Appellate Law and Practice MCLE Meeting

Attorney Resource Center

May 18, 2018

11:45 AM – Noon Welcome/Announcements

Bob Black, Appellate Law Section Chair

Noon – 1:00 PM Program

The Second District’s Local Rules and e-Developments at the

Appellate Court

Robert J. Mangan and Jeff Kaplan, Second District Appellate Court

Robert J. Mangan graduated from John Carrol University in 1974 and

received a BA in political science. In 1978 Bob graduated from John

Marshall Law School and passed the Bar the same year. He has served as

Clerk of the Appellate Court, Second District, since his appointment in

2002. Prior to that, Bob was engaged in civil practice in DuPage and Kane

counties.

Jeff Kaplan obtained his bachelor’s degree at the University of Michigan

and his law degree at George Washington University. After practicing

law at the Legal Services Organization of South Central Michigan, he

joined the Second District Appellate Court in 1999. He served the court

first as a research staff attorney and then as a judicial clerk, and in 2003

he was appointed Director of Research. He has lectured to various groups

of law students, paralegals, attorneys and judges.

Jeff Kaplan will provide an introduction to the Second District’s

Local Rules and Robert Mangan will discuss the manner of serving

documents (SCR11), proof of service (SCR12) and the upcoming

RE:SEARCHIL.

DCBA Events: 5/22 – 11th Hour Seminar, Part 1 – earn up to 3 PRMCLE credits

before the 6/30 reporting deadline, Attorney Resource Center

5/24 – An Afternoon with Abe – CLE Lecture and Portrait

Dedication – Attorney Resource Center

5/24 – Happy Hour – DOC Wine Bar, Lombard

6/7 – Installation of Offices & Directors – Top Golf, Naperville

6/19 – 11th Hour Seminar, Part 2 – earn up to 3 PRMCLE credits

before the 6/30 reporting deadline – Attorney Resource Center

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Article I. General Rules

Rule 101 Filing materials with the Court(a) Except where electronic filing is required by Supreme Court Rule 9, materials to be

filed with the Court may, but need not, be filed electronically.(b) A party filing materials electronically shall do so pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 9

and the “Supreme Court of Illinois Electronic filing Procedures and User Manual,”which is here incorporated by reference, except as provided in subsection (c) of thisLocal Rule.

(c) Where a party files a brief electronically, the electronically filed brief shall beconsidered the official original. The party shall provide the Clerk’s Office withfive duplicate paper copies, which shall be received in the Clerk’s Office withinfive days of the electronic notification generated upon acceptance of theelectronically filed brief. Each paper copy shall be a printed version of theelectronically filed brief, bearing the Clerk’s electronic file stamp, and shall beprinted one-sided and securely bound on the left side in a manner that does notobstruct the text. The paper copies shall comply with all applicable SupremeCourt Rules, including the color-cover requirement in Supreme Court Rule 341.A party shall not provide paper copies of any other materials filed electronically.

(d) Where materials are not filed electronically, the materials must be directed to theClerk’s Office by personal delivery, or by U.S. Mail or third-party commercialcarrier, at the following address:

Clerk of the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District55 Symphony WayElgin, Illinois 60120

(e) Where materials are not filed electronically, the party filing the materials shallprovide the original and one copy. However, where the party is filing a brief, theparty shall provide the original and five copies.

(f) The Court’s acceptance of a filing does not itself establish that the filing is timely orotherwise complies with the Supreme Court Rules or any other applicable rule.

(g) The Clerk’s Office will not correct any filings on any party’s behalf. If a partyseeks to make corrections to a filing, then the party seeking to make the correctionsmust file a motion seeking leave to withdraw the filing and to file a substitute.

Rule 102 Requirements for documents filed with the CourtAll documents filed with the Court, including motions, must comply with theformatting guidelines in Supreme Court Rules 10, 131(d), and 341(a), (f), and (g).Documents filed electronically must also comply with the formatting guidelines inthe “Supreme Court of Illinois Electronic filing Procedures and User Manual.”

Rule 103 Motions for extension of time

(a) A party moving for an extension of time must comply with Supreme Court Rules

361(a), (b), and (f) and, where applicable, 610. In addition to the information

required by those rules, the movant’s affidavit or verification must provide:

(1) The number of days requested and the number of days granted on each of

the previous motions for extension of time filed by the movant, and the total

number of days granted on all of those previous motions;(2) The total number of days requested and the total number of days granted on

all of the previous motions for extension of time filed by other parties;

(3) The number of days that will have elapsed from the date of filing of the

notice of appeal to the date that the case will be ready for disposition,

pursuant to Local Rule 105 or 107, if the present extension and no further

extension is granted; and(4) In a criminal case, the status of the defendant’s sentence (where applicable),

or, in any case that would become moot due to the passage of time on

appeal, the date on which the appeal would become moot.

(b) A motion for an extension of time should be filed, where practicable, at least 5 days

prior to the date to be extended if served electronically. If non-electronic service is

made in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 11(c), the motion should be filed,

where practicable, at least 5 days prior to the date to be extended if served

personally, or at least 10 days prior to the date to be extended if served by mail or

third-party commercial carrier.(c) Motions for extension of time in cases accelerated pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

311(a) or 660A must comply with subsection (a) of this Local Rule and Local Rules

106(b), (c), and (d).

Rule 104 Documentary and physical exhibits

The “Supreme Court of Illinois Standards and Requirements for Electronic Filing

the Record on Appeal” are here incorporated by reference. Pursuant to those

standards and requirements, the circuit clerks of the respective counties within the

second appellate district shall provide the Court with documentary exhibits but

shall not provide the Court with physical exhibits. If physical exhibits are required

for consideration of an appeal, the Court, sua sponte or upon motion of a party, will

direct the circuit clerk to transfer such exhibits.

Rule 105 Disposition of cases(a) Where no appellee’s brief is timely filed, a case will be considered ready for

disposition two weeks after the day that the brief is due to be filed, unless a timely

motion for extension of time to file the appellee’ s brief is filed. If a timely motion

or timely motions for extension of time are filed but no appellee’s brief is

subsequently timely filed, the case will be considered ready for disposition two

weeks after the due date determined by the resolution of the motion or motions for

extension.(b) All other cases will be considered ready for disposition upon the timely filing of the

appellant’s reply brief (or cross-reply brief, if applicable). Where no reply brief

(or cross-reply brief) is timely filed, a case will be considered ready for disposition

on the due date for the reply brief (or cross-reply brief), unless a timely motion forextension of time to file the reply brief (or cross-reply brief) is filed. If a timelymotion or timely motions for extension of time are filed but no reply brief (orcross-reply brief) is subsequently timely filed, the case will be considered ready fordisposition as of the due date determined by the resolution of the motion or motionsfor extension.

Rule 106 Preparation of accelerated cases(a) In order to expedite appeals under Supreme Court Rules 311(a) and 660A, parties

may file memoranda in lieu of formal briefs. Such memoranda need not complywith all the requirements applicable to formal briefs but must comply with therequirements of Supreme Court Rules 34 1(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h)(9), and (j),and Local Rule 102.

(b) Motions for extension of time are disfavored and shall be granted only forcompelling circumstances.(1)(2)

A motion for an extension must comply with Local Rule 103(a).When a motion for an extension is based on a delay in the preparation of therecord, the motion shall detail the proceedings at the status hearing requiredby Supreme Court Rule 31 1(a)(3) or 660A(b), including the trial court’sdetermination of the status of the case, the trial judge’s actions to expeditethe preparation of the record, and whether the trial judge has requested thechief judge’s assistance in resolving any filing delays. The motion shallalso attach any order entered at the status hearing and an affidavit orverification of the clerk or court reporter stating the reason for the delay.

(3) A motion for an extension must be filed at least 5 days prior to the date to beextended if served electronically. If non-electronic service is made inaccordance with Supreme Court Rule 11(c), the motion must be filed atleast 5 days prior to the date to be extended if served personally, or at least10 days prior to the date to be extended if served by mail or third-partycommercial carrier.

(4) The Court may require a personal appearance by the attorney or partyrequesting the extension.

(c) Whenever possible, motions should be served electronically or, if permitted bySupreme Court Rule 11(c), personally.

(d) Before filing any motion, a party shall confer with opposing counsel and inquire asto whether opposing counsel intends to file an objection. The results of thatinquiry shall be stated in the motion.

Rule 107 Disposition of accelerated cases(a) Where no appellee’s brief is timely filed, a case accelerated pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 311(a) or 660A will be considered ready for disposition three days afterthe day that the brief is due to be filed, unless a timely motion for extension of timeto file the appellee’s brief is filed. If a timely motion or timely motions forextension of time are filed but no appellee’s brief is subsequently timely filed, thecase will be considered ready for disposition three days after the due datedetermined by the resolution of the motion or motions for extension.

(b) All other accelerated cases will be considered ready for disposition upon the timelyfiling of the appellant’s reply brief (or cross-reply brief, if applicable). Where noreply brief (or cross-reply brief) is timely filed, a case will be considered ready fordisposition on the due date for the reply brief (or cross-reply brief), unless a timelymotion for extension of time to file the reply brief (or cross-reply brief) is filed. Ifa timely motion or timely motions for extension of time are filed but no reply brief(or cross-reply brief) is subsequently timely filed, the case will be considered readyfor disposition as of the due date determined by the resolution of the motion ormotions for extension.

Rule 108 Emergency motionsPursuant to Supreme Court Rule 361(g), emergency motions shall be filed anddisposed of as follows:

(a) An emergency motion may be filed only if an appeal has been docketed. The titleof the motion shall include the words “Emergency Motion.” If the motion requiresthe Court to act within a specific time, that information shall be set out in the firstparagraph of the motion. The motion shall specify the nature of the emergencyand the grounds for the specific relief requested. The motion shall also state whatrelief was sought in the trial court or why no relief was sought in that court. Themovant shall attach to the motion every trial court and appellate court documentrelevant to the motion. An emergency motion should be filed only when itinvolves a genuine emergency.

(b) The movant shall immediately serve the motion on every other party electronicallyor, if permitted by Supreme Court Rule 11(c), personally. The type of servicemade shall be specifically noted on the proof of service filed with the motion.

(c) Except in extraordinary circumstances necessitating an earlier ruling on the motion,or unless opposing counsel has indicated no objection to the motion, the Court willallow any non-moving party three days to respond to the motion.

Rule 109 Length and substance of oral arguments(a) Each side will receive a total of 15 minutes to present its main argument, and the

appellant or appellants will receive a total of 5 additional minutes to presentrebuttal.

(b) Oral arguments shall omit the recitation of the facts and the procedural history ofthe case except to the extent necessary to frame the issues that are presented onappeal.

Rule 110 Availability of materials(a) Any filed materials, not including secured materials, will be made available for

review upon request by any party or non-party. The Court may monitor anyreview of the materials in order to ensure the integrity of the materials.

(b) The Court’s internal electronic communications and internal administrativedocuments will not be provided to any party or his or her attorney, or to the generalpublic.

Rule 111 Availability of secured materialsIn all appeals, any party or attorney of record on appeal wishing to access securedmaterials must move to access those materials. Upon motion supported byaffidavit or verification, specifying the basis for access, the Court, in its solediscretion, shall grant or deny authorization to access any such materials.

Rule 112 Related-case statements(a) If an appeal is related to any case in any other court, the appellant shall file and

serve, with his or her docketing statement, an additional statement that includes thename, docket number, and status of all such related cases. Within seven daysthereafter, if any other party has reason to know that the appellant has failed toreport all such related cases, that party shall file and serve his or her ownrelated-case statement.

(b) For purposes of this Local Rule, a “related case” is any prior or pending caseinvolving (1) substantially the same parties and (2) the same or similar issues.

(c) For purposes of this Local Rule, “any other court” means the Illinois SupremeCourt, any other district of the Illinois Appellate Court, or any circuit court in thesecond appellate district.

Rule 113 Jurisdictional statements in postdissolution appealsIn any appeal from the final order disposing of any petition or motion filed in apostdissolution proceeding, the appellant’s jurisdictional statement pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 341(h)(4)(ii) shall specify that the Court has jurisdictionbecause (1) the trial court has jurisdiction of no other postdissolution matters or (2)although the trial court has jurisdiction of other postdissolution matters, the trialcourt entered a finding under Supreme Court Rule 3 04(a) as to the order appealed.If neither of those conditions applies, the appellant shall acknowledge same andspecify how the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction. For purposes of this LocalRule, a “postdissolution proceeding” is a dissolution case in which a judgment ofdissolution has been entered but is not the order appealed. The appellant’scompliance with this Local Rule does not necessarily establish that the Court hasjurisdiction.

2018 ILApp(2d) 170368No.2-17-0368

Opinion filed March 30, 2018

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

•M.

ROBERT PERAINO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

))))))))

THE COUNTY OF WE^WEBAGO; THEWINNEBAGO COUNTY HIGHWAYDEPARTMENT; JOSEPH A. )VANDERWERFF, the Winnebago County )Engineer; THE ROCKFORD TOWNSHIP )HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT; DANIEL P. )CONNESS, the Rockford Township Highway )Commissioner; THE VILLAGE OF CHERRY )VALLEY; THE VILLAGE OF CHERRY )VALLEY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT; )and CHUCK FREEMAN, the Village ofCherry Valley Public Works Director,

Defendants

(The County ofWinnebago, Defendant-Appellee).

)))))))

Appeal from the Circuit Courtof Winnebago County.

No. 13-L-169

HonorableJ. Edward Prochaska,Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Tf 1 Plaintiff, Robert Peraino, attempted to electronically file a motion to reconsider shortly

before midnight on the day it was due, but he failed to timely upload the motion, and it was file-

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2018ILApp(2d) 170368

stamped at 12:03 a.m. the next day. Plaintiff then sought to have the motion to reconsider

deemed filed on the due date based on a local court rule, but the trial court denied his request.

Plaintiff appeals from this ruling. However, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

to make such a ruling and that we also lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. We

therefore vacate the trial court's ruling and dismiss plaintiffs motion seeking to backdate the

motion to reconsider. See People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, Tfl 28-29.

If 2 I. BACKGROUND

TI 3 On June 12, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, the County ofWinnebago

(County), and others who were later voluntarily dismissed. He alleged that he was injured in a

motorcycle crash caused by a defective roadway.

^ 4 The County moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion on

December 2, 2016. A motion to reconsider would have been due on January 3, 2017, because

the thirtieth day after the order was a Sunday and the following day was a court holiday. See 735

ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2016); 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2016).

^ 5 Plaintiff electronically filed a motion to reconsider that was file-stamped on January 4,

2017.

T( 6 On January 5, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file his motion to reconsider

nuncpro tune to January 3, 2017. He alleged that, due to an illness and deadlines for other

cases, his attorney was not able to complete the motion to reconsider until 11 :55 p.m. on January

3, 2017. He alleged that, during the e-filing process, the I2File website would not upload the

motion, and the motion was not considered accepted or filed by the system until 12:03 a.m. on

January 4, 2017. Plaintiff cited local court rule 22.01, and specifically rule 22.01 CN), titled

"SYSTEM OR USER ERRORS," which provides, inter alia, that "[i]fthe electronic filing is not

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2018ILApp(2d) 170368

filed with the Clerk because of *** technical problems experienced by the filer, *** the Court

may upon good cause shown enter an order permitting the document to be subsequently filed

effective as of the date filing was first attempted." 17th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 22.01(N) (July 25,

2016). Plaintiff also cited Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 (eff. Feb. 16, 2011). Plaintiff

attached to the motion the affidavit of a paralegal at his attorney's office, who described her

attempt to upload the motion beginning at about 11:58 p.m.

^ 7 The County filed a response in opposition, arguing against the merits of plaintiff s motion

for leave.

II 8 The trial court denied plaintiffs motion on April 20, 2017. It stated as follows. The

motion to reconsider did not get filed before 12 a.m. on January 4, 2017, due to user error by

plaintiff through his attorney. The attorney's assistant might have had some difficulty

understanding what she needed to do in terms of uploading documents, but there were no

technical defects in the software or electronic filing system. Local court rule 22.01(N)(2) did not

define "technical problems." However, the local rules about e-filing were modeled on the

Supreme Court of Illinois Electronic Filing User Manual (Manual) (see 111. S. Ct., M.R. 18368

(eff. Feb. 3, 2014)). The Manual included the term "technical failure," which excluded a failure

of the user's equipment. The trial court did not think that "technical problems" included a user

problem, because that definition would be overly broad and would open up a Pandora's box of

similar motions. "[U]nder the facts of this case, there [was] no reason under the Local Rule

22.01 to allow the document to be ordered filed earlier." Rule 183 also did not apply, as it

pertained to deadlines set by the supreme court rather than statutory deadlines for filing motions.

19 This appeal followed.

II 10 II. ANALYSIS

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2018 ILApp(2d) 170368

T[ 11 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for leave to file

his motion to reconsider nuncpro tune to January 3, 2017. However, we do not consider the

substance of the trial court's ruling, as we determine that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

112 Although the parties have not raised the issue of jurisdiction, we have an obligation to

independently consider our jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal if jurisdiction is lacking.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois Labor

Relations Board, State Panel, 2017 IL App (5th) 160046, ^f 17. It is a jurisdictional and

mandatory requirement that a notice of appeal be timely filed (Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois

Farmers Insurance Co., 232 111. 2d 209, 213 (2009)), and neither the trial court nor the appellate

court has the authority to excuse compliance with the filing requirements set forth by supreme

court mles (Won v. Grant Park 2, L.L.C., 2013 IL App (1st) 122523, K 20).

^ 13 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(l) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) requires that a notice of appeal

be filed within 30 days aflter the entry of the final judgment appealed from or, "if a timely

posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed, *** within 30 days after the entry of the

order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment."

Section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2016)) sets forth

the deadline for filing posttrial motions in nonjury cases:

"In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the

judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any

extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the

judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief."

Absent a timely-filed posttrial motion, the trial court will lose jurisdiction over the case 30 days

after it enters the final judgment. In re Marriage ofHeinrich, 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, ^ 35.

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2018 ILApp(2d) 170368

^ 14 Here, plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the final

judgment (the grant of summary judgment for the County). Instead, he filed a motion to

reconsider, which was a "posttrial motion directed against the judgment," but that motion needed

to be filed within 30 days in order to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal (111. S. Ct. R.

303(a)(l) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)) and to extend the trial court's jurisdiction of the case (Inre

Marriage ofHeinrich, 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, 135). However, plaintiff filed his motion to

reconsider on January 4, 2017,* which was beyond the 30-day deadline.

Tf 15 Plaintiffs January 5, 2017, motion was an attempt to have his motion to reconsider

deemed filed on January 3, 2017. However, as 30 days had already passed since the trial court's

final judgment without a timely posttrial motion, the trial court's jurisdiction lapsed. As such,

per Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, <f[^ 28-29, the trial court's mling on the motion is void, and we must

vacate the ruling and dismiss the motion. Correspondingly, because plaintiff failed to file a

notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the trial court's final judgment, we lack

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. 111. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(l) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015); see

Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ^ 28-29.

^16 Plaintiff labeled his January 5, 2017, motion as a nuncpro tune request. A trial court

loses jurisdiction to review the substance of its final judgment after 30 days, but if there is proper

evidence of a clerical error, the court may use a nuncpro tune order at any time to correct the

' Local rule 22.01(K)(3) states: "The transmission date and time of transfer shall govern

the electronic file mark. Pleadings received by the clerk before midnight on a day the courthouse

is open shall be deemed filed that day." 17th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 22.01(K)(3) (July 25, 2016).

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff uploaded his motion to reconsider into the court's electronic

filing system after midnight, so it was file-stamped January 4, 2017.

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2018ILApp(2d) 170368

mistake. Jayko v. Fraczek, 2012 IL App (1st) 103665, ^29. Stated differently, nunc pro tune

orders incorporate into the record judicial actions taken by the court that were inadvertently

omitted due to a clerical error. People v. Melchor, 226 111. 2d 24, 32 (2007). However, such a

correction must be based on a note, memorandum, or paper remaining in the court record, and it

cannot rest on a recollection of an individual or on a new affidavit or testimony. Jqyko, 2012 IL

App (1st) 103665, ^ 29. Here, plaintiff did not seek to correct a clerical error in the trial court's

judgment, and the evidence he sought to rely on surrounding the filing date of his motion to

reconsider came from outside of the established court record. Accordingly, plaintiffs January 5,

2017, motion could not be resolved on a nuncpro tune basis.

^ 17 In conjunction with his arguments on appeal, plaintiff cites the Illinois Supreme Court's

Electronic Filing Standards and Principles (Filing Standards). Illinois Supreme Court, Electronic

Filing Standards and Principles (amended Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/

SupremeCourt/Policies/Pdf/Electronic_Filing_Standards.pdf. Local court rule 22.01 (A) also

references the Filing Standards, in that the rule states that "[e]lectronic filing shall operate

pursuant to the Electronic Filing Standards and Principles set out in the Supreme Court Order

[M.R. 18368 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013)]." (Emphasis in original.) 17th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 22.01(A)

(July 25, 2016). Illinois Supreme Court order M.R. 18368 authorized Illinois circuit courts to

accept the electronic filing of documents in civil cases. See id.; 111. S. Ct., M.R. 18368 (eff. Jan.

1, 2013). The order further approved the Filing Standards "to maintain uniformity of electronic

filing practices and procedures" throughout the state. 111. S. Ct., M.R. 18368 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013).

In 2016, the supreme court mandated e-filing in civil cases in Illinois circuit courts beginning

January 1, 2018. 111. S. Ct, M.R. 18368 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) (filed Jan. 22, 2016). The supreme

court additionally stated that "[i]n all Circuit Courts operating an approved local e-filing program

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2018 ILApp(2d) 170368

by the filing date of this Order, e-filing of civil cases shall occur per the applicable policies,

guidelines and/or standards authorized by the Supreme Court." Id.

^ 18 Plaintiff highlights section 10 of the Filing Standards, which is titled "Failure of

Electronic Filing Process." It states, as relevant here:

"If a document submitted electronically is not filed or is rejected, the court may,

upon good cause shown, enter an order permitting the document to be filed effective as of

the date of the attempted first filing.''1 (Emphasis added.) Illinois Supreme Court,

Electronic Filing Standards and Principles § 10(b) (amend. Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.

illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/Policies/Pdf/Electronic_Filing_Standards.pdf.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 9(d)(l) (eff. Dec. 13, 2017), although not in effect when plaintiff

filed his motion to reconsider, also merits consideration. The rule applies to electronic filings

and states: "If a document is untimely due to any court-approved electronic filing system

technical failure, the filing party may seek appropriate relief from the court, upon good cause

shown." Id.

119 We recognize that section 10 and Rule 9(d)(l) do not explicitly limit the time in which

the court may enter an order backdating a document. Read in isolation, they would appear to

allow consideration of plaintiffs January 5, 2017, motion. However, we cannot read those

general provisions to apply here over the specific jurisdictional deadlines in section 2-1203(a)

and Rule 303(a)(l). See In re Marriage of Adler, 271 111. App. 3d 469, 476 (1995) (specific.

provision applies over general). In any event, supreme court rules that give a court authority to

take specific actions presuppose that the court has jurisdiction of the case.

^ 20 For example. Rule 183, which plaintiff also cites, states:

"The court, for good cause shown on motion after notice to the opposite party,

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2018 ILApp(2d) 170368

may extend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is required by

the rules to be done within a limited period, either before or after the expiration of the

time." 111. S. Ct. R. 183 (eff. Feb. 16, 2011).

Like section 10 and Rule 9(d)(l), Rule 183 suggests that the trial court may grant an extension at

any time. Yet, in In re Marriage ofSingel, 373 111. App. 3d 554 (2007), we did not apply it to

facts similar to those here. In Singel, the respondent failed to file a motion directed against the

judgment within the 30-day time limit of section 2-1203(a). Instead he filed, on the thirtieth day,

a motion for an extension of time to file such a motion. The trial court thereafter mled that,

because the respondent had not filed such a motion during the 30-day period, it had lost

jurisdiction. On appeal, the respondent argued that Rule 183 allowed the trial court to grant an

extension of time to file the motion, even after the 30-day deadline. Id. at 556. We disagreed.

We observed that "[b]y its plain terms, the rule applies only to the time limits for pleadings and

to time limits that have been set by the supreme court mles," and not to the deadline in section 2-

1203(a). Id. at 556-57. However, we also held that, even if Rule 183 applied to that deadline,

the trial court could have extended it only within the 30 days. Id. at 556 (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-

1203(a) (West 2004)). Because the respondent did not file a motion directed against the

judgment (or obtain an extension to do so) within the 30 days, the trial court lost jurisdiction, and

we lacked jurisdiction of the respondent's appeal. Id. at 556-57.

Tf 21 Here, plaintiff likewise failed to file a motion to reconsider (or obtain an extension to do

so) within 30 days as section 2-1203(a) mandates. Although section 10 and Rule 9(d)(l), like

\::'.

•/-

Indeed, if Rule 183 applied to jurisdictional deadlines as its unlimited language seems

to suggest, it would allow a trial court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal after the

deadline set by Rule 303(a)(l). Yet, as noted above, the trial court has no power to do so.

-8-

2018 ILApp(2d) 170368

Rule 183, purport to allow the trial court to backdate at any time, the lapse of the 30 days

divested the court of jurisdiction to do so.

Tf22 Rule 9(d)(l) also cannot apply in a situation such as this one3 because it pertains to an

"electronic filing system technical failure." 111. S. Ct. R. 9(d)(l) (eff. Dec. 13, 2017). Although

Rule 9 does not define "technical failure," the Manual defines it as "a malfunction of the e-filing

provider's or the Court's hardware, software, and or telecommunications facility which results in

the inability of a registered user to submit a document electronically. It does not include the

failure of a user's equipment." 111. S. Ct., M.R. 18368, § 2(h) (eff. Feb. 3, 2014). Here, plaintiff

concedes that his January 5, 2017, motion was not predicated upon a technical problem in the e-

filing system but rather "user error" and/or other "technical problems experienced by the filer."

See 17th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 22.01(N)(2) (July 25, 2016).

^ 23 We recognize that the County did not assert that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of

plaintiffs January 5, 2017, motion, which leads to the question of whether the revestment

doctrine applies. The revestenent doctrine causes the trial court to regain jurisdiction of a case

even after 30 days have passed following the entry of a final judgment if both parties actively

participate, without objection, in proceedings that are inconsistent with the merits of the prior

judgment. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ^8. If a party opposes setting aside the prior

judgment, jurisdiction will not be revested, even if the party does not raise a timeliness objection.

Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ^ 25-26. In this case, the County opposed plaintiffs January 5, 2017,

motion. Accordingly, the parties' actions did not revest the trial court with jurisdiction.

.' ;'' -

We reiterate that Rule 9 was not in effect during the events at issue here. However, if

we had determined that it could apply to a situation such as plaintiffs, we would then consider

whether it could be applied retroactively.

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2018ILApp(2d) 170368

Tf 24 We acknowledge that the outcome in this case might appear harsh, as plaintiff has lost

both his chance to have the trial court reconsider its grant of summary judgment in favor of the

County and his chance to have this court review that ruling. However, plaintiffs attorney had 30

days in which to file a motion to reconsider and could even have obtained an extension during

those 30 days. He instead waited until less than two minutes before the deadline to attempt to

electronically file the motion and unfortunately was unable to upload the motion within that

time. As that deadline was jurisdictional, the trial court lacked authority to consider the untimely

motion to reconsider and plaintiffs subsequent request to backdate that motion. Plaintiffs

notice of appeal was correspondingly untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of

this case.

Tf 25 We do note that, once the 30-day deadline for posttrial motions in the trial court had

passed, along with the deadline to file a regular notice of appeal, plaintiff was not entirely

without recourse. He still had another 30 days to move this court for leave to file a late notice of

appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(d) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015), but he did not take

advantage of that potential avenue for relief. Still, even now, plaintiff has not completely run out

of options, as he may request supervisory or other relief from the supreme court.

Tl 26 III. CONCLUSION

^27 For the reasons stated, we vacate the April 20, 2017, order of the Winnebago County

circuit court and dismiss plaintiffs January 5, 2017, motion.

^ 28 Order vacated; motion dismissed.

-10-

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