arendt on politics
TRANSCRIPT
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Hannah Arendts Idea of Politics Revisited
Yi-huah JIANG
Professor
Department of Political Science
National Taiwan University
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I. Arendts Posthumous Work on Politics
Arendts idea of politics is usually celebrated as one of the most original in the
history of western political thought. Unlike ancient philosophers such as Plato or
Aristotle, she does not regard politics as a means for the realization of an ideal
human order or the pursuit of happiness. Unlike modern philosophers such as
Hobbes or Locke, she does not consider political life as a result of social contract
through which antagonized multitude get away of their warring state of nature. Even
among contemporary political theorists, her insistence on the human condition of
plurality and the revelatory characteristic of action also makes her concept of politics
different from that of Leo Strauss, who stresses the pursuit ofthe right, or the good,
political order, or that of John Rawls, who presupposes the neutrality of state and
the exercise ofpublic reason.
In the works published during her life time, Arendt never discusses in any
straightforward way what politics means or what significance it has for the human
world. She elaborates the human capability of action, the inescapable condition of
plurality and natality, and the division of the public and the private, etc., in The
Human Condition, but she does not talk for a moment on the concept of politics, as if
the above mentioned topics are identical with a treatise of politics itself. In Between
Past and Future, she deals with the concept of tradition, of history, of authority, of
freedom, of education, of culture, and so on; but again, there is no single chapter onpolitics. The most famous statements she writes about politics reads as follows: The
raison dtre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action. (BPF:
146)1
Yet, it is neither a definition nor an explanation of the concept of politics.
It is not until the publication ofThe Promise of Politics in 2005 that we have
direct access to Arendts understanding of politics per se. In the posthumous work
edited by Jerome Kohn, Arendts several monographs concerning politics and the
tradition of political thought are assembled together for the first time. Of particular
importance is the treatise Introduction into politics, which appears in German in
Ursula Ludzs 1993 edition of Was ist Politik? As Jerome Kohn correctly explains,
(The title) by no means indicates an introduction to the study of political science or
political theory but, on the contrary, a leading into (intro-ducere) genuine political
experience (PP: viii). Together with the others articles, the monograph provides us
with the best opportunity to understand what Arendt means by politics or the
political life.
My article is an attempt to read closely Arendts posthumous workThe Promise
of Politics. I will try to explore what Arendt means by politics, how she relates
1 For abbreviation of Arendts works, please see the bibliography.
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politics to human plurality and the public sphere, why she contends that the tradition
of political thought betrays the spirit of genuine politics, and how the modern
invention of massive destructive weapon threatens the world that politics aims to
build and preserve. In a word, I will reexamine Arendts idea of politics with the
view not only of locating its place in her political theory, but also of illuminating its
uniqueness and novelty. In the final section, however, I will offer my critical
assessment as to whether Arendts concept of politics can be of relevance for our
modern world.
II. The Meaning of Politics
Arendts usage of the world politics can be divided into two situations. First,
she uses politics to refer to the process of interest articulation and power struggle,
just like most of us do in most of the time. In Between Past and Future, she alludes
to this concept of politics as the lowest level of human affairs. Second, she also
promotes politics as the major achievement that human civilization could ever
reach if we actualize our human potential of acting in concert. This is Arendts idea
of politics, or the highest level of human affairs, if we could coin the term in
according with her spirit.
It is true that in the works published during her life, Arendt has already made
the distinction as clearly as a political theorist can. In an article discussing truth andpolitics, Arendt says: I have spoken as though the political realm were no more than
a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing counted but pleasure and
profit, partisanship, and the lust for domination (BPF: 263). The factual truth
Arendt ardently defends is always contradictory to this sense of politics because
politicians tend to struggle for power with lies, propagandas and manipulation.
Nevertheless, Arendt adds immediately that it is not the whole story. From this
perspective, we remain unaware of the actual content of political lifeof the joy and
the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting
together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word
and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning
something entirely new (BPF: 263). The later is of no doubt Arendts ideal of
genuine politics.
In The Promise of Politics, Arendt refers to the two different levels of politics
again. Politics could be defined in its usual sense, as a relationship between the
rulers and the ruled. But if it is thus defined, there is no way to prevent people from
having the prejudices against politicsthe prejudices that domestic policy is a
fabric of lies and deceptions woven by shady interests and even shadier ideologies,
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while foreign policy vacillates between vapid propaganda and the exercise of raw
power (PP: 97-98). Following this usual or narrow sense of politics, there is no
chance that public affairs can attract people who want to lead a noble, or at least
moderately decent, life.
Fortunately, politics could also mean something else. In a very succinct way,
Arendt contends: The meaning of politics is freedom. That is to say, to be political
is to be free. The definition is simple and concise, but, as Arendt explains, its
simplicity and conclusive force lie in the very fact that politics exists in the human
world (PP: 108). Freedom is the raison dtre and the essence of politics. It is the
raison dtre because human beings live together, act together, or even fight together,
with the view of enjoying the experience of being free. It is the essence of political
life because without freedom, action would deteriorate into behavior, and speech
would degenerate into rhetoric.
Almost all Arendtian scholars understand how difficult it is to distinguish
freedom from action, or action from politics in Arendts theory. Freedom
seems the reason why people have political life, while political life consists in the
interaction and communication of free and equal persons. When people do politics,
that is, when they act and speak to each other with a view of freedom, they are
beginning something anew and creating a public space that would not generate in
any other way. Arendts admiration of the phenomenon of acting freely in a public
space leads her to equate political action with a nonreligious miraclea miraclewhich is prompted by the birth of human life and comparable to the coming into
existence of the world. As she elaborates in The Promise of Politics:
Man himself evidently has a most amazing and mysterious talent for
working miracles. The normal, hackneyed word our language provides for
this talent is action. Action is unique in that it sets in motion processes that
in their automatism look very much like natural processes, and action also
marks the start of something, begins something new, seizes the initiative, or,
in Kantian terms, forges its own chain. The miracle of freedom is inherent in
this ability to make a beginning, which itself is inherent in the fact that every
human being, simply by being born into a world that was there before him
and will be there after him, is himself a new beginning (PP: 113).
If the meaning of politics is freedom, then what is the meaning of freedom?
Arendt answers this question by referring back to the experience of the Greek polis
because she maintains that the Greek is the first people who experienced and realized
freedom. Freedom originally meant nothing more than being able to go where one
please, but it was not merely the freedom of movement as we understand today. In
order to move freely, one must prove himself to be a free citizen, i.e., a person not
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subject to domination or coercion by another person. But freedom means even more
than that. A free man is also someone who need not take care of the burden of
maintaining his househe must be able to remove himself from the coercion of
household (PP: 121). The contrast between freedom and necessity is such a persistent
theme of Arendts theory that we do not need to repeat here. Arendts discussion of the
polis vs. the household in the ancient Greek, and her triple classification of the public,
the private and the social in The Human Condition has already explained clearly why
freedom cannot coexist with necessity of life.
What is important for us here is that although Arendt advocates the freedom of
movement and the liberation from lifes necessity, she emphasizes that it is not the
end purpose of politics; rather, it is the substance and meaning of all things
political. In other words, politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind
of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense (PP: 129, my
italics). Freedom itself is the essence of politics, while the means by which one can
establish such a space of freedom are not necessarily political. In the Greek
experience, lawgiving, foreign policy and war are means to establish or protect a
political space, but they themselves are definitely not political. They are
phenomena peripheral to politics and therefore not politics itself (PP: 129-130).
The identity of politics with freedom can be traced back to the pre-polis life of
Greece. For Arendt, just like for many other scholars of the history of political thought,
the very word politics is derived from the actual experience of the Greek polis. Thepre-polis life is the source of the Greek political vocabulary; while the political
vocabulary of polis, once created, becomes the standard of all European languages for
politics even though the heyday of polis has been long over. The polis is a very
specific form of human communal life, in which men in their freedom can interact
with one another without compulsion, force, and rule over one another, as equals
among equals, commanding and obeying one another only in emergencies that is, in
times of warbut otherwise managing all their affairs by speaking with and
persuading one another (PP: 45, 117). This particular form of organizational human
life determines in such an exemplary and definitive way what later westerns
understand by politics that it can almost be said to possess a kind of universal validity.
Whenever westerns talks about politics, they cannot but think of the way public
affairs were conducted in the ancient Greek polis.
According to the Greek experience, Arendt argues, what distinguishes life in the
polis from all other forms of human communal life (such as family or local
neighborhood) is freedom. It does not mean that the Greek acquire their freedom by
means of politics, but that, as said in the above, being free and living in the polis
were, in a certain sense, one and the same. Freedom is identical with the political life;
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it is not the purpose or end that political life pursuits. Conceived from this angle,
freedom can be understood negatively as not being ruled or ruling, and positively as
a space which can be created only by men (PP: 116-117).
If politics is to be bound together with freedom, and separated from the necessity
of life or the means for anything else, then it becomes clear that there must be only a
few moments in the long history of human beings that the meaning of politics is fully
realized or manifested. The few great historical moments, however, are crucial and
influential. Arendt says they set the standard, not in the sense that they can be
imitated, but that certain ideas and concepts inherent in them can determine those
epochs denied a full experience of political reality (PP: 119-120). Politics in this
higher sense becomes the criteria of judgment, by which we can evaluate the degree
or the extent that political freedom is actualized in any specific historical moment.
Whenever there is the hope of acting freely in a public space, there is the genuine
spirit of politics; whenever there is only power struggle and violent domination,
politics is in effect transformed into the lowest level of human affairs.
III. Politics and Human Plurality
The meaning of politics is freedom; while the whole realm of politics becomes
possible only on the fact of human plurality. By plurality Arendt means two
characteristics of human existence: distinctness and equality. Human being are borndistinct from one another (even twins are not identical), and they are equal in the
sense that they all have their personal distinctness. For this assertion Arendt offers two
arguments: one being biblical; the other being secular. Let us examine them in turn.
Arendt likes to quote from the Bible although she herself is neither an orthodox
Jewish nor a confessed Christian. In The Human Condition, she contends that in its
most elementary form, the human condition of action is implicit even in Genesis
(Male and female created He them). She emphasizes that the expression is different
from the other expression which also concerns the creation of man, in which God
originally created Man (Adam) and then created Eve and made them the origin of
reproduction (HC: 8). In The Promise of Politics, again, she refers to the same
statement in Genesis, and declares that the plurality of men constitutes the political
realm (PP: 61). Why should the Bible become the authority of human beings being
distinct and equal? Arendt does not offer any explanation.
The other way of argumentationthe secular argumentseems more
understandable and convincing. In The Human Condition, Arendt says: If action as
beginning corresponds to the fact of birth, . . . then speech corresponds to the fact of
distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of
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living as a distinct and unique being among equals (HC: 178). Plurality is the
condition of political action because if not for equality, men could not understand
each other and their ancestors, or anticipate the needs of their posterity; if not for
distinctness, they would lead a herd life not unlike that of animals, and need neither
action nor speech to distinguish themselves (HC: 175-176). In The Promise of Politics,
Arendt contends that, although it is possible to conceive of a human world in the
sense of a man-made artifice erected on the earth under the condition of the oneness
of man, it is impossible to conceive of an acting and speaking being existing in the
singular (PP: 61). The Nature makes human being distinct from each other. It is a fact
that we must respect rather than change. To have the idea of eradicating human
distinctness would be insane because it will lead to the cancellation of human
characteristics, changing human life into herd animal life.
Distinctness and equality are the two most important dimensions of human
plurality. Any genuine political philosophy, adds Arendt, must take this fact as its
point of departure, or it would end nowhere. As she maintains in The Promise of
Politics, If philosophers were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy, they
would have to make the plurality of man, out of which arises the whole realm of
human affairsin its grandeur and miserythe object of their thaumadzein
(wonder) (PP: 38). According to Arendt, one of the mistakes of the tradition of
political thought (be it manifested in Plato, Augustine or Hobbes) is to ignore or
underestimate the simple fact of human plurality. The great philosophers always wantto search for, or set up, a universal standard of measurement, by which they can
overcome the challenge human diversity brings forth. For this purpose, they tend to
presuppose that human beings are more or less of the same nature or behavior pattern.
Nevertheless, their attempt is doomed to failure because the presupposition itself is
erroneous.
Arendt is so fond of reminding us of the human condition of plurality that, in her
interpretation of Montesquieu, she even compares the principles of government to the
two characteristics of human plurality. First, she brings our attention to Montesquieus
classification of the principles of three different kinds of government: virtue is the
inspiring principle of a republic; honor is the principle of a monarchy; and fear guides
all actions in a tyranny. Then, she argues that virtue springs from the love of equality,
and honor arises from the love of distinctness. In other words, she thinks that two of
Montesquieus principles of government are from loving one or the other of the two
fundamental and interconnected traits of the human condition of plurality. Her
elaboration goes like the following:
The fundamental experience of monarchies, and also of aristocracies and
other hierarchical forms of government, is that by birth we are different from
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each other and therefore strive to distinguish ourselves, to manifest our
natural or social distinctness The experience upon which the body politic
of a republic rests is the being-together of those who are equal in strength,
and its virtue, which rules its public life, is the joy not to be alone in the
world (PP: 66-67).
Arendts interpretation of Montesquieu may be contestable (for instance, she
does not know how to find a place for the principle of fear in a tyranny), but her point
is clear: politics must base itself upon the simple fact of human plurality, and plurality
consists in distinctness and equality. Ignoring the fact of human plurality would only
make a political theory deficient and distortedan unfortunate situation the tradition
of political thought finds itself locked into.
One way of understanding why plurality is so important to politics is to follow
Arendt in her analysis ofdoxa (opinion). In the Greek context, opinion is the
formulation in speech of what appears to me. The concept of opinion presupposes
that the world we share opens up differently to different person according to his
position in it. Everyone, therefore, can perceive the world from his own angle, and
express his perception accordingly. Since the positions are different, the opinions
everyone holds would also be different. Yet, opinions are not necessarily subjective
fantasy or arbitrary judgment. They contain a certain degree of objectivity because
they are directing to the same common world. Insofar as we are human, the
commonness of the world we share would make sure that everyone perceiving it has asense of objectivity (PP: 14).
Now, philosophers have quite different views about the validity of opinions.
Plato, as we all understand well enough, opposes opinion to knowledge, and strongly
argues that a philosopher has to get rid of the influence of various opinions, having
truth (or ideas) in his mind only. That is, he does not trust the viewpoint of the
ordinary people, neither does he prepare to accept the reality of human plurality. On
the contrary, Arendt says, Socrates is much more friendly to opinions. Since he
believes that there must be some amount of truth in every viewpoint, he wants to
bring forth this truth which everyone potentially possesses. In other words, Socrates
wanted to make the city more truthful by delivering each of the citizens of their truths.
The method of doing this is dialegesthai, talking something through, but this dialectic
brings forth truth not by destroying doxa or opinion, but on the contrary by revealing
doxa in its own truthfulness (PP: 15). Accordingly, Platos philosopher always wants
to educate and instruct the people, while Socrates philosopher merely wishes to
improve his fellow citizens opinion by endless discussion.
What we learn from Arendts analysis of plurality and opinion is that the world
of political affairs is a world of diverse viewpoints and conflicting opinions. Freedom
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of political action becomes possible because human beings, distinct and equal as they
are, have to travel and communicate in the public space constituted by different
viewpoints. If we are of the same in thought and behavior, there is no need of freedom.
If we are constrained by some universally valid standard and denied the right of
contributing to that standard or revising it, politics would be meaningless for us. The
political sphere opens only when we acknowledge the legitimacy of plurality and
opinion.
IV. The Relation between the Public and the Political
Politics arises when different people come together to talk and act to each other,
but there seems to be a subtle difference between the public space, which opens up
wherever people gather together, and the political space, in which freedom becomes
the only legitimate concern or the primary principle. To make clear this distinction, we
may first reexamine Arendts concept of the public, and then see what she has to say
about the difference of the public and the political, if there is indeed any difference.
According to The Human Condition, Arendt contends that the public signifies two
closely related but not altogether identical phenomena. It means first of all the publicity
and the reality of everything that opens to our sense perceptions. As her famous maxim
Being and Appearing coincide implies, the reality of the public realm depends on the
simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the commonworld presents itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever
be devised (HC: 50, 57). Secondly, the term public also denotes the world itself. The
world is not the same as the earth, which is the physical space and environment for the
movement of people and organic life. Rather, the world means the mixture of the
human artifact and the human affairs occurring among people. To live together in the
world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common,
as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between,
relates and separates men at the same time (HC: 52).
In The Promise of Politics, Arendt reasserts similar points but allows a more
flexible definition of the space which opens up between human beings. She confirms
the argument that whenever people come together (be it in private or socially, be it in
public or politically), a space is generated among these gathering people. But the nature
of the space differs from each other. It could be manifested as custom in a private
context, as convention in a social context, or as laws, constitutions, statutes in a public
context. Every such space has its own structure that changes over time, but they share
the same basic characteristic of a world opening up among people (PP: 106). We do not
know what Arendt means by saying that custom is the realization of the space in a
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private context because it does not fit well with her interpretation of the private (the
space within the four walls of ones house and featuring necessity, privacy and love).
Nevertheless, her basic point is clear enough.
What really concerns us here is the question of whether the public sphere equals
to the political sphere. In the works published during her life-time, Arendt does not give
us an unambiguous answer, but her hint favors the positive reading. For example, she
maintains that The space ofappearance comes into being wherever men are together
in the manner of speech and action, that is, wherever men act in a typically political
manner (HC: 199). She also indicates, in her recommendation of the Greek
understanding ofpolitics, that whatever occurs in this space of appearances is political
by definition, even when it is not a direct product of action (BPF: 155). The public,
therefore, seems to be identical with the political in its broad sense.
Nevertheless, Arendts concept of the political is different from the conventional
understanding of the political life. As she once clearly pronounced, the public space
extends far beyond what we ordinarily mean by political life (MDT: 73). If the
so-called ordinary political life means power struggle, governmental activities, or the
management of life's necessities -- in a word, if it only designates the lower level of
human affairs as we discussed in the above, then the public is certainly not identical
with the political. The public is related to something which the ordinary political life
does not really care aboutto reveal one's irreplaceable personality with speech-act, to
manifest ones freedom in front of ones peers. It is only when politics is understood inthis way that the public is tantamount to the political.
When we come to the posthumous work ofThe Promise of Politics, however, the
relations between the public and the political becomes more complicated than what we
have just said. Here, Arendt emphasizes that, historically speaking, the public was not
necessarily a political space in the true sense. She refers to the epics of Homer, arguing
that the public space opened up by the heroes of the Greek and the Trojan is the first
example of a world entered into by stouthearted and enterprising adventurers. It
becomes public because the heroes were capable of seeing and hearing and admiring one
anothers deeds, of which the sagas of later poets and storytellers assured them lasting
fame. Yet, this public space is deceptive in that it is not an everlasting site for the heroes.
When the adventure and enterprise comes to an end (that is, when Troy was destroyed
and the kings departed for their homeland), the public space they opened up vanishes
immediately (PP: 122-123).
The real challenge, therefore, is how to rebuild a permanent public space after
the end of the adventure. According to Arendt, the answer lies in the polis:
This public space does not become political until it is secured within a city,
is bound, that is, to a concrete place that itself survives both those
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memorable deeds and the names of the memorable men who performed
them and thus can pass them on to posterity over generations. The city is
the polis; it is political and therefore different from other settlements
because it is purposefully build around its public space, the agora, where
free men could meet as peers on any occasion (PP: 123).
The transformation of the public space between heroes into the public space
between citizens is one of the most significant moments in the history of western
politics. It is as if the great adventure of the brave heroes finally finds its substitute
after the army disbands, and the experience of the Homeric epics is echoed and
perpetuated in the polis yet to come. What is even more interesting, according to
Arendt, is that the experience of freedom seems to undergo a fundamental
transformation as well: the most important activity of a free life moves from action
to speech, from free deeds to free words. It is so because the agora of a polis now
becomes the focus of a free life. The constant presence of others, the endless
dialogues between peer citizens, and the competing persuasion among rivalsall of
which features the employment of speechnow becomes the real substance of a free
and political life (PP: 124).
Arendt describes the shift as a shift from freedom of spontaneity to freedom of
opinion. By spontaneity she means the ability to initiate a sequence, to forge a new
chain. The Homeric heroes are people capable of spontaneity because they bravely
assert themselves in a great adventure, beginning something never seen or thought ofbefore, and kindling a chain of reaction and memory afterwards. The best illustration
of the experience of spontaneous action in the ancient time can be found in the Greek
words archein and prattein. The former means both to begin and to lead; while the
latter means to act and to carry out. They are testimony of the ancient Greeks
freedom of spontaneity. Also worthwhile our attention is that, when pushed to its
extreme, the activity of spontaneous action could be completed by a single person. As
Arendt maintains, A single individual can of course ultimately act alone. And it
is for this very reason that freedom of spontaneity is sometimes prepolitical (PP:
125-127).2
On the contrary, freedom of opinion differs from freedom of spontaneity in that it
is much more dependent on the presence of others and of our being confronted with
their opinions. Following our analysis in the previous section, we know that in
Arendt, freedom of opinion is never merely the modern concept of freedom of
expression, which of course constitutes an integral part of what she means to say. It
rather refers, primarily, to the fact that no one can adequately grasp the objective
2 This argument is of course contradictory to most of Arendts expression, for she always emphasizes
the action presupposes the presence of others.
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world in its full reality all on his own because the world always opens itself up and
reveals itself to different persons standing at different positions. Since everyone is
constrained by his limited standpoint, he has to enlarge his mind by sympathetically
understanding what others have to say from their standpoints if he wants to see and
experience the world as comprehensively as possible. That is, only in the freedom of
our speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak, emerge
in its objectivity and visibility from all sides (PP: 128-129). Thus, freedom of
opinion becomes the real experience of a genuine public space, while freedom of
spontaneity gradually fades away into history.
In short, Arendt does not regard the public to be completely identical with the
political. The public realm can be actualized in various forms of human gathering,
both political and nonpolitical; but the political (in the strict sense) indicates a space
in which freedom becomes the major principle. To experience this freedom, people
must act and speak in plural, that is, presenting oneself in front of others and
communicating with ones peer with the view of ascertaining the reality of world from
diverse angles. The significance of multiple viewpoints and the possibility of
objective understanding by means of mutual learning, remains the essential lesson of
Arendts political theory.
V. Politics and Political Thought
Arendts ideal of politics appeared for the first time in the ancient Greek, but it
was soon refuted by the tradition of political thought. For Arendt, the tradition of
political thought began with Plato and ended with Marx. It is part of the western
history but not identical with the history (PP: 43-44). The fact that Plato denied the
true meaning of politics and replaced it with something else is a great misfortune
because its influence upon the ensuing development of western tradition is so
tremendous that politics has never again reclaimed its dignity. To realize how much
impact the story has on the posterity, we need to go back to Plato.
Arendt thinks the tradition of political thought began when the trial and the death
of Socrates made Plato despair of the political life and doubt certain fundamentals of
Socrates teachings. Socrates himself is not hostile toward the polis. This can be seen
from the fact that he enjoys talking with people at the agora and the good record he
has as an Athenian citizen. When Socrates was sentenced to death, however, Plato
began to doubt the validity of the method Socrates used to win over his fellow citizens,
that is, the validity ofpeithein (persuasion). Plato preferred to believe that the
ordinary people are irrational, stubborn, unfit for philosophical argument, and can be
led or transformed only by brainwashing or threat of violence. Secondly, Plato also
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denounced furiously the legitimacy of doxa (opinion) in political life. Unlike Socrates,
who tries to improve the truthfulness of everyones opinion by the method of
midwifery, Plato despises opinions thoroughly and yearns for absolute standards of
truth. He opposes knowledge to opinions, and argues that only the philosophers who
possess the absolute knowledge are entitled to rule the polis. In Arednts words, Plato
was the first to introduce absolute standards into the realm of human affairs,
where, without such transcending standards, everything remains relative. Yet this
deed of Plato is surely the most anti-Socratic conclusion because Socrates never
considers that opinions are totally devoid of truth (PP: 6-8).
The result of Platos contempt for politics is that, ever since his time, the
tradition of political thought has always presupposed the superiority of the
philosophical life to the political life, and attempted to provide universal standards
and rules, yardsticks and measurements from the viewpoint of philosophers to make
judgments on the irregular, unstable and unreal world of human affairs. The dignity of
politics is deprived because all the standards political theorists have to apply upon it
are derived from philosophy, rather than from politics itself. The most telling of these
application, according to Arendt, is the idea of the law-giver, who invents an absolute
standard for constitution, renders it to the people who are to be ruled, and sets the
constrain for their behaviors. Moreover, the purpose of the law-givers conduct is to
guarantee the safety of the philosopher in a body politic, and to maintain the operation
of everyday life as smoothly as possible. Politics as a whole is obviously reduced tothat lower level whose task was to sustain life within the public space of the polis,
criticizes Arendt (PP: 37, 131-135).
If the tradition of political thought began with Platos contempt for the life of
polis (and to a lesser extent, with Aristotles request to be let alone), it was succeeded
by the Christianitys rejection and redefinition of politics. The Christian rejection
differs from the Platonic refutation in that it regards the public realm per se as
intolerable exactly because it is public. Arendt quotes Tertullians statement to
illustrate this point: Nothing is more alien to us Christians than what matters
publicly (PP: 135-136). It is as though the public is a sinful place and everything
sacred or religious must be kept in the private. For example, the goodness one does
must hide itself and be prevented from being seen in the public The left hand does
not know what the right hand is doing becomes the ideal for human ethics (Matthew
6:1). What is more important, however, is that the Christians also redefine the nature
of the political and the public, arguing that politics itself is a means to some higher
end (the salvation of soul), and that the public can be erected among the true believers
(the Christians who love ones neighbors but pay no attention to the body politic). The
faithful can thus constitute a totally new, religiously defined public space, which,
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although public, was not political (PP: 135-139).
The whole trend of regarding politics as a means for something else remains
intact even in the modern age. For Arendt, both the enlightened despotism of the
eighteenth century and the egalitarian democracy of the nineteenth century confirm
the principle that the purpose of the government is to protect the free productivity of
the society ant the security of the individual in his private life. The social sphere
keeps expanding day after day, replacing the traditional public sphere and positing
happiness as the highest goal of human life. In the end of the day, politics is defined
as the means by which individual freedom (or negative liberty, in Berlins
terminology) can be secured. It has nothing to do with the revelatory function of
speech-act, or the maintaining of a public world (PP: 141-143).
For Arendt, Karl Marx signifies the end of the tradition of political thought for
three reasons. First, Marx totally rejects the traditional view of subsuming practice to
theory. He does not accept that action in and of itself cannot reveal truth. As a matter
of fact, what he tries to do is to turn the traditional framework up side down, to
promote practice at the top of the contemplative life (PP: 76). Second, Marx envisages
a classless society after the proletarian revolution, while a classless society means that
all the traditional concepts relating to politics, such as rule and domination, will
disappear with the withering away of state. Freedom, the concept that traditional
politics puts as its end, will also become meaningless for the very reason that no one
will be oppressed any longer (PP: 77). Third, Marxs historical materialism concludesthat material production and material interest are the real force of historical changes.
He therefore links material interest to the essential humanity of man, and promotes
labor as the preeminent human activity. What this insight results in is a new definition
of man: the essence of humanity does not reside in rationality (as the classical
philosophers assume), nor in the ability of production (as implied in the concept of
homo faber), nor in mans likeness of God (creatura Dei), but rather in labor, which
the great tradition of political thought has unanimously rejected as incompatible with
a free human life. In Marx, man becomes essentially an animal laborans (PP: 78-79).
We learn from the previous sections that Arendt thinks the essence of politics is
freedom (the ability to begin something new or initiate a chain), and the political
realm becomes possible only when distinct and equal agents gather together in a
public space, that is, when human plurality is ascertained. The tradition of political
thought which begins with Plato and ends with Marx seems to Arendt never grasp this
point, and always attempt to substitute free action with contemplative rationality or
the capability of fabrication. It therefore never acknowledges the fundamental
significance of human plurality, mistakenly believes that men are universally similar
to each other. But why does the tradition make such a mistake?
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For Arendt, there are two good reasons for the misunderstanding of politics in the
tradition of political philosophy. First, traditional political philosophers tend to believe
that there is something political in man that belongs to his essence. Aristotles
famous assertion that man is by nature a political animal is a good example of this
misunderstanding. Yet Arendt contends that the assertion is not true. She prefers to say
that man is apolitical not that human being is not capable of acting or leading, but
that a single person cannot exercise (or actualize) politics by himself. Politics arises
between men, and so quite outside of man maintains Arendt. If we assume together
with the great philosophers that man is by natural capable of political life without the
presence of others, we will commit the same mistake. Secondly, the western tradition
is greatly influenced by the biblical legacy, while the monotheistic concept of God in
both Judaism and Christianity takes it for granted that man is created in the likeness of
Gods solitariness. It is as if that not men and women are created, but a single man;
and all the offspring come from the repetition and reproduction of the first single man.
Arendt thinks this is also a sad mistake (PP: 95).
So that is the reason why the tradition of political thought, ever since its
beginning, lost sight of man as an acting being and politics as an enterprise of the
many. As a result of this unfortunate development, the tradition never gets the point
that politics is identical with freedom, rather than a means to freedom; that action is
the essence of man, not contemplation, fabrication or laboring; and that politics
become possible exactly because human being are different from each other, while allthe attempt to cancel or control their diversity would result in disaster. The greatest
tragedy of the twenty centurythe rise of the totalitarian movement and the invention
of mass destruction weaponsattests Arendts concern. Let us now turn to this
question.
VI. Violence and the Destruction of Politics
Arendts posthumous work concerns not only the rise of the political, the
protection of the public, but also the threat to the survival of politics. In Introduction
into Politics, she begins with the section of What is Politics? continues with
sections bearing similar titles again and again, such as What Politics Is Today?
What is the Meaning of Politics? The Meaning of Politics, Does Politics Still
Have Any Meaning at All? But there is a section in the sequence which seems
arbitrary and out of context at the first glance. It is the section titled The Question of
War. Although the section on war appears unexpected, it is not for no reason that
Arendt decides to discuss this topic in her treatise on the meaning of politics.
For Arendt, the meaning of politics is freedom. But the classical identity of
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politics and freedom is now under serious doubt not only because of the
misunderstanding embedded in the tradition of political thought, but also because of
the emergence of two facts in the twentieth century. First, the rise and down of
totalitarian movement leaves people with the impression that totalized politics is a
terrible experience and that freedom seems possible only when we get rid of the
influence of politics. Second, the modern invention of massive destructive weapons
(as exemplified in the atomic bomb) makes people cannot but doubt if politics and the
preservation of human life are compatible, or if it is not true that we should dispense
with politics before politics destroys us all. In a word, totalitarianism and atomic
bomb ignite the question about the meaning of politics in our modern situation (PP:
108-109).
Does politics still have meaning? This is not an easy question to be answered.
For Arendt, the question actually involves three factor which, interwoven together,
causes our pessimism about the meaning of politics. The first element is our habit of
thinking public affairs in the means/end category. That is, we tend to consider politics
(or government) as a means to attain some other higher end which lies out side of
politics. Politics is always a necessary evil for something good in itself, but it never
counts as a good. Second, we also tend to think that the substance of politics is brute
force, be it manifested in power struggle, revolution, or war and invasion. If the
essence of politics is all these stuff, there seems no good reason why we should expect
politics to result in anything great or admirable. Third, our tradition of political theoryalso contributes to the popular notion that rule or domination is the central
concept of political theory. Max Webers famous equation of politics with the exercise
of power and domination is only a most recent example of how theorists reiterate the
same conviction ever since Plato (PP: 152).
Does politics necessarily relate itself to brute force and domination? Can it be
understood only in terms of means and end? Arendt obviously does not agree with this
popular impression. On the contrary, she ardently believes that it is only through
introducing brute force and the means/end category into politics that the melancholy
omen of the destruction of politics emerges on the horizon.
War is never compatible with politics, argues Arendt. Deriving her insights from
the experience of the ancient Greek, Arendt reminds us again that the Greeks formed
the polis around the agora, a place where free citizen assembled, speaking about
something with one another. In this understanding, war (and the brute force it entailed)
was entirely excluded from what was truly political. War was not the continuation
of politics, as Clausewitz tries to persuade us into belief, but the very opposite of
politics (PP: 164-165). However, the rise of totalitarianism brings with it the new
concept oftotal war, and defines the latter to be a war of annihilation. At the
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beginning, total war seems to be proclaimed by totalitarian country against
non-totalitarian country, but it soon becomes a reality of conflict even between
non-totalitarian countries themselves. The atomic bomb the United States dropped on
Japan is a proof of how terrible the effect of total war can engender between
non-totalitarian countries (PP: 159-160).
It may be worthy our attention here to compare Arendts strong objection against
the concept of total war and Carl Schmitts admiration of the same concept. Schmitt is
renowned for his definition of the political as the differentiation of enemy and friend.
He regards the conflict between rivals as something essential and indispensable for
politics, and celebrates the war of annihilation to be a mark of strong will. He says: A
world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe,
would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world
without politics (Schmitt, 1996:35). That is certainly a view with which Arendt
cannot agree.
The reason why Arendt cannot agree with Schmitt is that during a war of
annihilation, the multiple perspectives of how the world opens itself to us will be
destroyed or severely diminished. Arendt says:
The world comes into being only if there are perspectives If a people of
nation is annihilated, it is not merely that a people or a nation or a given
number of individuals perishes, but rather that a portion of our common
world is destroyed, an aspect of the world that has revealed itself to us untilnow but can never reveal again To the extent that politics becomes
destructive and causes worlds to end, it destroys and annihilates itself (PP:
175-176).
Living in the most violent and the most destructive century of human history,
Arendt is well aware of how wars and revolutions have shaped the political
experience of our times. The sad fact that both wars and revolutions use brute force to
achieve their purposes makes people easily believe that politics is always associated
with expansion and domination, and political action is nothing other than violence (PP:
191-192). The classical identity of politics and freedom is substituted with the modern
equation of politics and violence. Once the situation reached the point of no return,
there would be no possibility of reclaiming the meaning of the political.
After discussing the question of war and violence, let us now turn to the question
of means and end. To a very important extent, Arendt believes that our inability to
make a clear distinction between the end, the goal and the meaning of political action,
is one major reason why true politics is disappearing from our world. It is only when
we realize the subtle difference of these concepts can we possibly grasp the meaning
of politics again.
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Ends are associated with means. They are the results that we apply means in
order to achieve. For instance, self-preservation can be the end of defense, domination
can be the end of attack, and the overthrowing of an old political entity can be the end
of a revolution. To achieve a specific end, we usually make use of means, be it
violence, deception, alliance or persuasion. Political action pursues its end with
means (PP: 193-194).
Goals are different from ends in that they are not tangible, concrete objectives of
action. They are instead the guidelines and directives by which we orient ourselves.
Political actors must have goals in mind to guide their directions, but theses goals are
too abstract to be related to any specific means. Goals set the standards by which
everything that is done must be judged. They transcend what is done in the same
sense that every yardstick transcends what it has to measure. One of the salient
problems in modern political theory is that it cannot tell the goal from the end, and
always thinks of the public matter in terms of means/end when they should think
about the goal. Similarly, politicians introduce brute force into the political sphere as
an efficient means for their end, but confuse the later with the goal (Ibid).
Distinct from both end and goal, the meaning of political action is always
contained within the activity itself, and it can exist only as long as the activity
continues. Arendt contends that the meaning of action will reveals itself in the course
of action, but disappears immediately when the action is over. That is to say, meaning
is not like goal, which can stand out side the action as a standard and last longer thanthe activity. Meaning seems to be transient, and has nothing to do with the means or
the end of an activity (PP: 194).3
Arendt thinks that our unwillingness (and inability) to make distinctions between
end, goal and meaning, is the major reason why we cannot understand the true
meaning of politics, which is freedom. Worse still, whenever we talk about the
meaning of political action, we actually refer to its end or goal. Modern people do not
know what meaning is, nor do they believe that there is meaning for politics at all.
The loss of meaning marks the victory of brute force in the political sphere, as well as
the disappearing of genuine politics.
VII. Can Arendtian Politics Be Revived?
Arendt is certainly one of the most original political thinkers of our time. Her
idea of politics is so distinct from other contemporary philosophers that no students
who are dealing with the topic can afford neglecting its influence. On the other hand,
3
Arendt also lists the fourth element of action: principle. Principle is the fundamental conviction that agroup of people share, like honor, virtue, fear, fame, freedom, justice or equality. It does not concern us
here.
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however, Arendts concept of the political is also frequently criticized as too
idiosyncratic to be of any help for a world which is totally against her imagination.
Before concluding this article, I would like to make some comments regarding the
strength and the weakness of her concept of politics, and see if her idea is of any
insight for our understanding of politics.
Arendt should be credited for her attempt to guarantee an autonomous place for
the political. While most of us used to think of politics as a necessary tool for many
admirable purposes, such as peace of mankind, justice in distribution, economic
prosperity, etc, Arendt remind us of the independent character of political life. She is
not unaware of the fact that politics could serve something else and function as a
means to other end, but she strongly believes that it also has its own dignity and
rationality. The way she defines the meaning of politics demonstrates how serious she
wants to change peoples negative impression of the political. To a certain degree,
Arendts attempt to rescue the dignity of politics should be celebrated as a success.
Secondly, the insight Arendt derives from her interpretation of the classical
political experience is also impressive. While most contemporary political theorists
follow the power approach of politics introduced by Hobbes and reconfirmed by
Weber, Arendt displays her uniqueness in reasoning with the ancient Greek and
Roman. The unusual approach of appealing to the classical legacy sometimes results
in very interesting findings. For instance, we will not realize that political action could
have the connotation ofleading and carrying out if not for her analysis ofarcheinand prattein. Likewise, we will not comprehend the affinity of politics and courage if
not for her narration of the Homeric epic and its impact. Arendts adventure into the
ancient world uncovers many novel and invaluable treasures about political affairs.
We should also recognize this contribution.
Thirdly, as to the essence of politics, Arendts theory regarding human plurality
and the multiple perspective of the world is a brilliant and convincing argument.
There are many ways of talking about pluralism in politics. Berlins promotion of
value pluralism, for example, is as influential as stimulating. Arendts interpretation of
human plurality is different but no less remarkable. Arendt does not subsume to any
kind of monistic thinking or doctrine of uniformity. She is always championing for the
diversity of human standpoints, and asks political philosophers to take this diversity
serious. I think Arendt is right in protecting the richness of the world by appealing to
the argument of plurality.
Nevertheless, there are also some weaknesses in Arendts idea of politics. First of
all, we wonder if Arendts etymological analysis of the word action does not reflect
her own theoretical bias. Arendt traces the term action to its Greekarchein, which
means to begin, to lead, and to rule. But we are surprised to find that Arendt
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elaborates the meaning of action almost exclusively on the basis of one connotation
only to begin. The meaning ofleading and ruling disappears totally from her
interpretation of action. If we are to adopt the etymological approach as Arendt
recommends, there is no reason why the meaning, and the experience as well, of
rulership should be surgically removed from the essence of political action. It seems
fair to ask that both beginning something new and ruling be equally emphasized
in a sound and complete understanding of political action. Yet, if action means both
beginning and ruling, the meaning of politics would change quite a lot, too.
Secondly, Arendt is eager to separate politics from war and violence, lest it will
be intertwined with the means/end category. She is also extremely critical of the
association of politics with necessity of life, simply because she insists the essence of
politics should be freedom, while freedom is contradictory to necessity. Unfortunately,
if politics is totally separated from war, violence, and necessity of life, what we have
would be a completely purified concept of politicsadmirable as it may be, but
useless in practical analysis. In other words, the Arendtian idea of politics would have
nothing to say about violent confrontation, foreign policy, social welfare, national
security, or the question of family violence. Does it help our understanding of the
political world merely by declaring that violence and necessity are non-political and
walk away? I think not.
Finally, we find that Arendt is so fond of making distinctions that sometimes her
conceptual differentiation is simply too complicated to be meaningful. She contendsthat the end of an action is different from its goal, and the goal is different from the
principle. But then she confesses that what was a principle of action in one period
can in another become a goal by which the action orients itself, or even an end that it
pursues. So for example, freedom could be a principle in the Athenian polis, but
becomes a goal in a monarchy of the medieval age, and then becomes an end in a
revolutionary epoch (PP: 195). I think the shift between end, goal, meaning and
principle is too vibrant and arbitrary to be of real significance for our understanding of
political affairs.
My conclusion is that Arendts idea of politics is inspiring in three dimensions:
politics can be an autonomous activity; politics can mean something other than power
struggle and domination; politics is important for the preservation of world and its
multiple perspectives. On the other hand, Arendts idea of politics is weak on three
aspects: it is selectively interpreted in terms of its etymological origin; it is useless for
the analysis of some important human phenomena; it contains some unnecessary
internal differentiations and therefore confusions people. There is no perfect definition
of an idea, and Arendts interpretation of the political is no exception.
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Bibliography
Arendt, Hannah
1958 The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Referred
as HC)
1968 Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. (Referred as
MDT)
1977 Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. 2nd ed.
New York: Penguin Books. (Referred as BPF)
2005 The Promise of Politics. Edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken
Books. (Referred as PP)
Rawls, John
1993 Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Schmitt, Carl
1996 The Concept of the Political. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Strauss, Leo
1959 What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Villa, Dana (ed.)
2000 The Companion to Hannah Arendt. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
Weber, Max
1978 Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich.
Berkeley: University of California Press.