“Chinese Conceptions of Politics: A Point of Future Clashes of Civilizations?”

A paper prepared for

The Annual Convention of theAmerican Association of Chinese Studies

Winter Park, Florida

Panel: Conflicts and InterventionsSunday, Oct. 18, 2009, 8:30 – 10:00 a.m.

Daniel C. Palm, Ph.D.Dept. of History and Political Science

Azusa Pacific UniversityAzusa, CA 91702-7000

dpalm@apu.edu(Do not copy or cite without permission)

Introduction

On August 8, 2009, the Chinese government sponsored ceremonies to recognize the one-

year anniversary of the opening of the Beijing Olympics.1 The games of the previous

summer had gone smoothly in most respects, and appeared to have achieved much of

what Beijing had hoped to accomplish in terms of the PRC’s emergence as a great power.

At the same time, manifold political issues connected to the games received significant

media attention, from high-profile and long-standing issues respecting Beijing’s control

of Tibet and the future of Taiwan, to PRC relations with Sudan, to the authorities’

handling of questions concerning competing athletes’ ages, free speech zones, internet

freedom, Chinese labor practices, police detention of migrants, and appropriate

compensation for Beijing residents displaced by Olympic construction. Chinese

government decisions on these issues received unwelcome coverage, discussion and

critique in non-Chinese media—from major press and TV journalists to the humblest

bloggers—matched by vigorous defense of Chinese actions in Chinese media and by

Chinese bloggers.

This friction within media, alongside the tone and character of the games

themselves, was significant in calling attention to different Chinese and western

conceptions of politics. And not only with respect to political style in response to the

inevitable complications that accompany an event of this magnitude. Rather, the

Olympics turned out to be a perfect opportunity to observe western and Chinese

interaction, with multiple occasions to observe perceptions about individual rights, the

proper role and function of the state, limitations imposed on the press—in short, multiple

1 William Ide, “China Marks Olympic Anniversary, Reflects on Olympic Legacy,” VOA News, 10 August 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-10-voa11.cfm [accessed Sept. 10, 2009]

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occasions to consider different perceptions about the nature of political life by those

involved. Indeed, one might argue that the 2008 Olympics marked a turning point in

Chinese relations with the West, with Chinese conceptions about the nature of civic and

political life becoming sufficiently distinct from the essential elements of current western

political life, thereby casting doubt over the universal character of standard conceptions

about political life that emerged over the centuries in the West. In particular, the events of

the last 18 months call into question western conceptions of modernization theory—i.e.

that China and other developing nations are in the course of development toward an

eventual liberal democratic outcome with rule of law, multiple political parties, civil

liberties, and greatly-reduced state ownership of property and businesses. Students of

politics might be willing to pose the hard question: are Chinese conceptions of political

life and the nature of man distinct from those of the West, and can the two be reconciled?

Or does China represent an alternative vision about the nature of politics and civic life,

and thereby in effect a challenge to the West, portending friction at least, and a broad

“clash of civilizations” at worst?

As employed by the late Samuel Huntington, the “clash of civilizations” concept

referred to religious and cultural differences as the foundation for post-Cold War friction

between nations and peoples.2 Clearly religion, politics and culture are reflective within

culture of each other; foundational political views serve to inform the character of nations

and foreign policy for centuries. But “The Clash of Civilizations?” posited by Huntington

has been primarily discussed with respect to Islam’s encounter with the West. As the

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, will friction between China and the West

2 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

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increase, with the political forms offered to developing countries as a sort of intellectual

and political battleground?

Roots of Discord? A Summary of Classical Chinese Political Thought3

Politics, Aristotle teaches in his Nichomachean Ethics, is the “master art.” That is to say,

every individual action humans undertake is directed toward some end (telos), perceived

as a good. The whole of human action by individual men and women aims at a

comprehensive good, namely happiness. The activity that human beings pursue with a

view toward the good of the whole polis or community, that “investigates fine and just

actions” and aims toward achievement of good ends for the polis, is political activity, and

the study of that activity, political science. In The Politics, Aristotle famously

distinguishes between the just regimes—monarchy, aristocracy, and the mixed regime—

which aim toward the good of the whole polis and their unjust or perverse counterparts,

tyranny, oligarchy and democracy.

Mindful of the practical difficulty of beginning to comprehend Chinese conceptions

of politics (政 治 zheng 4 zhi 4) requires some comprehension of two millennia of

political literature. This long history has been aptly summarized into four eras by Kung-

chuan Hsiao in his two-volume History of Chinese Political Thought.4 The “Period of

Creativity”, beginning with the birth of Confucius (551 B.C 孔 子 kong 2 zi 3), concludes

three centuries later with the Warring States era, and is witness to the creation—albeit

“creation” understood as drawing on previously formulated but not systematized ideas5—

3 An earlier version of this section of the paper appears in the author’s “Beijing’s Non-Political Olympics—Policy or Doctrine?”, prepared for the Southwest Political Science Association, April 11, 2009.

4 Kung-chuan Hsiao, trans. By F. W. Mote, A History of Chinese Political Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), I: 9-10.

5 Hsiao notes that Confucius, and the Moist, Legalist, and Taoist schools of thought each paid homage to theorists or political figures who preceded them. Hsiao, 10.

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of classical Chinese political concepts. During this, its feudal era, Chinese political

thought emphasizes the idea of “everything under heaven” or “the world” (天下 tian 1-xia

4)—Hsiao describes it as “one all-embracing world of men”—which concept appears to

imply China’s centrality within Asia and the possibility of a universal politics.6 Over time

the concept transitions to refer to “empire”, especially once the concept of a Chinese

empire is well-established. This period is followed by the “Period of Continuation”, a 16-

centuries long era from Ch’in and Han on through Yuan dynasties, described by Hsiao as

“one extended internal war within Chinese thought and learning”. The authoritarian

character of the feudal dynasties meant that conceptions of the rule of law (“the law is

supreme over the emperor”) was in direct conflict with the rule of particular potentates

and was unlikely to have been well-received.7 Confucian thought, for its part, is able to

adapt, yielding its support of feudalism to the authoritarian regimes, while Legalism and

Moism are not.8

The spread of Buddhism into eastern China, the period of Mongol invasion and rule

(1278-1368 A.D.), and initial contacts with the West characterize the “Period of Change”,

a five-centuries long era (1368-1898 A.D.) from Ming and Ch’ing through the Qing

dynasties. Hsiao finds Chinese political thought during these centuries both politically

influenced by (e.g. the Taiping Rebellion’s connection with Christian thought) and

defensive against (e.g. development of a Chinese ethnocentrism) these foreign influences.

Finally, the “Period of Fruition”, from the political reform movement of 1898 and the

6 Hsiao, 10. Vestigial manifestations of the concept in the 16th and 17th centuries help explain the Chinese resistance and late start with diplomatic procedures and exchanges with foreign powers, as so doing amounts to tacit admission of other equally legitimate empires, and, in time, nations. See also Joseph Chan, “Territorial Boundaries and Confucianism” in Daniel A. Bell, ed., Confucian Political Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 70.

7 Hsiao, I:21.8 Ibid., I: 23.

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Republican Revolution of 1911 alongside the development and pronouncement of Sun

Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People” (三民主義 san1 min2 zhu3 yi4), in time leading

to the creation of a Chinese nation-state.9 Despite the radical character of the People’s

Republic of China established in 1949 under Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, and

its reclusive behavior during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC is nevertheless established

as a modern nation-state, blending its people’s traditions and political philosophies with

an imported ideology, and therefore “fruition”.

From this consideration, what elements stand out as prominent features of its

people’s political thought that can serve as ground from which to assess modern Chinese

concepts of the meaning of the political? A massive question, to be sure, and one that

might at least spark at least three subordinate and more immediately relevant questions:

First, to what extent do remnants of the centuries-long Chinese emphasis on the unitary

world (天下 tian 1-xia 4) still inform Chinese comprehension of the political? Is the 2008

PRC “no-politics at the Olympics” policy in any sense reflective of the Chinese self-

comprehension of its Middle Kingdom’s status, and that centrality excuses the state from

ordinary political requirements?

Secondly, political activity in China traditionally stands in contrast to the chaos (混亂 hun 3 luan 4) that lies beneath the calm surface of human activity. Politics amounts to

those actions of governmental authorities who, on the basis of the Confucian concept

“mandate of heaven” (天命 t’ien 1 ming 4) are able to suppress chaos, a “breakdown of

9 Ibid., I: 9-10. Hsiao goes on (I:19) to offer an alternative division of Chinese political thought into three eras: that of the Feudal Era as it emerges from Chinese tribal life, centered around the concept of “all under heaven” and a self-understanding of China as the political center; that of the authoritarian empire and its many dynasties (the two millenia from Ch’in and Han through Ch’ing); and that of the modern Chinese nation-state (from 1898 onward).

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the social order” and “unrestrained release of aggression.”10 It is the duty of government

to govern wisely and well, and the duty of the peasant and other citizen classes to respect

the authority of government, and to refrain from questioning authority. Upon the death of

a strong authority figure, a reversion to a condition of chaos is a constant danger. To what

extent does the non-political Olympics doctrine reflect governmental duty to continue to

suppress the chaos that lurks below the surface of human affairs?

For these longstanding traditional reasons deeply embedded in Chinese social

culture and the Chinese soul—and for others more immediate and practical—political

scientist Richard H. Solomon found ethnic Chinese from the PRC, Hong Kong, and

Taiwan interviewed in Hong Kong in 1969 uniformly reluctant to discuss politics.11 One

respondent explained why he agreed with the statement, “I very seldom discuss [political

questions].”

Because society today is very complicated. Each person’s thinking, point of view, and opinions are different. If you discuss these differences you won’t be able to reach any conclusion. Possibly it would lead to some trouble. (What kind of trouble?) People will not understand your thinking. Possibly they will think it is not correct. They might pay special attention to your behavior, or even lock you up.12

Solomon’s respondents noted that on the occasions when they did discuss political

matters, it was among close friends and family, or among those with whom they knew in

advance that there would be general agreement. This idea connects well to a third

question, concerning the emphasis Chinese culture places on the concept of consistency

with the community, from the family and village to larger society, expressed politically

10 As defined by Richard H. Solomon, Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 565.

11 In describing his interview process, Solomon notes that “’Political’ issues had to be handled with some care while interviewing in Taiwan and Hong Kong, however, for merely the use of the word ‘politics’ was sufficient to raise anxieties in some respondents.” Ibid., 9.

12 As quoted in Solomon, 146-147.

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both traditionally and most recently in 2005 as the official policy of the regime, “building

a Harmonious Society” (和谐社会).13 As well, one is reminded of the traditional Chinese

hope that the pattern of a period of order, followed by collapse and chaos, followed by

political authority acting harshly to return order, followed by a new regime of political

authority, can be got beyond through “great togetherness” or “great unity” (大同 dai 4

tong 2). One of Solomon’s respondents in 1969 described this as a time in which:

. . . everyone has a spirit of mutual assistance and this means that there will be no conflict among the common people and no war between one nation and another. [How can ta-t’ung be attained?] Mankind can create this. If everyone has received an education and everyone’s point of view is the same, then there will be no disorder, there will be no war . . . Education must be universal, then everyone’s knowledge will be about the same . . . If everyone’s opinions are not the same it can lead to quarreling and confusion.14

Intellectual Heritage: Modern Chinese Political Thought

For only a brief period in the early 20th century at the decline and fall of the Qing

dynasty, and with the life and work of Sun Yat-sen and his “Three Principles of the

People”, do alternative conceptions of the role of government appear, making possible

the contemplation of a Chinese republic with features of a constitutional government. But

China experienced the warlord era and civil war between Mao’s Communist and Chiang

Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces, interrupted by the invasion of Imperial Japan, and

temporary cooperation against this foreign power. The defeat of Japan was followed in

13 See, for example, Tang Jiaxuan,“Working Together to Pursue Peaceful Development and Build a Harmonious World,” a speech at the International Seminar on China’s Peaceful Development and a Harmonious World, Nov. 8, 2007, http://jm.chineseembassy.org/eng/xw/t379384.htm [Accessed Jan. 12, 2009], “China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society,” Washington Post, Oct. 12, 2006, A18, and “Building Harmonious Society CPC’s Top Task,” China Daily, Feb. 20, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/20/content_417718.htm [Jan. 12, 2009].

14 Respondent T-28 in Solomon, 153.

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time by renewed civil war and in 1949 the founding of the People’s Republic of China,

and its settling in as the world’s largest single-party modern political system.

Communist doctrine as expressed by Marx in the Manifesto holds that politics, like

religion and morality, is an expression of “class antagonism” and it is only when

humankind have, via revolution, advanced from the epoch of class antagonisms to

communist society that politics, and the exploitation of one part of society by another,

will cease. Before this can be realized, however, revolution is essential, and Marx

explains that revolutionary politics necessitates rule by the proletariat, and none other:

the first step in the revolution of the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class.15

For his part, Mao Zedong’s emphasis on politics as the means to achievement of

revolutionary aims is legendary. Indeed, Maoist doctrine about politics is often

summarized in his oft-quoted dictum, memorized by millions of Cultural Revolution

youth, that “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the

barrel of a gun,’” a statement pulled from his 1938 lectures On Protracted War16 That

document provides, however, alongside the body of Chinese communist literature, the

understanding that politics is “bloodless war” and war itself an extreme means of

achieving political objectives. Mao reduces human existence in these lecture to three

stages, beginning with millennia of the human war against nature for simple survival.

Following that is the second epoch, emerging from the end of clan society to the present,

15 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848). 16 As reproduced in Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung (Peking: Foreign Language Press,

1976), 60.

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and characterized by social divisions and warfare among nations and men. The

revolutionary war Mao believed imminent in 1938 will usher in, sooner or later, the third

epoch in which both war and its associate politics will be banished, and permanent peace

established.17

“Politics” (政 治 zheng 4 zhi 4) in the People’s Republic thus carries connotations

from both the long history of classical Chinese authoritarian-era traditions, as well as

Marxist-Leninist and Maoist conceptions of government.18 Politicization, and its cognate

verb, “to politicize” it should be understood, first appears in 18th century Britain as a

witticism, but rises to common usage with the emerging social sciences and the

beginnings of progressivism. In its transitive verb form it carries the meaning of making

political something that is otherwise not so. For Aristotle, “politicizing” would seem to

mean transforming something neutral or a-political into something directed toward the

good of the polis, and thereby its moral/political improvement. Yet the overwhelmingly

negative connotation that the term holds in our time—easily verified by means of

Google’s news function—reminds us that modernity brings with it an end to the

Aristotelian comprehensive character of political science, and that it is no longer

preeminent or even prominent among the social sciences, but merely one among many.

Chinese Political Doctrine and the Olympic Games

17 Mao Zedong, On Protracted War, May 1939, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm [Sept. 17, 2009].

18 Collections of classical Chinese political philosophic texts often point out the resilience of their core ideas in modern Chinese political expression, e.g. Sebastian de Grazia, ed., Masters of Chinese Political Thought: From the Beginnings to the Han Dynasty (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 9.

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As Xu Guoqi points out in his 2008 book, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports

1895-2008, pre-revolutionary Chinese Olympic actions were heavily informed by

politics, in one form or other. The chief motivations for the regime in Olympic

aspirations during the first half of the 20th century were international recognition of the

nationalist regime, defiance of the Japanese occupation on Manchuria—Japan attempted

in 1936 to sponsor a team from its puppet state Manchukuo—and, in the words of a

government report, “to encourage Chinese patriotic and nationalistic spirit.”19

Upon expulsion of Chinese nationalist forces to Taiwan and establishment of the

People’s Republic in 1949, the question of Chinese participation in the Olympics was

immediately conjoined with Cold War international relations in general, and the question

of the Republic of China, Taiwan in particular. During the 1970s, as the IOC debated

inclusion of PRC replacing ROC participation, a central point of objection was the extent

to which PRC athletes were, in effect, themselves politicized. The 1978 report by two of

the three IOC members appointed by IOC President Killanin to help resolve the dispute

observed after touring Beijing’s Olympic training facilities that “there exists much

evidence that [Beijing’s] All-China Sports Federation (Olympic Committee) is a state-

controlled organization and is not an independent body as required under the terms of the

IOC Charter . . .”20 The deadlock between PRC and ROC participation in the Olympics

was broken by Deng Xiaoping personally in the post-Cultural Revolution late 1970s,

largely as a means of reestablishing foreign relations with other nations, and, establishing

19 Guoqi, 48.20 Report by Lance Cross and Anthony Bridge in Minutes of the Eighty-First IOC Session,

Montevideo, April 5-7, 1979, as reproduced in Guoqi, 106.

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even prior to resolution of the Hong Kong question, the doctrine of “one country, two

systems.”21

About the PRC’s Olympic policies in general, Xu Guoqi’s assessment in Olympic

Dreams is that “Mao and his followers used sports (and other cultural activities) to serve

politics and revolution,” and that while other nations had taken a similar path, “the

Chinese have shown unbridled enthusiasm for using sports for political purposes, most

especially for strengthening the ruling party’s legitimacy and as a means of garnering

international prestige.”22 Sporting events were used to good revolutionary effect, for

example, as a means to build relations with China’s neighbors, North Korea in particular,

and in relations with developing countries under the slogan, “Friendship first,

competition second.”23 This policy included a willingness by Chinese officials to order

their teams to lose intentionally, and an attempt during the 1960s to design GANEFO

(Games of the Newly Emerging Forces) as an alternative to the Olympics alongside IOC

pariah-state Indonesia.24

At least one nameless PRC diplomat in conversation with IOC representatives in

the early 1950s is reported to have clung strongly to orthodox Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

doctrine, insisting explicitly that politics is the determining factor in sports policies.25 Xu

Guoqi’s account of PRC actions respecting Olympics would indicate consistency with

this, certainly during Mao’s lifetime, and on into the 1980s, and that any merger of

Chinese political doctrine with Olympic Committee doctrine—that the Olympics is

21 Guoqi, 114.22 Guoqi, 49. 23 Ibid.24 Ibid., 52-54.25 Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, Illinois: Human

Kinetics, 1999), 99.

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neutral political territory—would be difficult if not impossible. Indeed, as recounted by

Xu Guoqi, emphasis on winning the gold became an essential matter of state policy in the

1980s, with the National Sports Commission in 1979 naming Olympics participation and

success “an important but pressing political task.”26 Following PRC’s initial success in

the 1984 Los Angeles games, Deng Xiaoping himself voiced the opinion that the country

should focus on improving its Olympic teams, leading to diversion of financial resources

toward producing Olympic athletes. In Xu Guoqi’s account, this led, if anything, to a

hyper-politicizing of the Olympics in China, with national honor attached in the years

leading to Beijing tied directly to the gold medal count, and increasing funding for

Chinese Olympic athletes in boarding schools and Olympic training centers.

The question of political connections at the Olympics for China does not appear in

political rhetoric of either 1994 or 1996. In both instances the immediate matter

concerned Olympics attendance by Republic of China on Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui.

In 1994’s Hiroshima summer games, the PRC successfully prevented Taiwan’s President

Lee from appearing in Japan. Two years later, in February 1996 at the Winter Asian

Games in Harbin, China, IOC representatives felt themselves compelled to reassure the

PRC that neither President Lee nor other ROC Taiwan officials would receive an

invitation to the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games. As reported by the New York Times, the

IOC’s action was prompted by Chinese Minister of State for Physical Culture and Sports

Wu Shaozu had recalled for the media the outrage China had felt about the 1994

invitation, concluding that, “If something similar happens in Atlanta, things will get

much worse than Hiroshima.”27

26 Emphasis added. Guoqi, 215. 27 Jerry Schwartz, “Taiwan Officials Not Invited” New York Times, Feb. 9, 1996,

http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/09/sports/olympics-taiwan-officials-not-invited.html?n=Top

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On July 13, 2001 at the conclusion of the 112th International Olympic Committee

(IOC) Session, the Committee’s President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, announced that the

Committee had awarded the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing. The New York Times

reported that the news was greeted in the streets of the People’s Republic capitol city

with celebratory flags and fireworks, and that it served as “a triumphant send-off” for

President Jiang Zemin, as he embarked on a state visit to the U.S. The same news story

noted that human rights groups who had opposed Beijing’s candidacy were answered by

Chinese Minister of Sport, Yuan Weimin, who responded that, “Like all countries, China

has certain areas where something is left to be desired,” but that the economic progress

brought by the Olympics, and China’s anticipated admission into the World Trade

Organization, “will bring along advances in culture, health, education, sport and, not least

of all, corresponding progress in human rights causes.” Likewise, IOC Executive Director

Francois Carrard answered human rights doubters with this hopeful explanation of the

Committee’s thinking:

Some people say, because of serious human rights issues, “We close the door and say no,” Mr. Carrard said. The other way is to bet on openness. Bet on the fact that in the coming seven years, openness, progress and development in many areas will be such that the situation will be improved. We are taking the bet that seven years from now we will see many changes.28

Confirmation of this line of thinking was given by U.S. Olympic Committee President

Sandra Baldwin, who proclaimed herself “O.K. with Beijing,” adding that “I think the

Olympics should supersede politics . . . It’s the greatest peacetime event in the world.”29

The first explicit references by PRC sources to politicizing the Olympics appears in

the dispute concerning the 2008 venue in Spring 2001 as the U.S. House of

%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FO%2FOlympic%20Games [Jan. 20, 2009].28 Longman.29 Ibid.

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Representatives International Relations Committee passed a resolution in opposition to

awarding the Games to Beijing due to its record of human rights abuses, especially

respecting followers of the Falun Gong movement. CNN reported that, “Chinese officials

have urged the IOC not to mix sport and politics when it votes in July to select the

Olympics 2008 host among Beijing, Toronto, Paris, Osaka, or Istanbul.”30

The next significant references to politicizing the Olympics don’t appear until the

Games were 18 months away and the Chinese connections with Sudan’s government

receive significant press attention. Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, speaking in April

2007, using language that would be repeated numerous times in the coming months,

argued in a press conference that any discussion of boycotts (about Chinese connections

with Sudan) or pressure connected to the Olympics emerge either from ignorance of

Chinese policy or “other motives.” In either case,

This is not in compliance with the internationally recognized nonpolitical principle of sports and runs counter to the Olympic spirit and the wishes of the people in the world. I believe that next year’s Olympic Games in Beijing will be a successful and spectacular event that satisfies the people in the world.31

In response to mounting criticism of the PRC human rights situation in May 2007, a PRC

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated:

Recently, some organizations and individuals politicized the Olympic Games issue, making use of it to exert pressure on China. China expresses its resolute opposition. It goes against the Olympic spirit as well as the common aspiration of the people in the world. We are opposed to any attempt to politicize the Olympic Games.32

30 “China Slams U.S. Olympic Resolution,” CNN, March 31, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/30/china.olympics/index.html [Jan. 30, 2001].

31 Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Holds a Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Journalists on the Darfur Issue of Sudan, April 12, 2007 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t311008.htm [Aug. 14, 2007].

32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on 15 May 2007” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t319836.htm [Dec. 14, 2008].

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By this point, China’s critics had picked up the “politicizing” rhetoric, and some

already aimed to turn the tables on the Foreign Ministry by adopting the same tactic: In a

letter of May 16, 2007 from a self-described “coalition of native Chinese and Asian

human rights defenders” led by Olympic Watch, writing IOC President Jacques Rogge in

May 2007 requesting the Beijing Organizing Committee (BOCOG) be held accountable

“for the lack of progress on human rights since 2001 . . .” Olympic Watch, founded in

2001 upon China’s winning the venue battle, published a Manifesto that same year

pledging support of the Games should China’s human rights record improve, but nowhere

utilizing “politicizing” rhetoric. In its May 2007 letter, however, the authors used the

issue as their main point of criticism, demanding that,

in line with the Olympic Charter, BOCOG is immediately de-politicized. It must be run as a non-partisan non-political organization promoting Olympic ideals, including human rights and dignity. At this point it is an organ composed of Chinese Communist Party officials, interested primarily in the political propaganda abuse of the Games.33

Unfazed, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs would continue to utilize the non-political

rhetoric regularly throughout the summer. Special Representative for Darfur Liu Guijin

replied to questions respecting Chinese connections with Sudan at the UN in September

2007 this way: “The Olympic Games and Darfur are totally irrelevant. Non-politicization

is one of the fundamental principles of the Olympic Games, which is a great event to be

hosted by China for the people around the world . . .”34

Steven Spielberg’s decision of Feb. 12, 2008 to withdraw as artistic adviser to the

Opening Ceremony as a means to protest PRC policy of non-interventionism and

33 Forum for a Democratic China and Asia, Federation for a Democratic China, Olympic Watch, China Rights Network, Chinese Students and Scholars Organization in Germany, Letter to Jacques Rogge, May 16, 2007, http://www.olympicwatch.org/news.php?id=104 [Jan. 15, 2009].

34 “China Opposes Linking Games to Darfur Issue,” Xinhua, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2007-09/12/content_6100457.htm [Nov. 14, 2008].

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cooperation with Sudan respecting Darfur35 prompted a lengthy response in the People’s

Daily,36 and a news article produced by Xinhua news agency. The latter piece included a

quote from Jamaica’s track and field star Usain Bolt from which the editors were at some

pains to extrapolate the non-political doctrine:

Jamaica’s Usain Bolt said on Friday that athletes want to enjoy only the competition in this year’s Beijing Olympic Games. Bolt . . . said in a Puma promotion that what athletes focus on is competition instead of politics. “I didn’t know a lot about that,” he said of the decision of quitting Beijing Olympics by Hollywood movie director Steven Spielberg and some other Westerners to boycott the Beijing Games. “But I think (for athletes) this is mainly about working hard and getting to the Olympics. And we really look forward to it. “Everything is really focusing on that. We really want to go out and compete.”37

More cooperative to the Xinhua’s needs was Belgian tennis player Justine Henin, whose

comments required no extrapolation, but were deemed by the editors worthy of emphasis,

lest there be any misunderstanding:

Bolt’s comment echoed what Justine Henin insisted on—no politics at the Games. “Politics and sport must remain separate,” the world number one tennis player said on Tuesday. “Athletes must be focused on our job which is sport, which is our passion. We all hope to bring joy to the people watching the Games.”38

By late March 2008 public attention to Tibet and Sudan alongside nagging

questions of human rights abuses in the PRC prompted Daily Telegraph columnist and

long-time Beijing resident Richard Spencer to write a column detailing the extent of

Communist Party leadership positions in the Chinese Olympic team.39 By early April

35 “Steven Spielberg pulls out of Olympics in protest at China’s policy on Darfur” [London] Times, February 13, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3360577.ece [Feb. 12, 2009].

36 “Politicizing Beijing Olympics Unacceptable” People’s Daily Online, Feb. 20, 2008 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/6357571.html [Feb. 12, 2009].

37 “Athletes look to competing in non-political Olympics” (Xinhua), Feb. 16, 2008. <http://www.chinadaily.cn/olympics/2008-02/16/content_6460227.htm> [Feb. 12, 2009].

38 Ibid.39 Richard Spencer, “The Olympics Were Already Political” Daily Telegraph, March 25, 2008,

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/richard_spencer/blog/2008/03/25/the_olympics_were_already_political [Jan. 20, 2009].

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2008, criticism of the PRC torch relay, the March PRC crackdown in Tibet, and various

other actions taken in China, including the April 3 sentencing of human rights activist Hu

Jia to a sentence of 3.5 years, had reached new levels. Indeed, media reporters had begun

picking up the line from Amnesty International and other human rights organizations that

the Olympics was calling into question the prospect of human rights improvement, and

could be said to be having the effect of worsening China’s human rights situation. In

response,

IOC member Hein Verbruggen said the implication in an Amnesty International report this week that awarding the 2008 Games to China had made human rights worse was “blatantly untrue”. The Dutchman, chairman of the IOC’s inspection commission for the Beijing Games, also attacked politicians who talked about boycotting the opening ceremony of the Aug. 8-24 Games after doing big business deals with the Chinese. “We are not a political organization, so in spite of all the criticism we get, I am not afraid to tell you that we should not speak out on political issues,” he said at a news conference at the end of the final IOC inspection.40

This same month the Chinese position received support from Pakistan’s President

Musharraf, touring the country. Interviewed by China Daily, Musharraf stated that “You

cannot superimpose the human rights and democracy environment of a Western country

onto other countries . . . That is the error that the West makes and Western media makes.

This does not work at all and this must stop.”41 On the other hand, employment of the

non-political Olympics theme appeared as well in the May 6, 2008 edition of the South

China Morning Post, which editorialized on Tibet as follows:

Inviting the Dalai Lama to the Beijing Games is the best solution to the current crisis. . . The Olympics is the largest event on earth but also a non-political one. Inviting the Dalai Lama does not contravene Beijing’s current

40 Nick Mulvenney, “Olympics-IOC Vigorously Defends Non-political Role in China” Reuters, April 3, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSPEK112089 [Jan. 20, 2009].

41 As quoted in “Stop ‘politicizing’ Beijing Olympics, Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf tells the West,” Daily Telegraph, April 14, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/olympics/2297337/Stop-politicising-Beijing-Olympics-Pakistans-Pervez-Musharraf-tells-the-West.html [Jan. 12, 2009].

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position on the Tibet issue, summarized in Deng Xiaoping’s words: “Everything can be discussed provided it is not independence.” The invitation can indeed be seen as Beijing’s challenge for the Dalai Lama to back his pro-Olympics words.42

June 2008 was marked by the single instance of the IOC turning the tables on China

and issuing its own complaint about Chinese politicization, prompted by Tibetan

Communist Party chief Zhang Qingli’s speech following Tibetan protests at the Olympic

Torch Relay route and the subsequent Chinese crackdown. The speech that roused the

IOC assured listeners and readers of government new agencies that “the red flag with five

stars will always flutter” over the Tibetan sky, and that “we will certainly be able to

totally smash the splittist schemes of the Dalai Lama clique and safeguard the stability of

Tibet and national security so as to contribute to the success of the Beijing Olympic

Games.” 43 The IOC letter, according to an IOC spokeswoman, was sent to BOCOG head

Liu Qi and “reminded” BOCOG that “there’s a clear separation between sports and

politics.” This in turn forced a response from the Chinese foreign ministry—and the

closest thing to a direct acknowledgement that politics for Beijing clearly meant

something different than to the IOC--as recounted in the June 27, 2008 Wall Street

Journal, denying the charge:

China’s solid position is against the politicizing of the Olympics,” said Liu Jianchao, spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said that Mr. Zhang’s remarks were intended to foster “a stable and harmonious environment for the Olympics.44

As the date for the opening ceremony approached, the House Foreign Affairs

Committee approved HR 1370 in July 2008 passed a resolution linking China’s human 42 “Beijing Should Be Inviting the Dalai Lama to the Games,” South China Morning Post, May 6,

2008.43 Gordon Fairclough and Stacy Mechtry, “IOC Rebukes China for Dalai Lama Tirade,” Wall Street

Journal, June 27, 2008.44 Fairclough and Mechtry.

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rights conditions to the Olympics, prompting a response from the National People’s

Congress, and utilizing the by now well-established phrasing and language.45 Also in the

final few weeks, foreign media present for the Olympics made clear, if obliquely, that

they were not unaware of differing western and Chinese conceptions of the political.

With respect to the apparently heavy-handed government management of Olympic

athletes in training, New York Times reporter Juliet Macur confirmed the pressures and

rewards for athletic success in the system. Aside from their managers’ refusal, at least in

some cases, to allow athletes to quit, the central complaint became the government’s

intense pressure on athletes to train at the expense of any non-sports scholarship that

might lead to post-Olympic employment.46 National Public Radio carried a story by

Louisa Lim about the country’s government-funded and managed training programs,

describing the “top-down centralized control” Chinese sports system as “the last bastion

of the socialist planned economy,” and quoting former Chinese Olympic swimmer Fan

Hong as saying, “Competitive sport is war without gunfire.”47 A similar story in the June

12, 2008 edition of Time magazine argued that the Beijing venue itself—with the Chinese

public in effect demanding victory in the gold medal race—was responsible for the

continuation of the sports academies, and the huge devotion of public funds.48

Christian Science Monitor reporter Carol Huang’s July 16 story on Olympic

volunteers highlighted the Chinese understanding of Olympic “volunteerism”, in fact

45 “NPC Opposes U.S. Resolution Politicizing Olympics,” Xinhua, July 31, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/31/content_6894157.htm [Jan. 15, 2009].

46 See Juliet Macur, “In China’s Medal Factory, Winners Cannot Quit,” New York Times, June 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/21/sports/olympics/21athlete.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 [Jan. 7, 2009].

47 Louisa Lim, “Boarding Schools Generate China’s Sport Stars,” NPR, July 21, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92479526 [Jan. 9, 2009].

48 Hannah Beech/Weifang, “China’s Sports School: Crazy for Gold” Time, June 21, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1813961-2,00.html [Jan. 11, 2009].

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closely managed by government, and connected this to the PRC conception of NGOs: Of

the 100,000 Olympic volunteer hosts, and an additional 1 million “social volunteers”

stationed around Beijing and serving as both guides and lookouts for “troublemakers,”

Huang writes, “This is volunteerism Beijing 2008 style—managed rigorously by the state

and for the state.”49 The politics of Beijing-style volunteerism relates to PRC conceptions

of non-government organizations (NGO), as explained in the article by Deputy Director

of Beijing’s Tsinghua University NGO Research Center Jia Xijin: “The government has

its own structure to organize volunteers [and] prefers such ways rather than to let the

volunteers organize themselves.”50 The article continued to consider at some length

current policy respecting NGOs in China, noting that government registration is required

once organizations reach a size of 20 or more, and that they are understood as

“partnering” with government, serving as its adjuncts.

A Clash of Civilizations respecting the Meaning of “Politics”?

Looking back on not just the Beijing Olympics of 2008 but the entire decade

leading to it, one might argue that China found the opportunity--or had to of necessity--to

effectively promulgate and employ its own understanding of politics. That understanding

holds that single party government serves effectively to manage society in a way that

liberal democracy cannot offer. Traditional Chinese perceptions about the problem of

chaos and the need to promote harmonious society above individualism is, in effect,

introduced firmly and confidently, yet without the trauma of 1989. The success of the

PRC definition during this time period can be measured alongside the relatively weak

49 Carol Huang, “For Beijing’s Olympic Volunteers, the Rules are Many,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 2008.

50 As quoted in Huang.

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response from the West beyond the complaints of a few journalists. Hardly in itself a

“clash of civilizations.”

Limitations of PRC government materials to public access mean that the details of

the “no politicizing the Olympics” policy, and in particular, its intentionality, will likely

be known only to a few. Given the partial knowledge we can have of its history and the

thinking behind it, what can one conclude? Certainly it can be said that Chinese Ministry

of Foreign Affairs personnel developed a line of argument, and used it effectively for

many months, and if they failed to persuade human rights advocates, it is likely that

persuasion was probably not its objective. It was rather more likely a response meant to

slow the opposition, and in this it worked effectively enough. It is therefore likely that the

policy does not end with the closing ceremonies, and that it will reappear with future

Olympiad competition, regardless of venue.

Returning to our three questions posed above, one may first point out that the “no

politicization” line of argument does fit well with other PRC arguments grounded in the

understanding that conceptions of human rights and political systems themselves are

unique to particular cultures, and that criticism of human rights abuses by outsiders is

inappropriate. Indeed, the PRC Foreign Ministry has become adept at claiming its unique

culture isn’t understood abroad, that its special version of democracy is unique to its

situation, and that criticism is therefore out of bounds.51

With respect to traditional Chinese concepts of the role of government in

suppressing the chaos that lurks beneath the calm surface of political life, and the

51 On this point, see People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Office, Building of Political Democracy: White Paper on Political Democracy, Oct. 19, 2005, <http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy.html>.[Feb. 15, 2009].

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“harmonious society”, these conceptions appear frequently in Chinese rhetorical

responses to external criticism during 2007 and 2008. And the thousands mobilized,

employed, relocated, detained, or otherwise affected by the Olympic Games and

preparations relearned or rediscovered in manifest ways these concepts’ continuing

preeminence in civic affairs over and above external conceptions of human rights, free

press, and freedom of association. By contrast, it is unlikely that another Olympic host

government’s employment of a similar “no-politicization” policy to ward off criticism

would meet with success.

In sum, the “no-politicization” rhetorical tactic worked so well for the PRC in 2008

for several reasons. It was in keeping with a sufficient degree of traditional Chinese

conceptions about the nature of politics and the role of state authority. It was likewise

consistent with Chinese Communist Party principles and policies without requiring

inconvenient reference to the Party’s monopoly on political power. And it was finally

effective because its audience—largely, but not completely—was informed by modern

western progressive conceptions that politics is an expression of a particular culture (i.e.

multiculturalism), by its own negative conceptions of politics, and by the idea that

international organizations are automatically preferable to the national, by the Kantian

idealism of the Olympics movement itself, and therefore had no effective response.

The Olympics now months ago concluded, the most intriguing questions concern

the future. The People’s Republic of China can be expected to continue to utilize

strategies similarly grounded in the years ahead, arguing that its understanding not just of

particular policies, but of the nature of politics itself, must be respected. If the nation’s

current growth trajectory continues, there is every likelihood that it will be in a strong

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position to do so, at least promoting and perhaps even exporting Chinese perceptions

about political life abroad. Avoiding a clash with the West will require the Chinese and

their western counterparts to interact, avoiding the temptation to close or limit trade and

economic ties, cultural and human connections. The interesting challenge for Chinese

will be persuading the west and developing countries that its model, associated ultimately

with one people and region, is adaptable to the rest of the world.

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Appendix:

Paper Proposal 120 words:

Since the 2001 announcement that the International Olympic Committee had awarded the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing, an essential and oft-heard element of Chinese foreign policy and government pronouncements has been the a-political nature of the Olympics, and the necessity to separate the events themselves from political discussions. While on the one hand this idea is consistent with the progressive spirit of the modern Olympics, and is echoed by many nations’ governments (including the U.S.), Chinese expression of the doctrine is unique, blending as it does Chinese political traditions and Party ideology with western progressivism. The author proposes a paper that will focus on the intellectual heritage of this doctrine within the People’s Republic of China, its rigorous employment during the August 2008 Beijing Olympics and immediate aftermath, and the extent to which it is likely to find application in other situations by the Beijing regime.

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