art and epistmology

8/11/2019 Art and Epistmology

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Art and Epistmology

The relationship between art and epistemology has been forever tenuous and fraught with much

debate. It seems fairly obvious that we gain something meaningful from experiences and interactions

with works of art. It does not seem so obvious whether or not the experiences we have with art can

produce propositional knowledge that is constituted by true justified belief. In what follows I will givesome historical background on the debate and flesh out some of the important issues surrounding

the question (What) can we learn from art?

Table of Contents

Introduction

Plato and Aristotle

Rationalists, Empiricists, and Romantics

Knowledge Claims about the Arts

Art and Moral Knowledge

Additional Objections

Conclusion

References and Further Reading

1. Introduction

While engaging objects aesthetically is both a perceptual and emotionally laden activity, it is also

fundamentally cognitive. As such, aesthetic engagement is wedded to a number of epistemological

concerns. For example, we commonly claim to know things about art, and we respect what critics say

about various genres of art. We say that we thought the play was good or bad, that the emotions itproduced were warranted, justified, manipulative, or appropriate. People commonly claim that they

learn from art, that art changes their perception of the world, and that art has an impact on the way

that they see and make sense of the world. It is also widely believed that works of art, especially

good works of art, can engender beliefs about the world and can, in turn, provide knowledge about

the world. But what is it exactly that we can know about art? What is it precisely that art can teach

us? Is there any sort of propositional content that art can provide which resembles the content that

we claim to need for other kinds of knowledge claims? These are the sorts of questions that frame

the debate about whether, and in what sense, art is cognitive.

2. Plato and Aristotle

The question whether or not we can learn from art goes as far back as Plato, as he warned about the

dangers of indulging in both mimetic and narrative representations of the world and of human

actions. The ensuing debate has endured in the contemporary philosophical literature and has

spurred the further question of how we can learn from art. The arguments both for and against the

notion that we can learn from art have developed as well. The debate is not any less complicated

than it was historically, nor is it any closer to being resolved.

There are two extreme positions that one could take in answer to the question, Can we learn from

art? Either we can, and do, learn from art, or we cannot in any meaningful sense attain knowledge

that is non-propositional. Those who argue that we can learn from art generally argue that our

engagement with art arouses certain emotions or activities that are able to facilitate or produce


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knowledge. They would argue that there is some aspect of the artwork which can help to produce

greater understanding of the world around us. Art is thus seen as a source of insight and awareness

that cannot be put into propositional language; but it can help us to see the world in a new or

different way.

Those who deny that we can learn from art often argue that there can be no knowledge that is notpropositionally-based knowledge. Jerome Stolnitz, for example, claims in a 1992 article that art does

not and cannot contribute to knowledge primarily because it does not generate any sort of truths.

Those who argue this line want to defend the notion that since art cannot provide facts or generate

arguments, then we cannot learn from it. Further, those who believe we cannot learn from art argue

that art cannot be understood as a source of knowledge because it is not productive of knowledge,

taken in the traditional sense of justified true belief. Art does not have propositional content that can

be learned in a traditional way, even though it can been seen to have effects that promote

knowledge and that can either encourage or undermine the development of understanding. Art can

thus be rejected as a source of knowledge because it does not provide true beliefs, and because it

does not and cannot justify the beliefs that it does convey. Both extremes agree that if art can be

seen as a source of knowledge, the only way that it could possibly fulfill such a function would be if

that knowledge reflected something essential to arts nature and value.

Plato points out in the Republic (595-601) that it is possible to make a representation of something

without having knowledge of the thing represented. Painters represent cobblers when the painters

have no knowledge of shoemaking themselves, and poets write about beauty and courage without

necessarily having any clear knowledge of these virtues. Only philosophers, the lovers of wisdom,

and especially those who strive to intuit the Forms and employ abstract reasoning, can really have

knowledge of these virtues. Artists mislead their viewers into thinking that knowledge lies in the

represented (mimetic) object. Platos concern in the Republic extends to the literary arts in

particular, which are created with the express purpose to move us emotionally in such a way that

ones character could be corrupted (605-608). The more one indulges in emotions aroused by

representation, according to Plato, the more likely one is to suffer the effects of an unbalanced soul,

and ultimately the development of a bad character.

Aristotle agreed with Plato that art could indeed influence the development of ones moral

character. While Plato thought that we can learn from art and that it is detrimental to ones

character, however, Aristotle argued that indulging in the same mimetic emotions that Plato warned

us of can actually benefit ones character by producing an emotional catharsis (Poetics 1449b24-29).

By purging the tragic emotions in particular, Aristotle held, one has a better chance of being more

rational in everyday life. Thus, while both philosophers believed that we learn from art, one (Plato)

argued that the knowledge gained was detrimental while the other (Aristotle) argued that it was

beneficial.

3. Rationalists, Empiricists, and Romantics

Continuing with the line of argument Aristotle began, all the way through the Renaissance and

beyond, philosophers have defended the notion that we can learn from art, and that poetry and

fiction engage the emotions in a helpful, rather than detrimental, way. The Romantics dealt with this

question in a manner that the earlier rationalists and empiricists did not. The rationalists rejected the

idea that the imagination could be considered a source of knowledge, with Descartes going so far as


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be taken as an account of true events, with responses following as if the events depicted therein

were actually happening or had happened, does not solve the problem. For one thing, not all

emotional responses to real events are taken as equally justified. For another, most novels are not

meant to be taken as true (despite the report model of emotive response *see Matravers 1997+).

The fact that we do respond emotively to art, and to fiction in particular, would seem to indicate that

there is something in the artwork that is worth responding to, even if it is not the same thing

possessed by the objects we respond to outside the art world.

The third kind of knowledge claim we can have about art concerns the sort of information art can

provide about the world. That is, how is it that we can gain real knowledge from fictional or non-real

events or activities? It is widely accepted that art does, in fact, convey important insight into the way

we order and understand the world. It is also widely acknowledged that art gives a certain degree of

meaning to our lives. Art, and literature in particular, can elicit new beliefs and even new knowledge

about the world. But the concern is this: fiction is not produced in a way that is reflective of the

world as it actually is. It might be quite dangerous, in fact, for one to obtain knowledge about human

affairs only from fiction. For example, it could be downright unhealthy for me to get my sense of

what it is like to be in love from romance novels alone.

We can easily be experientially misled by art. The so-called empathic beliefs, those we gain from

experiencing art, should be based on and enhanced by our broader experience of the world and

should not arise independently of our other beliefs. But here the problem of justification returns.

That is, if the empathic beliefs we gain from our experience of art actually coincide with our

experience of the real world, then they can pass as empathic knowledge (that is, beliefs become true

and justified when they are connected to other justified beliefs). The problem is that often the

emotions and beliefs that we adopt empathically turn out to be temporary, since they are not

grounded in concrete experience. Can the experience we have with a work of art be confirming in

and of itself, or must there be another, external authority to make the experience, or at least the

knowledge gained from the experience, legitimate? It seems that much of what we learn about the

world does come from art, and thus the justificatory claims to knowledge must be reconsidered.

The propositional theory of knowledge holds that one must have justified true belief in the content

of a proposition in order to have knowledge. This appears reasonable under normal circumstances,

but seems not to work at all in the case of art. It seems odd, in fact, to hold that in order to show that

one has learned from a work of fiction, one must show that the work has propositional content of a

general or philosophical nature, or that it provides experience that cannot be gained in any other

way. If we can learn from art, we must be able to do so in a manner that diverges from the

traditional notion of justified true belief, but that still holds some sort of legitimate ground.

What kind of justification is needed to ground these potential knowledge claims that art provides?

First of all, we must be at least somewhat aware of what the new knowledge consists of. Moreover,

ones engagement with the artwork should provide at least some degree of justification (e.g., I feel

pity for Anna Karenina because she is in an unfortunate set of circumstances that she feels she has

no control over. I am justified in my emotional response to her if I can see that she is in a truly

pitiable situation). It is important to distinguish learning from art from merely being affected or

influenced by it, or even from being challenged by it. Accounts of knowledge provided by art should

be able to identify clearly what it is about the artwork itself, qua artwork, which prompts knowledge.


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A cognitivist account in particular will require first that the content of the work be specifiable (what

is it we learn?); second, that the demands for justification be respected; and third, that these

accounts appeal directly to aesthetic experience (Freeland 1997).

5. Art and Moral Knowledge

It would seem that there is indeed something about the content of an artwork that can be said to be

knowledge-producing. But how can that be so? The artist himself or herself is not the ultimate

authority here, since his/her knowledge or expertise is not necessarily directly transferred into the

artwork. Furthermore, even if it were capable of being transferred clearly, it is not always the case

that observers will interpret the meaning or significance of a work of art in any standard way. What

the artist knows and how others experience his/her art are not directly related enough to justify

epistemic legitimacy. It also seems unjustified to assume that there are intrinsic features of an

artwork that are always clearly identifiable. So the knowledge we gain from art has more to do with

the relationship between the art object and the consumer than anything else.

Another way we might argue for the possibility of gaining knowledge from art is by rejecting the

justified true belief account of knowledge. There might be more than one way to know, in other

words, and more than one way to learn. One of the most common alternative suggestions

concerning the knowledge that art elicits is that it is moral knowledge that we gain. These arguments

are based primarily of the presumption that art, and literature especially, can provide experiential

and emotional stimulation, and that moral knowledge is not simply propositional in nature. It has

been objected, however, that such stimulation is not equal to the propositional content that more

traditional forms of knowledge can provide.

Eileen John (2001) identifies two arguments for the claim that moral knowledge can be gained fromart. The first argument stresses the capacity of art to give us examples of, and exercise in, certain

morally pertinent activities. Thus, we come across circumstances and situations in art and literature

that we might not otherwise come across in our daily lives. If we simulate our own reactions to the

situations the work presents us with, we have an idea of how we might respond or how we would

feel (see especially Kendall Waltons theory of Make-Believe and Simulation Theory). On this view,

works of art can provide us with simulated or off-line emotional responses that could not be

achieved otherwise.

The second argument is based on the assumption that we can acquire specific substantive moral

knowledge from art. That is, works of art are taken to possess the ability to give us imaginative andepistemic access to certain kinds of experiences relevant to moral knowledge and judgment. Not only

can we respond emotionally to particular moral situations presented through artworks; we cannot

help but find ourselves morally outraged or saddened by the plights of certain fictional characters.

6. Additional Objections

Nol Carroll (2002) lays out three additional objections to the suggestion that art can provide

knowledge. The first objection he calls the banality argument: the idea that the significant truths

that many claim art and literature may affordthat is, general truths about life, usually of an implied

nature (as opposed to what is true in the fiction)are in the main, trivial. Compared to the

knowledge we are able to obtain from propositional statements and arguments, the kind of things


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works of literature are can point out are so obvious as to be useless. Carroll continues by stating that

art and knowledge are not sources of moral knowledge, but, at best, occasions for activating

antecedently possessed knowledge. The best it seems that art and literature can do is to point out

things we already know and believe.

The second objection Carroll outlines against the notion that we can learn from art is what he callsthe no-evidence argument. This focuses on the fact that not only is anything we gain from art and

literature banal, but for any knowledge to be legitimate, it needs to be warranted and must be

supported by evidence. Few artworks, however, supply any evidence at all in defense of a particular

view. One of the reasons interpretations seem to legitimately vary so widely is precisely due to this

lack of solid evidence. Moreover, fiction is not a reliable source of evidence when it comes to

literature and other arts.

Carroll calls the third objection the no-argument argument. As he explains, it maintains that even

if artworks contained or implied general truths, neither the artworks themselves nor the critical

discourse that surrounds them engages in argument, analysis, and debate in defense of the allegedtruths. If artworks do indeed suggest any sort of knowledge, Carroll points out, it can only be

suggested or implied but never argued for or defended. Furthermore, the critical discourse that

surrounds artworks is not generally focused on arguing for or against any of the claims made in the

artwork itself.

7. Conclusion

The fact that we do respond to works of art, and that we commonly believe we can and do learn

from such works, is not enough to justify that learning actually occurs. However, it is enough to make

us examine our presuppositions about what constitutes knowledge, and perhaps may lead us toreconceive knowledge in such a way that we may eventually come to understand how it can be

gained non-propositionally.

art and epistmology

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