appendix - springer978-0-230-62132-9/1.pdf · table a1 the 1992 ndp general-secretariat name title...

Table A1 The 1992 NDP General-Secretariat

Name Title

Minister of Agriculture Youssef Wali Secretary-general

Minister of state for parliamentary affairs

Kamal Al-Shazli

Assistant secretary-general and secretary for

organizational affairs

Minister of information Safwat Al-Sharif Assistant secretary-general and secretary for

Information

Sayyid Zaki Abd Al-Hadi Secretary for craftsmen

Dr. Nabiah Al-Alqami Secretary for Youth

Ahmed Waif Secretary for Financial Affairs

Mahmoud Abu Gharib Secretary for farmers

El-Sayed Rashed Secretary for workers

Dr. Mamdouh Gabr, Secretary for professionals

Zakariya Azmi Member

Mahmoud Al-Sharif Member

Husssein Kamel Baha Al-Din Member

Mohamed Ali Mahgub Member

Ibrahim Kamel Member

Mamdouh Al-Beltagi Member

Dr. Maher Mahran Member

Dr. Mohamed Zaki Abu Amar Member

Mohamed Abdellah Member

Ahmed Nouh Member

Mohamed Raghab Member

Twefiq Abdu Ismail, Member

Dr. Abd Al-Rahim Biumi Member

Aisha Abd Al-Hadi Member

Edward Ghali Member

Mahmoud Mohi Al-Din Member

Abd Al-Aiel Al-Garhi Member

Mustafa Soliman Member

Dr. Fawzia Abd Al-Satar Member

Source: Data gathered by the author from newspapers.

A P P E N D I X

Appendix204

Table A2 The 1992 NDP Politburo

Name Title

Hosni Mubarak President

Dr. Mustafa Khalil Deputy chairman for foreign affairs

Dr. Youssef Wali Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister

Dr. Ataf Sadqi Prime Minister

Dr. Fathi Sorour People’s Assembly speaker

Dr. Mustafa Helmi Shura council speaker

Safwat Al-Sharif Information Minister

Kamal Al-Shazli People’s Assembly and Shura council affairs

minister

Dr. Amal Othman Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs

Dr. Ibrahim Bdran, Former Minister of Health

Dr Abdel Salam Abd Al-Ghafer, Former Minister of Education.

Fikri Makram Ebeid Former NDP secretary general and Shura council

member

Dr. Ahmed Heikal Former Minister of Culture

Kamal Henri Abadir Head of the Defense and National Security

Committee of the People’s Assembly

Source: Data gathered by the author from newspapers.

Table A3 NDP General Secretariat 2002

Name Title Notes

Minister of information

Safwat Al-Sharif

Secretary-General New Secretary-General

Minister of state for

parliamentary affairs Kamal

Al-Shazli

Secretary-general assistant

and secretary for


Gamal Mubarak Secretary for politics New Secretary

Minister of tourism

Mamdouh Al-Beltagui

Secretary for information

Zakariya ‘Azmi Secretary for f inancial and

administrative affairs

New Secretary

Minister of youth ‘Ali

Al-Din Hilal

Secretary for training and

political indoctrination

New Secretary

Ahmed Azz Secretary for membership New Secretary

Al-Sayyid Hamad Mustafa Secretary for farmers

Al-Sayyid Rashed Secretary for workers

Moemena Kamel Secretary for women

Moufied Shehab Secretary for professionals

Hossam Al-Badrawi Secretary for public

business sector

New Secretary

‘Adel Qura Secretary for legal affairs New Secretary

Continued

Appendix 205

Table A3 Continued

Name Title Notes

Hussein Kamel Baha

Al-Din

Member Former education minister

Youssef Boutros Ghali Member Minister of f inance

Nadia Makram Ebeid Member University professor

Mohamed ‘Abdellah Member University professor

Ibrahim Kamel Member University professor

Mohamed Raghab Member Businessperson

‘Aisha ‘Abdel-Hadi Member

Fathi Qoseman Member

Mahmoud Mohi Al-Din Member

Source: Data collected by the author from different Egyptian newspapers and the NDP Web site.

Table A4 NDP Politburo 2002

Present Title

Hosni Mubarak President

Mustafa Khalil Deputy chairman for foreign affairs

Youssef Wali Deputy chairman for internal affairs

‘Ataf Ebeid Prime minister

Fathi Sorour People’s Assembly speaker

Mustafa Helmi Shura council speaker

Safwat Al-Sharif Information minister

Kamal Al-Shazli People’s Assembly and Shura council affairs minister

Amal Othman Parliament’s deputy speaker

Ahmed Hashem Head of Al-Azhar university

Hanna Nashed Former chairman of state council

Fikri Makram Ebeid Former NDP secretary general

Phillip Guirgis Former MP

Aglal Hafez Dean of faculty of commerce at Ain shams university

Source: Data collected by the author from different Egyptian newspapers and the NDP Web site.

Appendix206

Table A5 Policies-Secretariat 2002

Name Title Present Post Notes

Gamal Mubarak Secretary-General

for Policies-

Secretariat

Prominent

businessmen

President’s son

Ahmed ‘Azz Secretary-General

for membership

and Policies-

Secretariat’s

member

Prominent

businessmen

Close friend to

President’s son Gamal

Dr. Hatem

Al-Karashwi

Member Prime Minister’s

Economic adviser

Hossam

Al-Badrawi

Member Secretary for public

business sector

Close friend to


Dr. Aliah

Al-Mahdi

Member University Professor

Dr. Lobnah ‘Abd

Al-Latif


Mohmed Kamal Member University Professor. Close friend to Gamal

Mahmoud Mohi

Al-Din

Member Minister of

Investment, General-

Secretariat member.

Close friend to Gamal

Youssef Boutros

Ghali

Member Minister of foreign

commerce and NDP

General-Secretariat’s

member.


Sources: Data collected by the author from different Egyptian newspapers and the NDP Web site.

Table A6 NDP General-Secretariat 2006

Name Title Notes

Minister of Information

Safwat Al-Sharif

Secretary-General Shura Council Speaker

Secretary for Policies Gamal

Mubarak

Assistant Secretary-General Gamal is also secretary for


Mohamed Kamal Secretary for Training and

Political Indoctrination

Member of the NDP Policies-

secretariat

Zakariya ‘Azmi Secretary for Organizational,

Financial, Membership, and

Administrative affairs

Technocrat

‘Ali Al-Din Hilal Secretary for Information University professor and

ideological functionary

Continued

Appendix 207

Table A6 Continued

Name Title Notes

Ahmed ‘Azz Secretary for

Organizational Affairs

Businessman

Said ‘Abd Al-latif Secretary for Financial

and Administrative affairs

Businessman

Ahmed Mansi Secretary for Farmers Businessman

Mohamed ‘Abd Al-Halim Secretary for Workers High-ranking official in

al-fauoum governorate

Minister of Immigration and

workforces ‘Aisha ‘Abd

Al—Hadi

Secretary for Women Minister

Minister of state for

Parliamentary and Legal

Affairs Moufied Shehab

Secretary for Parliamentary

Affairs

Minister

Mohamed Naguib Abu Zad Secretary for Membership

Affairs

Professor at AUC

Mohamed Hassen Saad

Al-Haffinawi

Secretary for Professionals Professor at Cairo university

Hossam Al-Badrawi Secretary for Public

Business Sector

Businessman

Mohamed Mahmoud

Al-Dakrouri

Secretary for Legal Affairs Legal Advisor to President

Mubarak

Mohamed Ahmed ‘Abd

Al-Salem Hibah

Secretary for youth

Anas Al-Fiqi Member Businessman and minister

Youssef Boutros Ghali Member Businessman and minister

Nadia Makram Ebeid Member

Mohamed ‘Abdellah Member University professor

Ibrahim Kamel Member Businessman

Mohamed Raghab Member

Magad Al-Sharbini Member Lawyer and businessman

Youmen Al-Hamaqi Member University professor

Rashid Mohamed Rashid Member Minister

Nabiah Al-‘Alaqmi Member

Minister of Investment

Mahmoud Mohi Al-Din

Member Minister

Thrwat Thabat Basily Member Businessman

Rabah Ratib Basta Member Businessman and University

professor

Sources: Data collected by author from different Egyptian newspapers and the NDP Web site.

Appendix208

Table A7 Policies-Secretariat 2006

Name Title Present Post Notes

Gamal Mubarak Secretary-General

for Policies-

Secretariat

Prominent businessmen President’s son

Ahmed ‘Azz Secretary-General

for Organizational

Affairs and

Policies-Secretariat

member

Prominent businessmen Close friend to


Mohamed

Mahmoud

Al-Dakrouri

Member Legal Advisor to

President Mubarak

New appointee. He

replaced Dr. Hatem

al-Karashwi, Prime

minister’s economic

adviser

Currently Al-Dakrouri is

NDP Secretary for Legal

Affairs

Hossam

Al-Badrawi

Member Secretary for Public

Business Sector.

Close friend to


Dr. ‘Aliah

Al-Mahdi


Hassen Al-Syyaid

‘Abd Alah

Member New appointee. He

replaced Dr. Lobnah Abd

Al-Latif

Mohmed Kamal Member, Secretary

for Training and

Political

Indoctrination

University Professor Close friend to Gamal

Mahmoud Mohi

Al-Din

Member Minister of Investment,

General-Secretariat

member


Youssef Boutros

Ghali

Member Minister of foreign

commerce and NDP

General-Secretariat

member


Source: Data collected by author from different Egyptian newspapers and the NDP Web site.

G L O S S A R Y O F A R A B I C T E R M S

Astegouab: interpellationBayan: a political blueprint declared by Nasser in the 1968 and

soon after known as the 1968 March ProgramFeddan: roughly one acre, 4,200 square metersInfitah: such controlled economic liberalization policy issued by

Sadat in 1970sInfitahiyun or “Sadatist”: included investors who benefited from

their connections to the state apparatus and made quick money during infitah

Kasem, plural aksam: in the urban areas are analog to markez in the rural areas. Both of them constitute a separate electoral district

Manaber: platformsMarkaz, singular markez: comprises a main town—which serves

as its capital and is also sub-divided into neighborhoods—as well as village units

Modakhalat: interjectionsOmda: village chiefSheikha: According to Egypt Local Administrative system, each

rural unit or village is divided into a number of Sheikha accord-ing to its size and number of residents. Likewise, depending on that administrative system the NDP divides its basic units at the village levels into a number of Sheikha, which should not consist of less than 200 members paying their party’s member-ship fees

Shilla: Arabic for gang or groupTazkih: unopposed electoral victory or a walkoverWaffedin (outsiders): people who are not residents of the district

N O T E S

Introduction: Chronic Survival

1. P. J. Vatikiotis, Egypt’s Political Experience: The 1952 Revolution as an Expression of

the Historical Heritage, 3–29, in Shamir Shimon (ed.), Egypt from Monarchy to Republic

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995): 19.

2. Geraint Parry and Michael Moran (eds.), Democracy and Democratization (London: Rutledge,

1994): 208.

3. The single party, common in many Middle East nations, has served to disseminate ideology

and to organize political participation. Many scholars feel that the single-party system is

more an instrument of ideological indoctrination than a channel for political participation.

See Harik Iliya, The Political Mobilization of Peasants: A Study of an Egyptian Community

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974): 62–63.

4. Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978): 36; See also Iliya, Mobilization of Peasants,

66–67.

5. Ibid.

6. Ansari Hamied, Egypt, the Stalled Society, (Albany: State University of New York Press,

1986): 113–115.

7. Iliya, Mobilization of Peasants, 66–67.

8. Raymond William Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat, (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1978): 61.

9. Hamied, Stalled Society, 146.

10. Ibid.

11. For instance, in October 1965 Nasser appointed Zakariya Mohi Al-Din as prime minister

with a mandate to implement an austerity program for the country and to improve rela-

tions with the United States. Mohi Al-Din took the economic measures needed to trans-

form the state’s economic policies into what is known thereafter as the “open door policy,”

infitah. Prices and taxes were raised, consumer subsidies lowered, and private investment

encouraged. But Nasser abandoned this program in the mid-sixties. See Baker, Uncertain

Revolution, 90.

12. Farid Abdel Magid, Nasser: The Final Years, (Reading: Ithaca Press, First Edition 1994):

86.

13. Ibid., 87.

14. Binder, Moment of Enthusiasm, 349–50.

15. Ibid.

Notes212

One It Just Looks Like a Party

1. Kirk Beattie, Egypt Under the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, First Published, 2000):

34–35.

2. Beattie, Sadat Years, 37.

3. Ansari Hamied, Egypt, the Stalled Society, 166–67.

4. Ibid.

5. Cooper, Mark, 'The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1982): 68.

6. Cooper, Transformation of Egypt, 151–152.

7. Hinnebusch, Jr., Raymond, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an

Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Updated

Edition, 1988): 88.

8. Ibid.

9. Egypt has known political pluralism in its modern version since the turn of this century.

The turmoil of the First World War in 1914, however, interrupted party politics when

Britain declared Egypt a British protectorate. Party politics were not resumed until 1923

with the establishment of Egypt’s f irst modern constitution and the creation of numerous

political parties. This period, which lasted for some thirty years and came to be called the

“semi-liberal era,” was brought to an abrupt end by the military coup of July 23, 1952. See

for more details, Zaki Moheb, Civil Society & Democratization in Egypt, 1981–1994 (Cairo:

The Ibn Khaldoun Center & Konrad Adenauer-Stifung, 1994): 75–76.

10. Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, 135.

11. Ibid.

12. According to Professor Roger Owen, the recent retreat from state-centered policies and

move toward more open economic and/or political systems in various countries in the

Middle East are primarily due to the economic diff iculties of the late 1970s and the early

1980s. In this respect, the Egypt economy was stagnant, growth having fallen to perhaps

1 percent by 1974 while, in good part because of defense burdens, average private con-

sumption was actually around 7 percent lower than the consumption a decade earlier. The

country labored under a staggering debt load, estimated at $4 billion to $10 billion, and the

1974 debt service absorbed 40 percent of the earnings on exports. See Ellis Goldberg, Resat

Kasaba, and Joel Migdal, “Introduction,” in Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal

(eds.), Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society (Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 1993): 3–14, 8. See also Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics Under Sadat, 57.

13. Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics Under Sadat, 59.

14. Economic Minister Abd Al-Aziz Hagazi has explained that the open door is not a repu-

diation of Nasser’s emphasis on the public sector, but rather an attempt to build in a new

situation on the formulations Nasser erected: “we needed nationalization to build up our

infra-structure and give work to people. Now we have moved into a new stage. Those state

companies have to start being profitable. And now there is a place for foreign investment.”

See Baker, Uncertain Revolution, 146.

15. The implications of the “opening” strategy for Egypt and its place in the world were long-

standing. The origin of the policy can be traced to Nasser’s economic retrenchment of the

mid-sixties and his post-1967 moves (especially the acceptance of the Roger Plan) to wel-

come the United States back into the Middle East area. Sadat carried the logic of Nasser’s

strategy further when, in 1971, he inaugurated discussion of an expanded liberalization of

the Egyptian economy, which would eventually reintegrate Egypt into the Western world

market. See Baker, Uncertain Revolution, 135.

16. Cooper, Transformation of Egypt, 126.

17. Baker, Uncertain Revolution, 193.

Notes 213

18. Beattie, Sadat Years, 167–68.

19. Cooper, Transformation of Egypt, 91.

20. See Amani Qandil, The Democratic Transformation Process in Egypt (1981–1993) (in

Arabic), The Ibn Khaldoun Center, ND, 47–52.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: Tauris,

2000): 24.

25. Prominent centrists included ‘Ali Sabri, Shaarawi Gumaa, Sami Sharaf, Muhammad Faiq,

Amin Huweidi, and ‘Abd Al-Muhsin Abu Al-Nur, all of whom come from military back-

grounds. On the other hand, rightists were doubtful of Egypt’s association with the Soviet

bloc, but for varying reasons. They were also more inclined to seek ways to reach out to

Western countries so as not to leave Egypt too dependent upon the Soviet bloc. The right-

ists’ power was great, especially in the military and security apparatuses, but also in the

public sector companies and the bureaucracy.

26. Hinnebusch, Egyptian Poltics Under Sadat, 160.

27. See El-Mikawy Noha, The Building of Consensus in Egypt’s Transition Process (Cairo: The

American University in Cairo Press, 1999): 64–66.


29. Noha, Building of Consensus, 35.

30. Ibid.

31. Noha, Building of Consensus, 35.

32. Ilyas al-Ayyubi, in his book (The Age of Ismail), mentions that in the first session of the par-

liamentary council formed in 1866, Sharif Pasha, minister of the interior, delivered a speech

to the representatives, in which he said that European parliaments are always divided into

two parties: one that supports the government and one that opposes it. This being the case,

they ought to divide themselves likewise into two parties, one with the government and

one against it. The men of the government party would sit to the right and those of the

opposition would sit to the left, he said. Hearing this, the representatives all hurried to take

their seats to the right, shouting, “we are all the salves of our Effendi (the khedive), and so

how could we be in opposition to his government!!” See Amin Husayn Ahmad, “The crisis

of the individual in Egypt,” in Saghie Hazim, The Predicament of the Individual in the Middle

East (London: Saqi Books, 2001): 60–80, 70–71.

33. Kassem, May, In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt (Reading: Ithaca

Press, First Edition 1999), 42.

34. Mona Makram-Ebeid, Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality? The

Middle East Journal 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 428.

35. Ibid., 425–426.

36. Ibid., 15.

37. Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas

and Challenges for US Foreign Policy” ( July 2005). www.StretagicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil, 6.

38. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002): 66–67.

39. Kassem, Guise of Democracy, 10.

40. Ibid., 10.

41. Ibid., 40–42.

42. Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat Years, 160.

43. Roger Owen, “Socio-Economic Change and Political Mobilization: The Case of Egypt,

183–199,” in Ghassan Salamê (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in

the Muslim World (London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001): 185.

Notes214

44. Samuel Huntington argues that the world began to experience a “third wave of democra-

tization” in the mid-1970s, with its f irst visible result being the collapse of Portugal’s then

dictatorship (the first two waves came in the early nineteenth century and just after the

Second World War). The collapse of the Soviet Union led to many of its component and

satellite states gaining full or partial democracy (though not those in Central Asia). Much of

Latin America had gone from dictatorship to democracy during that time, with the notable

exception of Cuba. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization on the Late

Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). However,

according to Derek Reveron a fourth wave has started, it probably began with Afghanistan’s

presidential elections on October 9, 2004. One can also add that the color revolution in

Georgia, Ukraine, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan, and the revolution of elitists in Egypt were

clear examples of that unf ledged fourth wave of democratization. See Derek Reveron,

“Democracy Spreads: Is the World on the Cusp of a Fourth Wave of Democratization?”

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment (October 14, 2005).

45. Ibid.

46. The term “semi-authoritarian” was set forth and popularized by Marina Ottaway to denote

these hybrid regimes because labels that include the word democracy are not adequate

to capture their defining feature, namely, their deliberately designed character. Semi-

authoritarian regimes are not failed democracies or democracies in transition; rather, they

are carefully constructed and maintained alternative systems. If semi-authoritarian gov-

ernments had their way, the system would never change. Egypt has developed a particu-

larly resilient, almost institutionalized, semi-authoritarianism that has already lasted more

than twenty years and even survived the transition from the presidency of Anwar Sadat

to that of Mubarak. However, some semi-authoritarian countries fall close to the author-

itarian end, such as Egypt, and there are others that are closer to the democratic end. See,

for more details, Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003): 7–10. And see, for

hybrid regimes that resemble to a great extent semi-authoritarian regimes, Carl Gershman

and Michael Allen, “New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy Assistance,”

Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 36. Generally, semi-authoritarianism is simi-

lar to liberalized autocracy, which is a system of rule that allows for a measure of political

openness and competition in the electoral, party, and press arenas, while ultimately ensur-

ing that power rests in the hands of ruling regimes. This mix of control and openness has

not only benefited ruling elites, but oppositions as well. It gives them room to “let off

steam,” to criticize regimes, and occasionally to affect public policy. See Daniel Brumberg,

Democratization versus Liberalization, v.

Two Addicted to Hegemony

1. Wali was born in 1930. In 1951 he was one of the first graduates of the newly estab-

lished agriculture college at Cairo University. He earned a doctorate in agronomy at the

University of Arizona in 1958. In 1981 he was a genuine unknown in Egyptian national

politics, and to most he appeared to be a simple technocrat. In 1982 Wali was named as

a minister of agriculture and began delegating administrative responsibility to a coterie

of close friends and advisers whom he appointed as undersecretaries to various divisions.

Some of his followers were power brokers—men who knew how to turn money, favors,

and family contacts into sources of inf luence. See for an excellent analysis, Yahya Sadowski,

Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucratic in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture

(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991): 134–135.

Notes 215

2. Kamal Al-Shazli is a veteran politician who has occupied a parliamentary seat for a record

period—from 1964 until the present. He has been a leading member of all ruling politi-

cal parties in succession. In 1976, he joined the “centre platform,” which later became the

ASPE, led by Mamdouh Salem. Two years later, Al-Shazli was one of about 250 personal-

ities who quit the Misr Party to join the NDP upon its establishment by Sadat. In the same

year he was appointed by Sadat as the NDP’s Assistant Secretary-General and also Secretary

for Organizational Affairs.

3. Gamal Mubarak is a former investment banker with the Bank of America in Cairo and

London. While chairing the private equity fund, Medinvest Associates Ltd., he founded

the Future Generation Foundation in November 1998, an NGO that focuses on execu-

tive leadership training and human resource development, readying young Egyptians for

the job market so as to secure for Egypt a prominent position on the global economic

map. The Future Generation Foundation and Participatory Development: Working for a

Better Tomorrow were both featured in the United Nations Development Program. See

(no author) “The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War,” International

Crisis Group, (ICG) Middle East Briefing, (Cairo/Brussels, September 30, 2003): 12.

4. Al-Ahram, October 31, 1984.

5. Wahid ‘Abdel Maggid, “Egyptian Political Parties from Inside” (in Arabic), Al-Mahrousa for

Publishing and Documentation (Cairo, 1993): 167.

6. Robert Springborg, Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of Political Order (Boulder & London:

Westview Press, 1989): 22.

7. ‘Ali Al-Din Hilal (ed.), “The 1984 Election: Study and Analysis” (in Arabic), Al-Ahram

Center for Political and Strategic Studies, ACPSS (Cairo, 1986), 28–29.

8. According to Egypt Local Administrative Law, each rural governorate is divided into mar-

akez (districts) and may also include one or more independent towns. An independent town

is one that does not include villages under its administrative jurisdiction. These towns

are subdivided into neighborhoods. A markaz, singular markez, comprises of a main town

(which serves as its capital and is also subdivided into neighborhoods) as well as village

units. Kasem, plural aksam, in the urban areas are analogous to markez in the rural areas.

Both of them constitute a separate electoral district.

9. Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (London: Routledge,

First Published 1991): 54.

10. The Middle East, December 1981.

11. May Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy, 77.

12. Sadowski, Political Vegetables?, 129–130.

13. As under Nasser, the president is officially installed by referendum. Since the PA can only

refer one person to a national plebiscite (article 76), the president does not have to compete

for his position.

14. Springborg, Mubarak’s Egypt, 191–192.

15. Ayubi Nazih, Government and the State in Egypt Today, 1–20, in Tripp, and Owen (eds.),

Egypt under Mubarak (London and New York: Rutledge, 1991): 14.




19. The independents won 35 percent of the seats and represented 155 candidates. The party’s

official winners were 260 out of 444 candidates to its parliamentary category. By adding

the independents and official candidates together, the party held at least 80 percent of the

seats.

20. Mohmed Kamal Al-Qadi, Electoral Campaign (in Arabic), (Cairo 1995), 75.

21. Yassin Al-Sayyaid, “The 1990 Arab Strategic Report” (ASR), Al-Ahram Center for Political

and Strategic Studies, ACPSS (Cairo, 1991): 380–381.

Notes216


23. Al-Sayyaid (ed.), The 1990 ASR, 380–381.

24. Al-Ahram, November 6, 1991.

25. Al-Ahram, September 24, 1991.

26. Al-Sayyaid (ed.), The 1990 ASR, 380–381.


28. Akher Saiah, September 25, 1991.

29. Al-Ahram, December 22, 1993.

30. Mayo, December 20, 1993.

31. Roger Owen, Socio-Economic Change and Political Mobilization: 186–189.

32. Hala Mustafa, “The 2000 Election: General Remarks” (in Arabic), 58–63, in Journal

of Democracy, Arabic journal issued by state-owned Al-Ahram Foundation, no. 1

(Winter 2001): 58–59. See also the 2000 Arab Strategic Report, (ASR), (ACPSS,

Cairo, 2001).

33. Vickie Langohr, Cracks in Egypt’s Electoral Engineering, the 2000 Vote, Middle East Report

Online, November 7, 2000.

34. Akhbar Al-Youm, October 28, 2000.

35. Al-Ahram, January 2, 2002.

36. Khaled Dawoud, “Only a Beginning,” Ahram Weekly, September 19–25, 2002.

37. According to Safieddine Kharboush, member of the NDP Higher Council for Policies, and

deputy dean of the Cairo University Faculty of Economics and Political Science and adviser

to the Minister of Youth, Reform of the party structure was inspired by the example of

Tony Blair’s transformation of the British Labor Party as well as the experiences of majority

parties in Malaysia and Denmark. See (no author), “The Challenge of Political Reform:

Egypt after the Iraq war,” International Crisis Group, (ICG) Middle East Briefing, Cairo/

Brussels, September 30, 2003, 11.

38. Al-Ahram, August 1, 2001.

39. Essam El-Din Gamal, Target NDP, Al-Ahram Weekly, December 4–10, 2003.

40. Al-Ahram, June 2, 2001.

41. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Typically Lackluster,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 27/June 2, 2004.

42. Al-Ahram, April 29, 2002.

43. Al-Ahram, July 15, 2002.

44. Al-Ahram, July 24, 2002.

45. Mahmoud Mohi Al-Din summarized the NDP’s New Thought as follows: “We’re moving

from a party that relies on a few people to a party of institutions.” This point was reiterated

by Gamal Mubarak in his address to the NDP Annual Conference on September 26, 2003.

See (no author), The Challenge of Political Reform, 11–12.

46. Essam El-Din Gamal, The Dawn of a New Era, Al-Ahram Weekly, September 19, 2002.

47. Ibid.

48. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Countdown to ‘New Thinking,’ ” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 12,

2002.

49. See for more detailed information: http:/www.ndp.org.eg/en/Book/unite2_ch5.aspx.

50. Al-Ahram Weekly, September12–18, 2002.

51. See for more detailed information, http:/www.ndp.org.eg/en/Book/unite2_ch5.aspx.

52. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Shake-up of NDP,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 19, 2002.

53. Wali lost the remaining 15 percent of his power after losing his parliamentary seat in the

2005 election.

54. The members of the PS’s Political Bureau are Gamal Mubarak; Ahmed ‘Azz, parliamen-

tarian, steel magnate, and head of the parliament’s budget committee; Hatem Qaranshawi,

economic adviser to the Prime Minister; Hossam Badrawi, parliamentarian and head of the

parliament’s education committee; ‘Alia Mahdi, deputy dean of the Cairo University Faculty

of Economics and Political Science; Lobna ‘Abd Al-Latif, economist; Mohamed Kamal,

Notes 217

professor of politics at Cairo University; Mahmoud Mohi Al-Din; and Youssef Boutros

Ghali, minister of foreign trade. See (no author), The Challenge of Political Reform, 12.

55. Mona El-Ghobashy, “Egypt Looks Ahead to Portentous Year,” Middle East Report online,

www.merip.org, February 2, 2005.

56. See for the full names of members of the Policies-Secretariat’s Higher Council and their

different professionals, Mayo, November 5, 2002; Al-Akhbar, November 5, 2002. See the

NDP Web site: www.ndp.org.eg

57. Gamal Essam El-Din, “Whipping the NDP into Line,” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 31,

2002.

58. Gamal Essam El-Din, “NDP Congress’ Aftershocks,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 26,

2002.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. No author, “Egypt: Municipal Elections Postponed, Ruling Party Changes,” Arab Reform

Bulletin, 4, no. 1 (February 2006).

62. El-Hennawy Noha, “All Politics Is Local,” Egypt Today, March 2006.

63. Ibid.

64. El-Hennawy Noha, “All Politics Is Local,” Egypt Today, March 2006.

65. I will explore the Othmanist f irst generation and Othmanist second generation in a later

chapter.

66. See for more details, El-Mikawy Noha, “The Building of Consensus in Egypt,” 64–66.

67. Interview with ‘Ali Lotfi, Al-Ahrar, September 8, 1997.

68. El-Mikawy Noha, “The Building of Consensus in Egypt,” 64–66.

69. Sonbol El-Azhary Amira, The New Mamluks, Egyptian Society and Modern Feudalism,

(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 172.

70. Kassem, Guise of Democracy, 81.


72. Ibid., 172.

73. No author, The Challenge of Political Reform, 11.

Three The Tug of War

1. The absence of f irm procedures for selecting party lists, and the fact that NDP candidates

f ight each other to win seats, is the main reason for the poor performance of the NDP in the

parliamentary election. For instance, the party’s factual results were 58 percent, 70 percent,

39 percent, and 34 percent in the 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections, respectively. It

is also responsible for the emergence of NDP-independents and aggravating intra-party

opposition inside the PA.

2. May Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy, 82.

3. Al-‘Alam Al-Youm, October 8, 1995.

4. Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 242, October 12–18, 1995, an interview with Kamal

Al-Shazli.

5. Al-Ahram, October 11, 1995.

6. Given that the party fields 444 candidates, the president needs 1,776 hours; and given also

that Mubarak focuses eight hours per day, he needs 222 days or seven months to assess the

candidates as suggested. It is ridiculous!

7. For useful analysis of this event, see, for example, Al-Ahrar, October 12, 1995; Al-Ahrar,

October 13, 1995; and Al-Akhebar, January 5, 1995.

8. ‘Abdelah Mou’ad Galal, “People’s Assembly Election in the district of Benha,” in ‘Aloi

Mustfa (ed.), The 2000 Election, 319–321. See also Al-Akhebar, November 9, 2000.

Notes218

9. Al-Wafd, October 10, 2000.

10. Shahine Gihan, “A Taboo Too Far?,” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 13–19, 2006.

11. Alaa Al-Aswani, The Yacoubian Building (in Arabic) (Cairo: Madbouli Bookshop, First pub-

lished July 2002): 114–123.

12. Frederik Richter, “Money, Power and Parliament,” Cairo Magazine, November 3, 2005.

13. Miser Al-Fatah, April 20, 1992, an interview with Hamdi Al-Sayyed.

14. Akhbar Al-Youm, November 11, 2000.

15. Historically speaking, the independent phenomenon is not a new feature in Egypt’s parlia-

mentary history, but rather it has developed since the monarchical era. Similar to the NDP-

independents, there are also Al-Wafd-independents, but they are never allowed to rejoin

the party after winning the seat. Nor does Al-Wafd seek to readmit them to the party ranks.

As such, in 1976 they contributed almost 84 percent of all opposition activities and almost

28 percent of all parliamentary activities, although they occupied only 14 percent of the

parliament seats. Only in 1987 were their seat share and their contribution to parliamentary

activities over-shadowed by other opposition members. The percentage of the independent

MPs have begun to totter since 1990. Their highest rate was in 1990, when they constituted

13 percent and their lowest rate was in the 2005 parliament, when they contributed only

5 percent of the members.

16. For instance, in Japan, LDP-supporters who did not receive official endorsement could still

stand as independent candidates, maintaining a dynamic system within the party, despite

the fact that it was the party in power for more than thirty-five years. This meant that can-

didates from the same party were competing against each other to some extent. To ensure

that voters remain loyal, the candidate has to establish a personal support group—Koenkai.

The Koenkai system is the analogue of the ‘Asbia in Egyptian political system and is very

expensive to create and maintain. To keep followers loyal, it is necessary to send gifts,

f lowers, or cards for births, marriages, and deaths, as well as cards at New Year and mid-

summer, to members of the Koenkai and their families. See for a scholarly discussion of that

point, Ian Neary, The State and Politics in Japan (London: Polity Press in Association with

Blackwell Publishers, First Published, 2002): 72–73.

17. Ouda Jihad El-Borai Negad and Hafez Abu Se’ada, “A Door Onto the Desert, the Egyptian

Parliamentary Elections of 2000, Course, Dilemmas, and Recommendations for the

Future: A Political and Legal Study,” Friedrich Neumann Foundation, The Regional Office

for the Middle East & North Africa and United Group—Lawyers, Legal and Economic Advisors,

Research & Training Unit, (Cairo, 2000): 52–58.

18. Moheb, Civil Society & Democratization, 95–97.

19. Al-Akhbar, November 9, 2000.

20. ‘Abdelah Mou’ad Galal, “The 2000 Election,” 312.

21. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 142–143.

22. Hamzawy Amr and Nathan J. Brown, “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More

Democratic Future?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of

Law (December 2005): 2.

23. Al-Osbou’, March 20, 2006.

24. Ibid.

25. Abrahim Nagui, “The Evolution of the PA Performance, The First Annual Report of

the Second Session 1996–1997” (in Arabic), (Democracy Development Group, Cairo

1997), 145.

26. If one NDP MP seeks to submit an interpellation, he should first direct it to the NDP’s

leaders who ultimately decide its fate. See El-Borai Negad, et.al., Door onto the Desert.

27. “The Arab Strategic Report, 2001–2002,” Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

(Cairo, 2002): 131.

28. See Al-Ahram, December 20, 2000; Al-Ahram, December 27, 2000.

Notes 219

29. There are other similar examples to that of Nour, one such example is when sixty-two NDP

MPs voted for selecting Al-Mahguib as PA Speaker. See Ismail Gamal, The Trial of the People

Assembly (in Arabic), (Cairo, 1985): 95–96.


31. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Opposition MPs Ready Their Guns,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

November 28–December 4, 2002.

32. Abd Al-Latif Omayma, “ ‘Restless’ Majority,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 22–28, 2005.

33. Ibid.

34. Al-‘Arabi, March 12, 2006.

35. The PA speaker states that some 357 deputies had responded to the premier’s statement,

including 235 NDP MPs, 114 independent MPs, six Al-Wafd, and two Tagammu’. See

Al-Osbou’, March 13, 2006.

36. Ibid.

37. See for more details ‘Abd Al-Maggid Wahid, 212–216.

38. Ibid.

39. Al-Ahali, August 26, 1998.

40. Al-Wafd, October 19, 1998.

41. Al-‘Arabi, October 12, 1998.

42. ‘Amer Al-Shobeky, “The Organisational Structure of Egypt’s Political Parties” (in Arabic),

in Ahmed Al-Moslmani (ed.), Political Parties in Egypt: The Reality and the Future (in Arabic),

Democracy Development Group (Cairo 1999): 101–123, 115–118.

43. Ibid.

44. Hamouda ‘Adel, “Kamel Al-Ganzouri, and Me: “Secrets Behind the Scene Struggle in the

Politics and Journalism,” (in Arabic), Al-Forsan ( January 2000): 22.

45. Al-Osbou’, April 17, 2006.

46. Roz Al-Youssef, March 1, 1999.


48. Ibid.

49. Al-Ahali, June 29, 1988.

50. Al-Ahali, June 10, 1992.

51. Al-Ahram, December 22, 1993.

52. Al-Ahali, March 17, 1999.

53. Al-‘Arabi, January 4, 1999.

54. Al-Ahrar, February 1, 1999.

55. Roz Al-Youssef, March 1, 1999.

56. Al-Ahrar, June 16, 1986.

57. Al-Ahrar, June 16, 1986.

58. Al-Sh’ab, November 12, 1990.

59. Al-Saiasi Al-Maseri, August 7, 1995.

60. The “new faces” made up 35 percent of the 1995 PA electoral list, compared to 50 percent

in 1990. The rate of change in the PA membership was about 52 percent as the assembly

included 226 newcomers and 218 reelected incumbents. However, the rate of change in

the NDP list of candidates in the 2000 election was around 42 percent, and it reached

its peak in some governorates, as in Marsa Matruh, where it was 75 percent; 72 percent

in both Alexandrias; and 67 percent in Al-qalioubia and Port Said. However, one should

not be misled with this rate, as most of those newcomers had been elected before the 1995

parliament. See Al-Akhebar, December 12, 1995; “The 2000 Arab Strategic Report” (in

Arabic), 309.

61. Al-Beltagi, aged sixty-five, earned a PhD in economics in 1973 and also a PhD in political

science, both from Sorbonne. After entering government service in 1978 as information

plenipotentiary at the Egyptian Embassy in Paris, he served as the chairperson of the State

Notes220

Information Service from 1982 to 1993 before joining Kamal Al-Ganzouri’s government

as minister of tourism.

62. Anas Al-Fiqi, aged forty-five, f irst entered the cabinet in July 2004, succeeding

Ali Al-Din Hilal, who left the government service after the FIFA “zero” scandal. The

minister is a Cairo University graduate who began his career as the marketing director

for a UK-based encyclopedia company until he opened his own national distributorship.

After branching into publishing, Al-Fiqi earned strong reviews for his service as head of the

general organization for cultural palaces. See El-Hennawy Noha, “Musical Chairs,” Egypt

Today, March 2005.

63. Zakaria ‘Azmi had to face a judicial ruling that invalidated his membership to the PA.

Speaker Fathi Sorour, who hastened to abide by the court rulings in the case of Heshmat

and Hemeida, other opposition MPs, did an about-face and claimed that the report con-

cerned only the worker candidate for the district and not ‘Azmi. See Mona El-Ghobashy,

“What Happened to the ‘Parliament of Hope?’ ” Cairo Times, July 5, 2003; and Essam

El-Din Gamal, “The Solution is Dissolution,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 5–11, 2003.

64. Al-Osbou, July 9, 2001.

65. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Sporty Controversies Just Iceberg Tip,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

November 18–24, 2004.

66. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Amendments Near and Far,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 14–20,

2006.

67. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 142–143.

Four The Business of Politics

1. Rafiq Bahaa Edine Al-Hariri was born in the Lebanese town of Sidon in 1944 as the son

of a Sunni Muslim farmer and greengrocer. Upon completing his secondary education in

1964, Al-Hariri enrolled at the Beirut Arab University to study accounting. During this

period, he was an active member of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), a forerunner

of George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and he is said

to have worked occasionally as a bouncer at its fundraising events. In 1965, Al-Hariri cut

short his studies (reportedly because he couldn’t afford the tuition) and emigrated to Saudi

Arabia where he set up his own subcontracting firm, CICONEST, in 1969. His company

emerged as a major player in the construction bonanza that resulted from the oil boom of

the early 1970s, undertaking both government and private contracts to build offices, hospi-

tals, hotels, and residential palaces. After purchasing the French construction giant Oger in

the late 1970s, Al-Hariri headed the largest construction empire in the Arab World. By the

early 1980s, Al-Hariri had become one of the 100 richest men in the world and his business

empire expanded to include a network of banks in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, as well as

companies in insurance, publishing, light industry, and other sectors. See Gary C. Gambill

and Ziad K. Abdelnour, “Dossier: Rafiq AL-Hariri: Prime Minister of Lebanon,” Middle

East Intelligence Bulletin 2, no. 5 ( June 2000).

2. Pete Moore, Buy Low, Sell High and Organize for Politics: Fiscal Crisis and Business-State

Relations in the Middle East (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, December 2002): 71.

3. Ahmed ‘Azz was born on January 12, 1959. He graduated from Cairo University in 1982

with a degree in engineering. He has occupied various posts. He is deputy Chairman of

the Federation of Industries; Chairman of both ‘Azz Company, and Al-Dakhila Company

for Iron Steel; and he is also the NDP MP for Munnouf-Al-Sadat district. He is also a

member in the NDP’s General Secretariat, the NDP’s membership Assistant Secretary, the

NDP Policies Secretariat member, the NDP Higher Policies Council’s member, Chairman

of the NDP Committee for Preserving Agricultural land, Chairman of the PA’s Plan and

Notes 221

Budget Committee, the NDP Secretary in Al-Sadat city and the Chairman of the Investors

Council at the same city, and Egyptian-American Council’s member. Currently ‘Azz is

the NDP Secretary for Organizational Affairs, having replaced Al-Shazli. See Al-Ahram,

October 22, 2000. Also see Galal Mohamed, “The King of Iron, Steel and Ceramic, and

Agriculture as Well” (in Arabic), Al-‘Arabi, December 7, 2003.

4. Mohamed Abu Al-‘Anein was born in 1951. He graduated from Cairo University in 1973

with a degree in Business. Since his graduation, one cannot find any information about his

activity till the mid-1980s, when he began to invest in the ceramic industry with Italian

entrepreneurs. Generally, we began to hear about him at the beginning of the 1990s from

advertisements and paid articles. He is the owner and chairman of Cleopatra Group, a

ceramics manufacturing company; NDP MP; Secretary-General of the General Association

for Investors; member of Egyptian-American Presidential Council; Secretary-General of

Egyptian-Libyan Chamber; NDP’s Secretary-General for Al-Asher Men Ramadan district;

member of the NDP’s Economic Committee; and so on. For useful information, see ‘Assam

Raf ’at, “Sherout Al-Nagah,” in Al-Ahram Al-Aqatesadi, October 13, 2003.

5. Ibid.

6. For a useful overview of the “Neomercantilists,” see Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social

Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995): chapter 2. For an

analysis of the mercantilism phase, see James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New

East Asian Economic and Political System (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).

7. An eloquent example of Sadat’s reluctance to change the regime’s outlook is the statement

deputy prime minister ‘Abd Al-Razzak ‘Abd Al-Maggid made at the second NDP congress

in October 1981, a few days before Sadat’s assassination, in which he announced the NDP’s

definition of socialism and the role of the public sector: “It is essential to manage the pub-

lic sector with a capitalist mentality and the private sector with a socialist mentality.” See

Wahba Mourad Magdi, The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy: 1945–1981 (Reading:

Ithaca Press, 1994): 179.

8. Harik Iliya, “Privatization: The Issue, the Prospects, and the Fears,” 1–23, in Harik, Iliya

and Sullivan, Denis (eds.) Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington and

Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992): 9.

9. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 24.

10. Americans have aligned themselves with and supported the rising classes of the Sadat

regime. Both the “open door” policy launched by Sadat in 1974 and American aid have

served to create and strengthen new socioeconomically and politically powerful groups.

The economic interests of these classes and Western capital are identical. The United States

would like to market its goods in Egypt in preparation for further investment while the new

class of traders and commercial agents are the axis around which such policies can be made

possible. Moreover, this group’s increasing political power is indicative of the relationship

of Western capitalism to the new Egyptian socioeconomic structure and has widespread

implications for the country’s development. For a useful analysis of the United States’ reac-

tion to Sadat’s infitah, see Zaalouk, Malak, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise

of the New Bourgeoise (London, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1989): 11.

11. El-Mikawy Noha, Building of Consensus, 29.

12. Official f igures on inf lation, which run between 5 and 10 percent per year, are far below

the actual f igures. The Economist estimated the rate of inf lation as somewhere between 20

and 35 percent. See Cooper, 116–117.

13. Ibid., 106–107.

14. Zaki, Moheb, Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions & Investment Behaviour, (Cairo: Arab

Center for Development and Research, 1999), 84–87.

15. Sadowski, Political Vegetables?, 111.

16. Beattie, 150–153.

17. Baker, Sadat and After, 18–19.

Notes222

18. Beattie, 150–153.

19. Baker, Sadat and After, 18–19.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. To quote Sabri, “Othman was asked to leave the ministerial position and to be given

the responsibility of what is so-called chairman of Sadat’s NDP Committee for Popular

Development. He was vested this responsibility without having had any official post, leav-

ing him unaccountable to the parliament or government. He began his work in popular

development and food security projects. He phoned the ministers and governors directly to

provide them with his instructions.” See Moussa Sabri, “Sadat: The Reality and Myth” (in

Arabic), (Cairo: Modern Egyptian Bureau, nd): 670.

23. Sadowski, Political Vegetables?, 123.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 123–126.


27. Baker, Sadat and After, 41.


29. Baker, Sadat and After, 41.



32. For instance, in his meeting with a delegation of the American Chamber of Commerce

(ACC), President Mubarak declared his commitment to support the private sector along with

the public sector. See El-Sayyid Yessein (ed.), “The 1987 Arab Strategic Report,” 501.

33. In general, most have used the term privatization in the narrow sense of the denational-

ization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while employing the term liberalization in its

broader meaning, which includes relaxation of economic controls and encouragement of

the private sector. Liberalization ref lects the partial withdrawal of the state from its heg-

emonic role as an entrepreneur and as a provider of welfare and other services. In short,

liberalization signals the retreat of the patron state. See Harik Iliya, “Privatization: The

issue, the Prospects, and the Fears,” in Harik Iliya and Sullivan Denis (eds.), Privatization

and Liberalization, 1–23, 1.

34. For a useful analysis of the regime’s f iscal crisis, see Zaki Moheb, Egyptian Business Elites,

96–100.

35. Harik Iliya, Economic Policy Reform in Egypt (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997),

18–19.

36. Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman (eds.), “The Future Security Environment in the Middle

East: Conf lict, Stability, and Political Change,” RAND Project Air Force (2004): 79.

37. Harik Iliya, “Privatization: The issue, the Prospects, and the Fears,” in Harik Iliya and

Sullivan Denis (eds.) Privatization and Liberalization, 1–23, 16.

38. El-Naggar Said, “Opening Remarks,” in Kanaan Taher (ed.), The Social Effects of Economic

Adjustment on Arab Countries (International Monetary Fund, 1997): 5.

39. Dau Khalifa Ali and El-Amach Hussein, “Social Safety Nets: The Social Development

Fund in Egypt,” in Kanaan Taher (ed.), 102–103.

40. Ibid., 383.

41. Ibid., 382–383.

42. Ibid., 382.

43. El-Sayyid Yessein (ed.), “The 1987 Arab Strategic Report,” ACPSS (Cairo, 1988): 501.

44. For an excellent discussion of this meeting, see Steve Negus, “The Regime has it out with

Businessmen and the Press,” Cairo Times, March 19, 1998.

45. Harik Iliya, Economic Policy Reform, 18–19.

46. Ibid.

47. Ezzat Dina, “Not Strictly Public,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 9, 2006.

Notes 223

48. Businesspeople prefer to run for Magles Al-Sh’aab than to Shura Council because Magles

Al-Sh’aab has more authority. The latter is only a consultative body. Theoretically, Magles

Al-Sh’aab is more prestigious and provides better chances for protecting their interests.

49. Al-Manisi Ahmed, “Ragal Al-‘Amal and the 1995 Election” (in Arabic), in Hala Mustafa

(ed.), The 1995 Parliamentary Election in Egypt (ACPSS), (Cairo, 1997): 83–87, 86.

50. For useful information regarding the NDP’s policy for official and nonofficial candidates,

see Al-‘Alam Al-Youm, October, 8, 1995.

51. Perthes Volker, “The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of

Democratization: The Case of Syria and Some Other Arab Countries, in Ghassan Salamê,

243–268, 264.

52. For a useful analysis of the economic factor as a reason for pushing businessmen into

politics, see Al-Manisi Ahmed, “Ragal Al-‘Amal and Parliament, the Illusion of the

Lobbying Group” (in Arabic), Egyptian Affairs, no. 4 (Spring 1999), (ACPSS, Cairo 1999):

98–103, 100.

53. According to Al-Haqaqa newspapers, the number of fat-cat businessmen candidates in

the 1995 elections was 200, and they were expected to spend around £E400 million

($5.7 million) on campaigns. See Al-Haqaqa, November 4, 1995. However, some sources

suggest a total cost of the 1995 elections at £E4 billion. The average spending for each

district was about £E5–7 million. See Mahmoud Al-Sayyid Hamad, “Businessmen and

the Elections,” (in Arabic), in Qadia Barlamaniah (Parliamentary Affairs), no. 44 (November

2000), 18–21, 18. However, businessmen candidates peaked in the 2000 elections. They

comprised 1,000 out of the total 4,259; most of them were independents. According to one

source, the total cost of the parliamentary campaign was about £E4–6 billion (US $1 at that

time was roughly £E7.25). See ‘Aloi Mostafa, 180.

54. The Informal Grand Electorates (IGEs) consist of a very limited number of the district’s

politicians who can guarantee votes to anyone who concludes a deal with them. This stra-

tum socially includes the Umda (village chief ), family chiefs, LPC members, rich peasants,

and notables. The role of these IGEs has lessened since the 2000 election as a result of judi-

cial supervision. See Alaa Al-Din Arafat and Sarah Ben Néfissa, “Vote et démocratie dans l’

Egypte contemporaine,” (Paris: Karthala, 2005).

55. The definition of corruption is controversial, since acts condemned as corrupt in one

culture may be an acceptable norm in another. Even within any one particular culture,

the scope of the definition poses a problem. Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, head of Cairo

University’s Centre for Developing Countries Studies, notes there are in fact three per-

spectives for the definition of corruption. The f irst defines corruption as the use of an

off icial post to achieve personal gain; the second as the charging of a price for the provision

of a public service in excess of the off icial tariff; the third as engaging in activities deemed

illegal by society. Actually, the term corruption in its modern sense covers such a vast and

growing assortment of activities that it cannot be reduced to a single definition. These

activities include, but are not limited to, drug traff icking, money laundering, corporate

crime, arms sales, the sex trade, art and antique fraud, human traff icking, capital f light,

and the f inancing of terrorist networks. The only common denominator linking these

activities together is that they are all undertaken outside the legal system. See for a use-

ful analysis, Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, “Can Corruption be Measured?” Al-Ahram Weekly,

October, 21–27, 2004.

56. Zaki Moheb, Egyptian Business Elites, 147–148.

57. According to Mahmoud Mohi Al-Din, the then member of the NDP General Secretariat

and chairman of the NDP Economic Committee, the total indebtedness of defaulters now

stands at £E50 billion, or 14 percent of the £E360 billion (a f igure close to Egypt’s annual

GDP) lent by Egyptian banks to private industry, households, and the public sector. See

Mohi Al-Din Mahmoud, “Overhauling Egypt’s Banking System,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

September 12–18, 2002.

Notes224

58. The phenomenon of systematic exploitation of banks by some people with good regime ties

began in the 1990s. The deluge of bad loans began with Tawfiq ‘Abdu ‘Asmail, then NDP

MP and former minister of tourism, who was implicated, along with former Prosecutor

General Ragaa Al-‘Arabi, in the ‘Aleya Al-‘Ayyouti scandal of 1995. Four of the defendants

in this case were parliamentary deputies, leading the local press to dub these bad-loan scan-

dals as “The Loan Deputies.” ‘Asmail allegedly took some £E450 million in loans while

serving as chairman of the Commercial Bank of Daqahlia. MP Mahmoud ‘Azzam was

accused of receiving £E179 million in unlisted loans from ‘Ayyouti, the then vice-president

of the Nile Bank, who also happened to be his wife. ‘Ayyouti got a “get out of jail free” card

from Al-‘Arabi and subsequently f led the country. However, among the most notorious

to follow suit on the bad loans were cosmetics tycoon Mustafa Al-Beleidy, medical goods

chieftain Ramy Lakkah (who still denies that he took any of the money abroad), ex-Misr

Exterior Bank head ‘Abdallah Tail, and former BMW hotshot Hossam Abu Al-Fotouh,

who didn’t have time to f lee the country before his arrest—and the circulation of an x-rated

videotape of himself in bed with top belly dancer Dina. Similarly, one of the most talked-

about examples is that of the ex-Nasr City NDP MP who was charged and acquitted, not

once but three times. Al-Sayyid was accused of fraud and forgery after he reportedly signed

on the dotted line in place of a number of absent Nasr City landowners between 1983 and

1985. By early 2002, he had been kicked out of the PA. At the same time, two NDP MPs,

Baha Al-Din Meligi and Hussein Al-Owess, were found guilty of having stolen millions

of dollars and forging official documents, and were handed hefty prison sentences. See for

useful analysis, Réhab Al-Bakri and Noha Mohamed, “Great Crooks: The Open Door

Ushered in an Era of Unprecedented Economic Growth—and Heralded the Birth of ‘the

Business Scam,’ ” Egypt Today (September 2004); and Middle East Times, February 14, 2003,

“Corruption Cuts Two from Ruling Party.”

59. See Essam El-Din, “Two Maverick MPs Fall out of Favor, Al-Ahram Weekly, November 1–7,

2006.

60. Al-Ahram Al-Aqatesadi, March 20, 1995.

61. Ibid.


63. Richard Moench, “The May 1984 Elections in Egypt and the Question of Egypt’s Stability,”

in Linda Layne, Elections in the Middle East, Implications of Recent Trends (Boulder and London:

Westview Press, 1987): 47–85, 56.

64. Richard H. Adams, Jr., Development and Social Change in Rural Egypt (Syracuse: Syracuse

University Press, First Edition 1986): 150.

65. Ibid.

66. Kandil Amani, “Professional Groups and Political Participation” (in Arabic), in Al-Sayyid

Mustafa Kamel, The Reality About Political Pluralism in Egypt, 344–354.

67. Kassem, 85.

68. Ibid.

69. Sheriff Zeiffar, “The Businessmen Performance” (in Arabic), in Qadia Barlamaniah

(Parliamentary Affairs), no. 28 ( July 1999), 37.

70. Abu Ridah Mohamed, “The Political and Social Structure of the 2000 Magles Al-Sha’ab”

(in Arabic), Meglat al-Domkratiah ( Journal of Democracy), no. 1 (Winter 2001), 82.

71. Essam Al-Din Gamal, “Parliamentary Business,” Al-Ahram Weekly, February 8–14, 2007.

72. Al-‘Alam Al Yom, June 27, 1998.

73. Al-Ahram, March 2, 2001.

74. Al-Ahram, July 18, 2001.

75. Al-Ahram, July 25, 2001.

76. Al-Ahram, July 25, 2001.

77. Al-‘Arabi, December 25, 2005.

Notes 225

78. Zakaria ‘Azmi demagogically criticized the government because of its mortgage law, as he

said that the mortgage law is presented to assist impoverished people but served the inter-

ests of the wealthy. The government deluded the people by issuing this law. Businessmen

Ahmed ‘Azz was one of those businesspeople who facilitated the issuing of this law. See,

Al-Osbou’, July 9, 2001.

79. Al-Ahram, June 18, 2001.

80. Abrahim Nagoui, “The Evolution of Magles Al-Sh’aab Performance,” 41–46.

81. Ibid, 84–85.

82. Ibid., 139.

83. Al-Ahram, July 29, 2001.

84. ‘Ali Al-Sawi, “The Evolution of Magles Al-Sh’aab Performance” (in Arabic), The third

Annual Report for the third Session 1998–1999, Democracy Development Group

(1999): 149.

85. Rabia, ‘Amr Hesham, “Businessmen and the Legislative Privatization: A Case Study in

the Roads and Airports’ Privatization” (in Arabic), in Qadia Barlamaniah (Parliamentary

Affairs), 6–11, no. 40 ( July 2000), 8.

86. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Nazif under Fire,” Al-Ahram Weekly, February 1–7 (2007). For

more details on bad blood, see Leila Reem, “Bad Blood,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 18–24

(2007); Leila Reem, “Blood Scare,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 25–31 (2007); Salama,

Salama A, “Crippling Corruption,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 18–24 (2007); Al-‘Arabi,

January 14, 2007; Al-‘Arabi, January 21, 2007; Al-Osbou’, January 22, 2007; Al-Osbou’,

February 2, 2007; and Roz Al-Youssef, February 2, 2007.

87. Ibid, 140–141.

88. Hinnebusch, “Egyptian Politics Under Sadat,” 107.


90. Shukrallah Hani, “Political Crisis and Political Conf lict in Post-1967 Egypt,” in Tripp

Charles and Owen Roger (eds.), Egypt under Mubarak, 85–86.

91. Ibid.


93. Ibid, 132.

94. For a scholarly discussion about the role of the European bourgeoisie in establishing the

industrial revolution, capitalism, and democracy, with a comparison to the role of the

Arab bourgeoisie in those three occurrences, see Rayan Turner, Capitalism and Class in

the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development (London: Heinemann

Educational Books, First Published, 1984): 51–62.

95. “Democratization,” according to Hudson, “is the process through which the exercise

of political power by the state becomes less arbitrary and exclusive.” Some scholars dis-

tinguish between liberalization and democratization. “Liberalization refers to a change

which limits the power of the state to intervene in the life of people and allows some freer

expression and oppositional activities. Democratization refers more specifically to the pro-

cess of change toward freer elections, popular participation, and freedom of the masses;

it is a change toward democratic rule. Ghadbian Najib, Democratization and the Islamist

Challenge in the Arab World (London: Westview Press, 1997): 4–5.

96. Monshipouri Mahmood, Democratization, Liberalization & Human Rights in the Third World

(Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995): 12–13.

97. Moore, Buy Low, 235–238.

98. Amy Hawthorne, “Middle East Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer?” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace Working Papers, Middle East Series, Democracy and

Rule of Law Project, 1–24, No. 44, March 2004, 11.

99. Zaki Moheb, Egyptian Business Elites, 225.

100. Ibid.

Notes226

101. Mohamed Al-Sayyid S’aid, “Businessmen: Democracy and Human Rights” (in Arabic),

(Cairo: Cairo Center for Human-rights Studies, 2001), 100–101.

102. Ibid., 67–86.

103. Zaki Moheb, Egyptian Business Elites, 225.

104. Mubarak said, “The various groups that wish to change the constitution seek different and

conf licting goals. In all frankness. . . . I am not in favor of such a change at present, since

tampering with the constitution is dangerous. . . . and will pit different classes and different

interests against each other.” see Zaki Moheb, Egyptian Business Elites, 122.

105. Economist, May 30, 2004.

Five Keeping Reform at Bay

1. Tamara Wittes Cofman, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism,” Policy Review, no. 125

( June 2004), 1–13, 1, http://www.policyreview.org/jun04/wittes.html.

2. Gary C. Gambill, “Explaining the Arab Democracy Deficit: Part I,” Middle East Intelligence

Bulletin, 5, no. 2 (February–March 2003).

3. Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The

Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003), 43–58, 44.

4. Lorne Craner, “Will U.S. Democratization Policy Work?,” Middle East Quarterly (Summer

2006), http://www.meforum.org/article/942. See also Sarsar Saliba, “Quantifying Arab

Democracy: Democracy in the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2006), http://

www.meforum.org/article/970.

5. There is no evidence that regime type has any relationship to the amount of terrorism

or the amount of terrorists that come out of a particular country. There is no evidence

that democracy reduces terrorism. In a widely cited study of terrorist events in the 1980s,

William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg demonstrated that most terrorist incidents occur

in democracies. Examining incidents from 1975 to 1997, Pennsylvania State University’s

Quan Li has found that although terrorist attacks are less frequent when democratic political

participation is high, the kind of checks that liberal democracies typically place on execu-

tive power seem to encourage terrorist actions. Furthermore, the numbers published by the

US government do not bear out claims of a close link between terrorism and authoritarian-

ism either. Between 2000 and 2003, according to the State Department’s annual “Patterns

of Global Terrorism” report, 269 major terrorist incidents around the world occurred in

countries classified as “free” by Freedom House, 119 occurred in “partly free” countries,

and 138 occurred in “not free” countries. See Gregory F. Gause, “Can Democracy Stop

Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005), 62–76. See also Richard N. Haass,

“The Case for ‘Integration,’ ” The National Interest (Fall 2005), 22–29, 23.

6. Wittes Cofman, The Promise of Arab Liberalism, 1.

7. See, for Bush freedom agenda, Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization versus Liberalization

in the Arab World: Dilemmas and Challenges for US Foreign Policy,” ( July 2005). 2–3,

www.StretagicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, and Cagaptay Soner, Gause III, F. Gregory, and

Makram-Ebeid Mona, “Countering Islamists at the Ballot Box: Alternative Strategies,”

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus, No. 61, November

2006, 1.

8. Jennifer Windsor, “Advancing the Freedom Agenda: Time for a Recalibration?,” The

Washington Quarterly, no. 3, (Summer 2006), 21–34, 22.

9. Albrecht Hofheinz, “The Internet in the Arab World: Playground for Political

Liberalization,” International Politics and Society / Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft,”

(IPG), no. 3 (2006), 78–96, 78. http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/porta130/docs/FOLDER/IPG/

IPG3_2006/HERTOG_GB.PDF.

Notes 227

10. Hofheinz, The Internet, 81.

11. Shahin Emad El-Din, “Egypt’s Moment of Reform: A Reality or an Illusion?” Center for

European Policy Studies, CEPS, no. 78 ( July 2005), 4–5.

12. This goal has an established parentage among twentieth-century political leaders. Franklin

Delano Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and

Bill Clinton all sought, in different ways, to use the power of the United States to advance

the cause of freedom. See Windsor, Advancing the Freedom Agenda, 32.

13. In 2000 the American government criticized the revengeful measure taken against

American/Egyptian human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. The Bush administration’s

denial in August 2002 of the Egyptian government’s request for additional assistance, as a

protest against the continued imprisonment of Ibrahim, was seen as an encouraging sign of

a genuine change in US policy toward Egypt. See Windsor, Promoting Democratization Can

Combat Terrorism, 52.

14. Richard N. Haass, “Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World,” The Washington

Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 3, 137–148 (Summer 2003), 137–148, 137.

15. http://mepi.state.gov/outreach/index.htm.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ottaway, Marina and Carothers Thomas, “The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False

Start,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, no. 29, March 2004, 3.

19. Lorne Craner, “Will U.S. Democratization Policy Work?,” Middle East Quarterly (Summer

2006), http://www.meforum.org/article/942.

20. The vast majority of MEPI’s funds, over 70 percent, was allocated to programs that either

directly benefited Arab governments (in activities ranging from translating documents to

computerizing court records to revising school curricula) or provided training programs

and seminars for Arab government officials. Only $3.2 million, or 3.3 percent of MEPI’s

money, was directed to help local NGOs expand their work in areas such as family law and

anticorruption campaigns. In all, MEPI had about $150 million to spend in FY 2004, which

seems to be a lot but is actually 58 cents for each man, woman, and child in the Arab world.

See Tamara Cofman Wittes, Sarah Yerkes, “What Price Freedom?, Assessing the Bush

Administration’s Freedom Agenda” (The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings

Institute, Analysis Paper, No. 10, September 2006) 4, 18.

21. Wittes, The Promise of Arab Liberalism, 6.

22. Brumberg, Democratization versus Liberalization in the Arab World, 12.


24. The statement is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/

20031106–2.html

25. Brumberg, Democratization versus Liberalization in the Arab World, 12.


27. No author, “Reactions in the Arab Press to President Bush’s Address on Democracy in the

Middle East,” Middle East Media Research Institute, No. 615, November 25, 2003. http://

memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=egypt&ID=SP61503

28. Ottaway, “The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start,” 1.

29. Chris Zambelis, “The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and Democratization

in the Middle East,” Parameters, (Autumn 2005), 87–102, 91.

30. Tamara Cofman, “United States: Progress of the ‘Freedom Strategy’ in the Middle East,”

Arab Reform Bulletin, 4, no. 1, (February 2006).

31. Zambelis, Strategic Implications, 91.

32. Al-Ahram Weekly, April 8–14, 2004.

33. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Asserting home-grown reform,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 4–10,

2004.

34. For full text of this statement see, U.S. State Department, daily press, www.gov.org.

Notes228

35. Gary C. Gambill, “Jumpstarting Arab Reform: The Bush Administration’s Greater Middle

East Initiative,” http://www.meib.org/articles/0407_me2.htm.

36. Ibid.

37. Ottaway, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: A Hollow Victory for the

United States,” Arab Reform Bulletin, 2, no. 6 ( June 2004).

38. Robert Satloff, “The Greater Middle East Partnership: A Work Still Very Much in Progress,”

Washington institute for near policy, Policywatch, Number 836, February 25, 2004.

39. Gambill, Jumpstarting Arab Reform.

40. Ottaway, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.”

41. Dawoud Khaled, “Sticks and carrots,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Feburary 10–16, 2005.

42. Barbara Slavin, “Egypt defends its electoral process,” USA Today, May 17, 2005.

43. Steven A. Cook, “U.S. Policy: Hypocrisy, Principles, and Reform in the Middle East,” Arab

Reform Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 6 ( July 2006).

44. Elie Podeh, “Between Stagnation and Revolution: The Arab System Aftermath of the Iraq

War,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vo1. 9, no. 3 (September 2005),

51–72, 55.


46. There were 400 intellectuals and pro-reform activists from seventeen Arab states who

attended the Alexandria conference, plus 141 human rights organizations. See Al-Ahram

Al-‘Arabi, March 19, 2005.

47. Sid-Ahmed Mohamed, The Bibliotheca Alexandrina symposium, Al-Ahram Weekly

March 18–24, 2004.

48. Paul Schemm, “Recommended Reform,” Cairo Times, March 18–24, 2004.

49. Khalil Nevine, “Slowly but Surely,” Al-Ahram Weekly March 18–24, 2004.

50. Robert Satloff, “The Twin Faces of Arab reform,” Middle East Times, March 28, 2004.

51. Khalil Nevine, “Slowly but surely.”

52. Robert Satloff, Alexandria, “The Twin Facts of Arab Reform,” The Washington Institute

For Near Policy, Policywatch, No. 845, March 19, 2004.

53. Schemm Paul, “Recommended reform,” Cairo Times, March 18–24, 2004.

54. Howeidy Amira, “Ambivalent Response,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 18–24, 2004.

55. Robert Satloff, “The Twin Faces of Arab Reform,” Middle East Times, March 28, 2004.

56. Ibid.

57. Nafie Ibrahim, “Path to the Summit,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 18–24, 2004.

58. Amira Howeidy, Ambivalent response, Al-Ahram Weekly, March 18–24, 2004.

59. Satloff, “The Twin Faces.”

60. For the different reasons of delaying Tunisia conference, see Al-Qabes, daily Arabic Kuwaiti

newspaper, February 25, 2004.


62. The Economist, April 1, 2004.

63. See Nicholas Blanford, “The Arab League and Political Reform: A Vague Commitment,”

Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 6 ( June 2004).

64. Most of the proposals of the Arab summit of March 2004 in Tunisia were reiterated in the

Arab summit of March 2005 in Algeria.

65. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 6 ( June 2004).

66. See Blanford, “A Vague Commitment.”

67. Ibid.

68. The initiative offers Israel full normalization with the Arab world in exchange for a com-

plete withdrawal from occupied Arab territory.

69. Economist, May 30, 2004.

70. Nafie Ibrahim, “Demanding Consensus,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 25–31, 2004.

71. The Alexandria f irst and second reform conferences and the Tunisia Arab League summit

were not the only conferences that were convened in the Arab world for enhancing political

Notes 229

reform; however, they are the most important ones. There are also the Beirut Arab civil

society conference, held from 19 to 22 March, and the Doha conference, June 3–4, 2004,

which was sponsored by Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Center. However, the Egyptian

regime has no contributions in these two conferences. For more details, see Arab Reform

Bulletin, June 2004, vol. 2, no. 6. See, for more details on the Doha Declaration, “Doha

Declaration on Democracy and Reform,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2004);

Daniel Brumberg, “Islam Is Not the Solution (or the Problem),” The Washington Quarterly,

(Winter 2005–2006), 97–116, 107–108; Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 6 ( June 2004).

72. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3 (April 2005).


74. Shukrallah Hani, “Change or be Changed,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 9–15, 2005.

75. Ibid.

76. The presence of emergency laws allows the president in his capacity as military governor to

issue military orders having the force of law. Mubarak has often delegated this privilege to

the prime minister who acts as the vice military governor. Currently there are more than 122

military orders in effect, many of them dealing with political and security matters, for exam-

ple, demonstrations, insulting the president, calling for the overthrow of the regime, pos-

sessing weapons, and so on. Violations of military orders are tried by martial courts that are

established by the minister of defense. This is a direct violation of the basic democratic prin-

ciple of judicial independence. Military judges are in fact part of the executive authority and

their decisions cannot be appealed. See for more details, Khaled Ezzelarab, “Less Military

Rule?” Cairo Times, October 16–22, 2003; Ismael Tareq, Middle East Politics Today, 78.

77. The State Security courts have long been criticized by domestic and international human

rights groups for falling far short of international standards for fair trials, and gained further

notoriety when they twice sentenced Egyptian-American sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim

to seven years imprisonment in 2001 and 2002.

78. See, No author, “The Challenge of Political Reform,” 13. See also Essam El-Din Gamal,

“NDP Balancing Past and Future,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 25–October 1, 2003.

79. Essam El-Din Gamal, “More than Window-Dressing?” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 19, 2003.

80. Michele Dunne, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” Carnegie Papers, Democracy and Rule of

Law Project, No. 66, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2006, 9–10.

81. Khalil Nevine, “Winds of change,” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 2–8, 2003.

82. Charles Levinson, “New guard, Old Obstacles,” Cairo Times, October 2–8, 2003.

83. Glen C. Carey, “Turning to the People,” Cairo Times, May 6, 2003.

84. The NDP heavyweight Kamal Al-Shazli, for instance, had declared that amending the con-

stitution was not on the NDP’s agenda of political reforms. He argued that the constitution

forms the legal and constitutional skeleton of the state and therefore must be immune to

changes every now and then. He also argued that a great deal of reform can take place with-

out that kind of amendment. In July 2003, Minister of Information and NDP secretary-

general Safwat Al-Sharif declared that calls for constitutional reform “are rejected because

they come at the expense of national stability and unity. . . . [the constitution] has provided

the president of the republic with the powers required to combat terrorism and protect

civilian life from disintegration by extremist forces.” See Essam El-Din Gamal, “NDP

Balancing Past and Future, Al-Aharm Weekly, September 25–October1, 2003. See also, No

author, “The Challenge of Political Reform,” 18.

85. Al-Ahram Weekly, December 30, 2004–January 5, 2005.

86. The NCHR consists of twenty-seven members. Appointees to the council resembles a who’s

who of Egyptian politics. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is the chair,

and international lawyer and acclaimed Islamist thinker Ahmad Kamal Abu Al-Magd serves

as deputy. Mubarak “decided” to affiliate the NCHR with the upper house of Parliament

rather than with the presidency, perhaps having realized that, according to international law,

national human rights commissions cannot be affiliated with the chief executive.

Notes230

87. Joshua A. Stacher, “Rhetorical Acrobatics and Reputations: Egypt’s National Council for

Human Rights,” Middle East Report, no. 235, (Summer 2005). http://www.merip.org/

mer/mer235/stacher.html

88. Shukrallah Hani, “Change or be Changed.”

89. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Change at Hand,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 23–29, 2004. See

also, Middle East Times, September 24, 2004.

90. Dan Murphy, “Egyptians Talk Democratic Reform,” USA Today, September 27, 2004.

91. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Reform Agendas in Close Encounter,” Al-Ahram Weekly,


92. Emergency Law 162/1958 was imposed almost continuously from 1958 to 1981 and

has been repeatedly extended since 1981 by the NDP’s majority in parliament; most

recently, in February 2003, it was extended until 2006. Together with a 1914 decree

imposed by the British authorities at the outbreak of the First World War, criminalizing

public gatherings of more than f ive persons, it empowers the authorities to detain any-

one without charge for unspecif ied and renewable periods. Estimates of the number of

detainees held without charge in Egypt’s political prisons range from 16,000 to 30,000;

the Interior Ministry does not issue f igures. See, No author, “The Challenge of Political

Reform,” 15.

93. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Reform Debate Heats up,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 9–15,

2004.

94. ‘Assam Al-‘Arian, a leading member of the Brotherhood and vice president of the Doctors’

Syndicate, described the opposition parties’ decision to exclude the Brotherhood from

their coalition as a “big mistake.” To quote Al-‘Arian, “Opposition parties should real-

ize the importance of the coming stage, which will be crucial in determining the future

of this country.” See Howeidy Amira, “Dissent on the Fringe,” Al-Ahram weekly,


95. Middle East Times, September 24, 2004.

96. Hamzawy Amr, “Egypt: The Limits of Ruling Party Reform,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2,

no. 10, (November 2004).

97. No author, “The Challenge of Political Reform,” 18.

98. Since its formation in 1978, the NDP has invited the opposition to five national dialogues,

in 1982, 1986, 1988, 1992, and 1993, but all to no avail. The NDP normally resorts to the

idea of “national dialogues” whenever faced with a severe crisis.

99. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Dealing with the Dialogue,” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 30–

November 5, 2003.

100. Abd Al-Latif Omayma, “The Politics of Exclusion,” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 30–

November 5, 2003.

101. Charles Levinson, “Talking It Over: The NDP Opens Its ‘National Dialogue,’ but

Excludes the Brothers and Still Cracks down on Activists,” Cairo Times, October 30–

November 5, 2003.

102. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Dealing with the Dialogue.”

103. Levinson, “Talking It Over.”

104. Ibid.

105. Middle East Research Institute, (MEMRI), Special Dispatch, No. 655, February 4,

2004.

106. Levinson, “Talking It Over.”

107. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Truncated Agenda for National Dialogue,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

January 27–Feburary 2, 2005.

108. Essam El-Din Gamal, “There and Back Again,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Febrary10–16, 2005.

109. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Party Consensus Repudiates Meddling,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

February 17–23, 2005.

Notes 231

Six The Illusion of Reform

1. Chris Zambelis, 90–91. For scholarly discussion of the differences between liberalization

and democratization, see also Monshipouri Mahmood, 12–13 and Ghadbian Najib, 4–5.

2. Zambelis, 90–91.

3. Ibid.

4. Bensahel, Nora, and Byman, Daniel L. (eds.) “The Future Security Environment,” 53.

5. Mubarak has been reelected four times through the referendum system laid out in article

76 of the Egyptian constitution. Under this system, parliament endorses with a two-thirds

majority a single candidate, who then must be approved by a majority in a yes/no popular

referendum. Mubarak has always won with at least 95 percent of the votes.

6. El Amrani Issandr, “Egypt: Opening the Constitutional Debate,” Arab Reform Bulletin,

vol. 3, no. 2 (March 2005), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

7. Michele Dunne, Julia Choucair, “Egyptian Opposition Leader Arrested: Groups Rally for

Constitutional Reform,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 2005).

8. Al-Ghad, June 29, 2005.

9. The Lebanese uprising and a forced Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon would make it politi-

cally impossible for Mubarak to extend his own tenure by patently undemocratic means.

See Jackson Diehl, “A Mideast Makeover? Popular Protests Spur Changes From Autocrats,”

Washington Post, February 28, 2005.

10. Shahin Emad El-Din, “Egypt’s Moment of Reform,” 1.

11. Joshua Stacher, “Rhetorical Acrobatics and Reputations.”

12. Daniel Williams, “Egyptian President Says He Will Push Multiparty Elections,” Washington

Post, February 27, 2005.

13. Slavin Barbara, “Egypt Defends Its Electoral Process,” USA Today, May 17, 2005.

14. Yousari Amin, “An Electoral Program for a Presidential Election Candidate,” Al-‘Arabi,

March 13, 2005.

15. The Economist, February 28, 2005.

16. President Mubarak decides to re-amend article 76 on March 26, 2007, together with another

33 articles, in order to lighten the condition of the presidential nomination.

17. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “A Crack in the Sphinx,” Middle East Times, March 4, 2005.

18. However, the largest opposition parties in the 454-seat PA today are the New Wafd and the

Tagammu’, with only five seats each. Had the 5 percent rule been applied in the 2005 presi-

dential election, no opposition party candidate would have qualif ied. See Tamara Cofman,

“The 2005 Egyptian Elections: How Free? How Important?” Saban Center Middle East

Memo #8, August 24, 2005.

19. Ibid.

20. The Economist, February 28, 2005.

21. A few other Arab countries have recently established electoral commissions, but none has

a perfect record. Algeria has a judicial commission much like Egypt’s, along with a party-

based committee that mainly receives complaints and monitors media access. Morocco has

a similarly toothless committee. Only Iraq, Palestine, and Yemen have fully empowered

commissions. In contrast to the situation in Egypt, these three emerged in a context of

state formation, in which no single group could control election management. Iraq’s non-

partisan commission displayed admirable competence in organizing the January 2005 vote

under extremely trying circumstances. See Amy Hawthorne, “Arab Electoral Commissions:

Making the Vote Freer and Fairer?” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 7 (September 2005).

22. El-Hannawy Noha, “The Race Is On,” Egypt Today ( June 2005).

23. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “In Egypt, the ‘Thrill of Defying Tyranny,’ ” Daily Star, September 7,

2005.

Notes232

24. Even if Egypt’s judges stand united in defiance of the commission’s orders, they remain too

few to oversee all 10,000 polling stations. There are officially 8,000 judges in Egypt, but

approximately 2,000 of those are working abroad. Of the 6,000 remaining, scores more

have been excluded by the election commission. The shortage of judges will be filled with

state prosecutors and government lawyers.

25. Hawthorne, Amy, “Arab Electoral Commissions.”

26. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 6 ( July 2005).

27. Nafaa Hassan, “The Reform Dilemma,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 2–8, 2005.

28. The cynics had joked that once the tame legislature got hold of Mubarak’s election pro-

posal, it would write a law stipulating that any candidate must have twenty-four years of

presidential experience.

29. Kohstall Florian, “Reform Pirouettes: Foreign Democracy Promotion and the Politics of

Adjustment in Egypt,” International Politics and Society / Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft”

(IPG), 32–45, 35. http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/porta130/docs/FOLDER/IPG/IPG3_2006/

Florian.PDF.

30. Al-Anani Khalil M, “Face to Face,” Al-Ahram Weekly May 26–June 1 and June 1–6, 2005.

31. Shefa A., “Towards the September 7 Presidential Elections in Egypt: Public Debate over

the Change in the Electoral System,” Middle East Media Research Institute, memri.org,

Inquiry and Analysis Series—No. 237, September 2, 2005.

32. El-Hennawy Noha, “The Race Is On,” Egypt Today, June, 2005.

33. Ibid.

34. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Day of Reckoning,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 26–June 1, 2005.

35. Ibid.

36. Shefa A., “Egyptian Press Reactions to Change in Egypt’s Presidential Electoral System,”

Middle East Media Research Institute, memri.org, Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 217,

April 5, 2005.

37. See, No author, “Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy,” International Crisis Group,

Middle East/North Africa report, No. 46, (October 4, 2005), 19.

38. Al-Ahram Weekly, March 3–9, 2005.

39. Said Summer, “Egypt’s Constitutional Amendment First Step but not Enough,” Middle East

Times, March 11, 2005.

40. In February, Rice canceled a planned visit to Egypt when the government did not imme-

diately release Ayman Nour from jail on what US officials said were trumped-up charges.

See for more details, Kessler Glenn, “Rice Criticizes Allies In Call for Democracy: Egypt,

Saudi Arabia Challenged to Embrace Rights,” Washington Post, Tuesday, June 21, 2005. For

more details on Rice’s visit, see La Franchi, Howard, “The Message Rice Will Bring, and

Hear, in Her Mideast Trip, The Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2005. Marshall, Tyler,

“Cairo Audience Cool to Rice’s Call for Democratic Reform,” Los Angeles Times, June 21,

2005. Mackler, Peter, “Rice Appeals for Mideast Democracy and Free Choice, Middle East

Times, June 21, 2005.

41. Kessler, Glenn, “Rice Criticizes Allies In Call for Democracy: Egypt, Saudi Arabia

Challenged to Embrace Rights,” Washington Post, June 21, 2005.

42. Menotti, Roberto, “Democratize but Stabilize: Democracy in the Middle East,” Middle East

Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3 (Summer 2006). See also Ignatius, David, “Rice’s Speech Set Up

the Proper Democratic Guideposts,” Daily Star, Thursday, June 23, 2005.

43. Daily Star, June 21, 2005.

44. Cofman, Tamara, “The 2005 Egyptian Elections.”


46. No author, Reforming Egypt.

47. Ibid.

48. Mubarak’s announcement came at a pivotal moment for Egypt, as it was delivered after the

Sharm E-Sheikh attacks that killed at least sixty-seven people.

Notes 233

49. For a detailed English version of Mubarak’s electoral platform, see http://www.ndp.org.eg/

en/Platform/Mubarak.aspx.

50. Ibid.

51. The government puts the unemployment rate at 9.3 percent, but independent figures

says the figure tops 20 percent. According to the Planning Ministry, a quarter of Egypt’s

73 million inhabitants live on less than $2 a day. See The Daily Star, Monday, September 5,

2005. See also El-Amrousi Salah, “Campaigning for the Economy,” Al-Ahram Weekly,


52. Abdel-Latif Omayma, “A Blueprint for Reform,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 4–10, 2005.

53. Ibid.

54. Ahmed Al-Naggar, an economist with ACPSS, argued, “The job creation program is sim-

ply not realistic. In twenty-four years, 291,000 jobs were created every year. How can we

expect to see this f igure double in only six years?” He added that “This program is a litany

of hollow promises because it’s f inancing counts on banks and private investors and there

is no guarantee that they will or can contribute.” See Daily Star, Monday, September 05,

2005.

55. Similarly, Karima Korayem, professor of economics at Al-Azhar University, did not deny

that part of what the NDP is promising could be achieved, but only with a change in its

approach. Korayem believes that the 4.5 million jobs, promised by the NDP, fall in the

realm of wishful thinking. And some of the solutions they propose are not good enough.

See Wahish Niveen, “Difficult to Swallow,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 1–7, 2005.

56. Tadros Mariz, “Egypt’s Election All About Image, Almost,” Middle East Report Online,

September 6, 2005. www. merip.org.

57. No author, Reforming Egypt, 24.

58. The Economist, June 2, 2005.

59. Sid-Ahmed Mohamed, “What after the Opposition’s Boycott?” Al-Ahram Weekly,

May 26–June 1, 2005.

60. The religious mobilization of the electorate was achieved with direct coordination with the

Presidential Establishment with outright consent from Mubarak. According to The Qatari

daily Al-Sharq Al-Azhar, Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi met with Mubarak’s polit-

ical advisor, Osama Al-Baz, and Minister for Religious Endowments, Zagzoug, to discuss

assistance from Al-Azhar in enlisting the people’s support for President Mubarak. The paper

also wrote that the Ministry of Religious Endowments had ordered preachers to praise the

Egyptian government and Mubarak in their Friday sermons, and to denigrate opposition

organizations, depicting them as working against the homeland and collaborating with

foreign countries, particularly the US and Israel. See Shefa A., “Towards the September 7

Presidential Elections in Egypt.”

61. Shefa A., “Towards the September 7 Presidential Elections in Egypt.”

62. Shahine Gihan, “The one you know?” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 26–June 1, 2005.

63. No author, “Reforming Egypt.”

64. The Economist, Jun 2, 2005.

65. Newsweek, May 25, 2005.

66. Newsweek, May 25, 2005.

67. See Al-‘Arabi, July 31, 2005.

68. See Al-Dostour, July 6, 2005.

69. El-Nahhas Mona, “Opposition Cries Foul,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 2–8, 2005.

70. Shefa A., “Towards the September 7 Presidential Elections in Egypt.”

71. Ibid.

72. Amr Ahmed, “Vote like an Egyptian: Early and Often, Middle East Times, May 31, 2005.

73. Ibid.

74. The f lagrant scandals triggered jokes. Contrasting Egypt’s referendum with the French vote

on a European constitution, one cartoonist pictured an Egyptian official telling Jacques

Notes234

Chirac not to worry: “We’ll send some of our boys to take care of all those people who

voted no.” See The Economist, Jun 2, 2005.

75. According to figures released by the Ministry of Interior, 54 percent of the nation’s

16.4 million registered voters turned out on May 25 to cast ballots, and 83 percent cast

their ballots in favor of change. See El-Hennawy Noha, “The Race Is On,” Egypt Today,

June, 2005.

76. More recently, a critical report by Egypt’s judges made a mockery of the nationwide refer-

endum held in May the previous year. The government reported that there was 100 percent

judicial supervision over the process, but the judges said that no more than one in five

polling stations had an actual judge present. And while the government claimed turnout

was 54 percent, Egypt’s judges said the real number was closer to 3 percent. See Levinson

Charles, “Who’ll Watch Egypt’s Historic Vote?” The Christian Science Monitor, September 6,

2005.

77. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Day of Reckoning,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 26–June 1, 2005.

78. El-Nahhas Mona, “Opposition Cries Foul,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 2–8, 2005.

79. Nafaa Hassan, “The Reform Dilemma,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 2–8, 2005.

80. The issue of international observers is not important in the Egyptian presidential or

parliamentary election. International observers usually arrive just before Election Day

and leave soon afterward. They cannot fully evaluate the overall climate within which

polling occurs. Basic electoral fairness issues, such as how ballot access is determined,

whether opposition parties are given equal access to the media, or whether rallies and

demonstrations are allowed to proceed without interference, are often beyond the scope

of ad hoc international observer missions. See Cofman, Tamara, “The 2005 Egyptian

Elections.”

81. Saleh Heba, “Monitoring tops Egyptian poll concerns,” Financial Times, September 5,

2005.

82. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “In Egypt, the Thrill of Defying Tyranny,” Daily Star, September 7,

2005.

83. Allam Abeer, “Egypt’s Election Panel.”

84. Phillips, John, “Fraud Claims Prompt Demands for Egyptian Election Monitors,” The

Independent, Wednesday, September 7, 2005.

85. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Competence and the Commission,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 25–31,

2005.

86. Ibid.

87. Mr. Bastawissi hasn’t been allowed to supervise an election in Egypt since 1982, when

he declared a parliamentary election void because of voting irregularities. He is one of

hundreds of judges whom the election commission has excluded from supervising

Wednesday’s vote.

88. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “In Egypt, the Thrill of Defying Tyranny.”

89. Wallis, William, “Apathy and Chaos Mar Egyptian Poll,” Financial Times, September 8

2005.

90. Tadros, Mariz, “Egypt’s Election All About Image.”

91. Phillips, John, “Opposition to Mubarak may Force Poll into Second Round,” The

Independent, September 5, 2005.

92. Hamzawy Amr, “Opposition in Egypt, Performance in the Presidential Election and

Prospects for Parliamentary Elections,” Democracy and Rule of Law Projects, Policy

Outlook, October 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


94. El-Choubaki Amr, “Passively Engaged, Al-Ahram Weekly, September 1–7, 2005.

95. For the candidates’ platforms, see Al-‘Arabi, August 21, 2005, Al-Hayyat, September 7,

2005.

Notes 235

96. Nafaa Hassan, “Beyond the Elections,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 25–31, 2005.

97. Tadros Mariz, “Egypt’s Election All About Image.”

98. Mahmoud Abaza, the then deputy head of the Wafd and Gom’aa’s spokesman, dismissed

press reports suggesting Gom’aa’s nomination was part of a deal struck with the NDP under

which the Wafd will receive, in return, a number of seats in the forthcoming parliamentary

elections.Abdel-Latif Omayma, “The Battle Begins,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 11–17,

2005.

99. The Economist, August 25, 2005.

100. Gamil Mattar, “The Party’s Over,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 1–7, 2005.

101. Williams Daniel, “A Rush to the Finish on Eve of Egyptian Elections,” Washington Post,

September 7, 2005.

102. “It isn’t the case that we are just copying any other country. We are simply sticking to

the rules of the campaign,” said Mohamed Kamal, one of Mubarak most inf luential

advisers. See Giannangeli Marco, “Mubarak Looks West for Election Tactics,” The Sunday

Telegraph, September 4, 2005. See also Williams Daniel, “A Rush to the Finish on Eve of

Egyptian Elections.”

103. See for more details, Phillips John, “Opposition to Mubarak may Force Poll into Second

Round,” The Independent, September 5, 2005; and Shahine Gihan, “Jumbled Reactions,”

Al-Ahram Weekly, August 18–24, 2005.

104. Macleod Scott, “Democracy Slowly Comes to Egypt,” The Times, September 6,

2005.

105. Colvin Marie, “Mubarak Lights a Democratic Flame,” The Sunday Times, September 4,

2005.

106. See Al-‘Arabi, September 11, 2005.

107. Wise Lindsay, “On the Straight and Narrow,” Cairo Magazine, September 20, 2005.

108. Macleod Scott, Radwan Amany, and Wise Lindsay, “Egypt’s Vote: Flawed, but Promising,”

The Times, September 8, 2005.

109. Elizabeth Spiro Clark, “Why Elections Matter,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2000),

27–40, 37.

110. Macleod Scott, Radwan Amany, and Wise Lindsay, “Egypt’s Vote: Flawed, but Promising,”

The Times, September 8, 2005.

111. Ibid.

112. The Daily Star, Saturday, September 10, 2005.

113. Herald Tribune, September 8, 2005.

114. USA Today, September 8, 2005.

115. No author, “Egypt: Presidential Election,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 7 (September

2005).

116. Slackman Michael, “Egypt Holds a Multiple-Choice Vote, but the Answer Is Mubarak,”

New York Times, September 8, 2005.

117. For instance, “A polling station at Al-Radi primary school in the rural province of

Al-Faioum, southwest of Cairo, had just one voter, alongside election officers, many police

and watchmen armed with rif les. See Daily Mail, September 7, 2005.

118. According to independent estimates, turnout did not exceed 10 percent in previous pres-

idential elections. See for more details, Mojon Jean-Marc, “Egypt Prepares for Election

Amid Fraud Fears,” Middle East Times, September 5, 2005.

119. The Daily Star, September 10, 2005.

120. Ibid.

121. See Al-‘Arabi, September 25, 2005.

122. Dunne Michele, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” Carnegie Papers, Democracy

and Rule of Law Project, no. 66, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

January 2006, 7–8.

Notes236

Seven The Tipping Starts

1. Mona El-Ghobashy, “Egypt Looks Ahead to Portentous Year,” Middle East Report online,

February 2, 2005. www.merip.org.

2. Graham Eckert, “The Prospects for Egyptian Democracy are Down but Not Out,” Harvard

Political Review. http://hprsite.squarespace.com/after-mubarak-012007.

3. The HCPC includes, besides the minister of justice, three members of the judiciary, six

independent public f igures chosen by the PA and the Shura Council, and a representative of

the ministry of interior.

4. This approval was granted after the ruling of an administrative court that allowed Egyptian

monitors and local NGOs to monitor the election.

5. No Author, “Egypt: Parliamentary Elections Begin,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 9

(November 2005), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

6. Issandr El-Amrani, “Controlled Reform in Egypt: Neither Reformist nor Controlled,”

Middle East Report Online, December 15, 2005. www.merip.org.

7. Field, Bonnie N., Modes of Transition, Internal Party Rules, and Levels of Elite Continuity:

A Comparison of the Spanish and Argentine Democracies (Irvine: Center for the Study of

Democracy (CSD), University of California, 2004), 6, available online at www.democ.

uci.edu.

8. Sorour was sharply attacked by the opposition for amending Article 76 of the constitution

in a way that strips independent and opposition candidates of any chance to compete in

presidential elections.

9. In the 1995–2000 Parliament, there were around thirty-seven big businesspeople, hold-

ing some 8.1 percent of the total seats. In the 2000–2005 parliament, the number rose to

seventy-seven, or 17 percent of the seats.


11. Khairi Abaza, “Legislative Elections in Egypt: Another Test for Democracy,” Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1046, November 8, 2005.

12. Akhar S’ah, November 9, 2005.

13. El Amrani, “Controlled Reform in Egypt.”

14. Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown, “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More

Democratic Future?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule

of Law December 2005, 3.

15. Abaza Khairi, “Political Islam and Regime Survival in Egypt,” The Washington Institute

for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 51, January 2006, 12.

16. Howeidy Amin, “United They Stand?” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 13–19, 2005.

17. For detailed analysis of the UNFC electoral program, see Al-Osbou’, October 31, 2005.

18. No author, “Egypt: Parliamentary Elections Begin.”

19. Al-Ahram Al-Aqatesadi, November 21, 2005.

20. Al-Osbou’, October 10, 2005.

21. Abdel-Latif Omayma, “Empowering the Opposition,” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 13–19,

2005.

22. Hamzawy and Brown, “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections,” 3.

23. The MB was fielding 150 candidates—although officially they were running as indepen-

dents. The group fielded fifty businesspersons and the rest of the candidates came from the

middle class. Ironically, the group fielded ten women, compared to two women nominated

by the NDP. In addition, although officially the MB did not coordinate with the ruling

NDP, it did not f ield candidates in constituencies contested by key regime figures such as

the chief of the presidential staff, Zakaria ‘Azmi, or the speaker of the People’s Assembly,

Fathi Sourour.

24. Al-‘Arabi, November 13, 2005.

Notes 237

25. El Amrani, “Controlled Reform in Egypt.”



28. Mustafa El-Menshawy, “Change in Tactics,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 8–14, 2005.

29. The Economist, December 8, 2005.

30. Dan Murphy, “Egyptian Government Steps up Attacks on Voters,” The Christian Science

Monitor, December 9, 2005.

31. Dan Murphy and Sameh Naguib, “Egypt’s Islamists Arrested but Gain Seats,” The Christian

Science Monitor, November 22, 2005.

32. Mona Salem, “Egypt Regime Keeps Grip on Power after Bloody Final Vote,” Middle East

Times, December 8, 2005.

33. NDP stalwart Amal Othman, deputy chairman of the People’s Assembly, also won, though

Egyptian TV earlier announced he had lost his seat to MB’s Hazem Abu Ismail. See

Shehab Shaden, Mixed messages, Al-Ahram Weekly, November 17–23, 2005; Al-‘Arabi,

November 13, 2005.

34. Mona El-Nahhas, Who’s Afraid of the Brotherhood? Al-Ahram Weekly, December 1–7,

2005.

35. Sid-Ahmed Mohamed, “Israel and Egypt’s Elections,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 1–7,

2005.


37. Mona El-Nahhas, Who’s Afraid of the Brotherhood? Al-Ahram Weekly December 1–7,

2005.

38. For a full-version of the document, see Al-Ahram Weekly, December 1–7, 2005.

39. Shehab Shaden, “Mixed messages,” Al-Ahram Weekly, November 17–23, 2005.


41. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Time for delivery,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 15–21, 2005.

42. El Amrani Issandr, “Controlled Reform in Egypt.”

43. Different details of that deal was disclosed by ‘Ali Ashmawi, who was part of the nego-

tiations, in memoirs entitled The Secret History of the Muslim Brotherhood, see for an excel-

lent analysis, Eissa Salah, “Mutual Containment,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 1–7,

2005.

44. On October 30, Kamal Al-Shazli, assistant secretary-general of NDP, told the London-

based Al-Hayat newspaper that the “Muslim Brotherhood had established a prominent pres-

ence on the political scene . . . they have their supporters.” He adds, “The Brotherhood has a

street presence and wants to engage in political work. We don’t mind.” Actually, it was the

first time a senior government official has publicly acknowledged the group’s inf luence and

role in Egyptian politics. See Howeidy Amira, “Taking Their Chance,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

November 2–9, 2005.

45. Howeidy Amira, “The MB Conundrum,” Al-Ahram Weekly, November 10–16, 2005.

46. Mohamed El-Sayed, “Paying the Price? An Interview with Tagammu’’s leader Rif’aat

El-S’aid,” Al-ahram Weekly, no 773, December 15–21, 2005.

47. Mohamed El-Sayed, “Paying the Price?”

48. Fendi Mamoun, Miser Al-Mahzwarah (in Arabic), “Egypt Outlawed,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,

December 5, 2005.

49. Leading MB member ‘Assam Al-‘Arian distinguishes between “positive” votes that went to

MB candidates and the “protest” votes. According to Al-‘Arian, of the 35 to 40 percent of

the electorate that voted for the MB, “approximately 15 to 20 percent of the votes were pro-

test ones.” See Howeidy Amira, “Who’s Afraid of the Brotherhood,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

November 24–30, 2005.


51. Abel-Fattah Nabil, How the Brotherhood won, Al-Ahram Weekly, no 775, December 29,

2005— January 4, 2006.

Notes238

52. Official estimates put the voter turnout at 23 percent, while S’aad Al-Din Ibrahim, direc-

tor of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Human Rights and coordinator of the Independent

Committee for Elections Monitoring, reported estimates ranging from 10 to 20 percent.

However, I believe that the voter turnout in Egypt’s rural areas was between 5 to 8 percent

at best and on the urban areas between 3 to 5 percent. Egypt’s turnout generally in the 2005

election was less than 5 percent at best.

Eight Scaling the Eight Walls

1. Zambelis, Chris, “The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization,” 90–91.

2. Karl, Lynn Terry, “From Democracy to Democratization and Back: Before Transition

from Authoritarian Rule,” Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law,

(CDDRL) Stanford Institution on International Studies, Working Paper, No 45, September

2005, 13–14.

3. One feature of any given regime in transition is whether or not ruling elites have the polit-

ical will, the physical capacity, or both to defeat challenges to their rule during periods of

instability. Mubarak’s regime has kept its will and capacity to rule intact by harnessing civil

society as part of a wider strategy of survival, manipulating the rules of the game to keep

the prize of political change constantly out of reach.

4. According to Rustow’s dynamic model of democratic transition, the first phase in the dem-

ocratic transition is the preparatory stage in which a prolonged and inconclusive political

struggle is the necessary element that generates various forms of challenges to the non-

democratic rulers and the regime as well. The second phase is the decision stage in which

the ruling elites decide to institutionalize some critical democratic practices, procedures,

and rules. The final phase of the process is the habituation stage, in which both political

actors and the population habituate to the established democratic rules and procedures.

Later, Juan J. Linz defines the three phases of regime transformation toward democratic

polity as liberalization, transition, and consolidation, which become the familiar terms in the

study of regime transformation. For a scholarly discussion of these three phases, see Chou

Chen-Pao, “The Study of Democratization in the Era of Globalization,” Paper presented

at the Fourth Annual Kent State University Symposium on Democracy, http://upress.kent.

edu/Nieman/Study_Democratization.htm

5. See Karl, Lynn Terry, Democratization and Back, 8.

6. Uhlin, Anders, Indonesian and the “Third Wave of Democratization,” the Indonesian Pro-democracy

Movement in a Changing World (London: Curzon Press, First Published, 1997), 158.

7. Newsweek, July 28, 2005.

8. Byman, Daniel L., “The Implications of Leadership Change in the Arab World,” Political

Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 76. http://www.psqonline.org.

9. Ibid.

10. Stack, Megan K., “Life Without Mubarak? Unimaginable,” Los Angeles Times, September 6,

2005.

11. Osama Al-Ghazali Harb resigned from the NDP and established the Democratic Front

Party (DFP).

12. Newsweek, July 28, 2005.

13. Rubin, Barry, “Mubarak Goes to the Polls,” Middle East Times, August 29, 2005.

14. Egyptian debt is now quite manageable, constituting $31 billion; its present value is esti-

mated at 29 percent of GNP. See Bensahel, Nora, Byman, Daniel L. (eds.), “The Future

Security Environment,” 57. In September 2005, total domestic public debt, according to

Central Bank of Egypt f igures, stood at 82.9 percent of GDP. See Wahish Niveen, “The

three musketeers,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 5–11, 2006.

Notes 239

15. The government puts the unemployment rate at 9.3 percent, but independent figures

says the figure tops 20 percent. See The Daily Star, Monday, September 5, 2005. See also

El-Amrousi Salah, “Campaigning for the Economy,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 8–14,

2005.

16. See Bensahel, Nora, Byman, Daniel L. (eds.), “The Future Security Environment,”

67–68.


18. See Bensahel, Nora, Byman, Daniel L. (eds.), “The Future Security Environment,” 57.

19. See for more details, Ottaway, Marina, “Democracy Challenged,” 7–10.

20. Ghadbian Najib, 8.

21. Dunne, Michele, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” 14.

22. Bahgat Hossam, “Mubarak has Forgotten a Word: ‘Torture,’ ” Daily Star, September 6,

2005.


2005.

24. Bahgat, Hossam, “Mubarak has Forgotten a Word.”

25. See Crisis Group Briefing, “The Challenge of Political Reform.”

26. Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Liberalisation without Democratization in ‘Post-Populist’

Authoritarian States: Evidence from Syria and Egypt,” in Butenschon, Nils, Davis, Uri

and Hassassian, Manuel (eds.), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and

Applications, (Syracuse University Press, 2000), 123–145, 124–125.

27. Sestanovich, Stephen, “Russian Democracy in Eclipse: Force, Money, and Pluralism,”

Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 3, ( July 2004), 32–42, 32.

28. This term, originally coined by early twentieth-century economists to describe European

states that extended loans to governments in the underdeveloped world, was revived in a

1970 study of Iran by Hussein Mahdavy to denote a state that receives large amounts of

rent from “foreign individuals, concerns or governments.” Hazem Beblawi later refined

the term to mean a state in which large amounts of rent accrue directly to the government

from foreign actors and only a few are engaged in the generation of this wealth, the majority

being involved only in the distribution or utilization of it. The Arab Gulf States and Libya

are rentier states par excellence. See for more details Tadros, Mariz, “Egypt’s Election All

About Image.”

29. See, for this argument, Richards Alan, “Democracy in the Arab Region: Getting There

from Here,” Middle East Policy, vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 2005).

30. While exogenous rent has undoubtedly played a role in the persistence of authoritarianism

in some Arab states, the contention that it accounts for the enormous “democracy gap”

between the Middle East and other regions of the world is disputable on several grounds.

First, while case studies of oil-exporting states strongly suggest that abundant petroleum

revenues do impede democratization, there is also evidence that this impact varies accord-

ing to other social, political, and economic factors. Second, exogenous rent has not pro-

duced a significantly lower tax burden in the Arab world. While tax rates in Arab countries

are lower than those in developed nations, the Arab world is not under-taxed relative to

other areas of the developing world. Third, steep declines in the f low of exogenous rent into

the region have not decisively undermined authoritarian political institutions in the region.

See Gambill, Gary C., “Explaining the Arab Democracy Deficit.”

31. Alterman, Jon B., “Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?,” The Washington Quarterly, (Autumn

2000): 107–118, 113.

32. Bensahel, Nora, Byman, Daniel L. (eds.), “The Future Security Environment,” 20.

33. Dauderstädt, Michael, Lerch, Marika, “International Democracy Promotion: Patiently

Redistributing Power,” International Politics and Society / Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft”

(IPG), no. 4 (2005), 159–183, 171, http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/porta130/docs/FOLDER/

IPG/IPG4_2005/11_DAUDERSTAEDT.PDF.

Notes240

34. For a scholarly discussion of this point, see Taagepera Rein, Prospects for Democracy in Islamic

Countries (Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), University of California,

2003), 2, http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/03–10. See also Nkrumah, Gamal, “Viva

Corruption,” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 13–19, 2006. See also Tadros, Mariz, Egypt’s Election

All About Image.

35. According to the Nasserist Weekly Al-‘Arabi, Mubarak’s fortune is about 4 billion dollars.

Al-‘Arabi, August 28, 2005.

36. El-Ghobashy, Mona, “Egypt’s Summer of Discontent,” Middle East Report Online,

September 18, 2003.

37. Al-Shab Online, November 12, 2003.

38. For more details about the case of Kafr Al-Zayit Bridge, see Al-Ahram Weekly, July 13–19,

2006.

39. Al-Dostour, August 9, 2006.

40. Al-‘Arabi, September 10, 2006.

41. El-Ghitany, Magda, “Justice Lost at Sea? Al-Ahram Weekly,” June 1–7, 2006.

42. Ironically enough, three journalists were referred to a criminal court on the same day

Ism’ail was formally charged with a misdemeanor.

43. Raphaeli, Nimrod, “The Grooming of Gamal Husni Mubarak,” The Middle East Media

Research Institute (MEMRI), No. 141, July 8, 2003. See also Al-Dostour, June 29, 2005.

44. Essam, El-Din Gamal, “Re-introducing Gamal Mubarak,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 30 —

April 5, 2006.

45. According to the independent weekly Al-Dostour, the net profit of ‘Azz during four years

from 2002 to 2005 is 30 billion pounds, resulting from monopolizing the steel business. See

Al-Dostour, June 29, 2005.


47. Independent newspapers have alleged that he funded President Mubarak’s presidential elec-

tion campaigns. See Shehab, Shaden, “Limited Victory: Do Journalists Have Any Reason

to Rejoice,” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 13–19, 2006.

48. See Al-Dostour, June 14, 2006.

49. Al-Sadat mainly was accused of “spreading false rumors” and “insulting the armed forces

and the republican guard; however, the main target of the trial was to stop him from reveal-

ing corruption scandals about the regime’s corrupt elites. See Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 4,

no. 4 (November 2006).

50. Shehab, Shaden, “Limited Victory.”

51. Bensahel, Nora, Byman, Daniel L. (eds.), “The Future Security Environment,” 23–24.

52. Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, “Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment,” Journal of Democracy,

vol. 17, no. 3 ( July 2006), 86–99, 94.

53. Max Weber originally defined status societies, which are ruled by particularism, as socie-

ties that are governed by convention rather than law, where certain groups monopolize the

powers of domination and sources of income. Status can best be understood in terms of the

distribution of power, as it ref lects an individual’s distance from the groups or networks that

hold power. See Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, 88.

54. Biezen, Ingrid van, “How Political Parties Shape Democracy,” 2.


56. Mohamed Al-Sayyid S’aid, “The Debate on Democratic Reform,” Al-Ahram, December 1,

2003.

57. See, No author, “Reforming Egypt,” 15–17.

58. El-Nahas, Mona, “Party Impolitic,” Al-Ahram Weekly, February 15–21, 2007.

59. Shahin, Emad El-Din, 5–6.

60. McFaul, Michael, “Transitions from Postcommunism,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 3

( July 2005), 9.

Notes 241

61. El Amrani, Issandr, “Egypt: What Future for Liberals?” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2

(March 2006), (The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

62. Hamzawy Amr, “Inner Renewal,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 16–22, 2006.

63. Johnston, Michael, “Political Parties and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 3

( July 2005), 5–19, 3.

64. Fish M. Stevens, “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies,” Journal of Democracy,

vol. 17, no. 1 ( January 2006), 6–20, 12–13.

65. Ibid., 18.

66. No author, “Reforming Egypt,” 18.

67. Richards, Alan, “Democracy in the Arab Region.”

68. According to Harb, He resigned after concluding there is no real will within the NDP

for democratic transformation. In two letters submitted to Gamal Mubarak and NDP

Secretary-General Safwat Al-Sherif on Sunday, Al-Ghazali said his hopes that the Policies

Committee would take a leading role in democratic change had been entirely dashed.

“This was quite clear in the undemocratic way in which Article 76 of the constitution

was amended,” said Al-Ghazli. He strongly opposed the amendment of Article 76, calling

it a democratic setback. He also asserted that instead of inspiring for change, the Policies

Committee had turned into a “talk shop.” However, his resignation met with suspicion in

opposition circles, especially coming a few hours after President Mubarak declared that

the length of the party’s life has been frozen and he himself welcomes establishing a new

liberal party. See Al-‘Arabi, March 19, 2006. See Essam, Gamal El-Din, “Cracks in the

NDP,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 9–15, 2006. See also Howeidy, Amira, “I Fear for Egypt,”

Al-Ahram Weekly, March 16–22, 2006.

69. McFaul, Michael, “Transitions from Postcommunism,” 15–16.

70. Yom, Sean L., “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World,” Middle East Review

of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 9, no. 4 (December 2004), 14–33, 18.

71. Hawthorne, Amy, “Middle East Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer?,” 5.

72. Yom, Sean L., 18.





77. According to law 32 of 1964, a hold over from the Nasser era, all private and civic associa-

tions in Egypt are administrated by MSA. Law 32 stipulates that all prospective associations

must apply to the MSA for a license, which it has the authority to grant or withhold. In

addition, the MSA can intervene in the functioning of existing associations. For example,

it can appoint members of an association’s board, demand written reports on its activ-

ities, and supervise the collection of funds and their uses. See Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky,

“Mobilizing Islam,” 181.


79. Gershman, Carl, Allen, Michael, 44.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., 45.

82. Karl, Lynn Terry, 23.

83. Gershman, Carl, Allen, Michael, 41–42.


85. Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky, “Mobilizing Islam,” 181.


87. Ibid., 13.


89. Essam, El-Din Gamal, “Much More to be Done,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 7–13, 2006.

Notes242

90. No author, “Egypt: Municipal Elections Postponed, Ruling Party Changes,” Arab Reform

Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1, (February 1, 2006).

91. For more details on renewing the emergency laws, see Roz Al-Yousef, May 1, 2006. See also

Mohamed Saleh, “Egypt Renewed Emergency Laws for Two Years and the Opposition

Forces Consider Them a Reason for Terrorism,” Al-Hayyat, May 1, 2006.

92. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Much More to be Done,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 7–13,

2006.


94. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Spring Turns to Winter,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 24–30,

2006.

95. El-Hennawy, Noha, “Pressing Charges,” Egypt Today (August 2006).

96. See Al-Dostour July 6, 2005; Al-Sanawi ‘Adbellah, “The Leader, Maneuverer, and the

Administrator,” Al-‘Arabi, July 24, 2005, Al-Dostour, August 16, 2006; Sawt Al-Umma,

July 31, 2006; and Roz Al-Youssef, July 8, 2006.

97. El-Hennawy, Noha, “Pressing Charges,” Egypt Today (August 2006). For more details

on the case of Ibrahim ‘Aissa, see Al-Dostour, July 3, 2006; Sawt Al-Umma, July 2006;

Al Masry Al Youm, July 3, 2006.

98. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 1 (February 2007).

99. Amr, Ahmed, “Viewpoint: Revolt of the Egyptian Elite,” Middle East Times, May 31,

2006.

100. Clawson, Patrick, “The State Department’s ‘No Dominoes’ Report and Prospects for

Democratization in the a Post-Saddam Middle East,” The Washington Institute For Near

Policy, Policywatch, Number 756, May 13, 2003.

Nine On the Bright Side


2. Ibid, 2.

3. Ibid, 2–3.

4. El-Ghobashy Mona, “Egypt Looks Ahead to Portentous Year.”


6. El Amrani Issandr, “Egypt: Opening the Constitutional Debate.”

7. Shahin Emad El-Din, “Egypt’s Moment of Reform,” 2–3.



10. Ibid.



13. The group’s spokesman, ‘Abd Al-Halim Qandil, was brief ly kidnapped in November

2004, beaten up, and left naked in the desert. According to Qandil, the security agen-

cies were behind the incident, a charge vehemently denied by the interior minister. See

Howeidy Amira, “Distressing Spotlight,” Al-Ahram Weekly, February 10–16, 2005.

14. Shahin Emad El-Din, “Egypt’s Moment of Reform,” 3. See also Al-Osbou’ May 5, 2005.

15. El-Nahhas Mona, “Into the Breach,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 9–15, 2005.

16. El-Sayed Mohamed, “Divided They Stand,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December, 21–27, 2006.

17. Al-Messiri is a renowned scholar who began his career as an English literature profes-

sor at Ain Shams University. In 1975, Al-Messiri served as cultural-affairs adviser at

the permanent delegation of the Arab League to the United Nations. Over the past

three decades, he has published scores of books and articles on everything from Muslim

Notes 243

political thought to Palestinian issues and Zionism. See El Mallah Yasmeen, “Enough?,”

Egypt Today, March 2007.


19. El-Anani Khalil, “Resurrecting the Body Politic,” Al-Ahram Weekly September 8–14,

2005.

20. Shahin Emad El-Din, ‘Egypt’s Moment of Reform,” 2–3.

21. Ibid.


23. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 5 ( June 2005), Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace.



26. El Nahhas Mona, “Into the breach,” Al Ahram Weekly, June 9–15, 2005.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid., 13.

30. Koch, Christian, “The Societal Sources of Change in the Middle East,” International Politics

and Society / Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (IPG), No. 4, 2004, 54–69, 62.

31. Hofheinz Albrecht, 84.



34. Hofheinz Albrecht, “The Internet in the Arab World,” 93–94.

35. Wise Lindsay, “Why Egypt Is Cracking Down on Bloggers,” Middle East Times, Jun 1,

2006.


37. Richards Alan, “Democracy in the Arab Region,” 8.

38. Zambelis Chris, 94.

39. Ottaway Marina, “United States: Can Its Middle East Policy Serve Democracy?” Arab


40. Zambelis Chris, 94.

41. For more details of this scenario see, Zambelis, Chris, 96–97.

42. Byman, Daniel L., 79.

43. Zogby James, “Don’t Believe the Hype,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 31–April 6, 2005.

44. Middle East Policy Council, Thirty-ninth in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S.

Middle East Policy, “Democracy: Rising Tide or Mirage?” Middle East Policy Journal,

vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 2005), Unedited Transcript.

45. Abaza Khairi, “Reform Prospects during Mubarak’s Fifth Term.”

46. David Adesnik and McFaul Michael, “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy,”

The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), 7–62, 9.

47. Kuttab Daoud, “How Democracy Can Take Root,” Middle East Times, November 28,

2003.

48. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3 (April 2005). Interview with Elizabeth Cheney, U.S.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

49. Ottaway Marina, “Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World,” Carnegie Papers,

Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, No. 66, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace ( January 2006), 10.

50. Mattar Gamil, “A Marriage Made in Hell,” March 30—April 5, 2006.

51. Ottaway Marina, “Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World,” 5–6.

52. Middle East Policy Council, Thirty-ninth in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S.

Middle East Policy, “Democracy: Rising Tide or Mirage? Middle East Policy Journal, vol. 12,

no. 2 (Summer 2005), Unedited Transcript.

Notes244

53. Menotti Roberto, “Democratize but Stabilize: Democracy in the Middle East,” Middle East

Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3.

54. Asmus Ronald D., Diamond Larry, Leonard Mark, and McFaul Michael, “A Transatlantic

Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East,” The Washington

Quarterly (Spring 2005), 7.

55. Zambelis Chris, 100–101.

56. Leonard Mark, Diamond Larry, McFaul Michael, Ahlin Urban, Asmus Ronald, Byman

Daniel, and others, “Democracy and Human Development in the Broader Middle East: A

Transatlantic Strategy for Partnership,” Istanbul Papers # 1, Istanbul, Turkey June 25–27,

2004, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, (GMF) and Turkish Economic and

Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), 1.

57. For a scholarly discussion of Helsinki process, see Asmus Ronald D., Diamond Larry,

Leonard Mark, and McFaul Michael, 17–18.

58. For a scholarly discussion on Kirkpatrick’s doctrine, see David Adesnik and McFaul

Michael, “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly

(Spring 2006), 9.

59. Owens Bill, Eid Tory A., “Strategic Democracy Building: How U.S. Can Help,”

The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2002), 164.

60. Richards Alan, “Democracy in the Arab Region”.

61. Hamzawy Amr, “The Key to Arab Reform,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

policy Brief, No. 40, August 2005, 2–3.

62. Richards Alan, “Democracy in the Arab Region.”

63. Zambelis Chris, 100–101.

64. Windsor Jennifer, “Advancing the Freedom Agenda,” 30.

65. Ibid., 22.

66. Dunne Michele, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” 16–17. For a scholarly discussion of this

point, see also Leonard Mark, Diamond Larry, McFaul Michael and others, 5.

67. Dunne Michele, “Evaluating Egyptian Reform,” 16–17.

68. Ibid., 16–17.

69. Kienle Eberhard, “Transformation without Democratization? Egypt’s Political

Future,” International Politics and Society / Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (IPG),

No. 4, 2004, 70–86, 81. http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/IPG/

IPG4_2004/ARTKIENLE.PDF:81.

70. Asmus Ronald D., Diamond Larry, Leonard Mark, and McFaul Michael, 9.

71. Kopstein Jeffrey, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” The Washington

Quarterly (Spring 2006), 92–93.

72. Youngs Richard, “Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, Democracy and

Rule of Law Project, No. 45, June 2004, 11.

73. Ibid., 9–10.

74. Schlumberger Oliver, 51–52.

75. Campbell Kim, Carroll Sean C., “Sustaining Democracy’s Last Wave,” Georgetown Journal

of International Affairs (Summer/Fall 2005), 49.

76. Kienle Eberhard, “Transformation without Democratization,” 81.

77. The differences between U.S. and European views on democracy promotion are best under-

stood by examining their perceptions of the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the

post-Communist aftermath in the 1990s. Their interpretation has profoundly shaped their

views on democracy promotion in Iraq and elsewhere.

78. Kopstein Jeffrey, 93–94.

79. Asmus Ronald D., Diamond Larry, Leonard Mark, and McFaul Michael, 11.

80. Kopstein Jeffrey, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” 90.

81. Karl Lynn Terry, 23.

Notes 245

Ten Is Islam the Solution?

1. No author, “Islamism in North Africa II: Egypt’s Opportunity,” International Crisis Group,

(ICG) Middle East Briefing, Cairo/Brussels (2004), 12–13.

2. Walsh John, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam,” Harvard

International Review, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter 2003), http://hir.harvard.edu/article/1048/.

3. Shahin Emad El Din, 3–4.


5. Hamzawy Amr, Bishara Dina, “Islamist Movements in the Arab World, and the 2006

Lebanon War,” Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project,

No. 75, November 2006, 4.

6. According to the daily independent Al-Masri Al-Youm, the Coptic Orthodox Church has

already voiced its worries to the authorities over the MB’s election gains. Similarly, some

Coptic intellectuals have been vocal in expressing their concern. Coptic intellectual Milad

Hanna was widely quoted as saying he will “leave Egypt” if the Brotherhood comes to

power. See Howeidy Amira, “Who’s Afraid of the Brotherhood,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

November 24–30, 2005; and Daily Star, November 22, 2005.

7. Ibid.

8. Mohamed Habib, deputy supreme guide of the MB, joined other opposition figures in crit-

icizing the delay as “a blow to democracy.” Habib claims also that the Brotherhood would

have dominated the local council elections, See El-Hennawy Noha, “All Politics is Local,”

Egypt today (March 2006).

9. No author, “Egypt: Crackdown on Judges, Press, Muslim Brothers.”

10. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 3 (April 2006).

11. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 5 ( June 2006).

12. Hamzawy Amr, Bishara Dina, “Islamist Movements in the Arab World,” 6.

13. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Bad Year for the Brothers,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 28, 2006–

January 3, 2007.

14. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 7 (September 2006).

15. El-Aref Nevine, “Wars of the Roses,” Al-Ahram Weekly, November 23–29, 2006.

16. Hassan Fayza, “As Good As it Gets?” Egypt Today (December 2006).

17. See Roz Al-Yousef, November 28, 2006.

18. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Hosni Makes No Apology,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 7–13,

2006.

19. On December 26, 2006, President Mubarak formally requested that the PA amend some

thirty-four articles of the constitution. These thirty-four articles can be divided into three

categories. The first consists of those that require amendment in order to make them con-

sistent with current practice. The second category addresses the relationship between

the executive and legislative authorities, while the remaining fourteen articles appear to

strengthen the position of the ruling elite. See Hassan Bahey Eldin, “Egypt: Civil Society

and the Proposed Constitutional Amendments,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 1 (February

2007); and see also Essam El-Din Gamal, “Ridding Egypt of Socialism,” Al-Ahram Weekly,

February 1–7, 2007.

20. Ibid.

21. Alaa Al-Aswani was among several politicians and writers who thought the issue was fab-

ricated by the regime to demonstrate that there is no alternative to Mubarak and his son,

Gamal, and that the MB would curtail the people’s freedom when they come to power. See

Alaa Al-Aswani, “The Ado of the Headscarf: Remarks After Ending the Show,” Al-‘Arabi

December 10, 2006.

22. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Bad Year for the Brothers,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 28,

2006–January 3, 2007.

Notes246

23. Ibid.

24. Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2 (March 2007).

25. Al Anani Khalil, “Egypt: The Regime, the Brotherhood, and Labor Pains of the Fourth

Republic,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2 (March 2007).

26. For the complete version of the MB program, see Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 10, 11, and 12,

2007.

27. Howeidy Amira, “Endless Clampdowns,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 23–29, 2007.

28. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Stand Off Escalates,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 30–September 5,

2007.

29. Al Anani Khalil, “Egypt: The Regime, the Brotherhood, and Labor Pains of the Fourth

Republic,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2 (March 2007).

30. Howeidy Amira, “Back to Square One,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 29–July 5, 2006.

31. Shahin Emad El-Din, 3–4.

32. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Brotherhood Steps into the Fray,” Al-Ahram Weekly. March 11–17,

2004.

33. Hamzawy Amr and Brown Nathan J., “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More

Democratic Future?,” 6.

34. Khalil Magdi, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy

Survive?,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vo1. 10, no. 1 (March 2006),

44–52, 48.

35. Al-Akhbar, November 26, 2006.

36. Howeidy Amira, “We Take Nobody’s Permission,” Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 773,

December 15–21, 2005.

37. El-Erian Essam, “Towards the Renaissance,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 1–7, 2005.

38. Hamzawy Amr and Brown Nathan J., “Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More

Democratic Future?,” 6–7.

39. Guindy Adel, “The Islamization of Egypt,” Middle East Review of International Affairs

(MERIA), vo1. 10, no. 3 (September 2006), 92–102, 94–95.

40. Nassar Galal, “In No Uncertain Terms,” Al-Ahram Weekly, April 20–26, 2006.

41. Ibid.

42. Brown Nathan J., Hamzawy Amr, and Ottaway Marina, “Islamists in the Arab World,”

10–11.

43. Cagaptay Soner, Gause III, F. Gregory, and Makram-Ebeid Mona, 10.

44. Essam El-Din Gamal, “The Brothers Show Their Cards,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 16–22,

2007.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Kodmani Bassma, “The Danger of Political Exclusion: Egypt’s Islamist Problem,”

Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project Number 63,

October 2005, 19.

48. Al-Ahram Weekly, December 30, 2004–January 5, 2005.

49. Khorshid Sara, “Egypt’s Islamists ‘Reap What They Have Sown,’ ” Middle East Times,

December 1, 2005.

50. In January 1996, seventy-four Egyptians signed an application for obtaining legal status for

a new political party, Hizb Al-Wassat (the Centre Party). The project drew on a current that

had developed in Egyptian intellectual circles since the mid-1980s, which had been dubbed

Al-Wasatiyya (Centrism). This was a diffuse movement of ideas, in which a number of Islamic

intellectuals played a prominent role. The Wassat Party, which defines itself as a civil party

with an Islamic Marga’ia, opened its membership to all Egyptian citizens regardless of their

religion. In fact, a few Coptic intellectuals have already joined the party. What they had in

common was the project of re-thinking Islamic doctrines so as to take a positive account

of democracy using the values, not the theology, of Islam as a common denominator. See,

Notes 247

for a scholarly discussion of this point, No author, “Islamism in North Africa II,” 16–17.

Hamzawy Amr, Brown Nathan J., and Ottaway Marina, “Islamist Movements and the

Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones,” Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, Middle East Series, No. 67, March 2006, 11–12. Fuller Graham E.,

“Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance Around Democracy,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, No. 49,

September 2004, 16–17.

51. Hamzawy Amr, Brown Nathan J., and Ottaway Marina, “Islamist Movements and the

Democratic Process in the Arab World,” 11–12.

52. Al-Karama, August 13, 2007. See also the interview in Al-‘Arabi newspaper with ‘Akef,

Al-‘Arabi, August 25, 2007.

53. Hamzawy Amr, Brown Nathan J., and Ottaway Marina, “Islamists in the Arab

World,” 17.

54. Nasr Vali, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’ ” Journal of Democracy, vo1. 16, no. 2 (April

2005), 13–27, 24.

55. For a scholarly discussion of the Morocco experience of the integration of Islamists, see

Ottaway Marina, Riley Meredith, “Morocco: From Top-down Reform to Democratic

Transition?,” Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project,

No. 71, September 2006, 18.

56. The PJD leaders have contacts with U.S. embassy officials and are invited along with leaders

of all other parties to embassy receptions, and they have no trouble obtaining visas to the

United States. See Ottaway Marina, Riley Meredith, “Morocco,” 18.

57. Brown Nathan J., “Jordan and Its Islamic Movement: The limits of Inclusion?” Carnegie

Papers, Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, No. 74, November 2006,

18–19.


59. Reformist Islamist Abu Al’ala Madi estimated that all Islamists together would get more

than 15 to 20 percent of the vote, while the Al-Arabi former editor, ‘Abd Al-Halim Qandil,

estimated that Islamists would get one-third of the votes, pro-business candidates, another

third, and Nasserist and other candidates, the final third. See, No author, “The Challenge

of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War,” International Crisis Group, (ICG) Middle

East Briefing, Cairo/Brussels, September 30, 2003, 19. On the other hand, Kifaya general

coordinator George Ishak estimated that the group would win 10 to 15 percent. See, No

author, “Reforming Egypt,” 19–20.

60. Fuller Graham, “Islamists in the Arab World,” 10.

61. Hamzawy Amr, Bishara Dina, “Islamist Movements in the Arab World,” 4.


63. Ottaway Marina, “Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World,” 14. After all, the

Roman Catholic Church vociferously opposed democracy throughout the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, yet Catholic Europe is today entirely democratic, as is most

of largely Catholic Latin America. See Richards Alan, “Democracy in the Arab Region.”

64. Fuller Graham, “Islamists in the Arab World,” 12–14.

65. The Economist, June 2, 2005.

Epilogue: Succession or Success?

1. Former Syrian strongman Hafiz Al-Asad first groomed one son, Basil, and then turned to

another, Bashar, when the former was killed in a 1994 automobile accident. An ophthal-

mologist by training, Bashar was whisked up the military ladder to prepare him for lead-

ership. Hafiz, known to be in poor health, further ensured his son’s succession by purging

Notes248

potential challengers and then arranging, shortly before his death, for Syria’s parliament to

amend its constitution by lowering the legal age for the presidency from forty to thirty-

four. After Hafiz’s June 10, 2000, death, Bashar won a reported 97.29 percent of the presi-

dential vote and formally succeeded his father. See Schanzer, Jonathan, “Gamal Mubarak:

Successor Story in Egypt?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch,

No. 669, October 2002.

2. Sobelman, Daniel, “Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?” The Middle East Quarterly, vol. 8,

no. 2 (Spring 2001). http://www.meforum.org/article/27.

3. Mubarak’s health has begun to draw the concern of Egyptians, especially in terms of who

will succeed him, since November 2004 when the president interrupted a keynote speech

to parliament because of what officials said was a bout of severe f lu. See Chmaytelli, Maher,

“Mubarak Rules out Monarchy,” Middle East Times, January 2, 2004.

4. Schanzer, “Successor Story.”

5. Dickey, Christopher, “Death Scare On The Nile, Succession Question: Will Mubarak’s

Son Be the Next Leader?” Newsweek, December 1, 2004.


7. Essam El-Din Gamal, “It Won’t Happen Here,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 8—14, 2004.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/review/people_ful l_story.asp?service_id=7726

March 29, 2005.

11. Al-Ahram, May 14, 2005.


13. Slavin, Barbara, “Egypt Defends Its Electoral Process,” USA Today, May 17, 2005.

14. Ibid.

15. Abdel-Latif Omayma, “The Art of Not Saying Much,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 26–

February 2, 2006.

16. The Economist, September 28, 2006. http://economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.

cfm?story_id=7971125.

17. Stacher, Joshua, “Egypt: A Leap toward Reform—or Succession?” Arab Reform Bulletin,

vol 4, no. 8 (October 2006).


19. Essam El-Din Gamal, “It Won’t Happen Here,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 8–14, 2004.

20. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Re-introducing Gamal Mubarak,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 30–

April 5, 2006.

21. Nafaa, Hassan, “Looking towards November,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 8–14, 2005.


23. Sobelman, Daniel, “Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?.”


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Murphy, Dan, “Arab Allies Test US ‘Freedom’ Agenda,” The Christian Science Monitor,

May 17, 2005.

28. Raphaeli, Nimrod, ‘The Grooming of Gamal Husni Mubarak,” The Middle East Media

Research Institute (MEMRI), No. 141, July 8, 2003.

29. Murphy, Dan, “Egyptians Talk Democratic Reform,” The USA Today, September 27,

2004.

30. Ibid.

31. El Ghobashy, Mona, “Egypt Looks Ahead to Portentous Year.”

32. Ibid.

33. Williams, Daniel, “Clearing the Path for Scion of Egypt.”

34. Slavin, Barbara, “Egypt Defends Its Electoral Process,” USA Today, May 17, 2005.

Notes 249

35. New York Times, September 3, 2005.

36. El-Ghobashy, Mona, “Egypt’s Summer of Discontent.”


2005.


39. Krastev, Ivan, “New Threats to Freedom: Democracy’s ‘Doubles,’ ” Journal of Democracy,

vol. 17, no. 2 (April 2006), 52–62, 54–58.

40. Gubash, Charlene, Stage Set for Political Dynasty in Egypt? Signs May Indicate Gamal

Mubarak Being Groomed to Succeed Father,” Newsweek, July 28, 2004.


42. Bryson, Donna, “Egypt Billboard May Portend Aspirations,” Newsweek, September 10,

2004.

43. Raphaeli, Nimrod.

44. See Howeidy Amira, “Time for the N Word,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 28–

October 4, 2006.

45. Stacher, Joshua, “Egypt: A Leap toward Reform—or Succession?” Arab Reform Bulletin,

vol. 4, no. 8 (October 2006).

46. For Egyptian readers it was clear that the subtext of the discussion of Bashar’s succession

was the possibility of Gamal Mubarak’s succession. In fact, the goal of writing about Syria

is to prevent the repetition of this scenario in other Arab countries, since the Syrian legal

and constitutional state of affairs is identical to that of Egypt and the way the candidate for

presidency is elected is identical in the constitutions of both states. See Feldner, Yotam,

“Egypt’s Succession, Part I: Will Egypt Follow Syria’s Precedent?” The Middle East Media



48. Sobelman, Daniel.


50. El-Ghobashy Mona, “Egypt’s Summer of Discontent.”

51. Raphaeli, Nimrod.

52. Essam El-Din Gamal, “It Won’t Happen Here,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 8–14, 2004.

53. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Meeting the Press,” Al-Ahram weekly, August 5–11, 2004.

54. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Gamal Mubarak’s Coup D’état,” Al-‘Arabi, February 5, 2006.

55. No Author, “Egyptian Liberal Ayman Nour Attacks Mubarak’s Intention to Nominate His

Son Gamal as Next President,” Middle East Media Research Institute (memri), special dis-

patch series No. 1196, July 4, 2006. http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Ar

ea=egypt=egypt&ID=sp119606.

56. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Gamal Mubarak’s Coup D’état,” Al-‘Arabi, February 5, 2006.



59. Ibid.

60. For Nazif ’s visit to the United States, see Efron, Sonni, “Egypt Should Set Pace of Its

Reforms, Premier Says: Ahmed Nazief Asserts U.S. Pressure Would Only Hinder Political

and Economic Change.” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2005.



63. Abdel-Latif, Omayma, “The Final Cut,” Al-Ahram Weekly, September 28–October 4,

2006.

64. Al-‘Arabi, February 26, 2006.

65. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Mubarak and the Americans,” Al-‘Arabi, September 22, 2006.

66. Gubash, Charlene.

67. Shehata, Samer, “Egypt: The Gamal Mubarak Paradox,” Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 5

( June 2006).

Notes250

68. Feldner, Yotam, “Egypt’s Succession, Part I.”

69. Essam El-Din Gamal, “Re-introducing Gamal Mubarak.”

70. Levinson, Charles, “Suing for a Vice President,” Cairo times, August 9, 2003.

71. Shehata, Samer.

72. Ibid.

73. Williams, Daniel, “Clearing the Path For Scion of Egypt.”

74. With a desire to improving the relationship between the Mubarak regime and the Obama

administration, Ayman Nour was surprisingly released on February 18, 2009, after the

country’s general prosecutor cited Nour’s health concerns.

75. ‘Abdallah Al-Sennawi (chief editor of Nasserist Weekly Al-‘Arabi), “Hell Gates,” Al-‘Arabi,

September 19, 2006.

76. Al-Sanawi ‘Abdallah, “The Successor and the Succession,” Al-‘Arabi, September 24, 2006.

77. ‘Alaa Al-Aswani, “Your Achievements are Illusions and Crimes,” Al-‘Arabi, September 24,

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78. Mohamed Abu Al-Ghar, “Why People Don’t Want Gamal Mubarak as President,” Al-‘Arabi,

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79. Qandil claimed that four armed men told him that he was being punished for talking

about “important men.” Although the identity of the culprits is unknown, according to

some reports Qandil blamed Interior Minister Habib Al-‘Adli in a complaint sent to the

Prosecutor-General. See Arab Reform Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 10 (November 2004).

80. Al-Masroun, April 5, 2006.



83. Al-Osbou’, December 4, 2006.

84. Shehata Samer.

85. Al-‘Arabi, June 19, 2005.

86. Al-‘Arabi, “An interview with Hassan Nafia,” November, 12, 2006.


88. Williams, Daniel, “Clearing the Path For Scion of Egypt.”

89. Feldner Yotam, “Egpyt’s Succession, Part II.”

90. Chmaytelli Maher, “Mubarak Rules Out Monarchy,” Middle East Times, January 2, 2004.


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Foreign Newspapers and Magazines

Al-Ahram Weekly

Cairo Magazine

Cairo Times

Daily Mail

Daily Star

Economist

Egypt Today

Financial Times

International Herald Tribune

Jerusalem Post

Los Angeles Times

Middle East Times

New York Times

Newsweek

The Boston Globe

The Christian Science Monitor

The Independent

Bibliography262

The Middle East

The Sunday Telegraph

The Times

USA Today

Washington Post

Arabic Newspapers and Magazines

Akhar S’ah

Akhbar Al-Youm

Akher Saiah

Al-Ahali

Al-Ahram

Al-Ahram Al-Aqatesadi

Al-Ahram Al-‘Arabi

Al-Ahram Al-Masaay

Al-Ahrar

Al-Akhbar

Al-‘Alam Al-Youm

Al-‘Arabi

Al-Dostour

Al-Fager

Al-Gomhoeriah

Al-Hayyat

Al-Karama

Al-Masry Al-Youm

Al-Mosour

Al-Osbou’

Al-Saiasi

Al-Saiasi Al-Maseri

Al-Sh’ab

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat

Al-Wafd

Al-Zaman

Mayo

Miser Al-Fatah

October

Roz Al-Yousef

Sabah Al-Khir

Sawt Al-Umma

1974 October Paper, 18

‘Abd Al-’Aziz, Zakaria, 116

‘Abd Al-Fadil, Mahmoud, 15

Abd Al-Hakim, Sobhi, 25

Abd Al-Hakim ‘Amer, 64

‘Abd Al-Hamid, ‘Abd Al-Hakim, 152

‘Abd Al-Hayy, Tawfiq, 65

‘Abd Al-Latif Al-Manwai, 57

‘Abdellah, Mohamed, 53, 54, 55

Abdel-Nasser, Gamal, 138

Abdullah, Crown Prince, 96

‘Abid, Ataf, 49

abn al-dirah, 85

Abu Al’ala Madi, 128

Abu Al-’Anein, Mohamed, 21, 61,

71–72, 125, 143

Abu Al-Futuh family, 142

Abu Al-Ghar, Mohamed, 197

Abu ‘Amar, Dr. Mohamed Zaki, 54

Abu Bakr, Hoda, 152

Abu Wafia, Mahmoud, 13

Abu Zeid, Ragab, 176

Adam, Richard Jr., 72

Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP),

166, 181

Al-’Adli, Habib, 194

Afaq ‘Arabia, 152, 174

Ahmadinejhad, Mahmoud, 191

Ahmed, Makram Muhammad, 83

Al-Ahram Weekly, 133, 178

Al-Ahrar party, 171–172

‘Aissa, Ibrahim, 152

‘Aissa, Salah, 173

‘Akef, Mohamed Mahdi, 101, 111, 133,

174, 178, 197–198

Akhbar Al-Youm, 50

AKP (Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi),

166, 181

‘Alam, Mohamed, 49

‘Alam ‘Abd Al-Halim, Mohamed, 48

Al-’Alam Al-Yom, 69

Alexandria Businessmen’s Association

(ABA), 68, 74

Alexandria declaration (2004), 93–94

‘Ali, Kamal Hassan, 25

Alislambouli, ‘Assam, 196

Alliance of National Forces for Reform,

99–100

Al-’Amal party, 172

‘Amer, Sabri, 176

American Chamber of Commerce

(ACC), 68

American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 90

Al-Aqatesadi, Al-Ahram, 71

Arab Charter on Human Rights, 96

Arab Contractors, 66

Arab Reform Conference, 2005, 97

Arab Socialist Party of Egypt (ASPE),

13–14

Arab Socialist Union (ASU), 3–4

reforming, 6–8

subgroups in, 11

Al-’Arabi, 115, 130, 134, 197, 198, 199

I N D E X

Index264

Al-’Arian ‘Assam, 178

article 76 amendment, 102, 106,

108–110, 185, 188

Al-Asad, Bashar, 185

Al-Asad, Hafiz, 185

‘Ashour, Sameh, 145

ASU, compared to NDP, 17–18

Ayman Nour’s case, 108

‘Azmi, Zakaria, 21, 43–44, 58, 77, 129,

142, 174, 195

‘Azz, Ahmed, 21, 43–44, 50, 61,

125, 142

Al-Badrawi, Hossam, 21, 125, 199

‘Al-Badri, Abd Al-Fatah, 50

Al-Bana, Hassan, 63

the Bayan, 7–8

Al-Baz, Osama, 186

Al-Beltagi, Mamdouh, 32, 57

Ben Ali (president of Tunisia), 108

Big Eight faction, 21

hegemony of, 35–36

Big Four, 24–26

Bioumi, Fathi, 52

Broader Middle East and North Africa

Initiative (BMENAI), 91–92

Bush, George H.W., 164

Bush administration, 87–88, 107–108

US policy, 88–93

businessmen. See also Magles Al-Sh’aab

corrupt linkages of, 141–142

selection methods for Parliament, 85

Clark, Elizabeth Spiro, 119–120

controlled deliberalization, 97–100

corruption, 141–143

immunity-related factor in, 71

Dawad, Mahmoud, 54

deliberalization policies, 150–153

democracy

challenges to transition, 137

islah (democratic reform), 147

Latin America and Europe transitions

to, 82

political economy and, 140–141

transition needs, 146–147

weak civil society and, 147–150

weak political parties and, 143–146

Democratic Generation, 99

democratic transition, pro-reform

movements and, 157–161

democratization

Bush initiatives for, 90–95

defined, 82

Der Spiegel, 180

Al-Din, Awad Tage, 32

Al-Din, Fouad Mohi, 24, 25

Al-Din, Hussein Kamel Baha, 32

Al-Din, Mahmoud Mohi, 21, 195

Al-Din Dawoud, Dia, 145

Al-Din Hilal, ‘Ali, 21, 32, 58, 125–126,

192, 199

Al-Dostour, 115, 152, 196

Egypt

blogs in, 161–162

civil society in, 147–150

corruption as factor in, 143

current economy, 138–139

economic liberalization in, 68

economy issues of early 90’s, 67

National Council on

Human Rights, 149

overzealous state security, 139–140

political economy in, 140–141

television in, 162

trade relationships with other

countries, 167–168

Egypt 2000, 99

Egyptian Businessmen’s Association

(EBA), 68

Egyptian Movement for Change

(Kifaya), 110, 126, 144, 196–197

Egyptian Organization for Human

Rights, 120

El Borai, Negad, 120

Electoral College, 44, 124–125

electoral laws, conf licts over, 56

El-Maghrabi, Ahmed, 69

Index 265

Emergency Laws, 148, 151, 189

Establishment of the

Illegal Enrichment, 143

Al-Fagr, 173

Farouq Hosni, 159

Al-Fatah, ‘Abd, 162

Al-Fatah Al-’Adeli, ‘Abd, 51

Fendi, Mamoun, 134

Al-Feqi, Anas, 57, 58

Al-Feqi, Mostafa, 131, 199

Future Generation Foundation

(FGF), 191

G-8 Summit meeting of 2004,

90–92, 91

Gam’aiat Gail Al-Mostaqbel, 188

Al-Gandi, Amina, 32

Al-Ganzouri, Kamel, 52–53

Al-Ghad Party, 118, 121, 140, 144

Ghali, Yousef Boutros, 21, 32, 195

Al-Ghazali Harb, Osama, 147

Gom’aa, No’aman, 113, 118, 120, 121,

126, 128

Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI),

83, 90

Grossman, Marc, 91

Gulf War, 67–68

Al-Guwaili, Ahmad, 194

Habib, Mohamed, 116, 127–128, 133,

177, 178

Al-Hadidi, Lamees, 187

El-Hafyan, Karam, 174

Al-Hariri, Rafiq, 61

Hassan, Ahmed, 145

Hatata, Magdi, 194

Al-Hayat, 91

Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein, 196

Heshmat, Gamal, 131

Higher Commission for Parliamentary

Elections (HCPE), 123

Al-Hodeibi, Mamoun, 101

Hussein, ‘Adeli, 52

Hussein, Ahmed, 15

Hussein, Magdi Ahmed, 160

Hussein, Saddam, 90

Ibn Khaldun Center, 149

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, 149

Al-Ibrashi, Wael, 152

Independent Committee for Election

Monitoring (ICEM), 119

independents, 47–48

Individual Electoral System (IES), 70

al-infitah al-iqtisadi, 13

infitahists, 63, 84

Informal Grand Electorates (IGE), 71

Ishak, George, 159, 160

Ism’ail, Mamdouh, 141

journalists, laws affecting, 151–153

Jumlukiya, 185

Kamal, Mohamed, 21, 126, 199

Kamel, Ibrahim Mustafa, 75

Karama (Dignity) party, 128

Khalil, Mustafa, 24

Khiri, Ahmed, 54–55

Kifaya, 110, 126, 196–197

Korayem, Karima, 113

Labor Party, 99, 101

Larson, Alan, 91

Le Figaro, 159

Liberal Party (LP), 14

Liberation Rally (LR), 3–4

Magles Al-Sh’aab, 72, 75–82

1998–1999 session, 79

2000–2005 session, 80

2005–2010 session’s inf luence,

80–81

committee membership of, 76–77

Al-Mahgub, Raf’at, 13

Makram-Ebeid, Mona, 144

Maqeld, Taha, 73

Mar’ai, Mamdouh, 109, 116, 117

March 9 Movement, 197

Mashur, Mostafa, 177

Index266

Al-Masri Al-Youm, 115, 131, 174, 175,

176, 180

Al-Messiri, Abd Al-Wahab, 160

Middle East Times, 111

Misr Party, 13–14

Mo’az, Fawzi, 53

Mokhtar, Gamal, 54

Al-Mostaqbel, 188

Moussa, ‘Amr, 194

“Mr. AO,” 73–74

Mubarak, Alaa, 188

Mubarak, Gamal, 18, 21

2004 NDP conference agenda of, 99

and 2005 election, 57

accession to presidency, 24–25

achievements and legacy of, 138–139

biographical information, 188–190

business elite and, 69

and “deliberalization amendment,” 106

election fraud by team, 119–120

election repercussions, 120–121

f lagrant scandals inhibiting reforms

of, 114–116

impediments to succession, 193–196

on independents, 47–48

liberalization agenda of, 106

NDP faction of, 43

opposition push-back to, 196–198

potential succession supporters,

198–200

Presidential Election Committee

(PEC), 106

shilla, 189–190

succession plans and, 186–187,

190–193

Mubarak, President

assassination attempts, 185

relationship with businessmen,

68–69

Mubarak, Suzan, 199

“the Mukhabarat state,” 139

multiparty system, democracy in Egypt

and, 18–19

munfatihun, 26

Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 144–145

and 76 amendment, 110

defeat in 2005 election, 133–135

increasing power of, 135

integration strategy, 179–182

“Islamic Alliance,” 171–172

nature of, 145

real agenda of, 177–179

regime’s draconian crackdowns,

173–177

relationship with the regime, 171–173

role in national dialogue, 101

support of Mubarak, 118

University of Al-Azhar youth show, 175

Al-Naggar, Ahmed, 113

Naguib, General Mohamed, 4

Nasser, Abdel, 62

Nasserist Arab Party, 99, 101, 107,

117–119, 127, 144–145

National Consensus, 99

National Democratic Party (NDP),

13–14, 126–128, 145–146

administering 2005 election, 129–130

Alliance of National Forces for

Reform, 99–100

candidate selection methods, 43–46

candidate selection process in, 72–75

Committee for Popular Development

Program (PDP), 64–65

compared to ASU, 17–18

conf licts between governors and

deputies in, 51–53

defeat of, 132–133

demise of NDP political reform,

130–132

disputes with governors, 51–53

election cycles of, 21–26

elite of, 37–40

factions in, 43–44, 59

first 11-year cycle, 26–28

f irst annual conference, 2003,

97–98

nature of, 145

Index 267

new list selection mechanism, 124–125

old conservatives on list, 125–126

opposition to, 47–48

opposition within, 49–51

party conf licts classif ied, 44

recruiting conf licts in, 53–55

rivalries in, 46

under Sadat, 22–24

second annual conference, 2004, 99

Second Internal Election, 31–32

types of party conf lict in, 44

United National Front for Change

(UNFC), 126–128

upper echelons of, 55–58

National Endowment for Democracy

(NED), 90

National Progressive Unionist Party

(NPUP) (Tagammu’), 14, 99,

101, 117–119, 127, 128, 144

National Rally for Democratic

Transformation (NRDT), 144,

145, 160–161

National Union (NU), 3–6

Nazif, Ahmed, 50, 58, 174, 187, 195

NCHR (National Council for Human

Rights), 98–99

NDP-independents, 47–48

Negm, Ahmed Fouad, 196

neomercantilists

advent of, 62–63

elections, motivations for running for,

70–71

liberalization and, 82–84

wielding power, 69–71

New Deal, 84

new opposition network, 161–162

New Wafd, 15

Newsweek, 186

Nour, Ayman, 49, 111, 118, 120, 121,

127, 144, 197

October Paper (of 1974), 63

opposition parties, functioning of,

144. See also specific parties

Al-Osbou’, 198

Othman, Dr. Amal, 25, 49

Othman, Othman Ahmed, 63–66

Othman, Rashad, 24, 65–66

“Othmanists”

defined, 61–62

first-generation, 63–66

second-generation, 66–69

PA, 17–18

1987 election, 26

Parti de la Justice et Développement

(PJD), 181

perestroika, 18

Policies Secretariat (PS), 18, 22, 32–35

Politburo (1984), 25

political liberalization, 82

Political Parties Committee (PPC), 112

politics, participation in, 83–84

Powell, Colin, 89, 91

Presidential Election Commission

(PEC), 106, 109

partial performance of, 116–117

Proportional Electoral System

(PES), 70

pro-reform movements

Kifaya, 110, 126, 158–160, 196–197

NRDT, 160–161

Qadous, Azzat, 54

Qandil, Abd Al-Halim, 110, 116, 197

Qira, Dr. Fathiallah, 54

Quadripartite Reform Committee

(QRC), 21, 28–30

Radwan, Zainab, 50

Raf’aat, Assam, 199

Ragal Al-’Amal, 62, 84

alternate terms for, 84

and Al-Astegouab, 79

issues focused on by, 77t

and modakhalat, 79

participation in 1995 election, 70

participation inside, 78t

Index268

Rageb, Mohmed, 54

Rashid, Rashid Mohamed, 69

Al-Razeq, Hussein ‘Abd, 187

reform

American pressure and, 108–110

initiatives, 93–97

liberalization and democratization

and, 105

opposition forces and, 110–111

in practice, 114–121

role of outsiders in, 165–169

second package of, 111–114

US pressures handicapping,

162–165

“regime neomercantilist,” 61

Rice, C ondoleezza, 93, 111, 196

Roz Al-Youssef, 58, 142, 175,

192, 200

Sabri, 10–11

Sadat, Anwar, 62–63

character of, 9–10

constituency of, 9–10

daughter’s marriage into Othman

family, 64

infitah and, 63

and NDP, 13–14

“New Deal” of, 9, 11–12

Al-Sadat, Anwar, 143

Al-Sadat, Tal’aat, 142–143

Sadqi, ‘Ataf, 56, 126–127

Sadqi, ‘Aziz, 160

Al-Saiasi, 187

S’aid, Mohamed Al-Sayyid, 82, 83

Al-S’aid, Mustafa, 71

Al-S’aid, Rif’aat, 128, 134, 145, 159

Al-S’aid Al-Daqaq, Mohamed, 55

Al-S’aidi, Ali, 49, 142

Al-Salam Al-Mahgub, ‘Abd,

194, 200

Salem, Mamduh (Prime Minister), 14

Salem, Mohamed Hassan, 54

Al-Sanawi, ‘Adbellah, 115, 197

Sawt Al-Umma, 152

Al-Sh’aab, 141

Al-Sharbini, Maggid, 115

Al-Shareq Al-Wast, 57

Al-Sharif, Safwat, 21, 25, 32, 43, 55, 58,

99, 112, 129

Al-sharq Al-Awsat, 134

Al-Sharqawi, Mohamed, 162

Al-Shater, Khairet, 198

Al-Shazli, Kamal, 21, 25, 32, 43, 50, 51,

53, 55–56, 73, 77, 129–130, 132,

174, 193

Shehab, Moufied, 21

Shenouda III (Pope), 119

Shokri, Ibrahim, 15

Shura Council, 1986 election, 26

Socialist Labor Party (SLP), 15

Soliman, Mahmoud, 24

Soliman, Mohamed Ibrahim, 141

Soliman, Omar, 194, 200, 202

Sorour, Fathi, 21, 53, 125

State Partnership Program (SPP), 166

state security, 139–140

Tantawi, Hussein, 194

Tardelli, Marco, 58

transition theories, 137–138

Transparency International Perceptions

Index, 141

Tunis Declaration, 96

Umma Party, 99

United National Front for Change

(UNFC), 126–128

US policy, 88–93

Mubarak policy toward opposition

parties, 101–102

pressures as handicap to reform,

162–165

“reform initiatives war,” 93–97

and Sadat’s New Deal, 63

succession policy and, 195–196

USA Today, 187

US-Middle East Partnership Initiative

(MEPI), 89–91

Index 269

Al-Wafd, 187

Wafd Party, 26, 101, 127, 128,

140, 144

Al-Wafd Party, 99

Waffedin (outsiders), 119

Wahid ‘Abd Al-Magid, 199

Wali, Dr. Yousef, 21, 24–25, 43, 47–48,

54, 55–56, 99, 125, 141

Washington Post, 192

Al-Wassat, 180

Wasta, 48

Al-Watani Al-Mustaqil, 126

Welch, David, 196

Zaki, Sahar, 152

Al-Zeini, Noha, 131–132

appendix - springer978-0-230-62132-9/1.pdf · table a1 the 1992 ndp general-secretariat name title...

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