army aviation digest - dec 1972

7/27/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1972

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US RLSCI SUPPORT CENTERPOBOX 620577

fORT RUCKER L 36362 0577UNITED ST TES ARMY DECEM ER 97VIATION GEST


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UNITE

OF ARMY AVIATION, ACSFOROF THE ARMY

BG William J. Maddox Jr.

U. S. ARMY AVIATIONMG Allen M. Burdett Jr.

COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATIONCOL Earl W. Fletcher

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTRichard K Tierney

ABOUT THE COVERAs Army aviation celebrates its30th Christmas, Lieutenant General John J. Tolson takes a lookback and a look ahead. See page 2

j.

DECEMBER 1972 VOLUME 18

Views From ReadersThe New ChallengeAeromedic - DysbarismA Visit To ValhallaMaintenance Matters

NUMBER

An Approach To Aerial Command AndControl Training

First To Fail To FlyInstrument CornerAircraft Mine DeliveryRight Side Up Or Upside Down?Write To RightThat Frigid Old Man . Is Here AgainPearl'sDemonstrations Of Flying Skill?Static Displays And AR 360-61USAASO Sez

The mission of the U S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an opt ional or functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention, traimaintenance, operations, research and development, aviation medicine, and othelated data.The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly uthe supervision of the Commandant, U S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed hare not necessarily those of Department of the Army or the U S. Army Aviation ScPhotos are U S. Army unless otherwise specified. Material may be reprinted provcredit is given to the DIGEST and to the author, unless otherwise indicated.Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct commution is authorized to: Editor, U S. Army Aviation Digest, Fort Rucker, Ala. 36360.Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Headquarters , Dement of the Army, 1 October 1970.Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system aslined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-4 and send directly to CO AG Publicationster, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Md. 21220. For any change in distribution reqments, initiate a revised DA Form 12-4.National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should suDA Form 12-4. Other National Guard units should submit requests through their adjutants general.For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies ofDIGEST paid subscriptions, 4 .50 domestic and 5.50 overseas, are available from

Superintendent of Documents, U S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D C 2


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JEWSROME DERS

ir:t was noted with interest the article

entitled Another Helicopter Conceptin your April 1972 issue.This is not a new concept to theArmy. A system was designed by theU. S Army Weapons Command andcontractor who became combat operational in RVN in the latter months of1968. The system utilized eight 40 mmXM-129 grenade launchers firing downward from the bombay of a modifiedNavy P2V Neptune. The modified planewas a platform for and included operation of other Navy gear. Personalknowledge resulting from a trip toRVN by this writer in early 1969showed the system to be a unique concept of firepower yielding extremelyfavorable results. Upon returning toCONUS, an effort was undertaken todesign a similar downfire system for theArmy utilizing armored Chinooks (seephotograph). With the capabilities ofthe CH-47, a concept of 16 to 20launchers was envisioned. As anexample, assume a speed of 175 knotsat 100 feet altitude. The launchers areset at fixed angles firing through portsin the bottom of the hip so that theburst pattern overlaps to give saturationlevels depending upon the altitude. The20 weapons firing at the rate of 8,000SPM would yield a swath 340 feet widefor a length of 11,800 feet. The implications are apparent. As a safety factor,a rear firing .50 caliber was to be used.Since the system was already combatproven, the weapon control and ammocontainer all designed and built, and theaircraft existing, the effort to marry upthe two was considered to be minimal incost to achieve a prototype.

John S HathawayMech Engr TechRock Island, L 61201

DECEMBER 1972

Sir:I would like to share a point thatrelates both to CPT William D.Bristow's article, On Fire And GoingDown (DIGEST, May 1971) and tomy article The Extra Step (DIGEST,September 1972).The day Dave Bri tow went down inflames brings out the point I was tryingto make through my article. On thatday Dave was flying one of my aircraft

and had borrowed my chicken plate.As you will recall from his article,Dave's aircraft was completely engulfedby flames as soon as it touched down,and the crew escaped with minor burns.However, the only urvival equipmentthey had was the gear secured to mychicken plate. The undergrowth was sothick rescue aircraft did not see the

Continued o page 7


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The N ew ChallengeA new era of Army aviation is upon us. We now have air-minded,airmobile commanders with extensive combat experience in Vietnam behind them. They will never be satisfied without a ThreeDimension Army, which they will adapt to situations facing them

ARMY AVIATION celebratesits 30th Christmas this monthstanding at the threshold of a newera. This is signaled by the redistribution of Army aircraft in the wakeof the winddown in the Republicof Vietnam. Other actions also arebeing taken to assure that Armyaviat ion s full potential will beavailable and ready for any futureconflict.

The mission of Army aviationto support the ground soldier-wasput to the ultimate test in Vietnamand became essenti l to the Army srole in conducting land combat. In

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Lieutenant General John J. TolsonDeputy Commanding GeneralUnited States Continental Army Command

fact, Army aviation has added thethird dimension to the functions ofland combat, as illustrated infigure 1.There was a rapid increase in

the number of Army aviation unitsin Vietnam between fiscal years1965 and 1969-1970. An evensharper decrease occurred thereafter (figure 2). As you can see,Army aviation grew into a veritablegiant by 1969 and has since wounddown as the U. S disengages inthat theater.As our combat role ceases, wemust focus on the future of Army

aVlatIOn Certainly the main concern for Army aviation is the midto high-intensity European battlefield. In this connection we musask ourselves what is the best mixof Army units to be employedagainst a future adversary? We donot yet have the answers to thesequestions. However, when tests othe TRICAP Division and otheMASSTER evaluations at FtHood , TX, are completed, weshould have learned considerablymore on how Army aviation canoperate and survive in a midintensity conflict.

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Command &Control

Logistics

To fill the personnel requireents generated by the tremendousthat Army aviation hasndergone over the past decade,ore than 32,000 aviators wererained. The Army s aviatorreached its peak in 1969-1970 when the -total on active duty24,000.The drawdown in Vietnam hasesulted in the rapid redistributionaircraft assets throughassetsthe UH-IH, OH-58, R1G, CH-54A/ B and CH-47B/ Care being assigned to meet mostequirements. As an example,1,097 new production and overaul aircraft have been assigned to

he Continental Army CommandCON ARC) during the past fiscal

year. These qualitative improvements have enabled us to eliminate1,288 older, obsolete and nonstandard types of aircraft from ourinventory (fixed wing-types includehe 0-1, U-6, U-1A, U-10, C-45and C-47; rotary wing types are

This article was adaptedfrom a speech recentlydelivered by LTG Tolson

DECEMBER 1972

Reconnaissance Maneuver Firepower

g

>

Figure 1

the OH-13 , OH-23, UH-1B/ C/ M,UH-ID, CH-54 and TH-55).Essentially this is a modernization program through which whope to tidy up the system byminimizing the number and typesof aircraft and by phasing out lowdensity types as well as the oldernonstandard aircraft. We expect to

standardize our light observationhelicopters with OH-58s; ourattack helicopters with AH-1 Gsour CH-47 fleet with CH-47B / Csand our Huey fleet with UH-1Hs.Along with the reduction of wartime activity in Vietnam comes areduction in funding. We in theContinued o page 5

Figure 2AviationCompanyTroop Battery

Aviation Units In Vietnam150 144 138

1 0 0 r ____ ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

- - 4 _ - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - _ ~

30

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972End Fiscal Year


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ThIs Is the first in a .series ofthree articles about the ef-. feds of chaDgiDg baro-metric pressure onthe humanbody

DysbarismLTC Nicholas E Barreca, M.D.

Provided by the Society of U. S. Army Flight Surgeons

AT FIRST GLANCE one might be inclined tothink this will be a discuss ion about an emotionchoked courtroom drama or perhaps barroom brawling. Once again, however, medical linguistics areresponsible for the mind lurching gaggle of alph abeticperplexity. What then is this dysbarism ? By definition, it is the manifested effects of changing barometric pressure upon the hum n body (providinghypoxia is excluded). This term encompasses a largespectrum of environmental stresses and potentiallyharmful, often painful conditions that may be experienced when one engages the skies or seas.For clarity, dysbarism may be divided into twotypes that due to trapped gases and that due toevolved gases (see figure 1 . The trapped gas dysbar

isms are familiar to all of us and include ear blockssinus blocks dental pain and belly pain. The evolvedgas dysbarisms are less familiar , often being referredto as decompression sickness, and include the bendschokes creeps and crumps.In this first in a series of three articles the trappedgas dysbarisms will be discussed. The second articlewill concentrate on the evolved gas dysbarisms. Afinal article will relate some recent Army experiencewith this less common type of dysbarism.n order to get the right perspective on trapped

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gas dysbarism, let s place ourselves in the flying environment for a moment. A young, healthy, fit aviator friend of ours is returning from an observatiomission in an OH -6A. He is flying to a refueling anstaging area at 4,000 feet to keep out of the range osm all arms fire , knowing the enemy has no heavstuff in the area. Upon arrival he begins a steep anfast spir aling descent to avoid any local enemy inteference. At around 50 feet he notices fullness anpain in his left ear. As he levels off, attempting tclear his ears, he feels a spinning sensation and settleto a landing before losing control of the aircraft.What could have happened to this aviator in lesthan 4,000 feet of altitude? Army air crewmen donhave to worry about pressure changes; they fly lowand slow, right? Or do they?Let s take a look then at the changes in pressurinvolved. Boyle s Law states that the volume of a drgas is inversely proportional to the pressure providintemperature remains constant. Thus, as the barometric pressure decreases (increases) , the volume oa given amount of gas will increase (decrease). Agiven parcel of dry air at ground level will then expand as it ascends in altitude due to the decrease ipressure so that at about 18,000 feet it could occuptwice its original volume (see figure 2 . In the abov

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experienced a pressure differentialabout 100 mmHg. Since his body tissaturated with water vapor at constantwas even greater thanwill be discussed below, this changeis more than sufficient to produce prob

as barotrauma are causedand contraction of gases in accordnce with Boyle s Law, and result in igns and sympears, sinuses, teeth and gastrointestinalYour flight surgeon has perhaps bedazzled youfor the barotrauma (trapped gasysbarisms) such as barotitis or aerotitis media forear block, barosinusitis or aerosinusitis forinus block, barodontalgia or aerodontalgia for dentalpain and finally abdominal distension or gas expanion for belly pain. Don t let these terms fool youthough. They all refer to the same conditions. (Flight

surgeons need to keep their nimble minds alert , sothey have established certain word games.) With alittle bit of effort one can break the code and becomequite knowledgeable about the trapped gas dysbarsms. Let s take them one at a time.Ear block: The barotrauma known as barotitis oraerotitis media is caused by failure to equalizepressures in the limited and confined space of themiddle ear when it is subjected to changes in altitude.The middle ears serve primarily as mechanical ampliiers for our hearing mechanism. Anatomy Look at the structure of the humanear (see figure 3A . The confined air space of themiddle ear behind the eardrum opens to outside aironly through the Eustachian tube. This tube enablesthe air of the middle ear to exchange with outside airat the back of the nose near the throat (flight surgeonscall this area the nasopharynx). When the pressurebetween the outside and the middle ear is equalized,the Eustachian tube stays closed. This is because partof the Eustachian tube acts like a flapper valve. The

Figure 1DYSBARISM

Trapped Gas Evolved Gas

Ear Block Bendsaerot i t is . barotitis

Sin u s Block Chokesaerosinusitis , borosinusitis Dental Pain Creepsaerodontalg ia , barodontalg ia Belly Pain Crumpsabdom inal gas ex pans io n

or distension

DECEMBER 1972

first third of its length is located in bone, thus it isalways open. The remaining two-thirds is located insoft body tis ues and is lined with cartilage (like thatstiff stuff in the tip of your nose). Thus, it is normallyclosed unless the pressure in the middle ear is relatively greater than outside or muscles in the nasopharynx pull the end of the tube down and apart. Normal flying As one goes up in altitude, thebarometric pressure decreases, and the air inside themiddle ear tends to increase in volume. Thus, thepressure in the middle ear begins to increase andtends to bulge out the eardrum before the Eustachiantube is forced open. At about 500 feet or a differentialpressure of 5 mmHg the Eustachian tube opens, airescapes the middle ear and the pressure is aboutequalized. As one continues to ascend the Eustachiantube continues to flap open and closed about every425 feet to maintain pressure equalization. (This isproviding you do nothing active to assist equalization

and have no colds or ear abnormalities.) On descentpotential trouble starts (see figure 3B). The pressureof the air inside the ear is decreased relative to theoutside. Thus, the eardrum is drawn into (becomesretracted) the middle ear. In order to equalize thepressure the Eustachian tube mu t be opened activelyand outside air flows or is forced into it. I f for somereason the tube won t open, then the middle earbecomes blocked and pain starts. Relief On ascent no special relief is usually required. On descent, however, your active participation is required. When the Eustachian tube becomesblocked pain will develop when a 50 mmHg differential of pressure exists across the eardrum. Prior to

Figure 2DRY GAS EXPANSION WITH ALTITUDE

50 ,000 87 i\ 48 ,280 8 Volumes42 , 5 6 Volumes

40 .000 4 \ 33.750 4 Volumes30 ,000 226 \0 ,000 350 7 ,962 2 Volumes10,000 523 S . V . ~760

.:..Altitude Barometric 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 760

teet PressuremmHg Altitude Pressure Curve

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this there is a sensation of fullness in the ear. f theblock persists and you continue to descend, thepressure differential will increase. At 80 to 90 mmHgdifference the Eustachian tube is shut so forcefullyby outside air pressure that no manner of voluntaryaction on your part will open it. Relief will come onlyby ascent to a higher altitude. Before reaching thepoint of a "locked" ear block, you can equalize thepressure and relieve the pain by a number of maneuvers. Early this can be accomplished by swallowing,yawning and jutting the jaws out or sideways. Thisactivates three muscles (see figure 3C) in the nasopharynx which pull the opening of the Eustachiantube down and apart. (One can practice the use ofthe muscles for they tighten the throat and the softpalate-try just moving these ) Another procedurefor clearing the ears is by using the Valsalva maneu-ver This maneuver is performed by every air crewman when he takes a flight physical. The flight surgeon says, "Pop your ears" or "Do a Valsalva" whilehe looks at the eardrum through an otoscope (earscope). The air crewman pinches his nose, closeshis mouth tightly and forces air from his lungs intothe closed space of the nasopharynx. This forces airunder pressure up into the Eustachian tubes. Thesame maneuver can be used in flight to clear an earblock. A similar maneuver (the Frenzel) is a modification of the Valsalva and is frequently used toaccomplish the same effect. n this maneuver theepiglottis (valve-like door cover to the lungs whichcloses when swallowing liquids or solids) is closed,shutting off the lung ; the nose and mouth are thesame, but the muscles in the floor of the mouth andthroat are used to build up pressure. This also activates the muscles that open the Eustachian tube. Thecombination of these maneuvers will relieve even apainful ear block. f an ear block is not relieved andthe pressure differential goes beyond 90 to 100mmHg perforation of the drum may occur. There areother maneuvers which can be used to clear earblocks that are good to know when carrying passengers, especially children. Gum chewing or soda drinking tends to activate the muscles that affect theEustachian tube opening. Blowing up a balloon willsimulate the Valsalva maneuver to some extent. Anyone flying commercially with youngsters will appreciate these methods.

Pain After a painful ear block occurs, regardless of how mild or whether or not it has apparentlyresolved, the flight surgeon should be consulted. Amild ear block, if it produces pain , will probablyresult in redness of the eardrum. A more serious earblock, especially if incompletely or not promptlycleared, will result in redness and retraction of theeardrum. n addition fluid and/or blood may collect6

Figure 3

A PRESSURES EQUALIZED

B UNEQUAL DESCENT)

C VOLUNTARY CLEARING

u

in the middle ear. This will normally be associatedwith noticeable but usually temporary hearing loss.Finally, the most severe type of ear block may resultin rupture of the eardrum. Ear blocks are a commoncause of noneffectiveness DNIF) among air crewmen being the most common medically attendedtrapped gas dysbarism. They are especially prone tohappen to individuals who are nursing along a professionally untreated, mild to moderate common cold.U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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as a result of

as allergy, excessive tonsillar tissue orThe word of advice? see your flight sur

Prevention-The key to prevention is the knowlis at least a 100 mmHg

evel the differentialis at least 50 mmHg, sufficient to producenot cleared periodically duringis ample opportunityven the low and slow flying Army air crewman

He apparently failed to adeas a result of

t resulted in an ear blockbe discussed beis in your hands. First,

f the Valsalva maneuver is used it should not be

So the ma

is time to ascend. Go to a higher altitudeis relieved, then descend slowly.Second, do not fly with a common cold m t t e ror the active stage of an allergic condition.For the slightly snifit is easy to be lulled into complacency when

or no difficulty is experienced on ascent. Reember though, it's on descent that serious troubleis likely to start. Finally, seek your fHght surgeon'sadvice early when an ear block occurs. Do not useEar drops have little place in thetreatment of ear blocks. Never stick anything morethan a finger tip in your ear. Not even a cotton-tipapplicator, especially not a bobby pin. f you suspectimpacted wax as a culprit, then discuss it with yourlight surgeon.

Treatment-Sometimes with a mild cold unaccompanied by the blahs, your flight surgeon mayDECEM ER 1972

permit you to fly with certain decongestant inhalers,drops, sprays or pills, which do not preclude safeflying when they are taken under aeromedical supervision. This not only reduces noneffectiveness fromDNIF but ensures prevention. However, if the flightsurgeon feels you must be restricted, don't balk. Heusually must use drugs that are incompatible withsafe flying. Further he may be trying to keep youfrom complications [such as an infected middle ear( otitis media ) or perforation of the drum]. Theseconditions can result in even greater noneffectivenessand prolonged medical restriction, even suspension.

ssociated phenomena-There is a conditionknown as alternobaric or pressure vertigo that issometimes associated with sudden and large pressureFigure

P IRED IR SINUSES

changes in the middle ear during ascent or descent.The vertigo is due to the fact that . the semicircularcanals of the inner ear (see figure 3A, Balance )lie in close proximity to the middle ear. This phenomena can lead to catastrophic consequences.Again, recall the pilot above who experienced aspinning sensation as he pulled out at 50 feet. Thismay have been pressure vertigo. Another conditionof which we should be mindful is the 100 percentoxygen absorption type of ear block (known-as secondary or delayed aerotitis/ barotitis media). Thisoccurs ,frequently after an aircraft or altitude chamber flight requiring the use of oxygen. During the


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course of the flight 100 percent oxygen diffuses intothe middle ear during clearing. Upon return toground level, any residual oxygen is absorbed intothe circulation of the middle ear. Since little or nonitrogen is available, it is as if one descended inaltitude. The pressure in the middle ear drops, theeardrum retracts and fluid begins to accumulate. fan individual goes to sleep or is inactive after aflight, this is more likely to occur. He then awakenswith slight hearing loss and bubbles in his ears.Usually this clears rapidly, but sometimes requires aflight surgeon's assistance. It can often be avoided ifthe individual clears his ears actively and remainsphysically active for several hours after the flight.The use of a diluted oxygen setting (normal oxygen)or mask removal below 10,000 feet will also decreasethe likelihood that oxygen will remain in the middleear.Sinus block The barotrauma known as barosinusitisor aerosinusitis is caused by failure to equalize pres-sure in anyone of the four paired, boney air sinusesin the skull. These sinuses serve to humidify andwarm air as it is breathed.

Anatomy The air sinuses, of which there areeight (four on each side), are rigid walled spacesencased in the bones of the skull (see figure 4). Eachsinus communicates with the internal passages of thenose by way of a small opening (your friendly frightscourgeon calls this an ostium or orifice). Throughthese openings the sinuses equalize their internal airpressures with the outside. The openings are short(except the ones leading from the frontal sinuses)and rigid. Thus, the size of these passageways cannotbe voluntarily affected (as with the Eustachian tube).All the sinuses are lined by soft tissues similar tothose which line the nasal passages. ormal fiying A one ascends or descends inaltitude, barometric pressure changes are equalizedwhen air escapes from or returns to the sinusesthrough the sinus openings. No special efforts arenormally required on the part of an air crewman toaffect this equalization of pressures. Pain The first definite sign of a sinus block issudden pain. This mayor may not be preceded bydiscomfort or pressure over the involved sinus.Thankfully, nonefIectiveness due to sinus blocks isnot as common as from ear blocks 7 to 8 timesmore common). Sinus blocks often occur in individ-uals with some predisposing condition; e.g., an upperrespiratory infection, common cold, acute allergy orhay fever, nasal septal deviations or tumors. Painoccurs most commonly on descent. t results whenthe sinus opening becomes obstructed from the out-side in by tissue or swelling. Outside pressure is thentransmitted to the sinus cavity through the soft tissues

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creating a relative vacuum. The lining of the sinus be-comes red and swollen and the cavity starts to fillwith fluid. Sometimes a blood blister or hematomaforms under the lining. A sinus block can sometimesoccur on ascent. This happens if the sinus opening be-comes blocked from the inside out by tissue obstruc-tion of some kind. The most common sinus to blockis one of the frontal sinuses. Pain due to this blockwould thus be over one of the eyes. Sometimes thisskin over the sinus becomes reddened. The next mostcommon is one of the maxillary sinuses. Pain from

Altitudein feet

Figure

arometricressure

in mm Q

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this block would normally be below the eyes, butmay travel above or in the eye or to the upper teeth.The ethmoid and sphenoid sinuses are less commonly involved. Pain from these blocks would normally be at the bridge of the nose or over the scalp.Prevention Most important, don t fly with acold or upper respiratory infection especially not

with a history of allergy. f a sinus block occurs, assoon as safely possible ascend to an altitude at whichthe pain is relieved. Level off for a few minutes anduse a nasal inhaler or spray if available. Then descend slowly. Upon return to ground level see theflight surgeon as soon as possible. f a block occurson ascent then reverse the procedure but do not continue with the flight. Return to ground level and seethe flight surgeon. Treatment The treatment for sinus blocks requires a period of medical restriction from flyingduty. t is extremely important to follow the flight surgeon s advice and treatment to the letter. Even afterreturn to flying duty, an air crewman should be alertto the recurrence of symptoms such as discomfort,pressure or drainage. Sometimes a sinus hematomais not easily detected when a block first occurs. Recurrent symptoms may indicate its presence, so bringthem to the flight surgeon s attention as soon as possible rather than risk further complications andlengthy medical restriction from flying duty.Dental pain: This may be associated with changes inbarometric pressure on occasion. f such pain trulyarises from a dental abnormality it is known as barodontalgia or aerodontalgia. The condition was oncethought to be the result of air pockets under fillingsand thus was truly considered a barotrauma due tothe expansion or contraction of trapped gas. However, this view is no longer considered valid. In alllikelihood the condition results from large deepseated fillings which are unlined and various degreesof inflammation or degeneration of the tooth pulp.The latter is probably the more common and represents an early stage in a condition which would ultimately cause toothache at ground level. The resultantpain felt in the teeth or jaws is seldom incapacitating.

Prevention Good dental hygiene is essential,but more important is preventive dental treatment.This requires periodic dental cleaning to avoid gumdisease ,as well as early treatment of dental decay. Treatment Note the effect of altitude changeon the intensity of pain. The pain can occur on ascentor descent, thus reversal of altitude should result inrelief. Upon return to ground level report directly tothe flight surgeon. Not infrequently, dental pain maybe referred from a sinus block. This must be ruledout by the flight surgeon before referral to the dentist.Belly pain: This form of barotrauma, known as ab-DECEMBER 1972

dominal gas expansion or abdominal distension, frequently results in discomfort on flights above 10,000feet. Most individuals normally have from i 0 to 2of liter of gas in the gastrointestinal tract. Most ofthis gas is swallowed air but some results from thedecomposition of foodstuffs and other sources. Asone ascends in altitude this gas expands and can exertpainful pressure against body organs (see figure 5 .The pain usually begins at about 15,000 feet, but atand above 30,000 feet it can become severe and incapacitating. The distension at these altitudes can begreat enough to interfere with respiration. This notinfrequently occurs in altitude chamber operationsfrom excessive air swallowing while breathing onoxygen systems, or due to dietary indiscretion or selfimposed social constraints.

Prevention In most circumstances an effectivemeasure is control and selection of dietary intake.Foods likely to produce gas or intestinal irritationshould be avoided, particularly those which haveproven to be troublesome in the past. Common culprits are unripened fruit , cabbage, sauerkraut, cauliflower, beans, peas, cucumbers, brussel sprouts, highroughage foods (celery, etc.) , spices and carbonatedbeverages. Hurried bolting of meals and gulping ofliquids also predisposes to air swallowing as doesgum chewing. These conditions should be avoidedwhen higher altitude flights are anticipated. Once inflight frequent belching, passing of flatus and loosening of clothing will prevent discomfort. Some individuals, being overly conscious of social amenities,restrain these normal reflexes , but are soon regretful.Familiarity with oxygen equipment and its use, aswell as experience with clearing of ears under theseconditions, will decrease the extent of air swallowing.This is another good reason for altitude chamberindoctrination of air crews.

Treatment Usually preventive measures are allthat are required. In some individuals a chronicproblem exists due to excessive gas production or airswallowing. These individuals are sometimes relievedwith the use of a defoaming agent called simethicone.Tablets of this drug can be chewed and swallowedwithout side effects. t sometimes permits gas to bemore easily dealt with by normal reflexes.Changing barometric pressure, particularly ifrapid, can cause discomfort and pain from thetrapped gas dysbarisms. Knowledge of the mechanisms of their occurrence is the best form of prevention. It permits the air crewman to cope effectivelywith relatively minor stresses which could interferewith mission completion and efficiency. Further, itreduces the likelihood that unnecessary flying noneffectiveness win result from prolonged medical restriction from flying duty.

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alhallaThe Valkyries began their escort missions for the guests of thisfirst symposium ever at Valhalla. The meeting s a seminar affairbetween the air people of the world and the permanent tenants-those who have passed into Valhalla. The most often heard remarkfrom the tenants was, I wish I had that last decision back

MOST OF TODAY'S well-in-formed people know thatValhalla is the great hall whereOdin receives and feasts the soulsof heroes slain in battle. What mostpeople don't know is that there isa special room of the great hallreserved for that special kind ofpeople who have danced the skieson silvered wings and trod the highuntrespassed sanctity of space. Thetitle over the door of that specialroom is simply labeled Airman ofthe Universe.

There is great excitement in theair as chairman Leonardo da Vinciand his various committees preparefor the first symposium of its kindever to be held. The meeting is aseminar affair between the airpeople of the world and those whohave passed beyond the gates ofValhalla permanently.

With battles being plentifultoday and aviation accidents farmore than necessary, the seminar isan invitation only affair sincethe Valkyries (maidens of Odinwho conduct the souls of heroesslain in battle to Valhalla) are cutpretty short in doing their assignedtasks. The thing that brought theneed of such a meeting was the1

James H. Devlin, DACFlight Instructor

fact that things werc getting prettycrowded in the Airman of the Universe room and the tenants thereoffigured the overcrowding was unnecessary, as many of them nowwell knew.While working on the agenda ofsubiects to be covered during themeeting, the most often rcpeatedphrase heard was, I wish I hadthat last decision back, whereupon Odin advised them all oftheir status in Valhalla and,furthermore, th t st tus was irrevocable and permanent. With theretrospections out of the way thecommittee members returned to thepreparations for the soon-to-takeplace meeting.

The guest list included directorsof safety of all interested aviationa,gencies and :;;oecial ,gold-olqtedinvitations to directors of aviationaccident prevention research agencies. The gold-plated invitationswere intended as an inducement tobring along the accident reportsto the meeting without invokingthe privileged nature of the reports.After all. this meeting W(lS upto prevent accidents. wa sn't it? TheRSVPs from those keepers of therecords allayed anv fears in thatrespect. To a man the RSVPs in-

cluded the statement, That's whaour business is all about-prevention.With the great day of the meeting at hand, the Valkyries startedtheir escort missions to ValhallaThe first day of the meeting wasscheduled as an informal get together and a renew old friendships type of affair. Since therewas no cocktail bar set up (nopermitted by local regulation) , theactivity consisted mainly of conversation and hors d'oeuvres (whichhy mortal standards weren't toopalatable) .

The following day the meetingsta rted promptly at infinity minuX (which is how time is measuredin Valhalla) . With all of the accidcnt reports laid upon the tablefor any air accident that cver occurred, it would be extremelyhelpful in obtaining the before andafter picture of the entire accidentWhat is more important, it wouldpermit instant replay of the causfactors leading up to the decisionthat the accident experts wi sh theyhad back.Pistol Pete (who gained than i k n ~ m e for his tendency to gooff half cocked) was an ex-airlincaptain, age 40 plus infinity. He



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started off the seminar by recount-ing the hours of mortal time leadingup to the fateful decision he wishedhe had back. To begin with he hada misunderstanding with his wifebefore departing for the airport.Upon arrival at operations he wasassigned a substitute first officerwith whom he had never beforeflown. Next came the weather,which was WOXOF at departurepoint and destination, causing adelay.The forecaster s prognosticationcalled for slight improvementwithin the next couple of hours.appeared that it was just one ofthose days, as the aircraft did notcheck out on preflight causing theneed for a replacement aircraft.DECEMBER 1972

With the replacement aircraft ob-tained and checked, the steward-esses commenced loading a bunchof grumpy passengers. A few evenhad some unkind remarks for thecaptain when he boarded.As they approached the destina-tion at 0600Z and called for ap-proach clearance, air traffic control

ATC) advised them to hold withan expect approach clearance at0700Z. The terminal weatherwasn t all that good either, hover-ing right around minimums.After many trips around theracetrack, which did nothing toimprove Pete s disposition, theywere finally cleared for an ILSapproach. On the finai Pete hadtrouble keeping the glideslope

needle centered. Was it equipmentmalfunction or overreaction oncontrols and power? The aircraftcrashed just outside the middlemarker; there were no survivors.The findings of the board were

that engines were developing fullthrust, no indications of controlmalfunctions and that ILS equip-ment-both transmitter and re-ceiver-were functioning properly.The records of the captain indi-cated that he was a good pilot andrepeatedly passed the variousFederal Aviation Administrationand company flight checks withflying colors. As the captain wasgranted the floor and spoke, hisstatements probably revealed morcthan the myriad statements and


14/52

exhibits contained in the officialaccident report. He stated that onthat fateful day things seemed toirritate or bother me more thanusual and I just didn't seem tobe my good old jolly but professional self. The Valhalla resident psychiatrist/flight surgeonconcluded with the medical factthat no human being is the samephysical, mental or psychologicalindividual from day-to-day, weekto-week or for that matter fromhour-to-hour as he might think heis. Most individuals adjust orcompensate for these minor deviations from the norm either consciously or subconsciously. On thatfateful day Captain Pistol Pete didnot successfully adjust or compensate.Next on the agenda was thereport of a crash on takeoff in thevenerable and extremely reliableold Gooney Bird or C-47.Lieutenant Colonel Snuffy Smith(who gained that nickname because he was attempting to kickthe cigarette habit with the occasional use of snuff) was the aircraft commander. There was quitea delay as crewmember substitutions were made necessary bynonavailability of the originallyscheduled crew. t must be notedat this point that all substitutecrewmembers were consideredhighly qualified in their respectivepositions on the basis of past performance, hour level and checkride performance reports.

Once the crew was finally assembled, the tragedy starts to unfold. With a kick the tire and lightthe fire type preflight (not exactlyprofessional or consistent with regulations or directives on use ofestablished checklist for the typeaircraft being flown), the crewentered its last mortal door. Thenext one would be the door on theAirmen of the Universe room inValhalla.

Now in the instance of thechecklist for the C-47/ DC-3, it

12

gives the aircraft commander threechances at par for the course sincethe checklist states during walkaround inspection remove gustlocks, before entry to aircraftcount number of gust locks andprior to taking active runwaymove all controls through fullrange. The question might ariseamong the Monday morningquarterbacks as to why one ofthree required checks did not uncover the eventual culprit. The factis that these human individualsreverted to a very human trait ofsuccumbing to expediency in thatthev gave in to one of those twoinsidious cliches of fliers get-offitis and get-home-itis.

After cleared for takeoff theremainder of the accident report ismerely trivial since the moment ofimpact was already determined asa direct mathematical/time function of how fast the aircraft commander applied takeoff power. Thequestion comes up at this pointfrom one of the more recent inductees into Valhalla: Due to arash of landings a phrase wasadded to the Air Traffic Controller's Manual to the effect, 'Checkgear down and locked,' so why notanother amendment to the manualto include, 'Check controls throughfull movement or check gust locksremoved,' and after an affirmativeanswer reply, 'Cleared for takeoff'?Chairman Leonardo da Vinciopined that although he personallydid not have much experience withair traffic controllers since with allhis paintings, -aviation envisionments, mathematics, etc., he justhadn't gotten around to radio yet,that it just made good sense thatif just one 5 radio transmissioncould save many thousands ormillions of dollars and untoldhuman suffering, it would be farbetter odds than anyone could getin Las Vegas or Reno. Now, anyone knows that Leonardo had noconception of Las Vegas or Reno.

but he did have that rare forwardvision that could interpret the fullresults of his present actions.We sure could use more of thacapability in our day-to-day flightoperations, stated CINCUFO(Commander-in-Chief, Universa

Flight Operations). The lesson tobe learned in this accident is novision other than 20/ 20 in order tobe able to read and heed thechecklist

In the next case we encountera well-qualified civilian with commercial SMELS plus type ratingsCFIAI including rotorcraft. Let uscan him Joe Btsfle who, like theAl Capp character of Li'l Abnerfame, carries the proverbial cloudof doom with him wherever hegoes. This individual has everyrating in the book except gliderdirigible and balloon and that'sbecause he has this personal thingthat if he can't hear it purr orwhoosh I don't want to fly it.So be it, and as one literarygiant once stated, To each hisown. Back to the situation ahand, this individual was flying ona VFR business trip and accordingto ATC reports had reported flyingas high as 25 ,000 feet in order tostay out of clouds before requestingclearance back to his point of departure. After clearance back tohis point of departure, the accidenreport noted that the airplane disintegrated in an uncontrolled diveto the ground with all personsaboard becoming permanent residents of Valhalla.The accident report indicatedthat the pilot- was con


15/52

made n the aircraft logs, as aresult the system was not reserviced.Additional investigation revealed that the oxygen system wascapable (at full service) of delivering 2 hours and 50 minutes at25,000 feet (more at lesser altitudes). However, the fatal flightpoint of no return had been 2hours and 53 minutes. In the investigation of the wreckage it wasdetermined that the oxygen systemregulator valve was in the full openposition but, forsooth, the pressuregauge registered zero.At this point it must be pointedout loud and clear that at 25,000feet a pilot has s little s 2, duo,

minutes during which he will bephysically and mentally capable ofrecognizing and acting to avert thedisastrous results of hypoxia whichis no paper tiger but a real andimminent danger to successfulcompletion of the flight.

To the correction of the problemof oxygen deficiency in flight,Leonardo gave the opinion (basedon his dabbling in medicine) thathe understands that hypoxia is acondition in which the brain andbody tissues lack sufficient oxygento permit proper functioning. Thehigher you go, the more supplemental oxygen you need. At approximately 28,000 feet you willneed 100 percent oxygen. Recognition of this problem becomesdifficult because of the nature ofthe symptoms.

One of the first indications ofoxygen deficiency is a feeling ofexhileration and well being oftenassociated with consumption of thenectar of the gods.No wonder the symptoms arethe same, cried out one of thesymposium conferees, since alcohol burns up oxygen in the system.Now, it is true that oxygendeficiency varies from person toperson or in the same person itvaries in intensity or degree de-

DECE:MBER 1972

pendent on that individual's physical condition at any particulartime. In addition to the aforementioned feeling of exhileration thesymptoms can include any or all ofthe following symptoms includingincreased breathing rate, headache,fatigue, dizziness, listlessness, tingling sensation in the extremities,sweating, poor coordination, im -p irment of judgment reducedvisual acuity, sleepiness, cyanosis(blue color of skin, fingernails andlips) and beh vior changes.

In retrospect, this accident couldhave been prevented according toLeonardo (who had a hobby ofmeteorology and deficiency of oxygen in the human organism) if thepilot had: (1) followed good flightsafety principles and checked theoxygen supply, (2) recognizedoxygen deficiency symptoms and(3) since he was instrument qualified , requested assignment of loweraltitude even if it meant continuation of the flight IFR. That wouldhave been much better than PCSto Valhalla and it is , in this typesituation, a permanent change ofstation.

Next on the agenda is the caseof the pilot out of fuel and out ofluck. The accident started developing long before it happened. Hisexperience included over 5,000hours with commercial licenseCFlME and instrument rating. Hisassignment on this final flight washauling class A explosives on agovernment contract. Because ofthe nature of the cargo and thepossibility of future governmentcontracts, the nonscheduled aircarrier operator selected their mostqualified pilot for this flight. Thefirst f ux pas this pilot made wasnot refueling at the cargo pickUppoint since the weather was notprognosticated to be all that goodat final destination.

Of course, the cliche about burning fuel to carry fuel comes intofull focus because the fuel left inthe storage tanks at point of de-

parture ain't worth a tinker'sdam on final approach with fuelgauges reading empty.Back to the realities of life, whenapproach control at destinationreported in a barely distinguishablevoice: WX indefini te ceiling1,300 feet, obscured, visibility 2mile with snow. The pilot requested radar vector to final approach course ILS. Immediatelythereafter pilot requested courseturn on (an expedited tum to theouter marker) probably afternoting fuel tank indicators flirtingwith empty.

13


16/52

In this comedy of errors the nextreport was missed approach witha more excited request for courseturn on. At 2 miles from the outermarker, he reported he had justfeathered the left engine and requested that emergency equipmentstand by. At 5 minutes after fuelexhaustion time listed on the flightplan, he reported that the otherengine had quit. t might be addedthat it did not surprise approachcontrol or tower that seconds laterthe aircraft disappeared from theradar scope (a radar monitored approach).Rescuers found the aircraft andthe fatally injured pilot milefrom touchdown point on coursebut definitely below glide slope.Investigation revealed that lessthan 1 gallon of fuel remained inthe aircraft even with squeezingauxiliary and main tanks. Therewas no malfunction indicated otherthan the nut between the controlcolumn and the throttle.

Leonardo shook his head in saddismay. So unnecessary, he washeard to remark. The findings as tothe probable causes of the accidentwere fuel exhaustion due to pilot'sinadequate flight planning andpreparation, coupled with improper inflight decisions. The pilot,now in residence at Valhalla, allowed that the findings were 100percent correct and justified, but inmitigation he submitted that hejust didn't seem to be his usualreliable self on that day and thatit just seemed to be one of thosedays that everyone has once in awhile when nothing seems to goright. Not much mitigation in viewof the results, he stated. sincenothing can change my status.However, it may prevent similarincidents happening to thosepeople down there.

Since the conference had consumed several days of earth time.it was suggested that the confereessum things up, arrive at conclus-14

ions, and possibly come up withsome new approach to preventingfuture accidents. t was noted thatthere were several similarities inthese accidents.

First, it was the notation that allof the pilots were considered wellqualified; none had any previousaccidents, incidents or flight violations. All were considered professional in the true sense of theword. Each had expressed in somemanner that he just didn't seem tobe up to par on the fateful dayand things simply seemed to keeppiling up.

At this point Leonardo interjected the opInIOn (based onanother hobby he had-psychiatry) that every individual has hisbreaking point or point beyondwhich he is incompetent to makerational decisions or actions . Inmost accidents the actual impact ispost facto with many factors andcircumstances merely leading up toimoact. whether self-induced, badinflight decisions or outside factors. t is noted by Leonardo thatwe don't have a bunch of pilotswith suicidal tendencies, therefore , we must presume that atsome point in the flight the pilotis put beyond his capabilities. tmight serve well for every pilot toadhere to the old adage: nowthyselfPossibly one of the biggestlessons to be learned from theseminar is that accidents are norespectors of age, experience.training or intelligence quotient.Accidents happen to thc wholespectrum of people. but they aredefinitely and positively preventable. The symposium revealedsome aids in prevention of accidents: Know your own capabilities and limitations, know youraircraft's capabilities and limitati0n'\ and f(lithfully use aircraftchecklists. Other suggestions offered: Plan the flight well to includeselected options insofar as can beforeseen and then fly the planned

flight. Enroute, do not depart fromthe plan for any reason other thanprotection of passengers, crew andaircraft, or unless the planned flightis amended by air traffic control.In flying there is an old cliche,Never get caught without a course

of action to take. As a last resort,if you run out of options and justdon't know what move to makenext, there still remains one optionopen to you: Swallow your pride,don 't panic. get on the radio andrequest ATC personnel for assistance. They are trained to handlemost any kind of inftight situation,and can, in the vast majority ofcases, get you on the ground safely.With these conclusions reached,the meeting was adjourned a littleearly so that the guests could getready for the farewell formal diningin.

The following day. afterthoroughly planning the returnflip ht to earth , there were a fewATC delays on clearances but nomajor problems. After Valhallatower cleared us for frequencychange to Valhalla departure control and takeoff, we started thejourney home. Our departure callwas brisk and confidcnt: Climbingto interplanetary orbital track,flight level One Zero Zero ZeroZero.

Departure control replied, Havea safe flight, see you next year atthe conference. That courteouscomment brought up the question:Would a conference next year benecessary, or would the accidentprevention program based uponthc experiences of those who haveheen there cause a significantenough reduction in accidents tomake next year's conference un-necessary? Only each and everyone of you people who fly theazure blue can answer the question.You hold the key as to whether allthe preventable accidents are, infact, prevented. To quote an oldsage, You are here so short andgone so long.



17/52

heN ew hallengeContinued from p geactive Army are going to have tohitch in our belts. This means thatmany aviation units with primeassets and personnel trained tooperate them will be contained inthe Reserve Component forcestructure.Since reduction of the activeArmy began, the ne rmy concept has taken on added importance. As I pointed out earlier, theactive aviation structure has beencut, so shortfalls must be met byReserve Components. Figure 3reflects the Reserve Componentaircraft forecast s it is planned forFY 74.Since 1970 when the ReserveComponent aircraft inventory wasnear 900, most of which wereobsolete, more than 1,000 first-lineaircraft have been allocated anddistributed to the Reserves. Therenow is in excess of 1,800 aircraftin the hands of the Reserve Components, and by the end of FY 74they should be at 88 percent of

their approximate 2,900 authorizedaircraft.t now appears that by the end of

FY 73, 59 percent of the Reserveinventory will be comprised ofprime assets such s UH-l CH-47,CH-54 and OV-l type aircraft. Thebulk of substitute assets will be theUH-IB / C, in lieu of the AH-IG.Figure 4 (page 16) shows thegrowth of National Guard andReserve aviator strength from1969, when increased emphasiswas placed on the One Army aviation concept, to FY 74. As aresult of the aviation recruitingprogram initiated in 1970 morethan 1,500 experienced aviatorswere recruited into Reserve Com-

FigureReserve Component ircraft Forecast

3000

2569

2000

1000 933

o1970 1971 1972 1973 1974

nd Fiscal Year

DECEMBER 1972

ponent units. As more aircraftbecome available, recruiting experienced personnel may not besufficient to meet all ReserveComponent aviator requirements.Therefore, school quotas for Reserve Components have been increased which, coupled with recruiting of experienced personnel,should meet aviator requirements.The increase in active Army andReserve Component aviation assetsoutside the combat zone and theshift of training emphasis to a midintensity environment has precipitated a number of actions toimprove professionalism in Armyaviation.

At the Department of theArmy s direction, CONARC developed a flight standardizationprogram for Army-wide application. The program, published byDA on 29 June 1972, provides fora hierarchy of standardizationboards from DA to installationlevel to administer the standardization effort. Standard criteria forthe selection and training of allinstructor pilots is provided s wells a system for semiannual orannual flight evaluation of all aviators on flight status. The programalso makes provisions for publication of standardized literaturefor flight training and operations.

The formalization of flight standardization will enhance the maintenance of high standards of individual aviator proficiency andshould result in reduced aircraftaccident rates.Last March an instrument quali-15


18/52

5000 Authorized4156 4156

4000

3000

2261

Assigned

4860 4860~-

1 ~ ~

1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974nd Fiscal Year

National uard and Reserve Aviators Authorized Assigned

fication program was establishedwith an objective that all Armyaviators on flying status obtain astandard instrument rating by theend of the calendar year. In spiteof numerous obstacles excellentprogress has been made towardthis goal. Although the deadlinethis month may not be met at allinstallations and activities themany excellent local trainingprograms promise early attainmentof our goal during 1973.Revived emphasis has beenplaced on nap-of-the-earth flightoperations as a means of enhancingaircraft survivability in the midintensity combat environment. TheU. S Army Aviation School

USAAVNS) at Ft. Rucker ALhas revised rotary wing initial entryand rotary wing instructor pilotcourse POls to include this training and is preparing trammgliterature on the subject for dissemination to the field in the nearfuture.Army aviation to include napof-the-earth flying is meaningful tothe extent that it supports groundunits in the accomplishment of

16

Figure 4

their missions. Proficiency flyingby individual aviators if not mission oriented fails to contribute tothis objective. Therefore to makesure that training efforts are productive we must develop unit training programs that ensure realistictactically sound training and yetprovide adequate control to minimize the risks inherent in low-levelflight operations. DA and CONARC recently have published anabundance of policy and guidanceaimed at assisting aviation unitsin the establishment of safe andeffective nap-of-the-earth trainingprograms.Some time ago CONARC recognized that we had aviation unittraining programs for all types ofaviators except one-the attackhelicopter crew. Anticipating anincrease in CONARC aviationassets reSUlting from the drawdownin Vietnam which was then starting and subsequently acceleratedfirst Ft. Knox KY and then theCONUS Armies were tasked todevelop an attack helicopter crewgunnery training course. The resuit: a viable attack helicopter

gunnery crew qualification planthat we implemented within CONARC last August. The plan includes details of firing rangesammunition requirements firingtables and courses of instruction tobe completed before arrival at thefiring range and should enableCONARC to meet its attack helicopter crew training objective-tofire for qualification each attackhelicopter crew in CONARC, theactive Army and the Reserve Components by the end of FY 73.Thus CONARC units with attackhelicopters now have a trainingprogram that will enable them toattain and maintain readiness.An Army aviation mutual support program for active Army andReserve Component aviation unitshas been established to ensureoptimum use of aviation assets andexpertise and to promote the conduct of airmobile training foractive Army and Reserve Component aviation and ground units.The One Army program as it pertains to Army aviation has thusreceived an unprecedented boost.Regulations and training guidance



19/52

focused solely on the ReserveComponents are rapidly falling bythe wayside and are being replacedby policies that are applicable toall components.We also are placing additionalemphasis on safety within aviationtraining by: Documentation of the requirement for a safety officer positionin each aviation company-sizedunit, airfield command andflight detachment TOE/ TDA.This documentation will authorizetrained safety specialists who canestablish and conduct sound unitaccident prevention programs. Establishing the requirementfor commands to requisitionschool-trained safety officers, commissioned or warrant as appropriate, for assignment to units whichdo not have a trained individualassigned and do not have quotasto the University of Southern California safety course. Emphasizing the use of aviation accident prevention surveysand assistance visits to determinethe effectiveness of unit and installation aviation safety programs. Establishing guidance, basedon accident trends, to reduce aircraft accidents during ferry flights,combat readiness flights and transition training.

In addition, CONARC recentlyhas taken action to establish anaviation command and resourcemanagement course at Ft. Rucker.The purpose of this course is toprovide potential aviation commanders with a working knowledgeof the principles of aviation accident prevention and managementwith respect to aviation assets. Inthe development of the program ofinstruction, USAA VNS is closely

The drawdown in Vietnam has resulted inthe rapid redistribution of modern aircraft

a ~ h throughout the Army. Preferredassets including the OHS8 right) arebeing assigned to meet most requirements

NOVEMBER 1972

coordinating with the U. S ArmyAgency for Aviation Safety to ensure that future commanders makeeffective and efficient use of allsafety and accident preventiontools available to them. The annualtraining requirement for this courseis estimated to be 100 commissioned officers and the first classshould begin this February.The One Army concept is areality The Reserve Componentshave made remarkable progress inrecruiting experienced personnel,issuing aircraft and establishingtraining programs. The goal of theReserve Components is the sameas that of the active Army-toprovide fully combat ready, instantly deployable aviation units,wherever and whenever needed topreserve the security of the UnitedStates.Army aviators have excellentreasons for facing the future optimistically. We have a wealth ofprofessional experience and avastly improved aircraft fleet. Withthese ingredients we can move confidently to meet any challenges thefuture holds.Most importantly, we have airminded, airmobile commanderswith a generation of combat ex-

perience in Vietnam behind them.They will never be satisfied withouta "Three Dimension Army, whichthey will adapt to situations facingthem.Let me remind you and emphasize that in the fifties and early six

ties all of the original doctrine andtactics for employment of organicArmy aviation in achieving battle-field tactical air mobility were developed for the minimum of a midintensity environment. All of ourearly tests, to include those of the11th Air Assault Division T) ,validated the soundness of our concepts in this environment. Manypeople forget that during thetremendous growth in VietnamArmy aviation demonstrated itsterrific inherent flexibility by adjusting and modifying tactics to anentirely different environment.Now, we must go back to many ofour original practices such as napof-the-earth flight, maintenance indispersed field conditions, camouflage, etc. We must actually unlearn many procedures we usedduring recent years of combat inVietnam. The new challenge is forall and I know it will be met in thenew era of Army aviation that isupon us.

~


20/52

inten nceWhen Repairing cated by extreme tackiness or dryness of the rubber near the wheelrim.Repair Of Aircraft Tire Tubes:Hold it Before you begin repairingthat aircraft tire tube, check TM55-1500-204-25/1, paragraph 3-215, pages 3-63. t contains somevaluable information on makingthat repair. For instance:

All reparable tubes wiJl be repaired by a permanent method. Avulcanized patch is one method.Any tubes found to be patchedwith a cold patch will be eitherclassified as reparable or condemned, as appropriate.1. Reparable inner tubes are asfollows:a. Tubes with rubber-coveredvalve stems that are damaged,have base separation or the valvepulled out.b. Tubes with a damaged arealess than 3 inches.c. Only natural and butyl rubbertubes will be repaired. Butyl rubber tubes can be identified by ablue stripe on the inner circumference of the tube.2. The following tube conditionsare considered nonreparable :

Aircraft Tubesa. Those that exceed three repairs per tube at less than 30 degree intervals.(1) In excess of 2 inch by 2inches for tubes with a cross section width of less than 8 inches.(2) n excess of V inch by

3 inches for tubes with a crosssection width of 8 inches or larger.b. Tubes that require morethan one resplice. Fabric basedtubes will not be respliced.c. Tubes with tom or puncturedfabric or inner liner separationmore than 1A 2 inch.d. Tubes requiring more thanone of the following combinations:(1) One revalve and oneresplice.2) One revalve and onerepair.3) One resplice and onerepair.(4) A and b above excludefabric based tubes.

e. Tubes with deterioration orthinning due to brake heat. Heatdamage may be detected by inspection. This damage may be indi-

f. Tubes deteriorated by solvents or hardened by age.g. Tubes with more than twoblisters or a blister greater thaninch in diameter.h. Tubes with severe surfacecracking over 1 inch deep orindication of deterioration.i. Tubes with valve stems tornor pulled from fabric based tubes.j. Tubes which have folds orcreases.

k. Tubes that are chafed orpinched from beads or tire breaks.

Adjustment Of O-lA VoltageRegulator: Remember to keep thegenerator switch in the ON position during voltage regulator adjustment. Placing the generatorswitch in the OFF position willprevent the generator from producing more than residual voltage.This will make the adjustment ofthe voltage regulator impossible.

VH-l Main Drive Shaft Problem:The UH-l series helicopters haveencountered manY main drive shaftproblems causing excessive downtime and unnecessary expensive



21/52

t ersparts consumption. One particularmaintenance malpractice has beenobserved in several aircraft companies and concerns the following:1. The main drive shaft (shortshaft) attaching clamps employinternal wrenching high tensionbolts as indicated in figure 1. Note

Figure 1oot.3Co .h, Su.k W.sher Special he.t tre.ted .tte 2 M pl.i. w.sher~ I ~ @ ~ ~

l.ter.aI w ench in, bolt .

Figure 2I r.p.. I all.t i f Wuhemr/' V L J / N : : L : I / t c J J b ~

e IStress rU wh ich uts u asprin, uUl in, torqui probl. ,sand hiCh freque"", .i 'roli d.r op in, forces .

DN t\Ct .r S k Wnhtri .lled i. .,,,I,.thlefs bearin, " f .

1 of figure 1 shows the taperedshoulder of the internal wrenchingbolt and how it curves to preventstress from being applied at anygiven point and distributes theshearing forces. Note 2 of figure 1illustrates the proper counter sunkheat treated washer for the bolthead side of the internal wrenchingbolt. Note 3 of figure 1 illustratesthe proper washer for nut.

DECEMBER 1972

2. Improper installation of thewashers when installing the driveshaft will:a. Give a false impression oftorque to the mechanic causingloose clamps under operating conditions.b. Act as a spring when undernormal operating stress causing ahigh frequency vibration whichcauses excessive heat. This heatbreaks down lubricants causingdamage or destroying the driveshaft in just a few hours ofoperation.c. Cause high stress coneentration at one point on the bolt whichweakens the bolt and renders it asunserviceable.3. Figure 2, note 1, il1ustrates theimproper washer stack-up on aninternal wrenching bolt and note1 illustrates how the washer gives afalse impression of torque whichwill fool both the torque wrenchand the inexperienced mechanicalong with a flexing when underoperating stress. These factors willweaken the bolt and make it unserviceable.4. I t is highly recommended thatall maintenance officers, NCOs,technical inspectors and technicians be made aware of this problem, its seriousness and propermanagement procedures to ensureit does not occur in their units.

5. The proper use of internalwrenching bolts and u t i l i z ~ t i o n ofspecial washers can be referencedin TM 55-1500-204-25/1, page2-3, paragraph 2-25 and figure 2-82. Also see Federal AviationAgency Aircraft Manual 43.13-1,page 97, paragraph 120h.

UH-ID & H Model Tail RotorInspection: When inspecting thetail rotor drive shaft, do not mistake ' a single empty imprint in thebonding material next to thebalance strip as an indication of amissing balance strip. This spotresults from a removal of a testcoupon to inspect for bondingvoids. Reference: TM 55-1520-210-20, chapter 7, section 5,paragraph 7-115

Tropical Maintenance: Did youknow that operational turbineengines should be run up onceevery other. day in the tropics?Reference: TM 55-1500-204-25/1 page 1-12, paragraph 1-42.

FOD Again When cleaning turbineengines, remove all pencils, cigarettes, etc., from pockets. TheArmy doesn't need anymore FODinduced mishaps . . . , .


22/52

Lieutenant John G Schleicher

HE GROUND commanderrealizes that in order to takefull advantage of today s mobileground troops, he must effectivelyexercise personal control overthem. The emplqyment of an aerialcommand platform by the battalioncommander is fast becoming thevital link in the chain of commandfrom platoon to division andhigher.

The commander, after his firstcommand and control mission fromthe air, will have to admit that itis a different ball game than onethat is being commanded from theground. The rules of the game, theplanning, tactics and radio procedures have not changed andneither have the players. Whatmakes aerial command and controldifferent can be seen when it iscompared to a person viewing afootball game from the 50 yardline as opposed to sitting at homeand only hearing the same broadcast over the radio. The commander may feel safer and morecomfortable in his tactical operations center, but history has proven

that battles are not won from easychairs.Realizing this, the U S ArmyInfantry School at Ft. Benning,GA, set out in 1969 to train commanders and staff officers in theeffective utilization of the helicopter as an aerial command andcontrol platform. Besides the training aspects, the Aerial Employment Committee of the InfantrySchool was tasked with researchand development of a total learningenvironment which would simulateto the maximum extent the stressesand pressures encountered by thecommander s staff groups in combat.

The first class was presentedin May 1969 to colonels andlieutenant colonels attending theSpecial Vietnam OrientationCourse at Ft. Benning prior totheir assuming command of infantry units in the Republic of Vietnam. The class used readilyavailable training aids includingmotion pictures of the terrain, VuGraph transparencies, 35 mmslides and communication via an

nppro ch

to eri lcomm ndnd controltr ining

ASC-15 radio console. In theinitial class only one student wasexercised at one time. With theaddition of terrain model and anelevated platform overlooking theterrain to simulate the aerial helicopter platform, the instruction wasexpanded to include four students.The present system incorporatesinto a 50 man classroom fourseparate simulators and a premission briefing center.Before coming to class a studentreceives an advance sheet outlining the general situation for hisproblem. He then receives ageneral briefing within the classroom via an automatic 35 mmslide and tape presentation andcolor video tape. Along with anexplanation of the simulator, thestudent is given information on theoperation of the ASC-15command and control radio console and a premission briefing toinclude the enemy situation andwhat resources are available to himfor support of his operation. Thepremission briefing center is capable of projecting two separate pro-

20 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

grams simultaneously. Studentsseated at tables with mapboardsand signal operation instructions(SOl) receive the audio portionover individual headsets.Following the premission briefing the student organizes his planwithin his staff group which consists of a battalion commander,operations officer, fire supportcoordinator and air mission commander. Four such staff groupscan be trained simultaneously.After the members of the groupreceive coordinating instructionsfrom the primary instructor, theytake their places within thesimulator. A UH-l helicopterfuselage elevated above each terrain model gives the student commander and his staff an aerial viewof their area of operations. Thecommander and his staff areprovided headsets with which tocommunicate with ground units,artillery support, liftships, tacticalaircraft and higher headquarters.Two quarter-track audio taperecorders provide artillery, gunfireand helicopter engine sounds thatmay be added to support therealism of the simulator.

Each of the four simulatorsrepresents a different terrain environment to include jungle,mountainous, gently rolling anddesert battle areas. The detailed1 : 3 ,000 scale terrain models correspond to a 1: 50,000 scale military map and represent an area ofx kilometers. Produced by

Third U S Army Training Aidsat Ft. Benning, the terrain modelsare well detailed to give those inthe command and control helicopter as much information as theywould normally see from theiraerial vantage point.Artillery and gunfire are portrayed by flashing lights located

A view of a terrain model as seenfrom the airborne command post

DECEMBER 1972

singly and in clusters throughoutthe terrain model. These lights arecontrolled by a 60 switch controlpanel. When a student calls forartillery at a coordinate not represented by a cluster of lights, theprinciple instructor simulates thepuffs of smoke using small piecesof cotton. Colored smoke, used formarking positions, is also simulatedusing small puffs of cotton in thesame colors as issued smokegrenades.Reports received from studentswho have gone on to become commanders and staff officers havebeen most favorable. A recentstudy developed with the assistanceof the Human Resources ResearchOrganization (HumRRO) hasshown that although the initialclass raised the confidence levelof participating students, thepresent configuration employingthe terrain models and helicoptermockup is a significant improvement over previous simulationtechniques. Plans for future development can for further studyas to the feasibility of more sophisticated means of simulating thetactical environment.

One concept calls for a cameramodel system in which a televisioncamera is made to move closelyover a terrain model. The imageprojected onto a large screen creates the phenomenon of flight. Thistype of system-utilizing twocameras at opposite ends of the

terrain model--could simulateground viewpoints and allow twoground commanders to competeagainst each other.Another concept has beenproposed which would utilize

computer support to display groundtactical information for the studentcommander and his staff. Theprogramed computer would addthe dimension of analyzing realtime movement rates, fuel consumptions and losses of friendlyand enemy troops based on thecommander s decisions. The latestin computer use in environmentalsimulation is computer generatedimagery. t is receiving widespreaduse by the aircraft and aerospaceindustry to train pilots and crewmembers. This device would utilizethe computer to generate and display an almost unlimited amountof data to include projecting terrainand superimposing aircraft, vehicles and even weapons fire. Thecomputer could store data such asthe characteristics of heavy machine gun fire and the trajectoryof artillery fire.

The ability of the CombinedArms Tactical Training Simulator(CA TTS) to reproduce situationsboth on and above the battlefieldnot only exposes a potential commander and staff officer to thestress and pressures faced in anactual operation, but it also hasthe potential of testing the doctrineand tactics now being taught.

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U S RMY VI TION DIGEST


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This report of ancient aviation accidents contains discussionsof design features, flight conditions and pilot techniques.Although written in a lighthearted vein, the narrative isrelevant to those who take to the skies in this century

W IT THE BIRTH of avia-tion history came the birthof aviation accidents. The very earliest documented attempts of flightin heavier-than-air craft are reports of accident. Even the legendary sagas of man taking wing allend with man taking a fall. It hasoften been said that the study ofpast accidents can prevent futuremishaps. Judging this statement tobe true, let's look at some dusty oldaccident reports filed and forgottenover the centuries.Aircraft Accident Report #1Synopsis: The crash of a singlepassenger aircraft (no registrationnumber) off the coast of Italy.Time: Long ago in ancient Greece.Aircraft was destroyed in flight andthe pilot received fatal injury.History of the flight: The flightcommenced as an effort by Daedalus and his son Icarus (the accidentvictim) to escape from King Minosof Crete. Daedalus designed andconstructed individual aircraft consisting of feathers tied with stringand fastened to the pilot's armswith wax (type unknown). Neardawn the two aircraft caught updrafts on the cliffs of Crete and departed in a northerly direction.While flying in formation Daedaluscommunicated a warning to Icarusnot to fly too low lest the waterwet his wings and make themheavy, nor to fly too high since thesun might melt the wax. Communication acknowledged. The aircraftpassed the islands of Delos, ParosSamos without incident, butDaedalus (the only witness to theDECEMBER 1972

Dr Daniel S GrayAssistant Professor of HistoryTroy State UniversityFt Rucker, AL

accident) reports Icarus becameoverconfident and began wheelingand soaring. In his delight he flewtoo near the sun thus melting thewax binding the wings to his arms.The aircraft disintegrated and thepilot fell into the sea and wasdrowned.Injury to persons:

FatalNonfatalPilot

oOthersoo

Damage to aircraft: Destroyedin flight.Crew infonnation: Pilot waschecked out in the aircraft by thedesigner but had no flight experience.Aircraft infonnation: Found tobe of safe design when operatedwithin design specifications.Analysis and conclusions: Investigation revealed aircraft to beflightworthy and the pilot qualified.However, his disregard of a specific warning by the aircraft designerresulted in the accident. Probablecause of the accident: Heat fromthe sun melted wax binding wingsof aircraft, resulting in its destruction.Recommendations: Because ofthe lack of precedent, the FAA(Final Aviation Authority) has nostanding recommendation for suchan accident, but does suggest forfuture flights in such an aircraftthat the wax be replaced by a highgrade epoxy.Only a legend, right? Couldn'tpossibly have any relevance toyou? Wrong. Although men today

fly with metal alloy wings anddon't fear flying too near the sun,still we have too many who sufferfrom the Icarus syndrome -i.e.,overconfidence and a short memoryfor warnings.Aircraft Accident Report #2Synopsis: Accident involving asingle passenger aircraft near Bath,England. Time: 825 B.C. Aircraftwas damaged in the crash and thepilot received fatal injury.History of the flight: After having traveled to Athens to learnsecret arts, the pilot and aircraftdesigner, King Bladud of Britain ,constructed (with aid from Satan)an aircraft which consistedglider-type wings attached to the

pilot's arms. Bladud attempted tofly in and around the site ofpresent-day London; however, hecrashed into a building and waskilled. The aircraft was destroyedon impact.Injuries to persons:Pilot Others

FatalNonfatal o ooDamage to aircraft: Aircraft destroyed on impact.Other damage: The aircraftcrashed into the Temple of Appolyn in London but did little damage.Crew infonnation: Pilot was notexperienced but was more familiarwith the aircraft than anyone else.Aircraft infonnation: Aircraftseemingly of untrustworthy design,but it was impossible to substantiate this since Bladud was killed

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and his codesigner was not available for questioning.Analysis and conclusions: Theaccident proved very difficult toinvestigate due to the destructionof the aircraft and the fact that nowitnesses to the accident could befound. Also, the difficulty in locating the supposed codesigner wasa hinderance to the investigation.Probable cause of the accident:Pilot error in that the pilot operated his aircraft at too low an altitude to safely avoid obstructionsin his flight path.Recommendations: Such flightsin the future should take place inopen areas far from temples andtowns. We are happy to report thatBladud's son and successor, KingLear, informs us that he will neverdo such a crazy thing and hopeshis subjects follow his sane example.

So you never heard of KingBladud, huh? And you don't planto strap on any glider wings either?Fine, but the next time you mayhave to low level over an urbanarea remember Bladud and think.

Aircraft Accident Report 3Synopsis: Accident involving aquadripedial-biplane near Malmesbury (England). Time: 1020 A.D.Aircraft was slightly damaged inthe accident. The pilot receivednonfatal injuries.

History of the flight: The aircraft designer and pilot, a wellknown astrologer, inventor andmonk-Oliver of Malmesburyconstructed a dual set of gliderwings for his hands and his feetand became airborne from a towerin Malmesbury. Witnesses reportthe aircraft flew for more than afurlong, but then the velocity ofthe wind became such that the aircraft became unstable and fluttered down, causing the pilot tobreak both his legs.

Injuries to persons:FatalNonfatal

Piloto

Othersoo

Damage to aircraft: Aircraft wasslightly damaged on impact.Crew infonnation: The pilot admits to have no other flight experience and stresses that he shall havenone in the future.Aircraft information: Aircraftfound to be fully capable of liftrequirements, though the stabilityfactor remains uncertain.Analysis and conclusions: Theinvestigators had the full cooperation of the pilot in reconstructingthe accident. Probable cause of theaccident: t was suggested by thepilot and designer (Oliver) that hadhe not neglected to fasten a tail tohis hinder parts to steady him inflight, perhaps the accident couldhave been avoided.Recommendations: The investigators recommend that in the future aircraft of such design be provided with a tail assembly and thatanyone attempting a flight in such

an aircraft fly over something soft.Design inadequacy . . . well,that's completely out of the pilot'srealm of responsibility. Not really.f as an experienced pilot you spota possible design defect, you betyour life you had better stay on theground until you are proved wrong.You re betting your life if youjust shrug it off by saying, Theslide-rule boys know best.

Aircraft Accident Report 4Synopsis: Accident at the Hippodrome in Constantinople involving a single passenger aircraft.Time: mid-II th century. Aircraftwas damaged and the pilot received

fatal injuries.History of the flight: In an announced public demonstration thepilot, known as the Saracen ofConstantinople, attempted a flightaround the Hippodrome. The aircraft, designed and constructed bythe pilot, consisted of a long whiterobe braced with willow rods. Theflight originated atop a high towerat the end of the Hippodrome. Witnesses, who included the RomanEmperor Comnenus and about60,000 spectators, report that theSaracen stood leaning into thewind but appeared reluctant tobegin the flight. The chanting of thecrowd finally prompted him to become airborne. However, as a witness recorded, . . . the weight ofhis body having more power todrag him down than the artificial



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wings had to sustain him, he brokehis bones. The pilot later died ofhis injuries.Injuries to persons:

FatalNonfatalPilot

1oOthers

ooDamage to aircraft: Aircraft washeavily damaged on impact.Crew information: Pilot was thedesigner of the aircraft but had noflight experience.Aircraft infonnation: Investigators judge this type of aircraft incapable of lifting load attempted.Analysis and conclusions: In-vestigation revealed that this aircraft was not flightworthy and thatthe pilot lacked training. Probablecause of the accident: Design errorin lift capabilities, the pilot beingtoo heavy for the aircraft to transport.Recommendations: The FAAhas repeatedly published precautionary matter concerning maximum allowable gross operatingweights and their causative roles in

DECEMBER 1972

accidents of this type. Should another flight of this kind be attempted, a crash diet s suggestedfor the pilot.There are two lessons to belearned here: 1) Never exceedmaximum allowable gross operating weights, and (2) resist thetemptation to show off or you couldbreak ur bones.Aircraft Accident Report 5Synopsis: Crash of a glider-typeaircraft at Perugia, Italy. Time:1490 A.D. Aircraft was heavilydamaged and the pilot receivedsevere injuries.History of the flight: The flightcommenced when the pilot, Giovanni Battista Danti, became airborne from the top of a tall towerin Perugia. His personally designedaircraft consisted of linen wingsbraced with iron rods which, saidwitnesses, operated with a hor-rible hissing sound. The flight proceeded as scheduled until an ironsupport in the port wing gave way.

The pilot quickly lost control andthe aircraft crashed into the street ,badly injuring the pilot.Injuries to persons:

FatalNonfatalPiloto Othersoo

Damage to aircraft: Aircraft washeavily damaged on impact.Crew information: The pilot hadextensive experience n this typeaircraft having previously accomplished several flights over Lake

Trasimento earlier in 1490.Aircraft infonnation: Aircrafthad been thoroughly checked outby the pilot before the flight andhad proven itself of reliable design.Analysis and conclusions: Investigation showed the pilot to beexperienced and the aircraft trustworthy. Probable cause of the accident: Structural weakness of ironsupport caused it to break and allowed the port wing to collapse.The investigators believe that astrong possibility of metal fatigueexists in the failed structure.Recommendations: While the investigators in no way condemn thedesign of this aircraft, we do rec

ommend that extensive tests beconducted on structural supportsand that as a precaution furtherflights might well be conductedover the lake.A simple preflight check couldhave prevented this ancient accident. How many have you seen orheard about that would never havehappened if preflights had beenproperly completed?Aircraft Accident Report 6Synopsis: Accident involving a47 engine Rocket-Kite in centralChina. Time: 1500 A.D. Aircraftand pilot were completely destroyed in the accident.History of the flight: The designer and pilot, Wan Hoo, attempted a flight in an aircraft consisting of a saddle mounted betweentwo large kites, powered by 47rockets. The flight was witnessedby 47 coolies who, at the signalfrom Wan Hoo, each lit a rocket.

The surviving witnesses reportedthat the pilot and aircraft disappeared with much noise andsmoke.Injuries to persons:Pilot OthersFatal someNonfatal 0 some moreDamage to aircraft: Judged tobe extensive from the larger pieces

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Crew information: Pilot wasmaking his first solo flight. Theground crew were experienced withskyrockets and fireworks.Aircraft information: Aircraftwas of such a hybrid nature specification norms for it have not yetbeen established. However, thedesign does appear to have seriousdrawbacks.Analysis and conclusions: Theinvestigation has been difficultsince the nature of the aircraft hasled to jurisdictional disputes amongthe FAA and the Cavalry. However, it is agreed that the probablecause of the accident was the excessive charge of powder placed ineach rocket by the designer.

Recommendations: The FAArecommends that the test flying ofsuch aircraft be confined to unmanned attempts in the future.The saga of Wan Hoo shouldremind us all of the role of com- onsense in flying. He, rest hissoul, appears to have had justabout none.Aircraft Accident Report #7Synopsis: Accident involving aman-powered ornithopter on SwanMountain near Florence, Italy.Time: 1505 A.D. Aircraft destroyed on impact. The pilot received nonfatal injuries.History of the flight: The aircraft, designed by Leonardo daVinci, was launched from SwanMountain (elevation 1,300 feet)near Florence. It was piloted byZoroastro da Peretola. Unable tosustain flight by operating a rowingmechanism to flap the wings, thepilot and aircraft rapidly lost altitude and crashed. The pilot suffered a broken leg.Injuries to persons:

Pilot OthersFatal 0 0Nonfatal 1 0Damage to aircraft: Aircraft destroyed on impact.Crew information: Pilot had longassisted Mr. da Vinci and mayhave had previous experience and

26

logged several seconds flying time.Aircraft information: Veryscanty information is available onthe aircraft since both the designerand the pilot are reluctant to talkabout the whole thing.Analysis and conclusions: Because of the refusal of the designerand surviving pilot to discuss TheBird (as da Vinci calls it), the investigation is incomplete. Probable cause of the accident: Inabilityof the pilot to flap hard enough toflyRecommendations: The FAArecommends that aircraft of thisdesign be discontinued because ofthe unsuitable power source andthat the designer, Mr. da Vinci,pursue some earthbound hobbylike painting.This accident should tell ussomething about trusting in reputations. The Bird was a genuineda Vinci, designed and built bythe greatest genius of his day.Fortunately, the pilot didn't haveto pay with his life for trusting inthat reputation. He found that afamous name on the side of an aircraft in no way guarantees itsflightworthiness. Also, he discovered that previous flying experiencecan never make a pilot crashproof.Aircraft Accident Report #8Synopsis: Accident involving asingle passenger glider-aircraft atStirling Castle, Scotland. Time:1507 A.D. Aircraft slightly damaged in crash. Pilot sustained nonfatal injury.History of the flight: The designer and pilot, John Damian, thecourt physician to King James IV,took flight from the castle wall inan aircraft consisting of gliderwings strapped to the pilot's arms.Unable to support the weight of thewings, Damian's arms dropped andthe crash resulted. The pilot suffered a broken thigh bone.Injuries to persons:

Pilot OthersFatalNonfatal o1 oo

Damage to aircraft: Aircraftslightly damaged on impact.Crew information: Pilot is awell-known alchemist and doctor,but had no flight training or experience.Aircraft information: Of unapproved design, wing surface sufficient to lift desired load, but thewings too heavy to be supportedby the pilot's arms.Analysis and conclusions: Although the surviving pilot was veryeager to aid the investigators, wedo not accept his explanation ofthe accident. Damian said the aircraft crashed because it was constructed of hen feathers whichdisplayed a natural