“no representation without population”: maryland’s attempt...

Laura Royden 17.267 Democracy in America December 11, 2013

1

“No Representation without Population”: Maryland’s Attempt to Fix Prison-Based Gerrymandering Introduction In 2010, Maryland passed the No Representation Without Population Act, which changed

the way prisoners were accounted for in legislative districts. Instead of being counted at their

prisons, they will now be counted as living at their last-known home address. The motivation for

this was nominally to fix the prison-based gerrymandering present by miscounting a portion of

Maryland’s population, along with curtailing all of the problems in representation and democracy

that accompanied these practices. However, Maryland failed to follow these changes with non-

partisan redistricting and ended up with a partisan gerrymander that technically fixed the prison-

based gerrymandering, but appeared to leave all of the problems and side effects. In order to fix

prison-based gerrymandering for good, Maryland should continue its new plan of redistributing

prisoners but should then develop a non-partisan redistricting plan to work towards a fair electoral

map that allows equal representation and democracy for everyone.

Prison-Based Gerrymandering and its Effect on Representation Across the country, political districts are drawn using the results of the US Census, which

happens every ten years. The Census Bureau apportions representatives per state based on changes

in state population, but the drawing of individual districts is left up to state and local governments.1

But one major flaw in this method of redistricting is the way prisoners are accounted for. In the US

Census, prisoners are counted as living in the prison that they are currently incarcerated in. When

states then draw legislative districts based on these census results, they include prisoners in the

1 U.S. Census Bureau. “Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, 2010”. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2010. Found at http://www.census.gov/2010census/news/pdf/apport2010_table1.pdf


2

districts that their prisons are in. Even though they are forced to live there and are not members of

the greater community, they are still counted as living in that district and included in population

totals.

The method of counting prisoners in their prison districts becomes even more problematic

when considered along with the fact that prisoners are not eligible to vote. In Maryland, convicted

felons are only eligible to vote once they have served their full incarceration sentence and

completed any parole or probation once they are released.2 Assuming they complete these things,

they can regain the right to vote again. But while they are in prison, even though they are

disenfranchised, they are still included in the population totals for the district. Essentially, prisons

can be used as population buffers. Because their residents cannot vote but they are still counted as

residents of the district, the votes of everyone else in the district become more heavily weighted.

This method of districting prisoners in their prisons has come to be known as “prison-based

gerrymandering”, as it arguably gerrymanders districts in an unfair way by strategically

incorporating prisons (large blocks of citizens who cannot vote) into certain districts. Prison-based

gerrymandering creates two major problems that could affect representation: malapportionment and

overrepresentation of certain groups. Both of these could lead to non-majoritarian policy outcomes

and could impede democracy in Maryland.

Malapportionment, or creating electoral districts with unequal ratios of constituents to

elected officials, was a major problem in the United States in the 1960s. Districts were commonly

not redrawn after population shifts, which meant that fast-growing urban areas had significantly

more constituents in them than surrounding rural areas, even though they had the same

2 Maryland State Senate. “Voter Registration Protection Act”. Senate Bill 488. March 22, 2007. Found at http://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/maryland_voter_act.pdf


3

representation.3 The issue was brought to the Supreme Court in the 1960s in Baker v. Carr and

Reynolds v. Sims. The Supreme Court ruled that malapportionment was unconstitutional, and states

were mandated to draw districts for the US House of Representatives and state legislatures that

contained equal (or approximately equal) populations. States then began drawing new legislative

districts decennially after each Census, in order to account for population shifts. This nominally

made districts equal, as they were being updated for population changes and were mandated to hold

approximately equal populations in compliance with the “one person, one vote” principle, which

holds that all constituents’ votes should be approximately equal in a democracy.

This method of districting prisoners in their prisons arguably does not violate the “one

person, one vote” principle, as prisoners have lost the right to vote after being convicted, do legally

reside in their prisons, and need to still be counted somehow for population purposes in the Census.

At first glance, it seems like the counting of prisoners could be similar to the counting of children:

children also cannot vote, but are still counted in the Census and included in population totals for

legislative districting purposes. Likewise, the counting of prisoners also resembles the way the

census counts college students, as both are counted as living at their institutions and families are

explicitly told not to include them as family members.4

But counting prisoners in political districts where their prisons are creates malapportionment

problems that are not present when children are counted as living in their family homes. Prisoners

do not belong to the communities where their prisons are. When prisoners are released from prisons,

they will likely return to the communities they came from, instead of staying around their prison.

This is not the case when children are counted as living with their families or when college students

3 Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz. Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002 4 Nancy Scola. “Making Prisoners Count”. The American Prospect. October 22, 2012. Found at http://prospect.org/article/making-prisoners-count


4

are counted as living at their colleges. Children grow up as part of the community and feel

connected to it, even though they are too young to vote. Likewise, while college students may not

get heavily invested in local politics, they tend to engage and interact with the community they

reside in while at school.5 In other words, both children and college students have other ways to

have their voice heard and feel like they are a part of the community. Prisoners do not. By forcing

them into a political district with a rural community they have no ties to and cannot participate in,

they functionally become a phantom population. Elected officials have no reason to represent the

interest of the prisoner group, since they have no attachment to the district, cannot vote, will most

likely not be around for future elections, and most likely will not ever willingly reside in the district,

unlike the rest of the constituency.

The non-incarcerated remainder of the constituency is the only section that is listened to and

also the only section that can vote; this remainder of the constituency thus holds the same amount of

power as the entirety of constituencies without prisons, which is the essence of malapportionment.

One of the most extreme examples of this is from a ward in eastern Iowa, where out of the 1,400

constituents, 1,300 are in prison and only 58 are non-prisoners.6 The three other city wards have

relatively equal populations around 1,400, but none of them contains a prison. Effectively, this

means that the 58 non-prison residents each have thirty times as much political power as residents

in the other three wards. When being interviewed by the New York Times, the city councilor from

the previously mentioned eastern Iowa district that was primarily prisoners remarked, “Do I

5 Ibid. 6 Sam Roberts. “Census Bureau’s Counting of Prisoners Benefits Some Rural Voting Districts”. The New York Times. October 23, 2008. Found at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/politics/24census.html


5

consider [the prisoners] my constituents? They don’t vote, so, I guess, not really.”7, highlighting the

problem quite nicely.

This malapportionment could lead to non-majoritarian outcomes, particularly in Maryland

when the demographics of the involved populations are considered. Prisons tend to be in rural areas

but prisoners are overwhelmingly from urban areas.8 The 2010 Census found that, of Maryland’s

nearly 17,000 prisoners, 7,797 of them were from Baltimore City alone (out of a total population of

626,664 for the city). On the other hand, Western Maryland (comprised of Allegany, Garrett, and

Washington Counties) had a total population of 252,614 and housed prisons that held 8,030

prisoners, even though only 665 prisoners in the state of Maryland came from those counties. By

counting prisoners as residing in their prisons for purposes of Maryland districting, Maryland’s

urban population is systematically undercounted and its rural population is systematically

overcounted.

This systematic undercounting of urban centers and overcounting of rural populations is

strikingly similar to the malapportionment problems present before “one person, one vote”, and we

could expect to see similar problems with representation here.9 Biasing the representation in favor

of rural constituents could lead to non-majoritarian policy outcomes driven by these rural

constituents. For instance, a rural constituency the size of one district could turn into two rural

districts padded with disenfranchised urban prisoners. This could result in the rural constituency

being able to elect two representatives who would argue for their interests, instead of the one they

fairly deserve. In even more extreme cases, like the Iowa constituency mentioned above, there are

7 Ibid. 8 Maryland Department of Planning. “2010 Adjusted Census Population for Maryland by County and Region”. 2011. Found at http://www.mdp.state.md.us/PDF/Redistricting/2010docs/Adj_2010_Tot_Pop_by_MDCntyReg.pdf 9 Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz. Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution.


6

clear non-majoritarian decisions being made when less than 5% of the population are the only ones

who can vote and are the only ones who are represented.

Prison-based gerrymandering in Maryland also seems like it could lead to unequal

representation of certain groups (namely differentiated by class and race), which could lead to non-

majoritarian outcomes.

Bartels and Gilens both discuss the prevalence of legislators favoring higher-income

constituents over lower-income ones.10 11 Notably, they did find that the preferences between higher

and lower income constituents did not differ considerably on many issues, but that representatives

were considerably more likely to listen to their richer constituents when the opinions between

classes differed. Even after for controlling for participation, voter turnout, and other methods of

political activism, lower class constituents were still less likely to be listened to. Brunner, Ross, and

Washington argue that the effects found by Bartels and Gillens are less extreme than they argue, as

Brunner et al found that representatives’ responsiveness to their constituents when classes clashed

depended on party: they found that Democrats were more likely to follow the views of lower class

constituents, and Republicans were more likely to follow the views of upper class constituents.12 All

three articles discuss the potential negative impact that such findings could have on democracy. If

certain class groups are responded to and represented more than others, a social and political

hierarchy is created. Policies are more likely to be enacted to meet these groups’ interests and thus

ignore lower-class interests.

10 Larry Bartels. “Economic Inequality and Political Representation.” 2006 11 Martin Gilens. “The Preference/Policy Link”. Affluence and Influence. Princeton University Press. July 22, 2012. 12 Eric Brunner, Stephen Ross, Ebonya Washington. “Does Less Income Mean Less Representation?” 2012.


7

Prison-based gerrymandering could exacerbate both of these inequalities. Maryland’s prison

population is overwhelmingly black and poor. Statewide, Maryland’s population is around 28%

black. But on average, 76% of the prison population is black.13 These numbers match with the

demographics of the areas where prisoners are most likely to be from (e.g., the population of

Baltimore City is 63.6% black) and where prisons commonly are (e.g., the population of

Washington County is only 10% black).14 Likewise, these prisoners are overwhelmingly likely to be

from lower social classes, many of who are living below the poverty line and are homeless and

unemployed.15

By counting prisoners, who are predominantly black and poor, as members of the

predominately middle or upper class white communities where prisons are located, the electoral

process becomes biased against these lower-class black communities. This can only add to the

discrimination and lack of responsiveness they already encounter. The original articles do not

discuss race, but it seems likely, given the correlation between race and social class, that black

communities in Maryland are also underrepresented. By undercounting lower-class black

communities due to prisoners living in prisons in other districts, Maryland has taken a political

group that would already be underrepresented and underresponded to and counted them as being

smaller than they are.

The problems presented by counting prisoners as being residents of their prisons for

districting purposes can be summarized as presenting an unfair and inaccurate view of populations.

13 Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Ziedenberg. “Race and Incarceration in Maryland”. Justice Policy Institute. October 23, 2003. Found at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpi/finalmrd.pdf 14 U.S. Census Bureau. “Maryland”. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2010. Found at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24000.html 15 Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Ziedenberg. “Race and Incarceration in Maryland”. Justice Policy Institute. October 23, 2003. Found at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpi/finalmrd.pdf


8

Because prisoners cannot vote, counting them as living in their prisons can create “phantom

populations” that can simply be used to pad districts, causing some the votes of some to be worth

more than the votes of others. Given the skewed demographics of prisoners in Maryland, this, in

turn, means that some communities and populations can hold more political power than others.

Prison-based gerrymandering thus seems to cause one old problem (malapportionment) that

has already been considered to be undemocratic enough that the Supreme Court had to rule on it,

and exacerbate another problem (unequal representation of populations) that has been shown to be

present and problematic to democracy.

Maryland’s Attempted Solution

Maryland’s proposed solution to prison-based gerrymandering came in the form of the No

Representation Without Population Act of 2010. The act required that incarcerated prisoners be

counted as living at their last-known home address instead of living at the prison, for the purpose of

congressional, legislative, and local districting. The federal prison in Cumberland, Maryland and its

1400 inmates are excluded from the redistricting plans and will continue to be counted as residents

of the prison, as federal prisons do not release last-known addresses.16 Logistically, the act requires

a decent amount of work from Maryland. The Maryland Department of Corrections must work with

the Department of Planning to verify the last-known addresses of prisoners and add them into the

correct districts. Any prisoners who were homeless or who had unknown last addresses would be

counted as living at the prisons. Any prisoners who previously lived outside of Maryland

immediately before they were incarcerated are not counted in any districts.

16 Maryland Department of Redistricting. “No Representation Without Population Act”. Maryland Department of Planning. 2012. Found at http://planning.maryland.gov/redistricting/2010/newlaw.shtml


9

Following the 2010 Census, 18,309 prisoners were shifted based on previous home

addresses. 16,988 of them were moved between districts and 1,321 were removed. The full table,

provided by the US Census Bureau, is attached as Appendix 1. As one would expect, urban areas

tended to gain population. Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Prince George’s County each

gained a net increase of over a thousand prisoners. Areas on the Eastern Shore where there are no

prisons also gained net prisoners (as it was impossible for them to lose any), but no county’s

population gained more than 200 prisoners, presumably due to their low starting populations. On

the other hand, rural counties such as Somerset County, Washington County, and Allegany County

lost significant numbers of prisoners. In particular, Somerset County lost 10.3% of its population,

due to a nearly 3,000-person prison whose inmates were redistributed.

Maryland redistricted following the results of the 2010 Census and the redistribution of

prisoners to their last-known home addresses. On October 3, 2011, the Governor’s Redistricting

Advisory Committee released its recommendations for redistricting.17 The plan was met with

criticism from Maryland Republicans, who claimed the Democrat-led committee had intentionally

gerrymandered the districts in favor of Democrats. But the bill passed through the state legislature

and was signed into law by Governor O’Malley on October 19, 2011.

By March 5, opponents to the new redistricting plan had obtained enough signatures to add

the approval of the plan as a ballot initiative in the 2012 elections, believing that Maryland voters

may vote against the redistricting plan. But the ballot initiative passed with 61% of the vote,

effectively ending debate on the new districts.18

17 Maryland Department of Redistricting. “Congressional and Legislative Districts”. Maryland Department of Planning. 2013. Found at http://www.mdp.state.md.us/Redistricting/home.shtml 18 “2012 General Election Results”. Maryland State Board of Elections. 2012. Found at http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_2012_4_00_1.html


10

Recommended Solution: Non-Partisan Redistricting with Redistributed Prisoners

In order to fix these institutional problems, Maryland should adopt non-partisan redistricting

in addition to having prisoners counted as living at their last-known home addresses. Counting

prisoners at their real address should give a more accurate picture of Maryland’s population and its

distribution throughout the state. When districts are drawn according to these populations, districts

should be fairer and more accurately represent the real constituencies. But non-partisan redistricting

should be adopted because it will prevent other types of gerrymandering, ensuring that districts

remain as compact and cohesive as possible. Without non-partisan gerrymandering, Maryland could

potentially ignore the larger problem by redistributing prisoners and then drawing districts in a way

that still favor the same communities. This would have technically solved the problem of prison-

based gerrymandering, but would not have solved the larger problems in representation and

democracy. Maryland’s proposed solution, in fact, comes close to doing exactly this, as is discussed

in the next section.

Evaluating the effectiveness of redistributing prisoners is hard to do, because Maryland was

the first state to adopt such a plan and has only had one election cycle (2012) with the new

districting. New York, Delaware, and California have since passed similar laws, but not enough

data is available to be able to see any changes (or lack thereof) in voting, policy, representation, or

responsiveness. Results of the prison redistribution indicate that the population shift was not

particularly large in both Maryland and New York.19 The redrawn New York districting plans

showed a slight increase in population in urban areas and a decrease in rural areas, but the districts

themselves did not change shape or size in a meaningful way. Although Maryland’s districts did

19 Maggie Clark. “Could a Recount of Prisoners Affect Elections?”. Stateline: The Pew Charitable Trusts. October 12, 2012. Found at http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/could-a-recount-of-prisoners-affect-elections-85899422906


11

change, it seems like the change was due more to partisan redistricting and less population shift

from prisoners, since the number of prisoners shifted was so low.20 From looking at the shifted

numbers, it seems that redistributing prisoners did succeed in giving more accurate population

totals. Both New York and Maryland showed increases in urban centers and decreases in rural

areas, as is expected. The magnitude of the change is also somewhat expected, as prisoners are only

around 1% of the population, and thus should not significantly impact districts.

Jason P. Kelly’s article, The Strategic Use of Prisons in Partisan Gerrymandering, provides

one of the few quantitative views of prison-based gerrymandering and its effects. He looked at the

changes in districts containing and around prisons over time and found that the prison-based

gerrymandering was incorporated into most plans:

On average, we can expect a party that has recently taken control of the redistricting process to draw more than 5,000 prisoners from districts controlled by the other party or marginal districts into their safest districts. Further, as shown with the Texas and Florida cases, states that aggressively pursue such a strategy will shift tens of thousands of inmates into the districts that they are the least likely to lose over the following 10 years.21

He found that both Democratic and Republican legislators were likely to draw plans that

incorporated these large blocs of non-voters into districts that they would win. This strategy creates

safe districts for their party, but uses the minimal number of their voters, allowing them to

redistribute others into more competitive districts to give them a greater advantage there.

Importantly, he found that the change in prison populations among districts was only statistically

significant after the party in control of districting switched. These results indicate that legislators

only move prison populations around when it helps their party (presumably, if there is no change in

20 Maryland Department of Planning. “2010 Adjusted Census Population for Maryland by County and Region”. 2011. Found at http://www.mdp.state.md.us/PDF/Redistricting/2010docs/Adj_2010_Tot_Pop_by_MDCntyReg.pdf 21 Jason P. Kelly. “The Strategic Use of Prisons in Partisan Gerrymandering”. Legislative Studies Quarterly. Vol 37, Issue 1. February 2012. Found at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00037.x/full


12

power, the same party continues to control redistricting and has already shifted prison populations

to their advantage).

These results highlight the need for non-partisan redistricting to fully fix the problems

surrounding prisons. Even if prisoners are properly redistributed, it seems likely that partisan

redistricting could still take advantage of the high number of disenfranchised prisoners in urban

areas and create similarly gerrymandered districts that take advantage of this non-voting bloc.

The empirical evidence on non-partisan redistricting, however, is somewhat mixed. Michael

McDonald argues in favor of them, saying that, while non-partisan redistricting is not perfect,

appointing an independent committee to develop redistricting plans is one of the key factors in an

ideal redistricting process.22 He argues that states with partisan committees (or committees whose

members are appointed on a partisan basis) are prone to creating gerrymandered maps, and that

commissioners should be removed from politics as much as possible. They should be focused on

drawing districts that conform to objective criteria (such as compactness and cohesiveness) and they

should be accountable to the public, not to partisan legislators.

The main problem with non-partisan redistricting seems to be that it is hard to make it truly

non-partisan. It is nearly impossible to create districts that are compact, meaningful, cohesive,

competitive, and allow for minority views to be heard; many of these factors are frequently at odds.

Thus, some factors have to be chosen over others, which inevitably causes districting plans to favor

one party over the other.23 The article details how Iowa’s non-partisan committee is often lauded as

a success, but argues that this is more likely due to Iowa’s successful districting comes from its

naturally competitive and mostly even geography. It seems that outcome-based regulations, where

22 Michael P. McDonald. “Legislative Redistricting”. Democracy in the States. Brookings Institution Press. June 1, 2011. 23 Michael P. McDonald. “Regulating Redistricting”. PS: Political Science and Politics , Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 2007), pp. 675-67. Found at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452048


13

the political outcomes (whether it be competitive districts or minority-majority districts) are decided

beforehand and the redistricting board must then meet these goals. This may give less room for

gerrymandering regardless of the commission’s composition, as they have a set of goals that need to

be achieved.

Redistributing prisoners and non-partisan redistricting may not be a panacea for the

problems in representation surrounding the districting of prisons, but both seem to be at least

somewhat effective and would certainly be better than Maryland’s current solution.

Effectiveness of Changes in Maryland

Maryland redistributed prisoners and redistricted based on those results in 2010. As

described previously, the prison redistribution appears to have been successful. Population was

added to the major urban centers in Maryland and was subtracted from rural areas. The problem of

padding rural populations with non-voting blocs of prisoners seems to have disappeared, as the two

populations have been separated before districting occurs.

However, the redistricting that followed was partisan and heavily driven by Maryland

Democrats. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in a heavily gerrymandered map. A geospatial analysis

firm calculated the average compactness of each state’s districts, and Maryland ranked last.24 Much

of this can be attributed Maryland’s pinwheel-shaped third district, which contains separated parts

of Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Howard, and Montgomery Counties. The district weaves together

wealthy voters from DC suburbs with poor Baltimore residents, creating a constituency that

24 The Washington Post Editorial Board. “Vote Against Maryland Redistricting”. The Washington Post. October 19, 2012. Found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/vote-against-maryland-redistricting/2012/10/19/dc06c282-1967-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html


14

manages to lean Democratic while have few demographics or interests in common.25 The 2010

redistricting also split Maryland’s 6th district, which had consisted of the rural, western counties that

were historically Republican, in half. Half of it remained in the 6th district and absorbed a heavily

Democratic chunk of Montgomery County, while the other half was given to the 8th district, whose

remaining constituents were also heavily Democratic. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in Democratic

victories in both the 6th and 8th districts, netting the Democrats another member in the House of

Representatives.26

So while the redistricting did technically take prison readjustments into consideration, it

failed to fix the representation problems. Most of the districts continue to consist of politically

favorable constituencies, instead of meaningful communities or even compact geographic areas.

Paired with the earlier discussion on unequal representation, it seems likely that the

underrepresented constituencies are still underrepresented. In some districts, like the sprawling 3rd

district, inner-city areas that likely contain large amounts of prisoners are still grouped with rural

areas, indicating that perhaps the representation problem has not been solved at all.

Non-partisan redistricting has the potential to at least partially fix these problems. Given that

Maryland is considered to be the most gerrymandered state at the moment, it seems unlikely that a

non-partisan committee could do anything besides help. An outcome-based redistricting plan has

potential. If they started with the idea of what districts should look like and what political outcomes

should be, perhaps the districts would be more meaningful. If one of the goals were a compact

minority-majority district, Baltimore City would probably be mostly contained in such a district.

25 Jeff Guo. “Welcome to America’s Most Gerrymandered District”. The New Republic. November 8, 2012. Found at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/109938/marylands-3rd-district-americas-most-gerrymandered-congressional-district 26 “Gerrymandered? Maryland voters to Decide”. The Washington Post. Updated September 27, 2012. Accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/maryland-redistricting-map/index.html


15

Much of Maryland’s disenfranchised prison population would be included in this district, but their

real community would be, as well. They would be able to participate once they finished serving

their sentence, so representatives would have a bigger incentive to listen to and respond to them.

Likewise, their community would be heavily represented for the size that it truly is, which would

hopefully lend to an appropriately sized amount of political power.

Without this non-partisan redistricting, Maryland’s redistribution of prisoners seems

somewhat futile. Perhaps they stopped prison-based gerrymandering in practice, but the same

communities seem like they would still be underrepresented and ignored, and gerrymandering

clearly still exists. Thus, the fundamental democratic problems found in prison-based

gerrymandering continue to exist and seem like they will until a non-partisan redistricting effort is

implemented in Maryland.

Recommendations/Conclusions

Maryland should adopt a non-partisan redistricting plan in conjunction with its policy of

redistributing prisoners to their homes. Prison-based gerrymandering is certainly a problem that

exists in Maryland, and it does seem likely to have a negative impact on democracy. But simply

redistributing prisoners and continuing to redistrict on a partisan basis cannot solve these problems.

The same underrepresented communities will continue to be ignored, and the overrepresented

communities will continue to hold more political power than they should. Non-partisan redistricting

may not produce a perfect electoral map, but it will certainly be an improvement to the current one

and help to fix the problems of representation found in Maryland today.


16

Works Cited

Bartels, Larry. “Economic Inequality and Political Representation.” 2006 Brunner, Eric, Stephen Ross, Ebonya Washington. “Does Less Income Mean Less Representation?” 2012. Clark, Maggie. “Could a Recount of Prisoners Affect Elections?”. Stateline: The Pew Charitable Trusts. October 12, 2012. Found at http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/could-a-recount-of-prisoners-affect-elections-85899422906 Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002 Gilens, Martin. “The Preference/Policy Link”. Affluence and Influence. Princeton University Press. July 22, 2012. Guo, Jeff. “Welcome to America’s Most Gerrymandered District”. The New Republic. November 8, 2012. Found at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/109938/marylands-3rd-district-americas-most-gerrymandered-congressional-district Kelly, Jason P. “The Strategic Use of Prisons in Partisan Gerrymandering”. Legislative Studies Quarterly. Vol 37, Issue 1. February 2012. Found at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00037.x/full Maryland Department of Planning. “2010 Adjusted Census Population for Maryland by County and Region”. 2011. Found at http://www.mdp.state.md.us/PDF/Redistricting/2010docs/Adj_2010_Tot_Pop_by_MDCntyReg.pdf Maryland Department of Redistricting. “Congressional and Legislative Districts”. Maryland Department of Planning. 2013. Found at http://www.mdp.state.md.us/Redistricting/home.shtml Maryland Department of Redistricting. “No Representation Without Population Act”. Maryland Department of Planning. 2012. Found at http://planning.maryland.gov/redistricting/2010/newlaw.shtml Maryland State Board of Elections. “2012 General Election Results”. 2012. Found at http://elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_2012_4_00_1.html Maryland State Senate. “Voter Registration Protection Act”. Senate Bill 488. March 22, 2007. Found at http://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/maryland_voter_act.pdf McDonald, Michael P. “Legislative Redistricting”. Democracy in the States. Brookings Institution Press. June 1, 2011.


17

McDonald, Michael P. “Regulating Redistricting”. PS: Political Science and Politics , Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 2007), pp. 675-67. Found at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452048 Roberts, Sam. “Census Bureau’s Counting of Prisoners Benefits Some Rural Voting Districts”. The New York Times. October 23, 2008. Found at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/politics/24census.html Schiraldi, Vincent and Jason Ziedenberg. “Race and Incarceration in Maryland”. Justice Policy Institute. October 23, 2003. Found at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpi/finalmrd.pdf Scola, Nancy. “Making Prisoners Count”. The American Prospect. October 22, 2012. Found at http://prospect.org/article/making-prisoners-count U.S. Census Bureau. “Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, 2010”. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2010. Found at http://www.census.gov/2010census/news/pdf/apport2010_table1.pdf U.S. Census Bureau. “Maryland”. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2010. Found at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24000.html The Washington Post. “Gerrymandered? Maryland voters to Decide”. Updated September 27, 2012. Accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/maryland-redistricting-map/index.html The Washington Post Editorial Board. “Vote Against Maryland Redistricting”. The Washington Post. October 19, 2012. Found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/vote-against-maryland-redistricting/2012/10/19/dc06c282-1967-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html


18

Appendix 1: Census Bureau Chart

“no representation without population”: maryland’s attempt...

Documents