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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army WarCollege and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related tonational security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate-gic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategicstudies that develop policy recommendations on:

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Stephen J. BlankLouis H. Jordan, Jr.

Editors

August 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-545-3


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CONTENTS

Foreword ....................................................................... v

1. The Precarious and Far-ReachingCurrent Undecidability of the

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty .................1 Paul Schulte

2. European/Eurasian Securityand the Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe .......................................25

Jeffrey D. McCausland

3. European Security and Arms Control ................. 53 Sergey Rogov

About the Contributors .............................................. 69


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FOREWORD

While much attention is always given to issues ofstrategic and nuclear arms control, the conventionalarms control agenda remains something of a step-child. Nonetheless, in regards to European security,conventional arms control issues are of the utmostsignicance. Indeed, since Russia suspended its ob-servance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treatyin 2007, there has already been one war in Europe, theRusso-Georgian war of 2008, and many subsequentrumors of war. Indeed, one could arguably claim thatsince that Russian suspension, progress on ensuringEuropean security has stagnated, if not worse.

Bearing in mind the importance of these issues toEuropean security in general and Russian ties withEurope and the United States in particular, as well as

the connection between the conventional and nucleararms control agendas, the Strategic Studies Institute(SSI) is pleased to present our readers with this mono-graph wherein three distinguished U.S., European,and Russian experts outline the parameters of thesethorny interrelated issues. These papers represent theviews presented at the SSI-Carnegie Council confer-ence at Pocantico, NY, from June 1-3, 2011, and weresubsequently revised for publication by the editors.Taken together, these articles fully clarify the multipleand complicated dimensions and connections linkingthese issues of conventional arms control and force re-ductions in Europe to the wider strategic and nuclearissues in which the parties are also involved. In thisrespect, they embody a major part of our activity in

fostering international analysis and dialogue on topi-cal security issues for the benet and enlightenment ofpolicymakers and experts.


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At the same time, the presentation of these papersrepresents one more example of SSIs ability and will-

ingness to partner with major think tanks and organi-zations devoted to the analysis of contemporary stra-tegic issues, to bring international experts together incandid, high-level, and wide-ranging discussions, andto publish papers and books dealing with these issuesfor the benet of our audience. In this spirit, we pres-ent these essays to our readers.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute


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CHAPTER 1

THE PRECARIOUS AND FAR-REACHINGCURRENT UNDECIDABILITY OF THE

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY

Paul Schulte

BACKGROUND

Updated analysis of interests, possibilities, andimplications for the ground-breaking ConventionalForces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is timely. This is lessbecause the diplomatic situation of CFE itself has beenobservably changing (attempts to modernize it into auniversally observed Adapted Conventional Forces inEurope [ACFE] Treaty remain in long-term stalemate),

but because there are new arguments over how muchit might be worth paying for its reanimation.Whilethe future of the CFE project is certainly gloomy, itremains unresolved at present in Europe, though pos-sibly replicable elsewhere.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

In considering CFEs disputed future and widersignicance, it is paradoxically helpful to lookat thedeeper past. There is an instructive contrast betweenthe adaptation of the CFE Treaty with the complexand long-running 19th century Schleswig-HolsteinQuestion. The perennial British Foreign SecretaryJohn Henry Temple Palmerston said that Only three

people have ever really understood the Schleswig-Holstein businessthe Prince Consort, who isdeada German professor, who has gone madand


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I, who have forgotten all about it. The group of spe-The group of spe-cialist policymakers and academic commentators for

CFE/ACFE often seems only slightly larger. Both theSchleswig-Holstein and CFE questions were not onlyfamously complicated, but also largely incomprehen-sible to the public.

They also perfectly illustrate diametrically differ-ent approaches to military assertion and the role ofarmed force. The Schleswig-Holstein Question wasbuilt on dynastic convolutions and the complexitiesof feudal law. It was resolved violently. The SecondSchleswig War of 1864, in which a rising, revisionistPrussia took the dominant military role, can be seenas a move from the concerted conservative stabilityof post-Napoleonic Europe into the cycle of 19th and20th century nationalist and, later, ideological con-icts which tore Europe apart until 1945 and kept it

separated until 1989.1

The CFE project is an attemptto prevent further wars or military blackmail in theEurasian continent stretching from the Atlantic to theUrals, by rigorously formulated obligations to providemilitary transparency, and legally enshrined controlson allowable holdings of key weapons.

During the early days of CFE, Robert Cooper, nowCounsellor to the European External Action Service,even erected a theory2which framed and exalted CFEas the dening expression of global post-modernity,into which Europe would lead the world by seek-ing transparency and mutual trust rather than re-lying on balances of Westphalian national power,and threatened or actual resort to arms. Intrusivevericationwhich is at the heart of the CFE system

is a key element in a post-modern order where statesovereignty is no longer seen as an absolute . . . [and]. . . security is based on transparency, mutual open-security is based on transparency, mutual open-


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ness, interdependence, and mutual vulnerability.3The German Foreign Ministry, with its large arms con-

trol constituency, therefore characteristically tends torefer to CFE asthe capstone of European security. They,like others, additionally point out that it is also a treatythat could be uniquely valuable in moving from codi-fying defense relations in the Cold War world into ad-dressing post-Cold War arrangements where agree-ments have to be multilateral, there are no simplifyingalliances and parity has no easy bipolar meaning.

This chapters main predictive theoretical propo-sition is that in fact, progress on conventional armscontrol in Europe will continue to move at a pace dic-tated by nuclear atmospherics. This is because CFE,and, before it,mutual and balanced force reductions(MBFR), have expressed the wider state of East-Weststrategic relations, above all between the United States

and Russia. These relations have been anchored on anoverriding concern for nuclear stability.

NEGOTIATING HISTORIES

The historical record bears this out: The MBFRnegotiations process was initiated as a result of U.S.-Russian dtente, which culminated in an agreementbetween Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at the1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) meet-Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) meet-ing to move forward by separate political and militarynegotiations.4The Conference on Security and Coop-eration in Europe (CSCE) would deal with politicalnegotiations and MBFR would deal with military is-sues.

Bloc to bloc MBFR negotiations began in Vienna,Austria, in October 1973 to reduce conventional mili-tary forces in Central Europe to equal but signicantly


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lower levels. The talks were stultied by disagreementsover Limitations on Residual Forces (how national

sub-ceilings should apply after reductions), Associ-Associ-ated Measures (the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion [NATO] sought condence building measures[CBMs] such as prior notication of maneuvers andacceptance of observers, while the Warsaw Pact re-jected this as over intrusive and insisted that NationalTechnical Measures should sufce), and the Data Dis-the Data Dis-crepancy (how large the Warsaw Pact forces actuallywere). No substantive progress was made, althoughthe process itself, despite its protracted frustrations,was judged by many to have been worthwhile in fa-cilitating strategic dialogue between East and West.

But MBFR was ostentatiously stalled in 1979, asone of many angry Soviet responses to NATOs deci-to NATOs deci-to NATOs deci-NATOs deci-sion to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weap-

ons in Europe. After the intermediate-range nuclearforces(INF) crisis was surmounted, and the Cold Warwound down, the MBFR talks were formally ended in1989 and overtaken by negotiations in the new CFEframework.

CFE achieved a historically rapid movement tosignature in 1989 between the two blocks5 on tanks,armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery,combat aircraft, and attack helicoptersthe weapon-ry most important for large-scale offensive operations,collectively referred to as treaty-limited equipment(TLE). Thereafter, while the strategic atmosphere be-tween Russia and the West remained benign, by theend of the Treatys reduction period in 1995, the 30States Parties completed and veried by inspection

the destruction or conversion of over 52,000 battletanks, ACVs, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and at-tack helicopters. By the end of 1996, CFE states had


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also accepted and conducted more than 2,700 intru-sive on-site inspections.

Subsequent events created the obvious imperativeof adapting the Treaty to take account of the dissolu-tion of the Warsaw Pact and the possibility of NATOexpansion. For this, the key agreed features6were:

National Ceilingson TLE that states can deploywithin the treatys area of application, whichstretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).

Territorial Ceilingson TLE that can be deployedin each country within the ATTU.

Temporary Deployments: requirements to notifyadditions to territorial ceilings for military ex-ercises, temporary deployments or exception-al circumstances.

Transparency: a requirement on states parties topermit inspections of 20 percent of their ob-

jects of verication, down to regimental level,and storage, repair, and reduction sites withTLE present. Annual or quarterly reports onthe actual location of tanks, ACVs, and artillerywere also required, together with notication ofincreases in a state partys holdings of combataircraft or attack helicopters anywhere withinthe ATTU.

Flank Limitations: CFEs biggest challenge hadprobably been Russias discontent with treatysub-ceilings imposed to prevent dangerousconcentrations of TLE in the so-called north-ern and southern ank zones of the ATTU,adjacent to and including Norway and Turkey.But Russia remains the only state with treaty

limitations on deployment of its own forces onits own territory, in the sensitive St. Petersburgand North Caucasus military districts. The 1996


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review conference agreed numerical and geo-graphical changes to the ank rules for Rus-

sia and Ukraine, with additional transparencymeasures to meet the concerns of other ankstates.

The ACFE ank accord allowed new, higher limitson Russian battle tanks, ACVs, and heavy artillery de-ployed or stored in the now-recongured ank zone.According to President Bill Clinton in his Letter ofTransmittal to the Senate of 1997:

The Flank Document conrms the importance of sub-regional constraints on heavy military equipment.More specically, it revalidates the idea, unique toCFE, of limits on the amount of equipment particularnations in the Treaty area can locate on certain por-tions of their own national territory.7

During the ratication process, there were congres-sional anxieties that Moscow might use the new rulesto prolong an imposed presence in Georgia, Ukraine,Moldova, and Azerbaijan, together with fears that theClinton administration would be too accommodatingto this pressure in order to facilitate NATO expansion.

Before giving its consent, the Senate consequently in-sisted upon additional assurances with regard to thesovereignty of the former Soviet republics.

The ACFE Treaty text was therefore signed at theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-rope (OSCE) Istanbul summit in November 1999 onthe basis of Russian undertakings to withdraw fromthe Republic of Moldova, to reduce equipment levels

in Georgia and agree with the Georgian authoritieson the modalities and duration of the Russian forcesstationed on Georgian territory, and to reduce their


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forces in the anks to the agreed levels of the ACFETreaty.8

But worsening disputes over NATO enlargement,and the intentions behind U.S. missile defense (MD)plans, eroded Russian willingness to comply with itsIstanbul Commitments. Consequently only Belarus,Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine ratied the ACFE,and Russias ratication has been suspended.

In 2007, emphasising the unacceptability of theextraordinary circumstance of the introduction ofU.S. missile defenses in Europe, President VladimirPutin demanded a rewriting of the ACFE Treaty andwarned of a moratorium on Russias observation.NATO refused to change its policy, and Russia sub-sequently imposed the moratoriumalmost certainlyin legal violation of CFE provisions.Russia has haltedverication visits since June 2007 and insists that it is

no longer obliged by treaty to limit its conventionalweapons.

In a partially emollient response, NATO initiallyendorsed a parallel actions package in March 2008,calling for Alliance countries nevertheless to begin theACFE ratication process, while Russia was expectedand exhorted to have commenced its required with-drawals. It was hoped that Russia would resolve itsissues with Georgia and Moldova, and NATO nationscould then quickly complete ratication of the ACFETreaty and address additional Russian security con-cerns.

Russia rejected that expectation, and chances ofagreement have since been further undermined by theAugust 2008 conict with Georgia, Moscows decision

in the same month to recognize South Ossetia and Ab-khazia as independent nations, and its continuing re-fusal to accept any reference to host nation consentas a fundamental principle.


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In the course of 2010 attempts made towards re-suscitation, several bilateral as well as multilateral

meetings (using the formula 30+6, 30 CFE membersand 6 non-CFE NATO members) took place. Russiaand NATO submitted new proposals on escaping thedeadlock, although statements from both sides indi-cated little chance of agreement.9Yet, as a result ofpost-Cold War military reductions, actual holdings ofTLE are in almost all cases well below permitted ceil-ings.

All this has created a continuing long-term log jambetween NATO and Russia, leaving CFE on life sup-port with a diplomatic crisis approaching in the formof a Review Conference required before the end of theyear.

THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS

What are the apparent balances of interest in re-animating, adapting, and preserving the gains of CFEinside such a framework?

Benets to NATO.

There are multiple reasons for NATO to want topreserve CFE.

Arms Control is a continuing Alliance impera-tive. At least among European allies, pub-lic opinion, above all in Germany, would bealarmed and unforgiving if NATO appeared tobe giving up on any hope of reviving ACFE.

Ostentatious concern to preserve (or perfume)

the corpse of CFE may be essential to preventdissension over NATOs nuclear deterrenceposture, which is now being examined in the


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Alliances Deterrence and Defence Posture Re-view (DDPR).

It would seem, at least to those Westerners whoare aware of the issue, axiomatically importantto preserve the system of military transparencyas widely as possible in Europe. Collapseof theCFE Treaty would damage European arms con-damage European arms con-European arms con-trol in general, all institutions and instrumentsand the transnational networks of experts, andtrained specialist military observers dealingwith cooperative security.

It is uncertain whether the Vienna Document1999 procedures on condence and security-building measures10 could survive if the CFETreaty were formally declared dead by all par-ties.

But similar pessimism over the Dayton Ac-But similar pessimism over the Dayton Ac-

cordswould not seem to be justied. They arebuttressed by local and Balkan-wide regionalpressures and incentives from NATO and theEuropean Union (EU) which are probably suf-ciently powerful to hold the present situationtogether even in the absence of CFE.

Russia and ACFE: General Difcultyand Specic Objections.

Russias overall problem is that CFE originallycodied rough parity at a moment of rough bal-ance between the Warsaw Pact and the West, amidhoneymoon expectations of closer and closer secu-rity relations. Adapted CFE would have to be agreed,

evolved, and applied indenitely in a situation of un-disguiseable and probably growing disparity betweena Russia without close military allies and an expanded28-nation NATO, and where security partnership be-


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tween NATO and Russia is frequently proclaimed asan objective but is far from apparent.

Specic Russian objections are loud and numer-ous. The Russian Government now appears to be de-manding:11

ratication of the 1999 ACFE Treaty by theNATO states;

rapid accession of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-ania to the ACFE and their early ratication,to restrict emergency deployments of NATOforces there;

denition of the term substantial combatforces which would limit the forces which theAlliance could introduce into the new NATOstates;

immediate renegotiation and modernization ofACFE if it were ever, temporarily, brought into

force; balance of some kind between Russian and

NATO forces through a compensatory lower-ing of overall NATO ceilings on Treaty limitedequipment to take account of NATOs 1999 and2004 enlargements and the presence of Ameri-can forces in new NATO nations;

rejection of the principle of Host Nation Con-sent to limit Russian deployments. Russia con-siders the vexed troop withdrawal issues bilat-eral Russian-Georgian or Russian-Moldovanquestions, not relevant to European arms con-trol; and,

the abolition of discriminatory ank restric-tions on Russian territory (which especially af-

fect the volatile North Caucasus) by means ofapolitical decision between NATO and Russiaas necessary strategic compensation for NATOenlargement.


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Given the vigor with which Putin denounced CFEin 2007, there is now a self-inicted restriction on Rus-

sian freedom of political maneuver, because conces-sions in this area could easily be perceived as loss ofmachismo in election years.

Benets to Russia.

But without CFE, Russia would lose transparencyover the forces of existing or future members of a muchlarger and militarily superior Alliance and, above all,any legal limits on the deployment of NATO forcesinto the territory of the three geopolitically crucial Bal-tic Republics which are not parties to CFE and yet areso neurologically close to St. Petersburg and RussiasWindow on Europe.

SOLUTIONS

A rangeof compromisesdesigned to save the CFEprocess have been ingeniously charted by ProfessorJeffrey McCauslandand others.12

Summary of Options.

Option 1. Continue the current policy of seeking par-allel actions by NATO members and Russia leading to aresumption of Russian CFE implementation and a move to-ward the ACFE Treaty, with some additional inducementsto Moscow, perhaps by: a) declaring overall lower ter-ritorial and national ceilings, with only political effectuntil the ACFE entered into force; or by, b) including

the geopolitically crucial Baltic States, in particular,declaring their future territorial and national ceilings.


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Option 2. Continue current policies while opening theACFE Treaty to amendment. As a variant, NATO could

begin to address Russian concerns over ank limita-tions, providing Russia showed signs of restarting itsimplementation of CFE and began serious treaty-re-lated negotiations with Georgia and Moldova. NATOallies could decide to offer discussion of ank limits inthe framework of the parallel actions package.

Option 3.Begin provisional application of the ACFETreaty, but with conditions. The Alliance could provi-sionally apply ACFE among its 10 members for, say,18 months, in the hope of reciprocation from Russiathrough resumption of her implementation, and pro-gressive satisfaction of the Istanbul Commitments.

Option 4. Cease implementing the CFE Treaty andmanage a soft landing for the end of the CFE regime.NATO allies could signal to Russia that they had lost

condence in the parallel actions package or in anyother potential negotiated solution. Consequently, ifRussia continued its refusal to resume implementa-tion of the existing treaty or to negotiate over forces inGeorgia and Moldova, NATO would allow the Treatyto dieperhaps without formal ending. To soften theimpact on the international landscape, this positioncould, however, be combined with attempts to per-suade all CFE states parties to make political commit-ments to continue observing CFE treaty ceilings.

Near Term Prospects.

What might now realistically happen? PreviousEuropean arms control experience, and statements by

both sides, suggest that it would be unrealistic to ex-pect ACFE to be re-examined, ratied, or otherwiserevived unless it can be incorporated into a wider U.S.


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Russian rapprochementnearly certain to be domi-nated by nuclear aspects, as before.

Discussion in NATO related conferences betweenMarch and May 2011 suggested that, while this wouldcertainly be a demanding condition, it may not be en-tirely impossible. In particular, a well-informed yetstill optimistic diplomat in the mission of a major allyrepeatedly argued that the crucial inducement wouldbe Russias hope of getting access to advanced U.S.MD technologies through some kind of sharing ar-rangement. Others suggest that the additional nuclearsecurity advantages of getting some control over thepotential upload of U.S. strategic systems in a furthertreaty would add to the incentive for Russia at leastto go through the motions of reopening the process toadapt CFE.

CFEs prospects consequently depend on the Rus-

sian leadership seeing a positive outcome from en-tering overlapping negotiations over nuclear reduc-tions (in both Central Strategic and Theatre NuclearWeapons, including upload capacity and weapons instorage), MDs, and Conventional Forces in WesternEurasia. This would amount to a tentative military-technical conrmation of long sought RussoAmeri-can reset.

It is presumably in recognition of these interac-tions that responsibility for CFE is widely rumored tobe transferred to Rose Gottemoellers already impres-sively full State Department negotiating portfolio asAssistant Secretary in the Bureau of Arms Control,Verication and Compliance. Sergey Kislyak,RussiasAmbassador to the United States, stated to Mrs. Gotte-stated to Mrs. Gotte-

moeller at the Carnegie Nuclear Conference in March2011 that Russia was open to such a multiple negotia-tion process addressing strategic and theater nuclearweapons, missile defenses, and conventional forces.


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If the political hurdles to setting up the negotia-tions could be surmounted, as these overtures tan-

talisingly suggest, the actual negotiating complexi-ties would, of course, remain formidable: huge andnovel verication difculties, and difculties in gain-ing agreeement for the counting methodologies thatwill dene the balance between diverse conventionalforces, or, harder still, between conventional and nu-clear forces. (MBFR, as a whole, illustrated how long astalemate could be maintained over relatively simpleissues such as numbers of militarily identical count-ing units, e.g., numbers of troops or main battle tanks;while attempts by NATO to trade-off Soviet tank unitsfor the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weap-ons came to nothing.) Russias aspiration would be to-Russias aspiration would be to-Russias aspiration would be to-wards a wide scale multiple rebalancing with NATO.There is little public, or academic, indication of new

efforts to think through the fundamental methodo-logical problems involved.

Still, while scienticallyexact calculations may beimpossible, a good enough equivalency in a widescale multiple rebalancing might be agreed upon asthe de facto objective. Even the preliminaries to an am-bitious forward-looking negotiation of that kind couldhave attractions in condence building and creationof a positive diplomatic atmosphere.

Longer-term Possibilities.

At best, revival of CFE to allow ratication of ACFEwould mean formal, legalistic, and short-lived transi-tional steps to a very slow substantive new negotia-

tion. Even going that far would, however, undoubt-edly encounter intra-alliance difculties, though theanxieties of ank allies might be diminished by more


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assured reinforcements and continuous improvementin electronics, unmanned airpower, precision weap-

ons, and reinforcement planning. But these develop-ments would also have to be addressed in the negotia-tions. An ACFE follow-on agreement would probablylook very different: as much of a transformation asCFE was to MBFR.

If a new negotiation could be started, it might bepossible to reach compromises on numbers and evenank limits. But it will be harder to relent on the prin-cipal of host country consent, which is integral toboth the current and ACFE treaties. The ACFE Treatywould never have been signed if Russia had not rstsigned the bilateral agreements involving withdrawalfrom Georgia and Moldova.13

There is no public indication of compromiseswhich may have been formulated by the United States

to coax Russia back into a conventional arms controlprocess. But diplomatic ingenuity and high-mindedfudging might offer sufcient promise within an inev-itably long and complex negotiation, cross linked withparallel high stakes U.S.-Russian nuclear and missiledefense talks.

CORRELATIONS OF FORCES AND ARMSCONTROL METHODOLOGY

Certain issues raised by conventional arms controlin Europe have wider implications. Part of the unpre-dictability of the CFE decision, and indeed wider un-certainties about Russias future strategic choices, de-rives from uncertainties in understanding how others

see the effects of military power outside of warfare.This differs from the abstract military-on-military cal-culations of the impact of arms control proposals oncombat outcomes, which are complex enough.


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It appears publicly difcult to acknowledge, andeven more to agree upon, the signicance of what

Russian commentators continue to call, even after theend of sophisticated Marxist theories of conict, thebalance or correlation of forces: political and psy-chological force elds generated in peacetimeor incipi-ent crisis by military power, which may differ fromthe predicted utility of forces in professional militarycalculations. To give one recent example:

The Russian government considered various alterna-tives of rendering aid in [the 2008 Georgian] situation.After study of the correlation (or balance) of forcesand the tactical situation several years in advance ofAugust 2008, the necessity became evident for directmilitary intervention if the Georgian army undertookan attack on Tskhinvali.14

The literature of arms control does not easily cap-ture this aspect. Formally, ACFE or its successor wouldsolely affect the top level of Professor Joseph Nyesnow famous three-dimensional 21st-century securitychess board, which involves in addition to militarypower, successively, economic power on the next lev-el down and nongovernmental organizational (NGO)

activities and cultural ows below that.

15

ACFE wouldlimit and oversee a set-up of military counters on thattop playing surface which would be deliberately andexplicitly intended to make successful ground offen-sives harder to conduct and therefore less potentiallypsychologically signicant. In general, Western politi-cians and analysts tend to doubt the utility of powerconstellations on the top board in radiating inuence

down to the other nonmilitary political, economic,and playing surfaces, and it is not generally discussedin public statements. Even so, there is some informal


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acknowledgement of this factor, in the discourse ofreassurance of exposed allies. A senior NATO ofcial

repeatedly emphasised that we use nuclear weaponsevery day in inuencing Eurasian geopolitics to wagedeterrence and assurance. Presumably, conventionalforce balances have analogous psychological effects.

Russian perceptions are neither likely to mirrorimage NATOs, nor to put a lower political value onmilitary numbers. Conventional arms control in Eu-rope now seems to depend, in the near term at least,on Russian conclusions about the impact of ACFE andassociated negotiations on the Correlation of Forcesaffecting Russias preservation as a Great Power. Deci-sions on entering some large-scale holistic negotiationwill form part of Russias latest iteration of its fatefulnational choice of either trust in or suspicion of theWest.

It cannot be easy to determine the best way ofinhibiting what Russia frequently denounces as re-lentless pressures from NATO800 million rich,well-armed democracy-infatuated and moralisticallymeddlesome citizens of a super power and its alliesrecently attacking the Libyan Regime. The Russiansappear genuinely perturbed about the ultimate inten-tions behind the endless inventiveness of Americanmilitary power. In the worst case, they indicate theirfear that NATO might impose, or try continuouslyto threaten, Kosovo style solutions to future crisesby sixth generation high-technology, conventionalstand-off repower, capable of decapitation attacks,backed by nuclear missiles and, in the future, MD.16

Little in Russias strategic culture and political his-

tory indicates that the present Russian leadership seetheir Great Power status and regime security beingtidily accommodated, insulated from wider political


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and economic considerations, within hygienic, legallyenforceable, Kantian Euro Atlantic Security Struc-

tures, the Holy Grail of the European vision.Instead, and in relation to their own objectives

not necessarily stupidly, Russian decisionmakers arelikely to see Eurasian security as a complex, continu-ously changing mixture of pressures; counterpres-sures; reciprocal inhibitions; anxieties; intimidation;accommodations; cross-border political and culturalsubversion; fomented secessions; orchestrated ethnicminority discontents; externally sponsored color revo-lutions; self-interestedly subsidized scholarships; cy-ber offensive and defensive capabilities; technologicalthreats; trade deals; energy dependencies and vulner-abilities; historical emotions, fears, and resentments;intra-Alliance fault lines; and mixes of inducementsranging between negotiated strategic bargains, saber

rattling maneuvers, co-optation of decisionmakers,soft loans, and straightforward bribery. This hybridconception of security, involving endless state com-petition on many levels with few clear boundariesbetween peace and war, is one in which the presentregime feels itself profoundly threatened (as perhapsalternative politico economic systems in Moscowmight not) and required to respond with appropriatevigor. The corollary is that Russia can be described asa challenging neighbor by a small outspoken adja-cent state.17

From Russias perspective, the region encompass-ing the former Soviet republics is its sphere of privi-leged interests, and Moscow views U.S. and Westernexpansion in this area as a threat.18A positive Cor-

relation of Forces, as existed in relation to Georgia in2008, is very likely to seem positive in maintaining that


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sphere19and countering that and other threats. But itis not easily reconcilable with the intentions of CFE.

Will Russias difcult and probably weakening(and most certainly demographically declining) stra-tegic hand seem best strengthened by agreeing toexamine progressive merger into postmodern trans-parency and military predictability within an ACFEfollow-on system? Or would Russia maintain the bestpossible correlation of forces, which could most con-dently ensure that its Near Abroad does, in fact, proveto be a privileged sphere of inuence, by remainingunconstrained by treaty limits and transparencies, inorder to remain (and be perceived as) more capableof launching military actions to support its nationalinterests in that geopolitical zone, as it did in 2008against Georgia?

Russias leaders may therefore need signicant

inducements to conclude that, in the foreseeable stra-tegic climate, the impact on the correlation of forcesof the potential combined negotiations now on offerwould be positive, (and there are likely to be differentviews on that between Putin and Medvedev and theirfactions.) Otherwise, a paralysed CFE will continueon life support-which will only be turned off in someway if NATO could risk the painful internal dispute.

Russias decision over these negotiation packagesand possibilities, including an ACFE follow on, willbe far reaching and, publicly at least, is still in the bal-ance. But it will not be irreversible. It should be seenas just the latest movement in the long Eurasian stra-tegic dance stretching out into the decades to come.


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WIDER ISSUES AND GLOBAL POSSIBILITIES

Current commentary and recent conferences haverevealed few reasons to expect a positive change inCFEs prospects in the near future. Nevertheless,whatever choices may emerge from Russias strategicculture and sense of special predicament and destiny,it is worth looking forward and outward. To call theCFE process mankinds last best hope would clearlybe exaggerated, but equally certainly it hasbeen theworlds most successful attempt so far at reducing mil-itary insecurity and suspicion on a continental scale.Secure and peaceful conditions may not have arrivedthroughout Eurasia (although most parts of Europeare now a security community in which resumption ofhistorical conicts seem inconceivable), but we shouldnot ignore the moral, political, and human develop-

ment case for assisting similar movement elsewherewhere conditions could become receptive to the be-nign diplomatic and political technology which wasdeveloped during the CFE process.

It has meant that in Europe, with enormous as-sistance from the United States and frequently posi-tive reactions from Russia, laborious negotiations inHelsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, and elsewhere have cre-ated since the 1970s an interlocking system of: forcedeclarations, data exchanges, inspections, discussionsof military doctrines, notications of maneuvers,overights permitted by an Open Skies Treaty, trans-national military specialist communities of inspectorsand observers; and, crucially, a Joint ConsultativeGroup to take up and resolve anomalies, directly,

promptly, and discreetly. This effort culminated, aswe have seen, in the large-scale reductions of forcesachieved by CFE, increasing stability and saving tensof millions of dollars.


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Condence and Security Building Measures(CSBM) arrangements in Europe are not perfect or

universal and quite evidently not eternal, nor willthey necessarily prove to be the only model. But theyunquestionably helped transform Europe from theDark Continent of the early and mid-20th century tothe enormously more open, prosperous, and largelydemilitarized space that it is today.

This record prompts the question of how thewidely internationally applauded goal of Global Zerocould ever be achieved without the spread of such ar-rangements throughout a post-modern world. Mostimmediately, how realistic is it for diplomats to busythemselves debating the modalities of a Middle EastZone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and TheirMeans of Delivery (MEZFWMD), with the huge prob-lems in trust and verication that implies, if the re-

gional states cannot even agree on how to monitor thedeclared location and size of an armored division?

It is, however, encouraging that the underreportedConference on Interaction and Condence BuildingMeasures in Asia (CICA), which is modeled on theOSCE,20seems to be willing to examine many of themost positive CSBM lessons from Europe. It may bepossible to take the model still further aeld. System-atic consideration of how conventional arms controllessons from Europe might be globalized and adaptedon other continents in order to make maximum use ofinexpensive new aerial surveillance technologies andto contribute to regional security and nation-building,is the subject of a continuing project at the Centre forInternational Studies and Diplomacy at the School of

Oriental and African Studies in London University.Even if bafed and frustrated in its continent of birth,the CFE vision may ourish again in unexpected and


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exotic regions. But if, in fact, it never does, global ex-pectations for improved international security, eco-

nomic growth and prosperity will remain seriouslybounded.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. See, among other historical analyses, Russell J. Leng, In-terstate Crisis Behaviour, 1816-1980: Realism Vs Reciprocity, Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

2. Robert Cooper, The Post Modern State and the World Or-der available from www.demos.co.uk/les/postmodernstate.pdf.

3. Cooper was not the only writer to see far-reaching signi-cance in CFE: for example, Christopher Coker, Post-modernityand the end of the Cold War, Review of International Studies, July1992.

4. Chronology: CFE Treaty Negotiations and Implementa-tion, 1972-1996, Federation of American Scientists, n.d.

5. For the authoritative account of the genesis and nemesis ofCFE, see Jane M. O. Sharp,Striving for Military Stability in Europe:Negotiation, implementation and adaptation of the CFE Treaty, Lon-don, UK: Routledge, 2006.

6. A convenient brief overview is available from www.

armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.

7. Letter of Transmittal to Congress by President William J.Clinton, April 7, 1997.

8. NATO, Questions and Answers on CFE, n.d., p. 2, availablefrom www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2007_05/20090515_cfe_qa_factsheet.pdf.

9. Jacek Durkalec, The Russian Approach towards Revival of Con-ventional Arms Control Regime in Europe, Warsaw, Poland: PolishInstitute of International Affairs (PISM), November 2010.


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10. These are overseen by the OSCE and usefully described insummit2010.osce.org/en/in_focus/node/248.

11. V. Socor, Kremlin Would Re-write Or Kill CFE Treaty, Wash-ington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, July 18, 2007.

12. Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, and Jeff McCaus-Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, and Jeff McCaus-land, Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe TreatyRegime: Options for Washington, Washington, DC: The Brook-ings Institute, March 2010, available from www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/03_armed_forces_europe_treaty/03_armed_forces_europe_treaty.pdf.

13. Peter Perenyi, Key CFE Obstacles are Not Subregional,Arms Control Today, December 2009, available from armscontrol.org.

14. Anton Lavrov, Moscow Defense Brief #2, No. 24, 2011,available from mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2011/item3/article1/.

15. See the explication of this fashionable model availablefrom www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/commentary/american-power-21st-century.

16. Russian Army General Staff Deputy Head Major Gen-eral Igor Sheremet, interviewed on Ekho Moskvy radio and re-ported in Global Security Newswire, May 31, 2011: We forecastthat by 2020 Western countries will be armed with about 80,000cruise missiles, including about 2,000 with nuclear warheads. . . .It is clear that such arsenals are being created [not] just for ex -ercises or intimidation. These weapons are quite capable of dis-arming and decapitation strikes, available from gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110531_9890.php. To the extent that this view is genuinelyheld and not simply projected, especially over the improbablylarge nuclear statistic, to support Russian diplomatic positions,it must be unclear how CFE (which does not, for example, applyat all to the new and explosively expanding weapons category ofunmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) or other negotiations wouldreduce Russian concerns about endless Western military-techni-cal fertility.


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17. Interview with Mart Laar, Estonias Minister of Defence,Janes Defence Weekly, July 6, 2011.

18. Steve Andreasen and Michael Gerson, Deterrence Seenthrough the Eyes of Other Nations, In George P. Shultz, SidneyD. Drell, and James E. Goodby, eds., Deterrence Its Past and Future,Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2011,p. 107.

19. The political and strategic costs and distortions for Russiainvolved in the concept of a privileged sphere of interests arediscussed inDmitri Trenin, Post Imperium-A Eurasian Story, Wash-ington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2011.

20. See the Website of the Secretariat on Conference on Inter-action and Condence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), avail-able from www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1.


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CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN/EURASIAN SECURITY AND THETREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN EUROPE

Jeffrey D. McCausland

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Eu-rope (often referred to as the CFE Treaty) was signedin Paris, France, on November 19, 1990, betweenmembers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. At its signing, manyanalysts hailed it as the cornerstone of European se-curity, and it is clearly the most ambitious and far-ranging conventional arms control treaty in history.It underscored a transformation of European security

that is still ongoing and whose end state is unclear.1

The events that framed this transformation werelargely peaceful and remarkable. Only a year beforeon November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall, which hadserved as perhaps the primary symbol of the Cold Warfor nearly 40 years, was breached. Six weeks prior tothe Paris signing, Germany formally reunied into asingle nation. The 22 nations that signed this agree-ment have now subsequently increased to 34. One ofthe alliances, the Warsaw Pact, has dissolved and theother, NATO, has enlarged. A key signatory to thisagreement, the Soviet Union, disappeared and wasreplaced by a host of successor states. Finally, the na-tions that convened in Paris did so under the overallauspices of the Conference on Security Cooperation in

Europe (CSCE). This organization has now grown to56 members and become the Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which reects


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that it has now matured into an international organi-zation. An adapted treaty that reects many of these

political changes was signed on November 19, 1999, atthe OSCE Summit held in Istanbul, Turkey, but at thismoment it still has not been ratied by the majority ofthe states involved. All must ratify for it to formallyenter into force. At this writing, the treaty is endan-gered by the lack of progress in ratifying the adaptedagreement and a decision by the Russian Federationto suspend compliance.

This obviously begs several important questionsthat will be examined as part of this analysis. What isthe role of the CFE Treaty as part of contemporary Eu-ropean security architecture? How has it performedsince its signing and what is its current status? Finally,what steps must be taken to ensure that this agreementremains relevant and continues its cornerstone role?

NATIONAL INTEREST, STRATEGY,AND ARMS CONTROL

As we consider how the CFE Treaty ts into emerg-ing European security architecture, it is important toconsider rst principles. What is the fundamentalrelationship between national interest, strategy, andarms control? Thucydides noted in his History of thePeloponnesian War that a primary motivator of Athe-nian foreign policy had been interests.2This remainsas true for nations in the 21st century as for the city-states of ancient Greece. It is critical to underscore thepoint that arms control is not an interest or objec-tive of state policy. Rather it is a method or a way

to achieve the objective of improved security which isan essential interest to any state. Though the focus ofany negotiation is the details of the prospective agree-


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ment, the arms control process must always remainconsistent with a nations interests and the direction

of national or alliance security strategy.Strategic thinking has been the purview of Euro-

pean diplomats at least since the Congress of Vienna.Klemens von Metternich, Charles Maurice Talleyrand,Otto von Bismarck, or Robert Stewart Castlereagh,would all agree that the national strategy of any coun-try is built upon three variables: First, what are theends of strategy or the goals or objectives the nationis trying to accomplish alone or in concert with friendsand allies? Second, what are the ways or policiesthat are formulated to move the nation in the direc-tion of a better future? Finally, what are the meansor resources available to the government of any nationthat can be devoted to securing these objectives, andhow can they be husbanded in a fashion to maximize

their potential?As a result, modern European policymakers would

agree that a connection exists between arms controland each nations respective national security strategy.Both arms control and military operations are waysto achieve national strategic objectives or ends. Butat its very core, any arms control agreement dependsupon a harmony of interests among the signatoriesthat is consistent with their respective national inter-ests and associated strategy. This harmony is basedon careful analysis by each state that the benets to begained from entering the regime outweigh the risks as-sociated with reducing military forces and accepting atransparency regime that includes data exchanges andverication inspections. As a result, an implicit aspect

of any multilateral arms control agreement is the in-divisibility of security. The security of any state, nomatter how large or small, is of equal importance. This


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is clearly reected in the CFE Treaty by the fact thatthe initial treaty and any adapted agreement cannot

enter into force until all states parties have ratied it.Efforts to overcome the current impasse over the CFETreaty are in many ways a search for harmony amongthe signatories.

Consequently, an arms control agreement is nei-ther good nor bad when examined in isolation. Eachtreaty or agreement only has value as a policy waywhen there are underlying security concerns that, ifmitigated, might reduce the possibility of conict.This is why we do not see arms control agreementsbeing discussed or promulgated between countriesthat have friendly relations. It is also why we haveseen some agreements lapse when security conditionschanged.

This also may be why it is often easy to dismiss the

success of arms control, since we lose sight of its in-tent. A successful agreement is one that contributes tothe prevention of conict and enhances stability. But itis hard to correlate completely the cause and effect ofpolicies and apply metrics against something that didnot happen. The end of the Cold War, demise of theSoviet Union, collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and emer-gence of new nations and actors in Europe over thepast 20 years all occurred without violence. War didoccur in the former Yugoslavia, but this region wasoutside the area of application of the CFE Treaty, andYugoslavia did not participate in the treaty process. Itis not hard to imagine that such a period of upheavalcould have resulted in major conicts, but this did notoccur. Consequently, it is important to remind our-

selves that the level of transparency achieved by theCFE Treaty is particularly valuable and astonishingwhen one considers the security situation in Europe


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25 years ago. In many ways this agreement has madethe extraordinary routine.

Finally, arms control depends to some degree onother variables. Arms control is a political activity andcannot be divorced from other aspects of a nationssecurity/foreign policy or domestic agenda. Internalevents, other issues between states, and the bureau-cratic process of the participating parties have a directbearing on how an agreement is negotiated and com-plied with.

THE ORIGINAL CFE TREATYAND ITS ADAPTATION

Conventional arms negotiations between NATOand Warsaw Pact countries rst began with the Mu-tual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) that

commenced in Vienna, Austria, in 1973. These discus-sions accomplished very little and were replaced in1987 with the CFE negotiations. Despite the failure ofMBFR, NATO and the Warsaw Pact negotiators suc-cessfully crafted the CFE Treaty in the 3 years between1987 and 1990.

As a result, many commentators have argued thatthese negotiations had been successful, while MBFRhad failed because a new, more effective formula forthe talks had been discovered. This is totally untrue.The real difference between 1973 and 1987 is that in1973 neither the United States nor the Soviet Uniontruly wanted an agreement. The Richard Nixon admin-istration entered these discussions largely to defuseefforts in the U.S. Senate to unilaterally reduce Ameri-

can forces based in Europe. The Kremlin entered thenegotiations as a tool to try to drive a wedge betweenWashington and its European allies. By 1987, how-


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ever, conditions had changed. Soviet leader MikhailGorbachev realized that he needed a treaty to reduce

the economic burden of deploying large conventionalforces in Eastern Europe and as part of his efforts toreform the crumbling Soviet Union.

As stated above, the 22 members of NATO and theWarsaw Pact signed the Treaty on CFE on November19, 1990, following 3 years of negotiations. It estab-lished limits on the aggregate total of conventionalmilitary hardware for the two blocs, required substan-tial reductions in each nations conventional arsenal,and created an intrusive regime of inspections andverication.

The talks commenced in January 1988 and the fol-lowing mandate was agreed upon to guide these ne-gotiations:

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthenstability and security in Europe through the establish-ment of a stable and secure balance of conventionalarmed forces, which include conventional armamentsand equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of dis-parities prejudicial to stability and security; and theelimination, as a matter of priority, of the capabilityfor launching surprise attack and for initiating largescale offensive action.3

The nal agreement required alliance or grouplimitations on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehi-cles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and attack helicoptersknown collectively as Treaty Limited Equipment(TLE)in an area stretching from the Atlantic Oceanto the Ural Mountains. Each bloc was allowed the fol-

lowing:


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Subsequent national limits for each treaty signa-tory were determined during negotiations among themembers of the two respective alliances. Followingthe demise of the Soviet Union, the successor states(within the area of treaty application) determinedtheir respective limits from the total allocated to theSoviet Union in May 1992. The three Balkan states

(Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) did not participatein the discussions of the national limits for the suc-cessor states of the Soviet Union. They argued thatthey had been occupied territory and, therefore,their territory was no longer part of the treatys areaof application. Still, following their entry into NATO,all of them have indicated a willingness to accede tothe Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (ACFE)Treaty once it enters into force.

Bloc limitations for NATO and the former WarsawPact were further restrained by a series of ve geo-graphic nested zones for land-based TLE with respec-tive limits for each zone. This was done to achievethe goals established in the mandate to prevent thedestabilizing concentration of conventional military

armament. The four zones commence with a centralregion consisting of Germany, the Benelux, Poland,the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. The term

Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) Group Limit

Tanks 20,000

Artillery 20,000

Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs) 30,000

Attack Helicopters 2,000

Combat Aircraft 6,800


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nesting signies that, beginning with this initialzone, each successive zone subsumes all the preced-

ing zones, plus adjacent states and military districts.Cumulative limits are assigned on holdings of TLE ineach zone. This construct has the effect of permittingfree movement of equipment and units away from,but not towards, the central European region, whichthus inhibits surprise attack in the area deemed, dur-ing the Cold War at least, to be the most vulnerable.

The Soviet Union (and subsequently the RussianFederation) further accepted the so-called ankzone. This portion of the agreement places limits onground-based systems in the Leningrad and NorthCaucasus Military Districts in the Russian Federa-tion. Norway is part of the northern portion of theank, and the north Caucasus states, Turkey, Greece,Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova are in the southern

portion. Limitations on helicopters and attack aircraftonly apply to the entire area of application due to theirability to reposition rapidly.

New negotiations began after the signing of thetreaty focusing on personnel strength of armed forces.This resulted in the Concluding Act of the Negotia-tions on Personnel Strength of Conventional ArmedForces in Europe (referred to as the CFE-1A agree-ment). It was signed on July 6, 1992, and establishedlimits on the personnel strength of military forces, withthe exception of sea-based naval units, internal secu-rity forces, or those assigned to United Nations (UN)duties. CFE-1A (unlike the CFE Treaty) is a politicallybinding arrangement as opposed to a legally bindingtreaty. It provided that the ceilings announced by each

signatory would take effect 40 months after entry intoforce and further contained provisions for informa-tion exchange, notication, and verication.


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Only 1 year after the signing of the initial agree-ment and as treaty implementation was commenc-

ing, Russian leaders began arguing for adjustments totheir equipment limits. They began pressing concernsabout Russias equipment limitations, particularly inthe ank region, and Moscow undertook a campaignto alter those limits. A nal compromise was achievedat the rst Review Conference (May 1996) that per-mitted Russia higher force levels in the ank zone,established a May 1999 deadline for Moscow to meetthese adjusted levels, and reduced the overall size ofthe ank zone. Still, the problem of Russian force lev-els in this area would continue to bedevil negotiators.It was exacerbated by Russian military operations inChechnya (which is in the ank region) and the con-ict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. At the sametime, treaty signatories had already begun (as agreed

at the 1996 CFE Review Conference) to embark on amodernization of the treaty to adapt it more broad-ly to the changed European security architecture, onewithout a Soviet Union or a Warsaw Pact.

These CFE Treaty adaptation negotiations contin-ued from 1996-99, through a period in which the Eu-ropean landscape continued to evolve. Of direct rel-evance to the treaty and conventional forces, NATObegan its process of enlargement. The enlargementprocess, together with the dissolution of the SovietUnion, brought to the surface a number of Russianconcerns about changes that needed to be made to thetreaty. Many are identical in theme to those that Rus-sia is currently raising.

On November 19, 1999 (the ninth anniversary of

the CFE Treaty), 30 leaders signed the ACFE Treaty.All 19 NATO members accepted lower cumulative na-tional limits from 89,026 TLE to 79,967. All signatories


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accepted the new structure of limitations based on na-tional and territorial ceilings, consistent with the prin-

ciple of host nation consent for the presence of foreignforces on any countrys territory. The agreement alsoprovided enhanced transparency through increasedquotas for mandatory on-site inspections, operationalexibilities to exceed ceilings temporarily, and an ac-cession clause.

The states parties also adopted the CFE Final Act.This document contains a number of political com-mitments related to the ACFE Treaty. These commit-ments are: (1) reafrmation of Russias commitmentto fulll existing obligations under the treaty to in-clude equipment levels in the ank region; (2) a Rus-sian commitment to exercise restraint in deploymentsin its territory adjacent to the Baltic; (3) the commit-ment by a number of Central European countries not

to increase (and in some cases to reduce) their CFEterritorial ceilings; and, (4) Moscows agreement withGeorgia and Moldova on the withdrawal of Russianforces from their territories. President Bill Clintonnoted in his statement at the conclusion of the summitthat he would not submit the agreement for review bythe Senate until Russia had reduced to the ank levelsset forth in the ACFE Treaty, to include removing itsforces from Georgia and Moldova.

The most important agreed change in the ACFETreaty was that the parties took the old Treaty outof the Cold War frameworkeliminating the blocconstruct and reecting the new reality of a Europeno longer divided. The original treatys group limitswere replaced by national and territorial limits gov-

erning the TLE of every states party. The treatysank limits were adjusted for Russia, providing Rus-sia considerably more exibility for deployment of


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Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs) in the Northernand Southern portions of the ank than it had under

the original treaty. Corresponding transparency mea-sures, which apply equally to Russia and all otherstates parties, were a crucial part of this deal. Havingtaken the group structure out of the treaty to reectthat Europe was no longer divided, Allies and otherstates parties committed to lowering their ceilings inthe ACFE Treaty. These ceilings became more explicitin the ACFE Treaty text and were codied in Istanbul.Actual conventional force levels are well below thoseceilings and, in the case of NATO members, well be-low the original group limits.

Other provisions were adopted to reect the newsecurity environment. Russias concerns about thethree Baltic republics achieving NATO membershipwere addressed by adding an accession clause to the

ACFE Treaty. As previously mentioned, these statesindicated their readiness to request accession once theACFE Treaty entered into force. The 1997 NATO-Rus-sia Founding Act contained a key sentence to addressRussias concerns about stationed forces on the terri-tory of new member states:

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable

security environment, the Alliance will carry out itscollective defense and other missions by ensuring thenecessary interoperability, integration, and capabilityfor reinforcement rather than by additional permanentstationing of substantial combat forces.4

Throughout this period of the 1990s, the treatysignatories also dealt with a raft of implementation

issuese.g., the ank, and destruction of Russianequipmentand reached, for the most part, a success-ful resolution to these concerns.


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THE RUSSIAN SUSPENSION

On December 12, 2007, the Russian Federation of-cially announced that it would no longer be boundby the restrictions of the 1990 CFE Treaty, and sus-pended participation.5 Moscow took this action dueto the fact that the 22 NATO members bound by the1990 agreement have not ratied the 1999 ACFE Trea-ty, and during a June 2007 extraordinary conference,Russia provided a further detailed list of negativeeffects of the conduct of NATO states.6These includ-ed overall NATO force levels, the ank limits, andother unspecied demands for additional transpar-ency. In addition to these concerns, it was clear thatPrime Minister Vladimir Putin and Russian leadersin general were angry over a series of issues, includ-

ing NATO enlargement, the independence of Kosovo,and plans to install American anti-ballistic missileson Polish territory. Nonetheless, Moscow reassuredthe other treaty signatories that it did not intend todramatically increase its force levels in the territoryadjacent to their borders. Russian President DmitryMedvedev underscored Russias seriousness about itsTreaty concerns when he described the existing agree-ment as both unfair and nonviable.7At the sametime, Russian leaders have been quick to describe thecontributions made by the treaty as valuable, and tofurther acknowledge the spirit of both trust and coop-eration that it has engendered.

In terms of ratication, NATO members haveargued since the Istanbul Summit in 1999 that their

ratication remained contingent upon Russia comply-ing with obligations it freely accepted when the ACFETreaty was signed, the most contentious being the full


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removal of all Russian military forces from the ter-ritory of the former Soviet republics of Georgia and

Moldova. Russia adamantly refutes this linkage andRussian Prime Minister Putin has publicly argued thatthere is no legal link between the ACFE Treaty andthese commitments.8

Practically speaking, therefore, the Treaty is begin-ning to unravel. Russia has not provided input as partof the biannual data exchange since it suspended par-ticipation in 2007. Nor has Russia provided requiredinformation on changes to the location of ground TLE,and it is no longer accepting (nor participating in) thetreatys routine and challenge inspection regime. Theimplications of this situation for the future health ofthe CFE Treaty are serious. Although other partiescontinue to implement the treaty in full, a situation inwhich Russia is not implementing core treaty provi-

sions cannot be sustained forever. At some point, thisstate of affairs will cause other states parties to beginreevaluating their own treaty participation. If that be-comes the case, the treaty will truly unravel. This willhave unforeseen implications not only for the abilityto deal with other issues on the bilateral and Europeansecurity agenda, but also possibly with respect to thedefense postures among the states parties, as well asother arms control agreements. Even President Med-vedev, in his speech, seemed to have indicated hispreference for avoiding the treatys complete andnal collapse.9

In response, NATO endorsed a parallel actionspackage in March 2008 in an attempt to avoid the trea-tys demise. The package represented a serious shift in

the NATO position, as it called for NATO countries tobegin the ratication process (which in some countriessuch as the United States might take several months),


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while Russia commenced its withdrawals. Once theforces had been removed from Georgia and Moldova,

NATO countries would strive to complete ratica-tion of the ACFE Treaty quickly. NATO members alsopledged to address many Russian security concernsonce the ACFE Treaty was in place. For example, allnew NATO members that are not treaty signatories(Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have agreedto accede. NATO also announced that following nalratication, it would be willing to discuss Russianconcerns about future weapons ceilings and limita-tions placed on Moscow in the so-called ank zonesthat border Turkey, Norway, and the Baltic Repub-lics.10Unfortunately, the negotiations made little to noprogress between March and August 2008. This effortwas largely undermined by the deteriorating relationsbetween NATO countries and the Russian Federation

in the aftermath of the conict in Georgia in the latesummer of 2008. In fact, one expert observed that thisconict violated the principles contained in both OSCEdocuments as well as the preamble to the CFE Treaty.These documents call for states parties to refrain fromthe threat or use of force against the territorial integ-rity or political independence of any State, as well asthe commitment to peaceful cooperation and the pre-vention of military conict anywhere on the Europeancontinent.11 This situation has been further compli-cated by Moscows subsequent decision to recognizeSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations.

Following the meeting of OSCE foreign ministersin June 2009, the so-called Corfu Process began toexamine European security challenges. By early 2010,

an effort was undertaken in the Joint ConsultativeGroup to develop a framework document that wouldsimply contain principles of conventional arms con-trol which all nations could agree upon. It was hoped


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that this would serve as a basis for new negotiations,and in the interim offer each state the option of either

complying with the existing CFE Treaty or the listof specic requirements described in the frameworkdocument.

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in No-vember 2010, the Alliance reafrmed its continuedcommitment to the CFE Treaty Regime and all associ-ated elements. The Final Communiqu noted that al-though agreement had not yet been achieved on howto strengthen and modernize the arms control regimefor the 21st Century, progress among the 36 partici-pating states was encouraging. The allies further un-derscored the indivisibility of security for all statesparties and urged continued efforts to conclude aprinciples-based framework to guide negotiations in2011. This process should build on the CFE Treaty

of 1990, the Agreement on Adaptation of 1999, and ex-isting political commitments. While the ultimate goalremained to ensure the continued viability of conven-tional arms control in Europe and strengthening com-mon security, member states further recognized (asnoted at the previous Summit) that the current situ-ation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treatywhile Russia does not, cannot continue indenitely.12

Still, little progress has been made, largely due toRussian insistence that it cannot accept any languagein the framework document that recognizes host na-tion consent for stationed forces as an essential prin-ciple. It would seem that time is rapidly running out.The treaty requires a Review Conference every 5 yearswhich, in accordance with this provision, should have

occurred in 2011. It appears now this will happen inthe late fall of 2012. If no agreement can be reached onthe framework document, the CFE Treaty may trulybe in crisis.


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WHAT HAVE BEEN THE CONTRIBUTIONSOF THE CFE TREATY?

As suggested at the onset, the CFE Treaty has longbeen referred to as the cornerstone of European secu-rity. But in light of the dramatic changes in Europeansecurity architecture that have occurred since 1991,many wonder if that will continue to be the case and,if so, for how much longer? Obviously this questionlooms large in the aftermath of the Russian suspen-sion and subsequent conict between Georgia andthe Russian Federation. Can this agreement assist inreestablishing a sense of cooperative security, or haveboth its credibility and utility been undermined per-manently?

Many diplomats and military leaders still believethe treaty continues to be of vital importance to Euro-

pean security. Some argue, however, that its vitalitydepends upon all states parties accepting the follow-ing: (1) The 1990 CFE treaty, with its 1996 ank adjust-ments, must continue to be fully implemented; and(2) The 1999 ACFE Treaty must be brought into force.Only upon these foundations can the CFE states par-ties take a forward-looking approach to any additionalchanges that must be made to continue to ensure thisTreatys viability.

In retrospect, the agreement can only be truly eval-uated against the backdrop of European security dur-ing this crucial period. Oddly, the treaty was signedto prevent, or at least reduce, the likelihood of conictbetween NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Shortly afterit was signed, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union

both disappeared, so the true value of the treaty mustbe considered in the context of the dramatic transitionthat ensued. In fact, some have argued that the cor-


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nerstone metaphor is misplaced. The CFE Treaty hasnot been a static agreementas Europe has weath-

ered many changes, the treaty has been successfullyadapted to accommodate those changes.

The treaty clearly proved important in assuagingconcerns about German reunication and providedtransparency during the withdrawal of massive So-viet forces from Eastern Europe. These withdrawalsoccurred following the signing of the Treaty on Ger-man Reunication (September 12, 1990) by the FederalRepublic, the German Democratic Republic (East Ger-many), France, the United Kingdom (UK), the SovietUnion, and the United States.13 This agreement alsocontained signicant additional restraints on militaryoperations. Germany agreed to only deploy territorialunits that were not integrated in the NATO commandstructure on the territory of the former East Germany.

Bonn further agreed that no foreign troops would bestationed in its eastern states or carry out any othermilitary activity there while the withdrawal of Sovietforces was ongoing. Finally, the reunication treatyalso specied that foreign armed forces and nuclearweapons or their carriers will not be stationed in thatpart of Germany or deployed there, though Germanydid insist on the ability to interpret deployed.14

In terms of the actual reductions of military equip-ment associated with the implementation of the origi-nal treaty, the numbers are truly impressive. Over69,000 Cold War era battle tanks, combat aircraft,and other pieces of military equipment have beendestroyed in the now 30 countries stretching fromthe Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. In many ways,

the treaty changed the face of European security byestablishing new, cooperative political-military rela-tionships.15More than 5,500 on-site inspections have


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been conducted, which has created a new sense ofpolitical-military cooperation and openness.

The true value of the treaty and the associatedtransparency measures were demonstrated duringthe various conicts in the Balkans. Short notice in-spections in accordance with CFE were conductedof U.S. forces in Germany by Russian inspectors asthe American troops prepared to depart for Bosniain 1995. As a result, these military operations wereconducted without a signicant increase in tensions.The Dayton Accords that ended the initial conict inthe former Yugoslavia in 1996 also contain an annexthat established a CFE-like agreement between thecontending states. The treaty was crafted to be nearlyidentical to the CFE Treaty in terms of limits, deni-tions, transparency measures, etc. All of the Balkanstates participating in this agreement expressed a de-

sire to accede to the full CFE Treaty at some point inthe future. Finally, in 1999 a Russian inspection wasalso conducted at Aviano Airbase during the U.S.-ledair campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo. Thishelped allay to some degree Russian concerns aboutU.S. force deployments during this crisis.

In fact, many experts believe the inspection regimemay have contributed more to the reduction of ten-sions and crisis prevention during this dramatic tran-sition in European security than the actual reductions.Some argue that the agreements greatest value maybe the entire CFE system that encourages condencethrough transparency. In the nal analysis, the exist-ing treaty (as well as the adapted agreement) providesa forum for the major European states to debate, agree,

and maintain a set of rules about conventional mili-tary power on the continent that is critical to overallstability.16


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WHAT WOULD FAILURE MEAN?

One Russian commentator remarked that the trea-ty is a true relic of the Cold War and an example ofhow outdated agreements negotiated a long time agoin a galaxy far, far away perpetuate adversarial rela-tionships.17 But this opinion is not shared by mosttreaty members and security experts. A group of dis-tinguished Western diplomats, military leaders, andacademics prepared a letter in 2008 that argued thatthe collapse of the CFE Treaty would . . . undermineco-operative security in Europe and lead to new di-viding lines and confrontations.18

So, what would the impact on the future be if theCFE Treaty failed and the ow of routinely providedinformation on conventional equipment, inspectionsto verify that information, and constraints on the lev-

els of that equipment were to disappear? What wouldbe both Russian and Western perspectives on a situ-ation in which there were no limits at all on the leveland location of conventional weapons deploymentsor the conventional force levels of treaty signatories?What would the European security picture look like ifthe habits of cooperation developed through the CFETreaty were undone?

Sadly, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that thiscould cause a dramatic realignment of European se-curity. The loss of information and undermining ofpredictability would set the stage for historic animosi-ties to resurface and lingering crises to potentiallyworsen. For example, there have been suggestionsthat Azerbaijan is counting on the failure of the treaty

to provide it with an opportunity to increase its mili-tary forces. Such a development would clearly exacer-bate tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. These


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two countries remain embroiled in a long simmeringconict over Nagorno-Karabakh.19 This struggle has

resulted in over 15,000 casualties since 1988 and over800,000 Armenian and Azeri refugees. Furthermore,Russia would also lose any transparency over themilitary forces of existing or future members of theNATO alliance, as well as the deployment of NATOforces on the territory of new members. Finally, theBaltic republics would not be expected to accede to theexisting agreement and, consequently, there would beno mechanism to affect transparency about militaryforces on their territory.

Many believe these developments might encour-age an expansion in military forces or damage to otheragreements. For example, some experts believe Rus-sia might reconsider its participation in the Interme-diate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in an effort

to improve its security posture. Russian PresidentPutin threatened such action in a statement in Febru-ary 2007. Loss of CFE would also remove a valuablecrisis management tool from the security architectureand damage arms control as an instrument to en-hance overall European stability. In this regard, Bal-kan observers believe the demise of the CFE Treatymight mean an end to the arms control arrangementscontained in the Dayton Accords. Obviously, such adevelopment could contribute to renewed violence inthat troubled region.

The collapse of the CFE Treaty could spill overinto other aspects of the Russia-NATO relationship aswell. CFEs collapse could undermine the cooperativeEuropean security structures that have been built over

the last 15-plus years. These efforts include the NATO-Russia Council, the OSCE, and prospects for build-ing or enhancing future cooperation in other areas.


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Futhermore, if CFE is abandoned, its benets wouldbe difcult, if not impossible, to replace. It is hard to

imagine how to build new arrangements if there isno foundation any more on which to construct them.Beyond that, if CFE is no longer a viable agreement,and the condence-building aspects of the regime aredestroyed completely, over time it is entirely possiblethat some states parties will seek alternative arrange-ments that will replace the security benets they nowderive from the treaty.

Finally, the dissolution of this agreement could alsohave a major impact on relations between the UnitedStates and the Russian Federation. Moscow and Wash-ington have had serious disagreements over the pastdecade and, at the onset of the Barack Obama admin-istration, their bilateral relations were perhaps worsethan at any time since the end of the Cold War.20Early

in the new administration, President Obama called forhitting the reset button in the relations between thetwo countries and, despite serious differences, the twosides were able to negotiate the New Strategic ArmsReduction Treaty (New START) agreement by thespring of 2010. This was subsequently ratied by boththe U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma. While therewas no explicit link between these negotiations andthe CFE Treaty deadlock, it is clear that this successcould improve the prospects for nding a resolutionto the problem.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As we look to the future, Russian and NATO strat-

egists must carefully consider the deadlock over theCFE Treaty and how conventional arms control morebroadly can help reestablish a sense of cooperative


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security in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian con-ict. Michael Wyganowski, a former Polish diplomat

who headed Polands delegation to the CFE Treaty ne-gotiations in 1999, underscored the importance of theCFE Treaty following the conict. He observed thatthe accord was being relegated further to the sidelinesby a conict that actually underscored the importanceof limiting conventional arms holdings.21

With respect to the future of the CFE Treaty, thereare, in principle, three paths ahead. The rst optionwould be the status quo: Russia continues its suspen-sion, and efforts to resolve these issues remain dead-locked. In this scenario, the treaty over time will col-lapse. Other states parties are unlikely to continue toimplement a treaty while Russia continues to avoid itstreaty obligations.

The second path is that NATO agrees to address

Russian CFE demands and raties the ACFE Treatydespite the continued presence of Russian forces inAbkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova. This is alsounlikely to happen. In July 2007 (1 year prior to theRussian-Georgian War), the U.S. Senate passed Reso-lution 278. This resolution reafrmed the Senates sup-port for the Treaty, described the Russian suspensionas regrettable, and further warned that this was astep that will unnecessarily heighten tensions in Eu-rope.22 In this environment, it is very unlikely thatthe Obama administration would seek Senate ratica-tion of the ACFE Treaty, absent Russian compliancewith the Istanbul commitments.

The third path is to continue to seek agreement onthe framework document of principles which could

set the stage for new negotiations. If this cannot beachieved by the Review Conference in the fall of 2012,it may be an appropriate time for all NATO members


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to consider adopting the same position that the Rus-sian Federation has taken and suspend the existing

CFE Treaty. This should not be seen as an effort to endthe treaty or to argue that the Russian Federation isin material breach. Rather, it would simply be anacknowledgement that, after 4 years, the Alliance can-not continue to fulll treaty obligations absent somereciprocity from Moscow. NATO members could sim-ply state that the framework discussions are a goodstart and should continue. Still after 4 years of effort,it would appear these negotiations are at an impasse.A decision to at least temporarily halt the discussionof implementation of the ACFE Treaty or compliancewith the existing treaty might clear the agenda and al-low other areas of mutual interest between Russia andNATO to be discussed.

Clearly, a number of the core Russian concerns can

best be addressed not by the wholesale abandonmentof CFE, but the opposite, through entry into forceof the ACFE Treaty or new negotiations. The ACFETreaty provides the means through which Russia canensure predictability in the levels and locations ofNATO forces, as well as a means of inspecting theseforces against the information that NATO provides.Consequently, a decision by Moscow to move in thedirection of compromise would not be based on altru-ism but rather on a careful calculation of Russian na-tional interest. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lav-rov seemed to reect this in remarks at the Councilon Foreign Relations in New York when he observed,the only thing we want internationally is coopera-tion on the basis of full equality and mutual benet.23

Still, it is unclear whether all of the Russian concernscan be resolved within the context of the CFE Treaty.Moscow has also recommended a new Pan-European


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Security agreement. Consequently, it would seemmore likely that resolution to the disagreement over

the CFE Tre

arms control and european security

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