undersignedOmbudsman, Prosecutor and OIC- Director, EPIB, Office of theOmbudsman, hereby accUses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.'JOSE VELARDIE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John DOES a.k.a. EleuterioTan QREleuterio Ramos Tan orMr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John &Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, definedand penalizedunderR.A. No.7080, asamended by Sec. 12 ofR.A.No.7659, committed asfollows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada,THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES by himselfAND/OR in CONNIVANCE/ CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-AACUSED, WHO

ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY RELATIVES By AFFINITY ORCONSANGUINITY BUSINESS ASSOCIATES WlLORDINA TES AND/ ROTHER PERSONS BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIALPOSITION AUTHORITY RELA TIONSHIP CONNECTION OR, ORINFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ill-gottenwealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETYSEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDREDSEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17),more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTL Y ENRICHING HIMSELF ORTHEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINOPEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. through ANY OR Acombination OR A series of overt QR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES ORMEANS. described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERALINSTANCES. MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVEHUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545.000.000.00). MOREOR LESS. FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF .c!IFT.SHARE. PERCENTAGE. KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARYBENEFIT. BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accusedCHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND LANE DOES. in considerationOF TOLERA TION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING RECEIVING , misappropriating, converting ORmisusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. for HIS OR THEIR PERSONALgain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTYMILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or ll'ss, representing a portionof the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200.000.000.00) tobaccoexcise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,


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Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doea.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italicsupplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, EQR HIS PERSONAL GAINAND BENEFIT the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO

PURCHASE 351.878.000 SHARES OF STOCKS. MORE OR LESS. andthe Social Security System (555), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK.MORE OR LESS. OF THE BELLE CORPORA TION IN THE AMOUNTOF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLIONNINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENPESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (Pl.102.965.607.50) AND MORE ORLESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDREDTWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY pesos(P744.612.450.00). RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESSONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVEHUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS ANDFIFTY CENTAVOS (Pl,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING ORRECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR INCONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND ,ANE DOES COMMISSIONSOR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARESOF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINEMILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS {P189,700,000.00)MORE OR LESS FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICHBECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EOUIT ABLE-PCI BANKUNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE:'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS GIFTS SHARES.PERCENTAGES. KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARYBENEFITS IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES. inthe amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDREDTHIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONEHUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HISACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously nonethat will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factualassertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provideadequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocalassertions, petitioner is complete informed of the accusations against him as to enable himto prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition ofthe terms ,rcombination" and "series" in the key phrase ,a combination or series of overt orcriminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word ,rpattem" in Sec. 4. Theseomissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for beingimpermissibly vague and overbroad to be informed of the nature and cause of theaccusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right due process.


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The rat ionalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain andvoid merely because general terms are used therein, or beeause of the employment of termswithout defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, thereis no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define eachand every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of itswill, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result

in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least,can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be

interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it isevident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.8The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists andlexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definitionof the words "coinbination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining.To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individualcharacters.

Series -a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another inspatial and temporal succession.

That Cong'ress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in theirpopular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative--deliberations on the bill whicheventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMI1TEE ON JUSTICE, 7May1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINALACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE,HEREOF. Now when we say

combination, we actually mean to say, if there are hvo or more means, we

mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else areincluded, how about a series of the same act? For example, throughmisappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

REP.,GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP, GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.


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REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated

means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice? .

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice -but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that's it. When we say combination, wemean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to seies, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

REP. GARCIA: A series

REP. ISIDRO: That's not series. Its a combination. Because when we say

combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is

why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, itmay fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of

overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di.

SEN. TANADA: So that wouldfall under the term "series?"

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if itis a combination, ano, two missappropriations.

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination.

Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.


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SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one"l

or maybe even "two" acts may already result in sucha big amount, on line25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," toread, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as."

Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in

the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of theacts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be.

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two

or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr, President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under

the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, atleast, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing

laws, Mr. President

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) actsfalling under different categories of enumerauon provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids onthe public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assetsbelonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminalacts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec,1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaningfor "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providingfor it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandigabayan9 that this term issufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -


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x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern'consists of at least a combination orseries of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).

Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is

directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer

to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be

an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As

commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful schenle' indicates a 'general planof action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others

conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative,if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple

accused,vary, the overt or criminal acts nlust form part of a conspiracy to attain a

common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning andsufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's relianceon the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has beenformulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statuteestablishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness thatpersons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. Itcan only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e.,that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that menof common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violatesdue process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice ofwhat conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its

provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine

does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language butwhich nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that areapparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the secondwhenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot beinvoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether thelanguage conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when

measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be

upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes andbounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely becauseit might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especiallywhere, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details inadvance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is


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vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids orrequires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence mustnecessarily guess at its nleaning and differ as to its application, violates the firstessental of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand

decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which isoverbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory isthat "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparentconstruction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protectedexpression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with norequirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conductcould not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The possible

harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished isoutweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deferredand perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects ofoverly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general interrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challerge is allowedfor this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws againstsocially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances asin the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to freespeech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have notrecognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the FirstAmendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facialoverbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, ifentertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal lawsthat are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been heldthat "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challerge to mountsuccessfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists

under which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrines it is said thata litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possibleapplications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribedcannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analyticaltools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as theyare called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to doservice when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,


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theestablished rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional willnot be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be takenas applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be

unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the FirstAmendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facialinvalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are

invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."21

Consequently, there is nobasis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its faceand in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirelyon the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whoseactivities are constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the caseand controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made

without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S.Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, andrequiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect,is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of therelative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative processof the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature ofthe required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .ordinarily results ina kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutionalquestions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as

"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"25

and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute,therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be

examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.27

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of thePlunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imaginedthan real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words inthe statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in thelaw. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to everyother part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched

presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitionercannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators whovoted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberatedupon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registeredhis affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutionalanchorage.

The parallel case ofGallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be to illustrate and emphasize thepoint that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is


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so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonC1ble constructionthat will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillochallenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par.(e), ofThe Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" ishighly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by priorjudicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due

process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offensesto wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefitsthrough gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function andthat their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them wasviolated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they werebeing charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. Thephrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), ofthe statute may be committed, and the use of all these in the same Information does notmean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adeqllate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p.

2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.

v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases,Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative AlVlual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider acorrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted, benefits, advantage or

preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicialfunctions "1 through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or grossinexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [el, Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions

penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative

or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preferencewhich is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason,

through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use ofthe term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the


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Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyondreasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires onlyproof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. -For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, itshall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in

furtherance of the scheme or CO11S1'iracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of

overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminalprosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor thepresumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the Statesucceeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the

accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard isindispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the applicationof criminal law .It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a

standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairshas confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense withoutconvincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt"standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives lifeto theDue Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proofbeyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garciaon this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives areelucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law

that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonabledoubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts

enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the

accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is lessthan PIOO million, but the totality of the crime committed is PIOO million

since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,

coercion, theft ?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs

to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyondreasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr.

Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the

information -three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be

proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction ofa crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of

diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be


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proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the

crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such

a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the actof bribery, he was able to accumulate only PSO,OOO and in the crime of

extortion, he was only able to accumulate PI million. Now, when we add thetotality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation

on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convicthim?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an

essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that ele111ent beyondreasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the

amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other

acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be PIIOorPI20 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we

will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved.Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonabledoubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoringsupplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any mannerrefashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden stillremains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact orelement necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of thecrime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of actssufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern andinvolving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each andevery other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused infurtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate oracquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged, in anInformation for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the publictreasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficientto prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided

only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.31

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusionthat "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme orconspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hiddenwealth. Stated othewise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to provebeyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern ismerely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. , This conclusion is consistentwith reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for acombination or series of overt acts or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more,


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than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth."The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effortto prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series orcombination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his

submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" andthat Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantiveelement of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted ofplunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted

under the plunder law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence ifthere is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts

complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes

enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime areproved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not

have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4inconvicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down asubstantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is do we have to avail of Section 4

when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged

constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, itcontains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of thecrime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofaras the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not halve to gothat far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a veryimportant element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the

prosecution.32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of


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plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and openingclause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. -For purposes of establishing the crime ofplunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely proceduralmeasure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor ofthe accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a meansto an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec.4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for theprosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitudeexacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyondreasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 isflawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be

severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in thedemise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec.4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separabilityclause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. -If any provisions of this Act or theapplication thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, theremaining provisions of this Act and the application of suchprovisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affectedthereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from beingdeclared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assumingthat to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereofshould accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if bydoing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunderis a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in hisConcurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se theelement ofmens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It isnoteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime ofplunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thusalleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates therequirement ofmens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute isvoid, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada madeduring the deliberation on S.B. No.733:


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SENATOR TAADA ...And the evidence that will berequired to convict him would not be evidence for each andevery individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient toestablish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of

plunder.33

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by thesucceeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentlemanfeels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence,which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedierand faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President 34

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy

to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and everycriminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enoughif it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminalacts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far asthe acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elementsof the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must beshown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in

the commission of an offense contributing to the, crime ofplunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In theimposition of penalties,-the degree of participation and theattendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, asprovided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered bythe court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in theRevised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Lawindicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder sincethe degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his

criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person whoparticipates with the said public officer in the commission of anoffense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason tobelieve, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer asprincipal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all thegeneralities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,but there is no canon against using common sense in construing lawsas saying what they obviously mean."35


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Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum inse must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by thedecision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimespunishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes arepunished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.7659. Referringto these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.

Echegaray:36

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimesthat are, by their very nature, despicable, either because lifewas callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal andutterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normalcourse of his or her growth as a human being. ... Seen in thislight, the capital crimes of kidnapping and i. serious illegaldetention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or thevictim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses

involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in thecase of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, pi1rricide,infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, wherethe victim is detained for more than three days or seriousphysical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to killhim were made or the victim is a minor, robbery withhomicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson,and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of thecarnapped vehicle is killed or raped , which are penalized byreclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their verynature.

There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in thesignificance and implications of the subject criminal acts inthe scheme of the larger socio-political and economic contextin which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop andprovide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling fromdecades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted thegovernment and impoverished the population, the PhilippineGovernment must muster the political will to dismantle theculture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicatedcriminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of

society and the psyche of the populace. [With thegovernment] terribly lacking the money to provide even themost basic services to its people, any form ofmisappropriation or misapplication of government fundstranslates to an actual threat to the very existence ofgovernment, and in turn, the very survival of the people itgoverns over. Viewed in this context. no less heinous are theeffects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses


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involving government officials, employees or officers, thattheir perpetrators must not be allowed to cause furtherdestruction and damage to society .

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinousoffense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished

are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37

andit does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainlymala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions forplunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of theBouncing Check Law (B.P. BIg. 22) or of an ordinance againstjaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the dayfor him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by

People v. Echegaray38

to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of theCourt therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, andbecomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part ofit.1wphi1.nt

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and profligacy of officials in highplaces which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption hasbecome more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrivemore and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radicalmeasures are imperative to light the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodicaland economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,

especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, ifleft unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral andinstitutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will ofthe legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against theavarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues ofnational importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner'signominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under avirginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our peoplethat may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise

above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as thePlunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petitionto declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISIONw

G.R. No. 145927

August 24, 2007c

SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS,[1] Petitioners

vs

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases 1[2] filed with the Sandiganbayan

(SB) involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways

(MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from

numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977.Because of the sheer

magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of people involved, and the ingenious scheme

employed in defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway scam has few parallels in

the annals of crime in the country.

The Facts

cralawThe SB culled the facts2[6] this way:

On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of COA Regional OfficeNo. 7, directed auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit areport on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts in Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City HighwayEngineering Districts.Complying with the directive, they conducted an investigation andin due course submitted their findings.Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance offake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned.They discovered

that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts.One set consists of regular LAAswhich clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices and were duly signed byMrs. Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office.The LAAs werenumbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the Accounting,Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not indicatethe covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant RolandoMangubat and Engr. Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer.These fake LAAs

12


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were not numbered in proper sequence; they were mostly undated and were sometimesduplicated.They could not be traced to the files and records of the Accounting, Budgetand Finance Division.The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fakeLAAs was debited to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) andcredited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790).Nevertheless,the expenditures were taken from obligations of the current year (1978) because all the

supporting papers of the payment vouchers were dated in that year.The entries in thejournal vouchers filed with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 8-81-400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation), 8-83-000 (liquidated or current yearobligations) and 8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account).All of these were approved forthe Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat, however, hadno authority to approve them because since October 1977, he had already been detailedto the MPH Central Office. There were indications that the practice had been going onfor years.x x x x

Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a Special CabinetCommittee on MPH Region VII Ghost Projects Anomalies which in turn organized aSpecial Task Force composed of representatives from the Finance Ministry IntelligenceBureau (FMIB), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and theCommission on Audit.The mission of the task force was to conduct a wider and moreextended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPHRegion VII, including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, the 1977questionable disbursements of which are the subject matter of these cases.x x x x

cralawFor a better understanding of these highways cases, the flow in the releaseof funds to the various agencies of the government and the control devices set up fordisbursement and accounting of public funds should first be explained.A chart (ExhibitB) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district level.On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies, the thenMinistry of Budget released funds to the various agencies of the government by meansof an Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC).The Advice ofAllotment is an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a specified amountin accordance with approved programs and projects. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling isan authority to pay.Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget, the Central Officeof the agency prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of CashDisbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the disbursementallotment.These are sent to the Regional Office.Upon receipt, the Budget Officer of theregion prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which areforwarded to the various districts of the region (The amount that goes to each district isalready indicated in the Advice of Allotment).Only upon receipt of the LAA is thedistrict office authorized to incur obligations.Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts andultimately paid out to contractors, the District Engineer submits to the Regional Director


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a request for allotment in accordance with the program of work prepared by the former.This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and Equipment(RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer, approved by the DistrictEngineer, and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering District, whocertifies as to the availability of funds.The RSE is then submitted to the RegionalDirector for approval.Once it is approved, a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA)

is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil Engineer.The ROAsignifies that a certain amount of district funds has been set aside or earmarked for theparticular expenditures stated in the RSE.On the basis of the ROA, the District Office puts up advertisements, [conducts] biddings, makes awards and prepares purchaseorders which are served on the winning bidder.The District Office also prepares asummary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts and tally sheets,conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the payment ofdeliveries.Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared, the corresponding checkin the form of a Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by theDisbursing Officer and finally released to the contractor.At the end of every month, the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized DisbursingOfficer (RCIDD) is prepared, listing all the checks issued during that period.TheRCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the region.Upon receipt of theRCIDDO, the Regional Office draws a journal voucher, debiting the account obligation(liquidated or unliquidated obligation, whichever is applicable), and crediting theaccount Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA).The RCIDDO is recorded in theJournal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in thegeneral ledger at the end of each month.Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are summarized in the Reportsof Obligations Incurred (ROI) in the District Office, once or twice a month, dependingupon the volume of transactions.The ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office.Uponreceipt of the ROI, the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal voucher takingup the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting theobligation incurred (0-82-000). This is recorded in the general voucher and posted to thegeneral ledger at the end of each month.The journal voucher is prepared, closing theaccount 8-70-709 to 8-71-100-199 at the end of each month.It is also recorded andposted to the general ledger.At the end of the month, the balances of each accountshown in the general ledger are summarized in a statement called the trial balance. Thetrial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila where it is consolidatedwith other trial balances submitted by other regional offices.x x x xThe elaborate accounting procedure described above with its system of controls was setup obviously to make sure that government funds are properly released, disbursed andaccounted for.In the hands of untrustworthy guardians of the public purse, however, itproved to be inadequate.There were loopholes which an unscrupulous person adroit ingovernment accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous sumsof money from the government.Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia


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Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (ClerkII), all of MPH Region VII, met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City andhatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from governmentcoffers.Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use offake LAAs, vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with theconnivance of other government officials and employees.In fine, the fraudulent scheme

involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each generalvoucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor;the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year toprovide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account bynegation or adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers toconceal disbursements in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not toreflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the Regional Office.Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him.All three agreed to help himcarry out his plan.They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson alsotook charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the grossamount.Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers andGeneral Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.Thus, in theinitial report of the auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the doubtful allotmentsand other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations:

The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed bythe Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts.Disbursements madeon the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations(Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among thosecertified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of thepreceding year.To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursementsceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take upthe negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the TreasuryChecking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790.These journal vouchers ineffect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basisof the fake LAAs. Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the trial balance would not show the irregularity.Thechecks, however, were actually issued.

cralawThe four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy.Othergovernment employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed theirnames to be used and signed spurious documents.

cralawAlthough the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977to June 1978), the PNB and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBIbusted the illegal operations. (Some of the recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishlyand bought two cars at a time).The reason for this is that, at that time, the PNB andBureau of Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch ofthe PNB did not receive independent advice from the PNB head office in Manila.Therewere no deposits of money made with the PNB from which withdrawals could becharged.Only CDCs were presented to it, and not knowing that some of the CDCs werefake, the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn against them.The bank had also no way


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of knowing what amount was appropriated for the district; consequently, it did not knowif the limit had already been exceeded.Only an insider steep in government accounting,auditing and banking procedures, particularly their flaws and loopholes, could havepulled off such an ingenious and audacious plan.

cralawx x x x

cralawFocusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu FirstDistrict Engineering District, hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity,the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other highwayengineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed.The Cebu First HED receivedfrom Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum ofP4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash DisbursementCeiling (SACDCs), amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 toDecember 31, 1977.But apart from this, the Cebu First HED appears to have alsoreceived for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting toP4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment(SAA) or matched to the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) receivedfrom the MPH and Regional Office.This is highly irregular and not in consonance withaccounting procedures.

cralawIt was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prioryears obligations and chargeable to Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were notproperly funded.Furthermore, the list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed thatCebu First HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in itsdistricts from February to May 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00.Onthe other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the period from November to December, 1977.These completed projects were properly funded bylegitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754,504.00.However, anadditional amount of P3,839,810.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenanceof roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to anyauthoritative document coming from the MPH.

cralawx x x x

cralawA total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs,were traced back to Rolando Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII andAdventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of Region VII.Those LAAs andACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74,through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of theaforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the nationalhighways within the Cebu First HED.Despite the enormous additional expenditure ofP3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI, did notshow any improvement.As testified to by several barangay captains, the roadmaintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of thenational highway.Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in


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the additional amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than tosiphon the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officialsand employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers andcontractors who conspired and confederated with them.

The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, allof MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB.

The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the cases, became a state

witness in the remainder.On the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were

filed, convictions were obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused.

cralawOn the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the

Cebu First Highway Engineering District.Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in

Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally

sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding

number of general vouchers.Fund releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on

these general vouchers.

cralawThe Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case No. 2879 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez,Angelina Escao, Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar,Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leoniladel Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, AgripinoPagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo Villagonzalo,Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo Mendez, Simon Fernan, Jr. and Juliana de los Angeles forestafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents, committed as follows:

That on, about and during the period from December 1, 1976 up to January 31,1977,both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, AssistantDistrict Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant ofRegion VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez,Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each otherto defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation andassistance of Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry ofPublic Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same RegionalOffice; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra,Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director


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MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; MatildeJabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna,Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, RegionVII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, ChiefFinance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar,Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief

Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant,MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, CentralOffice; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera,Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; Mariano Jarina, Clerk in theProperty Division of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditors Aide of Cebu IHED; Zosimo Mendez, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron,Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Simon Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer ofCebu I HED and Juliana de los Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom tookadvantage of their official positions, with the exception of Juliana de losAngeles, mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfullyand feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents,to wit:

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment2. Letter of Advice of Allotment

3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling4. General Voucher No. B-15

5. Check No. 9933064

6. Abstract of Bids7. Purchase Order8. Statement of Delivery9. Report of Inspection10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment

11. Trial Balance

by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of PublicHighways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) andthe corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of1,400 cu. m. of item 1083[7] for use in the repair of the Cebu HagnayaWharf road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when in truth and in fact, as all theaccused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in the

3


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voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests forallotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said itemwas made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the roadconstruction materials were delivered, inspected and used in the supposedproject and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in

fact, as all the accused know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect andbecause of the foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were able tocollect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHTTHOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency, in payment of thenon-existing deliveries; that the said amount ofP28,000.00 was not reflected inthe monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showingits financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as adesigned means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of thesaid amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the same for theirpersonal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in thetotal amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00),Philippine Currency.

Criminal

Case No.

Dates of

Commission

Main

Documents

Falsified

Items Allegedly

Purchased

Amount of

Fraud

2879 December 1,1976 up toJanuary 31,

1977

1. GeneralVoucher No.B-15;2. Check No.9933064;

1,400 cu. m. of item 108for use in the repair of theCebuHagnayaWharf roadfrom Km. 50.30 to Km.60.00

PhP 28,000.00

2880 December 1,1976 up toJanuary 31,

1977

1. Request forAllocation ofAllotment 101-12-105-76;2. GeneralVoucher No.B-55;3. Check No.9933104;

1,400 cu. m. of item 108for use in the repair of theBogo-Curva-Medellonroad from Km. 110.00 toKm. 119.00

PhP 28,000.00

2881 January 2, 1977up to February

28, 1977

1. Request forAllocation ofAllotment 101-2-56-77;2. GeneralVoucher No.B-245;3. Check No.9933294;

Approximately 1,500 cu.m. of item 108 for use inthe repair andrehabilitation of damagedroads and bridges byTyphoon Aring at theTabogon-Bogo provincialroad from Km. 92 to Km.98

PhP 31,000.00

2885 January 2, 1977up to January

31, 1977

1. Request forAllocation ofAllotment 101-

materials for use in therepair and rehabilitationof the Daan-Bantayan

PhP 30,000.00


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12-112-76;2. GeneralVoucher No.B-76;3. Check No.9933125;

road from Km. 127.00 toKm. 136

2914 October 1,1977 up toNovember 30,

1977


1,200 cu. m. of item 108for use in therehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon barangayroad

PhP 27,000.00

2918 January 2, 1977up to February

28, 1977


1,500 cu. m. of item 108for the rehabilitation oftheCebuNorthHagnayaWharfroad from Km. 71 to Km.76

PhP 30,000.00

On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856,

2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.

The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case No. 2855 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez,

Angelina Escao, Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar,Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leoniladel Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo Tordecilla, AgripinoPagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Jorge de la Pea, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron,Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano Montera and Rufino V. Nuez for estafa thru falsificationof public and commercial documents, committed as follows:

That on, about and during the period from June 1, 1977 up to June 30,1977,both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and withinthe jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, AssistantDistrict Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of

Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez,Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each otherto defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation andassistance of Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry ofPublic Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same RegionalOffice; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra,Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant DirectorMPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; MatildeJabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna,


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Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, RegionVII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, ChiefFinance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar,Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant ChiefAccountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant,MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central

Office; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de la Pea,Auditor of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED;Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Expedito Torrevillas,representative of the Engineers Office, Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, SeniorCivil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; and Rufino V. Nuez, an allegedsupplier, all of whom took advantage of their official positions, with theexception of Rufino V. Nuez, mutually helping each other did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of thefollowing documents, to wit:

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-10-186-76; 10-190-76; 10-192-76; 10-188-76; 10-180-76

2. Letter of Advice of Allotment

3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling4. General Voucher No. B-613

5. Check No. 94030996. Abstract of Bids7. Purchase Order8. Statement of Delivery9. Report of Inspection10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment

11. Trial Balance

by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of PublicHighways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) andthe corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of153.63 m. t. of item 3104[8] for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelanroad at Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52, when in truth and in fact, as all the accusedknew, the same were not true and correct; by making it appear in the voucherthat funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments(ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made

4


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and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchaseorder was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the road constructionmaterials were delivered, inspected and used in the supposed project and that thealleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact, as all theaccused know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of theforegoing falsifications, the above-named accused were able to collect from the

Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOURHUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), PhilippineCurrency, in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said amount ofP48,431.85 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to theCentral Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same wasnegated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to cover-up the fraud; andthe accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated, convertedand misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice ofthe Philippine Government in the total amount of FORTY EIGHTTHOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100

(P48,431.85), Philippine Currency.CONTRARY TO LAW.

cralawThe Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details highlighted in the

aforequoted typical accusatory pleading.For ease of reference, Torrevillas criminal cases are

particularized as follows:

Criminal Case

No.

Dates of

Commission

Main

Documents

Falsified

Items

Allegedly

Purchased

Amount of

Fraud

2855 June 1, 1977 upto June 30,

1977

1. Request forAllocation ofAllotment 101-10-186-76; 10-190-76; 10-192-76; 10-188-76; 10-180-76;2. GeneralVoucher No. B-

613;3. Check No.9403099;

153.63 m. t. ofitem 310 for usein asphalting ofthe Toledo-Tabuelan roadfrom Km.108.34 to Km.109.52

PhP 48,431.85

2856 June 1, 1977 upto June 30,