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U.S. Army Audit AgencyService • Ethics • Progress

Followup Audit of ForwardOperating Base Closures

United States Forces - Iraq

Audit Report: A-2010-0169-ALL 19 August 2010



Executive SummaryAudit Report A-2010-0169-ALL

19 August 2010

Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures

United States Forces - Iraq

Results

At the request of United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I), we conducted thisfollowup audit to determine whether the recommendations from Audit

Report: A-2010-0044-ALL, Forward Operating Base Closures in Iraq,dated 26 January 2010, were implemented and if the corrective actionsfixed the problems identified during the initial audit. The recommen-dations were aimed at assisting USF-I streamline the base closureprocess.

The initial audit showed that USF-I needed to improve how itmonitored and documented base closures in Iraq. Command didn’thave reliable methods to monitor compliance with the base closureprocess and ensure commanders complied with established guidance.Further, Command didn’t have oversight of the document submissionprocess and wasn’t able to enforce compliance with establishedrequirements. The audit also showed that USF-I could improveguidance and document retention for property transfers during baseclosures as well as overall property accountability in Iraq. Commandissued confusing guidance for foreign excess personal property, andunits didn’t fully comply with orders to perform inventories on allbases in Iraq. We made 11 recommendations to address thesedeficiencies and assist command in streamlining the base closureprocess.

During our followup audit, we found that USF-I implemented 4 ofour 11 recommendations and was implementing the remaining7 recommendations. Subsequent to our draft report, USF-I tookadditional actions to implement five more recommendations. In May2010, we revisited USF-I and verified that the subsequent actions fixedthe problems for the five of the recommendations. As of the date ofthis report, nine of the recommendations were implemented and twowere being implemented.

The actions took by USF-I helped improve how base closures weremonitored and documented. Further, the actions clarified confusingguidance for all levels of command.

Recommendations

We recommended that theCommander, USF-I:

• Establish and implement aQuality AssuranceSurveillance Plan to monitorthe Base Closure AssistanceTeams contract to ensurepersonnel are sufficiently

advising and assisting thebase closure process. Providemetrics and surveillancemethods/formats to divisioncommanders for reportingteams’ accomplishments andconduct site visits to measurecontractors’ performance.

• Create a document repositoryportal, similar to the basing

portal, to ensure propertyaccountability inventories areaccurately reported.

USF-I concurred with ourrecommendations. The Officeof the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4provided the official Armyposition and agreed with thereport.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYU.S. ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL

ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS AUDITS

3101 PARK CENTER DRIVE

ALEXANDRIA, VA 22302-1596

19 August 2010

Commander, United States Forces -Iraq

This is our report on the followup audit of forward operating base closures in Iraq. Weperformed this followup effort at the request of your command.

This report addresses whether recommendations were implemented as agreed to inU.S. Army Audit Agency Report A-2010-0044-ALL, Forward Operating Base Closures

in Iraq, dated 26 January 2010. The report had 11 recommendations for strengtheningcontrols over base closures in Iraq, and this followup report has 2 additionalrecommendations addressed to you.

We conducted this followup audit in accordance with generally accepted governmentauditing standards.

The Army’s official position on the conclusions, recommendations, and commandcomments is in Annex D. For additional information about this report, contact theExpeditionary Support Audits Division at 910-643-6204.

I appreciate the courtesies and cooperation extended to us during the audit.

FOR THE AUDITOR GENERAL:

WILLIAM E. JENKINSProgram DirectorExpeditionary Support Audits



CONTENTS

Page

Introduction

What We Audited ............................................................................................................ 2 Background ....................................................................................................................... 2

Objective, Conclusion, Recommendations, and Comments

Implementing the Recommendations ........................................................................... 4 Annexes

A — General Audit Information .................................................................................. 17 B — Abbreviations Used in This Report ..................................................................... 20 C — Prior recommendations ........................................................................................ 21 D — Official Army Position and Verbatim Comments by Command .................. 23

Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures, United States Forces – Iraq (A-2010-0169-ALL) Page 1



INTRODUCTION

WHAT WE AUDITED

We reviewed actions taken by United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) to implementrecommendations in audit report A-2010-0044-ALL. The report had 11 recommen-dations to improve controls over forward operating base closure procedures. Wefocused on whether command took actions to implement agreed-to recommendationsand whether the corrective actions fixed the reported problems. Recommendationsfrom the previous report are in Annex C.

BACKGROUND

In October 2009, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps – I(MNC-I) were in the process of transitioning to USF-I. MNC-I C7 had fully transitionedinto USF-I J7, and the remaining elements were due to officially transition in January2010. In this report, we only refer to USF-I instead of the separate MNF-I and MNC-Ithat were in place during our initial audit.

Our initial audit report (Audit Report A-2010-0044-ALL) answered these two objectives:

• Were theater base closure processes at forward operating bases sufficiently

communicated and monitored, and properly documented to ensure bases wereclosed or returned in accordance with United States and Government of Iraqguidelines?

• Did the theater establish sufficient guidance, coordinate resources, and documentreal and personal property transactions appropriately during the base closureprocess?

USF-I established base closure processes that were well communicated to subordinateunits. However, command needed to improve how it monitored and documented baseclosures in Iraq. Specifically, command:

• Didn’t have reliable methods to monitor compliance with the base closure processand ensure commanders complied with established guidance.

• Didn’t have oversight of the document submission process and wasn’t able toenforce compliance with established requirements.




Because of these conditions, USF-I didn’t have full assurance that U.S. Forces closedbases in Iraq in accordance with established United States and Government of Iraqguidelines. In addition, without documentation, USF-I wouldn’t have support to refutepossible claims by the Government of Iraq and its citizens against the United States.

Command needed to improve guidance and document retention for property transfersduring base closures as well as overall property accountability in Iraq. Specifically:

• USF-I issued confusing guidance for foreign excess personal property transfers.

• Units didn’t fully comply with orders to perform inventories on all bases in Iraq.




IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

OBJECTIVE

Did command implement recommendations from the prior report and did the actionsfix the problems?

CONCLUSION

Yes and no. Command implemented 4 of our 11 recommendations, didn’t implement1 recommendation, and was implementing the remaining 6 recommendations.

Three of the recommendations that Command implemented fixed the problem weidentified in our initial effort. Specifically, Command:

• Developed a base closure reporting portal to standardize the method for gatheringbase closure documentation which allowed MNC-I to develop base closure reportsthat were more accurate and less subjective than the ones we reviewed during ourinitial effort.

• Published Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 832 requiring units to turn in missing baseclosure documentation from base closures dating back to October 2008. As a

result, USF-I gained accountability for 97 percent of the documentation, which wasarchived on the portal.

• Clarified the guidance for leaving bases and property “functional” at thesustainment conference held on 15 August 2009. This updated guidance was alsodiscussed and clarified periodically during the Base Management OperationsPlanning Team (BMOPT), giving units a better understanding of real versuspersonal property.

Due to these actions, Recommendations A-4, A-5, and B-1 can be closed.

Command also implemented Recommendation B-2, but the actions taken didn’t fix theproblem. The process that allows the Theater Property Book Office (TPBO) to reviewexcess properties inventories before property is declared as foreign excess personalproperty was still not working properly resulting in the potential for unauthorizedequipment being transferred to the Government of Iraqi. In addition, USF-I didn’timplement Recommendation B-3 which required that Command determine the




information necessary on the Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss (FLIPL)forms and the correct routing of the form to ensure proper review, approval, andretention. We coordinated with auditors working on the Audit of Forward OperatingBase Closures-Government of Iraq Property Transfers (Foreign Excess PersonalProperty) (Project A-2010-ALL-0232) that was ongoing at the same time as our

followup. Since that project covered processes for Foreign Excess Personal Property(FEPP) transfers in Iraq, the team agreed to include these recommendations in theiraudit work. Further actions for these recommendations will be included in the auditreport for Project A-2010-ALL-0232.

USF-I was implementing the remaining six recommendations. Four of thoserecommendations were on track to fix the problems we identified our initial audit.Specifically:

• Command coordinated with Army Central Command (ARCENT) to transfer base

closure documentation for long-term retention. But since the process wasn’t fullyformalized, there was no assurance ARCENT was retaining base closuredocumentation in accordance with AR 405-45 (Real Property InventoryManagement).

• USF-I personnel were planning a sustainment conference for November 2009 and abase closure synchronization meeting for January 2010 to bring together the keyplayers in the base closure process.

• USF-I personnel developed a system to track base closures in Iraq that was capableof providing base closure status on a red/green/amber status to the leadership and

were making it fully functional.

As a result, Recommendations A-1, A-3, A-6, and B-5 will remain open until USF-Icompletes the actions necessary to fully implement the recommendations.

Two recommendations were being implemented, but USF-I will have to take additionalactions to fully fix the problems. Specifically:

• USF-I acquired a contract instead of using service members to fill the Base ClosureAssistance Teams (BCATs) discussed in Recommendation A-2. Command wasdeveloping a training program for the team for when they would arrive in theateraround mid-November 2009. Because the teams would consist of contractpersonnel and would be under the control of the division commanders, the USF-Icontracting officers representative will need to develop and implement a QualityAssurance Surveillance Plan and conduct site visits to ensure that the teamseffectively assist with the base closure process.




• USF-I published MNC-I FRAGO 373 (formerly FRAGO 217) directing all units tosubmit monthly property accountability inventories to command so thatinventories could be monitored. Because of technical difficulties, not all unitscould upload their inventory memos to the portal, and documents were in multiplelocations making the task of property accountability difficult. As a result, there

was no assurance that property inventories were correctly tracked or reported.Command needs to establish an automated reporting form for propertyaccountability so that units have efficient means of uploading documents andCommand has a better method of retaining monthly inventory memos inaccordance with FRAGO 373.

Our detailed discussion of these conditions begins below. Our recommendations tocorrect them begin on page 13.

DISCUSSION

In this section, we these two areas:

• Base closure process.

• Property transactions.

Base Closure Process

We previously reported that the theater had suficient base closure processes in placeand effectively communicated guidance to major subordinate commands. However,some units requested additional training in base closure processes. Command alsoneeded to improve the methods used to monitor and document base closures. Wefound only 33 percent of required documentation on hand for recent base closures. Asa result, USF-I didn’t have full assurance that bases were closed in accordance withestablished guidance or that U.S. Forces were in line to meet timelines and expectationsset by the United States and Government of Iraq.

We made six recommendations to improve the USF-I base closure process. At the time

of our followup audit, Command had either implemented or was implementing the sixrecommendations.




Communication of Base Closure Process

Our initial audit showed that some units expressed a desire to have more training in thebeginning stage of the base closure process. In Recommendation A-1, we recom-mended that command hold semiannual base synchronization conferences to

consistently clarify and update base closure guidance in. In Recommendation A-2, werecommended that command take actions to ensure the BCATs were used effectively toassist commanders in the base closure process. Our followup audit showed thatcommand was implementing both recommendations.

USF-I hosted a sustainment conference on 15 August 2009, which included a session onlessons learned from prior base closures. Command personnel took this time to discussthe findings from our initial audit and the initiatives put in place to correct theproblems we identified. Command personnel were planning another sustainmentmeeting scheduled for late November 2009 to bring the key players in the base closure

process together again. In addition, a basing synchronization meeting was planned for January 2010 that would coordinate with upcoming rotations in the three Multi-National Divisions (MNDs) and provide new personnel with the latest base closureinformation. The audience for the January conference would be division engineers,logistics personnel, environmental personnel, and basing officers. Some of thetentatively scheduled discussion topics included:

• BCATs.

• Real versus Personal Property.

• Security Agreement Issues.

• The Government of Iraq Receivership Secretariat.

• Environmental Requirements.

• Foreign Excess Personal Property.

• Defense Reutilization Management Office and Transportation.

USF-I took corrective actions to ensure that base closure personnel were provided

sufficient guidance and training as required in the recommendation. However, becausethe base closure process is ongoing and the need for synchronization conferences willextend into the future, Recommendation A-1 will remain open.

Since our initial audit, Command personnel made some progress on the standup of theBCATs. Because of a shortage of service members with the correct skills, USF-I




acquired BCAT personnel through a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract,and those personnel were due to arrive in Iraq in mid-November 2009. The$10.3 million contract will provide 30 personnel to fill 6 teams to assist with baseclosures. The teams will consist of five personnel each as follows:

• 1 Logistics Management Specialist.

• 1 Logistics Management Specialist.

• 1 Transportation Specialist.

• 2 Property Analysts.

The contracting officers representative will be an USF-I representative, but the BCATpersonnel will be under the operational control of the various divisions in Iraq. Whilethe division commanders will be able to position BCAT personnel according to their

needs, the contracting officers representative will not have direct supervision or contactwith contract personnel on a regular basis.

Because the BCATs aren’t yet operational, Recommendation A-2 will remain open andwe have made an additional recommendation to ensure the success of the BCATmission. Because the BCATs will consist of contractors as opposed to Service members,we recommend that USF-I establish and implement a Quality Assurance SurveillancePlan for the BCAT contract. This plan should include metrics for the divisioncommanders to use for monitoring BCAT contract personnel as well as surveillancereports that should be submitted by commanders to the contracting officers

representative. The representative must be proactive in the BCAT mission by reviewingthese weekly reports and conducting site visits to ensure that the contractors effectivelyassist in the base closure process. This recommendation will remain open andRecommendation 1 in this report addresses additional action necessary to ensure thatthe BCATs effectively assist with the base closure process.

Monitoring of Base Closure Process

During our initial review, we found that theater personnel didn’t sufficiently monitorthe base closure process in Iraq and consequently may not have had an accurate picture

of the base closure posture in Iraq. At that time, we couldn’t validate the accuracy ofinformation used to assess the progress of base closures in Iraq and found thatpersonnel were using subjective methods to gauge the status of base closures. Thisoccurred because the theater didn’t have an effective tracking and reporting tool inplace to monitor base closures and ensure that units complied with establishedguidance or timelines. As a result, some units closed bases without following




established guidelines and/or obtaining approvals. Command had no assurance thatthe transactions and agreements some units entered into with the Government of Iraqwere legally sound or in accordance with established guidance.

In Recommendation A-3, we recommended that Command develop a system to

monitor base closures in Iraq and use this system to hold commanders accountable forcompleting base closure requirements on time and adhering to established policy.During our followup effort, we found that Command was developing a system tomonitor base closures in Iraq. Specifically, USF-I established and tested a systemcommonly referred to as the CUBE, between 15 and 30 June 2009. As of 31 October2009, the CUBE was functional and could produce charts that assessed base closuresfrom the macro theater level to the micro individual base level.

USF-I personnel demonstrated the capabilities of the system and showed that:

• At the theater level, base closure was assessed on a chart that compares the actualnumber of open bases during a certain period to previously established goals.

• At the division level, each division was assessed on a red/green/amber metricbased on a rollup of the bases in that division.

• At the individual level, each base was assessed on a base closure matrix for eachbase. The base closure matrix assigned red/green/amber status to each base foreach of the 13 documents required for submission by the base closure reportingform.

During followup, we found that the CUBE wasn’t fully functional and that it sufferedfrom quality control problems. Specifically, we found that USF-I needed to perform asignificant cleanup of the base closure data on the basing portal. Additionally, weidentified some disagreement between the USF-I functional divisions regarding theexact location from which base closure data was pulled for use in the CUBEassessments. As a result, USF-I basing personnel were manually compiling data forinclusion in reports to higher command while working to make the CUBE moreaccurate. Based on our followup assessment, Recommendation A-3 was beingimplemented and will remain open until the CUBE is fully functional.

Support for Recent Base Closures

Our initial audit showed that USF-I subordinate units didn’t sufficiently documentrecent base closures in Iraq. In addition, we found that major subordinate commandand unit commanders didn’t fully understand the effect of not submitting documentsbecause command leadership didn’t emphasize the need for long-term document




retention. Without sufficient base closure documentation, command had no assurancethat base closures were executed in accordance with established guidelines. Inaddition, the United States had no documented support to provide to the Governmentof Iraq or Iraqi citizens should claims or questions regarding base closures arise later.We made three recommendations to improve the documentation of base closures in

Iraq:

• Standardize methods for gathering base closure documentation and use thisdocumentation to track base closure progress.

• Retrieve missing base closure documentation.

• Formalize the process for long-term document retention.

During the followup audit, we found that USF-I published FRAGO 712 directing theestablishment of the Base Closure Reporting Portal no later than 8 July 2009. The

FRAGO also directed major subordinate commands to use the base closure portal toupload select base closure documents so that leadership could track the closure/returnprocess by base, task, and MND/Force. We verified that USF-I ensured regularcompliance with the reporting requirements in FRAGO 712 by reporting each MND’sbase closure status to the Joint Sustainment Integration Board in a red/green/amberstatus. We also verified that USF-I personnel used the Battle Update Assessmentmeetings to report base closure issues to the USF-I Chief of Staff. Because of theseactions, Recommendation A-4 can be closed.

We also found that command conducted an internal base closure documentation audit

for all bases closed since October 2008 to locate the missing base closure documentationwe noted in our initial report. In July 2009, command published FRAGO 832 directingunits to turn in missing base closure documentation to USF-I. If documentationcouldn’t be found or tasks hadn’t been conducted at some sites, units were required tosubmit a memorandum for record signed by their Division Chief of Staff indicating thisinformation. As a result of the FRAGO, USF-I obtained 97 percent of recent baseclosure and property transaction documentation - a significant increase over the 25-33percent rate we recorded during our initial audit. As a result, Recommendation A-5 canbe closed.

USF-I was also formalizing the process used to transfer base closure documents toArmy Central Command for long-term retention. Although ARCENT had the ability todownload information from the basing portal, there was no formal process in place toensure documents were consistently archived. Recommendation A-6 will remain openuntil the process for long-term document retention has been fully formalized withARCENT.




Property Transactions

We previously reported that most guidance for property disposition and/or transfer tothe Government of Iraq during the base closure process was clear; however, theaterpersonnel needed to provide some additional clarification to assist units. In addition,we found that theater personnel needed to improve the coordination of resources forproperty accountability and documentation of property transactions during baseclosures. These conditions occurred because command had previously issued someconfusing guidance for property transactions; theater commanders hadn’t emphasizedthe importance of accurate property accountability in Iraq; and command didn’t havean effective method to retain documentation for property transactions related to baseclosures.

Guidance for Property Transfers

Most guidance for property disposition and transfer to the Government of Iraq duringthe base closure process was clear; however, command needed to provide someadditional clarification to assist units with the process. Units were specifically confusedwith guidance on returning functional bases and facilities and with guidance on FEPPreviews and documentation. We recommended that command clarify the guidance inRecommendations B-1 and B-3 in our initial audit report.

During our followup audit, we verified that Command personnel clarified the guidancefor leaving bases and property “functional.” Personnel used the SustainmentConference held in August 2009 and the weekly BMOPT meetings to explain anddiscuss the meaning of a functional base and the property transfers associated with afunctional base. We interviewed Headquarters - and Division-level personnel about theguidance and found that they understood the guidance and weren’t confused overwhat property to leave. Based on this information, Recommendation B-1 can be closed.

However, Command didn’t determine the information necessary for the FLIPL forms orthe correct routing of the form to ensure proper review, approval, and retention as wasrequired in Recommendation B-3. According to the initial audit Command Comments,dated 10 July 2009, the FLIPL instructions were included in Appendix D-1, Tab J:Foreign Excess Personal Property of Operations Order (OPORD) 09-02.1. However,

during our followup audit, we reviewed the document and found that the appendixwasn’t updated with the FLIPL information. In addition, we were unable to verify thatthe FLIPL process was ever discussed during the weekly Base Management WorkingGroup (BMWG) meetings. As a result, FLIPLs still might not be routed properly anditems may not be properly removed from theater property book. Recommendation B-3




will remain open and Command should include FLIPL guidance in OPORD 10-1, whichwas due to be published in January 2010.

We found that Command was working to implement Recommendation B-2 whichcalled for the formalization of the process with the TPBO that allowed for the review of

excess property inventories before it was declared as foreign excess personal property.Since our initial audit, USF-I personnel updated MNC-I OPORD 09-02 to direct thatpersonal property inventory lists be provided to the TPBO before property beingdeclared FEPP. However, the OPORD listed two individual points of contact instead ofan organizational or static e-mail account for the receipt of inventory lists. Duringfollowup, we found that one of the individuals listed in the document had alreadyrotated out of the theater and the other individual stated that they still hadn’t receivedany inventory lists unless they specifically requested them from the unit.

Therefore, the actions taken by Command didn’t fix the problem and the process hadn’t

changed since our initial audit. As a result, TPBO wasn’t able to screen inventoriesbefore base closures and unauthorized property may have been transferred to theGovernment of Iraq. We coordinated with auditors working on the Audit of ForwardOperating Base Closures-Government of Iraq Property Transfers (Foreign ExcessPersonal Property) (Project A-2010-ALL-0232) that was ongoing at the same time as ourfollowup. Since that project covered processes for FEPP transfers in Iraq, the teamagreed to include these recommendations in their audit work. Recommendation B-2will remain open and further actions for these recommendations will be included in theaudit report for Project A-2010-ALL-0232.

We also found that Command was implementing Recommendation B-4 that called forUSF-I to hold semiannual property synchronization meetings. Command hosted asustainment conference on 15 August 2009, which included a session on propertyguidance. In addition, property transfers were scheduled to be discussed at a basingsynchronization meeting planned for January 2010. The synchronization meeting iscoordinated with the rotation of units in January, new units will be informed of baseclosure and property accountability processes at the beginning of their deployment. Aswith Recommendation A-1, because the base closure process is ongoing and the needfor synchronization conferences will extend into the future, Recommendation B-4 willremain open.

Coordination of Resources

In our prior report, we concluded that Command effectively coordinated resources forproperty accountability and movement but needed to improve methods for ensuringunits participated in inventory reporting. Without improvements, Command wouldn’t




have an accurate assessment of the total amount of property that must be disposed of,transferred to other units, transferred to the Government of Iraq, or transported out ofIraq as bases closed. To improve property accountability in Iraq, in RecommendationB-5 we required command to:

• Make property accountability a command priority and monitor compliance withproperty accountability issues at the executive level and hold commandersresponsible for updating inventories.

• Continue to monitor the monthly inventories required by FRAGOs 217 and 09-252and provide regular updates to commanders.

• Reiterate the availability of the property assistance teams to account for property atany time or stage of a unit’s mission in theater.

During our followup audit, we found that command was implementing this

recommendation but that additional actions would be needed to fix the problem.Command published MNC-I FRAGO 373 (formerly FRAGO 217) directing all units tosubmit monthly property accountability inventories to MNC-I C4. Although Commandcontinued to monitor these monthly inventories, not all documentation was uploadedonto the basing portal because of technological difficulties that prevented units fromuploading their inventory memos. To abide by the FRAGO, units instead sent theirinventories to one individual; however, many of the documents never got uploaded tothe portal due to the extensive time it took to upload the forms onto the portal. Instead,the documents were scattered throughout the points of contact’s e-mail and in hispersonal files and, as a result, there was no assurance that property inventories were

correctly tracked or reported. To prevent this confusion in the future, in Recommen-dation A-2 of this report, we recommend that Command establish an automatedreporting form similar to the one used for uploading the base closure documentsdiscussed in Recommendation A-4 of the initial audit report. This would give USF-I amore efficient means of uploading and retaining monthly inventory memos inaccordance with FRAGO 373.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS

This section contains specific recommendations and a summary of command commentsfor each recommendation. The official Army position and verbatim commandcomments are in Annex D.




For the Commander, U.S. Forces - Iraq

Recommendation 1

Establish and implement a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan to monitor the BCATcontract to ensure personnel are sufficiently advising and assisting the base closureprocess. Provide metrics and surveillance methods/formats to Division Commandersfor reporting teams’ accomplishments and conduct site visits to measure contractors’performance.

Command Comments

USF-I J4 concurred with our recommendation and will coordinate with the LogisticsCivil Augmentation Program to implement metrics ensuring that BCATs are advisingand assisting the Division Commanders for base closures and returns. Target date forimplementation is July 2010.

Recommendation 2

Create a document repository portal, similar to the USF-I J7 basing portal to ensureproperty accountability inventories are accurately reported.

Command Comments

USF-I J4 partially concurred with our recommendation. On 24 March 2010, Commandagreed that all transfer property inventories in conjunction with base closure or returnmust be accurately accounted for and reported. USF-I stated that personnel must notpost all transfer property inventories in conjunction with base closures into the USF-I J7portal. USF-I nonconcurred with establishing another portal for property documentsbecause units commanders would be burdened with posting base closure documents atmultiple portals.

Agency Evaluation of Comments

USF-I met the intent of the recommendation by ensuring that the propertyaccountability inventories are posted to the J7 portal.

Agency Evaluation of USF-I Comments on Status of Original Recommendations

USF-I provided comments on the status of our original audit recommendations on24 March 2010 and updated those comments on 21 April 2010. The comments indicate




that USF-I concurred with the status of Recommendations A-1, A-4, A-5, B-1, and B-5.Therefore, Recommendations A-1 and B-5 will remain open and Recommendations A-4,A-5, and B-1, will be closed.

USF-I nonconcurred with our conclusion that Recommendations A-2, A-3, A-6, B-2, B-3,

and B-4 were being implemented and recommended that the status of therecommendations be changed to implemented. This occurred because USF-I tooksignificant actions to implement the remaining recommendations after we finishedfieldwork in November 2009 and before comments were issued in March and April2010. On 10 May 2010, we revisited USF-I at Camp Victory in Iraq and validated thatappropriate actions were taken since the end of our fieldwork. We evaluated thecomments and subsequent actions as follows:

• Recommendation A-2: On 24 March 2010, USF-I provided additional informationstating that all actions regarding the BCATs were completed in November 2009

after we completed our fieldwork. In May 2010, we verified that these actions hadcorrected the problem. This recommendation can now be closed.

• Recommendation A-3: The recommendation called for USF-I to develop a systemto monitor base closures in Iraq and use this system to hold commandersaccountable. On 24 March 2010, USF-I informed us that base closure status isbeing monitored through the J7 reporting portal and not the CUBE. In addition,Commanders are being held responsible for timely submission of base closuredocuments through biweekly BMOPT meetings. On 10 May 2010, we verified thatthese actions were completed and that they corrected the problem. Thisrecommendation can be closed.

• Recommendation A-6: While the process for transferring base closure documentsto ARCENT for long-term retention hasn’t been formalized, USF-I continues toprovide documents to ARCENT through an informal process that appears to beworking. USF-I’s actions meet the intent of the recommendation and therefore itcan be closed.

• Recommendation B-2: The review process for excess property inventory before itis declared excess and placed on a Foreign Excess Personal Property list will becovered under Army Audit Agency project A-2010-ALL-0232. This

recommendation can be closed.• Recommendation B-3: On 21 April 2010, USF-I informed us that FEPP FLIPL

procedures had been finalized. USF-I FRAGO 0969-SS-0099-2, Change 1 wasreleased on 14 April 2010 to clarify FLIPL processing procedures to include FEPP





to the field. On 10 May 2010, we verified that USF-I completed the actionsnecessary to close this recommendation.

• Recommendation B-4: On 24 March 2010, USF-I indicated that J4 had conductedtransfer property synchronization training in November 2009 and in February

2010. In addition, J4 has conducted specialized property training with eachdivision and major subordinate command. On 10 May 2010, we meet with USF-Ipersonnel and verified that these actions met the intent of the recommendation andtherefore it can be closed.

Official Army Position

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 provided the official Army position andagreed with our recommendations.



ANNEX A

A — GENERAL AUDIT INFORMATION

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We conducted the audit from October 2009 through January 2010 under project A-2010-ALL-0105.000.

The audit covered transactions representative of base closures at the time of our audit. Weperformed our audit at Camp Victory, Iraq and worked with United States Forces – Iraqpersonnel, as well as their subordinate commands.

We conducted this followup audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditingstandards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusion based on ouraudit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for ourfindings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

We didn’t base our conclusions on data processed by automated systems. Consequently, wedidn’t need to access the reliability of computer-processed data but rather based ourconclusions on documents maintained by command.

To determine whether the recommendations were implemented, we:

• Reviewed the prior audit report (A-2010-0044-ALL, dated 26 January 2010) and theassociated workpapers to identify audit recommendations and related audit concerns.

• Interviewed key personnel from USF-I, MND-North, MND-South, MND-Bagdad, MNF-West, and TPBO.

• Reviewed USF-I and Army guidance on base closures.

• Reviewed base closure documents retained on the basing portal.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 leads the Army Logistics enterprise in sustaining,preparing, resetting, and transforming the Nation’s Army in support of full spectrum

Followup Audit of Forward Operating Base Closures, United States Forces - Iraq (A-2010-0169-ALL) Page 17



ANNEX A

operations. The office’s mission is to deliver a ready Army by providing the best logisticscapabilities, policies, and programs.

USF-I is a merger initiated by MNF-I between five major commands including MNC-I Corps -Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, Joint Area Support Group-

Central, Iraqi Assistance Group, and Task Force 134, into one single command underneath thefour-star commander in Iraq.

MNF-I is the U.S.-led military command in Iraq, managing strategic level issues to includepeace support, civil military operations, and strategic engagement operations with local Iraqis.

MNC-I is the tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq, overseeingdivisions in the north, west, south, and Baghdad areas.

MNC-I C4 establishes sustainment plans, policies, and procedures for both tactical and

operational logistics support and services to sustain Joint and Coalition Forces within theMNC-I Area of Responsibility. Within base closure, the major role of C4 is logistic reposturing,involving drawing-down, storing, and redistributing equipment. C4 is also responsible forforecasted planning for future draw-down and redeployment procedures. C4 is the lead indeveloping the BCAT concept.

MNC-I C7 plans, resources, and synchronizes combat and general engineering operations insupport of Joint and Coalition Forces in the Iraqi Combined Joint Areas of Operations. C7Basing serves as the focal point for MNC-I base management by centralizing all basingrequirements and issues to produce a holistic basing approach. Using their Secure Internet

Protocol Router Web Portal, C7 Basing facilitates the flow of base closure guidance anddocuments between the responsible MNDs, major subordinate commands, and external sectionsand agencies. MNC-I C7 has officially transitioned to USF-I J7.

The TPBO is to provide an accounting and visibility system to units in theater facilitated byusing Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced as an accounting software package. The TPBOenforces Army regulations and implements systemic fixes, when necessary; sets policies;provides guidance to the theater; establishes accountability procedure with sister Services andcoalition forces; and is ultimately responsible for all theater-provided equipment in the Iraq areaof operations.




ANNEX A


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

These personnel contributed to the report: Theresa R. Wilson (Audit Manager); and Amy Q.Rogers (Auditor-in Charge); Trevor A. Strickland, and Aaron P. Brown (Auditors); and Faith

Pruett (Editor).

DISTRIBUTION

We are sending copies of this report to the:

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4Commander, United States Forces - Iraq

We will also make copies available to others upon request.



ANNEX B

B — ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

ARCENT Army Central CommandBCAT Base Closure Assistance Team

BMOPT Base Management Operations Planning TeamBMWG Base Management Working GroupFEPP Foreign Excess Personal PropertyFLIPL Financial Liability Investigation of Property LossFRAGO Fragmentary OrderMNC-I Multi-National Corps – IraqMND Multi-National DivisionMNF-I Multi-National Force – IraqOPORD Operations OrderTPBO Theater Property Book OfficeUSF-I United States Forces - Iraq




ANNEX C

C — PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations and status of implementation for audit report A-2010-0044-ALL.

Number RecommendationImplementation

Status

A-1

Host semiannual base closure synchronization conferences tobring together the key players in the base closure process.Update and clarify base closure guidance and processesduring these events. In-Process

A-2

Take the following actions to ensure the BCATs effectivelyassist with the base closure process:

• Expedite the staffing, resourcing, and training of theBCATs.

• Use the BMWG Meetings and the semiannual basesynchronization conferences to publicize and promotethe capabilities of the BCATs so that units will knowtheir capabilities.

• Use the teams to provide initial base closure training forunits that are beginning the process. This training

should include an introduction-type instruction that willfamiliarize the units with the base closure process andprovide them with the tools and contacts necessary tostart the process.

Implemented

A-3

Develop a system to monitor base closures in Iraq and usethis system to hold commanders accountable for completingbase closure requirements on time and adhering toestablished policy. Implemented

A-4

Standardize methods for gathering base closuredocumentation. Use document submission as a method to

track the progress of base closures and to hold commandersresponsible for compliance with established policy. Implemented

A-5Retrieve missing base closure documentation and post on theMNC-I C7 Basing Portal. ImplementedFormalize the process for transferring base closuredocuments to ARCENT for long-term retention.




ANNEX C


A-6 Implemented

B-1

Clarify the guidance for leaving bases and property“functional.” Discuss the intent of the guidance at theBMOPT meetings to ensure subordinate units understand. Implemented

B-2

Formalize the process with the Theater Property Book Office

that allows for review of excess property inventories before itis declared as foreign excess personal property. Implemented

B-3

Determine the information necessary on the FLIPL forms andthe correct routing of the form to ensure proper review,approval, and retention. Disseminate guidance to units. Implemented

B-4

Host semi-annual property synchronization conferences withkey players to update and clarify property guidance andrequirements necessary during the base closure process. Implemented

B-5

Take the following actions to improve propertyaccountability in Iraq:

• Make property accountability a command priority. Monitor compliance with property accountability issuesat the executive level and hold commanders responsiblefor updating inventories.

• Continue to monitor the monthly inventories requiredby MNC-I FRAGO 217 and MNF-I FRAGO 09-252.Provide regular updates to commanders.

• Reiterate the availability of the property assistance teams

to account for property at any time or stage of a unit’smission in theater, even if it is before the unit’sinvolvement in a base closure.

In-Process



ANNEX D

D — OFFICIAL ARMY POSITION ANDVERBATIM COMMENTS BY COMMAND




ANNEX D




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