Appendix I

Approximate Signifaction of Single-Letter Symbols

A something else (alius)

C conceive, understand (concipere, intelligere)

D cause (causa)

E existence, being (existentia and esse)

F affect (affectus)

G act (agere)

H person, human being, man, we (homo, nos)

L free (liber)

N not . . . (non)

O striving (conatus)

P possibility, ability ( posse), power ( potentia)

R require something in order to something

S itself (se)

131

Appendix II

Approximate Meaning of Multiple-Letter Symbols

The following list does not contain all combinations of symbols used in thetext, but all that might not be understood from inspection of Appendix I.

Acq(x) x is in a state of self-satisfaction (acquiescentia in se ipso)

Ad adequate (adequatus)

Ali(x) x is in a state of alienation

Bon(xyz) x is good for y in relation to z (bonum)

C(xy) y is conceived through x, adequately or inadequately, to-tally or partially

CA(x) x is conceived through something else

CS(x) x is conceived through itself

D(xy) x causes y, partially or totally

de decrease

Dol(x) x is in a state of pain

E(xy) y is in x

EA(x) x is in something else

EANO(x) x strives against an increase in its level of being in some-thing else

ENPC(x) existence of x belongs to that without which x cannot beconceived

NPC(xy) x belongs to that without which y cannot be conceived

133

ES(x) x is in itself

ESO(x) x strives to increase its level of being in itself

F(x) x is in the state of emotion (affectus)

G(xy) x is active in relation to y, adequately or inadequately,partly or totally

H(x) x is a person (homo)

Hil(x) x is in a state of cheerfulness (hilaritas)

Id(xy) x is identical to y

in increase

In inadequate (inadequatus)

Inu(xyz) x is not useful to y in relation to z

L(x) x is free (liber), partially or totally, adequately orinadequately

Lae(x) x is in a state of joy (laetitia)

Mal(xyz) x is bad for y in relation to z (malum)

Mel(x) x is in a state of melancholy (melancholia)

Mix(x) x is in a state of mixed emotions

. . . NO(x) x strives against an increase in its level of . . .

. . . O(x) x strives to increase its level of . . .

P(xy) x has adequate or inadequate, in part or total, power inrelation to y

PCNE(x) it is possible to conceive x as nonexistent

Per(xy) x is perfect in relation to y

Pes(xy) x preserves itself in relation to y

Rat(xy) x acts rationally in relation to y

RC(x) x requires another concept in order to be conceived

APPENDIX II

134

RC(xy) concept x is required by y in order to exist

RE(x) x requires something else in order to exist

RE(xy) x is required by y in order to exist, y requires x in order to be

Refl(xy) x reflects upon or contemplates y (contemplari)

Sre(xy) x realizes itself in relation to y

Tit(x) x is in a state of pleasurable excitement (titillatio)

Tri (x) x is in a state of sorrow (tristitia)

Uti(xy) x is useful to y

Vir(xy) x acts virtuously in relation to y (virtus)

135

APPENDIX II

Appendix III

Basic Equivalences

137

SA2 ES ekv -RE

SA3 EA ekv RE

SA7 CS ekv -RE

SA8 CA ekv RE

SA11 ES ekv -RE

SA12 EA ekv RE

SA13 ES ekv CS

SA14 EA ekv CA

SA15 CS ekv -RE

SA18 RE ekv RC

SB2 -PCNE ekv ENPC

SB3 PCNE ekv -ENPC

SB3a ENPC ekv CS

SB4 PCNE ekv CA

SB5 -PCNE ekv CS

SB6 PCNE ekv EA

SB10 L ekv ENPC

SB12 L ekv -PCNE

SB14 L ekv ES

SB16 L ekv CS

SB18 L ekv -RE

SB19 L ekv -RC

SC10 AdD(xx) ~ ENPC(x)

SC11 AdC(xx) ~ ENPC(x)

SC22 AdD(xx) ~ AdL(x)

SC23 AdC(xx) ~ AdL(x)

SC24 InD(xx) ~ -ENPC(x)

SC27 InD(xx) ~ EA(x)

SC34 AdG(xy) ~ AdD(xy)

SC36 AdC(xy) ~ AdG(xy)

SC41 InG(xy) ~ InD(xy)

SC42 InG(xy) ~ InC(xy)

SD46 P<∞(x) ~ PCNE(x)

SD47 P<∞(x) ~ EA<∞(x)

SD48 P∞(x) ~ ES∞(x)

SD51 P<∞(x) ~ InD(xx)

SD59 P0(x) ~ EA∞(x)

SD62 P(xy) ~ G(xy)

SD65 Pin(x) ~ Gin(x)

SD66 Pin(x) ~ ESin(x)

SD68 Pin(x) ~ Lin(x)

SE1a F(x) ~ Pin(x) ∨ Pde(x)

SE4 AdF(x) ~ Pin(x)

SE10 AdF(x) ~ ESin(x)

SE14 AdF(x) ~ Lin(x)

SF1 Lae(x) ~ Pin(x)

SF7 Perin(x) ~ Pin(x)

SF12a Perin(x) ~ ESin(x)

SF17 PesO(x) ~ ESO(x)

SF20 Pesin(x) ~ Pin(x)

SF24 Srein(x) ekv ESin(x)

SF27 Aliin(x) ekv EAin(x)

SF28 Hil(x) ~ ( y) Pin(xy)

SF37 Tit(x) ~ InPin(x)

SF40 Tri(x) ~ Pde(x)

SF48 Mel(x) ~ ( y) Pde(xy)

SF53 Dol(x) ~ InPde(x)

SG1 Uti(xy) ~ D(x(Perin(yz)))

SG2 Bon(xyz) D=ef Uti(xyz)

SH1 Vir(x) ekv P(x)

SH2 Vir(xy) ~ CS(xy)

SH17 Vir(x) ekv Rat(x)

SH24 Ratin(x) ~ Lin(x)

APPENDIX III

138

Notes

Introduction

1. [Editor’s note: A mimeographed, fairly comprehensive survey containingabout 4,000 relations was prepared by the Institute of Philosophy at the Uni-versity of Oslo (Naess and Fløistad 1963–64; issue 1 was produced by Naessand Fløistad in 1963, issues 2 and 3 by Fløistad alone in 1964).]

Chapter I: The Fundamental Dual Distinction: “In Itself” and “In Something Else”

1. Occurrences of quatenus referring to God are found among other places inIP23Dem (quatenus absolute consideratur); IP28Dem (quatenus aliquo modo affec-tum consideratur —reference to God or an attribute); IP28Dem (quatenus affec-tum est modificatione); IP28Dem (quatenus modificatum est modificatione quaefinita est); IP29Sch (Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur); IP32Dem(quatenus substantia absolute infinita); IIP9 (quatenus alia rei singularis actu exis-tentis idea affectus consideratur); IIP9Dem (quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectusconsideratur); and IIP12Dem (quatenus naturam humanae Mentis constituit). Theuse of quatenus is central to Spinoza’s way of handling not only the general im-manence of God, but also the participation of particular beings in the natureand essence of God.

Chapter III: Causation, Cognition, and Action

1. A detailed textual confrontation and test of a somewhat narrower hypothesisof parallelism with reference to different classes of x’s and y’s is given in Rag-nar Naess (1969), an unpublished dissertation. Its largely positive conclusionhas strengthened my confidence in my general hypothesis of parallelismstated above.

2. A set of different criteria of inadequate cognition is discussed in Naess andWetlesen (1967: 11).

3. The complex families of terms connected with percipere, concipere, and intel-ligere, as well as the other terms of cognition, are surveyed and discussed in

139

the second part of Naess and Wetlesen (1967); see especially pp. 143, 156,and 188.

4. For systematic analysis of evidence, see R. Naess (1969). C1 and C2 togetherare designed to do justice to reconstruction Nos. 5 and 8, and C5 and C6 toNos. 4 and 7 in Naess and Wetlesen (1967).

5. Concerning subclasses of causes, see Gueroult (1968: 245 ff.). Gueroult’s workis outstanding in reliability and solidity. What I write I find in no case to beinconsistent with what he writes—but our goals are far apart. My goal is tohelp make Spinoza’s work accessible to modern readers, not help them towork with Spinoza’s own, enormously complex terminology.

6. For a discussion of Spinoza’s finite God see Naess (1981 [in SWAN IX]).

7. Four references concerning immanence include:Carl Gebhardt, “Der Zentralgedanke, aus dem heraus Spinoza die über-

kommenen Begriffe umgestaltet, ist der Gedanke der Immanenz” (1922:xvii).

Wilhelm Windelband: “God is Nature as the universal world-essence,he is the natura naturans; as sum-total of the individual things in which thisessence exists modified, he is the natura naturata. If in this connection thenatura naturans is called occasionally also the efficient cause of things, thiscreative force must not be thought as something distinct from its workings:this cause exists nowhere but in its workings” (Windelband 1926: 409). Godexists modified, that is, as modes, particular things, not as anything else.

Harry A. Wolfson: “Spinoza’s statement that God is the immanent causeof all things is thus not an assertion that God is identical with the aggregatetotality of things, it is only a denial that God is the external and separable andhence immaterial cause of all things” (1961, vol. 1: 324). Wolfson quotes theShort Treatise, which says that the immanent cause is that in which “the effectremains united with its cause in such a way that together they constitute awhole” (Sec. Dial. §3). As regards “whole,” Wolfson takes it in a strong sensesuggested by Aristotle (Met. 5, 1023b, 27–33). “A whole means . . . thatwhich so contains the things it contains that they form a unity.”

Evelyn Underhill (1930: 99 ff.) treats immanence from a point of viewnot completely foreign to Jewish philosophy. “‘He is not far from any one ofus, for in Him we live and move and have our being,’ is the pure doctrine ofImmanence: a doctrine whose teachers are drawn from amongst the soulswhich react more easily to the touch of the Divine than to the sense of alien-ation and of sin, and are naturally inclined to love rather than to awe.” Spi-noza was such a soul. We may put it this way: substance is but does not existindependently of modes. Accordingly, ES(x) reads, when we wish to be care-ful, “x is in itself,” not “x exists in itself.”

NOTES TO PAGES 35 –57

140

Chapter IV: Grading Basic Distinctions

1. The principle of grading of freedom is accepted by some Spinoza specialists,for instance Wolf (1966: 451) and Wetlesen (1969).

2. One of the reasons we avoid the term mode (modus) is that Spinoza lets affectssuch as amor be modes (IIA3). We need a notion of ‘particular thing’ thatavoids properties. Affects are primarily properties. States of joy are propertiesof living beings, not particular beings “inside” the living ones.

Chapter VI: Joy

1. A few more quotations will show the context in which Gandhi uses the termself-realization: “What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization, to see God faceto face, to attain moksha.” For God one may here substitute truth, as Gandhiholds Truth to be God. Moksha (mok.sa) is total, not partial freedom and notcompletely realizable for any human being. “Life is an aspiration. Its missionis to strive after perfection, which is self-realization. . . . The silent cry dailygoes out to Truth to help me . . .” (Young India 11.8.1927; quoted in Prabhuand Rao 1967: 46). It is the opinion of Gandhi that self-realization is thehighest aim according to the great religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Chris-tianity, and Islam (cf. the discussion in Young India 6.8.1941; quoted inPrabhu and Rao 1967: 76). The religious atmosphere of Gandhi is of coursevery different from that of Spinoza; Gandhi is no philosopher. But the sourceof their beliefs is not very different.

Chapter VII: Good and Bad and Usefulness

1. See Giancotti Boscherini (1970–71) regarding the lexical articles bonum, bonus,malum, and malus. A preliminary survey of occurrences and interpretations isfound in Naess and Wetlesen (1967: 381 ff.).

141

NOTES TO PAGES 103 –13

References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by(SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volumenumber.

Gebhardt, Carl, trans. and ed. 1922. Kurze Abhandlung von Gott, dem Menschen undseinem Gluck (Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and Human Welfare).Leipzig: Meiner.

Giancotti Boscherini, Emilia. 1970–71. Lexicon Spinozanum. 2 vols. The Hague:Nijhoff.

Gueroult, Martial. 1968. Spinoza, vol. 1. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.

Naess, Arne. 1973. “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement.”Inquiry 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X)

———. 1981. “Spinoza’s finite god.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 135: 120–26.(in SWAN IX)

Naess, Arne, and Guttorm Fløistad. 1963–64. Spinoza’s Etikk. Systematiske re-konstruksjoner, 3 issues. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo.

Naess, Arne, and Jon Wetlesen. 1967. Conation and Cognition in Spinoza’s Theory ofAffects. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo.

Naess, Ragnar H. 1969. Noen undersøkelser omkring forholdet mellom erkjennelse ogkausalitet i Spinoza’s filosofi, Ph.D. diss. Oslo: University of Oslo.

Prabhu, R. K., and U. R. Rao, eds. 1967. The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, with fore-word by Vinoba Bhave and S. Radhakrishnan. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.

Saw, Ruth L. 1969. “Personal identity in Spinoza.” Inquiry 12: 1–14.

Underhill, E. 1930. Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiri-tual Consciousness. London: Methuen.

Wetlesen, Jon. 1969. “Basic concepts in Spinoza’s social psychology.” Inquiry 12:105–32.

143

Windelband, Wilhelm. 1926. A History of Philosophy, translated by James H. Tufts.New York: Macmillan.

Wolf, A., trans. and ed. 1966. The Correspondence of Spinoza. New York: Russell andRussell.

Wolfson, Harry A. 1961. The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. 1. New York: Meridian.

REFERENCES

144

acquiescentia in se ipso (self-satisfaction), 125–30active emotion, 83–86, 87, 88–91

activeness and, 37, 88, 90adequate causation and, 41, 84, 90of animals, 129being in oneself and, 84, 89, 97freedom and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91the good and, 115power increase and, 83, 84, 86, 88, 95symbol for, 87understanding and, 84, 97See also emotions (affects)

activeness, 37–39, 46–48, 50–51active emotion and, 37, 88, 90causation and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62cheerfulness and, 105of every particular thing, 50–51freedom and, 37of God, 51of the good, 116increase or decrease in, 80, 81melancholy and, 109partial, 39, 48perfection and, 98in personal relations, 38, 40power and, 63, 64, 80, 125, 126self-satisfaction and, 125–26striving for, 101symbols for, 42understanding and, 2, 32, 37–38, 46, 47–48,

64See also passivity

active power (agendi potentia), 63, 125, 126adequate, symbol for, 41adequate causation

active emotion and, 41, 84, 90activeness and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62conception and, 31–36, 40, 43–44, 61by every particular thing, 50, 116

existence and, 36, 44freedom and, 45, 46by God, 35, 39, 41the good and, 115by human beings, 35, 38–39, 40–41, 51, 62of itself, 45, 46, 62, 78power and, 63, 78, 80, 127self-satisfaction and, 125–26, 127of something else, 46–48, 80See also causation

adequate conceptioncausation and, 31–36, 40, 41, 43–44, 61by every particular thing, 51freedom and, 45, 62grading of, 55–56, 64by human beings, 40part/whole terminology and, 110–11self-satisfaction and, 125–26through itself, 45See also conception (cognition, understand-

ing)adequate ideas, 40, 41adequate power, 80, 127–28affects. See emotions (affects)affectus, 84, 87agendi potentia (active power), 63, 125, 126agere, 37alienation, 104alius

symbol for, 14See also in something else (in alio)

amor intellectualis Dei, 84, 86animals, 129–30

See also living beingsanimism, 92–93, 96Aristotle

Spinoza’s ontology and, 27“whole” defined by, 140n7

atman, Gandhi on, 103

145

Index

ataraxia, 84attributes, 2, 4, 6

extension and thought as, 15–16, 59particular things and, 17

aut, 17, 19

bad (malum), 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 141n1being (esse)

vs. existence, 9, 10, 23–24, 59, 63, 71, 140n7

symbol for, 14See also existence; particular beings

being in itself. See in itself (in se)being in something else. See in something else (in

alio)body

joy and, 95, 104self-satisfaction and, 128

bonum. See good (bonum)

Cartesian dualism, 129causation

activeness and, 37–39, 40, 46–48, 62being in something else and, 17, 46cognition and, 31–36, 42–44, 139n1

by human beings, 2, 38, 40, 41, 61, 62

essence and, 38–39, 125existence and, 36, 44, 45–46freedom and, 45, 46by God, 35, 39, 41, 50, 63, 116, 140n7the good and, 114–17grading of, 68, 72, 100power and, 63, 78, 80, 127subclasses of causes, 35, 140n5symbols for, 42usefulness and, 113–14, 116–17See also adequate causation; inadequate (par-

tial) causationcause of itself (causa sui)

adequate/inadequate, 45, 46, 62, 78existence and, 25, 36, 44–45, 46grading of, 72joy and, 97power and, 63striving for, 101understanding and, 36

cheerfulness (hilaritas), 86, 104–06the good and, 116melancholia and, 107rationality and, 122

reflection and, 128virtue and, 121, 122

children, 41cognition. See conception (cognition, understand-

ing)cognitive-causal parallelism. See causation, cogni-

tion andconatus. See striving (conatus)conceived as nonexistent, 23, 24–29

adequate conception and, 45, 46being in something else and, 77grading of, 60, 61, 77person as, 39, 49power and, 77striving and, 91through existing things, 11

conceived through itself, 1–5adequately, 45attributes as, 15basic theorems about, 10–13, 18causation and, 36, 44cheerfulness and, 105existence and, 23–24, 26, 44–45, 46freedom and, 27, 45, 46, 54, 62the good and, 116grading of, 55–56, 58, 61, 62, 64

survey using symbols, 71–74, 77melancholy and, 109pain and, 111power and, 78striving for, 85, 91substance as, 65symbol for, 14, 15virtue and, 119, 120See also conception (cognition, understand-

ing); fundamental dual distinction; in it-self (in se)

conceived through something else, 1–5activeness and, 38, 47–48, 51basic theorems about, 10–14, 18causation and, 31, 33–35, 38, 42–44, 139n1existence and, 23, 26freedom and, 27grading of, 61, 62, 71–74, 78, 100human beings as, 39, 49, 62power and, 80striving and, 91symbols for, 15, 42through God, 16, 26See also conception (cognition, understand-

ing); fundamental dual distinction; in

INDEX

146

something else (in alio); require some-thing in order to be/be conceived

conception (cognition, understanding)activeness and, 2, 32, 37–38, 46, 47–48, 64causation and, 31–36, 42–44, 139n1

by human beings, 2, 38, 40, 41, 61, 62emotion and, 84, 86, 87, 97existence and, 23, 24–26, 44–46, 60, 77grading of, 55–56, 57, 64by nonhuman beings, 85, 93power and, 64striving for, 85of substance, 11–12, 23symbols for, 42terminology for, 34, 139n3See also adequate conception; conceived as

nonexistent; conceived through itself;conceived through something else; ideas;inadequate (partial) conception; knowl-edge

concipere, 2, 14, 34, 139n3contemplation, 126–28context

in grading predicates, 55as third variable, 42–43

decrease. See graded predicates, increase or de-crease in

deep ecology, 38See also ecology

degrees, 55, 67See also graded predicates

Democritus, 98Descartes, René, 59, 129dolor (pain), 107, 108, 109–10, 111dual distinction. See fundamental dual distinctiondualism, Cartesian, 129

ecologycausation by humans and, 38deep ecology, 38equalitarianism and, 130self-preservation and, 102worldview and, 76

ekv. See extensional equivalenceemotions (affects)

of animals, 129classes of, 85–86cognition (understanding) and, 84, 86, 87,

97defined by Spinoza, 84

freedom and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91mixed states of, 86, 106, 108modes and, 16, 140n2power and, 62, 81, 83–84, 86, 87–90, 95rationality and, 122Spinoza’s positive attitude toward, 6symbol for state of, 87virtue and, 121See also active emotion; joy (laetitia); love;

pain (dolor); passive emotion; sorrow (tris-titia)

ens rationisfreedom and, 64–65God as, 59hilaritas and, 105sensation as, 98See also reason (rationality)

epistemologyin human situation, 97lambanological-ontological parallelism, 1–5,

9, 10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18See also conception (cognition, understand-

ing); knowledgeequivalences, 3, 6

table of, 137–38See also extensional equivalence

esse. See being (esse)essence

causation and, 38–39, 125defined by Spinoza, 25–26of every being, 100existence and, 2, 25–26, 36, 65, 129of God, 40, 50, 140n7of substance, 65

Ethicscentrality of IP36, 50hidden structures of, 27reference format, xviiterminological relations in, 1–7, 139n1

Euclid, 24existence, 23–29

vs. being, 9, 10, 23–24, 59, 63, 71, 140n7

causation and, 25, 36, 44, 45–46conception and, 23, 24–26, 44–46, 60, 77essence and, 2, 25–26, 36, 65, 129freedom and, 26–29, 61–62of God, 25, 59, 128of human beings, 49of particular things, 59power and, 63

147

INDEX

existence (continued)survey of, 24–28

using symbols, 28–29See also being (esse); conceived as nonexistent;

require something in order to be/beconceived

existential quantification, 19ex parte, 32, 35

See also part/whole distinctionextension, as attribute, 15–16, 59extensional equivalence, 5–6, 7, 17

See also equivalences

Fløistad, Guttorm, 139n1formalization, 5

See also symbolizationfreedom

active emotion and, 41, 83–84, 86, 90–91activeness and, 37of all particular things, 116being in itself and, 27, 54, 64–65, 76causation and, 45, 46cheerfulness and, 105of children, 41conceiving and

adequate, 45, 62through itself, 27, 45, 46, 54, 62through something else, 27

existence and, 26–29, 61–62fundamental dual distinction and, 6Gandhi on, 141n1of God, 77the good and, 116grading of, 53–55, 61–62, 63, 64–65, 140n1

increase, 80partial increase or decrease, 81, 107survey using symbols, 67, 68, 76–77, 81,

107total, 49, 62, 76–77, 100zero level, 100

joy and, 96, 107pain and, 111perfection and, 100of a person, 49, 62, 76

Gandhi on, 141n1pleasurable excitement and, 107power and, 63, 79, 80reason and, 53, 64–65, 122–24reflection and, 128self-preservation and, 101, 102self-satisfaction and, 127

sorrow and, 108striving and, 84, 85, 92, 101virtue and, 54, 120

free (liber)Spinoza’s usage, 26, 27, 123symbol for, 28

free will, 84fundamental dual distinction, 1–4, 5, 6

existence and, 24survey of, 9–14

using symbols, 14–21See also in itself (in se); in something else (in

alio)

Gandhi, Mahatma, 103, 141n1Gebhardt, Carl, 140n7Gestalt psychology, 98Giancotti Boscherini, Emilia, 141n1God

adequate conception of, 40in Cartesian dualism, 129causation by, 35, 39, 41, 50, 63, 116, 140n7“conceived through” relation and, 16, 26,

100emotions and, 90essence of, 40, 50existence of, 25, 59, 128as expendable term, 3–4, 56as finite, 140n6freedom of, 77fundamental dual distinction and, 10Gandhi on, 103, 141n1graded predicates and, 58–59, 68, 77immanence of, 130, 140n7

activeness and, 51causation and, 50, 63, 116, 140n7dependence of God and, 41, 59personal identity and, 86power and, 63quatenus terminology and, 16, 56, 66,

139n1“in something else” relation and, 13, 15–17love for, 56, 84, 86as maximum concept, 120modes and, 16–17, 41, 51, 59, 140n7nature of, 128power of, 63, 64, 90virtue of, 120See also substance

good (bonum), 113, 114–17, 141n1virtue and, 121

INDEX

148

graded predicates, 53–81vs. absolutist dichotomies, 49, 54–55, 58,

66“cause of,” 68, 72, 100“conceived adequately,” 55–56, 57, 64“conceived as nonexistent,” 60, 61, 77“conceived through itself,” 55–56, 58, 61, 62,

64survey using symbols, 71–74, 77

“conceived through something else,” 61, 62,100survey using symbols, 71–74, 78

defined, 55dimensions of, 55–57, 64freedom as, 53–55, 61–62, 63, 64–65, 140n1

increase, 80partial increase or decrease, 81, 107survey using symbols, 67, 68, 76–77, 81,

107total, 49, 62, 76–77, 100zero level, 100

increase or decrease in, 64, 68in every relation, 88partial, 81, 110striving for, 87

infinite level, 67, 68, 100“in itself,” 56, 57–62, 63–65, 66, 67–68,

69–71freedom and, 64–65, 76, 77partial increase or decrease, 81power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80zero level, 100

“in something else,” 58, 61, 62, 69, 70–71decrease, 80power and, 77, 78, 79, 80symbols for, 66, 67

justification of, 6, 58–60knowledge as, 57perfection as, 53, 57, 95, 99, 100power as, 54, 62–64, 68, 77–78, 79–81

increase in every relation, 88increase or decrease, 68infinite level, 78, 79, 90partial increase or decrease, 81, 89zero level, 97, 100

reason as, 55“require something in order to be,” 58, 61,

74–76self-preservation as, 56–57self-satisfaction as, 127substantiality as, 59–60, 65, 97

symbols for, 65–68, 81three levels of, 54, 67–68zero level, 67, 100See also predicates

Gueroult, Martial, 140n5

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 38, 86hilaritas. See cheerfulness (hilaritas)Hobbes, Thomas, 81human being (person)

activeness of, 51adequate causation by, 35, 38–39, 40–41, 51,

62adequate conception by, 40vs. animal, 129child, 41conceivability of something through, 64conceived as nonexistent, 39, 49conceived through himself, 62, 72, 85conceived through something else, 39, 49, 62existence of, 49freedom of, 49, 62, 76

Gandhi on, 141n1God and, 40, 68in itself, partially, 41, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86personal identity of, 40, 86–87power of, 39, 79, 96, 97requirements to exist or be conceived, 49situation of, Spinoza’s synthesis, 97in society vs. alone, 53, 123in something else, 39–41, 48, 62striving by, 84–85, 91–92

to be joyous, 96to increase perfection, 101to increase virtue, 121toward being in itself, 85, 86

symbol for, 41, 42See also particular beings; particular things

Hume, David, 86humility, 125Husserl, Edmund, 12

idealism, 42ideas

adequate, 40, 41of animals, 129–30clear and distinct

part/whole terminology and, 110–11of substance, 12

confused, 40, 129emotions as, 129

149

INDEX

ideas (continued)inadequate, 110, 111See also conception (cognition, understand-

ing); ens rationisinadequate, symbol for, 41inadequate ideas, 110, 111inadequate (partial) causation, 33, 35

activeness and, 39, 48conception and, 43–44emotion and, 84existence and, 45–46of itself, 45, 46, 78power and, 78

inadequate (partial) conception, 110–11activeness and, 39, 48causation and, 43–44grading of, 55–56, 57pain and, 111of particular things, 32–33

increase. See graded predicates, increase or de-crease in

indiget, 14infinite being, 62–63infinite degree, 67, 68infinite perfection, 99infinite virtue, 120in itself (in se), 1–5

active emotion and, 84, 89, 97adequately, 45cheerfulness and, 105conceived as nonexistent and, 26, 28equivalences to, 6–7

not introduced, 128–29freedom and, 27, 54, 64–65, 76God as, 59the good and, 115, 116grading of, 56, 57–62, 63–65, 66, 67–68,

69–71freedom and, 64–65, 76, 77partial increase or decrease, 81power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80zero level, 100

human being as, 41, 58, 62, 69, 79, 85, 86joy and, 96particular things as, 57–58, 69perfection and, 99personal identity and, 86pleasurable excitement and, 106–07power and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80self-preservation and, 56–57, 101, 103self-realization and, 103

sorrow and, 108striving for, 84–85, 87, 91, 92, 101substantiality and, 97symbol for, 14, 19See also conceived through itself; fundamental

dual distinctionin something else (in alio), 1–5

alienation and, 104causation and, 17, 46conceivability as nonexistent and, 77freedom and, 27in God, 13, 15–17grading of, 58, 61, 62, 69, 70–71

decrease, 80power and, 77, 78, 79, 80symbols for, 66, 67

human beings as, 39–41, 48, 62striving against, 87, 91symbols for, 14, 15, 19, 42two meanings of, 13, 15–16, 17See also conceived through something else;

fundamental dual distinctionintelligere, 14, 34, 85, 139n3

See also conception (cognition, understanding)“is”. See being (esse)

joy (laetitia), 95–111adverse effects of, 111of animals, 129, 130centrality in Spinoza’s vision, 95, 97defined by Spinoza, 95freedom and, 96, 107the good and, 117kinds of, 83, 104–07love and, 125as mode, 140n2pain and, 109–10perfection and, 57, 95, 97–98, 99, 106power and, 95–96, 97, 106, 108, 110, 128self-preservation and, 102, 108self-satisfaction and, 125–26, 127, 128sensation of, 98sorrow and, 107, 108virtue and, 121See also cheerfulness (hilaritas); pleasurable ex-

citement (titillatio)

knowledge, three kinds ofemotions and, 16grading and, 57particular things and, 58

INDEX

150

second kind, as inadequate, 32third kind

fundamental dual distinction as, 19increase in, 85about particular beings, 87

See also conception (cognition, understand-ing); epistemology; ideas

laetitia. See joy (laetitia)lambanological-causal parallelism, 31

See also causation, cognition andlambanological-ontological parallelism, 1–5, 9,

10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 59liber. See freedom; free (liber)living beings

activeness of, 37conceiving by, 85, 93joy and, 96knowledge of, 58range of predicates and, 58, 129–30striving of, 85See also human being (person); particular

beingslogical formalization, 5

modal logic and, 10, 42See also symbolization

logical symbols, 17, 18See also symbols

lovedefined by Spinoza, 125for God, 56, 84, 86hate and, 110immanence of God and, 140n7of self, 113Spinoza’s inclination to, 140n7

malum (bad), 113, 114–15, 116, 117, 141n1man. See human being (person)Marx, Karl, 38material implication, 17melancholia, 107, 109, 122mind

in animals, 129God expressed in, 56joy and, 95self-satisfaction and, 128See also thought

modal logic, 10, 42modes

emotions and, 16, 140n2

as expendable term, 3–4, 6, 140n2God and, 16–17, 41, 51, 59, 140n7particular things and, 17, 140n2persons as, 48properties as, 140n2substance and, 41, 51, 140n7

mok˙sa, self-realization and, 141n1

motion, 15–16mutual implication

vs. extensional equivalence, 5–6symbol for, 17

Naess, Arneon deep ecology, 38on Spinoza’s terminology

bonum and malum, 141n1about cognition, 139n3survey of relations, 139n1

on Spinoza’s view of cognitionadequate, 139n4emotion and, 87inadequate, 139n2terminology, 139n3

Naess, Ragnar, 139n1, 139n4Nature

absolute virtue of, 120as expendable term, 4God as, 140n7reason and, 113

naturecognition and, 32, 33, 111of God, 128of a thing

existence and, 25, 26, 129virtuous action and, 129

necessityfreedom and, 26, 54fundamental dual distinction and, 10

negationof predicates, 58, 66symbol for, 17

nonexistence. See conceived as nonexistent;existence

ontological-lambanological parallelism, 1–5, 9,10–11, 12, 13–14, 17–18

ontologyAristotelian, 27equalitarian, 130in human situation, 97

“or,” exclusive and inclusive, 17, 19

151

INDEX

pain (dolor), 107, 108, 109–10, 111partial activeness, 39, 48partial causation. See inadequate (partial) causa-

tionpartial conception. See inadequate (partial) con-

ceptionpartial decrease or increase, 81, 110particular beings

essence of, 100God and, 86, 139n1perfection level of, 100–101striving of, 92–93, 100–101See also living beings

particular thingsactiveness of, 37, 50–51adequate causation by, 50, 116adequate conception by, 51cannot be God, 68causal relations between, 31, 139n1caused by human beings, 38–39conceived by human beings, 64essence of, 38–39existence of, 59freedom of, 116God expressed through, 50–51, 56, 66, 116,

130, 140n7human beings as, 39–41inadequate conception of, 32–33“in itself” applied to, 57–58, 69“in something else” applied to, 17modes and, 17, 140n2power of, 63striving of, 92–93See also human being (person); particular

beingspart/whole distinction, 32, 35, 110–11passion, 84, 87passive emotion, 39, 41, 84

of animals, 129power and, 89symbol for state of, 87See also emotions (affects)

passivity, 37, 39, 40inadequate cognition and, 32striving to avoid, 85symbol for, 42See also activeness

pati, 37percipere, 34, 139n3perfection (perfectio), 97–101

cheerfulness and, 106

Gandhi on, 141n1grading of, 53, 57, 95

complete, 99, 100zero level, 100

joy and, 57, 95, 97–98, 99, 106kinds of, 83Latin connotations of, 95, 98power and, 95, 98, 99, 100self-preservation and, 102sorrow and, 108, 117striving for, 85, 100–101, 141n1usefulness and, 113–14

person. See human being (person)personal identity, 40, 86–87pleasurable excitement (titillatio), 106–07

pain and, 107, 109–10, 111posse, 14, 63, 131possible to conceive as nonexistent. See conceived

as nonexistentpower (potentia)

activeness and, 63, 64, 80, 125, 126adequate, 80, 127–28the bad and, 114–15being in itself and, 63–64, 78, 79, 80causation and, 63, 78, 80, 127cheerfulness and, 104, 105conceiving and, 64emotions and, 62, 81, 83–84, 86, 87–90, 95existence and, 63freedom and, 63, 79, 80of God, 63, 64, 90grading of, 54, 62–64, 68, 77–78, 79–81

increase in every relation, 88increase or decrease, 68infinite level, 78, 79, 90partial increase or decrease, 81, 89zero level, 97, 100

of human being, 39, 79, 96, 97joy and, 95–96, 97, 106, 108, 110, 128kinds of, 83melancholy and, 109pain and, 109–10, 111perfection and, 95, 98, 99, 100self-preservation and, 85, 102self-realization and, 103self-satisfaction and, 125, 126sorrow and, 107–08, 117striving for, 85, 92, 101, 102symbols for, 68, 131usefulness and, 114virtue and, 119, 120

INDEX

152

Prabhu, R. K., 103predicates

negation of, 58, 66ranges of, 19–20, 58, 129–30

for usefulness, 116symbols for, 5, 131See also graded predicates

psychoanalysis, repression and, 105

quantification, 19quatenus, 16, 56–57, 66, 139n1

ranges. See predicates, ranges ofRao, U. R., 103rationality. See reason (rationality)reality, perfection and, 57reason (rationality), 121–24

freedom and, 53, 64–65, 122–24grading of, 55self-satisfaction and, 128usefulness and, 113virtue and, 55, 121–22, 124See also ens rationis

reflection, 126–28relationism, 40, 41require something in order to be/be conceived, 1,

9, 11, 13–14freedom and, 27grading of, 58, 61, 74–76human being and, 49inadequate conception and, 46striving to reduce extent of, 91symbol for, 14, 15, 20See also conceived through something else; in

something else (in alio)res particularis. See particular things

Saw, Ruth, 40, 86se

symbol for, 14See also in itself (in se)

Self, Gandhi on, 103self-preservation, 84–85, 92, 101–04

cheerfulness and, 106the good and, 115grading of, 56–57joy and, 102, 108melancholy and, 109rationality and, 124sorrow and, 108striving for, 101–02

usefulness and, 113, 115virtue and, 120, 124

self-realization, 102–03, 141n1self-satisfaction (acquiescentia in se ipso), 125–30sorrow (tristitia), 95, 97, 107–08, 110

good or bad and, 111, 117Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch)

animism of, 92–93, 96Cartesian dualism and, 129on cognitive-causal parallelism, 2, 31–35, 38,

40, 41, 61deep ecology and, 38finite God of, 140n6on free will, 84fundamental dual distinction and, 6, 10, 11,

12, 15, 49, 53Gandhi and, 103, 141n1on graded predicates, 6

freedom, 54–55, 65, 68, 77, 140n1power, 64self-satisfaction, 127substantiality, 60

on human beings, 39, 40, 41idealism and, 42on immanent God, 130, 140n7

causation and, 50, 63, 116, 140n7dependence of God and, 41, 59personal identity and, 86power and, 63quatenus and, 16, 56, 66, 139n1

optimism of, 97on perfection, 100–101

joy and, 57, 83, 95, 97–98self-preservation and, 85sorrow and, 117usefulness and, 114

ranges of predicates and, 19–20, 58, 129–30on rationality, 53, 65, 122–23reconstructions of his views, 1, 86–87, 124terminology of, 1–7

about activeness, 37affects as modes in, 140n2about causes, 35, 140n5about conception, 32, 34, 110–11about emotions, 84, 95, 107about existence, 19, 23–25, 59hilaritas, 86, 104, 105, 107liber, 26, 27, 123perfectio, 95, 98potentia, 62–63, 64, 95quatenus, 16, 56–57, 66, 139n1

153

INDEX

Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch) (continued)terminology of (continued)

about self-preservation, 102about self-satisfaction, 125symbolization and, 18–21tristitia, 117about usefulness, 114vel, 17, 19about virtue, 119, 120

on three kinds of knowledge, 16, 19, 32, 57,58, 85, 87

Stoicsself-preservation and, 102Spinoza and, 84

striving (conatus), 84–85, 87, 91–93for activeness, 101to avoid passivity, 85to avoid sorrow, 108for being in itself, 84–85, 87, 91, 92, 101to be joyous, 96–97freedom and, 84, 85, 92, 101Gandhi on, 141n1for perfection, 85, 100–101, 141n1for power, 85, 92, 101, 102relations between goals and, 96–97for self-preservation, 101–02for virtue, 121

substanceas adequate cause, 35, 39, 41conception of, 11–12, 23emotions and, 90as expendable term, 3–4, 6, 56, 128God as, 59gradation of, 59–60, 65, 97modes and, 41, 51, 140n7one and only one, 65in particular beings, 86virtue and, 120See also God

Substance, absolute virtue of, 120substantiality, 59–60, 65, 97sunt, 9, 19symbolization

vs. formalization, 5value of, 20–21, 45, 66

symbolsfor fundamental dual distinction, 14–15for graded predicates, 65–68, 81heuristic use of, 5, 18–19, 21

logical, 17, 18for striving, 87tables of, 131, 133–35

things. See particular thingsthought

as attribute, 15, 16, 59See also ens rationis; ideas; mind

titillatio. See pleasurable excitement (titillatio)tristitia. See sorrow (tristitia)truth

Gandhi on, 103, 141n1self-satisfaction and, 125

Underhill, Evelyn, 140n7understanding. See conception (cognition, under-

standing)universal quantification, 19usefulness, 113–14, 115, 116

virtue and, 113, 121

vel, 17, 19virtue, 119–22

as acting according to one’s nature, 129freedom and, 54, 120reason and, 55, 121–22, 124self-satisfaction and, 128striving for, 121usefulness and, 113, 121

Wetlesen, Jon, on Spinozabonum and malum, 141n1cognition

adequate, 139n4emotion and, 87inadequate, 139n2terms of, 139n3

freedom, grading of, 140n1power, 62

wholeconcept of, 59–60part/whole distinction, 32, 35, 110–11

will, 84Windelband, Wilhelm, 140n7Wolf, A., 140n1Wolfson, Harry A., 59, 140n7Wordsworth, William, 130worldview, 76

INDEX

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Arne Naess was born in Slemdal, Norway, in 1912. One of Norway’s fore-most philosophers, known especially for his innovative eco-philosophy,Naess began his work with peace studies, global justice, and human rights,and continued with environmental matters. The subjects of his scholarlywork and interests include empirical semantics, logic and foundations ofscience, communication theory and practice, Spinoza, scepticism, gestaltontology, and normative systems theory. Naess’s contributions have beenhonored by many awards, including Norway’s Peer Gynt Award, Den-mark’s Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environ-ment, the Uggla Prize for Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University,and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent Peace.

Naess graduated from the University of Oslo in 1933, studied in Parisand Vienna, and became the youngest person appointed to a full professor-ship of philosophy at the University of Oslo, where he worked from 1939 to1969. Since 1970, he has continued his work as a philosopher, naturalist,and environmental activist. He has been involved with the University ofOslo’s Center for Development and the Environment since 1991. The ArneNaess Chair in Global Justice and the Environment is being established atthe university to encourage scholars to engage creatively with Naess’s workand ideas, in particular to promote new insights into environmental issuesand the challenges posed by globalization, and to develop ideas that willhelp to humanize the difficult and conflict-laden transition to sustainabil-ity. Naess holds honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and TheNorwegian National University of Sports and Physical Education. He isalso an honorary member of The Norwegian Alpine Club and The Norwe-gian Tourist Association.

In addition to writing countless articles and essays that have beentranslated into several languages and have appeared in anthologies andjournals throughout the world, Naess is the author of numerous books, in-cluding Life’s Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World and Ecology,Community and Lifestyle. He was founder and editor of the journal Inquiry,and has lectured in many countries. As a mountaineer, Naess was the firstto climb Tirich Mir in Pakistan. In the 1930s, he built a hut on Halling-skarvet Mountain in Norway, where he spent much time reflecting uponand relating to the surroundings and native plants of his retreat. His re-spect and appreciation for diversity, wonderment, and our relationship to

155

the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in thespirit of his work.

Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies atWestern Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a vis-iting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ-ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Personfor the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visitingresearcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; anda lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philos-ophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for eco-cultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

Alan R. Drengson, Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-versity of Victoria, in Victoria BC Canada. He is a former Director of Envi-ronmental Studies and is currently an Adjunct Professor of Graduate Stud-ies. He is the author of numerous articles, reviews, and books, as well as theeditor of three anthologies and the founding editor of two journals, TheTrumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy and Ecoforestry.

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