ARDEX (ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise) 2018 Scenario Development

Natech Disaster Risk Management

Presented in Natech Risk Management Workshop 2018 5-7 September 2018, Berlin, Germany

Fatma Lestari, Agustino Zulys, Sjahrul M Nasri, Agus Wibowo, Achmad Yurianto, Dicky Pelupessy, Riyadh Firdaus, Teguh Cahyono, Satrio Pratomo, Yasuhito Jibiki, Imamura, Jatar Sagala, Risang Vibatsu Adi, Sony

Maulana, Gama Widyaputra, Ambi Pradiptha, Syahri Choirrini, Cynthia Febrina Maharani, Fiori Amelia Putri, Adelina Kamal, Arnel Capili, Janggam Adhityawarma, Mizan Bisri, Agustina Trunay, Dipo Summa

Disaster Research & Response Centre Universitas Indonesia Department of Occupational Health & Safety, Faculty of Public Health, Universitas Indonesia

Outline • Background • ARDEX Scenario Development • ARDEX Scenario Theme, Methods & Location • Industrial Chemical Vulnerability Assessment • Industrial Toxic Chemical, Fire & Explosion

Modeling

Disclaimer: This material is prepared under communication with the AHA Centre and National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB) of Government of Indonesia as the co-organizer of the 2018 ASEAN Regional Disaster and Emergency response Exercise throughout its preparation process. The presentation is not made on behalf of the AHA Centre or BNPB.

Background – Indonesia

• Indonesia lies between 3 tectonic plates

• Surrounded by ring of fire > 160 active volcanoes

• Number of islands > 17,000 islands

• Population > 250 millions people

• Diversity in religions, cultures, ethnics & traditions prone to disaster

Background – Natech Disasters • Natural disasters may initiate technological disasters release of flammable materials,

hazardous materials, toxic chemicals, nuclear radiation and oil spills. • Damaging consequences of natech disaster for public health and safety may be

catastrophes. • Huge number of fatalities, significant environmental pollution, massive damages to asset

and properties, significant nuclear radiation contamination, major business disruptions and impact on country’s reputation.

• The result of the 29th The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) meeting in October 2016 in Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia: Indonesia to Host the ARDEX-18

• ARDEX Exercise Location: Cilegon - Risks to volcano eruption (Krakatau in 1883), earthquake, tsunami & industrial disaster – NATECH Disasters

Example of Natech Disasters in Indonesia – Tsunami Aceh 2004 3.2 Damage to Oil Delivery Terminal at Krueng Raya

The terminal is owned by PERTAMINA (Indonesian public oil corporation), and is managed by its

branch office in Band Aceh. Spilled-oil-containment-dike was made from soil embankment,

enclosing the tank yard as shown in Figure 2. It was 317 m long and had 2.5 m trapezoid base width,

0.8 m trapezoid surface length, and 1.2 m height. There was no tide embankment too.

Table 2 Dimensions of oil storage tanks in the oil delivery terminal

Specification Liquid level at the time of the tsunamiNo. of

tank Applica- tion

Diameter m

Height m

Oil storagekl

Height of Oil

Installa-tion

year

Criteria

applied Damage notes

1 Gasoline 17.07 11.11 250 1.1 1986 API Moved several hundreds of meters

2 Distillate 17.07 11.11 600 2.6 1986 API

3 Distillate 17.07 11.11 0 0 1986 API Moved several hundreds of meters

4 Kerosene 17.07 11.11 1,500 6.6 1986 API

5 Jet fuel 10.98 6.23 200 2.5 1986 API Moved 0.70 meters

6 Jet fuel 10.98 6.23 413 5.3 1986 API

7 Gasoline 18.10 10.98 250 1.1 1990 API Moved 314 meters

8 Kerosene 18.10 10.98 1,600 7.0 1990 API

9 Distillate 18.10 10.98 549 2.4 1990 API

Photo 6 Three tanks drifted about 300 m and one moved 0.7 m

Courtesy of Aceh Province Office

• Oil & Gas Company in Krueng Raya, Banda Aceh

• 3 oil tanks moved to 314 m • Contains: Oil, gasoline, jet fuel,

destillates • Height of Tsunami: 20 m

yard side in the wall section. Distribution bars were Φ9 mm. There was no tide embankment.

Figure 1 Central part of cement factory and movement locus of tanks

No.5 - 10 tanks for heavy oil Tsunami

Closed

Circuit

Silo

Technical

& C.C.R

Coal siloGuard

No.3

No.1 No.2

Pozzolan warehouse

Siltstone

silo

Limestone

silo

Power

plant

Clinker

silo

No.4

Broken

Washed out

Dike

hut

No.3 tank

No.2 tank

Marks of the heavy oil leak

Courtesy of Prof. Ö. Aydan

Photo 1 Factory after suffering calamity as seen from ridge

Pozzolan warehouse

Cement ship

Tank yard (behind the buildings)

the direction of coal silo. Part of factory yard was polluted with leaked heavy fuel oil. Fire did not

occur, maybe, because of the earlier power failure than the tsunami coming.”

The engineer who witnessed these events was on the second floor of a building, named Technical &

C.C.R, in the factory when the earthquake occurred. About 5 minutes after the 1st earthquake, he

went outside to observe situation. He then returned and went outside again after the 2nd earthquake.

After a while, since one guard came running to escape from guard hut located on the sea side, he also

escaped in the direction of higher ground with 15 other persons. There were about 100 persons in the

factory when the tsunami inundated. About 50 of them escaped to higher ground etc. and survived.

Almost none of them had any knowledge about tsunami.

3.1.4 Restoration

It was necessary for cement-transport ships to enter the harbor and to pack cement at the pier

for inland shipment. 1,600 ton of cement a day needed to be sent down to various parts of Aceh

province. According to the HP of LAFARGE7) dated June 23, 2008, resumption of factory

operation was planned in 2009 and would have a production capacity of 1.6 million tons per

year, up from 1.3 million before the tsunami.

Photo 2 No.3 tank. 50% full of distillate Photo 3 No.1 tank remained inside the dike(Courtesy of Penta-Ocean Construction Co., Ltd)

Photo 4 This part of the dike was brokenthrough

Photo 5 The part where No.3 tank broke through the dike viewed from outside.

the direction of coal silo. Part of factory yard was polluted with leaked heavy fuel oil. Fire did not

occur, maybe, because of the earlier power failure than the tsunami coming.”

The engineer who witnessed these events was on the second floor of a building, named Technical &

C.C.R, in the factory when the earthquake occurred. About 5 minutes after the 1st earthquake, he

went outside to observe situation. He then returned and went outside again after the 2nd earthquake.

After a while, since one guard came running to escape from guard hut located on the sea side, he also

escaped in the direction of higher ground with 15 other persons. There were about 100 persons in the

factory when the tsunami inundated. About 50 of them escaped to higher ground etc. and survived.

Almost none of them had any knowledge about tsunami.

3.1.4 Restoration

It was necessary for cement-transport ships to enter the harbor and to pack cement at the pier

for inland shipment. 1,600 ton of cement a day needed to be sent down to various parts of Aceh

province. According to the HP of LAFARGE7) dated June 23, 2008, resumption of factory

operation was planned in 2009 and would have a production capacity of 1.6 million tons per

year, up from 1.3 million before the tsunami.

Photo 2 No.3 tank. 50% full of distillate Photo 3 No.1 tank remained inside the dike(Courtesy of Penta-Ocean Construction Co., Ltd)

Photo 4 This part of the dike was brokenthrough

Photo 5 The part where No.3 tank broke through the dike viewed from outside.

Tsunami Damage to Oil Storage Tank. Yozo Goto. Y. Goto, “Tsunami Damage to Oil Storage Tanks,” 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 2008, Beijing, China, ftp://jetty.ecn.purdue.edu/spujol/Andres/files/15-0005.PDF [accessed May.9, 2018]

• Understand the mechanism of ASEAN cooperation in disaster management

• Improve regional and international cooperation in disaster risk reduction management

• Invest on disaster risk reduction to increase disaster resilience

• Invest on preparedness activities to strengthen emergency response process and better result on recovery, rehabilitation & reconstruction

Global

• Implementation of the mandate in AADMER

• Realizing the 2025 ASEAN Vision on Disaster Management

• Understand and Implement the ASEAN Declaration "One ASEAN One Response"

• Implement output of 29th ACDM to ARDEX 2018

• Understand EAS Statement on Rapid Disaster Response

• Train Technical and Tactical Capacity of operational of disaster prevention interoperability in ASEAN region

Regional

• Implementation of Republic of Indonesia Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015 – 2019 regarding the goal to increase of resilience, and strengthening the disaster management countermeasure at national and sub-nationals.

• Increase the capacity of Cilegon city, location of ARDEX-18, is one of the 136 cities/districts with high economic growth & high disaster risk index

• The needs to increase preparedness for area with possibility for industrial disaster

• Train technical and operational tactical skills as well as integrated disaster management especially industrial disaster between local government & central government

National

Exercise Urgency

Exercise Targets

The endeavor to integrate the coordination mechanism of the Indonesian Disaster Management Emergency Command System (SKPDB) with regional coordination protocol / mechanism (JOCCA) and other international organizations for the fast of joint responses.

TARGET 1

.TARGET

2

TARGET 3

Additional input for ASEAN regional contigency plan to support affected ASEAN Member State

TARGET 4

Tested the tchnical and tactical ability of personnel in emergency disaster management

TARGET 5

Increased understanding of the role and function of National Focal Point and AHA Center in disaster emergency management.

Test the procedure of resource mobilization and emergency handling both civil and military

ARDEX 2018 Exercise Theme “Strengthening ASEAN’s collective response capacity through national leadership, regional enhancement & international support”

REASONS FOR SELECTING CILEGON AS THE LOCATION FOR ARDEX 2018

EXERCISE

• High risk to the threat of 8.5 M earthquake, which can trigger tsunami due to its location is facing and adjacent to indo-Australian and Eurasian plate subduction zone. Relative to Sunda Strait, it is located in southern direction.

• It is one of 136 city / District Economic Growth Areas with High Disaster Risk Index

• Located on the western peak of Java Island which connects Java and Sumatra Island, with administrative area of 175.5 Km2

• Known as “City of Steel” in terms of hundred of industries on both small enterprises until big company/enterprises, it cause Cilegon prone to disaster as city with intensive economic growth and activity

• Based on disaster risk assessment result, the potential loss total in Cilegon City caused by tsunami disaster was 319.159 billion Rupiah

9

PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN

18

Sumber : Citra Satelit Google Earth, Tahun 2012

ARDEX 2018 in Cilegon

Source: Mapping of Chemical Disaster Prone Areas. Health Crisis Center. 2016

EARTHQUAKE RISK PROFILE UPDATE: Megathurst Sunda Strait

Legend

Megathrust Sunda Strait

M 8.7; a= 5.99; b= 1.15

Megathrust West-Central

Java

M 8.7; a= 5.55; b= 1.08

Subduction

Fault linesSubduction Zone segmentation

The 2017 Seismic Hazard Map of Indonesia (MPW & PusGen, 2017)

EARTHQUAKE RISK PROFILE UPDATE: Megathurst Sunda StraitSeismotectonicmap of Sumatra and Java Island – Seismic sources influencing Jakarta city(Irsyam et al., 2015)

12

Sumber Gempa

ARDEX-18 | Tsunami ScenarioTsunami Simulation using TOAST Model, Earthquake source M 8.7 from Sunda Megathurst(Courtesy of BMKG)

ARDEX-18 | Tsunami ScenarioTsunami Simulation using TOAST Model, Earthquake source M 8.7 from Sunda Megathurst –Maximum Tsunami Height (Courtesy of BMKG)

IMPACT SCENARIO

• Based on the results of the quick assessment carried out by the Centre and the disasterescalation, the Government of Cilegon activates disaster emergency response status for 14 days.

• Other detailed impact scenario is available with BNPB

Casualties

Died 1.268 people

Missing 1.345 people

Injured 14.039 people

IDPs 61.015 people

Trapped in ruins 1.274 people

The Damaged building

Heavily Damaged 10.000 house

Moderate Damaged 3.000 house

Light Damaged 5.000 house

Courtesy: BNPB

https://www.bapeten.go.id/peta/

Radiological Facilities in ARDEX-18 LocationNOTE: Impact to Radiological Facilities only exercised during TTX

19

www.companyname.com © 2015 Planner PowerPoint Template. All Rights

Reserved.

1st Goal – The integration of the national coordination mechanism (MAC Center) with regional coordination protocols / mechanisms (JOCCA) & regional countries and international organizations for joint response speed will be tested.

3rd Goal – Test of

resources

mobilization

procedures on both

civil or military

2nd Goal – The realization of understanding enhancement of National Focal Points role and function for response speed

4th Goal – Realization

(draft) for ASEAN

Regional Contingency

Plan in order to support

the country that impact

of disaster

negara terdampak

Exercise Objectives

Exercise Method

SEMINAR/

LECTURE

R

Workshop

TTX (Table Top

Exercise)

Role Play

DRILL (CPX) Command

Post

Exercise

(FTX) Field Top

Exercise)

CA

PAB

ILIT

Y

GRADUAL FLOW – GRADED - CONTINUES

EXERCISE FOCUS ON

SKILL & TECHNICAL

CAPABILITY

EXERCISES FOCUS ON

SOFTWARE, SYSTEM,

POLICY & PLANNING

DISCUSSION BASED OPERATION BASED

TRAINING

PHASE

SIMULATION

PHASE

SYSTEM TEST

Location TTX & CPX: Hotel The Royale Krakatau,

Cilegon, Banten Province

ARDEX Exercise Locations

FTX Location: Area ± 10.000 M2 with Industries as a background

Source: Mapping of Chemical Disaster Prone Areas. Health Crisis Center. 2016

Chemical Disaster Vulnerability Assessment – Cilegon Cilegon City area that vulnerable/ prone to chemical disaster – effect – 47.920 people

Hazardous and Toxic Material Transportation Route

PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN

27 PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN

33

PEMETAAN KAWASAN RAWAN BENCANA KIMIADI PROVINSI BANTEN

9

Zona 1

Zona 2

Zona 3

Zona 4

Jalur B3

Bahan kimia

dari industri

Bahan Beracun

Berbahaya (B3)

dari Jalur

Transportasi B3

Chemical Pipelines

Modeling Industrial Disaster

• Flammable Gas: – Storage tank LPG – Ethylene

• Toxic Chemicals: – Chlorine

• Flammable liquid: – Ethanol – Crude Oil – Gasoline

Modeling Industrial Disaster

Consequences

• Dispersion

• Toxicity

• Fire

• Explosion

Software

• WISER (Wireless Information System for Emergency Responder)

• ALOHA

• Breeze

• FLACS Gexcon

66

b. Fire Radiation

Frequency Analysis – Failure Frequency Database

Type of Failure

• Catastrophic

• Partial

• Part of equipment

Frequency Analysis

• Storage Incident Frequency Report – OGP 2010

• TNO Purple, Yellow, Green & Red Book

23

- Subsidence;

- Kebakaran dari luar, dan lain sebagainya

Konsekuensi yang dapat terjadi akibat dari kebocoran LPG antara lain:

Jet Fire

Flash Fire

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Fireball

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)

Kemungkinan atau frekuensi kejadian tersebut dibahas dalam bagian 3.2

Berdasarkan pertimbangan di atas, perwakilan LPG release events dipertimbangkan dalam

penilaian adalah sebagaimana dirangkum dalam Tabel 12.

Tabel 12. Release Event Considered

Equipment Descriptions Event Descriptions Release Type Hole Size Potential Hazardous Event

Outcomes

LPG Ship Tanker Catastrophic failure Partial failure

Instantaneous Continuous

Rupture 2” leak

Firefire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE

Filling line to LPG Storage Tank (Marine Loading Arm)

Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Pipe full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

Marine Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Hose full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

LPG Storage Tank Catastrophic failure Partial failure

Instantaneous Continuous

Rupture 2” leak

Fireball, VCE, flash fire Jetfire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE

Filling line to LPG Road Tanker (Truck Loading Arm)

Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Pipe full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

Truck Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Hose full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

Di dalam kajian ini, release event yang dipertimbangkan yaitu berdasarkan dari tangki

penyimpanan LPG (LPG Storage Tanks).

3.2 Analisis Frekuensi

3.2.1 Base Event Frequency

Base event frequency yang diterapkan di dalam kajian ini dapat dilihat pada Tabel 13.

Tabel 13. Base Event Frequency

Event Descriptions Failure Rate

(per year) References

Catastrophic failure of LPG storage tanks 2.3 × 10-5

(1)

Partial failure of LPG storage tanks 1.0 × 10-5

(1)

Note: 1. Frekuensi kegagalan (failure rate) diambil dari OGP – Storage Incident Frequency Report No.434 -3,

March 2010.

23

- Subsidence;

- Kebakaran dari luar, dan lain sebagainya

Konsekuensi yang dapat terjadi akibat dari kebocoran LPG antara lain:

Jet Fire

Flash Fire

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Fireball

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)

Kemungkinan atau frekuensi kejadian tersebut dibahas dalam bagian 3.2

Berdasarkan pertimbangan di atas, perwakilan LPG release events dipertimbangkan dalam

penilaian adalah sebagaimana dirangkum dalam Tabel 12.

Tabel 12. Release Event Considered

Equipment Descriptions Event Descriptions Release Type Hole Size Potential Hazardous Event

Outcomes

LPG Ship Tanker Catastrophic failure Partial failure

Instantaneous Continuous

Rupture 2” leak

Firefire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE

Filling line to LPG Storage Tank (Marine Loading Arm)

Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Pipe full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

Marine Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Hose full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

LPG Storage Tank Catastrophic failure Partial failure

Instantaneous Continuous

Rupture 2” leak

Fireball, VCE, flash fire Jetfire, VCE, flash fire, BLEVE

Filling line to LPG Road Tanker (Truck Loading Arm)

Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Pipe full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

Truck Loading Arm Guillotine failure Partial Failure

Continuous Continuous

Hose full bore 1” leak

Jet fire, VCE, flash fire Jet fire, VCE, flash fire

Di dalam kajian ini, release event yang dipertimbangkan yaitu berdasarkan dari tangki

penyimpanan LPG (LPG Storage Tanks).

3.2 Analisis Frekuensi

3.2.1 Base Event Frequency

Base event frequency yang diterapkan di dalam kajian ini dapat dilihat pada Tabel 13.

Tabel 13. Base Event Frequency

Event Descriptions Failure Rate

(per year) References

Catastrophic failure of LPG storage tanks 2.3 × 10-5

(1)

Partial failure of LPG storage tanks 1.0 × 10-5

(1)

Note: 1. Frekuensi kegagalan (failure rate) diambil dari OGP – Storage Incident Frequency Report No.434 -3,

March 2010.

Modeling Fire & Explosion LPG Storage Tank

66

b. Fire Radiation

65

ii. Free Air Explosion Over Pressure

Gambar 14. Free Air Explosion Overpressure

64

4.3.1 Hasil simulasi pada pada Tangki Spherical

a. Explosion

i. Surface explosion Overpressure

Gambar 13. Surface Explosion Overpressure

62

4.2.3 Societal Risk Result

Gambar 12. Hasil Societal Risk (F-N Curve) dari Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong

Dari gambar di atas, terlihat bahwa risiko sosial (societal risk) terkait dengan Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong adalah masih di dalam wilayah

ALARP (ALARP region) dari kriteria risiko sosial. Alasan utama untuk ini adalah bahwa fasilitas Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong terletak jarak

yang aman dari populasi eksternal sehingga dampak dari peristiwa berbahaya sebagian besar terkandung dalam batas plant.

61

Gambar 11. Hasil Individual Risk dari Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong

Secara keseluruhan IR personil tertinggi di Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong saat bekerja di operasi normal ditemukan 2.87 x 10-4 per tahun yaitu

aktivitas dari LPG Truck Driver. Beberapa aktivitas dari Fireman, Jr. Supervisor Distribution Bulk LPG, Jr. Supervisor Receiving & Storage/ Control

Room dan Security juga termasuk dalam "As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region". Berdasarkan Individual Risk Acceptance Criteria,

hasil menunjukkan bahwa risiko terhadap personil dalam " As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) region".

16

2 PROSES DAN FASILITAS DEPOT LPG TANJUNG SEKONG

2.1 Proses di Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong

Depot LPG Pressurized Tanjung Sekong adalah depot LPG yang berlokasi di Serang, Propinsi

Banten, Indonesia. Depot LPG dibangun untuk menyangga kebutuhan LPG di Pulau Jawa.

Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong adalah suatu lapangan penyimpanan LPG berkapasitas 4 x 2500

Metrik Ton. LPG didatangkan menggunakan kapal tanker dan sarana penerimaan, serta

subsea pipeline sepanjang ±800 meter dialirkan menuju Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong,

kemudian disimpan kembali menuju kapal tanker dengan bantuan backloading pump. LPG

bisa juga dialirkan menuju Truck Filling Stasiun dengan bantuan Filling Pump.

Gambar 5. Maket Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong

Depot LPG Tanjung Sekong memiliki fasilitas yang terdiri sarana pengiriman dan

penerimaan dari dan ke tanker, 12” pipeline subsea, sarana pengukuran (metering), sarana

backloading, sarana penimbunan LPG di storage tank berbentuk sphere dengan total

volum sebesar 2500 MT, sarana penyaluran dari storage tank ke fasilitas pengisian truk,

terminal automation system dan sarana utility.

Sumber: Quantitative Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment. LPG Storage. Tg Sekong

LPG Explosion Modeling using FLACS 3D

Ethylene Gas Dispersion

Gas dispersion simulation results for October 2011 (duration of 1 hour)

Gas dispersion simulation results for December 2011 (duration of 1 hour)

Source: Recommendations for Reducing Technology Failure Risks in the Industrial Area of Cilegon City. 2012. BPPT

325 m; 7500 ppm

983 m; 1500 ppm

275 m; 7500 ppm

756 m; 1500 ppm

1,3 km; 600 ppm 1,9 km; 600 ppm

Ethylene Fire Model

Source: Recommendations for Reducing Technology Failure Risks in the Industrial Area of Cilegon City. 2012. BPPT

Gas simulation results that could potentially cause a fire for July 2011.

Gas simulation results that could potentially cause a fire for December 2011.

321 m; 16.200 ppm (60% LEL)

961 m; 2.700 ppm (10% LEL)

158 m; 16.200 ppm

571 m; 2700 ppm

Consideration for EMT

Hot Zone

Warm zone

Hot Zone Cold Zone

Free from contamination and that may be safely used as a planning

and staging area

Transition area : where responders enter and exit the exclusion zone

and where decontamination activities take place

Hot Zone/Red Zone

Warm Zone/

Cold Zone/Safety Zone

• Protective Suite • Only quick and life-saving

treatment • Goal : getting to safer area,

prevent further injury

• Not completely safe from danger

• Depending on the equipment available, expertise of personnel

• Outside immediate danger • Transportation available • Continue care and patient

reassesment • Hands off to the transporting

team

Hot zone

Cold Zone

Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Health Centre

Basic medical: SAR Team, military, EMT

Medical Transportation: SAR Team, military, EMT

Basic Life Support Advance Life Support : EMT

Medical Transportation:

EMT

EMT ROLES

Conclusion • Cilegon city is facing natech risks: volcano erruption, earthquake

and tsunami and major chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas industries, hence increasing the natech risks to community.

• ARDEX (ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise) 2018 will be conducted to simulate natech disasters in Cilegon, Indonesia.

• The scenario development for ARDEX natech disaster simulation is a challenging process, which involves many stakeholders in Indonesia & ASEAN country regions.

• The ARDEX exercise serves as a scientific and real-world platform to further understand on natech disaster risk management for ASEAN countries.

References

• A. M. Cruz, “Natech Disasters: A Review of Practices, Lessons Learned and Future”, 2016. • A. M. Cruz and L. J. Steinberg, “Preventing Natech Catastrophes: Country Practices and Case Studies

of Chemical Accident Prevention during Natural Disaster”, 2006, https://www.mona.uwi.edu/cardin/virtual_library/docs/1308/1308.pdf [accessed May.9, 2018]

• K. R. Da Silva Nascimento and M. H. Alencar, “Management of risks in natural disasters: A systematic review of the literature on NATECH events,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol.44, pp 347-359, November 2016.

• S. Zama, H. Nishi, K. Hatayama, M. Yamada, H. Yoshihara and Y. Ogawa, “On Damage of Oil Storage Tanks due to the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake (Mw9.0)”, http://www.iitk.ac.in/nicee/wcee/article/WCEE2012_0238.pdf [accessed May.9, 2018]

• Y. Goto, “Tsunami Damage to Oil Storage Tanks,” 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 2008, Beijing, China, ftp://jetty.ecn.purdue.edu/spujol/Andres/files/15-0005.PDF [accessed May.9, 2018]

• S. Adiningsih, M. Lestari, A. I. Rahutami, and A. S. Wijaya, “Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives: A Case Study of the Chemical Industry in Indonesia,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2009.

• D. Hudalah, D. Viantari, T. Firman,and J. Woltjer, ”Industrial Land Development and Manufacturing Deconcentration in Greater Jakarta,” Urban Geography, Vol.34. No.7, pp. 950-971, June 2013.

• M. F. Cahyandito,”The Effectiveness of Community Development and Environmental Protection Program in Oil and Gas Industry in Indonesia: Policy, Institutional, and Implementation Review,” Journal of Management and Sustainability, Vol.7, No.1, pp.115-126, February 2017.

• Sumber gambar: Google image

• S, Moon, “Justice, Geography, and Steel: Technology and National Identity in Indonesian Industrialization,” Osiris, Vol.24, No.1, pp.253-277, 2009.

• BNPB, ”Risiko Bencana Indonesia,” 2016, https://inarisk.bnpb.go.id/pdf/Buku%20RBI_Final_low.pdf [accessed May.9, 2018]

• Health Crisis Centre Ministry of Health, “Industrial Chemical Zones – Risk Mapping,” 2016. • BNPB, “Risk Assessment Cilegon City 2016-2020”. • BPPT, “Rekomendasi untuk Pengurangan Risiko Bencana Kegagalan Teknologi di Kawasan Industri Kota

Cilegon (Recommendation for Technological Failure in Cilgeon City for Disaster Risk Reduction),” 2012. • Cilegon City, “Rencana kontijensi tingkat Kota Cilegon, Menghadapi kemungkinan ancaman bencana

gempa bumi dan tsunami (Contingency Plan at Cilegon City, facing the possibility of earthquake and tsunami threat),” July 2010.

• BAPPEDA Cilegon City, Drills for earthquake, tsunami, and technological disaster, 2007. • ASEAN, “Preparation Materials for ARDEX, 2018,” 2018. • Cilegon City, “Usaha-usaha pemerintah Kota Cilegon dalam mengantisipasi bencana kegagalan teknologi

industry (Cilegon City Government efforts in anticipating the catastrophic failure of industrial technology),” December 2014.

• F. Lestari, “Quantitative Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis for LPG storage tank,” 2015, unpublished. • Y. Jibiki, D. Pelupessy, I. H. Susilowati, F. A. Putri, F. Lestari, F. Imamura, “Exploring community

preparedness for complex disaster: a case study in Cilegon (Province Banten in Indonesia),” International Conference on Occupational Health and Safety, November 2017.

• J. Simon and B. Sergio (Editor), "Participatory Technology Assessment: European Perspectives," Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 2002.

• A. Muhari, F. Imamura, D. Hilman, S. Diposaptono, H. Latief, J. Post and F. A. Islmail, "Tsunami mitigation efforts with pTA in west Sumatra province, Indonesia", Journal of Earthquake and Tsunami, Vol.4, No.4, pp.341-368, December 2010.

• F. Imamura, “Dissemination of information and evacuation procedures in the 2004-2007 tsunamis, including the 2004 Indian Ocean,” Journal of Earthquake and Tsunami, Vol.3, No.2, pp.59–65, June 2009.

References

Thank you Fatma Lestari Email: fatma@ui.ac.id; fatmalestari@icloud.com • Disaster Research & Response Centre, Universitas Indonesia • Department of Occupational Health & Safety, Faculty of Public

Health, Universitas Indonesia