Aristotle and Mathematics

First published Fri Mar 26, 2004

Aristotle uses mathematics and mathematical sciences in three important ways in

his treatises. Contemporary mathematics serves as a model for his philosophy of

science and provides some important techniques, e.g., as used in his logic.

Throughout the corpus, he constructs mathematical arguments for various theses,

especially in the physical writings, but also in the biology and ethics. Finally,

Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics provides an important alternative to

platonism. In this regard, there has been a revival of interest in recent years

because of its affinity to physicalism and fictionalisms based on physicalism.

However, his philosophy of mathematics may better be understood as a philosophy

of exact or mathematical sciences.

This article will explore the influence of mathematical sciences on Aristotle's

metaphysics and philosophy of science and will illustrate hisuse of mathematics.

1. Introduction

2. The Structure of a Mathematical Science: First Principles

3. Three Notions in Demonstration: ‘Of Every’, ‘Per se’, ‘Universal’

4. Demonstration and Mathematics

5. The Relation Between Different Sciences: Autonomy and Subalternation

6. What Mathematical Sciences Study: 4 Puzzles

7. Aristotle's Treatment of Mathematical Objects

o 7.1 Objects From Abstraction or ‘Removal’ (ta ex aphaireseôs)

o 7.2 Precision (akribeia)

o 7.3 As Separated (hôs kekhôrismenon)

o 7.4 X Qua (hêi) Y

o 7.5 Intelligible matter (noêtikê hylê)

8. Universal Mathematics

9. Place and Continuity of Magnitudes

10. Unit (monas) and Number (arithmos)

o 10.1 Background

o 10.2 Measure (metron)

o 10.3 Time

11. Mathematics and Hypothetical Necessity

12. The Infinite (apeiron)

13. Aristotle and Evidence for the History of Mathematics

Glossary

Bibliography

Other Internet Resources

Related Entries

1. Introduction

The late fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. saw many important developments in

Greek mathematics, including the organization of basic treatises or elements and

developments in conceptions of proof, number theory, proportion theory,

sophisticated uses of constructions (including spherical spirals and conic sections),

and the application of geometry and arithmetic in the formation of other sciences,

especially astronomy, mechanics, optics, and harmonics. The authors of such

treatises also began the process of creating effective methods of conceiving and

presenting technical work, including the use of letters to identify parts of diagrams,

the use of abstract quantities marked by letters in proofs instead of actual

numerical values, and the use of proofs. We cannot know whether Aristotle

influenced the authors of technical treatises or merely reflects current trends.

In this context, Plato's Academy was fertile ground for controversy concerning

how we are to know mathematics (the sorts of principles, the nature of proofs, etc.)

and what the objects known must be if the science is to be true and not vacuous.

Aristotle's treatments of mathematics reflect this diversity. Nonetheless, Aristotle's

reputation as a mathematician and philosopher of mathematical sciences has often

waxed and waned.

In fact, Aristotle's treatises display some of the technically most difficult

mathematics to be found in any philosopher before the Greco-Roman Age. His

technical failures involve conceptually difficult areas involving infinite lines and

non-homogenous magnitudes.

Commentators on Aristotle from the 2nd century on tended to interpret Aristotle's

mathematical objects as mental objects, which made Aristotle more compatible

with neo-Platonism. Later the mechanistic movement in the late Renaissance

treated Aristotle as divorcing mathematics from physical sciences in order to drive

a deeper wedge between their views and his. Because of this, it has been very easy

to discount Aristotle as subscribing to a version of psychologism in mathematics.

These tendencies contribute to the common view that Aristotle's views

mathematics are marginal to his thought. More recently, however, sympathetic

readers have seen Aristotle as expressing a fictionalist version of physicalism, the

view that the objects of mathematics are fictional entities grounded in physical

objects. To the extent that this view is regarded as a plausible view about

mathematics, Aristotle has regained his position.

There are two important senses in which Aristotle never presents a philosophy of

mathematics. Aristotle considers geometry and arithmetic, the two sciences which

we might say constitute ancient mathematics, as merely the two most important

mathematical sciences. His explanations of mathematics always include optics,

mathematical astronomy, harmonics, etc. Secondly, Aristotle, so far as we know,

never devoted a treatise to philosophy of mathematics. Even Metaphysics xiii and

xiv, the two books devoted primarily to discussions of the nature of mathematical

objects, are really concerned with diffusing Platonist positions that there are

immutable and eternal substances over and beyond sensible substances and

Pythagorean positions that identify numbers with sensible substances.

2. The Structure of a Mathematical Science: First Principles

Aristotle's discussions on the best format for a deductive science in the Posterior

Analytics reflect the practice of contemporary mathematics as taught and practiced

in Plato's Academy, discussions there about the nature of mathematical sciences,

and Aristotle's own discoveries in logic. Aristotle has two separate concerns. One

evolves from his argument that there must be first, unprovable principles for any

science, in order to avoid both circularity and infinite regresses. The other evolves

from his view that demonstrations must be explanatory. (See subsections A, B, and

C of §6, Demonstrations and Demonstrative Sciences, of the entry Aristotle's

logic.)

Aristotle distinguishes (Posterior Analytics i.2) Two sorts of starting points for

demonstration, axioms and posits.

An axiom (axiôma) is a statement worthy of acceptance and is needed prior to

learning anything. Aristotle's list here includes the most general principles such as

non-contradiction and excluded middle, and principles more specific to

mathematicals, e.g., when equals taken from equals the remainders are equal. It is

not clear why Aristotle thinks one needs to learn mathematical axioms to learn

anything, unless he means that one needs to learn them to learn anything in a

mathematical subject or that axioms are so basic that they should form the first part

of one ‘s learning.

Aristotle divides posits (thesis) into two types, definitions and hypotheses:

A hypothesis (hupothesis) asserts one part of a contradiction, e.g., that something

is or is not.

A definition (horismos) does not assert either part of a contradiction (or perhaps is

without the assertion of existence or non-existence).

Since a definition does not assert or deny, Aristotle probably intends us to

understand definitions as stipulations or as defining expressions which are

equivalent in some way to the defined term. The definition of unit as ‘indivisible in

quantity’ will not presuppose that units do or do not exist. Hence, the syllogistic

premise, ‘A unit is indivisibile in quantity,’ if taken as presupposing the existence

of units will not be a definition in this sense. Later, of course, Aristotle will allow

for many other kinds of definitions.

There are many views as to what Aristotle's hypotheses are: (i) existence claims,

(ii) any true assumption within a science, and (iii) the stipulation of objects at the

beginning of a typical proof in Greek mathematics. Examples might be, ‘Let A be a

unit,’ (where the object is stipulated to be a unit) or, more characteristically of

Greek mathematics, ‘Let there be a line AB’ (where a line is stipulated to exist,

namely AB). In fact, all these interpretations may have a modicum of what

Aristotle means. In that case, Aristotle implies that any assumption within a

science that asserts or denies something is a hypothesis. However, he singles out

existence claims. How do existence claims work in Aristotle's conceptions of

science? From Physics iv, we have claims such as ‘There is place,’ and ‘There is

no void.’ However, the examples that Aristotle uses in the Posterior Analytics are

claims such as that the genus exists, or specifically that there are units, or that there

are points and lines. Aristotle also points out that sometimes the hypothesis of the

genus is omitted as too obvious. Only by comparing these general claims with their

use in Aristotelian mathematics can we get a sense of what Aristotle means.

Aristotle intends us to understand that prior to the demonstrations in a scientific

treatise, the treatise should state starting propositions. These include general claims

broader than the science, definitions which are stated as stipulations and not as

assertions, and a claim that the basic entities ‘exist’. What counts as an acceptable

existence claim is relative to the actual science. The opening of a proof, ‘Let there

be a line AB,’ is an application of the basic hypothesis of the science. Since

Aristotle regards such proofs through particular lines as general proofs, the

opening claim is actually to be understood as standing for the general claim that

there are lines. This is how the hypothesis is used as a premise. The stipulation,

‘Let there be a triangle ABC,’ would not be a hypothesis on this interpretation,

since he holds that the existence of triangles is to be proved, so that this instantiates

a derived proposition.

A science consists of a genus (genos), what the science is about, and a collection

of attributes, what the science says about the genus. The genus or kind is both

defined and hypothesized to exist. From his examples (points and lines for

geometry), it would seem that the genus is to be understood loosely as the

fundamental entities in the science. The attributes are defined but are not

hypothesized as existing. One must prove that the attributes belong to various

members of the genus. For example, one must prove that triangles exist, e.g., that

some [constructible] figures are triangles.

If we take very seriously the common view that Aristotle claims that every

immediate premise of a demonstration expresses something about an existing

entity, then one may well wonder how the principles of demonstration, axioms and

posits, can be premises of demonstrations. Existence claims and stipulations do not

express something about an existing entity. Since Aristotle calls the axioms, ‘those

from which (demonstration arises),’ some have suggested that the axioms alone

form the premises for a science and that a proof in any science arises by placing

genus terms and their definitions in the axioms and then substituting terms like

‘triangle’ for their definitions when they arise in proofs. However, besides pointing

to the inadequacy of the axioms for this job, it may be objected that Aristotle also

calls the principles of demonstration immediate statements protaseis), i.e., axioms

and posits. Another possibility is that he regards even stipulations and existence

claims as premises, as well as other hypotheses, but treats the axioms as somehow

more fundamentally the source of proofs. In this case, he has a looser conception

of what counts as a premise than many readers would expect. In any case, if his

proof theory is to work at all, he must allow many more immediate premises than

one would find in the introduction to a standard text of ancient Greek mathematics.

For more information, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle and First Principles in Greek Mathematics

3. Three Notions in Demonstration: ‘Of Every’, ‘Per se’, ‘Universal’

In the Posterior Analytics i.4, Aristotle also develops three notions crucial to his

theory of scientific claims: ‘of every’, ‘per se’ (kath’ hauto) or ‘in virtue of itself’

(in four ways) and ‘universally’ (katholou). Although his exposition of these

notions is tailored to his proof theory, the notions are designed also to characterize

the basic features of any scientific claim, where the principal examples come

mostly from mathematics. (See §6 Demonstrations and Demonstrative Sciences of

the entry onAristotle's logic.)

A holds true ‘of every’ B iff A holds of B in every case always. Note that this is a

stronger condition than is meant in thePrior Analytics by ‘A belongs to all B’.

Mathematical example: point is on every line (i.e., every line has points on it).

A is per se1 with respect to B iff ‘A’ is in the account which gives the essence of B.

Note that Aristotle does not say thatA belongs to all B (e.g., ‘hair’ occurs in the

definition of bald, but ‘having hair’ does not belong to a bald person), yet it is

presupposed by the use Aristotle makes of it. Aristotle allows that there are

immediate statements of the form, A belongs to no B. Mathematical examples:

‘line’ is in the definition of triangle, ‘point’ is in the definition of line.

A is per se2 with respect to B iff ‘B’ is in the account which gives the essence

of A and A belongs to B. Mathematical examples: straight and circular-arc belong

to line, odd and even to number. Some commentators have held that it is the

disjunction which belongs per se2 (e.g., straight or circular-arc belongs per se2 to

all line); others that the examples are that each predicate belongs per se2 to the

subject (e.g., straight belongs per se2 to (some) line). However, Aristotle probably

knows that not all lines are straight or circular.

A is per se3 iff ‘A’ indicates ‘a this’ (tode ti), i.e., ‘A’ refers to just what A is. At

Post. An. i.22, Aristotle identifies the per se3 with substance, the rock bottom of a

syllogistic chain. However, one might well ask whether there must be an analogous

notion within a science. If so, A would be per se3 if A is a basic entity in a given

science, an instance of the kind studied by the science. If so, the per se3 items in

arithmetic would be units.

A is per se4 with respect to B iff A belongs to B on account of A. Either no

mathematical example is given or the examples are (depending on how we read the

text): straight or curved belongs to line and odd or even belongs to number, but

these may be cases of per se2. The non-mathematical example is: in getting its

throat cut it dies in virtue of the throat-cutting.

A belongs to B universally iff A belongs to all B, A belongs to B and A belongs

to B per se (in virtue of B) and qua itself (qua B). Here the notion of ‘per se’ seems

to be slightly different from those previously mentioned (it has been suggested that

the sense is per se4), but, in any case, is said to be equivalent to ‘qua itself’.

Perhaps we need a fifth notion of per se.

B has/is A per se5 (i.e., in virtue of B) iff A belongs to B qua B, i.e, there is no

higher genus or kind C of B such that Abelongs to C and so to B in virtue of

belonging to C. Again, Aristotle does not mark out per se5 as a separate notion, so

that the notion may be subsumed under per se4. Note that unlike per se1 and per

se2, per se5 is in virtue of the subject of the predication.

The idea here seems to be that:

A belongs to B universally iff A belongs to all B and A belongs per se5 to B.

An alternative (stronger?) interpretation is that:

A belongs to B universally iff A belongs per se to all B and B belongs to all A. In

this case, A and B are called, in modern discussions, commensurate universals.

Aristotle describes the property that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles

as being per se5 (= per se4) and universal, but also the property of ‘having internal

angles equal to two right angles’ as per se accidens (kath’ hauto sembebêkôs) of

triangle. It is commonly thought that these are somehow essential accidents. Since

these follow from per se properties by necessity, it seems strange to call them

accidents at all. Sometimes, however, it is more appropriate to think of accidents as

concomitants, the result of different demonstrative chains. Alternatively, Aristotle

frequently uses the same word to indicate consequences. In that case, they should

be called per se consequences.

It should be noted that the proof theory of Aristotle requires that all predicates in

demonstrations be either per se1 or per se2. What is neither per se1 nor per se2 is

accidental. Hence, per se4 (or per se5 if it is a separate notion),and per se accidens

should be reducible to these notions in any case.

4. Demonstration and Mathematics

Because of the formal success of his logical theory, Aristotle also considers most

mathematical proofs as having the form of auniversal affirmative syllogism,

namely Barbara. (See the section on The Syllogistic in the entry on Aristotle's

logic.) This means that most mathematical theorems are one thing A said of

another C and that every mathematical demonstration has a middle term B which

explains the connection between A and C. Aristotle provides several examples of

such triads of terms in mathematics, e.g., two right angles-angles about a point-

triangle, or right angle-half two right angles-angle in a semicircle. It has long been

noted by commentators that mathematical proofs work with a particular case

through universal instantiation (ekthesis) and then universalize to the general

claim, and that not all propositions have the form: A is said of B, e.g., Elements 1 1,

“To construct an equilateral triangle on a given line.” A more modern objection is

that the formal theory of the syllogism as presented in Prior Analytics 1 1, 3-7 is

woefully inadequate to express a theory involving conditionals and many-many

relations, as is the case with all ancient mathematics. Nonetheless, Aristotle does

think that most mathematical proofs actually do have this form. Those that

wouldn't would certainly be negative propositions and possibly existential

propositions. (We simply do not know enough about how Aristotle conceived of

the logical form of existential propositions.) From a careful reading of the rest of

thePrior Analytics, it becomes clear that Aristotle has a flexible notion of “one

thing said of another” and that he regards standard mathematical proofs as really

being in a universal form, which we express for purposes of comprehension as

particular.

5. The Relation Between Different Sciences: Autonomy and Subalternation

A science is defined by the genus or kind it studies and by a group of specifiable

properties which belong to that kind. Secondly, the properties studied within a

science are defined in terms of the genus of the science (per se2). Hence, it follows

that it will commonly be impossible to prove one thing using a different science.

For one would have to prove that a property within one genus applies to a

completely different genus. Hence, every science is autonomous. Aristotle makes

this claim, however, in the context of his rejection of Plato's view that sciences are

subordinate to knowledge of the Good. What he actually claims is more modest. If

one genus comes under another genus, it will be possible, in some cases

incumbent, to prove that a property belongs to a genus by using a theorem from

another science. In such a case the one science is said to be under

(subalternate with) the other science.

Here are the sciences along with their relations which Aristotle mentions in

the Analytics:

Geometry

Stereometry (solid

geometry) Arithmetic

| | | Optics

(mathematical)

Astronomy

(mathematical) Mechanics

Harmonics

(mathematical)

| | |

Concerning the

Rainbow

Nautical

Astronomy,

Phenomena,

Empirical

Acoustical

Science

Aristotle treats the science at the lowest level, descriptions of the rainbow,

astronomical phenomena, and acoustical harmonics, as descriptive, providing the

fact that something is the case, but not the explanation, which is provided by the

higher science. It is very easy to speculate how Aristotle would fill in the relations

in the table; e.g., would he put stereometry below geometry, as Plato does

in Rep. vii? Similarly, the explanatory relation between mathematical optics and

geometry is not the same as the relation of optics to empirical optics. This example

of the rainbow seems to refer to the argument in Meteorology iii.5, where the

observed fact that rainbows are never more than a semicircle (true in flat lands) is

explained by a proof in optics that is thoroughly geometrical in character. Once the

basic set-up and principle of reflection is provided, the rest is geometrical.

A different situation obtains when one science is not under another science, but

some of the properties come from the other science. Aristotle's example is the fact

that that round wounds heal more slowly [than slashes]. The medical property

depends on the area of the wound and its perimeter.

Aristotle's point about autonomy is that a theorem in arithmetic (even less a

theorem in harmonics) cannot be used to prove something in geometry. Here,

arithmetic is probably understood as the number theory found in

Euclid, Elements vii-ix, and not mere calculation of numbers, which, of course, is

used in geometry. This allows the anti-Platonic point that theorems about the

beautiful and theorems in mathematics have nothing to do with one another, even

if some theorems are beautiful.

Elsewhere (esp. Physics ii.2 and Metaphysics xiii.3),Aristotle provides different

accounts of the relations between mathematical sciences.

6. What Mathematical Sciences Study: Puzzles

Aristotle's principal concern in discussing ontological issues in mathematics is to

avoid various versions of platonism. Aristotle shares with Plato the view that there

are objects of understanding, that these must be universal and not particular and

that they have to satisfy certain “Parmenidean” conditions, such as being

unchanging and eternal. However, Aristotle rejects the view of Plato that objects of

understanding are separate from particulars. This is a general problem in Aristotle's

metaphysics. However, in the case of mathematical objects, there are three

important difficulties. First, if physical objects are the objects of mathematical

understanding and satisfy the standard definitions of line, circle, etc., then they

manifestly fail in two ways (cf. Met. iii 2 997b25-8a19):

1. The physical straight lines we draw are not straight; a physical tangent line

does not really touch a circle at a point. In other words, physical objects fail

to have the mathematical properties we study. This is the problem

of precision.

2. Physical mathematical objects lack properties which we require of objects of

understanding. They are not separate or independent of matter. Hence, they

are not eternal or unchanging. This is the problem of separability.

Although these two problems are distinct, Aristotle may hold that this failure is at

least partly responsible for the failure of mathematical objects to have the

mathematical properties we study. Platonic Forms fail in a third way.

3. Suppose that there is a Form for each kind of triangle. There still would be

only one Form for each kind. A mathematical theorem about diagonals of

rectangles might mention two equal and similar triangles which are,

nonetheless, distinct. Mathematical sciences require many objects of the

same sort. This is the problem of plurality (cf. Met. iii 2 and Met. iii.1-2).

A fourth problem is not explicitly stated by Aristotle, but is clearly a

presupposition of his discussion.

4. An account of mathematics should not impinge on mathematical practice so

as to make it incoherent or impossible. If mathematicians talk about

triangles, numbers, etc., the account of mathematical objects should at least

explain the discourse. This is the problem of non-revisionism (sometimes

also called naturalism). So Aristotle says (Met. xiii.3 1077b31-33) of his

own account of mathematics that “it is unqualifiedly true to say of the

mathematicals that thay exist and are such as they <the mathematicians

say>” (cf. Phys. iii.7 207b27-34 for an application of the principle).

To solve the problems of separation and precision, contemporary philosophers

such as Speusippus and possibly Plato posited a universe of mathematical entities

which are perfect instances of mathematical properties, adequately multiple for any

theorem we wish to prove, and separate from the physical or perceptible world.

Aristotle calls them mathematicals or intermediates, because they are

intermediate between the Forms and physical objects, in as much as they are

perfect, eternal, and unchanging like the Forms, but multiple like physical objects

(cf., for example, Met. i.6 987b14-18, iii 2, xiii.1-2). This solution is the ancestor

of many versions of platonism in mathematics.

Aristotle's rejection of intermediates involves showing that their advocates are

committed to an unwieldy multiplicity of mathematical universes, at least one

corresponding to each mathematical science, whether kinematics, astronomy, or

geometry. However, he also sets out to show that such ontologies are not merely

pleonastic, but also that an alternative account can be given free of all the

difficulties mentioned. In other words, Aristotle's strategy is best seen as diffusing

some versions of platonism.

Aristotle rejects a compromise as merely compounding this difficulty, the view

that either Forms or intermediates are immanent in things (separate but

coextensive), since these different worlds will now have to exist bundled together.

7. Aristotle's Treatment of Mathematical Objects

The account here of Aristotle on the status of mathematical objects will center on

five concepts, which Aristotle uses in his discussions: ‘abstraction’ or ‘taking

away’ or ‘removal’ or ‘subtraction’ (aphairesis), ‘precision’ (akribeia), ‘as

separated’ (hôs kekhôrismenon), ‘qua’ or ‘in the respect that’ (hêi), and

‘intelligible matter’ (noêtikê hylê). Principal sources are thePosterior

Analytics, De Anima iii.6-8, Metaphysics iii.2, vi.1, vii.10-11, ix.9, x.1-2, xi.2-3, 7,

xiii.1-3, Physics ii.2.

7.1 Objects From Abstraction or ‘Removal’ (ta ex aphaireseôs)

Aristotle occasionally refers to mathematical objects as things by, in, from, or

through removal (in different works Aristotle uses different expressions: ta

aphairesei, ta en aphairesei, ta ex aphaireseôs, ta di’ aphaireseôs). It is also clear

that this usage relates to logical discussions in the Topics of definitions where one

can speak of adding a term or deleting a term from an expression and seeing what

one gets as a result. Our principal task is to explain what this logical/psychological

removal is and how it solves the four puzzles. Aristotle starts with the class

of perceptible or physical magnitudes. The examination of these is a part of

physics (cf. Physics iii.4). The ontological status of these does not concern him, but

we may suppose that they consitute the category of quantities: the bodies, surfaces,

edges, corners, places, and times, sounds, etc. of physical substances

(Categories 6).

In the Analytics, where the notion of matter is absent, Aristotle begins with a

particular geometrical perceptible figure. What is removed is its particularity and

all that comes with this, including its being perceptible. What is left then is a

universal of some sort. Aristotle also does not seem to think in this work that there

is any conflict between the plurality problem and thinking of all terms in a

mathematical deduction as universals. However, since he allows that a term can be

a very complex expression, it can designate a rich complex for which there would

probably be no corresponding Form in a Platonic theory.

Elsewhere, Aristotle usually seems to mean that the attributes not a part of the

science are removed. What is left may be particular, a quasi-fictional entity. It is

the status of this entity which leads to much controversy? Is it a representation in

the soul or is it the perceptible object treated in a special way? Ancient and

medieval readers tended to take the former approach in their interpretation of

Aristotle, that the object left is a stripped down representation with only the

required properties. (Cf. Mueller (1990) and neo-Platonic foundations for these

interpretations of mathematics, such as Proclus in his commentary on Euclid.)

Most modern readers, perhaps influenced by the critiques of Berkeley and Hume

against the first and certainly less committed to neo-Platonism, take the second

approach. The objects studied by mathematical sciences are perceptible objects

treated in a special way, as a perceived representation, whether as a diagram in the

sand or an image in the imagination. Furthermore, perhaps as a response to Frege's

devastating critique of psychologism and Husserl's first attempt at a psychological

account of arithmetic, some have suggested that Aristotle has no need for a special

faculty of abstracting. Rather the mind is able to consider the perceived object

without some of its properties, such as being perceived, being made of sand, etc.

However, this is analogous to the logical manipulation of definitions, by

considering terms with or without certain additions. Hence, Aristotle will

sometimes call the material object, the mathematical object by adding on. As a

convenience, the mind conceives of this as if the object were just that. On this

view, abstraction is no more and no less psychological than inference.

Conceptually, we might think of the process as the mind rearranging the

ontological structure of the object. As a substantial artifact, what-it-is, the sand box

has certain properties essentially. The figure drawn may be incidental to what-it-is,

i.e., an accident. In treating the object as the figure drawn, being made of sand is

incidental to it. Hence, ‘things by removal’ may be one way of explaining

perceptible magnitudes qua lengths. This is the concept which does most of the

work for Aristotle.

7.2 Precision (akribeia)

In his discussions of precision, Aristotle states that those sciences which have more

properties removed are more precise. Arithemetic, about units, is more precise than

geometry, since a point is a unit having position. A science of kinematics

(geometry of moving magnitudes) where all motion is uniform motions is more

precise than a science that includes non-uniform motions in addition, and a science

of non-moving magnitudes (geometry) is more precise than one with moving

magnitudes. However, one might infer that ‘precision’ here means nothing more

than ‘clarity’ (or perhaps ‘refinement’, with all its ambiguity). Does this concept of

‘precision’ provide a framework for solving the problem of precision?

7.3 As Separated (hôs kekhôrismenon)

Aristotle solves the separability problem with a kind of fictionalism. The language

and practice of mathematicians is legitimate because we are able to conceive of

perceptible magnitudes in ways that they are not. The only basic realities for

Aristotle remain substances, however we are to conceive them. A primary

characteristic of substances is that they are separate. Yet we are able to speak of a

triangle, a finite surface, merely the limit of a body, and hence not separate, as if it

were separate (hôs kekhôrismenon). It is a subject in our science (in our discourse

in the science). The mental and logical mechanism by which we accomplish this is

the core of Aristotle's strategy in diffusing platonisms.

7.4 X Qua (hêi) Y

The word Aristotle uses is commonly translated with the English word ‘qua’ which

itself translates the Latin relative pronoun ‘qua’, but with one important

grammatical difference. The English adverb is normally followed by a noun

phrase.

As a relative adverbial pronoun in the dative case, the Greek word captures all

possible meanings of the dative, including, ‘where’, ‘in the manner that’, ‘by-

means-of-the-fact-that’, or ‘in-the-respect-that’. Some have suggested translating it

with the word ‘because’, although it is arguable that the English word at best

intersects with the appropriate Greek meaning (perhaps ‘just or precisely because’

works better. Hence, ‘X qua Y’ should be understood as elliptic for:

‘X in the respect that X is Y’

or

‘X by means of the fact that X is Y’ (or ‘X precisely because X is Y’).

Here ‘X’ is normally a noun phrase referring to an entity in any ordinary way, e.g.,

arithmetic studies Leopold qua unit, this manqua unit, this musician qua unit.

In the context of a scientific claim, ‘X by-means-of-the-fact-that or in-the-respect-

that X is Y is F’ maintains that ‘Y is F’ is a theorem, where Y is the most universal

or appropriate subject for F, and that X is F in virtue of the fact that X is Y. For

example, Figure ABC qua triangle has internal angles equal to two right angles,

but qua right triangle has sides AB2 + BC2 = AB2.

In the case where we examine or study an object X qua Y or X in-the-respect-

that X is Y, we study the consequences that follow from something's being an Y. In

other words, Y determines the logical space of what we study. If X is a bronze

triangle (a perceptible magnitude), to study X qua bronze will be to examine

bronze and the properties that accrue to something that is bronze. To

study X qua triangle is to study the properties that accrue to a triangle. Unless it

follows from something's being a triangle that it must be bronze, the property of

being bronze will not appear in one's examination.

Note that there is no necessity that ‘qua’ operators be of the form ‘qua Y’,

where Y is a noun phrase. For example, Aristotle says (De anima iii.4.429b25-6)

that two things affect and are affected “qua something in common belongs to

both.” Similarly, as evidence that ‘qua’ does not in these contexts always mean

‘because’ (usually, the context is too ambiguous to precisely decide whether it

means ‘because’ or ‘in the respect that’), consider Nicomachean Ethics i.3.1102b8-

9, “Sleep is an inactivity of the soul qua it is called good or bad,” but certainly not

because it is.

With only one or two possible exceptions, it seems that whenever Aristotle speaks

of F(X) qua G(X), G(X) must be true. We can study a perceptible

triangle qua triangle because it is a triangle. For convenience, we can call this

principle qua-realism.

The Account of Mathematical Objects with ‘Qua’. We begin with perceptible

magnitudes. These are volumes, surfaces, edges, and corners. They change in

position and size. They are made of some material and are the quantities of

substances and their interactions. The volumes, surfaces, and edges have shape.

Times and corners do not. Different sciences treat different perceptible

magnitudes qua different things.

Moreover, since there are many perceptible magnitudes, there will be

enough, qua line, to prove any theorem that involves lines. The plurality problem

is trivially solved.

The separability problem is solved because if we examine X qua Y, we will talk

about Y as if it is a separate entity, as a subject, and will pay no attention to the way

in which we captured Y through a description ‘X’, in the sense that only the residue

of thequa-filter are studied. The science will speak of Y. This too will not interfere

with mathematical practice and so will not violate non-revisionism.

In Metaphysics vi.1, Aristotle argues that physics concerns things which have

change, but are substances, that at least some of the things that mathematics is

about do not change and are eternal but are not substances (exceptions would

probably include stars and spheres in mathematical astronomy and bodies in

mathematical kinematics), while first philosophy or theology is about things which

are substances but do not change and are eternal. We can now characterize the way

in which mathematical objects are eternal and lack change. Namely, generation and

change are not among the predicates studied by geometry or arithmetic. Hence, it is

correct to say that qua lines, perceptible lines lack generation, destruction, and

change (with appropriate provisos for kinematics and mathematical astronomy).

Whether the precision problem is also solved and how it is solved is more

controversial. On the ancient and medieval interpretation, the problem of precision

is solved by allowing mental representations to be as precise as one chooses. The

contemporary interpretation of considering Aristotle's mathematical objects as

physical object treated in a special way has a more difficult task. There are five

ways in which Aristotle may attempt to solve the precision problem.

1. Many scholars today seem to hold to a view that for Aristotle if one can

speak of X qua Y, then X must be Y precisely. This means that any theorem

about triangles will only hold of the rare perfect triangles, wherever they

may be (a thesis once suggested by Descartes).

2. To increase the number of instances of exact triangles in the ontology, some

scholars turn to Met. xiii.3, where Aristotle says that being is said in two

ways, the one in actualilty and one materially, he may be pointing to the fact

that mathematical entities exist in continua as potentialities. Hence, a perfect

line exists potentially in the sand, even if the one I have drawn is not. (Some

have also seen support for this in Met. ix.9.) Hence, although there may be

no actual triangles right now, at least there are an infinity of potential ones.

The difficulty is that the argument is not about precision. It concerns an

objection to Aristotle that man qua man is indivisible, but geometry studies

man qua divisible. Since man is not divisible, the principle of qua-realism,

that if one can study X qua Y then X is Y, is violated. Aristotle says that man

is in actuality indivisible (you cannot slice a man in two and still have man

or men), but is materially divisible. It is enough that X is Y materially or in

actuality to study X qua Y. Nonetheless, the solution to the puzzle could

point to an Aristotelian solution to the problem of precision.

3. Alternatively, it is arguable that Aristotle allows that ‘X is Y’ may be true

only imprecisely. For example, I may study a triangle in a

diagram ABC qua triangle, but ABC is only a triangle imprecisely. Many

Hellenistic treatises involving applied sciences set up convenient but false

premises for the purposes of mathematical manipulation, including, notably,

Aristotle's own account of the rainbow (Meteorology iii.5). Hence, an appeal

to potentialities to get more exact triangles will do nothing to eliminate these

apparent violations of qua-realism.

4. In providing his hierarchy of precision in sciences, Aristotle may think that

from filtering out more properties one gets greater precision. One finds more

precise straight lines in geometry than in kinematics. Besides the obscurity

of the position, it is not clear that he intends any such thing (see Section 7.2

above).

5. One possibility is that Aristotle thinks that if a description has more

properties removed from consideration, the entity studied is more precise in

that there will be instances materially or actually that exactly exhibit

satisfy qua-realism. For example, there are precise instances of units or of

corners or points so that arithmetic and geometry are precise, while

astronomy might not be so precise, since the planets are imprecisely points,

but are studied qua points.

Our difficulty is that while Aristotle raises the problem of precision, he does not

explicitly explain his solution to it.

7.5 Intelligible matter (noêtikê hylê)

Perceptible magnitudes have perceptible matter. A bronze sphere is a perceptible

magnitude. For solving the plurality problem, Aristotle needs to have many

triangles with the same form. Since perceptible matter is not part of the object

considered (in abstraction or removal), he needs to have a notion of matter which is

the matter of the object: bronze sphere MINUS bronze (perceptible matter). Since

this object must be a composite individual to distinguish it from other individuals

with the same form, it will have matter. He calls such matter intelligible or

mathematical matter. Aristotle has at least four different conceptions of intelligible

matter in the middle books of the Metaphysics, Physics iv, and De anima i:

1. The form of a magnitude is its limit (Metaphysics v.17); hence, the matter is

what is between the limits of the magnitude, its extension (Physics iv 2).

2. Matter is the genus, e.g., in the sense that magnitude (and not perceptible-

magnitude) is the kind for triangles (e.g.,Metaphysics v.28, viii.6).

3. The ‘non-perceptible’ matter of a perceptible magnitude, which is in the

perceptible matter (Metaphysics vii.10, cf. De anima i.1).

4. The parts of a mathematical object which do not occur in the definition of

the object, e.g., acute angle is not in the definition of right angle, but is a

part of it and so is a non-perceptible material part of the angle

(Metaphysics vii.10, 11).

(1) and (3) are compatible; (2) may be a separate notion having more to do with the

unity of definition and seems incompatible with (4); Aristotle treats (3) and (4) as

the same notion. Since Aristotle's concern in discussing (4) is with the nature of the

parts of definitions and not with questions of extended matter, it is unclear whether

the non-definitional parts are potential extended parts or merely forms of extended

parts, although the former seems more plausible.

8. Universal Mathematics

Ancillary to his discussions of being qua being and theology (Metaphysics vi.1,

xi.7), Aristotle suggests an analogy with mathematics. If the analogy is that there is

a super-science of mathematics coverying all continuous magnitudes and discrete

quantities, such as numbers, then we should expect that Greek mathematicians

conceived of a general mathematical subject as a precursor of algebra, Descartes'

mathesis universalis (universal learning/mathematics), and mathematical logic.

Aristotle reports (Posterior Analytics. i.5, cf. Metaphysics xiii.2) that whereas

mathematicians proved theorems such as a : b= c : d => a : c = b : d (alternando)

separately for number, lines, planes, and solids, now there is one single general or

universal proof for all (see Section 3). The discovery of universal proofs is usually

associated with Eudoxus' theory of proportion. For Aristotle this creates a problem

since a science concerns a genus or kind, but also there seems to be no kind

comprising number and magnitude. Some scholars have proposed that a universal

science of ‘posology’ (a science of quantity) takes the whole category of quantity

as its subject.

Aristotle seems more reticent, describing the proofs as concerning lines, etc., qua

having such and such increment (An. Post.ii.17). He seems to identify such a

super-mathematics (Metaphysics vi.1, xi.7), but seems to imply that it does not

take a determinate kind as its subject. Another possibility is that the common

science has theorems which apply by analogy to the different mathematical kinds.

Elsewhere (Metaphysics xi.4), where Aristotle builds an analogy with the science

of being qua being, he seems to suggest that universal proofs of quantities (here too

including numbers) concern continuous quantity (unlike the similar passage

inMetaphysics iv.3). If so and if this is by Aristotle, it would correspond to the

general theory of proportions as it comes down to us. One may well wonder if

scholars have been led astray by a hyperbole about universal proofs.

Ironically, extant Greek mathematics shows no traces of an Aristotelian universal

mathematics. The theory of ratio for magnitudes in Euclid, Elements v is

completely separate from the treatment of ratio for number in Elements vii and

parts of viii, none of which appeals to v, even though almost all of the proofs of v

could apply straightforwardly to numbers. For example, Euclid provides separate

definitions of proportion (v def. 5, and vii def. 20). Compare the rule above

(alternando),which is proved at v.16, while the rule follows trivially for numbers

from the commutivity of multiplication and vii.19: ad = bc ⇔ a : b =c : d.

9. Place and continuity of Magnitudes

In Plato's Academy, some philosophers suggested that lines are composed of

indivisible magnitude, whether a finite number (a line of indivisible lines) or a

infinite number (a line of infinite points). Aristotle builds a theory of continuity

and infinite divisibility of geometrical objects. Aristotle denies both conceptions.

Yet, he needs to give an account of continuous magnitudes that is also free from

paradoxes that these theories attempted to avoid. The elements of his account may

be found principally in Physicsiv.1-5 and v.1 and vi. Aristotle's account pertains to

perceptible magnitudes. However, it is clear that he understands this to apply to

magnitudes in mathematics as well.

Aristotle has many objections to thinking of a line as composed of actual points

(likewise, a plane of lines, etc.), including:

a. No point in a line is adjacent to another point.

b. If a line is composed of actual points, than to move a distance an object

would have to complete an infinite number of tasks (as suggested by Zeno's

arguments against motion)

To say that a line is comprised of an infinity of potential points is no more than to

say that a line may be divided (with a line-cutter, with the mind, etc.) anywhere on

it, that any potential point may be brought to actuality. The continuity of a line

consists in the fact that any actualized point within the line will hold together the

line segments on each side. Otherwise, it makes no sense to speak of a potential

point actually holding two potential lines together.

Suppose I have a line AB and cut it at C. The lines AC and CB are distinct. Is C one

point or two?

C is one point in number.

C is two points in its being or formula (logos).

This merely means that we can treat it once or twice or as many times as we

choose. Note that Aristotle says the same thing about a continuous proportion.

in a : b = b : c, b is one magnitude in being, but is used as two.

For more information, see the following supplementary document:

Place and continuity of Magnitudes

10. Unit (monas) and Number (arithmos)

10.1 Background

Greek mathematicians tend to conceive of number (arithmos) as a plurality of

units. Perhaps a better translation, without our deeply entrenched notions, would be

‘count’. Their conception involves:

1. A number is constructed out of some countable entity, unit (monas).

2. Numbers are more like concatenations of units and are not sets. To draw a

contrast with modern treatments of numbers, a Greek pair or a two is neither

a subset of a triple, nor a member of a triple. It is a part of three. If I say that

ten cows are hungry, then I am not saying that a set is hungry. Or to point to

another use of ‘set’, my 12 piece teaset is in a cabinet, not in an abstract

universe. So too, these ten units are a part of these twenty units:

3. One (a unit) typically is not a number (but Aristotle is ambivalent on this),

since a number is a plurality of units.

4. At least in theoretical discussions of numbers, a fractional part is not a

number.

5. In other words, numbers are members of the series: 2, 3, …, with 1

conceived as the ‘beginning’ (archê) of number or as the least number.

6. In early Greek mathematics (5th century), numbers were represented by

arrangements of pebbles. Later (at least by the 3rd century BCE) they were

represented by evenly divided lines.

For Aristotle and his contemporaries there are several fundamental problems in

understanding number and arithmetic:

1. The precision problem of mathematicals is similar in the case of geometrical

entities and units (see Section 6). Consider, for example, Plato's discussion

of incompatible features of a finger as presenting one or two things to sight.

Aristotle deals with the problem in his discussion of measure (see Section

10.1).

2. The separability problem is the same as for geometry (see Section 6).

3. The plurality problem of mathematicals (Section 6) is similar in the case of

geometrical entities and units, with some differences. To count ‘perceptible’

units, or rather units from abstraction (cf. Section 7.1), one needs some

principle of individuating units, what one is counting, whether cows or

categories of predication. Aristotle says that one can always find an

appropriate classification (we may assume that some classifications would

be fairly convoluted, but that this is at best an aesthetic and not a logical

problem). For units, one will use the same principle that allows one to

individuate triangles. This is why Aristotle can describe a point as unit-

having-position. Arithmetic involves the study of entities qua indivisible.

4. The unity problem of numbers: This problem bedevils philosophy of

mathematics from Plato to Husserl. What makes a collection of units a unity

which we identify as a number? It cannot be physical juxtaposition of units.

Is it merely mental stipulation?

Aristotle does not seem bothered by:

5. The overlap problem: What guarantees that when I add this 3 and this 5

that the correct result is not 5, 6, or 7, namely that some units in this 3 are

not also in this 5.

Aristotle presents three Academic solutions to these problems. Units are

comparable if they can be counted together (such as the ten cows in the field).

Units are not comparable, if it is conceptually impossible to count them together (a

less intuitive notion).

1. Incomparable Units: Form numbers are conceived as ordinals, with units

conceived as being well ordered. What makes this number 3 is not that it is a

concatenation of three units, but that its unit is the third unit in this series of

units. Hence, it is simply false that there is a unity of the first three units

forming a number three. What makes an ordinary concatenation, e.g., a herd

of cows, ten cows is that they can be counted according to the series of

Form-numbers. The notion of incomparable numbers lacks the basic

conception of numbers as concatenations of units.

2. Comparable/Incomparable Units: Form numbers are, of course, special.

Each is a complete unity of units. For example, the Form of 3 is a unity of

three units. Since it is a unity, it cannot be an accident that these three units

form this unity. They are comparable with each other in the sense that

together they comprise Three Itself and perhaps cannot be conceived

separately. Hence, they cannot be parts of any other Form number. We

cannot take 2 units from the Three Itself and add them to 4 units in the Six

itself, to get a Form-number of the Seven itself. Myles Burnyeat once

suggested an analogy with a sequence of playing cards of one suit, say

diamonds.[1] Each card from ace (unit) to ten contains the appropriate

diamonds (from 1 to 10) on each card, unified by their being on their

particular card. Yet we don't count up two diamonds from the deuce and two

from the trey, but treat each card as a complete unity.

3. Comparable Units: These are intermediate or mathematical numbers (see

Section 6). There is a unlimited number of units (enough to do arithmetic),

which are arranged and so forth. Comparable numbers solve the plurality

problem, but not the unity problem.

Aristotle reports that some Academics opted for a version of Incomparable or

Comparable/Incomparable Units to solve the unity problem and introduced

comparable units as the objects of mathematical theorems, e.g., given some

comparable units, they are even if they can be divided in half, into two

concatenations corresponding to (participating in) the same Form-number.

10.2 Measure (metron)

10.2.1 Background

Greeks used an Egyptian system of fractions. With the exception of 2/3, all

fractions are proper parts which modern readers will see as unit fractions: 1/n. For

example, 2/5 is 1/3 1/15 (that is, the sum of 1/3 and 1/15). Additionally, Greeks

used systems of measure, as we do, with units of measure being divided up into

more refined units of measure. 1 foot is 16 finger-widths (inches). Hence, one can

always eliminate fractions by going, as we do, to a more refined measure (1, 1/2,

1/4 feet or 1 foot 12 inches). This feature of measure may be reflected in Plato's

observation (Rep. vii) that in arithmetic, one can always eliminate parts of units.

10.2.2 Aristotle's views

Since Aristotle (esp. Metaphysics x.1-2) treats measurement under his discussions

of units (and hence number), it turns out that the precision problem becomes a

problem of sorting out precise units of measure. Hence, in the case discrete

quantities, such as cows, the unit is very precise, one cow. In the case of

continuous quantities, the most precise unit of time is the time it takes for the fixed

stars (the fastest things in the universe) to move the smallest perceptible distance.

But a point or indivisible with position removed or a cow qua unit, i.e., a

mathematical unit, is precise.

10.3 Time

Aristotle's treatment of time (Physics iv.10-14) includes some observations about

numbers which come closest to being an acount of number. Aristotle defines time

as the number or count of change and then proceeds to distinguish two senses of

number, what is counted (e.g., ten cows as measured by the cow-unit, or ten feet as

measured by the foot-unit) and that by which we count. Time is number in the first

sense, not as so-many changes, but as so-much change as measured by a unit of

change. Aristotle clarifies the distinction between what is counted (or is countable)

and that by which we count. These five black cats (number as what is counted) are

different from these five brown cats, but their number (that by which we count) is

the same.

But what are the numbers by which we count? Aristotle says nothing, but we may

speculate that the five by which we count is the single formal explanation of what

makes the five black cats five and what makes the five brown cats five. Hence,

Aristotle probably subscribes to an Aristotelian version of the distinction between

intermediate and Form-numbers.

Aristotle's discussion of time also gives us some insight into the unity problem.

What gives the five black cats unity is just that they can be treated as a unity. From

this it follows for Aristotle that there can be no number without mind. Nothing

iscountable unless there exists a counter.

11. Mathematics and Hypothetical Necessity

It is often supposed, for Aristotle, mathematical explanation plays no role in the

study of nature, especially in biology. This conception is, most of all, a product of

anti-scholastics of the late Renaissance, who sought to draw the greatest chasm

between their own mechanism and scholasticism. Mathematics plays a vital role in

both. The principal way in which mathematics enters into biological explanation is

through hypothetical necessity:

If X is to have feature Y (which is good for X), then it is a feature of its matter

that Z be the case.

Z may be a constraint determined by a mathematical fact. For example, animals by

nature do not have an odd number of feet. For if one had an odd number of feet, it

would walk awkardly or the feet would have to be of different lengths (De

incessuanimalium 9). To see this, imagine an isosceles triangle with a altitude

drawn.

12. The Infinite (apeiron)

Aristotle famously rejects the infinite in mathematics and in physics, with some

notable exceptions. He defines it thus:

The infinite is that for which it is always possible to take something outside.

Implicit in this notion is an unending series of magnitudes, which will be achieved

either by dividing a magnitude (the infinite by division) or by adding a magnitude

to it (the infinite by addition). This is why he conceives of the infinite as pertaining

to material explanation, as it is indeterminate and involves potential cutting or

joining (cf. Section 7.5).

Aristotle argues that in the case of magnitudes, an infinitely large magnitude and

an infinitely small magnitude cannot exist. In fact, he thinks that universe is finite

in size. He also agrees with Anaxagoras, that given any magnitude, it is possible to

take a smaller. Hence, he allows that there are infinite magnitudes in a different

sense. Since it is always possible to divide a magnitude, the series of division is

unending and so is infinite. This is a potential, but never actual infinite. For each

division potentially exists. Similarly, since it is always possible to add to a finite

magnitude that is smaller than the whole universe continually smaller magnitudes,

there is a potential infinite in addition. That series too need never end. For

example, if I add to some magnitude a foot board, and then less than a half a foot,

and then less than a fourth, and so forth, the total amount added will never exceed

two feet. Aristotle claims that the mathematician never needs any other notion of

the infinite.

However, since Aristotle believes that the universe has no beginning and is eternal,

it follows that in the past there have been an infinite number of days. Hence, his

rejection of the actual infinite in the case of magnitude does not seem to extend to

the concept of time.

For more information, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle on the Infinite

13. Aristotle and the Evidence for the History of Mathematics

As philosophers usually do, Aristotle cites simple or familiar examples from

contemporary mathematics, although we should keep in mind that even basic

geometry such as we find in Euclid's Elements would have been advanced studies.

The average education in mathematics would have been basic arithmetical

operations (possibly called logistikê) and metrological geometry (given certain

dimensions of a figure, to find other dimensions), such as were also taught in

Egypt. Aristotle does allude to this sort of mathematics on occasion, but most of

his examples come from the sort of mathematics which we have come to associate

with Greece, the constructing of figures from given figures and rules, and the

proving that figures have certain properties, and the ‘discovery’ of numbers with

certain properties or proving that certain classes of numbers have certain

properties. If we attend carefully to his examples, we can even see an emerging

picture of elementary geometry as taught in the Academy. In the supplement are

provided twenty-five of his favorite propositions (the list is not exhaustive).

Aristotle also makes some mathematical claims that are genuinely problematic.

Was he ignorant of contemporary work? Why does he ignore some of the great

problems of his time? Is there any reason why Aristotle should be expected, for

example to refer to conic sections? Nonetheless, Aristotle does engage in some

original and difficult mathematics. Certainly, in this Aristotle was more an active

mathematician than his mentor, Plato.

For more information, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle and Greek Mathematics

Glossary

The standard English translation is given first, and, where appropirate, other more

idiomatic translations. Greek is in parentheses.

a this (tode ti)

abstraction, by removal, by subtraction, by taking away (aphairesis)

axiom (axiôma)

common notion (koinê ennoia)

definition (horismos), (horos)

hypothesis (hupothesis)

infinite (apeiron)

intelligible matter (noêtikê hulê)

intermediates (ta metaxu); also mathematicals (ta mathêmatika)

of everything (kata pantos)

per se, in virtue of itself (kath hauto)

per se accidens, per se accidents or per se consequences (kath’ hauto

sembebêkôs)

posits (thesis)

postulate (aitêma)

qua, in respect that, because of the fact that — also sometime translated as

‘in so far as’ (hêi)

subalternate (hupo)

unit (monas)

universal (katholou)

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Gesch. der Philosophie 52: 156-171 (reprint. in Barnes, Articles, vol. 3)

Mueller, Ian, 1990, "Aristotle's Doctrine of Abstraction in the

commentators." In Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient

Commentators and their Influennce, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 463-

479.

McKirahan, R.D., 1992, Principles and Proofs: Aristotle's Theory of

Demonstrative Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mignucci, M, 1987, "Aristotle's Arithmetic." In Graeser, 175-211.

Philippe, M.D., 1948, "Aphairesis, Prosthesis, khôrizein dans la philosophie

d'Aristote." Revue Thomiste 48: 461-79.

Sorabji, Richard, 1973, "Aristotle, Mathematics, and Color." Classical

Quarterly 22: 293-308.

Tiles, J.E., 1983, "Why the Triangle has 2 Right Angles Kath’

Hauto." Phronesis 28: 1-17.

White, Michael J., 1992. The Continuous and the Discrete. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Works focussing on mathematical issues either in Aristotle or importantly related to

Aristotle

Becker, Oskar, 1933, "Eudoxos-Studien I. Eine voreudoxische

Proportionenlehre und ihre Spuren bei Aristoteles und Euklid." QS 2: 311-

333.

Becker, Oskar, 1933, "Eudoxos-Studien II. Warum haben die Griechen die

Existenz der vierten Proportionale angenommen?" QS 2: 369-387.

Becker, Oskar, 1936, "Eudoxos-Studien III. Spuren eines Stetigkeitsaxioms

in der Art des Dedekind'schen zur Zeit des Eudoxos." QS 3: 236-244.

Becker, Oskar, 1936, "Eudoxos-Studien IV. Das Prinzip des

ausgeschlossenen Dritten in der griechischen Mathematik."QS 3: 370-388.

Euclid, 1926, The Elements of Euclid. 3 vols. 2nd. ed. Eng. trans. with

comm. T.L. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., (reprint: New York,

Dover, 1956).

Euclide, 1994, 1998, 1998 Les Éléments. 4 volumes (3 completed) French

trans. with commentary by Bernard Vitrac, Paris: Presses Universitaires de

France.

Einarson, Benedict, 1936, "On Certain Mathematical Terms in Aristotle's

Logic." American Journal of Philology 57: 33-44 (Part I), 151-172 (Part II).

Fowler, D.H., 1987, The Mathematics of Plato's Academy. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, (2nd ed., 1999).

Heath, T.L., 1921, A History of Greek Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, (reprint: New York, Dover, 1981)

Knorr, Wilbur R., 1978, "Archimedes and the Pre-Euclidean Proportion

Theory." Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences 28: 183-244.

Knorr, Wilbur R., 1983, "Construction as Existence Proof in Ancient

Geometry", Ancient Philosophy 3, 125-49.

Knorr, Wilbur R., 1975, The Evolution of the Euclidean Elements. Synthese

Historical Library 15. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Knorr, Wilbur R., 1986, The Ancient Tradition of Geometric Problems.

Boston: Birkhäuser, (reprint, New York: Dover).

Mendell, Henry R., 1984, "Two Geometrical Examples from Aristotle's

Metaphysics." Classical Quarterly 34: 359-72.

Mendell, Henry R., 2001, "The Trouble with Eudoxus". In Pat Suppes,

Julius Moravcsik, and Henry Mendell (eds.),Ancient and Medieval

Traditions in the Exact Sciences: Essays in Memory of Wilbur Knorr,

Stanford: CSLI (distr. University of Chicago Press), 59-138.

Mueller, Ian, 1969, "Euclid's Elements and the Axiomatic Method." British

Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20: 289-309.

Mueller, Ian, 1974, "Greek Mathematics and Greek Logic." In John

Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations (Dordrecht,

Reidel), 35-70.

Mueller, Ian, 1981, Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in

Euclid's Elements. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Netz, Reviel, 1999, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: a

Study in Cognitive History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Proclus Diadochus, 1992, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's

Elements. Trans. with intro. and notes by Glenn R. Morrow. Forward by Ian

Mueller. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Other Internet Resources

Vignettes of Ancient Mathematics This is a resource of translations of

Ancient Mathematics, including examples from Aristotle.

Related Entries

Aristotle | Aristotle, General Topics: logic

Copyright © 2004 by

Henry Mendell <hmendel@calstatela.edu>