APPLYING GAME THEORY TO THE BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER IN UNIVERSITIES

QIAN MENG, XU LIU, AND XIAODONG XUHuazhong University of Science and Technology

Academic power and administrative power are the 2 basic types of authority in a university. While closely related to each other, they are at the same time opposed to each other. Whether a university is dominated by academic power or administrative power, they are all influenced by the political and market needs of the country. Game theory is an effective tool to analyze the relationship between academic power and administrative power. In this study we analyzed the game relationships between these 2 types of authority in universities with the help of a prisoners dilemma game model, to achieve a new theoretical interpretation of the balance between academic power and administrative power.

Keywords: academic power, administrative power, game theory, theoretical research, prisoners dilemma.

Since 1978, reform has become the main thrust of social development in China. Society, consequently, pays the costs, resulting in a risky and often difficult transformation. As a social organization, a university is not exempt from the reform process. However, such reforms often produce unpleasant results, whereby unreasonable restrictions are placed upon the development of the university (Peng & Liu, 2006; Shi, 2006; Ye, 2011). In Chinas universities, administrative power exerts much more influence than does academic power, because of Chinas

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY, 2014, 42(6), 913-920 Society for Personality Researchhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2014.42.6.913

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Qian Meng, School of Education, Xu Liu, School of Public Administration, and Xiaodong Xu, School of Education, Huazhong University of Science and Technology.This research was supported by the Scientific Research Fund of Hunan Provincial Education Department (11C1149) and Hunan Association of Education Researchers Programs (XJK011CGD004). The authors thank the staff at the Decision Analysis Laboratory, Huazhong University of Science and Technology.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Xiaodong Xu, School of Education, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, No. 1037 Luoyu Road, Wuhan, Hubei Province 430074, Peoples Republic of China. Email: mengqian_china@hotmail.com

BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER914power-centralized political model and centralized administrative system. This means that university administrators have more power than academic staff do.

The coexistence of administrative power and academic power is the characteristic of higher education governance structure. The configuration of power decides the pattern of resource allocation. In the case of administrative power being stronger than academic power, administrative staff members have more authority over resources allocation when compared with academic staff. Game theory is the theory regarding conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers. It can be used to effectively analyze the interests behind the conflict. In this way, using game theory to analyze the academic and administrative powers of a university can assist in defining boundaries and forming a reasonable power structure. Using the classic prisoners dilemma game model, in this study we analyzed the game relationships between administrative power and academic power, with the aim of finding a new theoretical explanation for the balance between academic power and administrative power.

The Basic Elements of the Game: Administrative Powerand Academic Power

Power conflict is the most common phenomenon in human society and power is the most basic element of an organization (Clark, 1986). As a social organization, a university has the double characteristic of being an academic as well as a social organization. Administrative power and academic power, as two distinctive authorities in a university, have differing missions, responsibilities, scopes, contents, and operational mechanisms. Academic power is concerned with the implementation and guarantee of academic standards, protecting the rights and interests of academic staff, and assuring the development of discipline according to its logic. Administrative power is principally concerned with ensuring the implementation of national education policy and law, and assuring the efficiency of management. The win-win situation between academic and administrative authorities is the ultimate goal of the reform of the university internal management system.

Altbach, Gumport, and Berdahl (1998) pointed out that along with the expansion of university administrative power comes increasing control over the budget and planning of a university. This dual property of universities leads to the issues: (a) how to coordinate the inherent conflict, and (b) how to adjust and balance academic and administrative powers. Therefore, reaching an acceptable balance between the two powers is an institutional necessity for the resolution of a universitys internal conflicts. In China, the independent consciousness of universities is weak. At present, the greatest concern is the Chinese governments control over the university decision-making process, creating serious bureaucratic

BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER 915problems in the management of universities (Hayhoe, 1996; Lin, 1993). The government maintains firm control of universities through financial allocation and the appointment of university officials, such as the president and secretary of the Party Committee. On behalf of the government, the president and secretary govern the university, control the allocation of various resources, and have a decisive voice in decision making, whereas teachers and students, the most significant members of a university, have fewer opportunities to speak up and let their thoughts be known.

Table 1. The Game Model of Academic Power and Administrative Power

Administrator Centralization Decentralization

Academic staff Work hard Pa1, Pb1 Pa2, Pb2 Do not work hard Pa3, Pb3 Pa4 = 0, Pb4

Game Model of Academic Power and Administrative PowerThe game model shown in Table 1 is based on the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There will be two participants in the game: administrators and academic staff, both of whom have special rational interests, clear utility functions, and value preferences, and the ability to judge accurately on revenue whereby each attempts to maximize the benefits to themselves.Hypothesis 2: Administrators will have two strategies: (a) centralization, and (b) decentralization.Hypothesis 3: Academic staff will have two strategies: (a) work hard, and (b) do not work hard.

Based on the above hypotheses, the game matrix of academic power and administrative power is as follows (see Table 1):

a. We define the revenue of academic staff as Pa, and the revenue of administrators as Pb.

b. Pa1 stands for the revenue of academic staff under the condition centralized, work hard; Pa2 stands for the revenue of academic staff under the condition decentralized, work hard; Pa3 stands for the revenue of academic staff under the condition centralized, do not work hard; the revenue of academic staff under the condition decentralized, do not work hard is Pa4, which equals zero.

c. Pb1 stands for the revenue of administrators under the condition centralized, work hard; Pb2 stands for the revenue of administrators under the condition decentralized, work hard; Pb3 stands for the revenue of administrators under the condition centralized, do not work hard; Pb4 stands for the revenue of administrators under the condition decentralized, do not work hard.

BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER916d. We assumed decentralization means academic staff autonomy is respected

and academic freedom is fully guaranteed. In this way, academic staff can gain more revenue; therefore, Pa2 > Pa1.

e. If academic staff members use the work hard strategy, administrators taking the centralized strategy will gain more revenue than when taking the decentralized strategy. This means that Pb1 > Pb2. Similarly, if academic staff use the do not work hard strategy, administrators taking the centralized strategy will get more revenue than when taking the decentralized strategy, so Pb3 > Pb4.

f. Under the centralized condition, administrators will get more revenue if academic staff use the work hard strategy rather than the do not work hard strategy, so Pb1 > Pb3. Under the decentralized condition, administrators will get more revenue if academic staff use the work hard strategy rather than the do not work hard strategy, so Pb2 > Pb4.

Because Pb1 > Pb2 and Pb3 > Pb4, whereas Pb1 > Pb3 and Pb2 > Pb4, we conclude that Pb1 is the best strategy, and Pb4 is the worst strategy. Thus, we deduce that, for administrators, centralized, work hard is the optimal strategy, whereas decentralized, do not work hard is the least effective strategy.

The Analysis of Game Results

We analyzed the game results under different situations. If administrators use the centralization strategy, then academic staff may be able to hitchhike, i.e., just sit and enjoy the revenue (under this situation, Pa1 < Pa3 < Pa2). With Pb2 Pb3 and Pb2 Pb1, we used the following simulative digitals to indicate the above parameter model (see Table 2).

Table 2. The Simulative Digitals of the Game Model of Academic Power and Administrative Power

Administrator Centralization Decentralization

Academic staff Work hard 2, 6 4, 5 Do not work hard 3, 4 0, 2

As can be seen from Table 2, administrators decentralization strategy and academic staff members work hard strategy is the Pareto optimal, a state of resource allocation in which it is impossible to make one individual better off without causing at least one other individual to be worse off. When academic staff members choose strategies, the preponderant strategy of an administrator is centralization, not decentralization. Similarly, when administrators choose strategies, the best choice is centralization. Corresponding to this strategy, do not

BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER 917work hard is the optimal strategy for academic staff. Therefore, centralization, do not work hard, is associated with the Nash equilibrium, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and, therefore, no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy. A scenario can contain multiple or no Nash equilibriums. In this study the Nash equilibrium is achieved through the rational consideration of administrators and academic staff who fall into a prisoners dilemma, one of the best known game strategies in which it is demonstrated that two people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do so (Osborne, 2003).

There are two Nash equilibriums in this game model: centralization, do not work hard; and decentralization, work hard, and the appearance of each of these depends on the specific situation. Decentralization, work hard is the combination strategy whereby administrators and academic staff achieve more revenue. Although centralization, do not work hard is not conducive to the development of the academic institution, both academics and administrators can benefit from this combination. Therefore, effective administrators should use the decentralization strategy in order to promote and maintain the interest of academic staff and to ensure that academic staff will use the work hard strategy.

In Table 2, compared with the first and third quadrants, the first quadrant is obviously the Pareto optimal, whereby academic staff and administrators can achieve a win-win situation. However, the value changes of Pb1 in the second quadrant and Pa4 in the fourth quadrant will change the result of the game. Avoiding a prisoners dilemma would require a decrease in the value of Pb1 and an increase in the value of Pa4. A decreased value of Pb1 means that a university can provide a comfortable environment for academic staff. Faculty governance and democratic decision making are the characteristics of the university decen-tralization strategy (Miller & Katz, 2004). The increased value of Pa4 means academic staff members understand that if they do not work hard they will get less revenue than will peers or colleagues. We conclude that a university should reduce undue administrative power, and give supremacy to the academic and advocate the value of truth. Only if we respect the value of truth, can academic staff achieve supremacy and hold the decisive power in decision making.

In the game model, both academic staff and administrators are concerned with maximizing their own interests, but individual rational choices cannot definitely lead to collective rationality. Collectivism is associated most strongly with personal responsibility and with strong social support networks (Finkelstein, 2011). The game model of academic and administrative power also supports the classic truth of game theory: it is not possible to create a definitive model that guarantees the individual freedom and rights and generates a reasonable distribution of interests (Colman, Pulford, & Rose, 2008). All players strategies should be in favor of achieving Pareto optimality. Obviously, in the above game

BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER918model, the expected equilibrium is the decentralization, work hard strategy, aimed at promoting academic freedom and academic development.

The System Construction and Behavior Adjustment Under Pareto Optimality

Through discussion of the game strategy of academic staff and administrators, we refer to two questions: (a) How should we adjust our behaviors to break the prisoners dilemma, and (b) What kind of university system do we need to achieve Pareto optimality?

Whether an administrator chooses a centralization or decentralization strategy, having academic staff with a strong sense of responsibility and initiative is crucial to achieving the mission of the university (Zhang, 2011). Therefore, regardless of the power state between the centralization and decentralization interval, the university should limit the ability of academic staff to achieve their interests through hitchhiking, negative coping, or doing only the minimum amount of work to complete their duties. That is to say, in the above game model, Pa1 should be made to lead to Pa3, but it should be noted that, with fierce competition between different disciplines, excessive expansion of academic power is likely to open the door to academic bureaucracy, which tends to ignore market influence and efficiency, and, thus, influences the capacity to realize the universitys goals.

Analysis of this game model suggests two phenomena. First, for administrators, costs rise when they use the decentralization strategy, increasing the probability of academic staff preferring to use the work hard strategy. Costs are reduced when administrators use the centralization strategy meaning academic staff members are more reluctant to use the work hard strategy, so that they then move in opposite directions. Second, when administrators use the centralization strategy and academic staff members use the do not work hard strategy, if the utility Pa3 increases, the probability of administrators choosing centralization decreases. This is because, as explained above, academic staff can achieve more revenue with minimal effort on the back of administrative power.

North (1981) pointed out that a system is a series of rules, procedures and law-abiding behavior of the moral and ethical norms, which seeks to pursue the main constraints to maximize the effectiveness of well-being or personal behavior (p. 226). Therefore, a system may be a possible way to avoid the prisoners dilemma. A system consists of both endogenous and exogenous rules. Endogenous rules would require academic staff to understand the promotion of academic development as the nature of their job. Only if they choose to work hard will they be able to achieve more revenue, otherwise they will be surpassed by peers, especially when they have limited resources. Exogenous rules require a university to create a suitable environment for the development of academic

BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER 919excellence. The level of leader self-sacrifice is positively associated with team identification (Ruggieri & Abbate, 2013). In the case of a university, this would involve administrators giving academic staff the right to teach, to do research, and to be master of their fields. Only by setting up both endogenous and exogenous rules, can a university control the interest payoff between administrative and academic players.

Academic and administrative powers are the basic distinctive authorities in a university. Reciprocity serves as a moderator for players (Yang, Li, & Zheng, 2013). Although their operation is based on different values, goals, procedures, functions, and roles, the common denominator is that they all serve the achievement of university goals. For administrators, management should comply with the inherent development of discipline and serve the academic institution. For academic power, when academic freedom collides with management efficiency, scholars can obtain the best development space for the academy through cooperation, consultation, dialogue, and democratic procedures rather than arbitrarily calling for academic freedom, autonomy, and the disruption of organizational orders, which ultimately leads to the legitimation crisis of academic authority. Achieving a win-win situation for academic and administrative powers is necessary for the development of a university.

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