CAPRi WORKING PAPER NO. 15

CGIACollective

Secretariat: International Food Policy Research Institute2033 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A.

JUNE 2001

CAPRi Working Papers contain preliminary material andprior to a full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and criWorking Papers will eventually be published in some other form, revised.

TRIBES, STATE, AND TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN

ARID LAND MANAGEMENT, SYRIA

Rae, J., Arab, G., Nordblom, T., Jani, K.

R Systemwide Program on Action and Property Rights

research results, and are circulated tical comment. It is expected that most and that their content may also be

, and Gintzburger, G.

i

ABSTRACT

Arid shrub-lands in Syria and elsewhere in West Asia and North Africa are widely thought degraded. Characteristic of these areas is a preponderance of unpalatable shrubs or a lack of overall ground cover with a rise in the associated risks of soil erosion. Migrating pastoralists have been the scapegoats for this condition of the range. State steppe interventions of the last forty years have reflected this with programs to supplant customary systems with structures and institutions promoting western grazing systems and technologies. Principal amongst the latter has been shrub technology, particularly Atriplex species, for use in land rehabilitation and as a fodder reserve. This paper deconstructs state steppe policy in Syria by examining the overlap and interface of government and customary legal systems as a factor in the history of shrub technology transfer in the Syrian steppe. It is argued that the link made between signs of degradation and perceived moribund customary systems is not at all causal. Indeed, customary systems are found to be adaptive and resilient, and a strong influence on steppe management and the fate of technology transfer initiatives. Furthermore, developments in rangeland ecology raise questions about claims for grazing-induced degradation and call for a reinterpretation of recent shifts in vegetation on the Syrian steppe. Given the ineffectiveness of past state interventions, and in view of renewed understanding of customary systems and rangeland ecology, decentralization and some devolution of formal management responsibility is likely to be a viable and an attractive option for policymakers.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1 2. Rangeland Degradation: Models and Empirical Evidence ............................................ 2 3. Performance of Technologies aimed at Improving Rangeland Conditions ................... 8 4. Property Rights in Syria: An Historical Overview ...................................................... 14 5. Conclusions and Policy Implications........................................................................... 26 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 29

TRIBES, STATE, AND TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN ARID LAND MANAGEMENT, SYRIA

Rae, J1, Arab, G.2, Nordblom, T.3, Jani, K.4, and Gintzburger, G.5

1. INTRODUCTION

Arid rangelands dominate the countries of West Asia and North Africa (WANA).

Syria, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is better endowed with arable lands than

most countries in the region but still just over half its area, or 10.2 million hectares, falls

below the 200mm isohyet and is designated as badiah or 'steppe' where cultivation is

outlawed. In the steppe the majority of people are tribally organized and dependent on a

migratory pastoral or agro-pastoral economy where mobility and natural resource

management are facilitated by extensive customary systems. However, for much of this

century, migratory pastoralists have been blamed for being the key instigators of land

degradation. Most WANA states won their independence after World War II and pursued

policies of nation building and economic growth, neither of which carved out a role for tribes

or migratory pastoralism. Not only did the state generally perceive that the tribe and their

mobility were divisive and unstable elements in a fledgling nation, they saw customary

grazing practices as archaic, inefficient and environmentally exploitative. The tribe was seen

as a political and environmental threat that if not eliminated would undermine the new

state and stifle economic growth.

1 University of Oxford. 2 International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas. 3 CRC for Weed Management Systems, Charles Sturt University. 4 Steppe Directorate, Syrian Ministry for Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. 5 International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas.

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With the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the

United Nations and other aid agencies, many WANA states sidestepped and sought to

suffocate customary practices, and "green the desert" with the introduction of national

rangeland management. Coming in the early years of independence for many of the

WANA countries, the dominance of this paradigm had considerable influence on the

direction and evolution of state institutions responsible for steppe management. This

paper looks specifically at Syria and examines the impact of national policy over the past

forty years on the institutions governing range management, as well as how the overlap

and interface of the Syrian government and customary legal systems have shaped the

history of shrub technology transfer in the Syrian steppe.

2. RANGELAND DEGRADATION: MODELS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

THEORETICAL MODELS APPLYING TO RANGELANDS

The characterization of moving tribes as creators of desert conditions has a long

history among people of the settled areas in the region and further afield (Ibn Khaldun

translated in Issawi 1987; Bietenholz 1963). Hardin (1968) described a rationale for this

position in his influential "Tragedy of the Commons" paper. He considered the

perspective of a rational herder with private ownership of livestock in a pastoral society

that is reliant on pastures "open to all". Herders would follow the incentive to increase

the number of their herd because they would receive direct benefit but bear only a share

of the costs resulting from the delayed impact of their action. Each herder is "locked into

a system that compels him to increase his herd without limitin a world that is limited

(Hardin 1968). According to tragedy theorists, effective property rights and rational

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rangeland management is not possible without strong state involvement. This theory has

formed the rationale for state governance over rangelands and other natural resources in

many developing countries.

State programs to assess, manage or increase productivity of steppe areas are also

based on a model of how the steppe ecosystem functions. Predominant in rangeland

management science for much of this century has been the range succession model,

which derives from plant ecology (Westoby et al.1989). It assumes that the livestock

sector operates in environments that are largely stable, where weather variability is

limited to a narrow range and therefore inconsequential for long-term outcomes. The

model supposes that a given rangeland continually returns to a single persistent state (the

climax) of vegetation in the absence of grazing. By producing changes in the opposite

direction, grazing pressure arising from a set stocking rate can slow or halt the

successional tendency, producing an equilibrium in vegetation levels. This theory has

guided the principles of the western ranching system, which were subsequently

introduced in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and WANA to supplant customary

practices. These included private rights to graze, rotational or paddock grazing systems,

the establishment of water points to spread grazing pressure, the setting of a universal

stocking rate, and the reseeding or re-planting of the range with grasses and shrubs.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Whereas there are widespread claims for degradation in Syria, only limited

inventories and no long-term studies of the steppe flora have been carried out. Despite

this, numerous references in the literature attest to the 'degraded' nature of the vegetation.

A synthesis of range reports through to the mid-1950s concluded that "without exception,

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range management specialists and ecologists have stressed that the range grazing of the

steppe and semi desert regions of Syriais progressively deteriorating as a result of

overgrazing" (FAO 1956). A 1985 study of the Syrian rangelands by the Arab Center for

the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry lands (ACSAD 1992) suggested that unpalatable shrub

species have become "dominant in large areas of the steppe". It went on to estimate that

25% of the steppe is affected by wind erosion to one degree or another, while water

erosion affects around 6% of the area. Furthermore, almost all relevant publications

issued from the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas

(ICARDA), which is based in Aleppo, are premised on the assumption of widespread

degradation in the Syrian steppe (Rae 1999). Yet, evidence exists to the contrary.

An unpalatable shrub associated with a degraded steppe in Syria and neighboring

regions is the spiny Noaea mucronata. An ecological study carried out by Deiri (1990)

under the auspices of ICARDA, found Noaea ubiquitous in the Aleppo steppe, masking

the heterogeneity of climate and soil. Apparently, dominance of Noaea in some areas is a

relatively new phenomenon here (Sankary 1982) and elsewhere (Zakirov 1989; Noy-Mier

1990). Deiri and others have assumed that this shift in floral composition is the result of

overgrazing for lack of good management, and that with a reduction in grazing pressure a

climax community dominated by the palatable shrub Salsola vermiculata would return

(Deiri 1990; Sankary 1982). However, the link between cause and effect is not

adequately demonstrated.

Indeed, the basis of an alternative interpretation comes from grazing trials carried

out by the FAO and the Steppe Directorate in the 1960s at Wadi al-`Azib research station

in the Aleppo steppe. Over a three-year period, three sites were fenced off with a

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different stocking rate in each (trial A: 9ha per sheep, B: 6ha, and C: 4.5ha). No sizeable

differences in average meat production per animal were reported between the three

treatments. As for the vegetation, it was noted that plant density "fluctuated more

between years than between stocking rate treatments" (FAO 1966), suggesting climate

more than grazing determines productivity. The reported vegetation change was,

however, unexpected. Spininess in plants is usually interpreted as an anti-grazing

adaptation, and it has often been recorded that spiny plants increase under heavy grazing

but give way once protected (Noy-Mier 1990). In treatment C, with the highest stocking

rate there was a "reduction" in the spiny variety Noaea while in treatment A, with the

lowest stocking rate, Noaea "increased greatly in density" (FAO 1966, 1967). The cause

of this vegetation change is not alluded to by either of the reports at hand; Noaea is just

described as "a spiny, undesirable shrub".

An explanation for the expansion of Noaea under reduced grazing pressure is

given by another study in the Negev and Jerusalem deserts (Noy-Mier 1990). During

certain periods on the open range, Noaea are exposed to heavy pressure from herbivores

selecting for the rare green material. Even though spines and other types of protection

save the plants from local extinction, Noy-Mier asserted they are insufficient to outweigh

grazing pressure and are therefore among the first plants to benefit when an area is

protected.

The crucial difference between Noaea mucronata and other shrubs is its extended

growing period. Heavy grazing either end of the green season disadvantages Noaea, but

when such grazing pressure is relieved the extended growing period becomes an

advantage. When camels are removed from the near steppe, the pressure in late spring

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and summer is largely removed. Also, whereas as recently as thirty years ago almost all

herders wintering (November-February) on the near steppe sustained their flocks entirely

from grazing6, today almost none do. Instead they feed their sheep on hand-feed

generally imported from the settled areas7. Thus, rather than being due to overgrazing,

the shift to Noaea mucronata is a result of changes in the composition of livestock

grazing the steppe coupled with the adoption and widespread use of hand feed for

wintersomething encouraged by the state following the 1958-61 drought (Lewis 1987).

Conclusions like this bring into question the validity of the range succession

model in arid environments. Whereas the model predicts that rainfall cycles combined

with sustained grazing pressure will keep range vegetation in equilibrium, it is now

thought that where droughts or other episodic events are a feature, population fluctuations

hinder plants and herbivores from establishing closely linked interactions, and succession

is abbreviated or non-existent (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994). This realization that

equilibrium conditions are not met in many instances has led to the development of an

alternative paradigm centered around two models: the non-equilibrium model, which

deals with population dynamics in uncertain environments; and the state-and-transition

model (Westoby, Walker and Noy-Mier 1989). In contrast to the linear succession

model, it is argued that rangeland dynamics can be more accurately described by a set of

discrete states of vegetation with discrete transitions between them, triggered by natural

events, like floods, drought or fire, either alone or in combination with herbivore activity.

6 Van de Veen estimates that 58% of the Syrian sheep population, or 3.8 million head, resided in the steppe for winter grazing only shrubs, amongst them Noaea mucronata and Haloxylon articulatum (FAO 1967). 7 In an in-depth two-year study on animal diets of 129 herds frequenting the Aleppo steppe 98% of feed needs came from hand-feeding, the remainder from crop residues. No steppe grazing was reported during the winter months (Wachholtz 1996). Perversely, pressure is relieved on the steppe to the advantage of Noaea.

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Objectively apportioning responsibility for perceived or actual changes in steppe

vegetation composition is therefore difficult. Grazing inevitably has an impact on shrub

communities, but the nature of this impact is unclear, particularly when causes arise from

a conjunction of other factors in addition to grazing. Indeed, some speculate that the

landscape may in some sense be 'adapted' to grazing pressure. That is, either less

resistant shrub species have been eliminated long ago or the species in these communities

have adapted to grazing pressure. There is even some evidence to suggest that a certain

amount of grazing pressure on arid rangelands maintains or even enhances floral species

diversity (Olsvig-Whittaker et al. 1993; Perevolotsky 1995). In the case of the transition

to Noaea mucronata, it seems likely that this was actually brought about by a reduction in

grazing during critical times of the year.

Despite the lack of a clear consensus on the best model for predicting the extent

and causes of rangeland degradation, the Syrian government, aided by international

research and development institutions, has undertaken several measures to bring about a

change in rangeland management for the stated purpose of improving environmental

outcomes. Actions have reflected a persistent adherence to 'tragedy of the commons' and

rangeland succession models. They span from centralizing the governance and

enforcement of rangeland management to introducing new technologies designed to

enhance the quantity and quality of rangeland vegetation. The following section will

discuss shrub and plantation technologies that have been developed, extended, and often

imposed on herders occupying the Syrian steppe. Despite more than 50 years of

technological efforts, however, technology uptake has lagged far behind expectations.

Subsequent sections elaborate on the institutional changes preceding and accompanying

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technical solutions that demonstrate the important role played by customary institutions

in steppe management and shed light on the underlying reasons for the lack of adoption

success.

3. PERFORMANCE OF TECHNOLOGIES AIMED AT IMPROVING

RANGELAND CONDITIONS

ATRIPLEX SHRUB TECHNOLOGY

From its creation in 1961, the Steppe Directorate (SD) of the Syrian government

was given responsibility for range management, range and pasture research, management

and expansion of government wells, and organization of emergency feed during times of

drought. With the assistance of the FAO, the SD embarked on a highly centralized range

management initiative, setting the tenor for all future interventions. Part of this initiative

included trials to identify rain-use efficient, edible plants to re-vegetate the steppe and act

as a drought feed store. This was deemed necessary, for though the successional model

predicted natural regeneration towards a climax community, climatic variability and the

unpredictable recurrence of devastating droughts meant that natural regeneration could be

a long time coming. Shrub planting would fill this temporal gap, check soil erosion and

provide a source of animal feed during drought. The trials concluded in the late 1960s

recommending Atriplex, a shrub species already favored by range managers elsewhere

around the world, most notably Australia, South Africa and the United States (Houerou

1995).

Le Houerou, one of the most influential people involved in rangeland

management and rehabilitation in the WANA region over the last thirty years, describes

the planting of Atriplex species as "one of the most efficient ways to reclaim [arid lands],

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if not the only one" (Le Houerou 1992). The shrubs can prevent wind and water erosion

and are efficient users of water (McKell 1975). They could also serve as a feed reserve in

years of drought. There are around 400 species of Atriplex in the world, most in mid-

latitude temperate, sub-tropical and Mediterranean zones. Though many Atriplex species

exist in the Mediterranean region, their use in arid land stabilization and rehabilitation

began with the introduction of the Australian variety Atriplex nummularia into Tunisia in

the last years of the 19th century (McKell 1975). The introduction of this and other

varieties from Australia continued after World War I in Tunisia and Morocco. By the

1950s, Atriplex was being recommended for steppe rehabilitation in FAO circles, and

from the 1960s introductions took place throughout the WANA region and further afield.

Although many trials of non-indigenous species showed limited promise, Omar Draz,

FAO's chief advisor to the Syrian government on rangeland issues, conducted trials in

1968-69 with Atriplex nummularia that produced successful outcomes in an agricultural

district of Aleppo (FAO 1974).

With the support of Draz and a wider scientific consensus for the technology, the

Syrian authorities initiated programs to transfer Atriplex on the steppe. History of this

intervention in Syria can conveniently be divided into two phases: 1) encouraging and

later obliging agro-pastoralists to plant a part of their area with Atriplex; and then 2) the

establishment of government-run fodder shrub plantations from 1987. The first phase

envisaged that agro-pastoralists would forego barley cultivation over a portion of their

licensed steppe area and plant Atriplex in its place. In hindsight poor adoption rates for

Atriplex were a foregone conclusion. Barley is nutritious and palatable, while post-

harvest stubble can be used for grazing. During drought, it can be grazed in-situ. By

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contrast, it can take between three and five months for sheep grazing Atriplex to get used

to consuming and digesting it. Oxalates in the plant are potentially toxic to some

ruminant microorganisms and can form stones in the urinary tract (Goodchild & Osman

1993). Furthermore, to compensate for the high salt content of the plant, the animal must

drink between 6 and 12 liters of water day (depending on the heat of the day), twice the

normal levels (Le Houerou 1992; Nordblom et al. 1995). Nor does Atriplex fit

comfortably in the bedouin farming system. The "proper" time to harvest most Atriplex

used in Syria is late summer and early autumn, a period when most sheep are grazing

nutritious cotton residues in the settled areas (Wachholtz 1996). Not surprisingly, only a

fraction of those cultivating in the steppe actually planted Atriplex, and of those all but a

handful ensured their private plantation survived, the otherswith the shrubs gone

again cultivated barley (Leybourne et al. 1993).

THE PLANTATION APPROACH

The poor success of government initiatives to encourage or require private

adoption of range technology led directly to the 'plantation concept'. Here, the

government effectively privatizes an area of steppe with a trench, plants the enclosure

with shrubs, and after a period of establishment permits range users restricted access

under contract and on payment of a grazing fee. The idea is not unique to Syria. In the

last two decades, 470,000 ha have been taken for plantations in Tunisia, 133,000 ha in

Iran, 33,000 ha in Algeria, and there are many others (World Bank 1995). In Syria, the

plantations have been at the heart of state intervention in the steppe since the late 1980s

and by 2000 occupied 220,000 ha.

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The plantation concept came after a generation of frustrated state intervention in

rangeland management and technology transfer. It represented a significant step against

the tide of devolution in natural resource management elsewhere, and instead advocated

centralization as a solution for sustainable development in arid regions. The actual

presence on the steppe of the plantations, coupled with the fact the state had tilled and

planted the land (i.e. invested), brought the formal legal system and state authorities into

direct conflict with the customary land tenure system like never before.

Plantations are supposedly located where Steppe Directorate (SD) officials judge

the steppe to be degraded. Only private steppe land (approximately 2%) cannot be

included within a plantation; otherwise all other land (including cultivated fields and co-

operative pastures) is technically state land, and can therefore be appropriated, despite the

fact that customary institutions have governed land tenure for centuries. Once the site

and size are determined, a committee is appointed within the Ministry of Agricultural and

Agrarian Reform (MAAR), to produce a technical and economic feasibility study for the

proposed plantation8. Socio-economic or environmental impact assessments are not

regularly carried out. If the committee gives the go ahead, MAAR provides financial

support for plantation establishment.

After a period of shrub establishment, averaging five years, the plantations are

opened under contract for use during restricted periods, generally a couple months each

in the winter and spring. Enforcement of plantation rules is the prime responsibility of

the Steppe Directorate but the rules themselves are decided on at the provincial level by

8 The committee is composed of an agricultural economist, a geologist, and representatives from the provincial departments of the MAAR and the Steppe Directorate.

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the Agricultural Council9 and hence vary. However, the following rules are broadly

applicable. The carrying capacity of all the plantations was set at three head-of-sheep per

hectare in 1995, and has not changed since. In line with the succession model of plant

ecology, if the SD officials feel that grazing is insufficient in a particular season, access

to the plantations is delayed, truncated, or denied completely. Firewood collection

camping, milking and watering are prohibited in the plantations during leasing. A

deposit on the contract is also required in some provinces, including Aleppo, and where

this is the case each contract is clearly designated an allotted area. The cost to a herder

for a spring contract is harmonized across the country, at 125 Syrian Lira (SL) ($2.25)

per hectare per month.

On the frontline of plantation rule enforcement are year-round resident guards.

Those caught trespassing in Aleppo province are fined 5,000 SL, the equivalent of around

$100 or the price of a two-year old ewe. The official number of trespassers prosecuted in

the country since the plantations were first opened in 1995 is estimated around a

thousand, the vast majority of them reportedly at two plantations in the Aleppo steppe10.

9 The Agricultural Council is chaired by the provincial governor and includes provincial heads for Agriculture, Finance, the Ba`th Party, and the Peasants' Union. 10 Conversation with staff at Steppe Directorate Head Quarters, Palmyra: 4th July 1999

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TECHNOLOGICAL OUTCOMES, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS

Syrian authorities have sought to transfer shrub technology to the steppe through a

variety of institutional arrangements, all of which have discounted customary land tenure

and property rights. The underlying premise for the state approach is rooted in the

'tragedy of the commons' model of pastoral society, which hinges on the assumption of

non co-operating herders and eventual degradation.

While many researchers and rangeland scientists implicate government policy

itself for the decline of customary systems, a pervasive perception is that the system is

unable to adapt to changing socio-economic conditions (FAO 1967; World Bank 1995;

Ngaido 1997).

Customary systems in Syria, as elsewhere, have been perceived as being unable to

regulate pasture use in the face of pressures from increasing human and animal

populations, and a diminishing range area. Some have felt that the organizational and

institutional basis on which the customary system relies is in a process of irreversible

decline as an inevitable consequence of modernization (UN 1955; Abu Jaber 1966). That

is, tribes weaken as they become superfluous in the presence of a maturing and

ubiquitous judiciary and civil administration system.

Research on customary control and access systems in Syria is noticeable for its

absence. The tribes have been identified as the cause of degradation by a process of

deductive reasoning from ecology and political science theories, and re-enforced by

ambivalent attitudes held by policymakers towards migratory groups. Herders' resistance to

adoption of technologies and institutions imposed by government authorities is not well

understood, and often attributed to irrational behavior. However, a more accurate

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understanding of the institutions governing rangeland management and the incentives

underlying adoption behavior necessitates a detailed appreciation of the customary system,

state centralization, capitalist penetration and the evolution of these institutions in Syria

during the 20th century.

4. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SYRIA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Modern-day Syria is a relatively new phenomenon. It was originally carved out of

two Ottoman Provinces after World War I and placed under French Mandatory rule

before the country won its independence in 1944. A judicial-political division, called the

'steppe line', was inherited by the French and subsequently by the nationalists. It was first

defined in state law in 1870 by a centralizing Ottoman government wanting to

encapsulate and subject the moving camel and sheep rearing tribes of the desert interior.

Within the steppe line, the state recognized the authority of customary law and courts in

regulating the activities of tribal society, including land tenure issues. What amounted to

a "state within a state" remained ostensibly unchanged following independence, but it

was an obvious anathema to a fledgling nation, and within fourteen years customary law

and tribes were formally abolished, and the steppe areas nationalized. This was of

historic importance for it was the last legislation to deal specifically with the tribes and

marked the final act in the long struggle by central governments to eliminate the tribes

and shaykhs as rivals to their own power and jurisdiction.

Key to understanding property rights in Syria is the concept of legal pluralism.

For a long time the formal legal system of the state, the qanun, co-existed with tribal

customary law, `urf. Whereas the qanun is by definition written, the `urf is largely

unwritten. Often the qanun has confirmed existing local custom, as custom is recognized

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as one of the sources of Islamic law, shari`a, itself a pillar of the qanun (Heyd 1973).

The moving tribes were rarely subject to qanun prior to 1958. Amongst them customary

law prevailed in all matters including marriage, divorce, homicide and property rights.

These tribal legal institutions have been described as "remarkable for their sophistication,

and a central feature of the culture" (Stewart 1995).

The question of property rights in the steppe area was not of much concern to the

authorities prior to the 1940s. Historically, the government's principal interest in rural

property rights has been in regulating and taxing cultivation. The authority of the state

has broadly correlated with the extent of cultivation, and both have waxed and waned at

various times in history. Cultivation's most recent expansion began in the 1840s with

impetus from world trade and later a growing domestic human population. For a century

this expansion was mostly accommodated within the steppe line, particularly south of

Aleppo City and the Euphrates River. Rising international and local demands were also

encouraging expansion of sheep numbers in the steppe. These two forces of expanding

cultivation and growing sheep numbers converged along the margins of the steppe in the

early 1940s, raising land scarcity and precipitating dramatic developments in both the

statutory and customary land tenure systems.

THE STATUTORY TENURE SYSTEM

In Islamic law and prevalent in Syria until the 1950s, the uncultivated steppe was

categorized mawat, or dead land. On mawat land no taxes were claimed by the state and

all persons could "cut for fuel and for buildingor collect herbagewithout anyone

being able to prevent him" (Ottoman Land Code 1858). As for cultivation, Sunni jurists

considered vivification of mawat land as desirable and an activity that should be

16

encouraged (Maktari 1971), although the state retained the right to demand consent prior

to cultivation in lieu of a fee. This said, such consent was largely academic in the steppe

prior to state expansion in the late 19th century and was never fully enforced thereafter.

Prescriptive rights and the ancient category of mawat were eventually abolished in the

first years of independence (1952), and all such land was re-classed as state land (amlak

dawlah). Mawat was seen as a legitimization of open access and the destructive habits

that this in principal engenders amongst resource users.

Nationalization not only underscored the authority of the state to regulate land use

but also provided the state a tool with which to further reduce tribal power. The law,

however, failed to make a material impact until 1958 when the sway of customary law

among the tribes was officially abolished and a government more bent on state-led steppe

development, the Socialist Ba`th Party, came to power in 1963. They originally espoused

"pragmatism and evolutionism within the national framework" (Abu Jaber 1966) and

advocated the dispersal and sedentarization of moving tribes in order that individual

loyalty could be redirected toward national goals. The Ba'thist constitution states:

Nomadism is a primitive social state. It decreases the national output and makes an important part of the nation a paralyzed member and an obstacle to its development and progress. The party struggles for the sedentarization of nomads by the grants of land to them [and] for the abolition of tribal custom (Art.43)

The abolition of tribal rights coincided with the start of a severe drought (1958-

1961) that destroyed herds on an unprecedented scale. According to official estimates,

80% of the camel population was killed while the sheep population dropped from 6

million in 1957 to 3.5 million in 1961 (FAO 1967). The single most important

government response to the drought was the establishment of the Steppe Directorate

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within the MAAR to take on range management and alleviate the impact of future

droughts. With virgin cultivable land in the country now thought to be exhausted,

considerable state resources were redirected to steppe management and animal husbandry

in the hopes of stabilizing and expanding meat production. FAO had charged that over-

grazing, absence of grazing control mechanisms, expansion of cultivation, and the

uprooting of shrubs had together "resulted in the grazing capacity of the steppe being

seriously depleted" (FAO 1973). These factors, along with the current breeding system

and the region's susceptibility to drought, were implicated in adversely affecting the

nation's terms of trade and balance of payments, since livestock meat and grains tended to

be exported at low prices and imported at high prices.

With the guiding principles of import substitution and food security through self-

sufficiency, the authorities devised a four-point plan for steppe development with

assistance from the FAO, the impact of which continues to be felt today. It proposed to

regenerate the steppe through controlled grazing, increase local production of forage,

create feed supplies to meet emergencies caused by drought, and improve sheep

fattening. Their target was 11 million sheep by 1985, which would contribute to a

desired increase in per capita meat consumption and at the same time continue the

valuable export trade for which there was a large demand in neighboring countries (FAO

1967). To fulfill these ambitious objectives, the Steppe Directorate initiated research in

shrub technology for range rehabilitation and initiated in 1968 a rotational grazing

scheme within a co-operative model termed Hema to supplant the tribal system. Showing

little resemblance to a perceived indigenous mechanism of controlled grazing that

inspired it, the stringency of Hema cooperative rules, the corruption of cooperative

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structures for political ends, and the government's inability to supply credible grazing

management institutions and structures undermined the cooperative approach.

THE CUSTOMARY TENURE SYSTEM

The prevailing assumption of the inadequacy of the tribal system to manage

steppe resources supposedly stems from the failure of the tribes to either evolve their

institutions to adapt to changing socio-economic conditions or to resist suppression by a

nationalist state. Evidence uncovered from examining the case of tribes and land tenure

in the northern region of the Syrian steppe reveals an alternative history for the customary

system. Indeed, there is clear indication of an evolving, resilient customary system here,

one that has not only endured repression by the state but has obliged government

authorities to resume a positive and active role in its institutions.

All Arab tribal individuals belong to a particular tribe, which imparts an

authenticity of descent and a quality of honor that sets them apart from non-tribal society

(Dresch 1993; Hourani 1991). Individual families form larger groups, called `quam

(sing. qom), the fundamental organizing units within a tribe. A collection of `quam forms

a maximal lineage or clan, called fakhdh. Families within a clan rely on group collective

action and commonly hold water and pastures together (Wilkinson 1983). Generally, a

council of elders guides the clan, and in many instances there is a well-respected

individual amongst them, a mukhtar or wajih, who can speak for the group as a whole. A

tribe is much larger, often comprising several villages or herding groups. Common to

many tribes and clans is the ethno-political ideology of patrilineal descent or shared

ancestry. The language of common descent does not necessarily reflect fact but is better

19

understood as a metaphor for signifying notions of closeness (LaBianca 1990). In the

wider region, most tribes also have had long histories of a specific territorial identity11.

Tribal society has a wealth of social capital: the social relations and norms

embedded in the structures of their society that regulate interactions. Things do change

over time, but given that individuals involved in any of these social structures will engage

in repeated interactions, each relationship is guided by expectations of predictable

behavior, leading to trust and reciprocity. Such trust underpins the customary land tenure

system and its flexibility. The fact that the state has had to take overt actions to break up

customary systems and as yet remains unable to do away with them attests to the strength

and utility of these social capital networks.

A group associated with a territory holds the exclusive right to invest in land, such

as digging a well, building a house, or cultivating a field. They also hold the right to

graze and exclude others, but given the nature of an arid environment and the size of any

one territory, herders inevitably need to maintain flexible, reciprocal arrangements with

other groups to maintain mobility. Hence, social capital is a critical ingredient upholding

such arrangements and assuring mutual compliance. Events that transpired at the turn of

the 20th century in the Aleppo steppe illustrate the important role played by such

adaptive customary institutions in the face of resource competition.

Before the arrival of trucks, the broad region in which a tribe migrated throughout

the year was (and sometimes still is) known as the dirah. It represented a functional area

of habitual use composed of water holes and associated pastures to which the group held

rights. In drought years when parts or all of a dirah were affected, families, groups or

11 In Sinai, Stewart (1986); In Yemen, Dresch (1993); Hourani (1991).

20

larger parts of a tribe sought water and pastures through social networks in the dirah of

other tribes.

At the turn of the 20th century the Aleppo steppe was dominated by two

neighboring sheep herding tribes, the Hadidiyin and the Mawali, and a powerful camel-

herding tribe called the Sba`ah. The size of the dirah depended on the herding animal,

with camels-herders having substantially larger dirah and venturing deeper into the desert

then their brethren, the sheep and goat herders. These latter herders were restricted by

the water dependency of their animals to the desert fringes where water sources were

more frequent and plentiful. The Sba`ah spent their winter and early spring around wells

of Wadi Hauran and its environs in modern-day western Iraq, 500 km southeast of the

Aleppo steppe line. In spring the Sba`ah migrated to the Aleppo steppe were they stayed

the summer occupying water points and pastures just vacated by the sheep herding tribes,

the Hadidiyin and the Mawali. There, they traded with the settled areas, and grazed their

animals on steppe shrubs largely unpalatable to sheep. This complementary and non-

exclusive use of water and pastures between the sheep and camel rearing tribes has an

ancient history in the region, with rights to waters and pastures in the near steppe and the

time windows on seasonal movement acknowledged in a written tribal treaty signed in

the last years of the Ottoman Empire (1907-1918) (Zakrya 1947).

This agreement lasted until the 1940s. In the meantime, cultivation in Syria

trebled to 2.1 million ha, sheep numbers also trebled to 3.4 million head, while camels

started to give way to tractors and trucks (Issawi 1951; Widmer 1936). Sba`ah

households were adapting to the changing demands in the market place. Whereas they

owned no sheep in 1920 they reportedly held some 80,000 ten years later (H.C.R.F.

21

1930). As all three tribes now had sheep in large numbers but still broadly lacked the

ability to truck water, conflict arose between Sba`ah and the old sheep herding tribes over

water and pastures in the near steppe during winter and spring months.

Together with an expansion of agriculture, the rising sheep numbers demanded

changes in the customary land tenure system, at least in the near steppe. Of immediate

concern to the Hadidiyin, the Mawali and the Sba`ah, was an untangling of their

overlapping dirah in the near steppe and the establishment of discrete tribal territories as

a basis for access rights to natural resources. Once this was achieved, investment either

in water or agriculture could be undertaken without risk of inter-tribal disputes. To

facilitate this shift, the disputing tribes sought an agreement through customary channels

and under the auspices of the state. By far the most important of such agreements was

the Damascus tribal treaty of 1956, which divided over 500,000 ha of the Aleppo steppe

among the three tribes, although pre-existing claims to water and pasture were kept

intact. The political process used in this treaty, and other similar ones before and after it,

was based on tribal custom.

In 1958, when the role of customary law and structures was formerly abolished in

Syria, the Damascus treaty and others like it were automatically annulled. The authorities

assumed full responsibility for rangeland management, placing it with the Steppe

Directorate from 1961. Nevertheless, customary institutions continued to exert authority

over rangeland management and tribal control. Documented evidence, such as that

described below, shows that substantial cooperation to regulate control and access to

steppe resources persisted among herders from different tribes, despite the hostile

22

political environment, including a significant level of tribal corporate activity in

protecting rights.

In 1958, large numbers of the Sba`ah left Syria for Saudi Arabia following the

abolition of tribal rights. With most of Sba`ah gone, Ghanatsah (a faction of the

Hadidiyin) took the opportunity to reoccupy and claim for themselves a portion of the

treaty lands called Abu al Naytel and Dayl`. They went unchallenged for more than a

decade, but in 1974 Muharrab al-Rakan, a son of the supreme shaykh of Sba`ah, "and the

members of Sba`ah represented by him," (SAR 1975) returned to Syria and immediately

laid a claim on the Abu al-Naytel well and the lands of Dayl`.

Ghanatsah took the matter to the state authorities. The head (mudir) of the

Palmyra administrative district carried out preliminary consultations with the disputing

tribes and visited the questioned site. The "final meeting" (SAR 1975) to resolve the

problem was convened on the 10th of February 1975. The decision went in favor of

Ghanatsah and the old mutual border from the 1956 treaty was adjusted to the new

agreement. The legal precedent for the decision was adverse possession, i.e. undisputed

occupation of property for a given period of time becomes the property of the occupant.

Six years later, the situation flared up again when Muharrab attempted again to

extend his area of control by cultivating his shared border with Ghanatsah in an area

referred to as the "airport". This was land Ghanatsah believed was theirs. Another round

of resolution talks was held. The settlement reached went again in favor of Ghanatsah.

Muharrab was allowed to reap his crop "as he had ploughed and planted it" but

afterwards the land would revert to Ghanatsah.

23

This agreement, like many others12, was extraordinary considering the Ba`thist

constitution and ideology. The decision had been reached with the full participation of

the state authorities. As far as the written law was concerned the disputed land was state

land and, since it was not part of a cooperative, was technically open to all Syrian citizens

and their livestock. The shaykhs' intermediary roles were formally terminated in 1958,

but two decades later little had changed in practice. Indeed, customary institutions

remain the principal mechanism regulating access to steppe resources on a day-to-day

basis, while the state continues to implicitly recognize and endorse tribal customary

rights and practices, with high officials and Party cadres guaranteeing agreements and

signing documents in the name of the state. It is important to note, however, that the

Steppe Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, with statuary responsibility for steppe

resource management, was not involved in this particular agreement. It was seen instead

as a political not a land management problem per se.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATUTORY AND CUSTOMARY TENURE ON THE PLANTATIONS

That violations of plantation rules of access are a particular problem in Aleppo is

at least partially explained by the overlap of tribal territories. Both plantations discussed

below form a group of four located on lands held by the Abraz clan of the Hadidiyin.

12 Additional post-1958 documented territorial treaties have come to light. The dates of these agreements include 1962, 1983, 1989, and 1992.

24

A guard at one of these plantation suggested he had turned over for prosecution

no less than 200 Abraz herders in five years in addition to the "many others caught but

not charged" (Conversation with the guard: Maraghah, Syria, 21st June 1999). Faysal,

the shaykh of Abraz, puts the number of Abraz prosecuted as a whole at 370. Evidence

from official communications on a proposed fifth plantation in the Abraz area strongly

suggests that appropriation of land for the plantations was causing serious pasture

shortages for the clan. Upon hearing of the proposed plantation in early 1995, Faysal

wrote to the Aleppo Governor:

Once these lands are annexed and the said plantation is established ... we would no longer have lands for our sheep to graze. We were moved from `Ein al-Zarqah and Maraghah where two plantations were established. To the north of us is the al-Haib tribewith whom we have a bloody dispute[and consequently] we are not welcome on their pasture. Moreover, the establishment of the plantation would cause hundreds of herders to move away, many of whom have houses in the area.13 As a result, the proposed plantation was abandoned, although the reason given

was that the site was in fact "one of the good sites in our steppe in terms of plant cover."

This episode demonstrates that past decisions for plantation location failed to assess the

implications of customary land tenure and the inevitable impact this would have on the

household economy of local range uses.

It is an unwritten rule within the Steppe Directorate that first refusal on plantation

leases goes to local herders and clans, despite formal claims that the steppe and the

plantations are open to all. Problems of who can have access to a plantation do not

generally arise when the site is located entirely within a particular clan territory.

13 Letter to H.E. The Governor of Aleppo from Faysal al-Nuri and companions on behalf of the Abraz tribe: 13.2.1995.

25

However, when the plantation border cuts across tribal territories, or unwelcome groups

from far afield attempt to purchase a lease on a local plantation, then the incongruence of

tenure systems can result in some very serious problems. Of the four plantations under

study by ICARDA in 1996, two plantations fell wholly within clan territories but the

other two did not. In the latter, disputes over access between neighboring groups resulted

in considerable difficulties for the authorities.

Such was the case when two clans, Bu Hasan and Jimlan (both of the Hadidiyin),

attempted to gain access to the plantation and establish de facto possession of land

originally held by three tribal territories: the Bu Salah of Abraz, the Twimat of

Ghanatsah, and the Ma`atah, all three of which are also part of the Hadidiyin. In the

previous two leasing seasons, the plantation had been leased predominately by the Bu

Salah, Abraz, which had also secured the vast majority of leases for that season. The

only other group to have grazed the plantation in previous seasons, and who were there

again in 1996, was that led by members of Bu Kurdy (Ghanatsah) who neighbored the

reserve to the north. When Bu Hasan and Jimlan also lodged requests for licenses, all

applications were approved. Both Bu Kurdy and Bu Salah, however, felt that Jimlan and

Bu Hasan had no right to any leases on the plantation, as their tribal grazing grounds at

Hrabjah were unaffected by the plantation. They took their grievance to the plantation

guard who cancelled Jimlan's and Bu Hasan's leases on the spot.

Aggrieved, Jimlan and Bu Hasan took their protest to the authorities, reiterating

the formal position that any Syrian could legally take out a lease. The Hama Governor

26

went with the heads of the provincial Steppe Directorate and Peasants Union14 office to

Abu al-Fayad to settle the dispute. The resolution went in Jimlan's and Bu Hasan's favor.

The authorities hired a local tractor and ploughed a boundary line within the plantation to

separate the disputing parties. As compensation, Bu Salah and Bu Kurdy were released

from all plantation rules: firewood could henceforth be collected, sheep numbers would

be unregulated, and camping, watering and milking could take place in the plantation.

The Head of the Steppe Directorate protested strongly against the decision but was

ultimately unsuccessful in changing it. Within a few days, instead of the 22,000 sheep

paid for by the Bu Salah and the Bu Kurdy groups there were now 40,000 in the

plantation. The plantation was shut down after three weeks.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The above discussion demonstrates the value of customary institutions supportive

of herder mobility, reciprocal arrangements with respect to resource use, and inter-tribal

conflict resolution mechanisms when it comes to rangeland management. Contrary to

popular belief that they have broken down and disappeared, many customary institutions

in Syria remain strong and continue to be influential in the property rights domain. Their

inherent flexibility means they are usually better suited to the prevailing non-equilibrium

environment of the Syrian rangelands when compared to the rigid statutory laws and

inappropriate technologies imposed by the state. Imposition of technologies will not

succeed unless tribal land tenure and institutions are taken into account. Customary

institutions represent a superior foundation for an integrated and inclusionary resource

14 The Peasants Union is an arm of the ruling Bath Party and took control of co-operatives from the MAAR in 1974.

27

management system. The continuing existence of these institutions contradicts Hardins

assumption of the inability of resource users to coordinate their actions to avert over-

exploitation. It is not possible to prove that these customary methods are

environmentally sustainable since ecological studies based on the new paradigms in the

field have yet to be conducted. But what these institutions do represent are the

foundations of a sustainable system by reducing transaction costs and affording local

legitimacy.

Past policies centralizing rangeland management were founded on misplaced

assumptions about the physical dynamics of the steppe environment as well as the

capacity of herders to cooperate together and regulate their use of pastoral resources.

Shrub technologies like Atriplex have proven ill-suited to livestock as well as

incompatible with herders' socioeconomic realities. Plantations likewise conflict with

mobility objectives and customary land tenure, fueling the incidence of tribal conflict. In

contrast to this failed top-down approaches are the enduring customary institutions whose

sensitivity to the physical and social environment and inherent legitimacy have enabled

them to overcome statutory abolition, even to the extent of obliging the authorities to

recognize customary agreements.

With a fresh understanding of arid environments and the customary system, there

are new opportunities for rangeland management in Syria. Tribes no longer represent a

political threat as they once did, but they do represent irreplaceable social capital. With

doubts raised about imported shrub technologies, plantations, and steppe policy more

broadly, existing tribal systems offer a solid foundation on which to build an effective

and efficient administration of steppe management and conservation. The task that now

28

faces the authorities in Syria and elsewhere in the region is to respond to this latent

opportunity and enter into a genuine partnership with the steppe users for the

management and conservation of steppe resources.

29

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CAPRi WORKING PAPERS

LIST OF CAPRi WORKING PAPERS

01 Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies for Natural Resource Management: A Conceptual Framework, by Anna Knox, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Peter Hazell, October 1998.

02 Assessing the Relationships Between Property Rights and Technology Adoption in Smallholder Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods, by Frank Place and Brent Swallow, April 2000.

03 Impact of Land Tenure and Socioeconomic Factors on Mountain Terrace Maintenance in Yemen, by A. Aw-Hassan, M. Alsanabani and A. Bamatraf, July 2000.

04 Land Tenurial Systems and the Adoption of a Mucuna Planted Fallow in the Derived Savannas of West Africa, by Victor M. Manyong and Victorin A. Houndkon, July 2000.

05 Collective Action in Space:Assessing How Collective Action Varies Across an African Landscape, by Brent M. Swallow, Justine Wangila, Woudyalew Mulatu, Onyango Okello, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2000.

06 Land Tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti, by Glenn R. Smucker, T. Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, October 2000.

07 Collective Action in Ant Control, by Helle Munk Ravnborg, Ana Milena de la Cruz, Mara Del Pilar Guerrero, and Olaf Westermann, October 2000.

08 CAPRi Technical Workshop on Watershed Management Institutions: A Summary Paper, by Anna Knox and Subodh Gupta, October 2000.

09 The Role of Tenure in the Management of Trees at the Community Level: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses from Uganda and Malawi, by Frank Place and Keijiro Otsuka November 2000.

10 Collective Action and the Intensification of Cattle-Feeding Techniques a Village Case Study in Kenyas Coast Province, by Kimberly Swallow, November 2000.

11 Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, by Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, January 2001.

CAPRi WORKING PAPERS

12 Land Dispute Resolution in Mozambique: Evidence and Institutions of Agroforestry Technology Adoption, by John Unruh, January 2001.

13 Between Market Failure, Policy Failure, and Community Failure: Property Rights, Crop-Livestock Conflicts and the Adoption of Sustainable Land Use Practices in the Dry Area of Sri Lanka, by Regina Birner and Hasantha Gunaweera, March 2001.

14 Land Inheritance and Schooling in Matrilineal Societies: Evidence from Sumatra, by Agnes Quisumbing and Keijuro Otsuka, May 2001.