TO  SPEAK  OR  NOT  TO  SPEAK:ARISTOCLES’  ARGUMENT  AGAINST  TIMON

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The  Project:  Its  Scope  and  Aims

The early Hellenistic philosopher Aristocles of Messene has been extensively studied as

a source for information about other philosophical movements, especially Pyrrhonean

skepticism. However, very little attention has been paid to this philosopher’s own

commentary on philosophical positions. This is a missed opportunity on several fronts.

First, it seems clear that we are in a much better position to reconstruct Aristocles’ own

words as opposed to the fragments of other philosophers contained within his work.

Second, there is much of philosophical interest contained within Aristocles’

commentaries. Finally, by analyzing Aristocles’ commentaries, we can arrive at a better

understanding of the original philosophers’ positions.

The publication (nearly a decade ago) of all of the extant fragments of Aristocles’ work

is a welcome first step towards changing this situation.1 But Chiesara’s work does little

to examine Aristocles’ positions on their own, and rather focuses on reconstructing the

positions of the various philosophers discussed by Aristocles.

In this paper, I hope to illustrate the value that Aristocles’ work can have on its own,

and not merely as a pathway to Pyrrhonism or Epicureanism. I will examine part of one

fragment (AM F4), in which Aristocles argues against an early Pyrrhonean skeptic,

Timon, a student of Pyrrho. The first few paragraphs (AM F4:3-4) of this passage have

BURNS   1

1 Maria Lorenza Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene: Testamonia and Fragments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

received a great deal of attention, as they are reported to be a paraphrase of Timon’s

work. Thus, they are often seen as a rich resource for scholars wishing to reconstruct

the philosophy of the early Pyrrhonean skeptics. But I will spend most of this paper on

another often neglected section of the text, paragraphs 8-9. Here, Aristocles argues

strongly against Timon’s view.

The first part of this paper is concerned with background material for the project,

including some general comments on the many problems encountered while working

with ancient texts. The second part briefly discusses the fragment of Timon

paraphrased in Aristocles’ fragment. As mentioned above, this fragment has already

been extensively studied elsewhere, and here I will only touch upon some of the most

important issues involved in the interpretation of the fragment. The third part of this

paper examines Aristocles’ argument against Timon. I will attempt to outline this

argument, and provide some brief explications of its more difficult premisses. I will

conclude with a few general problems with the argument.

1.2. Aristocles  of  Messene

Aristocles of Messene is an enigmatic yet important character in the history of Greek

philosophy. Until recently, Aristocles was thought to be the teacher of Alexander of

Aphrodisias. This was based on a fragment from the latter’s De intellectu 110.4, where

Alexander claims to have heard of the “intellect from without” from a certain Aristotle.

The identification of Aristocles with this Aristotle was first made by Zeller, who

emended Aristotle to Aristocles.2 Zeller’s emendation was followed uncritically by

Heiland, who placed Aristocles in the second century CE.3 But Moraux points out that

BURNS   2

2 Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie Der Griechen in Ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 5 ed., vol. 3.1 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990), 814 n.1.3 Hermann Heiland, Aristoclis Messenii Reliquiae (Giessen: Meyer, 1925).

every extant manuscript mentioning Alexander’s teacher has the name Aristotle, and

that there is no need to emend the text.4

But this leaves us with little to go on in way of dating Aristocles. The possible dates are

bounded on the late end by references in Eusebius’ Praeparatio evangelica in the early

fourth century and on the early end by Aristocles’ references to Apellicon, who dates to

the early first century BCE. Scholarly opinions range across this four century period.5

Little is known of Aristocles’ work other than the fragments preserved by Eusebius. The

Suda, a 10th century Byzantine encyclopedia, records that Peri philosophias originally

comprised ten volumes, and that Aristocles also wrote several other works of

philosophy (AM T1-2). Aslepius and Johannes Philoponus each mention Peri philosophias

in their respective commentaries on Nichomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic (AM T3-6).

According to both of these sources, Aristocles discussed the meaning of wisdom

(σοφία), linking it to clarity (σάφειά).

1.3. Peri  philosophias

The primary text with which we are concerned here is fragment of Aristocles’ book, Peri

philosophias. This book itself does not survive, but five substantial portions of it are

quoted by Eusebius (4th century CE) in his Praeparatio evangelica (PE 14:16-20;6 AM F4-

F87). Each of the chapters in PE deals with objections to a certain school of

philosophers. Each fragment is preceded by an index which seems to be the work of

BURNS   3

4 Paul Moraux, "Aristoteles, Der Lehrer Alexanders Von Aphrodisias," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967).5 Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene: Testamonia and Fragments, xvi-xviii.6 I follow the paragraphing from Thomas Gaisford, Eusebii Pamphili Praeparationis Evangelicae Libri Xv (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1843); this is the paragraphing used in the critical edition of the Greek text by Karl Mras, Eusebii: Praeparatio Evangelica (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1954); but a different system is used in the prominant English translation by Edwin Hamilton Gifford, Eusebius Pamphili: Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri Xv, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903). 7 Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene: Testamonia and Fragments. Unless otherwise noted, all quoted translations of testimonia and fragments are from this edition.

Eusebius.8 These indices record that the chapters are against Xenophanes and

Parmenides (PE 14:16, AM F7), the Pyrrhonean skeptics (PE 14:17, AM F4), the

Aristippeans (PE 14:18, AM F5); Metrodorus and Protagoras (PE 14:19, AM F6), and the

Epicureans (PE 14:20, AM F8). In his analysis of Eusebius’ text, Moraux reconstructs the

order of these passages, arguing that PE 14:16-19 originally made up one continuous

block of text in Aristocles’ book, with PE 14:20 as a separate section. He reorders the

entire passage as follows: 17-18-19-16-20.9

In this paper, we are concerned with the passage against the Pyrrhonean skeptics (PE

14:16, AM F4). In this passage, Aristocles discusses the report which Timon, a student of

Aristocles, gives concerning the philosophy of Pyrrho. This is, of course, one of the

primary texts for reconstructing the philosophy of Pyrrho, and as such much effort has

been expended in attempting to extract the authentic philosophy of Pyrrho from the

text. This paper, however, will take a different approach. Rather than focusing on

Pyrrho’s philosophy, this paper is primarily concerned with Aristocles’ response to

Pyrrho. In order to understand this response, of course, some time will have to spent on

understanding Pyrrho’s position (or more accurately, at understanding what Aristocles

took Pyrrho’s position to be. As the next section will make clear, this distinction will not

turn out to be minor; and may indeed be the difference between a hopeless project and

a possible one.)

BURNS   4

8 Ibid., xxv; but Gifford, Eusebius Pamphili: Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri Xv. regards these indices as the work of a later copyist.9 Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus Bei Den Griechen: Von Andronikos Bis Alexander Von Aphrodisias, ed. H. J. Drossaart Lulolfs, L. Minio-Paluello, and R. Weil, vol. 2, Peripatoi: Philologisch-Historische Studien Zum Aristotelismus (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 83-92.

1.4. Notes  on  the  Texts

Before we get to the texts, however, a few words on method are in order. The

fragmentary texts of ancient philosophers cannot be extracted wholesale from their

embedded contexts and used to reconstruct ancient positions. These texts usually

appear in second or third hand reports, and often are quoted out of their original

contexts by commentators who may have purposes very different than those of the

original authors. Additionally, ancient authors do not always follow our strict standards

of quotation; loose paraphrase is often presented as direct quotation, and source texts

are altered to suit new contexts. All of this is problematic even if the ancient

commentators fully understand their source material, which is not always the case. Add

to this the possibility of outright distortion by unfriendly commentators, and the

practice of mining for ancient fragments is clearly a risky undertaking.

In our case, however, we need not be concerned with the accuracy of Eusebius’ report of

Aristocles’ report of Timon’s report of Pyrrho. We are only concerned with

reconstructing Aristocles’ response to the philosophy as he understood it, not as the

original authors meant it. Thus, we only need worry about Eusebius’ report. For this, we

are on much firmer ground. First, Eusebius is generally considered to be a reasonably

accurate reporter of other authors’ works.10 Second, Eusebius is reasonably sympathetic

to Aristocles: both of them are concerned with exposing fallacies in the works of the

philosophers under consideration, although albeit for different purposes. Aristocles’

purpose is not explicit, but if Moraux’s reconstruction is accurate, it seems that this

BURNS   5

10 For discussions of Eusebius' reliability, see H. A. Drake, "What Eusebius Knew: The Genesis of The "Vita Constantini"," Classical Philology 83, no. 1 (1988); Michael J. Hollerich, "Religion and Politics in the Writings of Eusebius: Reassessing the First "Court Theologian"," Church History 59, no. 3 (1990).

section of Aristocles’ work is concerned with the standard epistemological problem of

the criterion for our knowledge.11 The passages quoted seem to be a summary of the

positions espoused by the various schools of philosophy, followed by Aristocles’

refutation of each position. Eusebius, on the other hand, is developing an extended

polemic against non-Christian cultures. He contrasts Greek culture – which he

characterizes as descending from the pagan Phoenician and Egyptian cultures – with

what he characterizes as an ancient Hebraic and Christian tradition.12 Towards this end,

Eusebius presents Greek philosophy as riddled with “absurdities and inconsistencies.”13

Thus, despite their different motivations, both Aristocles and Eusebius have the same

view of the positions under consideration. Finally, Eusebius claims to be quoting

Aristocles’ work word-for-word, and not merely paraphrasing. This is indicated by the

presence of an introductory phrase before the passages attributed to Aristocles which

claims that the quoted text “states verbatim” (AM F4:10) what Eusebius reports.

2. ARISTOCLES’  UNDERSTANDING  OF  PYRRHONEAN  SKEPTICISM

2.1. The  Timon  Fragment

In the fragment under consideration, Aristocles discusses the philosophy of Pyrrho and

his disciple Timon. Aristocles begins by stating his central project:

BURNS   6

11 See Tad Brennan, "Pyrrho on the Criterion," Ancient Philosophy 18, no. 2 (1998): 426-30.12 Aaron P. Johnson, "Identity, Descent, and Polemic: Ethnic Argumentation in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica," Journal of Early Christian Studies 12, no. 1 (2004); see also A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), v. 2, 5.13 Jacques Brunschwig, "Once Again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho," in Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Jacques Brunschwig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 190.

Before everything it is necessary to investigate our own knowledge; for if it is

our nature to know nothing, there is no further need to inquire about the other

things. (AM F4:1) 14

In this section, Aristocles does not attempt to investigate on his own, but rather

evaluates the epistemological investigation of the Pyrrhonean skeptics, as reported by

Pyrrho’s student Timon.

Among the ancients too, there were some who affirmed such things, and were

opposed by Aristotle. Pyrrho of Elis too was emphatic in his opinion, but he

himself has left nothing in writing, while his pupil Timon says that the man who

means to be happy must consider these three things: First, how things are by

nature; secondly, what attitude we should take towards them; finally, what

advantage will come to those who are in this disposition (AM F4:2).

Aristocles then quotes Timon’s answer to the first of these questions:

Things (πράγματα), he [Timon] says he [Pyrrho] declared, are equally

undifferentiated (ἀδιάφορα), unstable (ἀστάθμητα), and indeterminate

(ἀνεπίκριτα); therefore (διὰ τοῦτο) neither our sense-perceptions nor our

opinions are true or false. For this reason (διὰ τοῦτο), then, we must not trust

them, but be unopinionated, unwavering, and unshaken, saying about every

single thing that it no more is than is not, or that it both is and is not, or that it

neither is nor is not.

To those who are in this disposition, says Timon, will come first speechlessness

BURNS   7

14 This introduction is parallel to the opening lines of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: "All men by nature desire to know"; see Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols., Bollingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1552.

(ἀφασίαν) and then inperturbability (ἀταραξίαν); Aenesidemus says pleasure

(AM F4:3-4; bracketed names in Chiesara).

If we are to accurately analyze Aristocles’ response to this argument, it is imperative

that we accurately understand what Aristocles understood Timon’s argument to be.

Thus, we will spend some time carefully examining this fragment.

2.2. Two  Interpretations

The meaning of the three adjectives – ἀδιάφορα, ἀστάθμητα, and ἀνεπίκριτα –

describing the way πράγματα are, are crucial to a proper exegesis of the passage. What

exactly is meant by these three words is not entirely clear, but two general

interpretations are possible. According to the first (the metaphysical interpretation),

the terms refer to characteristics of πράγματα in themselves; while according to the

second (the epistemological), the terms refer to our ability to comprehend πράγματα.

The received text suggests that Aristocles understood Timon as arguing for the

metaphysical interpretation, but there is a possible textual problem. Zeller argued that

the first occurrence of the Greek διὰ τοῦτο “for this reason” should be emended to διὰ

τό “because of the fact that.”15 This emendation would change the entire logical

structure of the argument, and would suggest the epistemological interpretation.

BURNS   8

15 Zeller, Die Philosophie Der Griechen in Ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 501-02.

Scholarly debate on this emendation has been heated, and to date no real consensus

has been reached.16

2.3. The  “Zany  Inference”

Besides the philological reasons for the emendation, some have argued that the

emended text makes better sense philosophically. Without the emendation, Timon

claims that since πράγματα are undifferentiated, unstable, and indeterminate, our

sense-perceptions and opinions are unreliable. Stopper calls this a “zany inference.”17

But the inference is only zany if we give the three adjectives an epistemological

meaning. That is, if πράγματα are ἀδιάφορα, ἀστάθμητα, and ἀνεπίκριτα in reference to

our ability to perceive them, then the inference makes no sense. On this interpretation

of the adjectives, it makes much better sense to argue that since our senses are

unreliable, πράγματα are ἀδιάφορα, ἀστάθμητα, and ἀνεπίκριτα. But then how does

Timon justify his claim that our senses are unreliable?

As Brunschwig points out, Aristocles clearly states that, according to Timon, before we

can investigate our attitudes towards πράγματα we must investigate how πράγματα are.

In this context, it makes sense to move from observations about the attributes of

πράγματα to a conclusion about our sense-perceptions and opinions, and thus to reject

BURNS   9

16 In support of Zeller's emendation, see Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Brennan, "Pyrrho on the Criterion."; M. R. Stopper, "Review: Schizzi Pirroniani," Phronesis 28, no. 3 (1983). Opposed to the emendation, for various reasons, are Richard Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); ———, "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho: The Text, Its Logic, and Its Credibility," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. C. C. W. Tayler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Brunschwig, "Once Again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho."; Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene: Testamonia and Fragments; Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 2 ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 299; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, v. 1, 16-17; v. 2, 5-6. The original evidence for the emendation is philological, and the discussion is beyond my understanding of the Greek language. However, it is clear that the philological evidence is far from decisive one way or the other.17 Stopper, "Review: Schizzi Pirroniani," 293 n. 53.

the emendation.18 This reconstruction requires that we take the adjectives ἀδιάφορα,

ἀστάθμητα, and ἀνεπίκριτα as referring to objective attributes of πράγματα rather than

as referring to our perceptual abilities.

Brunschwig argues that the solution lies in considering that our sense-perceptions and

opinions are themselves πράγματα. Then the “zany inference” becomes a mere

triviality: Pyrrho claims that πράγματα are undifferentiated. Our sense-impressions and

opinions are πράγματα. Thus, our sense-impressions and opinions are undifferentiated,

which means they are neither true nor false. But this leaves us in a similar position as

the previous argument: How does Pyrrho justify his claim that πράγματα are

undifferentiated?

It seems that we simply do not have enough of Timon’s text left to make a clear choice

between the two interpretations. The best that we can do is keep both interpretations

in mind as we reconstruct Aristocles’ response to Timon and Pyrrho’s position.

3. ARISTOCLES’  POLEMIC  AGAINST  PYRRHONEAN  SKEPTICISM

3.1. Summary  of  the  Arguments

After outlining the Pyrrhonean skeptics’ position, Aristocles presents a series of

arguments designed to refute skepticism. These arguments can be divided into several

types. The first type of argument (AM F4:5-7) attempts to show that Timon’s basic

principle refutes itself (that is, its truth implies its falsehood). Aristocles presents three

separate but related arguments of this type.

Now these are the main points of their arguments; let us consider whether they

are right. Since then they say that all things are equally undifferentiated, and

BURNS   10

18 Brunschwig, "Once Again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho," 196-97.

for this reason require us to incline to nothing and to have no opinion, one

could reasonably ask them, I think, whether those who think that things differ

are in error or not. For certainly, if they are in error, they cannot be right. So

they are forced to say that there are some people who have false opinions about

things; and then they themselves would be those who say the true things; but

therefore there would be something true and something false. But if we, the

majority, do not err in believing that things differ, what do they reproach us for?

For they themselves would be in error affirming that they do not differ (AM

F4:5).

In this argument, Aristocles assumes that the truth-values of statements are bivalent:

that is, the are either true or false. He points out that if the Pyrrhonean skeptics’

statements are true, then their opponents’ statements must be false. But then there are

true and false statements, and thus differentiation between them. But if the

Pyrrhonean skeptics’ statements are false, then Aristocles’ work is done.

In some ways, this argument is similar to the argument Aristotle presents in Metaphysics

Γ:8 against those theories that claim that all things are true or that all things are false.19

But there is a difference: Aristotle’s targets argue that everything is true or that

everything is false. Aristocles’ targets argue that our sense-perceptions and opinions

are neither true nor false. So Aristotle argues against univalent truth-values, but

Aristocles argues against indeterminate truth-values. But the argument progresses the

same the same way in each case.

Of course, the Pyrrhonean skeptic could merely deny the bivalence of truth-values. The

BURNS   11

19 See Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene: Testamonia and Fragments, 110.

statements of their opponents are neither true nor false, but meaningless. So Aristocles

continues:

And even if we grant them that all things are equally undifferentiated, it is

evident that they would not disagree with ordinary people. What then would

their wisdom be? and why does Timon blame all the others, and praise Pyrrho

only? (AM F4:6).

Here, Aristocles does not attack the Pyrrhonean skeptics’ argument, but rather its

usefulness. If it is true that everything is undifferentiated, then what is so special about

Pyrrho that we should respect him? For he is no different from anyone else. This

argument closely parallels Socrates’ argument against Protagoras in Theaetetus.20

Aristocles’ final argument in this section attacks the inference from the

undifferentiation of πράγματα to the order to be unopinionated (the second διὰ τοῦτο

clause in F4:3):

Again, if all things are equally undifferentiated and for this reason we ought not

to have an opinion, there would be no difference, either, between differing and

not differing, having opinions and not having them. For why are they such-and-

such a way more than not? or, as Timon says, why yes and why no and why the

very why itself? It is clear then that there is an end to all inquiry; so let them

stop troubling us, since now their madness is beyond medicine: on the one hand

they exhort us to have no opinion, on the other at the same time they tell us to

do just that, and saying that one should not make statements, they make a

statement just then; and they claim that one should agree with no one, but

BURNS   12

20 Ibid.

demand to be trusted. Moreover, though they say they know nothing, they

oppose everybody as if they knew a lot (AM F4:7).

If πράγματα are indeed undifferentiated, and if the having or not having of an opinion

is a πράγμα, then there is no difference between having an opinion and not having an

opinion. Thus, the Pyrrhonean argument for being unopinionated fails.

3.2. The  Argument  from  Linguistic  Meaning  (AM  F4:8-­9)

Aristocles next argues against Pyrrhonean skeptics by pointing out that if their claim is

true, then it would be impossible for them to engage in argument. Since they obviously

are engaged in argument, it follows that their argument must not be true. This is the

argument with which the rest of this paper is concerned.

And those who affirm that everything is obscure (ἄδμλα) must do one of two

things, be mute or state and say something. If they were silent, clearly there

would be no arguing with such folk; but if they make statements, in every way

and absolutely they would either affirm that something was or that it was not,

as they now say that everything is unknown (ἅγνωστος) and indeterminate

(ἀόριστος) to everybody and nothing is known (AM F4:8).

Chiesara points out that the vocabulary here draws heavily from Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Γ:4, where Aristotle argues against those who claim that the same thing can both be and

not be. Chiesara goes as far as to argue that in this passage Aristocles merely replaces

the Pyrrhonean vocabulary ἀδιάφορος, ἀστάθμητος, and ἀνεπίκριτος with the

Aristotelian vocabulary ἀόριστος, ἄδμλος, and ἄγνωστος.

This claim is supported by the fact that the argument in this paragraph itself bears a

striking resemblance to the beginning of Aristotle’s argument:

BURNS   13

We can, however, demonstrate negatively even that this view [that it is possible

for the same thing to be and not be] is impossible, if our opponent will only say

something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to attempt to reason with one

who will not reason about anything, in so far as he refuses to reason. For such a

man, as such, is seen already to be no better than a mere plant (Metaphysics

1006a:12-15).21

Both of these arguments start with a constructive dilemma: the targets of each of the

arguments must either speak or not speak, and if they do not speak, then they cannot

engage in argument. Aristocles continues:

Therefore, either the man who maintains this either makes the thing clear

(δηλοῖ) and it can be understood when it is said, or that it cannot. If he does not,

there would be absolutely no arguing with such a man either. But if he did make

his meaning (σημαίνοι) clear, he certainly speaks indefinitely (ἄπειρα) or

definitely (πεπερασμένα); and if he speaks indefinitely, in this case too there

would no arguing with him, for there is no such thing as knowledge of the

indefinite. But if what he means, or one of the things he means, is definite, the

man who says it defines (ὁρίζει) something and judges (κρίνει) it. How then

could all things be unknown (άγνωστα) and undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα)? (AM

F4:9).

Once again, this passage is reminiscent of Metaphysics Γ:4, where Aristotle spends some

time explicating the term σημαίνοι. Here are the relevant passages from Aristotle:

Τhe starting point for all such arguments is not the demand that our opponent

shall say that something either is or is not (for this one might perhaps take to be

BURNS   14

21 All translations of Aristotle are from Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation.

assuming what is at issue), but that he shall say something which is significant

(σημαίνειν) both for himself and for another; for this is necessary, if he really is

to say anything. For, if he means nothing, such a man will not be capable of

reasoning, either with himself or with another (Metaphysics 1006a:19-24).

And it makes no difference even if one were to say a word has several meanings

(σημαίνειν), if only they are limited in number; for to each formula there might

be assigned a different word. For instance, we might say that ‘man’ has not one

meaning but several, one of which would be defined as ‘two-footed animal’,

while there might be also several other formulae if only they were limited in

number; for a special name might be assigned to each of the formulae. If,

however, they were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite

(ἄπειρα) number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not

to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning

reasoning with other people, and indeed with oneself has been annihilated

(Metaphysics 1006a:33-1006b:9).

Aristotle argues that if a word is to have any communicative value, then there is some

σημαίνειν which is shared between the speaker and his audience. This σημαίνειν can be

thought of as a member of a set of definitions for a word. That is, for any word ‘P’, there

is some set {P} which consists of definitions for ‘P’. For example, the set of definitions

for the word ‘man’ includes the definition ‘two-footed animal’. If this set has an infinite

number of members, Aristotle argues, then communication is impossible.

We are now in a position to outline Aristocles’ argument in paragraphs 8 and 9 premise

by premise. For convenience, let us refer to Aristocles’ target with the abbreviation ‘T’.

The argument then is as follows:

BURNS   15

(A) T must either not speak or speak.

(B) If T does not speak, then T cannot engage in argument.

(C) If T does speak, then T’s sentences about some πράγμα x must be of one of the types ‘x is P’ or ‘x is not P’, where P is some predicate.

(D) If T utters any sentence of these types, then the set {P} of definitions attached to the word ‘P’ is either empty or not empty.

(E) If {P} is empty, then T cannot engage in argument.

(F) If {P} is not empty, then it has either a infinite or finite number of members.

(G) If {P} has an infinite number of members, then T cannot engage in argument.

(H) If {P} has a finite number of members, then T defines and judges {P}.

(I) If T defines and judges P, then P is not indeterminate.

(J) Either T cannot engage in argument, or P is not indeterminate.

(K) T is engaged in argument.

(L) P is not indeterminate.

This argument is a series of constructive dilemmas. One horn of each dilemma is that T

cannot engage in argument, and the other horn leads to another dilemma until the

final stage, where the second horn is that x is not indeterminate. But of course, one of

Pyrrho’s fundamental principles is that πράγματα are indeterminate. So if the

argument succeeds, then at least one of Pyrrho’s fundamental principles is untenable.

Premise (C) is reconstructed from Aristocles’ line in paragraph 8: “But if they make

statements, in every way and absolutely they would either affirm that something was

or that it was not.” This reconstruction requires that εἶναι be given a predicative

meaning, which is supported by the next line: “As they now say that everything is

unknown and indeterminate.”

Premise (D) is derived from the beginning of paragraph 9: “Therefore, either the man

who maintains this either makes the thing clear and it can be understood when it is

said, or that it cannot.” Aristocles uses δελόιω in conjunction with σημαίνοι, so to make

BURNS   16

something clear is to assign a meaning. As seen above, within the Aristotelian

framework σημαίνειν can be seen as a member of a set of shared meanings attached to

a word. When T utters a sentence of the form ‘x is P’ where ‘P’ is any predicate, {P} is

either empty or not empty. If {P} is empty, that is, if there is no shared σημαίνειν, then

any communication is impossible. Since engaging in argument is a form of

communication, if for any word ‘P’ the corresponding set {P} is empty, then engaging in

argument is impossible.

If, on the other hand, for some predicate ‘P’ the corresponding set {P} is not empty,

then {P} must have some number of members. If this number is infinite, then according

to Aristotle, communication is once again impossible. Or as Aristocles puts it: “There is

no such thing as knowledge of the indefinite.” This claim is not quite as obvious as

Aristotle and Aristocles seem to believe, however. Even with an infinite number of

meanings attached to a word, it seems that other linguistic criterion (such as context)

can be used to determine which subsets of meaning are relevant. But it seems that for

context to be of much use, there must be some point of meaning that is fixed, at least in

relation to the other words in question. So the Pyrrhonean skeptic can hardly use this

defense if their claims of indeterminacy are universal.

Premise (H) is slightly more difficult. The two words here, ὁρίζω and κρίνω, both have

meanings related to dividing and separating.22 If the {P} has a finite number of

meanings, then by uttering the sentence ‘x is P’, T claims that x is divided and

separated from the meanings that are inconsistent with the members of {P}. So if {P}’s

members are finite, then by uttering ‘x is P’, T decides the possible range of x’s

properties. Thus, there is something that is decided, and T’s claim that all things are

BURNS   17

22 See the relevant entries in Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, 7 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955).

undecidable fails. Note that it is not x itself that is decided, but only the members of {P}.

As I will show below, this is a potential flaw in the argument.

(J)-(L) seem to follow trivially from the rest. So it seems that if Aristocles is allowed (A)-

(I), then by engaging in argument, the Pyrrhonean skeptic falsifies his own principles.

3.3. Potential  Objections

An objection a Pyrrhonean skeptic might make to the preceding argument is suggested

by the form of the argument. The argument is a series of constructive dilemmas based

on the Aristotelian principle of the excluded middle, which is usually considered a

trivial truth.23 But the Pyrrhonean skeptic would not allow even this principle. The

principle of the excluded middle relies on a distinction between true and false

statements, a distinction which cannot be made if all things are “undifferentiated,

unstable, and indeterminate.” In this is the case, then the Pyrrhonean skeptic would

reject even premise (A).

A second (and potentially more damaging) objection is that the conclusion of the

argument is not that x (some πράγμα) is not indeterminate, but rather that P (some

predicate) is not indeterminate. But Pyrrho’s principles concern πράγματα, not

predicates. In other words, Aristocles’ conclusion is metalinguistic, not metaphysical or

epistemological. If words and sentences are not πράγματα, then there is no

contradiction for the Pyrrhonean skeptic to claim that πράγματα are indeterminate but

that some words are determined.

BURNS   18

23 See Aristotle, De Interpretatione, chapter 9

4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper is only a preliminary sketch of a complex argument against the Pyrrhonean

skeptics. Much work remains to be done, especially in regard to the range of the word

πράγμα, both as Pyrrho and Timon understood it and as Aristocles understood it. A

much more thorough examination of Aristocles’ debt to Aristotle is also required.

But it is my hope that this paper has illustrated the value of studying the commentaries

of Aristocles as interesting philosophical positions on their own, and not merely as

preservers of others’ positions.

BURNS   19

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Annas, Julia, and Jonathan Barnes. The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Barnes, Jonathan. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 2 vols, Bollingen Series. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Bett, Richard. "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho: The Text, Its Logic, and Its Credibility." In Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, edited by C. C. W. Tayler, 137-81. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

———. Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.Brennan, Tad. "Pyrrho on the Criterion." Ancient Philosophy 18, no. 2 (1998): 417-34.Brunschwig, Jacques. "Once Again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho." In

Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Jacques Brunschwig, 190-211. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Chiesara, Maria Lorenza. Aristocles of Messene: Testamonia and Fragments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Drake, H. A. "What Eusebius Knew: The Genesis of The "Vita Constantini"." Classical Philology 83, no. 1 (1988): 20-38.

Gaisford, Thomas. Eusebii Pamphili Praeparationis Evangelicae Libri Xv. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1843.

Gifford, Edwin Hamilton. Eusebius Pamphili: Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri Xv. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903.

Heiland, Hermann. Aristoclis Messenii Reliquiae. Giessen: Meyer, 1925.Hollerich, Michael J. "Religion and Politics in the Writings of Eusebius: Reassessing the

First "Court Theologian"." Church History 59, no. 3 (1990): 309-25.Inwood, Brad, and L. P. Gerson. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. 2 ed.

Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.Johnson, Aaron P. "Identity, Descent, and Polemic: Ethnic Argumentation in Eusebius'

Praeparatio Evangelica." Journal of Early Christian Studies 12, no. 1 (2004): 23-56.Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. 7 ed.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1987.Moraux, Paul. "Aristoteles, Der Lehrer Alexanders Von Aphrodisias." Archiv fur

Geschichte der Philosophie 49, (1967): 169-82.———. Der Aristotelismus Bei Den Griechen: Von Andronikos Bis Alexander Von Aphrodisias.

Edited by H. J. Drossaart Lulolfs, L. Minio-Paluello and R. Weil. Vol. 2, Peripatoi: Philologisch-Historische Studien Zum Aristotelismus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984.

Mras, Karl. Eusebii: Praeparatio Evangelica. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1954.Stopper, M. R. "Review: Schizzi Pirroniani." Phronesis 28, no. 3 (1983): 265-97.Zeller, Eduard. Die Philosophie Der Griechen in Ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 5 ed. Vol.

3.1. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990.

BURNS   20