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SECRET - NATO COPY NO.

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing GroupREGRADED NATO UNCLASSIF IED

Per Authority IMSM-431-99

By. JesSMe.. Date s h a - l i .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ministry of Defense, Paris, FranceMinistry of Defense, London, England Secretary of Defense, Washington 25, D.C.

SUBJECT : NATO C-E Board 1st Meeting Minutes (Revised)References: a, NATO C-3 Board 1st Mtg Minutes

dated 21 May 54b . STAS3C 1971

1. Attached hereto are revised Minutes of the NATO C-E Board 1st Meeting, as agreed to by the CECS.

2, All copies of the first draft NATO C-E Board 1st Meeting Minutes, dated 21 May 1954, are to be destroyed by burning.

\}S

FOR THE STANDING GROUP;

DIST:A El(less BJSM), 2, 3, 7 X: MOD Paris - 5

MOD London - 35 SECDEF (JCEC) - 5 SACEUR - 5 SACLANT - 5 CINCHAN - 5 EMCCC - 5 C/S, USA - 5 CNO - 5 C/S, USAF - 5 V.ycdr Huxley - 251

5 / T Â i u h )T. L. HORNER Commander, USN Deputy Secretary

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25 June 1954

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NATO C-E Board 1st Mtg Minutes (Revised)25 J-'ne 19rj4Pages 1 - 42, Incl.

NATO COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS BOARD

Minutes of the First Meeting Held In S.G. Conference Room

The Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C.On 20-22 April 195^

PRESENT

Brigadier General R.V.D. Corput, USA (Chairman) Colonel C. J. Lester, USAF Brigadier General P. Marcoz., FAF Colonel J. Lemarchand, FA Commander J. Vigneau, FN Captain A. D. Lenox-Conyngham, RN Group Captain C. M. Stewart, RAF Major General F. L. Ankenbrandt, USAF Colonel J.G.E. Ricard, FAF Captain R. R. Hay, USN Commander I. F. Sommerville, RN Major General J. M. Guerin, FA

SECDEF

MOD PARIS

MOD LONDON

SACEUR

SACLANT CINCHANEMCCC

ALSO PRESENTCECS Commander M. Lavollay, FN (Chairman, CECS)

Group Captain J. E, Kirk, RAF Lt Colonel H. N. Sturdivant, USAF Wing Commander J.D.S. Huxley, RAF Major M. A. Gouillon, FAF Lt Colonel G. H, Chevreau, FA

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ALSO PRESENT (Contd)

US JCS

US ARMY

US NAVY

US AIR FORCEBJSM

US

Colonel G. P. Sampson, USA Captain J. O. Kinert, USN Captain W. B. Goulett, USN Lt Colonel H. W. Berry, USA Mr. M. C. Davie, US Civilian Captain J. E. Edwards, USN Captain L. S. Howeth, USN Lieutenant J. K. Allen, USN Colonel O. W. Miller, USAF Colonel J. C. Hardy, BA Commander H. H. Ridler, RN Mr. P. F. Bayne, UK Civilian Miss K. Ross, US Civilian

SECRETARY

Commander T. L. Horner, USN

INTERPRETER

Major G. J. Blanchard, FA

VERBATIM REPORTER

Mr. Carl Eubank, US Civilian

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I N D E X

SUBJECT PAGE

GENERAL1. Opening Remarks 5 - 6

SECTION A1. Terms of Reference for NATO Communication

Agenciesa. Discussion on Terms of Reference 6 - 7b. Full-Time Chairman, CECS 7 - 8

2. International Meteorological CommunicationPlan 8 - 9

3. Phonetic Alphabet for NATO Use 9 - 1 0

SECTION B1. Interim NATO IFF Policy 10 -2. Coordination Between Operational Requirements

and Mutual Aid Plans, UHF Conversion 11 - 12

SECTION D1. Method of Making Effective NATO Publications

and Changes Thereto 12 - 142. Publications Needed to Meet Operational

Requirements of NATO Commanders 14 - 153. Need for Regulations on Care and Custody of

Publications 16

4. Use of Address Groups 16 - 17;5. Mercast Organization 176. Abolition of RESTRICTED in U .S. 18 - 19

SECTION E1. Procurement of Cryptographic Material

Requirements 19 - 21

2. Security of Wartime Meteorological Communications

22 - 23

3. Operational Aspects of Communications Security Measures

23 - 24

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SUBJECT PAGE

SECTION F1. Rental of Signal Facilities Procured as

NATO Infrastructure 24 - 25

2. Release of Information Concerning Electronic Countermeasures 25 - 27

3. NATO Ship/Shore Radio Organization 27 - 294. Discussion of SGM-212-54 29 - 315. Policy Regarding Use of Transatlantic

Cables in War 31 - 32

6, International Financing of Signal Projects 33 - 34

SECTION G1. Any Other Business

Date of Next Meeting 34Enclosure (French Proposals on Establishment and

Use of Address Groups - See Item 4, Section D, pages 16-I7 ) 35 - 42

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GENERAL1. OPENING REMARKS

The Chairman advised members and associate members of the NATO C-E Board that the Chairman of the Standing Group, Sir John Whiteley, was to welcome them at this time. However, he pointed out that there was scheduled a regular meeting of the Standing Group at 1500

hours and that all members and associate members of the NATO C-E Board were invited to meet the Standing Group at that time.

In addition, the Chairman welcomed the group to Washington for the first meeting of the NATO C-E Board. He went on to say that he hoped that all had enjoyed the trip to Washington, and stated that he was sure that this meeting and all contacts they would make out­side the meeting would be of mutual benefit.

At this time the Chairman announced that the representatives of SACEUR, SACLANT, CBANCOM, Chairman of EMCCC, and the representa­tives of the French and United Kingdom Ministries of Defense would be asked to say a few words,

General Ankenbrandt of SACEUR:"Mr. Chairman, I would merely like to say that I am extremely

pleased that we are having this meeting. As you all know, we feel that the principal impetus for the creation of this Board came from SACEUR, and we feel that it is a mechanism that should be able to solve a number of outstanding problems which have plagued us for a considerable time, and we look upon it as a distinct step forward In the NATO organization. Thank you."

Captain Hay of SACLANT:"As SACLANT 's representative I welcome this opportunity to

attend the Board meeting, and I feel that the guidance we obtain here will be of considerable value in our future planning,"

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Commander Sommerville of CINCHAN:"I would like to endorse what General Ankenbrandt has said.

One hopes that on the high level of thia meeting many of the question we argue in the lower echelons may perhaps get solved."

General Guerin of EMCCC: (Interpreted):"I wish to associate myself with the statements by the repre­

sentatives of the major commands. I look forward for the result of these meetings and for the decisions which will be reached."

General Marcoz of French Ministry of Defense: (Interpreted): "The French Delegation is very happy to have the opportunity

to work in this excellent allied' undertaking and expect that it will be possible to solve a good many of the outstanding problems in the C-E field."

Captain Lenox-Conyngham of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense :

"Only two points, Mr, Chairman. First, I feel that we are here to make decisions, not to refer difficult points back to committees outside this meeting for further deliberation. If we, as the senior communications-electronics directors of our various countries and commands, cannot take responsibility at this meeting today for actual decision, I feel we ought not to be here at all.

"The second point is I am sure it is essential to have frank speaking, to say what we feel and not in diplomatic language. If we feel that a country or a commander is at fault I hope everyone will say so. And I welcome the opportunity of hearing if the U.K. has ever been at fault. "

SECTION AORGANIZATION AND PLANNING - GENERAL POLICY

1. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NATO COMMUNICATION AGENCIES a* Discussion on Terms of Reference

This item was submitted for the agenda by the CECS and SACEUR.

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At this time the Chairman stated that the first item of business on the agenda was to agree upon the Terms of Reference for the NATO c-E Agencies, and the paper which the CECS had prepared (CECS 91/1 ), which included split views by the three Standing Group nations, would now be discussed.

All Members expressed their views on the Terms of Reference for the various agencies. Certain modifications were proposed and agreed. The Terms of Reference for the NATO C-E Agencies (CECS 91/I as amended) was approved.

The discussion brought out the point that Canada is not represented in any of the C-E Agencies, No action was taken on this matter as it was agreed that the Terms of Reference of the CECS were sufficiently broad to permit the presentation of Canadian views through the Canada-US Regional Planning Group.

All Members concurred in the view that CECS should consult with the Supreme Commanders and/or Regional Committees when appropriate.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board:a. Approved CECS 91/1, as amended.b_. Instructed the Secretary to promulgate CECS 9l/l

as an S.G. paper.SECRETARIAL NOTE:

CECS 91/1 was published as S.G. 28/2 (Revised), and pro­mulgated as SGM-373*54.

b_. Full Time Chairman, CECSThis item was submitted by SACLANT in his SER 343 of

14 April 1953.The NATO C-E Board considered SACLANT SER 343 in which he

recommended the establishment of a permanent Chairman for the CECS.

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Captain Hay outlined the reasons which had led to the recommendation and all Members were in general agreement that a permanent chairman would be desirable. However, it was emphasized that the efficacy of such a permanent chairman is dependent on his travelling to the various commands and there­fore the availability of adequate travel funds must be assured. DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board:a,. Approved, in principle, SACLANT's proposal that

there should be a full-time chairman for the CECS.b. Agreed that :

(1) The chairman would also be secretary of the NATO C-E Board, in order to provide direct liaison between the CECS and the NATO C-E Board.

(2) That the chairmanship would rotate between nations and between services, and that the chairman should be of a different nationality and service, whenever possible, to the secretary.c_. Instructed the CECS to prepare the necessary

documents to the Standing Group for the establishment of a full-time chairman for the CECS.

2. INTERNATIONAL METEOROLOGICAL COMMUNICATIONS PLAN This item was submitted by the United Kingdom.The Board considered the United Kingdom views on the Meteoro­

logical plan, MET-78-53-In support of the United Kingdom view. Group Captain Stewart

gave a brief outline of their view on this matter.First, he wished to have the assurance of SACEUR and SACLANT

representatives here that they were operationally and from a techni­cal point of view behind this meteorological requirement.

A second point that he wished to stress, assuming SACLANT*s and SACEUR's assurance that they were backing this plan, was that the

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plan itself is written not so much as a justification for communica­tions but rather as a statement of communications facilities that should be provided.

He went on to say that perhaps in the plan there should be written a statement that this plan is ideal, but that it is not obligatory to follow it word for word in its implementation.

General Ankenbrandt of SACEUR and Captain Hay of SACLANT assured the Chairman at this time that they fully agreed with the United Kingdom representative's statement, and in furtherance to this General Ankenbrandt added that the final paragraph of the agenda item as pre­pared by the United Kingdom summed up his views fully,DECISION:

The NATO C~E Board agreed that the following be forwarded to the Met Committee as a statement on MET-7S-53J

"The plan in its present form should be considered for approval only as a guide to the ideal requirement. During implementation it must be subject to modification in accordance with availability of facilities, competing requirements and such like changing circumstances,''

3. PHONETIC ALPHABET FOR NATO USEThis item was submitted by the CECS and SACEUR.The Chairman gave a brief resume on the background on the

phonetic alphabet fcr NATO use, and called on General Ankenbrandt of SACEUR for his recommendation on the solution to the problem with which NATO was now confronted; namely, that there was no approved alphabet for NATO,

General Ankenbrandt briefly stated that some SHAPE forces are using AELE, BAKER, CHARLIE and some the ICAO alphabet. SHAPE has issued a directive that in time of emergency the ICAO alphabet will be used. He said that it appeared to him that the ICAO alphabet more nearly fits the forces assigned or earmarked for SHAPE. He went on to say that it would appear to him that since such remarkable

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progress has been made at ICAO, that the Board should agree in prin­ciple to adopt the ICAO alphabet for NATO use. He said that we are now down to the question of one word and he felt that it would be a serious mistake, since we are so near agreement, to go back now to the other alphabet,

In addition, General Ankenbrandt recommended that the first two paragraphs of SGM-218-54 be sent to all NATO nations, and that the CECS should ascertain the exact status of the ICAO alphabet, such as details as to which word or words are changed and which are still being considered, and that this information should be included in the memorandum to the nations.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed to General Ankenbrandt 's statement and recommendations that the first two paragraphs of SGM-218-54 be dispatched to all Member Nations, and that an additional paragraph be added giving the exact status of the ICAO alphabet, as ascertained by the CF.CS .

SECTION B COMMUNTCATXOIftS-ELECTRONICS E^UIFM£NT

1. INTERIM .MATO IFF POLICYThis item was submitted by SACEUR and he referred to his paper

AG 3170/S SIG of 10 December 1953 which was sent to all Member Nations, NATO Commanä the Standing Group for comment. It was brought out that inasmuch as the Standing Group nations would comment direct to SHAPE on this matter, the Standing Group would not comment on the paper until the final draft Incorporating the national comments was sub­mitted. It was ascertained that all Members were in accord with the proposal that no additional Mark 3 equipment would be procured or installed and that the Change over to Mark 10 would be accomplished as soon as possible.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board advised SHAPE to formulate a final document, which is to be submitted to the Standing Group for approval at an early date, on an interim IFF policy for NATO.

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2. COORDINATION BETWEEN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND MUTUAL AIDPLANS, UHF CONVERSIONThis item was submitted by the French Ministry of Defense.The French Member elaborated on this subject in that the con­

version program within their armed forces was being curtailed due to the non-delivery of UHF equipment which had been requested through MDAP sources. He pointed out that it would be very difficult to im­plement SACEUR and SACLANT plans concerning UHF conversion unless considerable aid is received from MDAP during the years 1955-1957.He concluded his statement by showing the necessity to have coordina­tion between the plans as existing and delivery dates of the actual equipment.

Further, the French Member advised that assuming that the MDAP requirements have been met in time, that UHF conversion within the Navy would be completed by 1958 and that by 1956 all first line tac­tical Air Forces and those Air Forces which operate in conjunction with air defense would be equipped with UHF.

The United Kingdom Member pointed out that the problem of UHF conversion within the United Kingdom was most difficult in that the Navy would not complete this program until I960, and pointed out that the RAF would not be able to complete their conversion plans for about 10 years.

General Ankenbrandt pointed out that insofar as the assigned NATO Ground and Air Forces were concerned, the situation was quite well in hand. However, he further pointed out that this does not apply to the Navies or to the national fo’-’oes which are a vital part of the overall European preparedness program.

Considerable discussion followed on what concrete action should be taken to speed up the UHF conversion program within the NATO forces.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed that a report should be made in strong terms to the Standing Group, pointing out the gravity of the situa­tion of the UHF conversion program within the forces of NATO.

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SECRETARIAL NOTE:The United Kingdom submitted a draft to the Board under

CECS/UK/LO2A, and this draft was approved and dispatched to the Standing Group as SGWM-2Ö1-54.

The United States Member stated that he would provide the French the answers to the following questions;

a. Will the UHF equipment which will be delivered be of the most up-to-date model? If not, how will the problem of spare parts be solved?

b_. Will this equipment be delivered with or without crystals?

c_. What are the characteristics of the crystals used?

SECTION DC OMMUNIC ATIONS-ELECTRONIC S PUBLIC ATIONS

(Excl Security and Cryptographic)1. METHOD OF MAKING EFFECTIVE NATO PUBLICATIONS AND CHANGES THERETO

This item was submitted by SACEUR and the United Kingdom.The United Kingdom Member stated briefly that they had put for­

ward four specific suggestions and that they wished to submit these to the Board for approval. These points are as follows:

a. An agreed length of time between availability of an ACP and its NATO effective date to allow for translating, print­ing and distribution.

b_. An agreed date for the bringing into force of certain amendm ents to ACP's, etc. (e.g. Call Sign Books).

c_. A NATO general message system for rapid amendments,d. A routine report, issued by the Standing Group, say

half-yearly, showing latest state of changes of all books. This report should be amended monthly by signal.In addition, he wished to point out that they had a small fifth

point to add, in that the United Kingdom would like to propose that in a large change to any book that all new matter should be marked in some way, such as marked at the side or other appropriate means.

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In the course of the discussion, it was suggested that a European Distribution Center might be a partial solution to the reduction of the time consumed in distribution.

The French Member stated that steps must be taken to expedite the publication and implementation of ACP's. He went on to say that ACP's which have been initially prepared in the past have been drafted before the French representative of the CECS had been asked to give his views on the document, and that sometimes these documents had been printed befor’e the comments from all Standing Group nations had reached the Standing Group. Therefore, it appeared that this was an additional reason for delay as, he pointed out, these documents were not always adapted in their initial form to the requirements of the various countries. Their translation is often made more difficult than it would be if the initial draft had been prepared together by- all three CECS representatives of the Standing Group.

He therefore strongly recommended that the French Member parti­cipate in the preparation of certain appropriate publications with the other CECS representatives of the Standing Group.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board:a. Approved the five points submitted by the United

Kingdom Member.b. Agreed that the CECS, together with the United States

authorities who have a large responsibility in the preparation and distribution of publications, should take under considera­tion the whole problem of distribution of publications and see what can be done to cut down the time it now takes to get an ACP from the distribution authority Into the hands of the user.

c_. Agreed in principle to the French recommendation that the French Member of the CECS should be in on the initial writ­ing of the ACP's. However, the final decision on this matter could not be taken by the Board inasmuch as certain previous

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U.S. agreements are involved. The U.S. Member undertook to explore the possibility of including the French representative in the initial stages of the preparation of ACP's and advise the CECS.

2. PUBLICATIONS NEEDED TO MEET OPERATING REQUIREMENTS OF THE NATO COMMANDERSThis item was submitted by SACLANT, CHANCOM and the United

Kingdom.The Chairman stated that his reaction to SACLANT*s recommenda­

tions was that in order for forces to operate properly, it was neces­sary fox’ SACLANT to prepare and issue certain publications.

He went on to say that he proposed that the NATO C-E Board con­cur with SACLANT's recommendations as stated in Enclosure 2 to his SER 545 of 12 April 1954;

a. When an ACP is not available, that Supreme Commanders be authorized to prepare and issue a document which will meet their operational requirements, and

b. That Communications publications produced by Supreme Commanders be considered in the drafting of ACP's.Captain Hay at this time made the following points:

a. That he wished to call to the NATO C-E Board's atten­tion that it was not SACLANT's intention to stay in the publi­cation business any longer than necessary.

b. That SACLANT1s idea in producing a publication was that it would not be used solely within one command. In other words, he wished to emphasize that publications that SACLANT produced would be of use to the Mediterranean and CHANCOM.

c_. That there would possibly be a duplication in connec­tion with ACP 177 since this publication has gone so long with­out correction that it is unusable in its present form.He further stated that for the fall exercises SACLANT has pre­

pared the issuance of orders which would be called a "Blue Supplement, which would consist of colored printed pages in ACP 177 to correct factual errors.

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The United Kingdom Member stated that he would support SACLANT's recommendation, and in addition he proposed three rules for these books :

a. They must not go counter to existing or projected ACP's.

b. They must have the agreement of all the Supreme Commanders.

ca That after publication they be turned into proper ACP's as soon as practicable.General Ankenbrandt supported the SACLANT proposal but called

attention to the fact that an analysis of his needs indicates that it seems to be primarily a naval problem. SHAPE has not found an opera­tional requirement for such publications and so supports this proposal only insofar as the naval forces are concerned,DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed:a. That SACLANT's two recommendations, as stated above,

be approved.b. That a third recommendation proposed by the Chairman

be numbered No. 1, which was that the NATO C-E Board recognize the necessity of Supreme Commanders to issue supplemental pub­lications due to the lack of necessary approved ACP's.

c_. To the three rules for the preparation of these publi­cations as proposed by the United Kingdom, in that the NCCP must not run counter to an existing or projected ACP, that it must have the agreement of all Supreme Commanders, and that these publications normally be turned into proper ACP's as soon after publication as practicable.

d. That SACLANT should look into the possibility of having these publications printed.

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3. NEED FOR NATO REGULATIONS ON CARE AND CUSTODY OF PUBLICATIONS This item was submitted by the United Kingdom.The United Kingdom Member stated that he had nothing further to

add to his short paragraph other than that he proposed that this problem on the need for instructions on how to safeguard classified publications should be dealt with by the appropriate committee of the Standing Group.

The Chairman stated that this was a matter which came under the jurisdiction of the Standing Group Security Committee and suggested that the NATO C-E Board present this problem to the Standing Group in order that it may be referred to this committee for appropriate action.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board concurred in the United Kingdom Member's and Chairman's statements, and directed the CECS to prepare a memoran­dum for the Standing Group, pointing out the need for NATO instructions on the handling and safeguarding of classified publications, and re­commending that this matter be referred to the Standing Group Security Committee for such action as considered necessary.

4. USE OF ADDRESS GROUPSThis item was submitted by the French Ministry of Defense.General Marcoz of the French Delegation gave a lengthy and

comprehensive report on the lack of rules and regulations regarding the use of address groups in NATO communications. Since the matter was very complex, he proposed that his report on this subject be pre­pared and submitted formally to the CECS for consideration after the meeting. He also proposed to submit, for study, a French system for making up address groups by each authority concerned.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed that the French proposal be submitted to the CECS and that the CECS should use the French recommendations as a guide in preparing rules and regulations which would contain the

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policy on the use of address groups in order to eliminate the present misunderstanding and confusion,SECRETARIAL NOTE:

French proposals have been submitted to the CECS under refer­ence DELEF/TRANS/i47 of 29 May 1954 (circulated to the CECS under CSM/158/54/D of 3 June 1954), and are attached as Enclosure.

5. MERCAST ORGANIZATIONThis item was submitted by the French Ministry of Defense. Commander Vigneau of the French Delegation stated that the

amendments to JANAP 149 proposed by the French bacK in 1950 have been under consideration for four years, and he would like to know the present status of these, and moreover the status of the prepara­tion of the ACP (ACP 149) which will deal with this matter, stress­ing that, when this publication has been-prepared, it must be con­sidered and studied, which will be a lengthy process.

The United State? Member advised that this problem was under active consideration. however, he wished to inform the French Member that the data submitted in 1950 had been misplaced, and suggested that it be resubmitted to the Standing Group for consider­ation for inclusion in ACP 149.DECISION :

The NATO C-E Board:a. Agreed that ACP 149 should be promulgated as early

as possible, and perfdrably should be made available for the ENCA meeting which is scheduled to be held in June if at all possible to do so.

b . Agreed that the information submitted by the French in 1950 be brought up to date and resubmitted to the Standing Group for consideration for inclusion in ACP 149 and also be submitted to ENCA for its June meeting.

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6. ABOLITION OF RESTRICTED IN U.S.This item was submitted by the United Kingdom.The Chairman at this time gave a brief resume in regard to the

abolition of RESTRICTED classification in the United States. He ■ briefly stated that the real problem is what can now be done about it since, as we all know, the classification of RESTRICTED in the United States has been eliminated, which means that in the United States material classified RESTRICTED had to be declassified or up­graded to CONFIDENTIAL. He further stated that he did not know what could be accomplished on this subject at this meeting . However, it might be possible that the CECS could point out to the Standing Group Security Coordinating Committee the Impact this has on communi­cations and communication publications.

The United Kingdom Member briefly stated that he did not wish to become involved in the United States domestic troubles, but he felt that it would be wise and proper to inform the Standing Group that this unilateral breach of a NATO agreement by the United States is causing a great deal of delay and trouble to the communications generally of NATO.

He went on to say that he felt that it was the duty of this Board to bring to the attention of the Standing Group, and that the Standing Group should be asked to approach the U.S. and ask the U.S. to do something about it, since it is a known fact that some com­munications publications are being held up because of this contro­versy over the security classification.

In addition, he recommended that the Board proposal be put forward to the Standing Group, with the support of the French and the Supreme Commanders. He said he did not think it would be wise to ask the support of the U.S. in this matter.

The French Member stated that he wished to associate himself with the ideas expressed by the U.K. regarding the trouble the abolition of the RESTRICTED classification brought.

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DECISION:The NATO C-E Board agreed:

a. That this problem should be presented to the Standing Group, drawing their attention to examples as to the impact the abolition of RESTRICTED classification in the U.S. is havingon NATO communications.

b. That the U.S. Member not be asked to support this action since it was contrary to the United States Government's action,

SECRETARIAL NOTE:This paper was prepared by the United Kingdom Member under

CECS/UK/W.83, and forwarded to the Standing Group under SGWM-279-54.

SECTION ESECURITY AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY AND PLANNING

1. PROCUREMENT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS This item was submitted by SACEUR.General Ankenbrandt said that within NATO as a whole there

existed a deplorable situation as regards the supply of cryptograph­ic equipment; in the first place there was an acute shortage, and secondly, what there was, was old we are using second and third rate material instead of first rate.

He also pointed out that In order to get sixty terminal on-line equipments he personally had had to argue for some 72 hours in front of the Military Budget Committee, He felt that the provision of cryptographic equipment was a problem requiring urgent study.

General Corput introduced Miss Ross whom he had invited to be present for this item as she had up-to-date information regarding the provision of cryptographic material.

Miss Ross first referred to General Ankenbrandt's criticism that the cypher machines so far made available to NATO were old and second-hand; the CCM had been chosen because at least some NATO forces, those of the U.S, U.K. and Canada, were already equipped -

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with this system; but since the CCM was admittedly obsolescent it had not been considered feasible to initiate further production of this equipment. In its place, however, the U.S. hoped to be in a position very soon to offer to NATO a new and superior off-line machine; moreover, every effort would be made to provide this machine through MDAP in sufficient quantities to satisfy NATO requirements.

Miss Ross said that with regard to on-line equipment the U.S. had been able to make available a certain number of SIGTOT machines, while the ETCRRM had been approved for NATO use by the Standing Group and a number had just been ordered by SHAPE though, as General Ankenbrandt has just described, with some difficulty. In addition, the Dutch had offered a machine called the ECOLEX and the French a machine called the T 53; if an when these were approved for NATO use by the Standing Group, they might well provide two more sources from which on-line equipment could be procured.

The French Member said that he wished tö associate himself with the statement made by General Ankenbrandt concerning the pre­sent unsatisfactory situation with regard to the provision of cryptographic equipment. He also considered that both the source and the method of provision of cypher machines should be urgently studied by the CECS.

He said that the French had developed a machine, the T 53, which had been offered to the Standing Group where it was at present under study. Nothing could at present be said with regard to its production if its use by NATO were approved. France had also developed a machine known as the T 51 which had not yet been sub­mitted to the Standing Group, This machine might well be of value at lower echelons, and has given very good results while on trial over a period of six months. This machine was ready to go into production.

Group Captain Stewart said that the U.K. also fully realized the seriousness of the shortage of cypher machines within the forces of NATO. It seemed possible that the importance of an adequate

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provision of first class equipment of this nature was not fully ap­preciated in financial circles. It should, however, be noted that the CECS cannot design machines and is dependent on machines being offered for NATO use by Member Nat ions i similarly the CECS cannot provide machines - provisioning arrangements must be made both by individual Nations and by Supreme Commands as appropriate. The whole problem should be urgently studied by the CECS.

General Ankenbrandt agreed that the CECS should exam ine this serious problem and suggested that the Standing Group might be asked to support applications to the International Budget Conanittee on the part of Commands, not only for cypher machines but also for tape- making equipment.

Captain Hay said that SACLANT had experienced the problem on a smaller scale but had found it no less acute.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board:a. Agreed that there was a serious shortage of all types

of cryptographic machines for NATO communications.b_. Directed the CECS to examine the source and methods

of procurement of equipment with a view to the correction of this situation.

c_. Agreed that Commands should notify the CECS when requests for funds for the provision of cryptographic equipment were about to be made to the International Budget Committee, in order that the CECS could study these requests and, if approp­riate, recommend that the Standing Group should lend them their support when placed before the International Budget Committee.

d. Took note that the French would submit their machine, T 51, to the CECS for consideration, for adoption, and for use by NATO.

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2. SECURITY OF WARTIME METEOROLOGICAL COMMUNICATIONSThis item was submitted by SACEUR.General Ankenbrandt stated that the basic reason for proposing

clear-text transmission over certain circuits for weather control information is to prevent the diversion of enciphering equipment and crypto personnel for meteorological purposes while relaying channels are still short. In other words, he explained that it is a matter of practicality, in that SHAPE does not oppose the idea of encypher- ing everything if it can be done, but with equipment that is present­ly available, it Just isn't possible.

In addition, General Ankenbrandt pointed out that SHAPE is not in favor of attempting to set a frequency level below which one can­not send clear-text, and above which the sending of clear-text is permitted. He stated that SHAPE had developed an alternate wording which is - something like this: "that transmission of this type In the clear is authorized over landline or radio relay circuits, the security of which is not definitely suspect.11

He further pointed out that the reason for this is that certain landiines are more subject to security breaches than perhaps are radio circuits in rear areas, and that if any attempt were made to set the limit at even 100 megacycles, that would cut out the whole series of radio relay which would then not be acceptable to SHAPE.

At this time General Corput stated that SHAPTO 587j which was SHAPE'S new proposal containing the wording more or less as stated by General Ankenbrandt, had not been received by the CECS, but in­stead this request from SHAPE went directly to the Meteorological Committee. He further stated that in view of this he was not pre­pared to agree to General Ankenbrandt*s proposal.

The French Member stated that he supported the proposal made by General Ankenbrandt with respect to communications on ground lines and by radio relay, and that France feels that these communi­cations could be sent in the clear provided those lines are definite­ly not suspect.

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The United Kingdom Member stated that their thought on this was that they were opposed to sending classified material in the clear under any circumstances. He further stated that they were not pre­pared to give any carte blanche clearance, but would agree to limited clearance. He went on to say that the U.K. was in agreement with the point made that lines are at least as likely to be suspect in certain circumstances as the radio, but they thought perhaps too much emphasis has been put on the radio side.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed:a. That this matter raised by General Ankenbrandt should

be given the earliest consideration for approval.b. That the NATO C-E Board could not at this time agree

to SHAPE'S latest recommendation regarding the clear-text hand­ling of weather communications because of lack of guidance by the U.S. and U.K. However, since at this time France could agree, and the U.K. agreed in principle, the Chairman stated that he personally was very strongly in favor of SHAPE'S pro­posal and that he would do everything possible in the near future to obtain complete approval of SHAPE'S proposal.

3. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MEASURES This item was submitted by SACLANT and CHANCOM.The Chairman remarked that previous discussion on Item D.4 was

also relevant to this item.Captain Hay, outlining SACLANT's agenda paper, stated the problem

was that the security measures of CODRESS and call sign encryption and the inability to refer to an encrypted message's D.T.G. in plain language are interfering with the efficient delivery of traffic. To improve the situation SACLANT proposed:

a. Modification of these communication security rules, or, if this is Impossible,

b. Provision of a statement of the calculated risks in­volved should operational commanders find departure from the rules a necessity.

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c_. A combination of a and b above.The most obvious modification was the reinstitution of "dual pre­cedence" with CODRESS.

ClnC Channel, SACEUR , the U.K. and the U.S. representatives all fully supported SACLANT's views, Commander Sommerville stressing the present difficulties would become critical in wartime. General Ankenbrandt saying the final determination of security measures must lie with the originator and Captain Lenox-Conyngham proposing that Supreme Commanders should:

a. Try out the use of tactical call signs with tactical codes ;

b_. Endeavor to reduce the phenomenal number of call signs allocated to a single ship.Colonel Lester informed the Board that the U.S. Services were

unable to implement the provisions of SGM-13O1-53 as at present worded but were proposing amendments.

General Marcoz, while supporting SACLANT, said France felt it would be prudent to remind Commanders of the security measures which they tended to forget. He said he would submit a paper concerning address groups and suggested measures for making a compromise between speed and security.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board approved SACLANT's proposals a and b_ and authorized Supreme Commanders to test the U.K. proposals. In the absence of NATO instructions, CinC Channel was authorized to draft his own rules for his July exercises, using British rules for guid­ance and SACEUR's assistance if necessary,

SECTION F MISCELLANEOUS

1. RENTAL OF SIGNAL FACILITIES PROCURED AS NATO INFRASTRUCTURE This item was submitted by SACEUR.General Ankenbrandt briefly outlined the problem of rental of

signal facilities procured as NATO infrastructure. He pointed out

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that no action would be expected by SACEUR from the NATO C-E Board at this time, but he wished merely to bring this to the attention of the Board as a matter of considerable importance.

He went on to say that SACEUR finds that large infrastructure networks now coming Into existence are not being properly utilized during exercises or frequent tests simply because funds are not available from the Military Budget Committee for payment of these circuits.

He further stated that he realized that this is a political and financial problem primarily, and indicated that the problem would be even greater as submarine cables were installed, because of the large number of circuits needed throughout the Mediterranean, North Sea and Skagerrak, which NATO would want, but would not be able to pay for.

Concluding, he pointed out that SHAPE proposals were that these circuits not be made available free of charge, but that some sort of reduced charge which would take into account the annual recurring costs could be taken note of.

The Chairman pointed out that action on SHAPE'S request had already been taken by STANLO 451 which was read to the NATO C-E Board. .DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board:a. Noted the action taken by the Logistic and Materiel

Planners, in coordination with the CECS, in dispatching STANLO 451.

b. Instructed the Secretary to readdress STANLO 451 to include SACEUR, MOD Paris and MOD London.

SECRETARIAL NOTE:STANLO 4SI has been relayed to SACEUR, MOD Paris and MOD

London.

2. RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURESThis item was submitted by SACUER and the French Ministry of

Defense.

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French Member briefly stated that he wished to invite the attention of the NATO C-E Board to the very high interest France attaches to the question of electronic warfare and the difficulty she is facing in achieving an efficient organisation in electronics warfare.

He pointed out that because of lack of Information on this subject, the French Ministry of Defense was not able to make any contribution on the NATO level regarding electronic countermeasures, and wished to suggest that the Standing Group should recommend to all Nations that they exchange information on electronic counter­measures which they may have in order to prepare a list of different types of equipment available and to establish a plan for the com» bined use of such countermeasures.

The French Member further stated that it might be possible for EMCCC, already dealing with one specific problem, the control of transmitters, to participate in the study of the establishment of a radio countermeasures system for NATO.

General Ankenbrandt stated briefly that he agreed fully with the French views that countermeasures in war is more important than ever. In addition, he recommended that machinery be set up for releasing basic countermeasures information to NATO, and added that there is a basic need for schools where officers and NCO's could be trained. After training, these officers and NCO's could return to their own formations and pass on Information they had learned in these schools.

United Kingdom Member fully agreed with the proposals made by the French and SHAPE Members, In addition, he suggested that this item be a continuing one for the NATO C-E Board agenda.

Captain Hay pointed out that the CECS has already taken some of the action recommended as far as SACLANT was concerned, in that authorization for the preparation of a radio data book is now under­way by SACLANT, and will provide some answers on this problem.

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United States Member pointed out that in November 1952, SGM-2585-52 was dispatched to SACEUR, containing a list of United States equipment available to the NATO countries. Since that time SACEUR has released that Information to various countries. There is a current action within the CECS to release this information to Portugal, and to SACLANT.

In addition, he pointed out that the information which had been passed on to the Supreme Commanders contained a list of four schools, and that arrangements to use these facilities should be made through normal service-to-service channels between NATO countries and the United States.

French Member said that they tried to use the facilities offered in the U.S. training centers. A request was placed to MAAG for several officers, but so far it is impossible to send any, certainly due to a lack of liaison between the Standing Group and MAAG. However, it would be very helpful for France to send some officers to study those RCM problems.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed:a. That the whole problem of releasing information con­

cerning electronic countermeasures be referred to the CECS,in order that machinery may be established to permit early release of electronic countermeasures information to NATO countries.

b. That the exchange of information between the various countries should be the maximum possible.

c_. That this item be retained on the agenda for con­tinued review by the NATO C-E Board.

3. NATO SHIP/SHORE RADIO ORGANIZATIONThis item was submitted by SACEUR and the French Ministry of

Defense.General Ankenbrandt stated that it appears that the system as

outlined in ACP 177 (interim) is not satisfactory to meet wartime

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requirements, and that in fact, each Nation varies from the others somewhat in their procedures, frequencies, standards of service, etc .

He further stated that SHAPE recommends that an ad hoc group be set up under the NATO C-E Board or the CECS to settle this prob­lem and set up a system suitable for both peace and war.

Captain Hay of SACLANT supported SHAPE'S recommendation and offered the following principles for consideration in the solution of the problem:

a. That a common wartime procedure be agreed.b. That the present ship/shore systems of a world-wide

nature be retained, supplemented as necessary by additional stations where coverage Is not adequate.

c_. That provision be made for rapid transfer of traffic from one system to another.

d. That local Ship/shore systems supplement world-wide systems by providing them with access to the latter.United States Member at this time briefly informed the Board

Members that two or more peacetime procedures were in use; the United States using the SIMPLEX system, which is a system they hope will be adopted for wartime use; the other Nations using a cross- band type of operation utilizing the call and working frequencies as assigned in Atlantic City.

He pointed out that this fact has made' it difficult to plan peacetime operations for training.

United Kingdom Member stated that he fully agreed with SACEUR and SACLANT that in wartijne all must have the same procedure. He added that the United Kingdom is ready to agree that in wartime the SIMPLEX procedure will be used, and pointed out that the U.K. had not resorted to the SIMPLEX procedure in peacetime because the current cross-band was able to handle more traffic for more economy of frequencies, but that in wartime there would not be so much ship/ shore traffic.

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French Member stressed the necessity to use the same procedure in peace and war if the exercises are to be of real value.

A considerable discussion followed as to which body should carry out the study recommended by SACEUR, and to the geographical area to be considered, either NATO, or world-wide.

The question was then raised by Commander Vigneau as to what exactly was meant by the expression used by SACLANT, "the present ship/shore systems of a world-wide nature".

SACLANT Representative said that he presumed the U.S. and U.K. will be involved, but he did not Intend it should be limited to these two.

United Kingdom Member supported two systems, one the U.S., and the other the U.K.

Commander Vigneau then said that he could agree provided one station of the French system would be incorporated in each of the U..S. and U.K. systems.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed:a. That the SIMPLEX procedure be adopted as a common

wartime ship/shore procedure, and also be used during large peacetime NATO exercises.

b_. That the CECS should make a study of existing ship/ shore facilities in order to determine the gaps in the present system, and to determine what must be done to permit efficient lateral communications from one system to another; this study to be limited to ships within the NATO area.

c_. That the draft chapter of ACP 177 concerning ship- to-shore liaison be referred at an early date to the French Member of the CECS for consideration.

4. DISCUSSION OF SGM-212-54This item was submitted by the CECS and SACEUR.Chairman briefly stated the problem and gave a brief outline

as to why this item was placed on the agenda. He went on to say

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that because of the development of nuclear weapons of tactical size, that it is important that our system of communications be rapid and secure, in that targets and such weapons would present themselves only for a limited time.

He informed the NATO C-E Board that SGM-212-54 was sent to the Supreme Commanders requesting them to review their communications systems and requirements in the light of the "new look" in modern warfare and to report to the Standing Group definite weaknesses that may be disclosed by this study, and to make recommendations to the Standing Group to minimize such weaknesses.

He further stated that the. only action necessary by the NATO C-E Board was to take note of the action that had already been taken oy the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders.

General Ankenbrandt at this time made the following report on the action completed by SHAPE thus far . He advised that SHAPE had dispatched a directive to all subordinate commanders, directing them to initiate a study, and calling for a planning group to meet in Paris on 12 April. Results of this meeting would be promulgated to all concerned In the near future.

In addition. General Ankenbrandt pointed out how SHAPE was conducting this study, in that the individual commands are now preparing their o-wn individual study. Report from these commands will be submitted to SHAPE by 1 June, and by 1 July they will be consolidated with the study prepared by SHAPE'S signal staff. This report should be in the hands of the Standing Group by 5 July.

Further, General Ankenbrandt pointed out that in the interest of the NATO C-E Board Members, their preliminary studies have been pretty much verified, in that it appears that it isn't the weaknesses of communications so much that is going to bother, as it is the necessity for streamlining the echelons of command responsibility.

General Ankenbrandt further stated that in order to eliminate encryption and deciphering time of operational commands, it might be necessary to utilize automatic ciphering equipment throughout

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the NATO communications system in order to prevent delay. He then pointed out why he would like to have 5OO on-line equipments which he had recommended earlier.

Captain Hay of SACLANT and Commander Sommervllle of CHANCOM advised that they would be able to meet the July dated established by the Standing Group.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed:a. That primarily the problem as it stands now is

Supreme Commanders* problem exclusively at the moment.b_. That no further action on this item would be taken

by the NATO C-E Board until reports were in from the Supreme Commanders.

5. POLICY REGARDING USE OF TRANSATLANTIC CABLES IN WAR This item was submitted by SACLANT.Chairman briefly outlined Captain Hay's recommendations in

that SACLANT has made specific recommendations as to procurement of transatlantic cable circuits in the event of war.

In addition, Captain Hay stated that he had received certain background information from the British Joint Services Mission in April 1952, which gave an estimate of requirements for the naval communications traffic in groups per day, and of routes provided. Three of them are recommended as being carried on cable channels : London to Washington, 4O,OOO groups a day; Ravenscraig to Norfolk, 55jOOO groups a day; and from the United Kingdom to Halifax, 5jOOO groups a day.

He also pointed out that there will be a requirement for the use of one cable channel for exchange of submarine plot information between the U.K. and SACLANT.

In closing, Captain Hay stated that before SACLANT makes any application for cable service, he would like to have some policy

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guidance in accordance with the recommendations contained in Enclosure 4 to his SER 545.

General Guerin of EMCCC stated that this is a problem which the BMCCC has tried to deal with very recently. He pointed out that at their last meeting, various European countries' representa­tives supported a recommendation to the effect that considering the limited number of cables available, governments would only com­mit themselves to reserve these cables for governmental use without specifying their utilization.

United Kingdom Member stated that this was the U.E. policy at the momentj because of the shortage of transatlantic cables, they must be regarded as common user cables.

The United Kingdom Member further stated that when the new transatlantic cable with its very much increased facilities is available, he would like to review the policy which would then probably permit reservations for exclusive facilities.

In closing , he proposed that we accept the principle of common user facilities for transatlantic cables and that any request for exclusive facilities be considered by the CECS, in collaboration with the EMCCC as necessary.

The French Member heartily concurred in the necessity of re­taining all cables for common use.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board:a. Concurred in the proposal made by the U.K. Member

that the NATO C-E Board accept the principle of common user facilities for transatlantic cables and that any request for exclusive facilities be referred to the CECS for study, In collaboration with the EMCCC as .necessary.

b. Agreed that the deadline for initial requests from Supreme Commanders and individual Nations for exclusive cable facilities should be submitted to the Standing Group no later than 1 August 1954.

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6. INTERNATIONAL FINANCING OF SIGNAL PROJECTS This Item was submitted by SACLANT.Captain Hay briefly outlined his problem regarding the inter­

national financing of signal projects, in that SACLANT's problem is complicated by the fact that he has sub-areas and headquarters not financed by international funds, and that the Budget Committee is only receptive to SACLANT's request for support of assigned forces and for headquarters which are now financed internationally.

He went on to say that such things as on-line crypto equipment appear to fall neither in the category of peacetime budget nor com­mon infrastructure. In the case of on-line crypto equipment,SACLANT has been able to obtain about one-fifth of his wartime requirement by submitting it as a request for an exercise pool to be distributed for exercise purposes.

General Ankenbrandt pointed out that the trouble involves mostly partially financed international headquarters such as we have in the Mediterranean, and such places as war headquarters in Gibraltar, and the shore-end of a ship/shore channel up in North Norway, and suggested that the NATO C-E Board endorse the need as a NATO military requirement, for certain internationally financed communication equipment, at subordinate headquarters which are not supported from International funds.

The French and United Kingdom Members stated that they fully supported. General Ankenbrandt*s proposal.DECISION:

The NATO C-E Board agreed:a. To endorse the need, as a military requirement,

for certain Internationally financed communication equipment at subordinate headquarters which are not supported from International funds.

b. That the NATO C-E Board take note of this problem which has as yet been unsolved and agreed that this matter

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should be brought to the attention of the Standing Group, pointing out that the policy with respect to this problem is set by other than communications people.

SECTION G ADMINISTRATIVE

1. ANY OTHER BUSINESS None. ,

2. DATE OF NEXT MEETING .Alter discussion it was agreed that the next meeting of

the NATO C-E Board be held in Paris in the latter part of January 1955. It was also agreed that the Chairman should be provided by the host Nation, and it was recommended that —Should not act also as a National Representative.f>

At this time all Members and Associate Members thanked the Chairman, and the United States as host Nation.

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There being no further business, the Board adjourned.

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WASHINGTON 29 Mai 1954

DELEF/TRANS/147

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATO CE BOARD SECRETARY FROM: French Member CECS SUBJECT: Address Groups

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Please find enclosed herewith the study on Communications Security and Address Groups made by the French authorities and stated at the CE Board meeting by Brigadier General P. MARCOZ French Member.

It Is to be noted that a copy of this statement should be attached as an annex to the minutes of the 1st NATO CE Board meeting (Cf. itemD4).

(Signed) Commander M. LAVOLLAY French Navy

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USE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDRESS GROUPS

I. The French authorities consider that the present NATO system of address groups, ACP's 101 through 105, is not complete and not suitable for the following reasons:

a) no directive or publication has been issued to specify the way to use them;

b) the documents give indications of the location of forces and a complete list of address groups and are being distributed throughout the world; which is an unacceptable security risk;

c) the lists of address groups are very difficult to keep up to date and this will be worse in wartime;

d) it is unlikely that the documents will be kept secret or denied to the enemy;

e) in case of compromise, new editions will be difficult to establish and to distribute;

f) the address groups‘encryption system is cumbersome and lengthy (CSP 1T5O-1756).

II. It is therefore recommended that the present NATO system be revised. The overall problem has to be reconsidered with regard to its two different aspects:

a) determination of general rules to improve communi­cations security by correct use of address groups;

b) establishment of new systems of production of address groups at various echelons presenting a good protection against enemy analys is.

III. The French views on these two aspects are given at enclosures, Appendix A and B. They are submitted as a proposal being able to affect the general study to be undertaken in order to meet the requirement for a new system more reliable, quicker and more secure.

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APPENDIX "A"

GENERAL PULES TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

I. As specified in ACP 122, measures have to be taken to avoid

the possibility for the enemy to find the relationship between:

- the geographical location of the stations;

- the frequencies used;

- the call signs used;

- the authorities served by the stations;

In the case of fixed stations always working on the same

frequencies (as recommended in SHAPE Directive 34 A on interferences)

a traffic analysis would indicate the various nets, their relation­

ship and the component authorities. By comparison of unclassified

traffic with classified traffic and taking into account the fixed

factors of frequencies, location and even call signs, it is possible:

a) to find the address group encryption system if the

address groups used for encryption in classified messages are

the same a3 those used in unclassified messages;

b) to find the cyphering code in use, by comparison

of the beginning of a CODRESS message with the plain designa­

tion of the corresponding authorities as available from un­

classified transmissions.

This applies particularly when the address is

inserted, in normal sequence, at the beginning of the

text of a CODRESS message as prescribed by SHAPE

Directive 330 H. Furthermore, that directive auth­

orises in paragraph a the use of address groups In

the heading of CODRESS messages: by doing so, the

CODRESS safeguard is relaxed.

II. In order to deny enemy access to the content of messages,

security safeguards must be followed and even strengthened. General

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NATO C-E Board 1st Mtg Minutes (Revised)Appendix A

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precautionary measures have to be taken and the rules for use of

CODRESS and address groups, practices in force to achieve communica­

tions security, must be stated more precisely.

The following principles are proposed as necessary measures to

be considered or reinforced:

a) limit the use of messages to the matters which cannot

be dealt with by other means;

b) avoid or limit to a minimum the use of radiotelegraphy

or radiotelephony in static ground nets, especially for un­

classified traffic;

c) reallocate frequencies between short range and medium

range liaisons;

d) put the address anywhere within the text and not at

the beginning of a CODRESS message;

e) change call signs whenever frequencies or address

groups are changed;

f) conceal the authorities both in the address and in the

text of unclassified messages;

g) when classified and encrypted traffic:

1. use to the maximum the CODRESS procedure (with­

out using address groups in the heading). To

insure a correct routing, the use of routing

Indicators for tape relay procedure will have

to be extended to radiotelegraph procedure.

2. encrypt the address groups within the address

in plaindress procedure has to be used.

h) use different address groups for classified (encrypted)

messages and clear messages;

i) give to the documents controlling the establishment

of address groups a secure classification;

j) give a "Restricted" classification to messages with

no secret character but mentioning in the address {or in the

text) any indication of tactical units.

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APPENDIX "B »

ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDRESS GROUPS

I - THE PROBLEM.

1) The use of address groups would be more secure if a system

of production was available to the authorities concerned at various

echelons.

Such a system, basically composed of a dictionary and a list

of numbers would be made once and for all without giving away any

information about the quantity, the type or the location of units.

By the use of key lists, any authority could produce, change

and encrypt address groups,

A different address group could be obtained for unclassified

messages and for encrypted messages.

The same system could be used to produce call signs as well as

address groups.

Extracts of the system could be made for use in a confined area.

2) In communication systems, the relationship between security

and speed varies according to the echelon concerned. In combat, plai;

language may be authorized for immediate action. But in the planning

of an operation between commands, security considerations are domin­

ant .

Therefore it seems that two different methods have to be

determined. They are:

a) one for the lower echelons (e.g. army division or

equivalent and below), simple and easy to use providing a

security lasting at least 12 hours;

b) another one better for higher echelons, more static,

having better trained personnel and better accommodations, and

dealing with questions requiring ä great security insurance

against enemy analysis.

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Appendix "B'

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II . LOW ECHELONS SYSTEM

A system has been used within the French Air Force and it

could be used for the method mentioned in a) above (low echelons).

Its description and use are given below:

Note.- Only one hand-made raw copy of the slide rule is available

and is forwarded to SECAN as well as extracts from the

dictionary and the tables used for a more secure system.

A - Description.- The basic documents are:

i - a dictionary listing in alphabetical order, all authorities,

services or units (necessary extracts only being given to Communica­

tions Centers) each of them being given a 5 digit number;

ii - a slide rule;

iii - the communications directive concerned.

The slide rule is composed of a frame and 20 strips (or 10

printed on both sides with different figures). At the left hand

side of the frame is a fixed window. At the top of the frame, two

series of letters in the same order are for Key Identification. On

the frame two slides provide the positioning for mobile windows.

Each strip or side of strip is marked with an identifica­

tion number from 1 to 20. In addition are printed on it:

I - the 10 digits from O to 9j

ii - on two equivalent spaces, and in the same order, a series

of letters and the 10 digits in random order;

iii - on two other equivalent spaces, the letters and digits in

a different but still confused order.

Any stï’ip, except for the first 10 digits (i) is different

from all the others.

B - Use. - The communications directive indicates:

(i) which strips to use and their order (e.g . 1, 5j 4, 2, 3.)

(ii) on which position the two slides A and B have to be,

position given by a key letter shown in the upper small window

(e.g. J for slide A, C for slide B).

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NATO C-E

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To obtain the address groups of a unit, its characterizing

number from the dictionary is posted in the fixed window of the rule,

by pulling out the five strips.

The corresponding address groups are picked up amongst the five

series of four letters shown on the five strips in the long windows

of slides A and B, Slide A is used for address groups for unclassi­

fied messages, slide B for encrypted messages.

For a unit having . a 5 digit code number 10438 and with the

examples given in (i) and (ii) the two different address groups

chosen could be: NXFMG and PFBDR.

The rule is also used to have the call signs changed when

address groups are changed. The present call sign is shown in the

slide A window. The new one Is obtained in slide B window, by

reading the letters located on the same horizontal line as the

present call sign letters.

Keeping the same positions as those given above for an example

of address groups, a call sign N7F is changed to F3B.

NOTE: The other two strips provided with the slide rule can be

considered as optional. They are used within the French Air Force

to send in a concealed form in the text of messages, complete

references of documents issued by commands or headquarters. The

abbreviations marked on these two strips are the commonly used short

titles or numbers for the different bureaux or directions.

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Ill - HIGH ECHELONS SYSTEM.

This system could be composed of:

1.- a dictionary (one for peacetime - one for wartime)

listing:

a) in alphabetical order, every type of authority,

service or unitj

b) in numerical order, a series of numbers from

which the particular number of an outfit is selected;

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2 - 2 Keys giving the page of reference;

1 Key giving the right line in the page;

Two different places on each page would be used to

determine two possibilities for address groups encryption: one for

unclassified messages and the other for the non-CODHESS encrypted

messages.

Two systems could be made; one for inter-allied use ;

one for high echelons within each operation theater.

X

X X

The purpose of all these proposed measures is to make enemy

traffic analysis more difficult.

An ideal solution to deny enemy access to radio traffic would

be to encrypt and to send all messages using CQDRESS procedure.

But this will, only be possible when a telecypher machine is avail­

able for radiotélégraphie communications.

The French authorities wish to make known that they are working

with an Italian firm (Teledactylomorse) on the problem of conversion

from teleprinter 5 unit code to Morse code, and vice-versa.

Since the signals of these two codes are Identical, a telecypher

used with a teleprinter could encrypt Morse signals with the same

degree of security. By that means, encypherment would be automatic,

without extra delay, and all messages could be sent in clear with

CODRESS procedure, either by radioteletype or by radiotelegraphy.

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Appendix B

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11 August 1954

COPY NO,

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

to the

HOLDERS OF NATO C-S BOARD 1ST MTG MINUTES (REVISED)

Holders of the NATO C-E Board 1st Mtg Minutes (Revised), dated

25 June 1954 and enclosed to SGM-46O-54, are requested to delete the

present paragraph under Item 2, Section G, page 34, and to substi­

tute the following therefor :

SECRET - NATOCorrig. to NATO C-E Board 1st Mtg Minutes (Revised) ^ ^

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