asia policy, number 13 ( january 2012 ) , 13365

http://asiapolicy.nbr.org

Incompatible Partners: The Role of Identity and Self-Image in the Sino-U.S. RelationshipLyle J. Morris

lyle j. morris is a Research Assistant at the RAND Corporation. In 201011,he was a Next Generation Fellow at The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). He can be reached at .

The author is greatly indebted to Robert G. Sutter, Andrew L. Oros, Andrew Scobell, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts.

note

keywords: china; identity; nationalism; international relations

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executive summaryThis article examines identity as an underexplored factor complicating U.S.China relations and concludes that the identity variable contributes to mutual suspicion and frustrates efforts in conflict resolution.

main argumentMany scholars and pundits have concluded that the noticeable downturn in U.S.-China relations in 2010 was merely an intermittent low in the broader high-low dynamic that characterizes the relationship. This article argues that recent tensions can also be understood as part of larger, macro-level suspicions stemming from the disparate identities that pervade bilateral relations. Analyzing the historical processes that have helped shape these identities and using four case studies to illustrate this phenomenon in action, this article argues that China and the U.S. have produced incompatible selfimages, which, when interfaced, work at cross-purposes with each other. These dueling identities, if unmanaged, have the capacity to undermine cooperative relations in the long term. However, both countries could mitigate the identity variable by acknowledging the historical and cultural barriers precluding greater cooperation, as well as by utilizing multilateral mechanisms to address issues of common interest.

policy implications Policymakersonbothsidesunderappreciatehowmuchtheidentityfactor militates against long-term, healthy relations between the U.S. and China. ChinaplaysupitsvictimidentityduringtimesofconflictwiththeU.S.to seek leverage and legitimacy, which increases the likelihood of prolonged tension and misinterpretation. FutureeventsinEastAsiaandbeyondhaveahighlikelihoodofarousing reactions related to the identities of the U.S. and China, which could frustrate efforts in conflict resolution. Multilateralplatforms,suchastheUNandtheASEANRegionalForum, offer promise for diffusing identity tensions in the pursuit of cooperation on issues of common concern. U.S.policymakersshouldunderstandthatChinasstrongrhetoricisoften meant to assuage an increasingly nationalistic and hawkish domestic audience rather than as a signal of conflict escalation directed at the U.S.

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More than half a century since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China, it is still widely believed among Chinas political elites that the United States, joined by other hostile external forces, is intent on efforts to conquer, divide, destabilize, and demonize China.1 Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University

T

wo major incidents in 2010 soured relations and increased mutual consternationbetweenthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)andthe United States: joint naval exercises between the United States and the Republic ofKorea(ROK)offtheKoreanPeninsulafollowingthesinkingoftheCheonan andSecretaryofStateHillaryClintonsspeechattheASEANRegionalForum (ARF)affirmingU.S.nationalinterestinthepeacefulresolutionofterritorial disputes in the South China Sea. Both events, albeit for different reasons, elicited strong negative reactions from Beijing, further aggravating a relationship already struggling to find areas of mutual interest. Some scholars and pundits attributed this discord to the ups and downs of a complex relationship characterized by varying degrees of cooperation and conflict.2 However, such an explanation only highlights the manifestations, not the drivers, of increasing tension. This article explores identity and self-image in the Sino-U.S. relationship as underexamined factors that help provide context for understanding why both countries continue to view each other with suspicion. China and the United States have, over time, created and burnished fundamentally distinct identities for themselves, which, when interfaced, work at cross-purposes with each other. China has built what I call a repressed victim3 identity, perceiving the West, and more specifically the United States, as treating China unfairly and seeking to contain it. Beijing fears U.S. manipulation in international strategic terms, exploitation in economic terms, and subversion in political and ideological termsandfrequentlydrawsparallelsbetweenU.S.hegemonicactionandChinas1 Wang Jisi, China-U.S. Relations at a Crossroads, in China-United States Sustained Dialogue:

19862001,ed.ZhaoMeiandMaxineThomas(Dayton:KetteringFoundationandtheInstituteof AmericanStudies,2001). aboutNothing,CouncilonForeignRelations,AsiaUnboundblog,February2,2010,http://blogs. cfr.org/asia/2010/02/02/the-u-s-and-china-have-at-it-again/;U.S.MovestoCounterChinas Growing Assertiveness, Arizona Daily Star,October26,2010;WilliamIde,Analysts:China Growing Increasingly Assertive Along its Coast, Voice of America,September24,2010;and MichaelWines,BehindaMilitaryChill:AMoreForcefulChina,New York Times, June 8, 2010. out how negative images of humiliation and victimization in China also coexist with positive images of its rapid economic growth and five thousand years of civilization, forming a positivenegative identity dilemma. See William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2010).OthersassertthatChinahasoutgrownitsvictimcomplex.See Bates Gill, Rising Star: Chinas New Security Diplomacy(Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitution Press,2007).

2 Forexample,seeElizabethEconomy,TheU.S.andChinaHaveatItAgain;butItsMuchAdo

3 ThisisnottoprecludeotherinterpretationsofChinasidentity.Forexample,scholarshavepointed

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centuryofhumiliation(18421949)tojustifythisnarrative.Attimes,sucha perception can breed a conspiratorial view, which predisposes Beijing to see ill intentions behind U.S. policy toward China. China has chosen to perpetuate this identity in apparent contradiction with its successful emergence as a powerful, prosperous nation. It also accentuates this victim identity during times of conflict with the United States to seek leverage and legitimacy. This adds a level of complexity to U.S. negotiating tactics that increases the likelihood of prolonged tension and misinterpretation. Alternatively, the United States has created what I call a global protector identity, seeing its role in the world as necessary for maintaining global peace and prosperity. This is an image forged out of the ruins of World War II, when the United States performed the role of security guarantor in many parts of Asia andEurope.FromtheU.S.perspective,thisroleisderivedfromandinspired by a unique responsibility in the world to actively maintain and promote the Westernliberaleconomicorder(maintenanceoffreetradeandunimpeded accesstoshippinglanes)anddemocraticpeace(allowingopen,democratic societiestoexistfreefromcoercionandbelligerence).Thisidentityisreflected in U.S. interventionist behavior abroad and the continued sustenance of bilateral and multilateral security alliances. These two identities work in subtle but influential ways to produce actions and reactions that hinder the development of positive bilateral relations. The contours of these identity structures are not fully appreciated by policymakers in eithercountryandareoftenmisinterpretedasaggressiveorantagonisticstances towardeachother.Examiningidentityandperceptioncanhelpilluminatehow the actions of states are perceived fundamentally differently by other states, depending on the prism through which the intent of those actions is discerned. Historically, there has been a marked inability of the United States and China to appropriately gauge their identities and understand the ways in which they produceunintendedconflict.Eachcountrytendstofallintoapatternoffiltering theothersactionsthroughitsownframeworkofunderstanding.Thisoften opens expectation gaps, breeds misunderstanding and mistrust, and in some cases leads to conflict. Calling attention to the role of identity in the U.S.-China relationship does not require discounting other equally important factors that contribute to mutual mistrust, such as divergent national interests or power transition dynamics. Scholars and policymakers involved in the study of U.S.-China relations have offered important analytic models that help us better understand

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this multilayered and complex relationship.4 The goal of this article is to examine identity as an underappreciated element that complicates the abilities of Chinese and U.S. decisionmakers to resolve differences when tension arises. Specialists, policymakers, and students of U.S.-China relations need to take into account howincongruentidentitiesaddtothepolicydifficultiesthetwosidesfaceas they deal with a wide range of issues. Any attempt to analyze identity in international politics is admittedly fraught with analytical challenges. The term itself can encompass a wide variety of disparate indicators such as culture, beliefs, civilization, ideology, andemotions,alleasilycloakedinmonolithicterms.Forthepurposesof this analysis, therefore, state identity is defined as a set of broadly accepted representations of a countrys cultural and societal beliefs about its own orientation in the international political arena, as manifested by the rhetoric of officialpolicy,academia,andpopularculture.Thisinteractiveviewnecessitates exploring not only the rhetoric of political elites but also reaction from a broad swath of the public, including commentary from scholars in the press, public opinionpolls,andpostsbynetizensinInternetchatrooms.Theseunofficial voicesareusefulinilluminatingtheemotionalfactorsatplaybehindtheofficial rhetoric from policy elites and commentators in the media. In this regard, it is important to point out that while this analysis attempts to highlight an important analytic strand in the identity structures of the United States and China, it does not seek to discount the identity constructs and interpretations suggested by other scholars.5 Thearticleisbrokenintofourparts.First,itprovidesabriefoverviewof the literature on identity in international relations. Second, it analyzes how historical, cultural, and political factors have shaped the self-images of the

4 Forexample,seeDavidM.Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations

19892000(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2002);AaronFriedberg,TheFutureof US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International Security30,no.2(2005);Thomas Christensen,FosteringStabilityorCreatingaMonster?TheRiseofChinaandU.S.Policytoward EastAsia,International Security31,no.1(2006);RobertG.Sutter,U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present(Lanham:Rowman&Littlefield,2010);YanXuetong,TheInstabilityof ChinaU.S.Relations,Chinese Journal of International Politics3,no.3(2010):26392;andAaron Friedberg,A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia(New York:W.W.Norton,2011).Formoreonpowertransitiontheory,seeRobertGilpin,War and Change in World Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983);andJohnJ.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2003). (Westport:Praeger,1992);PeterHaysGries,SocialPsychologyandtheIdentity-ConflictDebate: IsaChinaThreatInevitable?European Journal of International Relations11,no.2(2005);Rex Li,A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse(New York:Routledge,2009),17190;andPeterHaysGries,QingminZhang,H.MichaelCrowson,and HuajianCai,Patriotism,NationalismandChinasU.S.Policy:StructuresandConsequencesof ChineseNationalIdentity,China Quarterly205(2011):117.

5 See, for example, Jie Chen, Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy

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United States and China. Third, it provides four case studies that illustrate theinterplayofthesetwoidentitiesinpractice:the1999U.S.bombingofthe ChineseEmbassyinBelgrade,the2010U.S.nationalinterestpolicystatement ontheSouthChinaSea,the2010U.S.-ROKjointnavalexercisesinresponse to the Cheonan sinking,andU.S.-Chinesecooperationin2009onUNSecurity Council(UNSC)Resolution1874.Finally,thearticleconcludesbyanalyzing what these case studies tell us about the future of U.S.-China relations.

state identity in international relationsState identity can be broken down into two dimensions: the internal dimension, which refers to the representations of the beliefs held by elites and thegeneralpublicwithinthestateitself;andtheexternaldimension,whichare the representations of and beliefs about that state among the elites and publics in other states.6 This article will focus primarily on the internal dimension that is, on how China and the United States understand their own places in the international sphere and the factors that have led to those understandingsand argues that major historical events have been catalysts for shaping the internal characterofbothcountries.TheworldtheUnitedStatesinheritedafterWorld War II was crucial in shaping its identity, just as the century of humiliation has continued to produce lasting negative effects on the Chinese psyche and state. By itself, identity cannot act as a causal determinant of state interest and policies. It always requires interpretation and linkage to particular actions. Onlythroughthebroadlyunderstoodprocessofstateidentitypoliticscan identity shape the articulation of interests and actual policies.7 The term state identity politics refers to various attempts by state representatives and other political actors to reinforce, weaken, or redefine the current representations of the state and the beliefs about appropriate behavior in order to influence the statesforeignpolicyoritsrelationswithotherstates.Aswillbeilluminated in the case studies, policymakers from the United States and China frequently use state identity politics to legitimize their actions, which tends to increase tensions during times of bilateral conflict.

6 Formoreonthisinternal-externaldimensionofstateidentity,seeWilliamBloom,Personal

Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 9(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993). Relations: A Theoretical Analysis, Journal of International Development and Cooperation 10, no. 1 (2003):3346.

7 This discussion draws from Maxym Alexandrov, The Concept of State Identity in International

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Slightly reframed then, state identity, especially as it relates to the interpretationofhistoryandculture,affectseverycountrysinteractionswith otherstates.Astatesidentitynotonlybequeathssomeofthesubstantiveissues on its foreign policy agenda but also affects foreign policy decisionmaking when leaders draw from past experience or invoke analogical reasoning that places a countryscurrentcircumstanceswithinabroaderculturalandhistoricalcontext. Scholars have recently started examining how intangible cultural and ideational factors affect tangible foreign policy decisions. Historians such as Akira Iriye practice a cultural approach to diplomatic history that recognizes that nations, like individualsdevelop visions, dreams and prejudices about themselves and the world that shape their interactions.8 International relations(IR)theoryhasseenparalleldevelopments,withscholarsemploying constructivist notions of perception and image to explain cooperation and conflict in the international arena.9 Robert Scalapino points out how national identity has become a focus not so much on the state itself but rather on the way in which people, and especially policy-making elite[s], perceive the essence of their nation in relation to others, which becomes the psychological foundation for the role and behavior patterns of a country in the international arena.10 Such a focus on images and identity in IR studies offers a new approach for examining the origins of conflict and cooperation in the global system. While intangiblefactorssuchasthethoughtsandfeelingsofacountrysleadersor citizensaredifficulttodecipherempirically,manytheoristsarebeginning

8 Akira Iriye, Culture, Journal of American History77,no.1(1990):100101;MartinSampson,

CulturalInfluencesonForeignPolicy,inNew Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, ed. Charles Hermann(Boston:Allen&Unwin,1987),38687;WangJisi,InternationalRelationsTheoryand theStudyofChineseForeignPolicy:AChinesePerspective,inChinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,ed.ThomasRobinsonandDavidShambaugh(NewYork:ClarendonPress,1998),501. Robert Jervis argued that logic and image had tangible impacts on foreign policy decisions. In a regional focus, David Shambaugh looked at image structures and perception gaps in the U.S.Chinarelationship.OthershaveusedsimilarmethodstolookatChinasrelationswiththeSoviet Union and Japan. See, for example, Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India(NewYork:JohnDay,1958),28;RobertJervis,Perception and Misperception in International Politics(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976);DavidShambaugh,Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 19721990(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991); Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 19781985(Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,1987);andAllenS.Whiting,China Eyes Japan(Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia Press,1989).Forasystemicapproachtoidentityininternationalpolitics,seeBloom,Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations;JillKrauseandNeilRenwick,eds.,Identities in International Relations(NewYork:St.Martins,1996);andRodneyHall,National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1999).

9 Harold Isaac looked at perceptions and how images get cranked into the process of policymaking.

10 RobertScalapino,ChinasMultipleIdentitiesinEastAsia:ChinaasaRegionalForce,inChinas

Quest for a National Identity,ed.LowellDittmerandSamuelKim(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1993),215.

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to examine how emotions, history, and culture mix together and influence a countrysforeignpolicydecisionsinsubtlebutimportantways.11 Identities are not formed simply in a vacuum, however. In addition to states forming distinct internal identities, they also develop perceptions about their national identity through a complex web of interactions with other states and the international system. Based on their perceptions of how other states view them,statesthenrecalibratetheirownviewsofself.MichaelNg-Quinnargues thatwhileastatesidentityiscollectivelyconstructedbyitsmembers,itis alsoafunctionofthestateschanginginteractionwithotherstates.Therefore, discrepancies between internal and external expectations and realities may cause identity confusion and incongruent policies.12 Similarly, Samuel Kim remarks that a state actor in the international system understands other states basedontheidentityitascribestothem,anditoftenrespondsaccordingly.13 Thus, to understand how actors in international relations are perceived, it is important to examine not only the self-image that an actor has fashioned for itself, but also how the perceiver, or external actor, apprehends that image. In the U.S.-China context, both self-perceptions and external perceptions continuetoshapeeachcountrysexpectationsfortheother,whichguidethe interpretation of actions and intentions.

china: the repressed victimTo the international community, China is a superpower. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has acceded to the World Trade Organization,andhostedthe2008SummerOlympicGamestogreatfanfareand success. It has a modern military that is becoming capable of asserting power beyond its borders. It has overseen a period of economic growth unprecedented in modern history, sustaining annual GDP growth rates of 8%10% for

11 Peter Katzenstein argues that issues dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming

more salient in consideration of national security issues. Similarly, Masaru Tamamoto highlights his sense of culture and identity having more salient and obvious factors in shaping the history of international relations than given credit. See Peter Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative PerspectivesonNationalSecurity,inThe Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,ed.PeterKatzenstein(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),2;andMasaru Tamamoto, Ambiguous Japan, in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. John IkenberryandMichaelMastanduno(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2003),193. Dittmer and Kim, Chinas Quest for National Identity,3233.

12 MichaelNg-Quinn,NationalIdentityandPremodernChina:FormationandRoleEnactment,in 13 SamuelS.Kim,NortheastAsiaintheLocal-Regional-GlobalNexus:MultipleChallengesand

ContendingExplanations,inThe International Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham:Rowman&Littlefield,2003),41.

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over three decades and surpassing Japan as the second-largest economy in the world.14 Yetbeneaththissuccessexistsanegativeinternalidentitythatpersiststo this day, grounded in feelings of disrespect and victimization at the hands of Western nations and Japan. This victim narrative has been actively nurtured bytheChineseCommunistParty(CCP).Duringconflictswithotherstates, in particular the United States, the CCP frequently gives significant latitude to nationalist protests highly tinged with a victim mentality to bolster Chinese legitimacy and moral righteousness. ThekeytounderstandingthepersistenceofChinasvictimidentitycan be traced back to its experience during the century of humiliation, when it suffered defeat and loss of territory at the hands of Western powers and Japan. TheseeventsdeeplyscarredChinasnationalself-perceptionandshattered the preexisting Chinese view of the world, precipitating what psychologist Vamik Volkan describes as the struggle of the indomitable Chinese people against imperialism and a tragic history of suffering, beatings, and extraordinary humiliations.15 The current CCP leadership takes pains to remind the Chinese citizenry that the century of humiliation should be remembered as an important and painful lesson of how Western powers, particularly the United States, have treated China in the past. The China we see today is a vastly changed nationpowerful, prosperous, andhugelyinfluentialinglobalpolitics.YetitstillviewstheWestandthe UnitedStateswithsuspicion.Fourfactorshelpexplaintheenduranceofsuch suspicion.First,inthepostColdWarerathemajorpowersoftheinternational system, confident of their liberal democratic identities and their political and social achievements, have increasingly labeled China as the last bastion of Communism standing against liberal democracy and democratization. China is thus defined as the other.16Second,Chinaspoorrecordonhumanrightshas provokedfrequentcriticismofthecountryslegitimacyasaresponsiblepower by the Western powers that continue to dominate the international system and set its normative agendas.17 Third, the rise of Chinese economic and military

14 DavidBarboza,ChinaPassesJapanasSecondLargestEconomy,New York Times,August15,2010. 15 Peter Hays Gries, Chinas New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy(Berkeley:Universityof

CaliforniaPress,2004),50.

16 FrancisFukuyama,TheEndofHistory?National Interest16(Summer1989):318;andYongjin 17 JackDonnelly,HumanRights:ANewStandardofCivilization?International Affairs 74, no.1

Zhang,ProblematizingChinasSecurity:SociologicalInsights,Pacifica Review13,no.3(2001):252. (1998):124;GerritW.Gong,The Standard of Civilization in International Society(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1984);andIanClark,Legitimacy in International Society(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2005).

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power has sparked fear among a number of Western observers, resulting in theChinathreatthesis.Fourth,theCCPspatrioticeducationcampaign, initiatedintheearly1990s,continuestohighlightChinastraumaticexperiences at the hands of the West and Japan as a means of legitimizing CCP rule.18 China was and still is seen by many scholars and pundits as a revisionist power bent on altering the Western-centric status quo of the international system and reluctant to conform to its norms.19 To these observers, this latter point is demonstrated by Chinas numerous political disputes with other members of the international community, such as its maritime and border disputes with countries in Southeast Asia, its sometimes bellicose reaction to U.S. presence in the South China Sea, and its threat to use force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. Conversely, the China threat thesis has created a strong sense among Chinese elites that the PRC is being unjustly treated within the international system.20 Many believe that the proponents of the thesis are in fact unwilling toseeanindependent,powerful,prosperousChinastandproudlyintheEast,21 andthatChinaisbeingtargetedbecauseWesternersoftensubconsciously judge whether a nation is a friend or enemy by its racial or cultural attributes and national power, just as they did in the nineteenth century, when they unfairly humiliated China based on racial and civilizational characteristics.22 Chinese policymakers still remember a time in the not-too-distant past when China was alienated from key members of the international system, in many cases as a direct result of efforts and actions by the United States. The perceived18 ZhengWang,NationalHumiliation,HistoryEducation,andthePoliticsofHistoricalMemory: 19 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, China I: The Coming Conflict with America, Foreign

PatrioticEducationCampaigninChina,International Studies Quarterly52,no.4.(2008):783806. Affairs76,no.2(1997):1832;SamuelP.Huntington,TheClashofCivilizations?Foreign Affairs 72,no.3(1993):2249;Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics;DanBlumenthal,Not SoReassuring,AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,CenterforDefenseStudies,weblog,September 25,2009,http://www.defensestudies.org/cds/steinberg-in-china-not-so-reassuring/;andHugh White,ChinaandtheStatusQuo,Interpreter,LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,weblog, January28,2010,http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/01/28/China-and-the-status-quo.aspx. andWesternpolicymakersisunimportant.Themereexistenceofsuchsentimentissufficientfor Chinese citizens and leaders to harbor strong suspicions toward the intentions of Western and U.S. policiestowardChina.FormoreonChinesereactions,seeLiuJinghua,Ershiyishijiershi-sanshi niandai zhongguo jueqi ji waijiao zhanlue xuanze [Diplomatic Strategic Alternatives for a Rising China in 2020 to 2030], Zhanlue yu guanli3(1994):11920;andYongjinZhang,Problematizing ChinasSecurity:SociologicalInsights,Pacific Review13,no.3(2001):247. to Rest], Qiushi3(1996):20.SeealsoZiShuiandXiaoShi,Jingti Riben diguo zhuyi [Beware of JapaneseMilitarism](Beijing:Jinchengchubanshe,1997),28689. Zhongguoweixielun,20;andZhengYongnian,Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999):9697.

20 How widespread or marginal these China threat sentiments were and continue to be among U.S.

21 XingShizhong,Zhongguoweixielunkeyixiuyi[TheChinaThreatTheoryCanBeLaid

22 ShiYinhong,WhyAgainstChina?Beijing Review,October21,1996,11.SeealsoXing,

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grievancesincludepreventingthePRCsterritorialunificationwithTaiwan, creating threatening military alliances with some of Chinas neighbors, obstructingBeijingsestablishmentofdiplomaticrelationswithanumberof states, imposing a strict trading embargo upon the country, and organizing a coalitionthatsoughttodenyittheChinaseatintheUnitedNationsuntil1971. ChinaspoliticalisolationfollowingtheTiananmenSquareincidentserved to strengthen popular Chinese perceptions that the country continues to be persecutedbythegreatpowersoftheinternationalsystem.DengXiaoping noted the following in November 1989, when China faced international condemnation and sanctions for its brutal suppression of the demonstrations:I am Chinese, and understand the history of foreign invasions of China. When I heard that sanctions against China had been decided at the G-7 summit, I immediately thought of the time when theEight-NationAlliance[senttosuppresstheBoxerRebellion] invadedChinain1900.WiththeexceptionofCanada,allthe countries [in the G-7], with the addition of Tsarist Russia, were members of the Alliance.23

By using the historical analogy of the century of humiliation to contextualize theinternationalsituationthatChinafacedin1989,Dengsinterpretation implies that China continues to suffer from the interference of Western powers in its internal affairs, just as it had one hundred years ago, and in this sense he contributestostrengtheningChinassenseofvictimhood.24 During a speech at thesixthplenarysessionoftheseventeenthCPCCentralCommitteeinOctober 2011, President Hu Jintao evoked a similar historical narrative when he warned CCP members to see clearly that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration,25 The 2008 riots in Tibet offer a more recent example of perceptions among Chinese citizens of alienation from the international system and mistreatment by the U.S. media, which many Chinese believe represents the sentiments of the U.S. government. U.S. reporting on the event galvanized the Chinese populace into linking foreign criticism with Western and U.S. intentions to split China apart. Many in China perceived an orchestrated Western smear campaign to delegitimizeandhumiliateBeijingbeforethe2008SummerOlympicGames,23 DengXiaoping,Deng Xiaoping wenxuan[SelectedWorksofDengXiaoping],vol.3(Beijing:

Renminchubanshe,1993),358.

24 YuenFoongKhong,Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of

1965(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992),20.

25 EdwardWong,ChinasPresidentLashesOutatWesternCulture,New York Times, January 3,

2012.ThefulltextofthespeechinChineseisavailableathttp://www.qstheory.cn/zywz/201201/ t20120101_133218.htm.

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believing that such treatment fit squarely in a long historical narrative of WesterncountriesinterferinginChinassovereigntyandfrustratingChinas efforts in becoming a great power.26 China resists such criticism by attempting to regain the moral high ground, and its victim identity plays a critical role in this effort. The term victim denotesthattheinternationalsystemsactionstowardChinaareunjustand thereby creates a narrative that the country is undeserving of such treatment. Consequently, the Chinese state is depicted as a principled, moral actor in international politics. Many Chinese commentators argue that China has always upheld values such as peace, justice, and harmony in international relations and that any dissenting interpretation represents an attempt to make China out as an enemy.27 In referring to this illustrious dynastic heritage, Chinese policymakers maintain that China was never a hegemonic ruler that relied on forceorcoercion(qiang po)butratherwasagreatpowerthatattractedother countries by virtue of its economic wealth, superior culture, and benevolent moralrule(wang dao).28 Finally,thereisapowerfullinkagebetweenChinasidentityasavictimand its historical experience with territorial loss and intrusion. Under contemporary discursiveconceptionsofstatehood,sovereigntyisatthecoreofanations identity.Itisthegaugeandemblemofanationsfreedom.29 Thus, not only is the establishment of a sovereign state essential for a people to retain material controlofitshomeland,butsovereigntyisalsoasymbolofapeoplesability to resist outside oppression and ensure the safety and perpetuation of its political and cultural existence. According to this understanding, the concept of sovereignty over territory provides the ultimate defense against threats to the survival of the community by legitimizing the exclusion of outside powers deemed threatening.30 By extension, then, a loss of sovereignty, as China experienced during its century of humiliation, delegitimizes the state and its senseofselfhood.ThisconceptisimportantforunderstandingChinasacute sensitivity to issues of territorial integrity. Anxieties about state legitimacy contributetoChinasstrongreactiontoterritorialdisputesthatthreatento

26 EvanOsnos,AngryYouth:TheNewGenerationsNeoconNationalists,New Yorker, July 28, 2008. 27 StevenI.Levine,PerceptionandIdeologyinChineseForeignPolicy,inChinese Foreign Policy:

Theory and Practice,ed.ThomasW.RobinsonandDavidShambaugh(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1994),3046. (2001):3339.

28 YanXuetong,TheRiseofChinainChineseEyes,Journal of Contemporary China10,no.26 29 Denisa Kostovicova, Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space(London:Routledge,2005),4,11. 30 Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo(London:Hurst,2000),2225.

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impingeonitssovereigntyandhelpexplainthecountrysstrongaversionto perceived foreign interference around its periphery.

the united states: the global protector and pacifier in east asiaTheworldorderandsecuritystructurethatemergedafterWorldWarII fundamentally changed U.S. engagement and intentions in global politics. The United States saw itself as acting with the heavy responsibility of underwriting securityandpeacethroughoutmanypartsoftheworld,includinginEastAsia, where security alliances with Japan and South Korea necessitated the continued presence of U.S. peacekeeping troops. This identity is sustained by the United Statesongoingroleassecurityguarantorinmanypartsoftheglobe.31 ThemostexplicitmanifestationoftheUnitedStatespostWorldWarII missionwastheTrumanDoctrine,firstarticulatedin1947.PresidentHarry Truman believed that merely providing an example for the rest of the world tofollowwasnolongersufficient.HearguedthattheUnitedStates,asthe chosen nation, must take up the gauntlet and defend the rights of free peoples everywhere, against what Americans regarded as totalitarian aggression and subversion. The Truman Doctrine helped define the policy of containment toward the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War, and its rhetoric describing the United States as a global protector in the world has remained a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy. After Truman, successive presidents and other public officials and opinion leaders persistently portrayed the Cold War in stark, binary terms: as a battle between good and evil. The United States was the leader of the free world that must prevail and save humanity from the evils of Communism. Consequentially, an important psychological byproduct, as well as material reality,ofthepostWorldWarIIperiodwasthattheUnitedStates,forbetter or worse, was the only great power with the means and fortitude to assume the responsibility of securing and maintaining the free world.

31 Certainly U.S. foreign policy identity structures characterized by moralism, democracy-promotion,

and belief in a providential mission can be traced to the legacy of Wilsonianism and even to the daysoftheAmericanRevolution.Iargue,however,thatthepostWorldWarIIera,morethanany othertimeperiod,helpeddefinetheUnitedStatesglobalprotectoridentity.SeeMichaelH.Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1988);WalterRussellMead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World(NewYork:Routledge, 2002),1622;andAndrewJ.Bacevich,ProphetsandPoseurs:NiebuhrandOurTimes,World Affairs170,no.3(2008),2437.

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Similarly,thesecretNationalSecurityCouncilpaperno.68(NSC68),the documentthatdefinedthecourseofU.S.ColdWarpolicyin1950,declared that the position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibilityupontheUnitedStatesforleadership.NSC68describedthe Cold War as a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin.32 To ensure that the forces of freedom prevail, it was imperative that the United States build up its political, economic, and military strength.33 This document was designed only for the eyes of other policymakers, yet the idea of the United States as leader of the free world, protector of democracy, and the pacifier of a war-torn world became the dominant metaphor in U.S. foreign policy discourse throughout the postwar period. Although adapted to changing times, this is a metaphor and image that the United States retains today. EastAsiahasandcontinuestooccupyanimportantgeopoliticalpieceinthe UnitedStatesglobalprotectorstrategy.TheColdWarpittedCommunistChina against the United States in a battle of both ideologies and competing alliances. BeginningwithU.S.involvementinJapanspostWorldWarIIreconstruction and the Korean War, the Asia-Pacific became an important pillar of U.S. power andinfluencealongsideWesternEurope.UnlikeU.S.engagementinEurope, however,wheremembershipinNATOcommitstheUnitedStatestothesecurity ofallmembers,mostoftheUnitedStatesAsia-Pacificcommitmentstookthe form of bilateral security agreements and a less formal but nonetheless robust economic and diplomatic presencetermed the hub and spoke systemin which countries have established important links to the United States but are not formally bound to each other for their security. This system manifests itself today in formal bilateral military ties with Japan and South Korea, where over 70,000 U.S. troops and several dozen military basesarehosted,aswellasinpolitical,diplomatic,andeconomicties.East Asia has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past several decades, marked by war, political upheaval, democratization, and economic boom and crisis.YetfromtheperspectiveofmanyU.S.policymakers,thepostWorld WarIIandpostColdWarorderintheregionhasstayedremarkablyfixed and peaceful due to the presence of U.S. forward-deployed troops as a security buffer. Many U.S. scholars and strategists believe that such a robust military presence has precluded any serious arms competition in the region and created

32 S.NelsonDrew,ed.,NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment(Washington,D.C.:National

DefenseUniversityPress,1994),40. Martins,1993):2444.

33 ErnestR.May,American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68(Boston,NewYork:Bedford/St.

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an environment conducive to economic development.34 This relative peace enabledJapantodevoteitsresourcestoeconomicdevelopmentwiththeROK, Taiwan, and eventually China and thereby achieve even faster rates of economic growth and higher levels of prosperity. TheUnitedStatesidentityasaglobalprotectorandpacifierisreflectedin U.S.opinionpolls.Overseveraldecades,theChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairs has polled Americans on their feelings toward democracy-promotion and the UnitedStatesactiveroleinworldaffairsandfoundconsistentsupportforboth. Forexample,whenaskedhowimportantthegoalofhelpingbringademocratic form of government to other nations should be for U.S. foreign policy, a large majority of U.S. citizensbetween 70% and 80%have consistently said that it is important. The same trend holds true when asked the question, Do you think the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs? A majority of respondents(60%80%)haveembracedthepositionthattheUnitedStates shouldtakeanactivepart.Eveninthe1990s,aftertheendoftheColdWar, a solid majority held this attitude, which not surprisingly was strongest during theyearaftertheSeptember11attacks.35 Upon conclusion of the Cold War, American strategists, excited by the prospectoftheUnitedStatesbeingtheonlyremainingsuperpowerafterthefall of the Soviet Union, sought to consolidate U.S. power in the world, particularly inEastAsia.TheDefenseDepartments1992strategicframeworkarticulated U.S.policytowardEastAsiaasastrategytoshapethesecurityenvironment in ways favorable to the U.S. and to our allies and friends while opposing the emergence of a regional hegemony.36 This strategy has been consistent in its desire to maintain a preeminent role in the security and economic structure oftheregion,withthe2001and2006U.S.quadrennialdefensereviewsstating that such a policy not only serves the interests of the United States but also protects the peace and prosperity of the region at large.37

34 G.JohnIkenberryandChung-inMoon,Introduction:TheDynamicsofTransitioninNortheast

Asia, in The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order, ed. G. John IkenberryandChung-inMoon(Plymouth:Rowman&Littlefield,2008),118.SeealsoAshleyJ. Tellis,PowerShift:HowtheWestCanAdaptandThriveinanAsianCentury,GermanMarshall FundoftheUnitedStates,AsiaPapersSeries,January22,2010. us_role/general_principles.cfm. DepartmentofDefense,1992).

35 U.S.RoleintheWord,WorldPublicOpinion,http://www.americans-world.org/digest/overview/ 36 A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to the Congress(Washington,D.C.: 37 Forexample,the2001and2006DepartmentofDefensequadrennialdefensereviewsusevaried

rhetoricstatingtheessentialroleoftheUnitedStatesinmaintainingsecurityandprosperityinEast Asia. See Quadrennial Defense Review Report(Washington,D.C.:DepartmentofDefense,2001), 4,http://www.dod.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf;andQuadrennial Defense Review Report(Washington, D.C.:DepartmentofDefense,2006),30,http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf.

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This global protector identity is also manifest in the notion that the United States has and will continue to safeguard the global commons.38 Since World War II, the global commonsa free and open system allowing the unimpeded flow of goods and services around the world through air, land, space, and cyberspacehas been sustained by overwhelming U.S. military dominance. The U.S.NavyandCoastGuardhavedissuadednavalaggressionandfoughtpiracy, thereby ensuring unparalleled freedom of the seas and allowing countries to rely on safe and secure commercial passageways to prosper economically. Thus, the international global economy is tremendously reliant upon the sustained protection of international transport channels by the U.S. military. Moreover, the United States sees itself as the only country capable and willing to expend the military and political resources for this task. There is a broad consensus among U.S. military and civilian strategists that a drastic reduction of U.S. power in the region would likely lead to counterbalancing among the various countries and create a more precarious security environment. As will be discussed in thefollowingcasestudies,thisAmericanself-perceptionconflictswithChinas identity and engenders mistrust toward U.S. intentions.

u.s. and chinese identities in action: four case studiesThe first three cases illustrate how the identities described in the preceding sections overtly and covertly exert a negative influence in the bilateral relationship.Thesecasesinclude:(1)the1999U.S.bombingoftheChinese embassyinBelgrade,(2)the2010U.S.policystatementoverterritorialdisputes intheSouthChinaSea,and(3)the2010U.S.-ROKjointnavalexercises in response to the Cheonan sinking. A fourth case analyzing U.S.-Chinese cooperationin2009onUNSCResolution1874ishighlightedasanexample of when and under what conditions the two countries can mitigate the identity factor. These four cases were explicitly chosen because they illustrate how the identity structures of each country do or do not come into play when conflict arises.

38 BarryPosen,CommandoftheCommons:TheMilitaryFoundationofU.S.Hegemony,

International Security28,no.1(2003);MicheleFlournoyandShawnBrimley,TheContested Commons, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings135,no.7(2009);andAbrahamM.Denmark, Managing the Global Commons, Washington Quarterly33,no.3(2010).

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The 1999 Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in BelgradeOnMay7,1999,theU.S.AirForce,underNATOcommand,inadvertently bombedtheChineseembassyinBelgradeaspartoftheongoingNATOair campaignagainsttheYugoslavgovernment.TargetingaYugoslavmilitary compound, a U.S. B-2 bomber instead struck the embassy with five precisionguided bombs, killing three Chinese citizens and injuring twenty others. The officialexplanationfromtheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseblamedthemishap on outdated maps and poor communication.39 While this was admittedly an embarrassing and costly error on the part of the United States, the scope and duration of Chinese nationalistic backlashprovedfarmoreintenseandhardertoreininthanmanyU.S.officials anticipated.TheattacksstruckatthecoreofChinasvictimidentityandadded fuel for Chinese conspiracy theorists who suspected a covert U.S. plot to bully andtestChinasresolve.MostU.S.policymakersatthetimeunderestimated this backlash and were taken aback by what was to follow. After the incident, the U.S. government immediately orchestrated a comprehensiveofficialapologycampaign.PresidentBillClintontelephoned Chinese president Jiang Zemin to offer an apology, but Jiang refused to accept the call. The next day, both Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and U.S. ambassador James Sasser went to the Chinese embassies in Beijing and Washington to apologize in person and deliver the message that it was a tragic mistake, not an intentional act.40 Secretary of Defense William Cohen and CIA director George Tenet also issued a joint statement explaining how the error occurred and that the United States deeply regretted the loss of life and injuries from the bombing.41 According to U.S. citizens living in China at the time, as well as Susan Shirk,thendeputyassistantsecretaryofstateintheBureauofEastAsiaand PacificAffairs,theofficialChinesemediadelayedreportingtheU.S.apology and instead focused on the massive protests that followed.42 The streets of Beijing, Chengdu, and Guangzhou soon were filled with tens of thousands of young Chinese protesters, shouting anti-American slogans and throwing bricks andMolotovcocktails.ProtestorsburnedtheU.S.ConsulGeneralsresidence39 SecretaryofDefenseCohensNewsBriefingonChineseEmbassyBombing,U.S.Department

ofDefense,NewsTranscript,May10,1999,http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=536. ResearchService,CRSReportforCongress,RS20547,April12,2000.

40 KerryDumbaugh,ChineseEmbassyBombinginBelgrade:CompensationIssues,Congressional 41 JointStatementbySecretaryCohenandDCITenet,CIA,PressRelease,May8,1999,https://www.

cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1999/pr050899.html.

42 SusanL.Shirk,China: Fragile Superpower(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),214.

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in Chengdu and shouted slogans like blood for blood, calling on China to boycottallAmericanproductsandtoturngriefintostrength(hua beitong wei liliang),sothatinthenotsodistantfuture,nohostileforcewilldareor be able to take military action against China.43 Chinasofficialmedia44 described the incident as an intentional, brazen, and barbaric act.45OnenewspapercomparedthebombingtoaNaziwar crime.46 A front-page story in the Peoples Daily lambasted the attack as a modern version of the imperialist invasion of China during the Boxer Rebellion:Thisis1999,not1899.Thisisnottheagewhenpeoplecanbarge about in the world just by sending a few gunboatsIt is not the age when the Western powers plundered the Imperial Palace at will,destroyedtheOldSummerPalace,andseizedHongKongand MacaoChina is a China that has stood up.47

Moderate voices were quickly pushed to the side as a singular narrative of the attacks as being an intentional act of war carried the day.48 The Ministry ofForeignAffairs,alongwithsubsequentinterviewswithChineseacademics, reinforced this narrative by concluding that it was impossible that the most modern, technologically advanced military could make such a major error.49 OfficialsintheChinesegovernmentandmediaencouragedthisnarrativeto take hold, arousing anti-American sentiment to a level not seen in decades. The Western media was shocked by the excessively volatile protests and by the fact that many in China believed the bombing was intentional. A Washington Post editorialconcluded:TheBigLieisaliveandwellinBeijing Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,afterweeksofinternalpropaganda,thatmany ordinary Chinese now believe the embassy bombing was deliberate.50 A Boston Globe article blamed the brutes in Beijing for manufacturing a belief among Chinascitizensthatthebombingwasintentional,declaringtheproteststobe

43 Gries, Chinas New Nationalism,100105. 44 Icitestate-runChinesenewssourcesknowingthattheymightnotalwaysreflectofficialstatepolicy

orcapturethespectrumofopinionamongChineseforeignpolicystrategists.Nevertheless,Chinese leadersoftenissueopinionessaysandcommentaryinofficialPRCnewspaperstosignalChinas foreign policy preferences.

45 StephanieHo,ChinaCondemnsBarbaricAct,Voice of America,May8,1999. 46 WuBaiyi,Zhongguoduizhaguanshijiandewentiguanli[ACaseStudyofChinasCrisis 47 Gries, Chinas New Nationalism, 17. 48 Wu,Zhongguoduizhaguanshijiandewentiguanli,27. 49 U.S.-LedNATOsAttackontheChineseEmbassyintheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,PRC

ManagementoftheEmbassyBombingIncident],Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi,no.3(2005):2229.

MinistryofForeignAffairs,November15,2000,http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/ gjlb/3432/3441/t17317.htm;alsoseeWu,Zhongguoduizhaguanshijiandewentiguanli,2628.

50 JoelBlockerandAnthonyGeorgieff,ChinasTrueColors,Washington Post,May11,1999.

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another example of Communist menace.51InaninterviewonPBSsNewsHour, ChineseambassadorLiZhaoxingexpressedskepticismthatthebombingwas anaccident.ThisstunnedanchorJimLehrer,whofollowedupseveraltimes togetAmbassadorLitoarticulatewhyChinawoulddoubttheofficialU.S. explanation that it was a terrible mistake. U.S. House majority leader Tom DeLay,waitingtobeinterviewednextontheshow,reportedlyadmonished the ambassador to not take the weakness of this President as the weakness of the American people.52 The U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy was without question one of the most serious setbacks for U.S.-China relations in decades. U.S. actions and Chinesereactionslargelyconformedtobothcountriesidentitystructuresand served to complicate efforts in conflict management. U.S. policymakers and punditsweretakenabackbythescopeanddurationofChinasnationalistic backlash, and many did not expect the narrative of an intentional U.S. plot to gain traction among a wide swath of Chinese society. Chinese political elites saw a nefarious conspiracy not only to incite social chaos but to bully and intimidate China. This anger had the opposite effect in the United States of making the CCP appear as if it were exploiting and manipulating the incident by unleashing popular Chinese nationalism at an external enemy. The U.S. decision to intervene in Kosovo on humanitarian grounds also resonated strongly with Chinese policymakers who undoubtedly worried aboutChinasownsovereigntyissuesregardingTaiwan,Tibet,andXinjiang. Fromtheirperspective,theUnitedStatesnowadvocatedaviewoflimited sovereignty, with human rights overriding state sovereignty. The ulterior motivewas,intheirview,tojustifytheUnitedStatesaggressiveinterference inothercountriesdomesticaffairs,todemonizecertaincountriesthatdefy U.S. plans, and ultimately to provide a pretext for power politics. In search for reasons to oppose American hegemony, one Chinese scholar contended that U.S. unipolarity by necessity threatens freedom, suggesting that unchecked unipolar hegemony is no less prone to abusive power than totalitarianism.53 As anotherChinesescholarobserved,afterNATOstartedtheairstrikeagainst Yugoslavia,theChineseleadersandthepublicbegantoaskthesamequestion:

51 PeterHaysGries,TearsofRage:ChineseNationalistReactionstotheBelgradeEmbassy

Bombing, China Journal,no.46(2001):2543.

52 Gries, Chinas New Nationalism, 21. 53 WangXiaodong,OnLiberalismandHegemony,Jianchuan Zhishi,inFBIS-China,July17,1999.

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iftheyarebombingYugoslaviatodayfortheissueofKosovo,willtheybomb ChinasomedayifacrisisarisesonTibet,Xinjiang,orTaiwan?54

The U.S. Policy Statement on Territorial Disputes in the South China SeaOnJuly23,2010,attheARFinHanoi,SecretaryofStateClintongavea speech outlining U.S. policy on the South China Sea, stating that the U.S. had anationalinterestinfreedomofnavigation,openaccesstoAsiasmaritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. She expressedsupportforthe2002ASEAN-ChinaDeclarationontheConduct ofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea(DoC),andofferedassistancetofacilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures consistent with the declaration. LostinthecoveragewasthefactthatClintondidnotalterthelong-standing U.S. position of neutrality on territorial disputes in the region and did not take a position on how the disputes should be resolved. Rather, she emphasized the need to resolve disputes without the use or threat of force and stated claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights tomaritimespaceinaccordancewiththeUNConventionontheLawofthe Sea(UNCLOS).55 CaughtoffguardbySecretaryClintonsaddressandthelargenumberof countriesthatairedconcernsaboutthesituation,ChineseforeignministerYang Jiechi followed with a strongly worded rebuttal, arguing that the situation in the South China Sea was peaceful and that the rapid growth of trade was evidence thatnavigationalfreedomhadobviouslynotbeenhindered.Yangalsoinsisted thatchannelsofdiscussionbetweenChinaandASEANwereopenand smooth.Finally,hecautionedothercountriesagainstinternationalizingthe South China Sea territorial disputes, saying it will only make matters worse and theresolutionmoredifficult.56Dayslater,astatementpostedonChinasForeign Ministry website accused Secretary Clinton of launching an attack on China that was designed to give the international community a wrong impression that the situation in the South China Sea is a cause for grave concern.57

54 WuXinbo,FourContradictionsConstrainingChinasForeignPolicyBehavior,Journal of

Contemporary China10,no.27(2001):295.

55 RemarksatPressAvailability,SecretaryofStateHillaryRodhamClinton,July23,2010,http://

www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.

56 LiXiaokunandZhangTing,ForeignMinisterWarnsofSouthChinaSeaIssue,China Daily, July

26,2010,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/26/content_11046544.htm. AffairsofthePRC,July26,2010,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t719460.htm.

57 ForeignMinisterYangJiechiRefutesFallaciesontheSouthChinaSeaIssue,MinistryofForeign

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SecretaryClintonsarticulationofamoredetailedU.SpolicyontheSouth ChinaSeawasaresultofseveraldevelopments.First,manycountriesinthe region, concerned about the potentially destabilizing consequences of China staking unilateral claims to territory in the area, had urged the United States to speak out on the issue. As part of its military modernization, China has increased naval patrols, pressured foreign oil corporations to cease operations in contested waters, established administrative units to oversee its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and arrested and detained civilian fishing vessels in violation of Chinese jurisdiction.58 Perhapsmoreimportantly,therewereworrisomesignsthatChinasstance on the South China Sea was hardening. According to widespread reports, high-rankingChineseofficialstoldU.S.counterpartsinclosed-doormeetings thattheissuewasoneofChinascoreinterests,suggestingthatfromBeijings perspective the South China Sea had been elevated to the same category as Tibet,Xinjiang,andTaiwanandconstitutedaninalienablepartofChina.59 ThiscausedmuchconsternationintheUnitedStatesandamongChinas Southeast Asian neighbors that Beijing was hardening its stance and might begin to assert sovereignty over more of the disputed territory.60 FromChinasperspective,theU.S.decisiontoreassertitselfontheSouth ChinaSeaissuewaspartoftheObamaadministrationsstrategytoconsolidate U.S.influenceintheregion.SecretaryClintonsspeechfurtherexacerbated Chinese suspicions that the United States was attempting to tighten its strategic encirclement of China and undermine relations between China and itsneighbors.OneXinhuaarticleaccusedtheUnitedStatesofusingdivideand ruletacticstodealwithdisputesandwarnedthatWashingtonsstrategyisto playtheoldtrickagainintheSouthChinaSea,initsbidtomaintainAmericas long-heldswayintheWesternPacificOcean.61 A China Daily article criticized theObamaadministrationasattemptingtocozyuptoASEANcountries and strengthen its influence in the region so as to contain China by forcing countries to take sides. The article concluded by asserting that all parties in

58 JohnPomfret,ConcernedaboutChinasRise,SoutheastAsianNationsBuildUpMilitaries,

Washington Post,August9,2010;BPHaltsVietnamExplorationPlanDuetoChinaDispute, Reuters,June15,2007;andBenThomas,VietnamOpposesChinasTourismPlaninDisputed Area, Bloomberg Businessweek,June25,2010. September 22, 2010.

59 EdwardWong,ChinasDisputesinAsiaButtressInfluenceofU.S.,New York Times, 60 See,forexample,MichaelD.SwaineandM.TaylorFravel,ChinasAssertiveBehaviorPartTwo:

theMaritimePeriphery,HooverInstitution,ChinaLeadershipMonitor,no.35,Summer2011;and Roberto R. Romulo, The South China Sea Disputes, Philippine Star, January 21, 2011. Xinhua,July27,2010.

61 WuLimingandChenYong,U.S.InvolvementWillOnlyComplicateSouthChinaSeaIssue,

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the region covet the comparatively rich oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea, especially the U.S., which is keen to control energy resources all over the world, for which it never hesitates to launch a war.62 Chinesenetizenssawevenmoreinsidiousintentions.Oneuserremarked thatClintonsremarksvilifiedChinaslegitimateinterestsintheSouth China Sea. The author claimed that this particular U.S. policy stance was in line with a larger goal of jeopardizingPRC ties with surrounding countries, supporting Tibetan and Taiwan independence, and presenting military threats against China in a bid to disintegrate it. 63 Another user commented that the United States has always been hostile to China and sought to subvert it from the start, claiming that China is being encircled by the United States over waterfromtheYellowSeatotheSouthChinaSeaandacrosslandfromIndia to Afghanistan in the name of counter-terrorism. The author concluded that this C-shaped encirclement was aimed at establishing U.S. dominance around China,thusputtingthecountryonthedefensive.Otherusersclaimedthatthis was just another U.S. excuse to cast China as the enemy and that China should stop fantasizing that the U.S. regards it as a friend.64 SomeintheU.S.mediainterpretedChinasaggressivereactionasfurther evidence of an assertive Chinese posture aimed at testing U.S. resolve. Patrick Cronin,aformerU.S.governmentofficialandascholarattheCenterforNew AmericanSecurity,wrotethatChinaspostureintheSouthChinaSeawas creatingaMonroeDoctrineforAsiasseasandthreateninglongstanding freedom of navigation.65 A Wall Street JournalarticledescribedhowForeign MinisterYanglashedoutatClintonwithdyspepticeditorialsinChinese state media.66OthersregardedChineserhetoricandactionsasevidencethat the South China Sea would be the battlefield of the future, with the potential for armed conflict among the United States, China, and other Asian nations.67 In this case study, both countries employed actions and rhetoric that hewed closely to their identity constructs, which greatly complicated how each countryperceivedtheintentbehindtheothersaction.TheU.S.statementon the South China Sea issue can be understood as not only an effort to maintain

62 ChinaDailyOpinion:U.S.HamperingPeacefulSettlementofSouthChinaSeaIssue,China

Daily,July29,2010.

63 PRCNetizensCriticizeU.S.-ROKExercise,LinkwithSouthChinaSeaIssue,OSC

CPP20100803572001,7/10/107/29/10.

64 Ibid. 65 PatrickCroninandPaulGiarra,ChinasDangerousArrogance,Diplomat, July 23, 2010. 66 Battle of the South China Sea, Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2010. 67 RobertD.Kaplan,TheSouthChinaSeaIstheFutureofConflict,Foreign Policy,September/

October2011.

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open access to sea lanes, but more broadly as an opportunity to leverage its regional power status to both diplomatically and militarily reassert its role asbalancerintheregion.Chinasstrongnegativereaction,whileexpectedto someextentbyU.S.officials,invokedovertreferencestoanAmericanplotto containChinaandanattackonChinasterritorialintegrity.Thus,toChina, Clintonsoverturetomediateamultilateralapproachtoresolvingthedispute was not a gesture of goodwill but nothing more than an excuse by the United States to insert itself into the issue.

U.S.-ROK Joint Naval ExercisesOnMarch26,2010,aSouthKoreannavalshipcarrying104personnelwas torpedoedandsankoffthecountryswesterncoastnearBaengnyeongIslandin theYellowSea,killing46sailors.InMay,SouthKoreaformallyaccusedNorth Korea of responsibility for the sinking of the warship, one of the deadliest provocationssincethetwocountriesendedtheKoreanWarinatrucein1953. The multinational committee tasked with investigating the incident found strongevidencelinkingatorpedobelongingtoaNorthKoreansubmarineto theattack.ChinaandRussia,citinginsufficientevidence,didnotsignontothe findingsandremainedunconvincedofNorthKoreanculpability. In response to the attack, the U.S. and South Korean militaries announced aseriesofjointnavalexercisestobeginJune8intheYellowSeaashowof forcedisplayingtheU.S.commitmenttotheU.S.-ROKsecurityallianceaswell asanadmonishmenttoNorthKoreaagainstfutureprovocations.Soonafter, South Korean news outlets leaked unsubstantiated reports that the USS George Washingtonaircraftcarrierwouldalsoparticipateintheexercises.However, the U.S. Department of Defense did not issue a formal announcement of the participation of the carrier until July 20, stating it would be sent as part the U.S.-ROKexercise,InvincibleSpirit.68 Initially,ChinasForeignMinistryreleasedameasuredstatement,callingon relevant parties to remain calm and exercise restraint.69Soonafter,however, commentators took on a noticeably harsher tone, with voices within the PeoplesLiberationArmy(PLA)constitutingthevocalmajority.OnJuly1, inaninterviewwithHongKongbasedPhoenixTV,GeneralMaXiaotian, deputychiefofstaffofthePLA,saidthatChinaextremelyopposes(feichang68 MediaAvailabilitywithGeoffMorrell,Adm.WillardandaSeniorDefenseOfficialfromSeoul,

SouthKorea,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,NewsTranscript,July20,2010,http://www.defense.gov/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4657. July 21, 2010.

69 AndrewQuinnandPhilStewart,U.S.AnnouncesNewSanctionsAgainstNorthKorea,Reuters,

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fandui)thedrillintheYellowSeabecauseofitscloseproximitytoChinese territorialwaters.Aweeklater,reflectingtheharsher,outspokenPLAstance, theForeignMinistryspokesmanadoptedtougherlanguage,statingthatChina firmlyopposesforeignwarshipsandmilitaryaircraftcarryingoutactivities intheYellowSeaandotherChinesecoastalwatersthataffectChinassecurity interests.70Meanwhile,betweenJuneandJuly2010,thePLANavyconducted fourlive-ammunitionfireandlong-rangestrikedrillsintheEastChina,South China,andYellowseas.WhilePRCmilitaryofficialsdownplayedanylinkto theU.S.-ROKnavalexercises,observersintheregiontooknoticeofboththe intensity and high volume of the drills in a short time span, which seemed to beanimplicitbutstrategicsignaltotheUnitedStatesandtheROK.71 MajorGeneralLuoYuanrespondedinaPeoples Daily interview that theinclusionofaU.S.aircraftcarrierwouldgiveChinaanopportunityto conduct counter-reconnaissance and use the carrier as a target in red-blue simulations.72LuobelievedthattheU.S.-ROKexerciseswereaimednotjustat deterringNorthKoreabutalsoatconductingstrategicreconnaissanceagainst China and therefore posed a threat. He reminded Chinese readers that China isanationofmemoriesandhistory,andtheYellowSeahasbeenanareaused toinvadeChinaduringtheOpiumandSino-JapaneseWars.Luoconcluded by asking rhetorically, What reasons do they have to conduct a joint military drill right in our front yard and threaten our security? How can China permit this?73Soonafter,theGlobal Times published an online poll that seemingly confirmedChinasdispleasurewiththeexercises,inwhichmorethan96%of respondents agreed that the exercises posed a threat to China.74

70 HKPhoenixTV:PLADeputyChiefofStaffOpposesUS-ROKDrill,WelcomesGatesVisit,OSC

CPP20100702572002,July2,2010;andPatrickGoodenough,ChinaBristlesatProspectofU.S. AircraftCarrierintheYellowSea,CNS News, July 12, 2010.

71 PLANavyStartsLive-AmmunitionTrainingintheWestPacific,Xinhua,June30,2010,http://

eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2010-07/01/content_4170141.htm;ChinaLaunchesWarGamesin YellowSea,AgenceFrance-Presse,September1,2010,http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/ afp_asiapacific/view/1078415/1/.html;andLiuYue-shan,StealthAssassinGoesintoAction DuringFourTroopTrainingExerciseswithinaMonthFrequentDrillsofLong-RangeStrikes, OSCCPP20100730788007,July30,2010. CPP20100713787008,July13,2010.LuoYuan,nowretired(afactnotacknowledgedinthe Chinesepress),isquotedwidelyintheChinesemediaasadvocatinghawkishpoliciestoward theUnitedStatesandothercountries.IoperateundertheassumptionthataslongasChinas propagandadepartmentpermitsvoicesfromthePLAtopublishsuchviewsinmajordomestic mediaoutlets,itislegitimatetointerprettheseviewsasrepresentativeofatleastonestrandofPLA sentiment,whichisnottobemisconstruedasofficialPLApolicy.

72 MajorGeneralLuoYuanDiscussesU.S.-ROKMilitaryExerciseinYellowSea,OSC

73 Ibid.,23. 74 AngeredOverU.S.AircraftCarriersEnteringtheYellowSea,ChineseNetizensImageofKoreaIs

Worrying, Global Times,June9,2010,http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2010-06/849599.html.

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FudanUniversityprofessorShenDinglitookthisinterpretationonestep fartherbyarguingthatU.S.actionintheYellowSeawasanalogoustothe Cuban Missile Crisis: Threat-posing military exercises are occurring in our interestwatersbytheouterworld[waibu guojia], and Chinese objections are no different than U.S. military action during the Cuban Missile Crisis to prevent the Soviet Union from threatening its interests along its periphery.75 Similarly, XinhuawarnedtheUnitedStatestoreconsideritsplanbecauseoffending the Chinese people is not in the fundamental interest of the U.S. The article explained: Any activity aimed at pushing a country with a 1.3 billion populace with enormous potential would be inadvisable. The United States cannot ignore Chinasself-esteemanddrivetheiraircraftcarrierstraighttothefrontofChinas doorstep to flex their muscles.76 Onlinemessageboardscontinuedtheanti-Americannationalistcampaign. OnenetizendescribedtheplotoftheYellowSeamilitaryexerciseastouching onabottomlinethattheChinesecannottolerate,whichviolatesChinassoul ofsovereignty.77Othersadoptedamorehawkishstance,callingonthePLAto sinktheU.S.aircraftcarrierwereittogettooclosetoChinasterritorialwaters.78 BeijingsstridentreactiononceagaincaughtU.S.officialsoffguard.From theU.S.perspective,theobjectivesoftheU.S.-ROKexerciseswerestrictlylimited todeterringfurtherNorthKoreanprovocationsandweretobeconductedoffof SouthKoreasterritorialwaters.Seeminglytakingnoticeofnegativereactions in China, U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates held a press conference restating that the exercises were off the coast of Korea, not China, and insisting that there is thus nothing provocative about them at all. 79 Admiral Mike Mullen stated that the United States would not cancel the exercises to placate Chinese concernsandreassertedthattheYellowSeaisaninternationalbodyofwater, and the United States always reserves the right to operatein international waters.HeaddedthattheUnitedStateshaslongheldexercisesintheYellow Seaandthathefullyexpectsthatwelldosointhefuture.80

75 PRCScholar:US-ROKYellowSeaMilitaryExercisesProvocativeAgainstChina,Dongfang

Zaobao Online,OSCCPP20100718138044,July12,2010.

76 LiangJun,U.S.MustRestrainProvocativeMilitaryActions,Peoples Daily, June 12, 2010. 77 GuangmingGuanchaArticleCriticizesU.S.-ROKMilitaryExerciseinYellowSea,Guangming

Wang,OSCCPP20100818718001,August17,2010.

78 HKSP:PRCNetizensCallforSinkingU.S.CarrieruponApproachingCoastline,Hsiang Kang

Shang Pao Online,OSCCPP20100814716017,August14,2010.

79 Media Availability with Secretary Gates at Camp Casey, South Korea, U.S. Department

ofDefense,NewsTranscript,July20,2010,http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=4655. July 20, 2010.

80 AlPessin,U.S.WontBowtoChineseConcernsonYellowSeaExercises,VoiceofAmerica,

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In this dispute, both countries were once again acting and reacting in conformity with their respective identities. The Cheonan sinking confronted theU.S.-ROKalliancewithamajorchallenge,callingthefundamentalstrength andcohesivenessoftheallianceintoquestionandwarrantingswiftactionin the face of blatant provocation. The United States believed that it had to answer such provocations with a show of force as an admonishment against future hostile acts in order to fulfill its responsibility toward South Korea vis--vis theirsecurityalliance.Chinasreaction,ontheotherhand,illustratesjusthow easily Chinese policymakers and citizens perceive U.S. military actions as a threat not only to the region but to Chinese core interests. This also illustrates a scenario in which the United States and China were acting and reacting to the situation with the implicit expectation that the motivation behind their behavior would be self-evident to the other party. ChineseleadershadhopedthattheUnitedStateswouldrecognizeChinas acuteterritorialsensitivityintheYellowSeaandnotdispatchanaircraftcarrier soclosetoChinasshores.Washington,meanwhile,believedthatsuchajoint militaryexercisewasentirelyappropriateaftersuchprovocativeactionsby NorthKorea,especiallyconsideringthefactthattheexercisesweretotakeplace in South Korean territorial waters. The result, however, was a clashing not only ofinterestsbutofidentities,whichseverelyhamperedtheabilityofofficialsin both countries to cooperate and resolve their differences expeditiously.

U.S.-Chinese Cooperation on UNSC Resolution 1874In2009themosturgentregionalsecurityconcernfortheUnitedStatesand ChinawasNorthKorea,whichundertookaseriesofdestabilizingactionsthat inducedahighdegreeofU.S.-Chinacooperation.InlateMay2009,following aprovocativelong-rangemissiletestamonthearlier,NorthKoreaconducted itssecondnucleartestinlessthanthreeyears.Furiousatthemove,Beijingand WashingtonworkedcloselyintheUNSecurityCouncil,alongwithJapanand South Korea, to forge a consensus first on a presidential statement condemning the missile launch and subsequently on a new resolution in response to the nucleartestwhichtightenedsanctionsagainstNorthKorea.Thatresolution, UNSCResolution(UNSCR)1874,remainsoneofthetoughestandmost interventionistresolutionsonNorthKoreatodate.81 Among other provisions, itauthorizesmemberstatestoinspectNorthKoreancargothatissuspectedof

81 ThefulltextofUNSCR1874canfoundathttp://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2026178.html.

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carrying illicit nuclear and missile-producing material and urges them to freeze financialassetsassociatedwithNorthKoreasnuclearprogram. ConsideringBeijingstraditionalprincipleofnoninterferenceintheinternal affairsofsovereignstates,UNSCR1874representedamajorshiftinChinese thinking.PartlyunderpressurefromtheUnitedStatestodraftaresolution thathadteeth,butmoreoutoffrustrationatPyongyangsblatantfloutingof ChineseeffortstoconvinceNorthKoreatodenuclearize,Beijingbrokefromits traditionalforeignpolicystancebysofteningitspositionagainstsanctionsand punitive measures toward its only ally in the region. More importantly, U.S.China cooperation during this period illustrates how under certain conditions the two countries can cooperate in spite of their identity structures. AfterpassingUNSCR1874,ChineseandU.S.officialsworkedcloselyto coordinateexecutionoftheresolution.First,jointU.S.andChineseefforts commencedtopersuadePyongyangtoreturntothesix-partytalksandreaffirm its commitment to denuclearization. In early July 2009, U.S. ambassador PhilipGoldberg,coordinatorforimplementationofUNSCR1874,ledan interagency delegation to Beijing. Representatives from Chinese government, military,andintelligencebureaus,includingChinasMinistryofForeignAffairs, Central Bank, and General Administration of Customs, met with Goldberg to discuss implementation of the resolution. At the same time, Beijings negotiator for the six-party talks, Wu Dawei, visited Washington for talks on howtocoordinateU.S.-Chineseefforts.Lessthantwoweekslater,Assistant SecretaryofStateKurtCampbellmetWuandotherChineseofficialsinBeijing. Finally,inearlySeptember,theU.S.specialrepresentativeforNorthKorea policy Stephen Bosworth visited China to discuss how to advance the process of denuclearization. AnimportanttestofU.S.-ChinesecooperationonUNSCR1874arosein lateJunewhenaNorthKoreanfreighter,theKang Nam 1, was cited by the United States as possibly carrying illicit cargo. The freighter was tracked by U.S. naval ships for several weeks as it traveled through the South China Sea toward Myanmar and then suddenly turned around and returned to a port in NorthKorea.SpeakingatapressconferenceinPhuket,Thailand,Secretaryof State Clinton singled out China in describing the successful conclusion of the incidentandcalledChinaspressureaproximatecause.82 Tobesure,ChinahadreservationsaboutthelegitimacyofmanyofUNSCR 1874smandatesunderinternationallawandmadenumerousstatements followingtheresolutionspassageemphasizingthatsanctionswerenotmeant

82 MarkLandler,ClintonTradesJibeswithNorthKorea,New York Times,July23,2009.

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to punish Pyongyang but rather to persuade it to reconsider its actions and returntonegotiations.ButChinasdecisiontovoteinfavoroftheresolution,and in some cases actively participate in its implementation, nonetheless represents adeparturefromChinashistoricallycautiousapproachtoforeignpolicy.First, BeijingdidnotobjecttothelanguageusedtocondemnNorthKoreasaction as in violation and flagrant disregard of Council resolutions, specific wording that was insisted upon by the United States and South Korea. In the past, Beijing had shown a willingness to protect its Cold War neighbor against what it regarded as antagonistic actions and rhetoric by Western nations led by the UnitedStates.UNSCR1874thuswasarareinstanceofChinasigningontoa strongly worded rebuke of its once stalwart ally. Second, and more importantly, UNSCR1874mandatedactionsthatwerehighlyinterventionistinnatureand couldhaveeasilytouchedonBeijingssensitivityoverprinciplesofsovereignty and aversion to sanctions. China could have watered down the resolution on noninterventionist grounds so as to render it entirely toothless. Given that it hadvetoedorabstainedfrompreviousU.S.-ledmeasuresintheUNSCmost notably,resolutionsonIranandMyanmarChinasfull-fledgedsupportof UNSCR1874canberegardedasabreakfromitspolicyofnoninterventionin the affairs of sovereign states.83 U.S.-ChinacooperationonUNSCR1874thusoffersimportantlessons for mitigating the identity variable. Chief among them is understanding why Beijing cooperated so closely with the United States and agreed to tough sanctionsagainstNorthKorea,despitethepresenceofmanyingredientswith thepotentialtoinflameChineseinsecurities.First,Chinahadasignificant stakeinpeacefullyresolvingtheNorthKoreannuclearissue.BecauseBeijing had taken the lead in the six-party talks and invested substantial material and diplomatic resources toward achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,ChinawasoneofthebiggestloserswhenNorthKoreafloutedthe international community by conducting a nuclear test. Second, the problem was addressed multilaterally, which exerted pressure on China to fall in line to punishNorthKoreawhenitwasapparentthatthepatienceoftheinternational community had worn thin. This case thus has important implications for how China and the United States might achieve limited success pursuing cooperation in spite of the identity factor. The concluding section argues that this should at least provide U.S.

83 ChinaandRussiaVetoUS/UK-backedSecurityCouncilDraftResolutiononMyanmar,UNNews

Centre,January12,2007;andLuisCharbonneau,Russia,ChinaSnubU.N.CouncilTalksonSyria -Envoys,Reuters,June12,2011.

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policymakers with some useful lessons on how identity might be defused in pursuit of greater cooperation.

lessons for u.s.-china relationsBeyond the obvious national interest and sovereignty issues at play, the first three cases offer important illustrations of the ways in which Chinese and American identities can complicate efforts in crisis management and in cooperating on issues of mutual concern. In each example, U.S. action was a function of a larger historical imperative either to intervene or respond in a fashion that maintained peace or to admonish others not to act in ways that threatenpeace,thusconformingtotheUnitedStatesglobalprotectorimage. Chinasreactionwaslikewisenoteworthyforitsovertlyaggressiveresponse to perceived infringement on its territorial sovereignty, hewing closely to its victim image. In all three cases, U.S. action, or the context leading up to that action, wasnotdirectedexplicitlyatChina,yetChineseofficials,commentators,and netizens reacted as if it were, showing a strong propensity to link U.S. action to a grand scheme to contain or infringe on China. The rhetoric employed among these various groups sought to juxtapose the assertive, hegemonic actions of the United States with a vulnerable and morally justified Chinese posture in regional affairs. Chinese commentators invoked memories of the century of humiliation or the Cold War to justify their feelings of injustice toward hegemonic behavior by the United States. Such strong reactions on the part of the Chinese had the counter effect of appearing belligerent or bombastic to the United States. American policymakers and commentators regarded the legitimacy behind U.S. action as axiomatic and Chinese reaction as unnecessarily strident. Such a scenariowhere both countries perceive the motivation behind their behavior as not respected or understood by the other partyspawns a circulardynamicinwhichonecountrysaction,reaction,andinterpretation feedsintotheotherssensethatthefirstcountryisactinginappropriately.This dynamic will in all likelihood persist as long as China chooses to invoke the past in interpreting present U.S. action and as long as the United States continues to perceiveitsactionsandpresenceinEastAsiaasaforceforpeaceandprosperity. Both countries are thus trapped in their own identities, not fully cognizant of how these identities negatively affect U.S.-China relations. Furthermore,thefirstthreecasestudies,whichdealtwithmilitaryand territorial issues, offer only a small slice of perceived mistreatment of China bytheUnitedStates.Chinaspreoccupationwithnefariousintentonthepart[ 161 ]

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of the United States goes well beyond issues of security and sovereignty and occupiesthewholespectrumofpolitical,economic,andculturalspheres.For example, recent U.S.-led efforts at pressuring China to revalue its currency havepromptedsomeChinesecommentatorsandofficialstosuspectulterior motives. A recent bestseller in China is a book called Currency Wars [Huobi zhanzheng], which argues that governments, in particular the U.S. government, have historically used currency regimes and manipulation as weapons for international economic espionage. China, the author concludes, must realize thattherealmotivebehindU.S.demandsfortherenminbisappreciationis a desire to control the Chinese economy by weakening it. The book is a huge success and reportedly has been read by several senior leaders in China.84Other actionsthatfromBeijingspointofviewsubstantiateitsperceptionsofU.S. malevolence toward China include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, visits with the DalaiLama,theStateDepartmentsannualreportonChinesehumanrights violations,tariffsonChineseimports,SecretaryClintonsspeechcriticizing ChinasInternetcensorship,andLiuXiaobowinningtheNobelPeacePrize, whichsomehigh-levelChineseofficialsbelievewasawardedunderpressure from the United States.85 This tension between U.S. and Chinese identities has important and potentiallyforebodingimplicationsforfuturedevelopmentsinEastAsia.Ina region still replete with hot spots that could elicit a U.S. military responsefrom furtherNorthKoreanprovocationstoanescalationofconflictoverthemyriad territorial disputes in the South China Seanumerous scenarios exist under which China could feel threatened and react with rhetoric or action that puts the United States on edge and risks unintended conflict. TheUNSCR1874case,however,offersanimportantcounterexamplein which the two countries were able to compartmentalize identity in pursuit of cooperation. This case then provides important policy-relevant lessons for how and under what circumstances the United States and China might mitigate theidentityfactorintheirrelationship.First,asUNSCR1874illustrated, when China has a significant political or diplomatic investment in an issue, it is naturally more prone to cooperation and flexibility to achieve a positive outcome.ThedisadvantagesofanegativeoutcomewerecleartoBeijing;a nuclearNorthKoreawouldaddunwantedtensionandarevitalizedU.S.military presenceinahighlystrategicareaborderingChineseterritory.WhenNorth

84 EdwardWongBooming,ChinaFaultsU.S.PolicyontheEconomy,New York Times, June 17, 2008. 85 ChineseGeneralSaysU.S.WasBehindNobelPeacePrizeforDissident,DeutschePresse-Agentur,

November3,2010.

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KoreaactedinblatantdisregardtotheinternationalcommunityandtoBeijings efforts at denuclearization, it was noteworthy how quickly China came on boardtopunishNorthKoreaandcooperatewiththeUnitedStates.Second, and perhaps more importantly, U.S.-Chinese cooperation in addressing the NorthKoreanissueoccurredinamultilateralforuminthiscasetheUN. China has historically shown a greater propensity to attach legitimacy to and fall in line with solutions agreed to in multilateral organizations, even when such solutions are in reality conceived or heavily influenced by the United States or other countries. 86 Ofcourse,inthisandotherexamples,somesortofstimulustypicallya provocative act criticized by the international communityis usually necessary toelicitChineseaction.Nonetheless, Chinahavingasignificant political investment in an issue and the existence of a multilateral framework seem to be two important preconditions that help mitigate and defuse the identity factor in bilateral relations. U.S.-ChinacooperationonUNSCR1874offershopethatcertaintensionladen issues of bilateral importance, such as territorial disputes in the South ChinaSea,canbesuccessfullytackledinmultilateralinstitutionslikeASEANor theUNratherthanbetweenpolicymakersinWashingtonandBeijing.Indeed, recent scholarship on the issue provides evidence that prospects for multilateral cooperation with China are increasing and should be pursued further.87 Hillary Clintons2010statementattheARF,whileelicitingstrongpushbackfromChina, is a good example of the United States utilizing a multilateral forum to address growingwarinessamongleadersinbothWashingtonandtheregionofChinas increasing assertiveness on territorial issues in the South China Sea. President ObamasefforttocompelChinatoaddresstheSouthChinaSeaissueatthe November2011EastAsiaSummit,despiteBeijingsrepeatedwarningsthatit would not be discussed, represents another instance of successfully addressing the South China Sea through multilateral means.88

86 See, for example, Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams, U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem

ofFailingStatesandTransnationalThreats,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,SpecialReport,no. 126,September2004;andKuikCheng-Chwee,MultilateralisminChinasASEANPolicy:Its Evolution,CharacteristicsandAspiration,Contemporary Southeast Asia27,no.1(2005):10222.

87 Daryl Morini, Preventing U.S.-China War, Towards Multilateral Preventative Diplomacy in the

South China Sea, Forward,ExtendedPolicyReport,August2,2011;RaoulHeinrichs,JustinJones, and Rory Medcalf, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia,LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June27,2011;andMingjiangLi,Reconciling AssertivenessandCooperation?ChinasChangingApproachtotheSouthChinaSeaDispute, Security Challenges6,no.2(2010):4968. November19,2011.

88 JackieCalmes,ObamaandAsianLeadersConfrontChinasPremier,New York Times,

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Overall,oneshouldnotmisinterprettensionbetweenU.S.andChinese identities as inherently unmanageable. While both countries hold vastly different cultural and historical conceptions of themselves and the form that the future international order should take, they are not necessarily preordained to perceive each other as adversaries. Policymakers on both sides need to soberly acknowledge the significant intangible factorsidentity being an important oneworking against positive bilateral relations. This reality needs to be factored into the policymaking equation of both parties to a greater degree, especially as the two sides become further enmeshed in an interconnected economic and military relationship. Both China and the United States can undertake nuanced, albeit limited, adjustments in policy to deal with these identity incompatibilities. It would be unrealistic for the United States to adopt an overly cautious approach on issues that may be perceived by Beijing as sensitive simply because they touch onChinassenseofvictimhood.PreciselybecausefutureU.S.contingencies inNortheastandSoutheastAsiawillinevitablycomeintocontactwithan increasingly assertive and confident Chinese naval force, clear and consistent signals of U.S. national interest and resolve in these pivotal geostrategic regions shouldbesenttoBeijingfrompolicymakersinWashington.Fromadiplomatic perspective, however, U.S. policymakers need to show patience and be willing tolookbeyondtheknee-jerkreactionsfromofficialandunofficialvoicesin China and not misconstrue such reactions as being inherently malevolent. U.S.policymakersshouldbeawarethatthepurposeofthisrhetoricisoftento assuage an increasingly nationalistic Chinese domestic audience that demands hawkish responses to perceived infringements to national sovereignty rather than to antagonize and intimidate the United States directly. ForChina,overcomingitspredispositiontoviewitselfasavictimwould requirestate-ledeffortstoheal,notperpetuate,historicalwounds.Elitesin theeducationalandpoliticalestablishmentsneedtode-emphasizeChinas unrequited moral outrage over past atrocities by Western imperialists. While China has admittedly been subjected to foreign interference throughout its history, this is an image that has taken on a life of its own and works against positiverelationswiththeUnitedStatesaswellasChinasneighborsinAsia. AsthePRCsdiplomaticandmilitarypowerincreases,onewouldhopethat a more powerful, confident Beijing will no longer see the need to play up a victim image as a politically expedient method of gaining domestic legitimacy during conflict. China and the United States have shown that they can cooperate on many bilateral and international issues without allowing the identity variable[ 164 ]

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to sabotage collaboration. However, the four cases highlighted in this article should act as a reminder that potent historical, cultural, and political forces driveeachcountrysactionsandresponsesinsubtlebutinfluentialways.A better understanding of the factors that animate the United States and China can help prepare each country for the bumpy road that lies ahead, even if such knowledge will not mitigate all areas of incompatible interests and strategic mistrust.

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strategic asia 201112

asia responds to its rising powersChina and IndiaEdited by Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica KeoughThe National Bureau of Asian Research September 2011 396 pp Paper 6x9 ISBN 978-0-98189