appeasement and the road to war 1933-1939 7. abyssinian crisis

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Appeasement and the Road to War 1933- 1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

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Page 1: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

Appeasement and the Road to War1933-1939

7. Abyssinian Crisis

Page 2: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

What you need to know:

Why Italy wanted to invade AbyssiniaWhat action the League took?What was Britain and France’s reaction to

the incident?What the consequences of the Abyssinian

crisis were.

Page 3: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis
Page 4: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

The Wal Wal IncidentIn December 1934 a group of Abyssinian and Italian

soldiers clashed at the Wal Wal water hole in the Abyssinian desert.

Mussolini demanded compensation for the death of 32 Italian soldiers and also that Abyssinian troops salute the Italian flag at Wal Wal knowing full well that such a proud people would never accept this.

To resolve the issue the Abyssinian Emperor, Haile Selassie turned to the League of Nations to arbitrate.

However, despite League arbitration Mussolini invaded on 3rd October 1935.

Page 5: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

Use Cameron textbook page 20 -

1. Why would Mussolini want to invade Abyssinia?

2. What date did Italy invade?

3. What was the League’s reaction to the invasion?

4. What was the Hoare-Laval Pact?

5. What was the reaction to this Pact?

Page 6: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

Italy lacked a large colonial empire, the

outward sign of great power

At Adowa in 1896 the

Abyssinians defeated the

Italians

Why did Mussolini invade Abyssinia?

Broken Promises

Revenge

Empire

Self-respect

Mussolini had sworn to

restore the glories of the

Roman Empire

“Italy received but a few crumbs from the rich

colonial booty”

Distract public

attention from

problems in the

economy

A place for Italy’s surplus

population

Possibly a good market

for Italian goods

“A day in the battlefield is

worth a thousand years of peace”

Page 7: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

The failure of sanctionsLimited sanction imposed by League on 7th October

- all loans to Italy forbidden- sale of war materials stopped- ban on importing goods from Italy

Succeeded in damaging Italian economy leading to devaluation of lira, but not enough to force Mussolini to seek peace.

Extension of sanctions to include oil would, by Mussolini’s admission, have had more serious effect and may have succeeded in ending the war. Neither Britain nor especially France were willing to consider this. Issue discussed in February 1936, but no decision taken

Page 8: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

Factors influencing British and French response

Some action had be taken because:• Italian invasion was clearly unprovoked and in violation of the League Covenant.

Immediately condemned by League of Nations.• British public opinion, as seen in the Peace Ballot of June 1935, overwhelmingly

favoured the use of economic sanctions.However, both Britain and France were reluctant to take strong action because:• Neither country had any liking for Abyssinia and saw their relationship with Italy as

more important.• They did not want to antagonise Mussolini and risk him becoming closer to fellow

fascist, Hitler.• They were concerned about German rearmament and wished to preserve the

recently established “Stresa Front” (April 1935)• Military action against Mussolini would have overstretched British military resources,

given her imperial commitments.

Note: Evidence of this desire to accommodate and appease Mussolini had already been seen in the months before the invasion (See above) and is clearly shown in the limited nature of sanctions and in the Hoare-Laval Pact (below).

Page 9: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

Hoare-Laval Pact1. Details

Plan devised by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary and Pierre Laval, French Prime Minister

It suggested::the handover of some 60,000 sq miles of Abyssinia to Italy (the province of Tigre and the Ogaden desert): extensive economic rights for Italy over the bulk of southern Abyssinia:a small area of Italian territory to go to Abyssinia to give them access to the sea

2. Reaction to PactIt provoked an outcry in both Britain and France. Public opinion saw it as rewarding an aggressor and as going against the spirit of the League and collective security.

3. Defence of PactAccording to Hoare, a negotiated settlement was the only realistic option as the ideas of extending economic sanctions or of taking military sanctions, were both unacceptable. To have any chance of success, such a settlement would require substantial concessions to Italy.

Page 10: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

End of War

In May 1936 the Italian conquest was complete.

In July 1936 the League lifted sanctions. They had earlier refused to consider the non-recognition of Mussolini’s control.

Page 11: Appeasement and the Road to War 1933-1939 7. Abyssinian Crisis

European repercussions of the crisis

League of Nations weakened by half-hearted use of sanctions and Hoare-Laval Pact. Played no real part in any future dispute.

A fascist power had successfully followed an aggressive foreign policy with little done by the democratic powers to stop it.

The Stresa Front collapsed.The hope of keeping Mussolini away from Hitler

had failed. The Rome-Berlin Axis agreement was signed in October 1936