appendix c international involvement in a civilian …

Appendix C

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ACIVILIAN “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM*

Introduction

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,as amended, includes the following passage: “The aer-onautical and space activities of the United States shallbe conducted so as to contribute to . . . the follow-ing [objective]: . . . Cooperation by the United Stateswith other nations and groups of nations in work donepursuant to this Act and in the peaceful applicationof the results thereof . . . .’1 As a result of this provi-sion, NASA has a long tradition of cooperation withother countries in space activities.

In accordance with this tradition, there have beenextensive discussions over the past 2 years betweenNASA and other friendly countries regarding a possi-ble international in-space infrastructure acquisitionprogram. Then, in January of 1984, President Reaganin his State of the Union Address called for a U.S.“space station” with international participation. Thesecircumstances indicate the importance of a full con-sideration of various international options for devel-opment, acquisition, operation, and use of future long-term, in-orbit infrastructure. The aim of this appen-dix is to contribute to this consideration.

Why International Involvement?

THE MOTIVES FOR COOPERATION

Countries engage in international cooperation in sci-entific and technical undertakings for a variety ofreasons. In order to assess the potential advantagesand disadvantages of international involvement byanother country in a U.S. “space station” program (oreven the advantages of fully internationalizing the pro-gram) it is first of all necessary to understand thereasons which lead nations to engage in internationaltechnical cooperation in general. These motivationscan then be discussed as they apply to the specificsituation of space infrastructure development, opera-tion, and/or use in order to provide a framework forexamining various degrees and forms of potential in-ternational involvement, from no involvement at allup to and including a space infrastructure enterprisewhich is fully multinational from the start.

● Paper prepared for OTA by Hubert Bortzmeyer, with revision by JohnLogsdon.

I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, As Amended, Section102(b)(7).

There are both symbolic and utilitarian payoffswhich lead a country to engage in international in-volvement in its technical activities through formal co-operative agreements. Among the national objectivesserved by such involvement are:2

1. Symbolic Objectivesa.

b.

c.

d.

e.

political and policy influence–a country mayengage in international cooperation in orderto influence political attitudes and policy out-comes in cooperating countries, in particularso that those attitudes and outcomes are com-patible with its own national objectives.policy legitimization–a country may inviteothers to cooperate with it in order to enlisttheir support for a particular course of actionthat the country intends to pursue; broaden-ing the base of involvement in a particularundertaking may increase its legitimacy bothat home and abroad.policy commitment–a country may allowothers to participate in one of its undertak-ings as a means of gaining their commitmentto support some of its other policies.leadership–a country may invite others tojoin it in a common undertaking because itbelieves that such an intimate partnership willallow it to demonstrate clearly to others aleadership position.cooperation to encourage cooperation—acountry may initiate or enter into a specificcooperative undertaking in order to demon-strate its commitment to the general princi-ple of international cooperation as a desirablecourse of action.

2. Utilitarian Objectivesa.

b.

division of labor and sharing of costs–a coun-try may invite others to join in an undertak-ing it wishes to pursue in order to achieve anecessary or desirable sharing of the burdens,particularly the cost, of that undertaking.access to foreign resources—a country mayopen one of its undertakings to foreign partic-ipation in order to engage or have access to

‘This statement of objectwes IS adapted from Stephen M. Shaffer and LisaRobock Shaffer, The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison ofU.S. Experience in Space and in Security (Graduate School of InternationalRelations, University of Denver, 1980).

177

178 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

unique or superior resources, both physicaland human, available only in other countries.

c. economic influences-a country may inviteothers to participate in an undertaking in or-der to increase the likelihood that they willthen purchase the products or services of thatundertaking, rather than those of potentialcompetitors.

This breakdown of the objectives of cooperation ba-sically reflects the perspective of a country seeking toinvolve others in its activities; however, it also can beused to identify the reasons why others would agreeto cooperate with that country. In general, one wouldexpect those responding to a cooperative initiative togive highest priority to utilitarian benefits, but the sym-bolic payoffs from international cooperation can ac-crue, though not evenly, to all partners.

The United States has made international coopera-tion in science and technology—in space as in numer-ous other sectors-a major element of its foreign pol-icy; most observers agree that the overall benefits ofsuch cooperation in both symbolic and utilitarianterms have been substantial, and that the negative im-pacts have been comparatively insignificant.3 Unlessit begins a technical undertaking for motivations whichare overwhelmingly nationalistic in character (e.g.,Project Apollo or the Supersonic Transport) the UnitedStates has welcomed the participation of its closestallies. As international involvement in the “space sta-tion” program is assessed, this “bias” toward coop-eration will be maintained.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE:THE RECORD TO DATE

In the 25 years that the United States has had a Gov-ernment-funded civilian space program, internationalcooperation has been one of its major themes; as men-tioned above, it was an explicit objective of the NASAct. Armed with this legislative mandate, with Presi-dential and congressional support for a U.S. civilianspace program which emphasized openness and sci-entific objectives, and with already existing patternsof cooperation in space science, NASA has since itsinception conducted an active program of interna-tional partnership.

In space, perhaps more than in most areas of inter-national science, it has been the policies and initia-tives of the Government, rather than those of the sci-entif ic and technical community, which haveestablished the U.S. attitude toward cooperativeundertakings. 4 Although NASA’s international pro-grams have involved the Soviet Union, Canada, Ja-pan, and various developing countries, NASA’s pri-mary cooperative partner to date has been Europe—both individual European countries and the variousEuropean space organizations which have existedover the past two decades.

International cooperation in civilian space activityis thus a longstanding tradition, especially in the fieldof space science, but also to some extent in space ap-plications and space technology programs. As the gen-eral space policies of potential international partnersin a space infrastructure acquisition program are re-viewed, many examples of cooperative ventures canbe brought to light. These range in scope from mod-est participation in minor projects to intense involve-ment in major undertakings on the basis of full part-nership, An extreme example of the latter is the settingup of an intergovernmental consortium to carry outcomprehensive programs in a particular technicalfield—telecommunications.

On the other hand, there are few examples of sub-stantial involvement of foreign partners in programswhich could be characterized as the main thrust ofthe national space policy of a given country, whetherit be the United States, the U. S. S. R., or any otherspace-capable state. As a matter of fact, the only in-stance so far of such an arrangement is the involve-ment, since the early 1970s, of Europe and Canadain the development of the American Space Transpor-tation System (STS).

But even that example is not really valid, since thehardware developments assigned to Europe (Spacelab)and Canada (the Remote Manipulator System, RMS),although producing valuable complements, involvea rather minor share of the total costs involved, onthe order of 10 percent. Furthermore, what is reallycentral in the STS is the American-built Shuttle. Theother two items are accessory to it: the RMS couldeasily have been replaced with some U.S.-designedequivalent, and, if Spacelab did not exist, the STS

JThe Nat tonal Academy of Sciences has recently undertaken a review ofsclentlflc and technolog~al cooperation among the OECD countries which 4Another area where Government I nttlatlves were crucial I n establlshi ngreaches this conclusion. patterns of international cooperation was nuclear energy.

App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 179

would still be able to carry out 90 percent of its in-tended activities. s

An invitation for international participation in a U.S.“space station” program might well have the result,as did the U.S. offer to participate in STS development,that foreign participation would be somewhat margin-al in terms of both the scope and the nature of its sharein the workload. A different outcome, however, is alsopossible, resulting in what was described above as arather unusual circumstance: major foreign involve-ment in what will be the brunt of the U.S. effort inspace over the next decade or more. Since the earlyseventies, space technology has been disseminatingand/or maturing throughout the world, bringing cer-tain countries almost to par with the United States inaspects of space technology relevant to a such anundertaking, and thus broadening the technical basefor significant cooperation.

In order to understand which of these outcomes islikely and/or preferable, it is first necessary to detailthe objectives which would lead both the UnitedStates and other countries to collaborate on a spaceinfrastructure undertaking. As NASA’s current Direc-tor of International Affairs has observed: “Internationalspace cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; coun-tries cooperate because they judge it in their interestt o d o s o . ”6

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS RELATEDTO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. SPACE

INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUISITION PROGRAM

In the first year of its existence, NASA formulateda set of policy guidelines for international coopera-tion in space. Those guidelines have survived periodicreexamination and remain in force today. They reflect“conservative values7” with respect to the conditionsunder which cooperation is desirable.

sThe U.S. policy, as became clear I n 1972, was to ensure that foreign con-tributors to the STS should not have responsibility for any element whichwas essential to the success of the system. The only civillan space programsto which Europe has contributed or is contributing essential parts are theInternational Ultraviolet Explorer (IUVE) and the Spxe Telescope (ST). ThereIS a strong push within NASA to Iim it the foreign role in any ‘‘space station’program to non-essential elements, but this push is being countered by anIncreasingly strong insistence, from the major ESA contributors at least, thatpotential partners be allowed to develop some of the key infrastructure ele-ments, Of course, there is a natural resistance within U.S. industry to seeingforeign organizations provide what it could produce: witness, for instance,the Industrial opposition to the Canadian development of the RMS. It shouldbe noted, however, that NATO partners are frequently gwen responsibilityfor developing essential components of defense systems, with consequentstrerigthenlng of the alliance.

6Kenneth S. Pedersen, “International Aspects of Commercial Space Activ-ities, ” speech to Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1983.

7Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Cooperation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1965),

p. 32.

The essential features of NASA guidelines are:cooperation is to be on a project-by-project basis,not on a program or other open-ended ar-rangement;each project must be of mutual interest and haveclear scientific value;technical agreement is necessary before politicalcommitment;each side bears full financial responsibility for itsshare of the project;each side must have the technical and managerialcapabilities to carry out its share of the project;NASA does not provide substantial technical as-sistance to its partners, and little or no U.S. tech-nology is transferred; andscientific results are made publicly available.8

These guidelines have occasionally been bent, asin the case of the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-SoyuzProgram. In general, however, they have provided aneffective framework within which NASA has pursueda mixed set of objectives, including:

● Scientific/TechnicalIncreasing the number of qualified peopleworking on problems of space research andspace technology by broadening the base ofinvolvement in space activities;Shaping the development of the space pro-grams in other countries by offering attractiveopportunities to join with the United States i n“doing things our way”; andChanneling the funds and technical capabil-ities dedicated to space in other countriesaway from activities which are competitive ornot compatible with U.S. interests, but involv-ing them in a program dominated by and large-ly defined by the United States.

● Economic– NASA estimates that it has achieved over $2

billion in cost savings and effective contribu-tions from its cooperative programs over thepast 25 years; cost-sharing has been an influen-tial, though not top-priority, element of NASA’scooperative programs.

– Involving other countries in expanded spaceactivities may create new markets for U.S. aer-ospace products.

● Political— NASA’s international cooperative programs

have been designed to present a positive im-age of the United States to our cooperatingpartners; in particular, the contrast between

8Shatier and Shaffer, op. CIt,, p. 18

38-798 0 - 84 - 13 , QL 3


U.S. openness and Soviet secrecy with respectto space has been exploited by the UnitedStates.

— International cooperation in space has beenundertaken by the United States in order toadvance other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

While the priority given to these various objectiveshas varied over time and mission opportunity, at thecore has been a policy that permitted this country’sclosest allies to become involved in the U.S. spaceeffort. Indeed, some have criticized NASA for mak-ing possible such participation, at minimal cost, in aneffort paid for almost entirely by U.S. taxpayers; “ben-efit, know-how and opportunity were shared to an ex-tent which was totally unprecedented where an ad-vanced technology was involved . . . .“9 Since thestart of its civilian space program, the United Stateshas used international cooperation in space as ameans of creating a sense of togetherness and com-mon achievement among, particularly, the industrialdemocracies which are this country’s most significantpartners in maintaining world order.

The benefits to the United States of internationalspace cooperation do not come without costs, ofcourse. Among the potential negative impacts of in-volving others in the U.S. space program are:

1. increased technical risk and management com-plexity;

2. Significant O Ut-flOWS of sensitive or valuable U.S..

3.

4.

technology, employment opportunities, and/orhard currency, as the United States purchasesspace-related goods or services from othercountries;in particular, the development, through their in-volvement in U.S. space activities, of effectivecompetitors to U.S. firms in commercial space ef-forts; andpossible disputes among the United States andits cooperating partners-which, if not resolved,could lead to broader foreign policy conflicts.

To date, NASA has managed its affairs so as to haveminimized these potential negative impacts. For in-stance, many of the cooperative programs involvedNASA’s launching of foreign satellites, in which thetechnical risk to NASA was virtually non-existent andwhich often led to foreign purchase of additionallaunches.

gArnold Frutkin, “U.S. Policy: a Drama in N Acts,” Spectrum, September1983, p. 74.

FOREIGN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTSRELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S.

“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM

Success in cooperative undertakings requires thateach side perceives the cooperation as being bene-ficial to itself; such undertakings are even more likelyto be successful if there is at least some commonalityof objectives. All partners must believe that coopera-tion is a useful means for advancing some of their na-tional objectives without undue costs related to others.It is somewhat more difficult to generalize with respectto the motivations which might lead specific countriesor groupings of countries to decide to join the UnitedStates in development, operation, and/or use of spaceinfrastructure, but the following seems most germane:

● Scientific/TechnicalIn most areas of space technology, the UnitedStates is still a leader. Other countries mayhope that close partnership with the UnitedStates will give them increased access to thesetechnologies and help upgrade their own tech-nical capabilities.The “space station” contains elements ofspace infrastructure which, used in connectionwith the space transportation system, will“modernize” space operations; other coun-tries may decide they must be part of the mostadvanced way of operating in space,

● Economic— If the commercial potential of many areas of

space activity is as large as some forecast, useof in-space infrastructure will be an essentialor at least extremely useful means for achiev-ing that potential. Other countries wanting toparticipate in the commercial exploitation ofspace may view sharing the costs of a “spacestation” program as the best way to be majorpartners in such commercial exploitation.

— Cooperation with the United States may be theonly way that other countries can afford to de-velop capabilities in particular areas of spacetechnology. Division of labor and costs is anecessary approach for those without the re-sources to develop a total system of space in-frastructure on their own. While the UnitedStates could probably afford to develop it onits own, as could the ESA countries in collab-oration with Japan,10 probably no other coun-

IOAS noted later in this appemfix, there is a considerable difference bet-

ween the amount of taxpayers’ money the United States on the one handand Europe and Japan on the other are prepared to spend on space. Butthere is little doubt that Europe alone cou/d make a comparable investmentif the political will existed.

App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 181

try or region except the Soviet Union and itsallies could make a comparable investment inspace.

— Other countries may anticipate that such a pro-gram will provide marketing opportunities fortheir industries and want to participate in theprogram in order to maximize those opportu-nities.

. Political— Participation in the “space station,” like par-

ticipation in the space transportation system,may provide other countries a way of sharingin the political and prestige benefits of mannedspace flight activities without bearing the totalcost of manned systems.

— The United States is the military and economicleader of the non-Communist world; cooper-ation with the United States in such an effortmay provide a way for other countries to main-tain or increase their commitment to a politicaland military alliance with the United States.

THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM

Some have suggested that any major new undertak-ing in space be from the start “truly” international—i.e., designed, funded, and managed by an interna-tional consortium or an equivalent organization .11 Al-though the current momentum behind “space sta-tion” plans is leading away from this option, it is worthidentifying it here and assessing it later as a possibleway of approaching its development or operation.

Such an approach would, of course, be the ultimatein the way of internationalizing a program; in thismode of cooperation, the United States would merelybe a shareholder among many others within a con-sortium of participants. There are precedents in thisrespect; an instance which comes readily to mind isthat of the International Telecommunications Satel-lite Organization (INTELSAT).

In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communi-cations Satellite Act, creating the Communications Sat-ellite Corporation (COMSAT) and charging it with de-veloping a global system for international satellitecommunications. The United States could not achievesuch an ambitious goal without the active participa-tion of other nations; therefore negotiations werestarted which led (after substantial conflict) in 1964to an “interim agreement” under which a global net-work was successfully established. In 1969, a Pleni-potentiary Conference was convened, with 67

1 I See, for example, RcJ&rt Salkeld, “Toward Men Permanently in Space, ’

Astronautics and Aeronautics, October 1979.

member countries in attendance: it resulted in aDefinitive Agreement which entered into force in 1973and made INTELSAT a working international organiza-tion, with a present membership of more than 100countries.

The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries neverjoined INTELSAT, both because it was initiated by theUnited States and actually run by Americans duringthe first years of its existence and because they wouldhave had very little influence on the organizationunder the weighted system of voting which wasemployed.

The International Maritime Satellite Organization(lNMARSAT) has a number of features that are dis-tinctly different from those of INTELSAT. It providesglobal coverage, whereas INTELSAT does not. Anotherdifference is that among its member states, INMARSATcounts the Soviet Union (with a 14 percent owner-ship share, second only to the United States’ 23 per-cent) and several other socialist countries.INMARSAT’S statute obliges it to provide free accessto members and nonmembers.

INMARSAT was created pursuant to the initiative ofa United Nations agency, the Inter-governmentalMaritime Consultative Organization, which, from1973 to 1976, convened a series of international con-ferences to establish a global maritime satellite com-munications system. In 1979, the INMARSAT Conven-tion and Operating Agreement entered into force, andoperations started early in 1982. With the exceptionof the above-mentioned differences, INTELSAT andINMARSAT are similar in structure.

Could a similar international organization becreated, in order to develop, operate, and use in-spaceinfrastructure? In principle there is no obstacle to this,although the parallel with INTELSAT can be very mis-leading. In particular, it is not clear that the provisionof orbital infrastructure to accomplish a variety of ob-jectives could ever be the kind of profitable enterprisethat space-based communications has been. Commu-nications is a well-established business, yielding a re-turn on investment of about 14 percent withinINTELSAT. Also, the capability upon which INTELSATwas originally based (communications satellites andlaunch capabilities) had been developed by theUnited States at its own expense.

There are no such credible economic prospects forspace infrastructure, which would have many differentuses, some for pure government-funded research,others in the nature of a public service, and still othersfor commercial applications. Also, in a satellite com-munications system, there lies more cash-flow in theprocurement of the ground segment than in thebuilding of the satellites. This has made it possible for


American firms to be the exclusive manufacturers ofINTELSAT satellites for years without stirring too muchresentment within the international consortium,because other member countries have found ade-quate compensation in the manufacturing of groundstations for themselves and for sale abroad.

Also, Europe, with its Ariane series of boosters, isnow competing for INTELSAT launch contracts. In ad-dition, some form of international cooperation was ab-solutely essential, almost by definition, for an inter-national communications network to be feasible. Nosuch cooperative imperative is attached to space in-frastructure.

A more adequate precedent for an international“space station” enterprise might be that of an inter-national organization created to conduct a numberof jointly coordinated space programs for the benefitof its member states. Such a “limited partnership” maybe a realistic approach to space infrastructure devel-opment and/or operation. To a large extent, the Euro-pean Space Agency (ESA) does provide such a paral-lel. 12 Since its inception, ESA has performed verysuccessfully in spite of the difficulties associated withalmost all international organizations.13 In ESA’s case,the two major problem areas have been, and still are:1 ) the time and burdensome negotiations required tosettle differences about general policies to follow andwhat programs to support; 2) the framing of an “in-dustrial policy” designed to improve the worldwidecompetitiveness of European industry while ensuringa “fair return” to individual members states (the “re-turn” is the value of the contracts let by ESA to anymember state, and it is “fair” when proportionate tothat member’s financial contribution to the agency’sbudget).

The Convention governing ESA provides some cluesas to how these difficulties are dealt with in the longrun:

1. The formal structure of ESA is designed to accom-modate laborious negotiations and compromises.The legislative power, so to speak, rests with aCouncil where all states are represented; theCouncil meets regularly, usually for 2-day ses-sions.14 There is also an Executive responsible forday-to-day operations and long-range planning.

I ZESA is described i n more detail below.IJI ndeed, if one takes a long view of past European coopf?ration, saY, over

100 years, ESA’S record is strikingly good. Although its operations have beenon a much smaller scale than have those of NASA, ESA’S record of technicalsuccesses is perhaps as good as that of any other organization.

141n general, exh Member State has one vote in the Council. However,

a Member State does not have the right to vote on matters concerning anoptional program in which it does not take part. Except where the ESA Con-vention provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by a simplemajority of Member States represented and voting.

2. ESA’s overall activity is subdivided into two cat-egories:

mandatory activities, which include chieflyscientific programs and basic organizationalexpenditures; mandatory contributions arebased on each state’s GNP;optional activities, which are specific programslike Ariane, Spacelab, Marecs, and so on; con-tributions to these programs are negotiatedbetween the participants at the inception ofthe program.

This system provides ESA with a considerable flexi-bility: although unanimous consent of all MemberStates is needed formally to permit ESA to undertakean optional program, a vote in favor of the programdoes not carry any obligation to participate. MemberStates may decide, after a program has beenauthorized, whether—and, if so, to what extent—theywiII participate. Thus, Member states can adjust theirfinancial effort to the degree of interest they see in aprogram and/or to the “return” their industry will ob-tain from it (one of the solutions to the irksome “fairreturn” problem). Also, member states can supportanother partner’s favorite project by a token partici-pation which can be traded against others, resultingi n “package deals” which settle seemingly unrecon-cilable differences.

A further degree of flexibility is provided by the factthat the agency is not obligated to manage all of itsprograms through its own staff. ESA can delegate toa national agency the responsibilities for a program’smanagement, if this appears to be preferable from apolitical, economic, or technical point of view (CNES,the French space agency, is thus entrusted with tech-nical management of the Ariane developmentprogram).

3. ESA early recognized that a multinational agencyis better off letting contracts to multinational in-dustrial firms rather than attempting to balancecontracts among national companies accordingto its “fair return” principle. This balancing actis often performed better and more quickly in-side multinational consortia of European aero-space and electronics firms, the creation of whichESA has encouraged.

As a last parallel which might be drawn from ESA,it should be noted that this agency’s role is generallylimited to development and demonstration of spacesystems. Utilization, in the sense of operational orcommercial exploitation, is usually entrusted to otherintergovernmental organization, like EUTELSAT for re-gional European communications or EUMETSAT formeteorological satellites. Commercial operation caneven be entrusted to private multinational corpora-tions like ARIANESPACE, which has been established


to produce, market, launch, and finance Arianelaunch vehicles. This arrangement could be paralleledin an international “space station” program: differentinternational entities, with possibly different member-ship and operating procedures, could take care of itsdevelopment and operation.

As far as development and operation are concerned,one might question whether the creation of interna-tional entities in charge of these activities would en-tail creation of new technical agencies duplicating theknow-how and resources of existing space agencies,most notably NASA. Clearly, this would not be an ad-visable course. However, the international body incharge of the program could confine itself to overallmanagement, and rely on existing agencies in the par-ticipating countries for technical management, super-vision, and day-to-day activity, a procedure similar tothat sometimes followed by ESA. Given that theUnited States would undoubtedly be the largest share-holder in such a joint venture, it should be possibleto have the leading role assigned to NASA and/or theU.S. private sector in this context. Other major agen-cies like ESA (Europe), NASDA (Japan), CNES (France),or DFVLR (West Germany) would as a matter ofcourse have to be entrusted with tasks commensuratewith their country’s or region’s financial commitment.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. DECISION TO“GO IT ALONE” WITH RESPECT TO THE

“SPACE STATION”15

Of course, there is the possibility that no other coun-try will reach agreement with the United States to co-operate in the acquisition and use of in-space infra-structure. In this unlikely situation, the United Stateswould “go it alone. ” Would such a step deal a fatalblow to all future prospects of international coopera-tion in space? There seems to be no reason to fearsuch a drastic outcome: what would probably hap-pen is merely an extension into the future of the pres-ent situation, characterized by a large amount of du-plication, with most countries striving to acquire moreor less the same capabilities so as to be able to com-pete, especially where commercial applications areconcerned.

The same countries, however, are now willing toparticipate in quite a large number of cooperative

.I SThe circumstances adduced at the beginning of this appendix provide

reason to believe that a U .S, -only program is the least I ikely alternative, How-ever, since no final Congressional decision on international participation inany U.S. “space station” program has been made—and since the Congressmay wish to reconsider this matter de rrovo-the U.S.-only option IS Includedhere

schemes, not only in the field of space science (re-putedly free of competition), but also in general publicservice types of applications (e.g., meteorology orsearch-and-rescue), and even in commercial applica-tions (e.g., communication via INTELSAT, INMARSAT,or INTERSPUTNIK). Cooperation, in other words,seems to be a widely recognized way of performingspace activities, provided a certain amount of auton-omous assets have been secured to safeguard nationalindependence and ability to compete, so that if thisU.S. offer to cooperate is not taken up on a programas central even as the “space station, ” this situationis unlikely to be reversed,

That such duplication does not make optimal useof the global resources of the international commu-nity is obvious, but by no means new. If one acceptsit, the next question, from a U.S. perspective, iswhether other spacefaring countries, not being in-volved in the U.S. program, would thus be motivatedto challenge U.S. supremacy in space and to competecommercially with it even more effectively and bet-ter than they do now. In other words, what are theimplications if other countries strive to acquire moreor less the same capabilities as the United States isseeking by developing space infrastructure, but ontheir own and not in partnership with the UnitedStates?

It should be noted first that acquisition of similar ca-pabilities does not necessarily require developmentof similar technology. The capability to launch satel-lites, for instance, can be provided by a very sophisti-cated reusable craft like the Shuttle, or by less inex-pensive expendable rockets. Similarly, it could turnout that most or all functions of space infrastructurethat utilize a human crew could eventually be per-formed by one or several automated systems. This cer-tainly seems to be true whenever a single specific ac-tivity is under examination: materials processing inspace, for instance, could perhaps be adequately per-formed in an operational production mode by an un-manned platform along the lines of the FrenchSOLARIS concept.

Therefore, when specific activities are consideredin isolation, there appear to be ways for other coun-tries to remain competitive in space applications with-out joining a U.S. “space station” program. However,when looked at from a global perspective, a compre-hensive space program is more than the sum of a fewspecific application projects. U.S. development oflong-term space infrastructure would mark the incep-tion of a new way of performing activities in space;the hoped-for result would be enhanced flexibility andeconomies of operation in many areas of space sci-ence and applications, whether already recognizedor presently unforeseen.

184. Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Any country wishing to gain access to this new wayof doing business in space would have to acquire anextensive set of technologies and systems:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Orbital communication relays. (The United Statesis developing such relays in the form of the Track-ing and Data Relay Satellites; similarly, ESA’s L-SAT will have orbital capabilities and will be usedin this role for the control of EURECA).In-orbit servicing (and probably retrieval) systems.(The United States has flown a short-range systemof that kind, the manned maneuvering unit(MMU), which enables people to tend satellitesin the vicinity of the Shuttle, To go further alongthis line, NASA will have to develop the so-calledOrbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)).The capability of returning space hardware fromorbit to the surface of the Earth via unmannedvehicles. (This is a capability which the UnitedStates has bypassed through development of theShuttle) and/or;Ultimately, man-rated launch and reentry vehi-cles (unless automated systems or systems re-motely controlled from the ground suffice. to per-form all the space tasks for which the need forhuman beings is currently foreseen–a possibil-ity which is debatable at best).

Even if one takes into account that such capabilitiesneed not rest on facilities identical (in terms of size,sophistication, etc.) to those deployed by the UnitedStates, the cost of their creation is nevertheless likelyto be several times higher than the cost of creatingand maintaining independent “traditional” satellitebuilding and launching capabilities.

Consider, for instance, the total development andflight testing cost of Ariane 1: roughly $1 billion (1984).The corresponding cost for the Shuttle exceeds $10billion. The Shuttle’s payload capability is muchgreater than that of Ariane 1, especially in LEO. Butthe important point is that Ariane suffices to endowEuropean countries with the capability to launch allthe applications satellites they need, and even further,to market launch services abroad, competing com-mercially with NASA and the U.S. private sector inthat field. (One might state more accurately that thereal competition will come from the Ariane 2, 3 and4 versions, which together will cost about an addition-al $400 million beyond the initial development ex-penditures: the argument, however, still holds true.)

Suppose now that Europe decides to acquire amanned flight capability of its own. A typical way todo that (as explored in ESA’s “long-term preparatoryprogram”) would be to develop an even larger ver-sion of Ariane, with a LEO capability around one-halfthat of the Shuttle: under the name Ariane S, various

preliminary designs for such a vehicle have been pub-licized. These designs are compatible with a wingedreentry vehicle, looking somewhat like a down-scaledShuttle, which under the name HERMES has also beenthrough early design stages in France. Both craft couldoperate automatically but could also transport people.

No cost estimates have been officially quoted yet,but independent experts, by extrapolating from otherEuropean and U.S. program costs, predict $2 billionto $4 billion as the price for acquiring such a minimalcapability. This is much less than what it took to de-velop the Shuttle, but 2 to 3 times what it cost todevelop Ariane. Of course, in order to exploit sucha staffed flight capability properly, if it is not to remainonly a prestige enterprise, all space activities must beadapted to the “new way of doing business in space.”Today’s European satellites, for instance, do not lendthemselves to servicing in orbit; all sorts of new tech-niques would have to be adopted for that purpose,such as modules easy to plug out or in; built-in, readilyaccessible and readable check-out circuits; safety de-vices destined to protect the astronauts’ lives, and soon.

In turn, even if this proves to be economical in thelong run, it would call for increased investment at thestart. Added to the higher operating costs of mannedspace flight, the overall consequence of all these con-siderations amounts to this: in order to acquire thecapabilities which go with the new way of conduc-ting space activities, medium space powers like Eur-ope or Japan would probably have to multiply theirspace budgets by at least 2 to 3 times. However, theratio of civilian space expenditures to gross nationalproduct (GNP) in Europe and Japan is much smallerthan the corresponding ratio in the United States—i.e., roughly 4 times less. There is therefore room forexpansion, but such a major shifting of gears wouldrequire a reassessment of national priorities in all thecountries involved, and there is no sign that such areassessment is imminent.

A last question to address is whether another alter-native is open to these countries: again assuming thatthe United States goes ahead alone with the devel-opment of a “space station” and all the attendant newtechnologies, must countries wishing to enter into orstay in the space business of necessity develop similarcapabilities? In other words, could “doing businessin the old way” be competitive when faced with the“new way, ” just as expendable launch vehicles fromEurope, Japan, and the United States seem to be man-aging to stay in competition with a very new and dif-ferent craft, the Shuttle?

Two factors will have a deciding influence on thisquestion:

App. C—International /evolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 185

1. Economics— The relative importance of captive markets;— charges applied to users: the very sophistica-

tion of new systems may, at least in the initialphase, lead to high operational costs; this argu-ment is further complicated by the fact thatuser’s charges do not necessarily reflect actualcosts. If the United States decided to go aheadfor reasons of its own, not all of which wereeconomic ones, it probably would not fullyamortize costs through user’s charges; othersuppliers of space services might do the same,to facilitate export sales, for instance;

— the fact that the key area of commercial com-petition in space utilizes the geostationary or-bit, whereas the “space station” and its relatednew capabilities will at the start focus on LEOactivities, and will extend their sphere ofoperations to geostationary orbit much later;meanwhile, business can go on as usual in thatorbit.

2. Political and Technical Trends— One of the major impacts of “space station”

technology will be in the field of constructionand assembly of large structures or platformsin orbit. Presently, however, there seems tobe a trend in favor of small or medium-sizedsatellites which fit the needs of one givencountry or group of countries eager to possessits own independent system. Small to medi-um-sized satellites would probably also appealto commercial operators (in the United Statesand elsewhere) who might find it of advantageto own a system built along their specificationsrather than to lease a segment of a largersystem.

— However, even small/medium satellites mightbenefit from new methods of operating inspace. The capability to check a satellite inlow orbit before transferring it to its final or-bit to start operation there, or the capabilityto repair it when it fails, may be a significantcommercial advantage which no prospectivecustomer is likely to overlook. However, theeconomic attractiveness of satellite servicingis still a very controversial matter; lb anyway,from a strictly financial point of view, a cus-tomer could be presented with the same ad-vantages by an adequate system of warranty.But the psychological appeal would clearly bein favor of the servicing capability.

lbThe reluctance of those concerned to meet the relatively low costs of

retrieving and refurbishing WESTSTAR 6 and PALAPA B-2 indicate that in-orbit retrieval ad repair are not yet economically attractive.

At the present stage, it would seem that neither eco-nomic factors nor political and technical trends yielda clear answer to the question of whether there is analternative way open to countries unable or unwill-ing to acquire in-space infrastructure. This is a majorreason to believe that the U.S. offer to cooperate withother countries will be accepted by other spacefar-ing nations, at least to the minimum extent necessaryto see what happens. Whether such minimal partici-pation is in the U.S. interest will be discussed later inthis paper. But the conclusion of the reasoning andanalysis just presented is inescapable—as the UnitedStates begins a space infrastructure program, others willwant to be part of it, provided the cost (in all sensesof the term) is not too great.

Possible Modes of InternationalInvolvement in a U.S. “SpaceStation” Program

There is a wide variety of possible forms that inter-national cooperation in a space infrastructure programmight take. This section describes two general cate-gories of involvement, each with several variations:

1. international cooperation during “space station”development, then separate deployment ofoperational systems; and

2. international cooperation throughout the deploy-ment, operation, and use of the “space station .“

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT

If the United States and/or its potential internationalpartners believe that free and open competition in uti-lizing space is preferable (or unavoidable), and if thesecountries nevertheless want to save on developmentcosts and prevent all-out duplication of efforts, thenthis option will be attractive. joint development of atotal system or a piece of hardware, followed by sep-arate or independent deployment, operation, exploita-tion and/or sale is a commonplace arrangement in,among others, aerospace programs. Many military andcivilian aircraft have been or are being born that way,at least in Europe. The United States seems to favorseparate development fo l lowed by l icens ingagreements, but there are examples to the contrary(e.g., the joint development of the CFM 56 jet engineby General Electric and the French SNECMA).

Among the reasons that other countries might wantto commit only to joint development, reserving theright of separate deployment of constituent elements,are:

1. Going along to see what happens. This wouldtypically be the attitude of countries or agenciesfeeling rather skeptical about the benefits to be

186 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

2.

3.

derived from use of in-space infrastructure, butwhich deem it necessary to be at least symboli-cally present in the game, just in case it turns outthat their skepticism was ill-founded. Such part-ners may not be of the most active sort, but theyalso will not be troublesome, since the veryreason of their being present is “to follow theleader.” Presumably they would not be interestedenough in the joint undertaking to fund cost in-creases if the program should meet with difficul-ties, and would therefore attempt to settle for afixed amount rather than a fixed percentage typeof participation.Going along to acquire some of the know-howand of the technologies to be derived from theprogram. This would be the attitude of countriesor agencies with a positive attitude towards newsystems, but which are not in a hurry to deployand use them, so that they only want to acquireknowledge to be implemented in a much laterperspective. Along with other, more “political”motivations, this seems to be what prompted Eur-ope to join the post-Apollo program. There wasalso a more immediate industrial motivation; Eur-ope hoped to sell to NASA more units of the hard-ware developed by European firms, and NASAhas indeed purchased a second Spacelab flightunit in Europe. This type of motivation is apt tocreate problems, insofar as it raises the issue oftechnology transfer or dissemination.Going along in order to & able to deploy a sep-arate system at about the time that the primarypartner deploys its own. This is a sign of real in-terest to the program, insofar as it means that allparties truly believe in it. However, it might wellgenerate more problems than would the preced-ing ones. It is indeed unlikely that all parties con-cerned will aim, through their joint developmentefforts, towards development of strictly identicalinfrastructure elements. As a consequence, anumber of compromises would have to be ac-cepted by all (or some of) the participants to rec-onciIe differing specifications. Any given partici-pant will tend to specify the work assigned to itso that it serves directly (or with the smallestpossible amount of modification or adaptation)its own national interests. However, the endproduct of the same work, if the joint endeavoris to make any sense, must also be readily adapt-able to what other participants plan to construct.In a rather grossly exaggerated way, this is a situa-tion akin to ESA and NASA trying to agree on adefinition of Spacelab which would enable it tobe launched either by the Shuttle or by Ariane.

Such compromises are by no means impossible, butmust be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to makesure that the overall cost of the compromise designand of its adaptations to specific needs does not ex-ceed the added costs of separate developments. Fur-thermore, such a compromise design is inevitably dif-ficult to agree on, for all parties tend to believe thatit is to them that will fall the largest amount of modifi-cations to be made later to adapt the common devel-opment of their specific needs. These, however, areproblems inherent in all cooperative developmentprograms, and past experience, notably in the fieldof aeronautics and armaments, proves that they canbe settled whenever a strong sense of common pur-pose prevails.

While, for one or more of the reasons sketchedabove, joint development without a commitment tojoint operation or utilization may be attractive to a po-tential cooperating partner, it would appear that theUnited States might prefer a more comprehensivecooperative approach, as described below. However,there may be reasons for the United States to avoidcommitment to international involvement beyond thedevelopment stage. Among such possible motivationsare:

1.

2.

3

In

A feeling that national security applications inspace might evolve in such a way that the UnitedStates would prefer to deploy its own infrastruc-ture so that it could control access to it; this isnot necessarily a problem since provisions forsuch restriction could be part of an internationalagreement.A similar argument could be made if, particularly,materials processing activities appear quite prom-ising commercially and U.S. firms prefer a U. S.-only “industrial park” in space.The United States may prefer a safety valve free-ing it from the need to continue a joint effort ifthere is a likelihood that the cooperative experi-ence during the development phase is not satis-factory on technical, economic, and/or politicalgrounds.addition to all of the above, dissatisfaction with

joint development programs sometimes crops up, notfrom problems directly related to the developmentphase of the undertaking, but from an apparent or reallack of benefits deriving from the joint effort once ithas carried through. This leads one to examine whatbenefits can be expected, and what sort of frameworkis needed to ensure that they can be reaped.

1. Each party deploys and uses for its own purposesone or several units of the jointly developed hard-ware. (Construction would presumably be sharedamong industrial firms which built the proto-

App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 187

2.

A

types.) This approach is feasible if integratedsystems have in fact been jointly developed; how-ever, as stated earlier, this may not necessarilybe the usual case, as agencies and administrationsinvolved wiII tend to prefer clear-cut interfacesrather than closely integrated systems.Assuming then that each participant has devel-oped a self-contained system (e.g., the UnitedStates develops a core element and country X ateleoperator maneuvering system (TMS) compati-ble both with the U.S. element and country X’sown spacecraft and launch vehicles), several op-tions are possible:— Participants in joint development efforts make

no provisions for the post-development phase,and leave it to evolving circumstances andeconomics to ensure a successful career for thedeveloped items. (For example, if the U.S. ele-ments are sound ones, country X will purchaseone or more, and vice versa, provided no legalobstacles or perceived national security con-cerns regarding these sales arise).

— Make it an obligation for all par-ties to purchase(and agree to sell) one or several units of thehardware developed by each.17

— And, of course, all possible intermediate ar-rangements between these two extremes. (Touse a simplified example: the United Statescould be obligated to use country X’s teleoper-ator maneuvering system, not by purchasingit but by offering as a compensation a givenamount of “utilization time” on elements ofits infrastructure; reciprocally, country X’s obli-gations would be to provide and maintain agiven number of these TMS vehicles.)

“closed-end” international partnership appearsto make the most sense if the infrastructure is a“ nec-essary, but not sufficient, part of the capabilities re-quired for effective and efficient operations in space.All partners will want to ensure that whatever is de-veloped will be compatible with their longer range,but separate, plans for space. However, this kind oflimited international involvement is less likely in mostsituations to be attractive either to the United Statesor to its potential partners than more substantial in-volvement in the operation and utilization phases aswell as the development phase. The following sectionexamines such an approach.

I @ch an expl~it obligation WOUld circumvent the possible unwillingness

of one party to purchase elements from another. From the European pointof view, U.S. unwillingness to purchase additional Spacelab modules hasbeen something of a problem.

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND USE

The essential features of this option are:— operation and maintenance costs of the infra-

structure, as well as development costs, wouldbe shared;

— ownership of most or all of its elements wouldstay most probably with the United States; how-ever, all participants’ rights of access and use forcommon and/or national purposes, includingmutual commercial competition, would be guar-anteed by an adequate legal framework.

Implementation of this approach is essentially athree-step process, where each step has to be con-sidered separately before an overall conclusion ismade:

1. Joint DevelopmentMost considerations just set forth in the section

above are applicable here. In a way, however,there are fewer problems; the ultimate purposeof joint development being the deployment ofelements to be used jointly, there is less need forinvolved legal rules concerning mutual purchas-ing obligation, second source development, andso on. Nor does one have to be concerned aboutcompatibility of certain sub-elements with indi-vidual countries’ nationally developed launchvehicles and the like. (Unless of course some par-ticipants wish to be able to break the partnershipand go their own ways, but this would not be setas a primary objective of the arrangement.)

Needless to say, though, “rules of the game”are still indispensable, especially in three areas:

Settling the ownership of technology acquiredwhile carrying out the joint development, andtransfer of technology, where required, for ac-complishing the work;Assuming a dominant position of the UnitedStates in the undertaking, how much poten-tial leverage will be left to its partners in orderto give them a feeling of being able to protecttheir rights?Conversely, one has to retain for the UnitedStates the possibility to work out substitute ar-rangements, in the event that one or anotherof the partners defaults, so as to ensure theultimate integrity of the program,

2. Joint Operationjointly developed infrastructure can be used

jointly while being operated by a single coun-try—presumably the United States. joint opera-tion would, however, lend a more internationalflavor and help international participants to feelmore secure by giving them added leverage—


3.

with, of course, potential problems for the UnitedStates.

International involvement in operating the in-frastructure could range from very little (openinga few positions to foreign nationals on the groundcontrol team and possibly in the orbital crew, asa token gesture) to full-fledged internationaliza-tion of both ground team and crew. The latterwould imply including citizens of other countriesin various key positions in numbers proportionatewith the overall level of participation of theircountry in the program.

The latter case, even if likely to create prob-lems for the United States by the leverage andthe visibility it gives to its partners, might, how-ever, also pave the way towards solution of oneissue raised by this approach—the question of“equitable costs.” Assuming that the UnitedStates develops, say, 95 percent of a “space sta-tion” system, and that country X develops andbuilds 5 percent of it, it seems fair to reserve 5percent of the station’s effective working time forcountry X’s purposes. If, however, the UnitedStates is alone in bearing all the maintenance andoperating costs, X cannot enjoy its 5 percent“space station time” free of charge. Some equi-table reimbursement scheme has to be devisedfor maintenance and operating costs incurred bythe United States—a scheme that would resolveattendant problems of fair and accurate account-ing, opening U.S. accounts to X’s comptrollers,devising rules for taking into account all the fringebenefits built in the system (like the replenish-ment of propellant tanks with unused fuel fromthe Shuttle, and so on). However, if country Xactually carries out 5 percent of the maintenanceand operations in kind, it may be possible to endup wi th an a lmost no-exchange-of - fundssituation.Joint Utilization

The problem here is that there will be not onlyutilization in common for common purposes, butalso an individual participant’s use of the infra-structure for its own benefit, including commer-cially competitive types of usages.

International partners will want to be providedwith adequate safeguards to protect their legiti-mate rights. This, in turn, raises the question ofwhat are “legitimate rights.” An effort should bemade to define this concept as precisely as possi-ble. Listed below are what appear to be majorissues involved:— Is thereto be unrestricted use of a given frac-

tion of the “space station’s” effective work

time, for the user’s own benefit, for whateverpurposes, provided it complies with interna-tional law and a preset series of explicit rules?These rules must not be open to unilateral in-terpretation. Sensitive aspects, such as safetyand national security requirements, must beexhaustively and accurately dealt with in ad-vance, so as not to allow, later on, the impres-sion of arbitrarily imposed requirements.This right-to-use may not necessarily be freeof charge, but if a price has to be charged forit, it must be equitable (no preference with re-spect to the U.S. Government or private users,no hidden overheads, etc.). As stated above,the ideal situation would probably be onewhere very little or no exchange of funds oc-curs. The setting of utilization priorities isequally important in this connection; the pre-sent NASA-DOD arrangement for giving abso-lute priority to national security payloads inShuttle manifesting would not be likely to gen-erate much international enthusiasm if it wereparalleled.Cancellation clauses must be very explicit andprovide for adequate prior warning and com-pensation; unilateral recanting should not beallowed. Needless to say, the purpose of suchclauses would not be limited to protection ofU.S. partners; the latter would have to consentas a counterpart to a perdurable involvementsystem, in order to allow not only for the in-frastructure’s initial deployment, but also forthe continuous evolution and growth whichis going to be one of its main features.

There seems to be no reason why all the above-mentioned issues could not be settled in the terms ofa cooperative agreement among the United States andits partners. Legal terms, however, would probably notbe sufficient to enable all parties to the undertakingto feel safe and secure: safeguards embedded in thevery fabric of the joint effort, providing mutual le-verage and affording room for the inevitable compro-mises, may have to be accepted.

On the surface at least, such a situation might ap-pear unbalanced in the eyes of the U.S. public andGovernment: the United States will probably be car-rying most of the burden of the joint undertaking, andwould seem required to provide to others guaranteesand safeguards and to accept dependence on themin excess of what would be commensurate with itspartners’ share of the burden. To most of these part-ners, however, being involved substantially in a U.S.“space station” program would mean forfeiting theirability to develop not only a similar, but even a re-


duced, capacity of their own, at least in the near term.Therefore, they will be staking the whole of their ini-tial asset commitment in the joint venture, whereasthe United States would always be in a position, withsome added funds and efforts, to make up for the fail-ure of one of its partners to keep the deal—a recoursethat, under the circumstances, would be more costlyto the partners.

From the U.S. point of view, of course, acceptinginternational participants in its “space station” pro-gram makes sense only if this apparent–and, to someextent, real—imbalance does not jeopardize funda-mental national interests. The more guarantees andsafeguards the United States can afford to offer to itspotential partners, the more those countries are likelyto participate substantially and to pay accordingly.This working out of mutual stakes in a common under-taking is likely to be a delicate and complicatedprocess,

Potential International Partners

Now that potential modes of cooperation have beendiscussed, the potential partners for the United Statesin a “space station” effort will be described in somedetail.

Advances in space technology over the last decadethroughout the world provide many prospective can-didates for bilateral or multilateral cooperation on aspace station project. One should, however, keep inmind that taking a meaningful share in a program ofsuch scope, cost and technical sophistication, will beno trivial undertaking for most of these candidates.What is meant by “meaningful share” depends, ofcourse, very much upon the circumstances. In a bi-lateral arrangement between the United States andanother country, the latter’s supplying less than 1 per-cent of the infrastructure’s value in hardware or com-monplace electronic components can hardly betermed meaningful. On the other hand, in the caseof a broad multilateral organization comprising manycountries, large and small, with shares ranging froma fraction of 1 percent to several 10s of percent, a par-ticipation similar in level and kind to what has justbeen described might well be meaningful to the par-ticipating country.

Another factor to be taken into account when con-sidering joint ventures in advanced technological de-velopments is, obviously, the relative level of indus-trial development of the participating countries.Countries with more or less comparable industrialbackgrounds, similar technical outlook and mutuallycompatible management practices will find it easierto pool their resources.

This description of potential international partnerswill focus first and foremost on those industrializedcountries which at present are displaying a certainamount of interest, or at any rate curiosity, toward“space stations.” This list includes Europe–as a wholethrough the European Space Agency and as exempli-fied by countries like France, the Federal Republic ofGermany and Italy–and Japan and Canada.

Among the industrialized countries, the SovietUnion also deserves some mention, though hardly asa likely participant in a U.S.-sponsored program. Rath-er, as a major space power already engaged in its ownprogram of developing, emplacing, and using in-spaceinfrastructure, the Soviet Union is a potential compet-itor to the United States in offering opportunities forinternational involvement in such activity.

Among the developing countries, some have ac-quired enough space technology capability to designand build indigenous satellites and launch vehicles(China, India), and others have ambitious plans to doso in the future (Brazil). These and others deservesome attention, especially as possible participants ina broad multilateral effort.

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY

Although joint European endeavors in space dateback to the early 1960s, the present European SpaceAgency (ESA) was founded in May 1975. ESA was thesuccessor to two earlier organizations, the EuropeanLauncher Development Organization (ELDO) and theEuropean Space Research Organization (ESRO). It isof interest to recall briefly the history of these organi-zations, insofar as it sheds some light on U. S.-European relationships in space endeavors as well ason how international space organizations perform.

In 1960-1961 a number of European countries (Bel-gium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, andthe United Kingdom) became aware of the politicaland scientific benefits to be drawn from space activi-ties (awareness of potential economic benefitsemerged some years later). They understood also thata pooling of their resources and efforts was necessaryto compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R.i n at least certain key areas—leaving out the develop-ment of staffed capabilities in which the superpowerswere competing strongly for what appeared to be es-sentially national prestige reasons. These countriesalso recognized the importance of a comprehensiveprogram including satellite as well as launch vehicledevelopment.

ESRO was created to deal with satellite develop-ment, and it did so successfully. From 1967 to 1975,ESRO launched (with U.S.-built rockets) nine satellites,


conducted a large number of experiments in space,engaged in successful cooperative projects withNASA, and managed to have its mandate enlarged toencompass applications satellites. The organizationbuilt up a competent and well-organized executiveand technical staff which ran three technical fieldcenters and a network of tracking stations.

ELDO, meanwhile, kept running into trouble, al-though it had only one project to deal with, the de-velopment of Europa, a medium-size rocket, roughlyequivalent to the U.S.-built Atlas-Agena. Poor man-agement structure was the main source of trouble;ELDO had almost no authority of its own, but actedas a sort of coordinating agency for separate nationalprojects (a British first stage, a French second stage,a German third stage, Italian payload fairings, etc.).Additional problems arose from the fact that systemand subsystem development had to proceed in par-allel. The first stage was virtually completely devel-oped at the start of the program and suffered only oneminor failure in nine flights. Each of the remainingstages experienced failures on its first operational flightas an element of the complete vehicle: as a result,there was a string of six failures in which, in turn, eachmajor element became successful.

The program was further marred by a formidableescalation of costs, and, when its eleventh test flightended in failure at the end of 1971, it was finally can-celed after $700 million had been spent.

At about the same time, the United States had stim-ulated ELDO, ESRO, and their member states to con-sider whether Europe should build a major segmentof NASA’s proposed space transportation system (STS),then referred to as the “post-Apollo program.” By1972, agreement seemed to be within reach; the taskallocated to Europe was development of a “spacetug,” an advanced rocket-stage to be used to transferpayloads from the Shuttle’s low orbit to higher ones,including the commercially essential geostationary or-bit, The tug appeared to be a good candidate for coop-eration, insofar as it was indeed an important segmentof the STS—almost a key one—and because in devel-oping it, Europe could draw from its unhappy but ex-tensive experience in rocketry. Furthermore, it wouldenable Europeans to keep working and making pro-gress in what they felt was an essential area–i.e.,launch vehicle development.

In mid-1 972, however, the United States decidedto withdraw the space tug proposal, “partly becausethe entire post-Apollo program was being scaled back,because of doubts about European technical capabil-ities, and also because the Air Force thought the mili-

tary potential of the tug was too great to permit de-pendence on outside sources.”18-19

Also, during the same period, France and the Fed-eral Republic of Germany (FRG) were negotiating withthe United States for the launching of their jointly builtSymphonic telecommunications satellite, which thecancellation of the Europa project left without alaunch vehicle. The United States agreed initially tolaunch Symphonic, but required that the satellite bedeclared experimental rather than operational. TheUnited States thus complied with its policy of assistingwith launchings provided they were for peaceful pur-poses and in compliance with “relevant internationalarrangements.” This was a reference to the INTELSATAgreement which required signatories to avoid “sig-nificant economic harm” to the organization causedby regional competition, To France especially, andperhaps to a lesser degree to the FRG, these condi-tions were construed as an attempt by the UnitedStates (and other INTELSAT partners who shared inthis position) to keep them out of the expanding sat-ellite telecommunications business.

These events acted as catalysts in the setting up (in1973) of the principles which were to govern the fu-ture ESA as well as in the drafting of its program. Basedon unsatisfactory European experience in obtainingU.S. launch assurances, the French found excellentgrounds for advocating development of an autono-mous European launch capability, and succeeded inobtaining from its partners a 40-percent participationin the previously French-only program to develop theAriane launcher. The FRG, though disappointed bythe withdrawal of the tug proposal, neverthelesssought out European participation in the U.S. spacetransportation system through development of a “sor-tie laboratory,” later named Spacelab.

The United Kingdom agreed to go along with a“package deal” which was worked out in July 1973,whereby France funded 60 percent of Ariane, the FRGabout the same percentage of Spacelab, and the U.K.56 percent of a European maritime communicationssatellite, later called MARECS. Each of the three coun-tries also agreed to take a minor share of the twoothers’ favorite projects. With this “package deal” ac-cepted, the creation of ESA could proceed, and theagency began operation in May 1975. The stated ob-jectives of the ESA include:

IKivilian Space Policy and Applications (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,Office of Technology Assessment OTA-STI-1 77, 1982), p. 363.

19A more detailed discussion of European involvement in NASA’S pOst-

Apollo efforts is provided below.

App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program • 191

— developing and implementing a long-term spacepolicy;

— carrying out space activities;— coordinating the European space program and

the space programs of its member states; and— developing and implementing an industrial poli-

cy appropriate for its programs.The agency, in addition to carrying out major but

optional projects such as Ariane and Spacelab, car-ries out a space science program planned on a 5-yearbasis. This science program and ESA’s operating budg-et call for mandatory financial contributions from itsmember states. Table C-1 lists the current distributionof such contributions for the ESA science program. I nconstant-dollar terms, the ESA budget for mandatoryprograms has remained virtually constant since the or-ganization’s inception.

ESA runs a comprehensive set of space programs.1.

2.

Communications Satellites-a broad and vigorousprogram, with several satellites in orbit (OTS, anexperimental spacecraft, and MARECS, leased toINMARSAT to provide operational maritime com-munications); with more to be launched (ECS-1and -2, for the purpose of setting up a regionalsatcom system); and with a large communicationssatellite (L-SAT) under development. The first L-SAT payload includes four different experiments,one of which is to test direct-to-the-home TVbroadcasting.Remote Sensing–as a contribution to a globalprogram set up under the auspices of the WorldMeteorological Organization, ESA launched twoMETEOSAT geostationary weather satellites sim-ilar to the U.S. GMS. The second of these satel-lites was carried in orbit by ESA’s own launcher(Ariane), and ESA’s member states have agreedto keep the METEOSAT system in operationalcondition for at least 10 years (by replacing thesatellites when they fail in orbit). The Agency also

Table C-1 .—ESA Science Budget

Percent contribution to ESA’sMember States science programBelgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.49Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.51France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.40Federal Republic

of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . 25.57Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.54Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.46Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.00Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.04Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.25Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.99United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . 13.75

3.

4.

has under development an advanced coastal andoceanic monitoring satellite (ERS-1) equippedwith a radar and other microwave instruments.Other remote-sensing activities are also underway(data reception and dissemination, Spacelab-borne high-resolution camera).Space Sciences-ESA has pursued ESRO’s tradi-tion of ambitious scientific satellite projects. Fourof these are presently operating successfully whileseveral more are in the development phase. Mostnotable is GIOITO, a spacecraft to fly by Halley’sComet in 1986. Science also is an area wherecooperation with NASA has been and is exten-sive; ESA is contributing several major subsystemson the Space Telescope. The two agencies alsohad a joint program called the International SolarPower Mission (ISPM). This was a rather sophis-ticated plan to send two spacecraft (one U.S.-builtand the other European-built) over the two polesof the Sun. In 1981, because of budget cutbacks,NASA chose to withdraw its spacecraft from thisenterprise, creating frustrations and resentmentnot only within the scientific community but alsowithin political circles in Europe. The ISPM hasgone ahead but now includes only a Europeanspacecraft launched by NASA. The impact of thiswithdrawal is discussed later in this appendix.Launch Vehicles–this is an area where the dualnature of ESA’s policy is best shown. On onehand, the Agency actively pursues its Arianeautonomous launcher program, aimed in part atcompeting commercially with U.S. launch vehi-cles; on the other hand, it is locked in, throughthe Spacelab program, to the use of the U.S. Shut-tle. Concerning Ariane, in spite of two setbacks(failure of one development flight out of four andof the first operational flight attempted late in1982), there were (as of July 1984) 7 successfullaunches out of 9 attempts, and it is definitely atechnical success. The more powerful Ariane 2,3, and 4 versions have already been approvedand funded by ESA. Commercial success also isexpected during the next several years as a re-sult of several external factors: delays in the Shut-tle development schedule, high cost of U.S. ex-pendable vehicles such as Delta or Atlas-Centaur(resulting, in turn, from low production volume),and an insufficient number of Shuttle flights. Aprivate corporation (Arianespace) has been estab-lished to finance and market Ariane through ac-tive salesmanship and promotion.

Spacelab was successfully launched aboard theShuttle in November 1983. Slippages in thelaunch schedule, cost overruns, and technical in-terface problems—which each party tended to at-


tribute to the other—have at times caused a cer-tain amount of strain between NASA and ESA,but probably nothing more than is to be expectedin such an ambitious cooperative effort.zo T h equestion remains, however, of the scope whichwill be given to Spacelab’s utilization, and of whois willing to pay for the exploitation of its capa-bilities. How this question is resolved will havean influence on European attitudes toward par-ticipation in a U.S. “space station” program.

5. Future Plans–These are still in the process of be-ing drawn up, but it is worthwhile to point outthat ESA has allocated funds not only to evaluatethose options which are natural follow-ons of pre-sent programs (like an advanced heavy versionof Ariane beyond the planned version 4) but alsoto study explicitly the prospects of “transatlan-tic” cooperation. Within the next 2 years, ESAmust decide which of the major options identifiedby its long-term space transportation plan tofollow: cooperation with the United States in de-veloping space infrastructure, and/or pursuingEuropean-only development of modern capabil-ities for space operations. The timing of U.S. andESA decisions on future programs is now com-patible, but will not remain so indefinitely.

ESA also has an active program of basic researchin materials processing, one of the most promisingcandidates for widescale applications aboard a “spacestation.” This research program is carried out at pres-ent on a variety of vehicles, among which Spacelabis prominent. ESA’s Council has already approved andfunded the development of another in-space infra-structure element for this purpose; a space “platform,”it is named EURECA (European Retrievable Carrier).

EURECA is designed to carry experiments that re-quire longer times on orbit than are available on theShuttle. It will include materials processing facilities(furnaces and the like), and will be launched and re-trieved by the Shuttle. Its design will provide enoughmaneuvering and power supply capability to sustaina prolonged (i.e., 6 months) orbital life of its own.These features give to EURECA all the appearancesof a “free-flyer” which could be tended by other,future infrastructure elements and actually make itlook like a first step toward ESA participation in a“space station.”

All of the above points clearly toward an ESA will-ingness to consider seriously the possibility of a Euro-pean participation in a space infrastructure program.

ZOMany modifications had to be made to Spacelab as a result of changes

in the Shuttle interface. This situation was somewhat reminiscent of the opera-tions of ELDO, for it arose, and inevitably so, from the parallel developmentof a system and one of its major subsystems.

Past history, however, also points strongly toward aEuropean tendency to balance its commitments care-fully between the acquisition of autonomous capabil-ities (as exemplified by Ariane) and the involvementwith U.S. projects (e.g., Spacelab).

To sum up, it appears that, notwithstanding its pol-icy of retaining capabilities of its own, especially inthose areas where commercial competition may takeplace, ESA is a likely candidate for a substantial coop-erative effort with NASA because:

a. ESA and its individual member-states have a

b.

c.

d.

In

longstanding tradition of cooperation withNASA.Although much smaller, total European space ex-penditures are commensurate with NASA’s(about one fourth). Given that the consolidatedgross national product (GNP) of ESA’s member-states is somewhat larger than the GNP of theUnited States, there seems to be room for a sub-stantial increase in these expenditures. However,present trends do not seem to point in thatdirection.The ESA Executive (headquarters and technicalcenters) is driven by internal motivations whichare somewhat similar to NASA’s, and ESA is striv-ing to define and get authorization for an ambi-tious long-range program which would give size,focus and purpose to its activity.Most member-states of ESA are at least willingto take a look at a possible U.S. offer to cooper-ate on a “space station,” and generally believethat the very scope of such a program makes itnecessary to approach it jointly in order toachieve a meaningful level of participation.spite of what has just been said, some major

member-states of the European Space Agency do notwant at the present juncture to preclude bilateral co-operation with the United States (if they deem it wor-thwhile and no satisfactory joint European arrange-ment with the United States can be devised.) Thesecountries appear at present to be France, the FRG, andItaly, which together account for over so percent ofESA’s resources. In any case, even though these coun-tries would be likely to end up participating in a U.S.space infrastructure program through ESA if such aprogram is instituted, they will assess their interestsand decide upon their course irrespective of the jointEuropean assessment, and it is therefore worthwhileto take a closer look at each one.

FRANCE

France has always aimed at being the “third spacepower” after the United States and the Soviet Union,and has indeed managed to build up the largest and

App. C—international lnvolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 193

most comprehensive space program in Europe and thethird-largest in the world. Budgetary appropriationsare an indication of this; in 1983 (approximate figures)France’s space expenses will be $545 million (as com-pared with the FRG’s $325 million, or Japan’s $450million). French ambitions date back to the de Gaulleera, and it was as early as 1966 that France orbitedits first satellite with a French-built rocket, a few daysbefore its second satellite was launched by NASA.Since then, the French program has substantiallyshifted its emphasis away from national prestige to-wards economic competitiveness, especially for ex-port purposes.

Therefore, while maintaining a fair-sized space sci-ence program, CNES (the French space agency) hasbeen active mostly in launch vehicle development(Ariane, under ESA’s supervision), communication sat-ellites construction (participation in joint Europeanprograms; national TELECOM 1 satellites to be laun-ched in 1984; a bilateral program with the FRG tolaunch direct TV broadcasting satellites in 1985), landremote-sensing systems (the first satellite of which,named SPOT 1, is to be launched in 1986 and willincorporate two high-resolution instruments andstereoscopic imaging capability), and a variety of otherprograms.

French industry, meanwhile, does not content itselfwith implementing national programs and its share ofEuropean ones, but also strives very hard to competefor space-related export sales. Ariane launch serviceshave been sold to several organizations or countries–including private firms in the United States—and com-munications satellites to ARABSAT (a consortium ofArab countries).

CNES also runs a research program to evaluate ma-terials processing applications, and has laid out plansand preliminary designs for a specialized automated“manufacturing-in-space system” named SOLARIS.This concept features a platform (without crew facil-ities) equipped with furnaces, adequate power supply,and other ancillary subsystems including a robot man-ipulator arm; a transfer and raw material supply stageto be launched by Ariane 4; and a ballistic reentry cap-sule to bring processed items back to Earth. An effortto promote interest in this concept among other ESAmember-states has not met with success up to now,perhaps because it was felt to be premature.

In sum, France’s space policy places a strong em-phasis on “autonomy” (on a European level at least,if not in the strictly national sense). This is due in partto a frame of mind inherited from the de Gaulle era,but now even more so to economic considerations;commercial competition requires that a country beable to play its own hand independently. Furthermore,

France and the FRG are now discussing plans for amilitary reconnaissance satellite: this makes autonomyall the more important to French decision makers.

Hence the staunch support (and high financial con-tribution) given to the Ariane program, and the care-fully balanced bilateral cooperation with many differ-ent countries: the United States, the FRG, Sweden,and the U.S.S.R. particularly. In ESA’s policymakingbodies, France has been and will probably remain inthe future one of the staunchest advocates of the dualapproach of balancing cooperation with the UnitedStates with an equally strong commitment to autono-mous capabilities.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Just like France and other members of ESA, the FRGconducts the largest share of its space efforts throughthat agency’s joint programs. In particular, the FRGgovernment strongly supported the Spacelab programat its inception in the early 1970s, and since then hasprovided more than 50 percent of its funding. The FRGalso provides the largest single contribution to ESA’sremote-sensing programs (METEOSAT, ERS), and landcommunications programs (OTS, ETS). More recently,when trying to shape ESA’s future programs, the FRGhas acted as a promoter of the EURECA project de-scribed earlier, while France was promoting Ariane 4.

The FRG, however, is also engaged in a number ofbilateral cooperative undertakings. Along with France,the FRG is developing TV-SAT, a direct televisionbroadcasting satellite: experience thus gained willenable its electronics and aerospace firms to competefor export sales in what is expected to become oneof the fastest growing markets, that of DBS (directbroadcasting satellites). Another important area ofbilateral endeavor is space science, not only with theUnited States (several FRG scientific satellites havebeen launched by the United States), but also withFrance, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Strong emphasis on materials science and process-ing is a characteristic feature of the FRG’s space pro-gram. This includes suborbital flights on soundingrockets, which provide a few minutes of “near zerogravity”; small payload packages to be carried by theShuttle (referred to by NASA as “Getaway Specials”)and of course utilization of Spacelab. The FRG hasconducted major experiments on the first Spacelabmission in 1983 (which was a joint U.S.-Europeanflight). It has also purchased and will manage a whollyFRG Spacelab mission called D-1, to be flown in Oc-tober 1985.

The FRG materials processing program is not purelyscientific in orientation. It aims at involving the indus-trial sector early in exploring potential applications of


space-processed metals, composite metals, crystals,and chemicals. This close association of governmentsupport with industry’s initiative seems to work well,all the more so because the FRG’s major aerospaceand electronics firms play a much larger role in initi-ating and funding research and development effortsthan do their counterparts in other Europeancountries.

Generally speaking, this fits in well with what ap-pears to be the overall goal of the FRG’s space poli-cy: to encourage its national aerospace industry, topromote scientific and industrial/technological re-search, and to rely on ESA’S programs to stay in theapplications business. The keyword seems to be“competition through technological capability” ratherthan “competition through nationally proven sys-tems.” (This latter could well be the French motto.)

All this supports the views expressed in many quar-ters that among ESA’s member-states the FRG is themost “transatlantic-rein ded,” and that its attitudetowards cooperative ventures with the United Statesis likely to be more positive than that of the French.There is no doubt that in ESA’s councils, and evenmore freely so when drafting its national program, theFRG would consider very seriously a possible invita-tion from the United States to participate in “spacestation” development. Also, the FRG has been lessoutspoken than France in its reactions to the frustra-tions which have resulted from some of the past U. S.-Europe joint ventures. But the frustrations were thereall the same, and like most of its European partners,the FRG will weigh closely the pros and cons of thepossible modes of cooperation.

ITALY

With a 1983 budget for space activities in the rangeof$150 million, of which slightly more than one-halfmakes up its contribution to ESA programs, Italy isclearly demonstrating a willingness to implement aspace policy of its own. The framing of such a policyseems to be hindered by lack of central coordinationamong the several interested government agencies:Defense, Communications, and the National ResearchCouncil (CNR). The last, however, seems to be in theprocess of taking the lead.

In 1979, CNR managed to secure government ap-proval for an overall plan calling for a sharp increasein funding; this has been partly implemented. Mostof the increase is to fund national programs, especiallyin the field of communications satellites: a systemnamed ITALSAT is being considered, as well as a di-rect broadcasting TV system. Meanwhile, Italy hasstrongly supported ESA’s experimental L-SAT program

and has taken a leading position in advanced com-munications technology (20-30 gigahertz) through theSIRIO-2 meteorological data dissemination satellite,which was destroyed in 1982 when the first Arianeoperational flight failed to achieve orbit.

Besides its marked interest in communications-re-lated space activities, Italy has undertaken severalbilateral cooperative ventures with NASA, particularlyin areas not covered by European programs. In thepast, these have included an imaginative conceptcalled San Marco, involving several launchings ofsmall scientific satellites by U.S.-made SCOUT rocketsfrom an off-shore platform located on the equator offthe coast of Kenya. More recently, Italy started devel-oping IRIS, a small booster stage for Shuttle payloads.Remote sensing is another theme for U.S.-Italian coop-eration, if only because Italy runs the main EuropeanLandsat data receiving station located at Fucino nearRome.

The latest scheme considered for a joint U.S.-Italianventure is worth mentioning because of its obviousrelation to in-space activities. It is the so called“tethered satellite” concept, in which a scientific sat-ellite is to be attached by a long umbilical cord to theShuttle or another infrastructure element in orbit. Italynow has a Memorandum of Understanding withNASA regarding this matter, and joint studies areunder way to develop the concept, Perhaps becauseof this, Italy up to now has been one of the most eagerof ESA’s member-states to participate in informal dis-cussions on U.S.-European cooperation in a “spacestation” development program.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

Although the United Kingdom initially showed lit-tle inclination to share in NASA’s “space station”aspirations, this situation has changed over the pastyear, with U.K. interest coming to focus on platforms.Great Britain is, after France and the FRG, the thirdlargest contributor to ESA’s budget, but the lion’s shareof its attention over the past several years has beengiven to satellite communications, within ESA as wellas nationally. As it happens, a “space station” hasbeen thought, until recently, to be of relatively littlevalue to satellite communications (except in the verylong term). Britain’s developing interest in long-termin-orbit infrastructure, coupled with its intention ofmaintaining its vigorous space science program (pur-sued both through ESA and bilaterally with NASA) andits rapidly growing interest in remote sensing, may sig-nal a move toward a more comprehensive and diver-sified space program.

App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 195

OTHER ESA MEMBER-STATES

This paper has dwelt at some length on those mem-bers of ESA which deem it preferable to participatedirectly, as well as through ESA, in talks with NASAon “space station” matters, This does by no meansimply a lack of interest on other member countries’parts. However, it does make it more difficult to assesstheir positions with respect to possible U.S. overturessince those positions are not debated publicly.21 Onefact remains, however: all ESA’s members have en-trusted to the Agency a long-term program planningmandate, and have provided funds therefore. And thismandate explicitly encompasses consideration of“transatlantic” cooperation on a space station.

CANADA

There is a General Agreement on Cooperation bet-ween Canada and ESA, which makes Canadian par-ticipation in an ESA contribution to a space infrastruc-ture program at least a possibility. Its longstandingtradition of bilateral cooperation with the UnitedStates, however, prompts Canada, through its NationalResearch Council, to evaluate its interest in a “spacestation” independently.

Canada’s expenditures in space in 1983 were about$100 million. Apart from a pioneering effort to operatedomestic satellite communications systems (the ANIKspacecraft family built by Hughes) and a number ofjoint scientific projects with the United States, Can-ada’s major bilateral program with NASA is the de-velopment of the remote manipulator arm for theShuttle. In return for a NASA commitment to purchaseadditional arms from Toronto-based Spar AerospaceLtd., Canada has funded the $100 million develop-ment of the first flight unit, which has been success-fully tested on Shuttle flights. Manipulator systemscould be important features of space infrastructure andthus are candidates for Canadian contribution.

JAPAN

With the exception of bilateral cooperation with theUnited States, Japan has, to date, carried the burdenof its space activities alone.22 Fairly constant in the lastfew years, Japan’s space expenditures per annumamount to approximately $45O million, a budget near-ly one half the size of the European Space Agency’s.

ZIThe ~sitlon of the smaller states In ESA is somewhat simi far to that of

those in the European Economic Community. At the Economic Summit, thebig four European nations attend in their own right; the remaining six arerepresented by the President of the Commission.

Zz)apan may nw be expanding its sphere of space cooperation. it has re-cently opened a liaison office in Paris, for example.

Space development in Japan is executed under theleadership of the Space Activities Commission (SAC),an advisory organ to the Prime Minister. The main ex-ecutive agency is the National Space DevelopmentAgency (NASDA), established in 1969 to undertakethe development of applications satellites and relatedlaunch vehicles, and to conduct launching and track-ing operations. Another agency, the Institute of Spaceand Astronautical Science (ISAS), is in charge of scien-tific space programs carried out on balloons, soundingrockets, and satellites. ISAS builds its own family oflaunch vehicles and runs its own launch center at Kag-oshima, independently of NASDA’s launch facilitieswhich are located at Tanegashima.

Japan is the only country where large-scale spacescience and space applications programs are carriedout by two completely separate entities, reporting todifferent departments of government; while ISAS is an“independent national institute” under the Ministryof Education, NASDA reports to the Prime Minister’sOffice through the Science and Technology Agency.But NASDA also carries out programs on behalf of,and draws funds from, other ministries: Transport(meteorology), Posts and Telecommunications,

From 1970 to 1981, Japan successfully launched 21satellites, developed two families of launch vehicles,undertook the development of several more satellitesand of a third type of launcher, and readied a numberof experiments to be carried by the Shuttle andSpacelab. For the time being, this effort has beendirected exclusively towards meeting domestic needs(communications, remote sensing) and the acquisitionof technology and expertise through a wide range ofscientific and experimental programs. Consequently,there has been, to date, little effort by Japan to com-pete with other space powers in offering commercialservices abroad. (An exception is the sale of groundstations for setting up communications networks orremote-sensing data reception; in these areas, Japa-nese industry has captured a good share of the worldmarket.)

Until very recently, Japan has cooperated closelywith NASA as well as with U.S. industry. In the fieldof space science, there have been a number of scien-tific exchanges, and this will continue as Japan plansto use flight opportunities on the Shuttle and Spacelab.Many of Japan’s applications satellites, whether ex-perimental or operational, have been developed with-in the framework of joint ventures among Japaneseand U.S. companies. As far as launch vehicles are con-cerned, the “Mu” series of small launchers has beenan indigenous development from the start, but thelarger “N” family to be used to launch applicationssatellites has relied on technology transfers from theUnited States.

38-798 0 - 84 - 14 : QL 3


The first stage of the “N1” version is in effect a Thor-Delta first stage built under license, and the third stageis a U.S. (Thiokol) production. The improved “N2”version goes even further in this direction, as it alsoincludes a U.S. (Aerojet) second stage. All told, Japa-nese industry builds barely more than half of the “N2”vehicle. It should be pointed out that the U. S.-Japa-nese Agreement on Space Activities (signed in 1969)imposes restrictions on the use of these U.S. technol-ogies and hardware by curbing transfer to third parties.The new launcher design, named Hi-A (roughlyequivalent to ESA’s Ariane 1 ) will alter this situationsignificantly, for the second stage (which will burn ad-vanced liquid hydrogen/oxygen propellants) and thethird stage, as well as the guidance system, will be ofindigenous design and manufacture. When the H1 -Abecomes operational, Japan will be only one stepremoved from an autonomous launch capability,namely the development of a new first stage (for whichpreliminary designs have already been proposed).

In addition to the obvious desire to increase Japa-nese industry’s share of the construction of spacehardware, this trend towards autonomy could bebased on two grounds. First, there may be dissatisfac-tion with U.S.-supplied hardware; indeed, in 1979 and1980 two costly launch failures were traced to prob-able malfunction of U.S.-supplied subsystems, and inthe aftermath of these events it was decided to accel-erate indigenous development.23 Second, an autono-mous launch capability clearly would enable Japanto offer full-scale commercial services in space ap-placations. 24

Another aspect of Japan’s space policy is that littlehas been done to diversify its sources for technologyprocurement and partnerships beyond the UnitedStates. Regular consultations are held, for instance,with ESA, but amount to little beyond some coordi-nation or satellite tracking stations. France was ap-proached in the early 1970s and at several points lateron for possible cooperation on liquid hydrogen-fueledrocket engines, but to no avail; the parties did notreach even a conceptual definition of a cooperativeventure.

zqhe japane5e reaction to the recent failure of transponders on their di-

rect broadcast satdlite suggests that the drive toward self-sufficiency will probably be further intensified.q has ~n ~nt~ out that Japan’s launch capabilities are severely limited

by agreements with the fishing industry, whereby the Tanegashima launchcenter can be used only four months per year. But this restriction clearlywould not be sufficient to deter Japan frcwr its traditional policy of enteringthe world market after a technology has been mastered and tried out on do-mestic markets.

In May 1984, Japan announced a plan for its par-ticipation in the U.S. “space station” program. Theplan calls for Japan’s development of an experimentalmodule to carry out life science and materials scienceexperiments, to be performed by one Japanese work-er. The module will be connected with the U.S. in-frastructure. It will include a manipulator arm, exper-imental devices for studies related to pharmaceuticals,crystals, compound materials, and a self-sufficiencyfood system. The development expenses to be paidby Japan are estimated to be 200-300 billion yen [$0.9-1.4 billion (1984)].

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Some developing countries can operate in space ontheir own, as is exemplified by India and the People’sRepublic of China. Both countries have launched sev-eral satellites using indigenous launchers. Both coun-tries are engaged in efforts to use existing systems toacquire expertise in important applications areas likemeteorology, remote sensing, communications, andeducational broadcasting. Details of programs andtechnology are not always very well known outsideof these countries; most Western observers who havevisited space facilities in India and China have beenimpressed by their potential, if not always by theirpresent condition. In both countries, an adequate sub-stratum of advanced industries is missing—especiallyin the areas of electronic components, high-grade ma-terials, and chemicals—and strains are caused by con-flicting priorities and by lack of foreign exchange.Shortages of trained technicians add further difficul-ties, but the foundation has been laid for further activ-ities in space.

Other developing countries are striving to reach thestage already attained by China and India. A few yearsago, it seemed that Brazil was on the verge of gettinga comprehensive program started, including its ownsatellites and launchers, developed in part indige-nously and in part with foreign help. (France and theFRG had actually almost concluded agreements withBrazil to that effect.) Political developments, growingeconomic difficulties, and diplomatic pressures fromsome countries that were, perhaps, wary of Brazil’saccess to missile technology have lowered these pros-pects considerably. Although Brazil has not managedto become a builder of space systems, it is an activeuser of existing systems (INTELSAT for communica-tions, LANDSAT for remote sensing), and still plansto operate a satellite communications system of itsown, which would be procured abroad.

Utilization of space technology, in contrast to its de-velopment, is almost worldwide. In particular, morethan 100 participating countries are members in


INTELSAT, and each of them operates at least oneground station. In addition, there are more than halfa dozen LANDSAT and/or SPOT remote-sensing datareception stations i n existence or u rider constructionthroughout the so-called Third World .25

Are there potential partners in a joint “space sta-tion” venture to be found among these countries, es-pecially among those which have some sort of aero-space industry of their own? There is no basic reasonwhy the answer should be no, but it must be pointedout that:

— to some of these countries, cooperation with theUnited States would pose a tricky, if not insur-mountable, political challenge, unless the modeof cooperation approached a “genuinely inter-national” one;

— financial participation of these countries couldprobably not exceed a very small percentage ofthe total cost; and

— such a program exceeds by far the ambitions thatthese countries set at present for their endeavorsin space, and going along with it in an interna-tional context would not satisfy the fundamentalcraving for autonomy and self-assertion whichoften, to some extent, underlies their spacepolicies.

Concerning the second point, it might be arguedthat a large number of small percentages can amountto a sizable sum. To give one example: 82 out of 102signatures of INTELSAT own each less than 1 percentof the shares, but their combined participationamounts to more than 20 percent. As to the thirdpoint, a genuinely international structure could beacceptable to countries who see space activities as ameans of self-assertion; for, even if the system werebuilt and operated by industrialized countries, itwould at least be jointly owned/managed by all. Theseconsiderations all point to the same conclusions: a sig-nificant level of participation by developing countriesis unlikely to occur, except possibly within somebroad international framework and unless aggressivelypursued by the United States.

THE SOVIET UNION

Under present and foreseeable political circum-stances, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to par-ticipate in in a space venture initiated and led by theUnited States. Even the prospects of its participatingin a genuinely international system seem very remote.One need only remember that the Soviet Union, andthe other Eastern-bloc countries, have never joined

25Each of these stations usually serves several Countria.

the INTELSAT organization. These countries decidedinstead to create their own international satellite com-munications system, named INTERSPUTNIK; since thetwo systems have to be linked somehow, there areINTELSAT ground stations in the U. S. S. R., Cuba, andRomania, but these countries are users of and not par-ties to INTELSAT. It is true that the Soviet Union isparty to several international satellite systems, notablyINMARSAT (which is, roughly speaking, to maritimecommunications, what INTELSAT is to ground com-munications) and SARSAT-CORPAS (an experimentalsatellite assisted search and rescue system). But thesewere created in a context where the United States didnot play a dominant role.

However, it is not possible to discuss internationalprospects for international involvement in a “spacestation” without mentioning the Soviet Union, for thatcountry does operate its own in-space infrastructure:Sal yut-Soyuz-Progress .26 Furthermore, the SovietUnion has provided opportunities to several othercountries to have one or more of their citizens visitthis infrastructure.

The Soviets have never concealed their ultimate in-tention to have some of their people in spaceoperating permanent facilities there, and Salyut isclearly a major step towards that goal. The pace ofits future evolution is, however, open to conjecture.The Salyut-Soyuz-Progress infrastructure, as developedto date, does not exhibit all the features to whichNASA aspires for U.S. in-space infrastructure.

For instance, the Salyut’s crew can perform workonly inside the station, or, when spacewalking, onlyvery close to it, by remaining tethered. The Sovietsapparently have no such thing as manned maneuver-ing units, teleoperated maneuvering systems, and thelike. As a result, the crew cannot tend other space-craft which might co-orbit or rendezvous with theircomplex, in order to maintain, service, or repair them.This reflects adversely on all material processing re-search: Salyut, because of perturbations caused by

NThe name SALYUT designates a series of manned Ohitd laboratories,

launched and operated one at a time since 1971. The system presently ac-tive, SALYU1 7, is likely to stay several years in orbit, as did its predecessorSALYUT 6, both because of design improvements and because a fair amountof in-orbit maintenance can now be carried out by visiting crews. The space-craft, weighing about 40,000 Ibs, is launched unmanned, and later on rendez-vous with SOYUZ capsules carrying a crew of 2 or 3. SALYUT 6 and 7 havealso been visited by larger (30,000 Ibs) unmanned craft. The usual patternof activity is to send abroad first a “semi-permanent” crew of two for a dura-tion now exceeding 6 months. While this crew stays on board, visiting crewsof three join them (usually for a week). These visits alternate with unmannedresupply trips by PROGRESS. To date, the station has been left unoccupiedfor some time after the semipermanent crew has accomplished its long-dur-ation stay, after which the cycle starts again. For a more complete discus-sion, see the OTA Technical Memorandum Sa/yut: Soviet Steps Toward Per-manent Human Presence in Space, December 1982.


crew members’ movements and the lack of a free-fly-ing platform in its vicinity, does not provide the verylow level of residual “gravity” necessary for the im-plementation of finely tuned experiments.

In spite of this, and other present limitations, the Sal-yut has been used extensively for military and civil-ian activities. In the latter case, where some resultsare known, cosmonauts have performed useful workin life sciences, Earth observation, astronomy, mate-rials processing, and technology development. Fur-thermore, SaIyut has enabled the Soviet Union to gainthe prestige associated with having some of its peo-ple in orbit.

Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space is acomplex matter.27 Planning is difficult when futureplans are, by definition, to be kept secret. Communi-cation with authoritative Soviet representatives tendsto be scant, slow, and often “beside the point.” Stand-ards, methods and even terminology are very differentfrom those in use outside the Soviet Union. Conse-quently, project managers and teams from these coun-tries who have been involved in bilateral programswith the U.S.S.R. have usually experienced great dif-ficulties in keeping cost and schedule under control.However, Soviet teams have proven their ability tobe flexible and imaginative when they feel the needfor it. For example, West German scientists whose in-struments are to be flown on the upcoming SovietVEGA mission to Halley’s Comet have found the co-operative arrangements quite satisfactory.

Whatever the difficulties inherent in internationalcooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space activities, thereare countries which have no other choice, and thereare countries which find advantage in balancing coop-eration with the United States with joint ventures withthe Soviet Union. It seems unlikely, however, thatthese latter countries would go so far as to bypass co-operation with the United States on a “space station”by exclusive recourse to analogous Soviet flight op-portunities.

Factors Influencing Assessmentof International Involvement inU.S. “Space Station” Program

PAST EXPERIENCE

Both the United States and its potential partners willhave a substantial historical record in mind when itcomes time to decide whether, and how, to proceedin a cooperative “space station” endeavor.

The debate over European participation in NASA’spost-Apollo program is by far the most important pastexperience, since it was the only time that the UnitedStates invited its major allies–Europe, Canada, Aus-tralia, and Japan—to participate in an effort which wasat the core of NASA’s plans for the future. While therehad been significant scientific cooperation prior to1969, particularly with Europe, there was a deliberatedecision as NASA’s post-Apollo efforts were beingplanned in 1969 and 1970 to make international in-volvement in those efforts, particularly of U.S. allies,a major theme.

Armed with what he thought was a mandate fromPresident Richard Nixon to seek such involvement,NASA Administrator Thomas Paine toured Europe andthe Far East inviting other countries to considersubstantial involvement in the emerging U.S. post-Apollo plans, which at the time included a “space sta-tion,” Shuttle, reusable orbital transfer vehicle (“spacetug”), and, ultimately, having people visit Mars. Euro-pean nations, through ELDO and ESRO, were particu-larly responsive to Paine’s initiative, and began tostudy in some detail various forms of participation; nei-ther Japan nor Australia made an active response tothe U.S. initiative.

A pr imary NASA object ive in in i t ia t ing thepost-Apollo dialogue was “to stimulate Europeans torethink their present limited space objectives, to helpthem avoid wasting resources on obsolescent devel-opments, and eventually to establish more consider-able prospects for future international collaborationon major space projects. ”28 In particular, NASA waseager to steer Europe away from developing an auton-omous launch capability. Plans for an expendableEuropean launcher were the “obsolescent develop-ments” to which Paine was referring.

At the time NASA was offering to involve othercountries in an ambitious post-Apollo enterprise; it didnot have White House or congressional approval forthe programs it was promoting overseas. Indeed, onetactic NASA may have been using to gain program ap-proval at home was to point out the problems involvedin withdrawing from incipient agreements with Eur-ope to cooperate in those programs. Potential U.S.partners were aware of the NASA approach; in Sep-tember 1970, for example, “American space officialswere asked for assurance that, if West European na-tions scrapped their space programs in favor of a jointeffort with the United States, the latter would not, inan economy move, back down. ”29

ZTU ,s, /u .s, s, R. Coowation in space will be examined by OTA in detail

in a technical memorandum to be published late In 1984.

ZBLetter from Thomas Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, NOV.

7, 1969.ZqNew York Times, Sept. 24, 1970, P. 64.


By 1971, only the Shuttle and orbital transfer vehi-cle remained as part of NASA’s post-Apollo plans; the“space station” had been shelved for the indefinitefuture. NASA was suggesting to Europe that its partic-ipation involve developing some portion of the air-frame of the Shuttle orbiter and total responsibility fordeveloping the space tug. However, others within theExecutive Branch were skeptical that Europe had thetechnical capability to develop the tug on its own, andwere concerned that the United States might, in theprocess of assisting Europe in the tug development,transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable U.S.technology.

Throughout 1970 and 1971, negotiations on Euro-pean involvement in post-Apollo development effortswere Iinked to a European request for U.S. assurancethat it would launch European communication satel-lites. The United States had for some time resisted pro-viding such assurances on terms acceptable to Eur-ope because of its own economic interests, bothINTELSAT and in U.S. industry’s domination of themarket for communications satellites, but i n Septem-ber 1971 a compromise on the issue acceptable toboth sides was reached and this obstacle to the post-Apollo negotiations was removed.

President Nixon approved development of the Shut-tle on January 5, 1972. Shortly afterwards, a jointNASA/European “experts group” met and reportedthat “NASA . . . continued to encourage Europeanparticipation in development and use of the post-Apollo program. . . . NASA’s expectation [was] thatEuropean participation in development of the Shut-tle would be within the context of a broader programwhich included multilateral European responsibilityfor development of a major element such as reusablespace tugs . . , or Shuttle-borne orbital laborator-ies . . , .“3°

The suggestion that there was an alternative to Euro-pean development of the space tug had emerged with-in the United States during 1971; the so-called “sor-tie can” laboratory (also called a research andapplications module) was seen as clearly within Euro-pean capabilities, offering no risks of unwanted tech-nology transfer, having no military implications, andproviding clean technical and managerial interfaceswith development of the Shuttle orbiter itself. On theother hand, two factors militated against Europe’s de-veloping the tug: 1 ) recognition that the Shuttle andits associated orbital transfer vehicle would be usedby the United States for military, as well as civilian,purposes, and 2) NASA’s concern over housing the

JONASA press Release, Feb. 11, 1972.

tug, with its planned cryogenic fuel, in the Shuttlepayload bay.

In June 1972, the United States withdrew (withoutwarning) the option of Europe’s participation beingdevelopment of the tug, and told Europe that the onlychoice left for substantial participation was develop-ment of the sortie laboratory. Europe was also ex-cluded from direct involvement in developing any ele-ment of the Shuttle orbiter itself. This decision cameas a blow to Europe, which had already spent substan-tial sums both on tug development and, particularlyin the United Kingdom and Italy, on orbiter designwork in collaboration with U.S. industry. In terms ofstimulus to European technical and industrial capa-bility and eventual sales potential, Europe viewed thesortie laboratory as a distinctly less desirable option.

Nevertheless, Europe (and in particular the FRG)found the opportunity to become involved with theU.S. mainstream program for the 1970s attractiveenough that it continued negotiations in a situationwhere the United States was clearly playing a domi-nant role. After a further year of negotiations, in mid-1973 Europe agreed to proceed with development ofthe sortie laboratory (by now named Spacelab) as partof a “package deal” which also included developmentof a French launcher (which became the Ariane proj-ect) and of an experimental maritime communicationssatellite and which called for the creation of a singleEuropean Space Agency to carry out these projects.It was the difference in cost between the expensivetug development program and the less expensive (atthe time) Spacelab program which freed up the fun-ding needed to initiate joint European support ofAriane.

The Memorandum of Understanding which gov-erned NASA/European cooperation on Spacelab wassigned in September 1973.31 At the time of the U. S.-European agreement on Spacelab development, it wasanticipated that the facility would be used extensivelyin conjunction with the Shuttle and that the UnitedStates would buy several Spacelabs beyond the oneengineering model and one flight model which Eur-ope agreed to develop and build at its own cost andthen to deliver to NASA. This has not yet happened.

31 The Mou b~ween NASA and E’jA was a subo~l “ate document ~hlch

drew its authority from the Intergowxnmental Agreement between the UnitedStates on the one hand and each of the individual governments of the ESROMember States on the other. This Agreement was thus binding on the wholeof the U.S. Government not just on NASA. Although ratified by the parlia-ments of several ESRO countries, it was not submitted to the U.S. Senatefor ratification. As a consequence, its status was that of an “InternationalExecutive Agreement” and, as such, subordinate to U.S. domestic law. Thispoint, which the ESRO states did not appreciate at the time, became impor-tant in 1979 in connection with a U.S. Air Force plan (later cancelled) todevelop a system similar to Spacelab.


The costs of both Shuttle and Spacelab utilization haveescalated to the point where extensive utilization ofthe full Spacelab capabilities is questionable, and theUnited States has bought only the minimum single ad-ditional Spacelab to which it was committed.

The Europeans knew that, under the circumstances,they would have to accept the status of a junior part-ner. Now that they have demonstrated their compe-tence, they will look to agreements on a much moreequitable basis as Europe considers cooperation withthe United States in “space station” development. Forexample, the current head of CNES has questionedwhether Spacelab has “fulfilled German expectations”(the FRG was the major European advocate of the pro-gram) and has suggested that “there is some questionas to whether Spacelab . . . is really appreciated bythe U.S. . . . In any event, Europe does not really feelat home in Spacelab, whose operation is now out ofEuropean hands.”32

European acceptance of what some now perceiveto be unfavorable terms in the Spacelab agreementstemmed in large part from lack of confidence in Euro-pean capabilities and from a belief that only throughcooperation with the United States could those capa-bilities be improved. Now, having brought bothSpacelab and Ariane to success, Europe has muchmore confidence in its ability to chart its own futurein space and it is likely to be a more demanding par-ticipant in negotiations with the United States overcooperative ventures.

European confidence in the United States as a coop-erative partner was shaken in the spring of 1981 whenthe United States announced, without prior consulta-tion with its European partners, that it was cancelinga U.S. spacecraft which was part of a two-spacecraftInternational Solar Polar Mission (ISPM).33 This with-drawal caused vigorous protests from not only Euro-pean space officials but also representatives of foreignministries.34 There is general agreement that the ISPMaffair was not handled well by the United States.35 Al-though both the United States and Europe have man-aged to put ISPM in perspective, European officialsare not beyond using U.S. remorse over the incident

‘zHerbert Curien, “The Pride of France: a National Commitment, ” Spec-trum, September 1983, p. 75.

JJlndeed, European confidence had been shaken earlier when the United

States cancel led its share in the AEROSAT program, In this instance, the U.S.withdrawal was total, and the program was stopped.

3zFor a runn i ng account of the International Solar Polar Mission COfItrOVerSy,see articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar, 2, Mar. 30, Aug.3, Sept. 28, and Dec. 28, 1981.

JSlt is ~rhaps ~rth noting that the situation was aggravated because NASA

was not permitted to consult or even warn ESA of the impending cancella-tion until the President’s budget had been delivered to the Congress.

as a bargaining chip in U.S.-European negotiations onfuture collaboration. For a time, though, it seemed asif “aberrations such as the unilateral pullout by theUnited States” from the ISPM could “set back pro-gress for years.”36 It is perhaps an indication of thebasically favorable climate for U.S.-European collab-oration in space activities that the ISPM incident andthe Spacelab experience are viewed as lessons of whatis to be avoided in future negotiations rather thanreasons for not cooperating in the future.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Military and national intelligence space activitiesprovide the United States and its allies with major na-tional security advantages, and all indications pointtowards reliance on them in the future. A major pro-gram like the “space station” is therefore bound tohave national security implications. If a decision ismade to develop a single set of infrastructure elementsto satisfy all interests, civilian and military, then theprospect of international involvement in such a pro-gram raises critical questions. This is all the more truesince new security implications may emerge as theprogram matures. If the future unveils unforeseen po-tentialities, international participation in the programmay inhibit, perhaps even prevent. the United Statesfrom taking full advantage of them.

To an extent, major international involvement willobviously restrict U.S. freedom of choice in the future:it would be more difficult, for instance, for the UnitedStates to preserve the option of integrating all its ef-forts in space (military as well as civilian) and havinga single Government agency responsible for them(though the U.S. Army and its Corps of Engineers mayexemplify a possible approach). Such a drastic stephas been debated and rejected in the past, but, in prin-ciple, it remains an option which international par-ticipation might foreclose. Conversely, any form ofU.S. military activity would raise major problems forESA as a partner, since the ESA charter precludes anyinvolvement in military projectso

37

A more likely future, however, is that any nationalsecurity uses would rely on elements operationallyseparate from the civilian one, but built with similaror identical technology and perhaps making joint useof basic utilities. Dependence of any military seg-ment(s) on parts and/or subsystems procured from for-eign sources could ensue, This is a situation which will

36Noel Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in Jerry Greyand Lawrence Levy, eds., Global Implications of Space Activities (AmericanInstitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 43.

‘Three of ESA’S members (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) are neutralcountries.


never please the military (which, like France, prefers“autonomy”), but which can probably be met withadequate licensing arrangements (e.g., those underwhich the A V-8 Harrier aircraft was produced). Forinstance, if the U.S. military were to envision usingelements of any civilian space infrastructure undersuch circumstances, a foreign supplier could be re-quired to entrust a U.S. official agency with all draw-ings and documents needed to transfer the manufac-turing of the item under consideration to a U.S.supplier if such a course eventually proved to be nec-essary. An intergovernmental arrangement would spe-cify those situations where the U.S. agency is author-ized to implement the transfer to a national supplier,so as to protect the foreign firm’s commercial inter-ests in all other cases.

Such a device works best when the back-up sup-plier in the U.S. is pre-identified, so that a minimumamount of transfer of know-how, consistent with thepreservation of the foreign source’s interests, can becarried out in advance, thus shortening the inevita-ble lead time inherent in a manufacturing restart. Ofcourse, there is always the possibility that the U.S. mil-itary could procure systems directly from non-U. S.suppliers; this has happened for a few military systemsin the past.

Another security-related consequence of interna-tional participation could be that foreign participantswould be exposed to the operating characteristics ofthe technology used by U.S. national security agen-cies. This could involve those parts or subsystems pro-vided by foreign sources, and can be assessed onlyon a case-by-case basis. But the matter could extendbeyond foreign-supplied hardware, since foreign par-ticipants will of necessity have access to a certain levelof technological detail, especially those interfacingwith what they supply. This, however, is not neces-sarily critical: in a similar instance, the Shuttle, al-though it can be used to carry on U.S. national secu-rity activities, is itself not a classified item. However,many aspects of Shuttle operations, such as access tothe Orbiter itself, are carried out under strict security,and the military has developed separate control facil-ities for its use of the Shuttle.

Similarly, as the presumed leader in a space infra-structure program, the United States is bound to bei n a dominant position regarding transfer of sensitivetechnology and industrial information. As was the casewith Spacelab, all data and drawings pertaining to anyforeign contribution would have to be made availableto the United States in order to allow operation, main-tenance, and repairs to be carried out. The UnitedStates, on the other hand, would have to provide onlyessential interface data to its partners. Such considera-

tions, therefore, should not discourage the UnitedStates from seeking foreign participation, if it sodesires.

Perhaps more important to national security con-siderations are the restrictions which might be im-posed on certain national security uses of internation-ally developed infrastructure. While some, perhapsmany, potential international partners might not op-pose so-called “peaceful” military applications (e.g.,military R&D, or activities in support areas such ascommunications, navigation, surveillance), some ofthem are unlikely to agree to the installation of any“battle station” on an element derived from a devel-opment program to which they are party. There isclearly no way to bypass such an issue: it would ofnecessity have to be settled beforehand, as explicitlyas possible, in the agreement instituting the interna-tional program.

A last issue relating to national security considera-tions is that of the transfer of technology from theUnited States to foreign participants, or vice versa.There are generally two ways in which such technol-ogy

1.

2.

transfers occur: “In the course of an international developmentprogram, a certain amount of know-how is inevi-tably transferred among the parties to the project.This is more in the nature of general knowledge(management, organizational methodology andprocedures) than of specific technological skills.The character of technical interaction betweenNASA and ESA in conjunction with Spacelab,even though it includes some technical assistanceprovided by NASA, is evidence of this.If a foreign participant in charge of a given sub-system were to appear unable; at a late stage ofthe program, to produce a product conformingto required performance standards, it then wouldbecome necessary to assist the concerned partyin meeting the specifications, a process whichmight involve the transfer of valuable and sensi-tive know-how. This can only be assessed on acase-by-case basis, but a number of safeguardscan be built into the program at the start. Thesewould include careful selection of subsystems en-trusted to foreign participants and provision formidcourse assessment of performance. Ofcourse, the reverse possibility now exists as well:that the United States could gain access to valu-ab le technolog ica l know-how f rom othercountries.

POTENTIAL PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

In principle, private business and internationalcooperation are perfectly compatible; successful


“multinationals” are proof of this. It is true that untilrecently there were no multinational firms involvedin space developments (unless INTELSAT is seen asa business). Actually, space activities in practically allcountries constitute an area where governmental set-ting of policy, financing, and implementation of pro-grams are the rule, although the private sector can beexpected to play an increasingly important role in fu-ture space activities.

There is a clear trend towards increased private-sec-tor involvement in those applications of space ex-pected to generate profit, and the matter of “spacecommercialization” is now being actively debated inthe United States. In Europe, precedents have beenset with firms like ARIANESPACE (for the sale of launchservices) and SPOT-IMAGE (for the commercial ex-ploitation of the French SPOT Earth-resources-sensingsatellite). In Japan, space programs rely on close gov-ernment-industry interaction.

Hence, if it appears that activities conducted usingspace infrastructure can be economically profitable,the fact that it was developed internationally shouldnot present an insurmountable obstacle to private-sec-tor involvement in its use. However, all other thingsbeing equal, it is likely that U.S. industry would pre-fer to deal with infrastructure owned and operated byU.S. interests, Government or private.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS

The greater the prospects of commercial use ofspace infrastructure, the better the prospects for re-turns from investments made to develop it. The eco-nomic prospects can only gain from its large and wide-encompassing utilization. Such utilization, includingforeign users, may exist even if the United States de-velops all or nearly all of the infrastructure. Manyforeign customers would be attracted to any oppor-tunities provided by its use. The extent of commer-cialization would then depend mainly on the condi-tions set by the owner(s) and operator(s): first andforemost, pricing policy, but also any commercial re-strictions (e.g., will the infrastructure be made avail-able to foreign firms competing directly with U.S. firmsin a given field of application?) and technical factors(e.g., such stringent safety requirements that disclosureof proprietary knowledge would have to be made bythe user). However, NASA’s experience with accom-modating commercial interests (including R&D efforts)on the Shuttle, through such mechanisms as Joint En-deavor Agreements and trips purchased in whole orin part by commercial interests under proprietary con-ditions, provides precedents which suggest that evenU.S.-only elements could accommodate non-U.S.commercial users successfully.

It appears likely that international involvement inspace infrastructure development, operation, andownership would enhance the prospects for an eco-nomically efficient and broadly based utilization pro-gram. Common interest in its future capabilities anduse will stimulate creativity and innovation among amuch wider international community of potential us-ers, including non-profit-seeking ones (governmentalagencies, research institutions and the like). Also, anycompetition from the Soviet Union will be lessenedif spacefaring countries feel secure in their participa-tion in a U.S./international complex.

THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF POTENTIALFOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

What components of space infrastructure wouldeach of the potential partners reviewed earlier be mostlikely to contribute by virtue of the current tenden-cies of its own programs, of the existence of techno-logical domains where its industry is known to excel,or of other factors? Answers to this question are im-portant. For if any foreign partners enter such a coop-erative effort, the United States must ensure that theirtechnical contributions are feasible, compatible, andcomplementary. Or, from another perspective: towhat extent would the desired infrastructure have tobe modified in order to accommodate contributionsby a given set of participants?

It is impossible now to suggest more than a few gen-eralities, inasmuch as NASA has not yet specified whatthe overall performance specifications are going to be.

Too, the level of technical sophistication for a givensubsystem cannot yet be articulated. As just one ex-ample, consider electric power conditioning and dis-tribution. On all spacecraft developed until now, elec-tric power is distributed at low voltage, and allspacefaring countries possess the relevant technology.Many experts, however, judge that, for long-term in-space infrastructure, this technology should be sup-planted by an alternative, high-voltage technology. Inanticipation of just such a development, ESA andNASA have been discussing for some time the gener-ation of a set of standards to be employed in space-craft high-voltage power systems; but the matter is stilloutstanding,

Lastly, potential participants may wish to make theircontribution, not in the areas where their industry isbest endowed with existing capabilities, but rather inareas where they want it to acquire new capabilities.Nothing should prevent them from doing so if theyare ready to commit themselves to meet the costs ofsuch new and (to them) risky developments. This mat-ter could become “sticky,” however, if they were towish to make a “key” contribution in such an area,


Thus, no useful projection of task allocation can bemade now. Perhaps the division of work will have tobe negotiated on a case-by-case basis, before the pro-gram actually starts, but after its shape and definitionhave been outlined in more detail. Some countries arealready suggesting ways in which they might preferto contribute, and it would be wise for the UnitedStates to give careful consideration to including pro-spective partners in the infrastructure design phase insome sensible fashion.

Assessment: Pros and Consof International Involvement

A “U.S. ONLY” PROGRAM

At first glance, since almost certainly the UnitedStates is likely to bear the largest part of the financialburden of a “space station” development program,and since international cooperation is fraught withmany well-known difficulties, it would seem that therewould be much merit in the prospect of an independ-ent, strictly U. S., undertaking. In addition, many ofthe reasons which have led the United States to con-sider a “space station” program in the first place—national pride and a sense of accomplishment, nation-al prestige, national security, or supporting U.S. firmsin commercial space activities—might best be servedby a program carried out under exclusive U.S. control.

Similarly, it could be argued that potential interna-tional partners might find it to their advantage to beleft to their own devices in planning and implement-ing their respective space programs, rather than hav-ing to weigh the pros and cons of associating them-selves with what will in essence be an Americanprogram, unlikely to be perfectly suited to their goalsand/or technical and financial resources and likely tolimit their ability to pursue independent actions.

The arguments in favor of a strictly national U.S. pro-gram can be summarized as follows:

1, There is no substantial reason why the UnitedStates would not be able to go it alone: the coun-try has all the technical and industrial resourcesnecessary.

2. Generating and maintaining international inter-

38

est in a “space station” program and enlistingparticipants is in itself a difficult process, leadingto many concessions on the part of the UnitedStates and other participating countries, the re-turn from which could be rather disappointing.Participation of Europe in major U.S. spaceundertakings, such as the Space TransportationSystem or the Space Telescope, seems always tostay in the 10 to 15 percent range, which is con-sistent with European space budgets. Even if one

798 0 - 84 - ] 5 , QL 3

3.

4.

other major partner, say Japan, joins the “spacestation” program at a similar level, this still leavesthe U.S. to bear 60 to 70 percent of the expense.International cooperative programs, especiallywhere advanced technology is concerned, havethe reputation of being beleaguered by complexdiplomatic and managerial interfaces, as well asby difficult compromises needed to tailor theoverall undertaking to each participant’s particu-lar requirements.Past experience points to the fact that the U.S.civilian space pro-gram is difficult enough to coor-dinate with the U.S. national security program ona purely national basis. This could be even moredifficult in the case of an international “space sta-tion” program.

These considerations must however be carefullyweighed against a number of arguments in favor ofinternational involvement:

As stated repeatedly, international cooperationis a long-standing tradition in civilian space pro-grams, and pursuing it has had a very positive po-litical impact. Traditional partners of the UnitedStates in the industrialized world consistently listcooperation with this country among the objec-tives of their space policy statements; for exam-ple, the head of the French space program, whoalso chairs the ESA Council and the European Sci-ence Foundation, has recently noted that “coop-eration with the United States is of fundamentalimportance. ”38 The United States has given astrong impression already that it anticipates sig-nificant international utilization of a “space sta-tion” and that, in order to assure such utilization,it wilI be receptive to foreign participation i n thedevelopment phase of the program. A decisionto forego such participation would certainly havemajor (though probably not yet very major) po-litical costs.

2. As discussed earlier, if the United States choosesto go ahead alone with its space infrastructure ac-quisition program, several countries or groups ofcountries among the industrialized Western-typedemocracies are likely to follow suit, even if ona smaller scale and after some time. Such duplica-tion of efforts might well result in a net loss tothe Western world. The very cost of these invest-ments is bound to generate an extremely harshlevel of competition for their commercial utiliza-tion, to the point where it may not be economi-cally sound any more and the benefits of space

~acurlen, op. Cit., P. 76


commercialization could be lost or significantlydelayed.

3. Even if the prospects that Europe and Japan mayassociate in a joint “space station” program with-out the United States seem remote, there is nodoubt that this possibility becomes more likelyif the United States chooses to go it alone. Asargued earlier, there are virtually no cir-cumstances in which Europe or Japan wouldrefuse a U.S. offer of involvement in the “spacestation, ” and thus it is up to the United States todecide whether to make that offer.

As argued earlier and briefly again above, a likelyimpact of U.S. decision to proceed alone would bethe eventual development by other space-orientedcountries of capabilities which will be, at least in part,similar to those offered by a U.S. “space station.” Thiscould result in increased downstream economic com-petition between the United States and other indus-trial countries in commercial exploitation of space. Byinvolving potential competitors in the U.S. ‘program,this situation might be avoided or minimized. Thereis a certain parallel with the situation regarding Euro-pean involvement in U.S. post-Apollo activities. Bywithdrawing the offer of European development of aspace tug (with an estimated cost to Europe of $500million—$1 billion) and substituting the Spacelab (thenestimated to cost $100 million-$200 million), theUnited States made possible a European financialcommitment to develop its own launcher, which isnow competing with the Shuttle for launch contracts.The United States needs to evaluate carefully whetherit wants to create a similar situation as its “space sta-tion” program begins.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, from the U.S.perspective international involvement is an option, nota requirement. However, not only are there strongreasons for the United States to pursue this option,but, at least from NASA’s perspective, internationaliz-ing the “space station” program to some meaningfuldegree eventually may bean important means of ga-thering political support in this country for the sizeand kind of program that it wishes to have. If the na-tionalistic objectives which might be served by NASA’spresent “space station” program aspirations are notsufficient to gain White House and congressional sup-port of a “go it alone” approach, then an approachmixing nationalistic and cooperative elements seemsessential to mobilize political support for it.

AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

This approach to space infrastructure development,operation, and use would be preferred by the UnitedStates and/or other space-capable countries only if it

was the best available means of maximizing all of thenational objectives which have led to beginning theprogram in the first place. As mentioned earlier, theINTELSAT and INMARSAT analogy is rather mislead-ing here. The objectives of those systems are inher-ently international in character and could not be suc-cessfully pursued without broad internationalparticipation, while space infrastructure can be devel-oped and operated as a purely national enterprise.

Even the parallel to ESA is somewhat artificial: Euro-pean countries created ESA because such a joint en-deavor was the only way that they could marshal theresources required to carry out a comprehensivespace program, albeit on a regional rather than a na-tional basis. The United States, should it chose to doso, has the resources required for unilateral “spacestation” development.

A decision to create an international acquisition ar-rangement is highly unlikely, given the specific char-acter of the support mobilized behind the “space sta-tion” concept in the United States, Europe and Japanto date. One fundamental motivation which couldlead to such a decision–that it was the only way tomobil ize the needed financial or technical re-sources—is missing, and there seems to be no othercompelling reason, from a U.S. perspective, to pur-sue this option. Only if it were seen by the UnitedStates and, to a lesser degree, other spacefaring statesas a particularly attractive way of symbolizing theircommitment to broadly based international cooper-ation would a “fully international” option be pre-ferred; no such vision has been persuasively ad-vanced.

Making international operational arrangementsonce the infrastructure is acquired appears a some-what more realistic prospect, though still unlikely tobe preferred by its developers. The United States (andits partners) could recoup at least some costs of theacquisition by selling shares in it, and this form ofbroadened international involvement may be an at-tractive way of giving newly industrializing and de-veloping countries a useful sense of involvement onthe space frontier. Broader international involvementcould also be accomplished by internationalizing (tosome extent) the operating crew—or by leasing facili-ties to the rest of the world.

A U.S. PROGRAM WITH INTERNATIONALINVOLVEMENT

Since the United States has given strong indicationthat it will open its space infrastructure program toforeign participation, it is useful to estimate what formof involvement is most likely to be successful, wheresuccess is defined as a mixture of costs and benefits


which is acceptable to all involved. Reaching an agree-ment is likely to involve difficult bargaining and sig-nificant compromise at the political, managerial, andtechnical levels. This process is already beginning, andboth the United States and its potential partners (par-ticularly Europe) are approaching the issue in a ratherdifferent manner than was the case during the 1969-73negotiations over post-Apollo participation.

Those objectives which are likely to be of most in-terest to the United States perhaps would be bestserved by a cooperative approach which would com-mit the United States and its partners to share impor-tant parts of the overall acquisition program, to remaininvolved beyond its acquisition (i. e., during its oper-ational phase as well), and to seek broadly based infra-structure utilization once established: that is, overalljoint acquisition, operation, and use. Certainly theUnited States would prefer to be the world leader inspace development and use over the next few dec-ades. A U.S.-led, freely arrived at, major in-space in-frastructure collaboration program–one involvingmany, perhaps all, countries, especially the majorspacefaring ones—would go a long way towardachieving this goal.

But it seems as if the objectives, primarily utilitarian,which would motivate other countries to join in sucha U.S. program would be best served if they could doso with minimal loss of their future freedom of ac-tion—i.e., participation in the acquisition, includingdevelopment, phase only, with no a priori commit-ment to system utilization or to sharing in overallsystem management.

Potential U.S. partners are, of course, fully awarethat a U.S. offer to share in the acquisition of in-spaceinfrastructure is fundamentally political in character,and that decisions on issues such as cost-sharing anddivision of labor are as much political as technical oreconomic. However, as the earlier review of the spaceprograms of potential partners has suggested, Europe(both ESA and individual countries) Canada and Ja-pan will bring some very real assets to the negotiat-ing process. The outcome of that process is certainlynot going to reflect U.S. interests alone. Indeed, Eur-ope, Canada and Japan may consider their participa-tion in the operation of the infrastructure and theirguaranteed access to it as preconditions to their con-tributing to its development.

appendix c international involvement in a civilian …

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