APPROVED: Geoffrey Wawro, Major Professor Robert Citino, Committee Member Donald Mitchener, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Chair of the Department

of History James D. Meernik, Acting Dean of the

Toulouse Graduate School

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:

THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO

Evan Michael Vaughan, B.A.

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

May 2012

Vaughan, Evan Michael. The Development of Anti-Submarine Warfare in the

Mediterranean: The American Contribution and the Bombardment of Durazzo. Master of Arts

(History), May 2012, 91 pp., 75 titles.

The Entente powers began World War I without any formal anti-submarine

countermeasures. However, the Entente developed countermeasures through trial and error over

time. Success was moderate until America joined the war. With America came the arrival of

subchasers to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. This highly specialized vessel helped

turn the tide against U-boats. A true counter to the U-boat threat in the Mediterranean did not

come until October 2, 1918 with the bombardment of Durazzo.

This thesis discusses the development of Entente anti-submarine capabilities and

illustrate how America's contribution led to success. A detailed analysis of the rarely discussed

bombardment of Durazzo is included using archival documents.

ii

Copyright 2012

by

Evan Michael Vaughan

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would not have been able to make this thesis possible if it were not for the following

individuals:

My father, Michael Vaughan, M.D., who ultimately made it possible for me to get my

master's.

My major professor, Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, who has dedicated his time in helping me gain

my master's.

Professors Robert Citino and Donald Mitchener for being a part of my committee and

guiding me through several classes.

A special thanks to the individuals who helped me at the Washington Navy Yard and

National Archives.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...........................................................................................................v NOTE TO THE READER ............................................................................................................. vi THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ...............1 Appendices

A. U.S. FORCES AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ..............................80 B. CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ..........................82

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................87

v

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page 1. The Otranto Barrage ..........................................................................................................18

2. Subchasers 227 and 324 .....................................................................................................31

3. Hydrophone........................................................................................................................33

4. Subchasers and USS Leonidas AD-7 .................................................................................36

5. American Subchasers anchored at Corfu, Greece, 1918....................................................38

6. Durazzo, Albania ...............................................................................................................43

7. Allied intelligence map of Durazzo pinpointing coastal batteries .....................................44

8. Two phase Italian and British bombardment of Durazzo ..................................................49

9. Captain Nelson in white shaking hands .............................................................................55

10. S.C. 129’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo .................................60

11. S.C. 215 and S.C. 128’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo ...........63

12. Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo (Commander in this photograph) ........................................................71

vi

NOTE TO THE READER

For the purpose of clarity, the following German terms appear in their English equivalents.

Kapitänleutnant ......................Lieutenant-Commander

Linienschiffsleutnant..............Lieutenant

Oberleutnant ...........................Lieutenant Junior Grade

Mittelmeerdivision .................German Mediterranean Division

1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:

THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO

Scholarship on the First World War as a naval war has tended to focus on large surface

actions, such as Jutland and the struggle for the Atlantic shipping lanes. Considerably less

attention is given to the Mediterranean Theater and even less to the submarine war in this theater.

The literature on naval warfare, whether scholarly - Richard Hough's The Great War at Sea, Paul

Halpern's A Naval History of World War I and The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918,

and Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, or popular, Robert Massie's

Dreadnought - has focused on large surface engagements or the submarine war in the Atlantic.

Little attention has been paid to the strategic and tactical problems posed by submarines in the

Mediterranean, which was a strategically vital front and theater in the war. Even more obscure is

the Entente and American anti-submarine effort in the Mediterranean that developed throughout

the war. However, as illustrated in Lawrence Sondhaus' The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary,

1867-1918, a very important part of the war for the Entente and Central Powers was played out

in the Mediterranean Theater between U-boats and anti-submarine vessels.

Most works that cover anti-submarine warfare during World War I, such as Dwight

Messimer's Find and Destroy: Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I devote a very small

portion to the Mediterranean Theater. Furthermore, very little is written on the Otranto Barrage

and the American subchasers that were part of this theater. In fact, Robert M. Grant's U-boat

Hunters only mentions the Otranto Barrage as a note in his list of German submarines sunk

during the war. The discussion of the American subchasers is so limited that the sources that do

mention these vessels often quote the same sources. The memoirs of Ray Millholland, The

Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage, and Hillary Ranald Chambers Jr., United States

2

Submarine Chasers, are the two most referenced sources that cover these American vessels. In

addition, archival material is hardly ever presented when discussing the subchasers. By far the

least discussed among historians is the Allied bombardment of Durazzo on 2 October 1918.

Lawrence Sondhaus only devotes half a paragraph in Navies of Europe to this raid. Furthermore,

Arthur Marder does not mention the bombardment of Durazzo once in his five volume opus,

From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Through the extensive use of archival material and

primary and secondary sources, this analysis focuses on Entente and later Allied, anti-submarine

warfare against Central Powers U-boats in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, with an

emphasis on the American effort and the bombardment of the Austrian Port at Durazzo.

Both the Entente and Central Powers were dependent on this area for troop movements,

operations, and most important, supply convoys. Using the Mediterranean Sea to move supplies

and personnel was much more feasible than land means because alliances among both sides

meant that certain land routes were no longer usable. The Entente used the Mediterranean to

move troops and supplies from North Africa, France, Egypt, Greece, and Italy to support

operations in the Balkans, Dardanelles, and the Western Front. In addition, Great Britain relied

on the Suez Canal for passage to India, Australia, and New Zealand. During the opening months

of the war, the Entente enjoyed relatively risk-free use of the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas.

The arrival of German submarines in 1915 limited this freedom.

During the early months of the war, before Entente naval surface operations increased in

the Mediterranean, the Central Powers used the Mediterranean to move supplies and troops to

the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Dardanelles. However, as the war unfolded, the

3

Central Powers relied more on land routes to move troops and supplies around this theater of

operations. 1

The full potential of the U-boat and the importance of anti-submarine warfare were not

understood at the start of hostilities in 1914. German and Austrian U-boats would become the

Central Powers' main naval presence in the Mediterranean. The addition of the German U-boats

to the Austrian vessels already in the Adriatic caused the Entente Powers to become much more

cautious and concerned about their sea lines of communication. This led to the Entente's anti-

submarine warfare effort against marauding German and Austrian U-boats. While the Entente

would develop various countermeasures to the U-boat threat, the high loss of shipping would

continue to increase until 1918.2

Action within the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea began soon after World War I started

on 28 June 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Italy, although a

member of the Triple Alliance, declared its neutrality on 3 August and did not join the Central

Powers.3 As a result, Italy's position was constantly questioned and many wondered what side

Italy would join if it decided to enter the war. Due to this uncertainty and the presence of

German warships in the region, Britain had six battleships sent to the Mediterranean.4 As

hostilities began, Germany had the cruisers Goeben and Breslau stationed at Pola, in the

Adriatic. Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, commander of the German Mediterranean Division,

planned to use the two cruisers to attack the French convoy lines in the Mediterranean that were 1 Paolo. E. Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), 93-95, 98. 2 Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of Navalism, 1890-1918 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 253, 257. 3 Antonio Salandra, Italy and The Great War: From Neutrality to Intervention (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1932), 71. 4 B. B. Schofield, British Sea Power: Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1967), 30.

4

bringing troops to France from North Africa. On 3 August, Admiral Souchon learned of the

German declaration of war against France.5 The next day, both cruisers arrived off French

Algeria, North Africa. The Goeben bombarded Philippeville and Breslau shelled Bône, also

known as Annaba. The two cruisers stopped firing on shore installations after French batteries

returned fire. Neither ship took any damage, while considerable damage had been inflicted on

French installations. These were the first shots fired in the Mediterranean.6

Following these bombardments, Souchon and his two cruisers were ordered to sail to

Constantinople. As Souchon headed towards Constantinople he passed several British ships, but

nothing happened. Only after this passing did the British declare war on Germany on 4 August.7

This declaration of war caused Souchon to become concerned about the French and British fleets

catching up to destroy him before he reached the Dardanelles. Because of the recent start of the

war and the formation of alliances, Souchon feared the British and French, while the British and

French feared the Austro-Hungarian Navy. What ensued was a high speed chase across the

Mediterranean, with the French and British ships pursuing the Goeben and Breslau.

Interestingly, the British cruisers in pursuit were unable to steam at their maximum speed

because of faulty boiler systems, while the two German cruisers were able to steam two knots

over their maximum speed.8 The Turkish government allowed Souchon to pass through the

Dardanelles. Souchon successfully evaded the British and French and handed over the two

5 Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 51-52. 6 Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of Nationalism, 1890-1918, 191. 7 Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991), 908. 8 Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 228-229.

5

cruisers to the Turkish Navy.9 The Goeben was renamed the Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Breslau

became the Midilli. The Central Powers viewed this as a major victory over the Entente and

declared it to be their first naval triumph of the new conflict.

The Entente, on the other hand, viewed this event as an opportunity to strengthen their

war effort against the Central Powers.10 Shortly before the transfer of the Goeben and Breslau,

Great Britain ceased construction of three Dreadnought battleships: Resadiye, Sultan Osman-i

Evvel, and Faith Sultan Mehmed, which were being built in British shipyards for the Turkish

Navy. The first two joined the Royal Navy renamed Erin and Agincourt, while the third was

scrapped.11 Other factors, such as the Berlin-Baghdad railroad and Otto Liman von Sanders'

mission to reorganize the Ottoman Army earlier in 1913 led to the Ottoman entry into the war. 12

In fact, Germany already effectively controlled the Ottoman Army because of von Sanders'

mission to supervise the training of an Ottoman Army. In addition, Germany wished to gain

naval bases around the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara in order to have a presence in the

Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. This greatly upset the Russians who believed that the

development of a strong Ottoman Army and a German naval presence would someday be used

against them.13 However, the gift of the Goeben and Breslau was the final event that eventually

caused the Ottoman Empire to join the war allied with the Central Powers.

9 Charles W. Koburger, Jr., The Central Powers in the Adriatic, 1914-1918 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 26-29. 10 Lawrence Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002 (London: Pearson, 2002), 153. 11 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 220. 12 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3, 57. 13 Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 22, 34-35, 63.

6

With the Goeben and Breslau contained within the Dardanelles, the French, British, and

Russians were free to use the Mediterranean without fear, for the time being. The Mediterranean

Sea was a vital sea communication line for these three Entente Powers. The French used the

Mediterranean to ship troops from North Africa to France for the Western Front. The British

transported men and supplies to Egypt and relied on the Suez Canal to get to India. The British

got troops from India and oil from Iran and Iraq.14 Russia used the Dardanelles to enter the

Mediterranean Sea for shipping and transportation purposes. The Dardanelles and the Sea of

Marmara was the point where all Russian shipping had to pass through the Black Sea into the

Mediterranean and vice versa.15 As the war unfolded, Egypt became the focal point of British

operations in the Mediterranean. Equipment and men were amassed at Egyptian ports in

preparation for operations in the Dardanelles and Salonika.16 Both France and Great Britain

relied on their colonies to get the necessary numbers of men for their armies. As the war

unfolded, the Entente and Central Powers relied on the Mediterranean more and more for

operations and transportation.

During this time, tensions in the Dardanelles and Turkey began to increased. Upset by the

transfer of the Goeben and Breslau, the British Admiralty ordered British surface ships around

the Dardanelles to sink these two warships if they entered the Mediterranean. This order was

later expanded to include all Turkish ships leaving the Dardanelles.17 Tensions increased further

when the Goeben and Breslau bombarded the Russian ports at Odessa and Theodosia in the

14 Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean: 1914-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 26-27. 15 Dwight R. Messimer, Find and Destroy: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 191. 16 David R. Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 15, 19. 17 Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I, 9, 16.

7

Black Sea on 29 October 1914.18 On the same day, the Ottoman Empire joined the war allied

with the Central Powers.19 Admiral Souchon, the man who started hostilities within the

Mediterranean, was also the first to begin the fighting in the Black Sea. In retaliation, Russia

declared war on Turkey on November 2; while the British and French sent a small squadron of

naval vessels to bombard Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles. With Russia and Turkey

now belligerents in the growing war, Russia's shipping route to the Mediterranean Sea was cut

off. Britain finally declared war against Turkey on 5 November 1914, two days after the British

and French bombardment of the forts.20

Throughout 1914, the British knew of the possible threats from German and Austrian

U-boats, but believed they would not be used against convoys and shipping. For the first six

months of the war, Germany shared the same view as the British and only used its U-boats for

reconnaissance and to attack capital warships.21 In fact, Germany truly did not know how to get

the most use out of its submarines for the first year of the war.22 Because of the 1909 Declaration

of London, which was an effort to defend the maritime rights of neutral nations in times of war,

Germany did not use its U-boats against Entente shipping at first.23 On the rare occasion that a

U-boat attacked a supply vessel, the submarine would surface and give warning to the vessel's

crew before attacking. The first British anti-submarine warfare measure was ordered in

18 Henry W. Nevinson, The Dardanelles Campaign (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), 11. 19 Weber, Eagles on the Crescent, 5. 20 Peter Hart, Gallipoli (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11-14. 21 Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1929), 61-63. 22 Gary E. Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 132-133. 23 Arthur J. Marder, The Road to War: 1904-1914. Vol. 1 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 358-361.

8

September 1914, when the Admiralty ordered its warships to make periodic course changes. So

confident were the British that they had no program to cope with submarine warfare until the

very end of 1914. In the opening months of the war, politics became the most effective anti-

submarine measure.24

With the British, French, and Russians at war with the Ottoman Empire, the Suez Canal

came under threat from Ottoman forces. At this time, the British relied on Indian soldiers to

guard the vital Suez Canal. The area around the Suez Canal was subjected to small periodic

attacks made by Turkish soldiers. As a result, Britain began to build up defenses in Egypt.25 The

British, along with the French, thought the best form of defense was to use their naval ships to

cut off Turkish supply lines at İskenderun, which is located on the Southern Mediterranean coast

of modern day Turkey. This action would protect the Suez Canal and Entente shipping in the

eastern Mediterranean. The British, French, and Russian naval bombardments against Turkish

lines of communication proved just how defenseless these supply lines were to naval gunfire.

After this Entente show of force, the Turks gave up their idea of attacking the Suez Canal and

Egypt. In addition, Turkey repositioned large numbers of their troops to defend against the

Entente operations in the Dardanelles in February 1915, thus sparing the Suez Canal and

Egypt.26

The Entente began operations in the Dardanelles and Salonika in an effort to break the

stalemate on the Western Front and to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Winston

Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, believed that an offensive against Gallipoli would be the

24 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 3-10. 25 Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land, 15. 26 Halpern, Naval History, 106-108.

9

best way to defend Egypt.27 Starting in April of 1915, British forces, along with Commonwealth

soldiers from New Zealand, Australia and India, concentrated on Gallipoli.28 Interestingly, Otto

Liman von Sanders, the German officer who trained the Ottoman Army, was placed in charge of

the defenses at Gallipoli.29 The British believed that a massive campaign at Gallipoli would force

the Ottoman Empire to an armistice and would reopen Russia's route to the Mediterranean Sea.

This was of vital importance to the Entente because this route was critical to keep Russia

supplied. Entente forces carried out operations at Salonika in an effort to prevent the Central

Powers from building a railroad between Germany and Constantinople. If this railroad were to be

established, it would strengthen the Central Powers' defense in the Dardanelles and jeopardize

the Gallipoli campaign.30 This railroad was necessary to the Ottoman war effort because the

empire could not execute the war on its own. The vast majority of the supplies the Ottoman

Army depended on came from Germany.31 In addition to the land campaigns, the Entente

believed that overwhelming naval superiority in the region would cut off Turkey from maritime

shipping.

Many Entente leaders believed the French and British naval forces alone would be

enough to get Constantinople to surrender. British and French naval ships in this area could sever

the supply lines for the Turkish army in the Dardanelles region, which mostly came from the

Mediterranean sea.32 The gathering of Entente ships sparked German concern that the Turks

27 Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 7, 11. 28 Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: The Stress of Sea Power 1915-1916 (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 52-55. 29 Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth, 77. 30 Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea: 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 150-151. 31 Weber, Eagles on the Crescent, 106. 32 Hart, Gallipoli, 32-33.

10

would not be able to fend off the attackers and that lines of communication between Germany

and the Ottoman Empire would be severed. 33 This concern motivated the Germans to send U-

boats to the Mediterranean Sea. The Turks pleaded for these U-boats to be used to attack British

and French ships, while Germany also tried to get Austrian submarines to assist. Austria refused

to use their submarines, but Germany sent four UB and four UC type U-boats by rail to Austrian

ports on the Adriatic Sea.34 By 20 May 1915, the German U-21 left Cattaro for Constantinople

under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Otto Hersing.35 On 25 May U-21 torpedoed and

sank the Royal Navy battleship HMS Triumph off Gallipoli. Two days after this attack, U-21

returned to the area and sank another British battleship, HMS Majestic. In the days after these

two attacks, another German submarine sank the large Italian cruiser Amalfi.36 Suddenly, the sea

lines of communication which the British, and more importantly the Entente, relied on were at

risk of being severed. The Entente quickly realized that U-boats in the region could cut off the

maritime supply lines that supported land operations.37 The loss of these two battleships, as well

as supply vessels spurred an increase in Entente anti-submarine operations at the western

entrance of the Dardanelles. Months later on 13 September 1915, the British announced that they

had made the Dardanelles impassable to U-boats by using nets and mines. Germany started an

organized anti-shipping campaign in the Mediterranean Sea because of the successes of U-21

and the buildup of British and French forces at Salonika.

33 Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 77-79. 34 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 192-194. 35 Victor Rudenno, Gallipoli: Attack from the Sea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 136-144. 36 Henry J. James, German Subs in Yankee Waters: First World War (New York: Gotham House, 1940), 4. 37 A. T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1911), 166-167, 207.

11

Germany separated the Mediterranean into two areas, an eastern and a western half, with

Sicily being the dividing point. German U-boats had greater success in the west because Entente

anti-submarine measures in that area were weak compared to the eastern half. However, U-boats

did operate in the Aegean Sea in the areas around Salonika and the Dardanelles. Entente supply

vessels and convoys were the main target for these submarines. Between September and

December of 1915, German U-boats sank ninety-nine Entente ships. With the loss of needed

capital and supply ships thanks to the implementation of an organized German anti-shipping

campaign, the Entente suddenly found themselves faced with the threat of U-boats in the

Mediterranean and no way to counter it.38

In retaliation against the German and Austrian U-boat campaign, the British and French

began submarine operations against Turkey, but lost eight boats when trying to pass through the

Dardanelles.39 In the end, operations at the Dardanelles and Salonika proved to be unsuccessful

for the Entente powers. Large numbers of British, French, and Italian troops were required to

hold the Salonika Front, which failed to prevent the fall of Serbia to the Central Powers. The

Entente's defeat at Gallipoli by late 1915 ultimately led to the Entente's failure in the

Dardanelles.40 Because of this defeat, the British and French were unable to open a shipping lane

to the Black Sea to supply Russia. As a result, the Entente was forced to use the Arctic Ocean to

ship supplies to the Russian ports at Murmansk and Archangel.41 During these two operations,

U-boats inflicted considerable damage to Entente supply lines in the Mediterranean. These

38 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 192-194, 202. 39 Halpern, Naval History, 115-119. 40 Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I, 22. 41 Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002, 167.

12

events contributed to an increasing interest by the British to begin anti-submarine operations in

the Mediterranean to protect shipping.

As events unfolded around the Dardanelles, the British and the French realized that

control of the Mediterranean Sea would keep the Austrian Navy bottled up in the Adriatic Sea.

Once France declared war on Austria-Hungary, French naval ships in the Mediterranean made a

daring attempt to surprise the Austrian Navy. On 16 August 1914, French ships surrounded the

Austrian Cruiser Zenta hoping to lure the rest of the Austrian Navy out of their ports to rescue

the ship. Unfortunately for the French, the Austrian ships remained in their ports. Even after this

encounter, both the French and Austrian Navies maintained operations in the Adriatic. French

ships entered the Adriatic to protect Entente convoys shipping supplies to Montenegro. On the

other hand, Austrian ships continued to operate off the Montenegrin Coast, until the Austro-

Hungarians took over Montenegro in 1916. Like the Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea was a vital

sea line of communication for the Entente. The French considered a raid on the Austrian naval

port at Cattaro, but this never materialized and the port would later harbor Austrian and German

U-boats.42 Towards the end of 1914, both the Central and Entente Powers began to use

submarines in the Adriatic Sea.

At this time, Austria had seven submarines in service, but only five were capable of

carrying out operations.43 Germany was not much better off, having only thirty-six

U-boats in operation at the start of the war. 44 Nevertheless, French naval ships protecting

convoys to Montenegro became vulnerable to Austrian U-boats. With complete surprise on 21

December 1914, the Austrian U-12 torpedoed the French battleship Jean Bart, starting

42 Koburger, Jr., Central Powers, 33-35. 43 Halpern, Naval History, 61. 44 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914, 205.

13

submarine operations in the Adriatic Sea. Following this encounter, the French decided that it

was no longer worth risking their naval ships to protect the convoys to Montenegro. Afterwards,

the French Navy only carried out operations at the mouth of the Adriatic at the Strait of Otranto.

By April 1915, Italy started negotiations with the Entente Powers, which caused great

concern for the Austrian Navy. The Austrian Navy would be threatened if Italy were to join the

war allied with the Entente Powers. Anticipating Italy's move, French ships began to resume

operations in the Adriatic Sea. On 27 April, the French cruiser Leon Gambetta was torpedoed

and sunk by the Austrian U-5 under the command of Lieutenant Georg Ritter von Trapp.45 This

led to the beginning of a stalemate in the Adriatic because the Austrians did not want to risk their

surface ships, while the France lacked a naval base in the area, which kept their surface ships and

submarines from operating effectively.46 The French Naval bases in the Mediterranean were

located at Algiers, Rachgoun, and Oran in Algeria, Bizerte in Tunisia, and Toulon, France. The

French strategically put bases at these locations at the start of the 20th century because of their

close proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar. However, these bases were too far away to support

French naval operations in the Adriatic.47 Both the Entente and Central Powers wondered if

Italy's entrance into the war would give one side the needed advantage to break the stalemate. On

23 May 1915, Italy joined the Entente and declared war on Austria-Hungary. At this time, Italy

still had not declared war against Germany.48 Italy's move to the Entente allowed the British and

French to have free rein over the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas until German submarines

arrived in late 1915.

45 This commander would later gain fame in the movie The Sound of Music. 46 Halpern, Naval History, 61-62, 64. 47 Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904, 336-338. 48 Salandra, Italy and The Great War, 361

14

Italy's entry into the war was a great advantage for the Entente Powers, but Italy did have

its weaknesses. Compared to other Entente nations, the Italian Navy was not capable of carrying

out anti-submarine missions. Italy did not possess large numbers of trawlers and drifters that

could be used to patrol for Austrian and German submarines. Trawlers dragged anti-shipping

nets while drifters were vessels that stayed in place and had nets drifting from the stern. To

address this weakness, Italy stopped building four battleships in order to construct cruisers and

other anti-submarine vessels. Italy also armed trains with heavy coastal defense guns and used

them to protect naval bases from Austrian destroyers and submarines.49 By 1917 and 1918,

Italian planes were regularly used to fly reconnaissance missions to locate U-boats in the

Adriatic.50 Due to Italy's move to the Entente, German submariners were told to consider Italian

ships as hostile, but under no circumstances were the German submarines to reveal their identity.

In the event that a German submarine had to surface or was spotted, they were instructed to fly

the flag of Austria. This precaution was necessary because Italy had declared war on Austria-

Hungary, but not on Germany. In addition to their anti-submarine warfare mission, the Italians

placed great importance on protecting their convoys.51

Italian shipping was especially vulnerable to submarines because of the close proximity

to Austrian submarine bases on the other side of the Adriatic Sea. Despite this, by the end of the

war, the Italian Navy had shipped 1,499,595 Entente men by convoys to different areas around

the Mediterranean. In 1915 these convoys transported and supplied the Italian force in Albania.

In April and May of 1916, the Serbian Army along with an Italian garrison was evacuated from

49 Paolo E. Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations in the European Theater, World War I (Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd, 1996), 319-320. 50 Geoffrey L. Rossano, Stalking the U-boat: U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2010), 294-297. 51 Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002, 165.

15

Durazzo by Italian convoys after the Austro-Hungarian offensive into Albania. By August of

1916, these Italian vessels were shipping provisions to the port of Salonika, Greece, in order to

supply the Italian troops in Macedonia.52 The Italian Navy may not have been well equipped for

anti-submarine warfare, but it did make great contributions to the Entente war effort by shipping

troops and vital equipment around the Mediterranean.

This series of events in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas along with the formation of

alliances led to the Central Powers' use of submarines and the Entente Powers' anti-submarine

warfare operations in the area. Germany sent more submarines to the Austrian ports of Pola and

Cattaro in an effort to attack Entente convoys.53 By the end of 1915, Admiral Pini, Italian Chief

of the Navy, stated that the protection of convoys operating in the southern Adriatic was of great

importance.54 This order was given primarily in recognition of the loss of 640 Entente vessels to

U-boats, totaling 1,189,031 tons worldwide.55 By the middle of 1916, Germany had sent twelve

U-boats to Cattaro and three to Constantinople. This number would increase to twenty by the end

of the year. German submariners favored the western half of the Mediterranean because this area

was the entry point for Entente shipping. The increase of submarine activity prompted the

British, French, and Italians to take defensive measures against the submarine threat.56

In December of 1915, British, French, and Italian representatives met in Paris to divide

the Mediterranean Sea into anti-submarine patrol areas. The idea was that these three powers

52 Office of the Chief of Staff of the Royal Italian Navy (Historical Section), The Italian Navy in the World War 1915-1918 (Rome: Historical Section, 1927), 31, 33. 53 Paul G. Halpern, The Battle of the Otranto Straits: Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 11-13. 54 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War: Naval Operations Vol. IV (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 101. 55 Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of Nationalism, 1890-1918, 259-260. 56 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 194-195, 203-204.

16

would be responsible for escorting Entente convoys in their area of the Mediterranean. Great

Britain was assigned areas in the east, the Adriatic and Ionian Seas were assigned to Italy, and

France covered the western half of the Mediterranean.57 This meeting created eighteen patrol

areas, but this number was condensed to eleven in early 1916. This patrol zone concept was not

successful because the Entente lacked effective anti-submarine capabilities in 1915 and 1916.58

In addition, the three Entente powers did not effectively work together to coordinate patrols. In

some cases, patrols came late or never showed up, leaving vessels easy prey for U-boats. Entente

shipping losses continued to grow and U-boat attacks increased with each passing month.

The escalating loss of Entente shipping to U-boats illustrated to the Entente powers that

the anti-submarine measures being used were ineffective. From May 1915 to December 1916,

Germany lost five U-boats and Austria four. Five of these nine U-boats were lost in combat

situations, but only four of these were sunk as a result of Entente surface anti-submarine patrols.

On the other hand, U-boats wreaked havoc among Entente shipping in the Mediterranean and

Adriatic. While commanding U-35, Lieutenant-Commander Lothar von Arnauld de la Periere

sank more than forty Entente vessels in June and July of 1916. The same commander sank fifty-

four cargo vessels in August around Spain and Sicily. In three weeks, von Arnauld de la Periere

sank ninety-one thousand tons of Entente shipping. In addition, two other U-boat commanders

sank a combined seventy-five vessels between July and August of 1916 in the western half of the

Mediterranean.59 Due to these staggering losses, the Entente quickly focused more attention on

developing and carrying out effective anti-submarine countermeasures. Before 1916, the convoy

57 Arthur J. Marder, The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland. Vol. 2 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 335 58 Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 316-318. 59 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 194-195, 203-204.

17

was not a widely accepted countermeasure to U-boats. Many believed that such a large

concentration of slow moving ships would pose an easy target for submarines. Critics also

believed the large amount of smoke created by the convoy would only attract U-boats.60

However, the loss of shipping to U-boats began to decrease by 1917 as the Entente started to use

the convoy system in the Mediterranean as a defensive measure against U-boats.

Convoys were comprised of naval escorts, usually destroyers, which would accompany

transport ships to their destination. The convoy system was an improvement in the effort to

protect shipping and lowered the losses among supply ships. In addition to defending supply

ships, convoys lured U-boats into a lethal anti-submarine defense of destroyers and other ships.

Even with the successes gained from using the convoy system, U-boats still remained a constant

threat to Entente shipping.61 Unlike the Atlantic Ocean in which there were vast areas U-boats

could not venture, the entire Mediterranean Sea was a giant naval battlefield.62 By the end of

1915, thirty-two German and several Austrian U-boats were operating in the Mediterranean,

which accounted for 30 percent of Entente commerce losses by 1918.63 The submarines that

attacked Entente shipping in the Mediterranean operated from ports within the Adriatic Sea.

Preventing German and Austrian submarines from entering the Mediterranean and attacking

shipping was of great importance to the Entente Powers.64 When reevaluating anti-submarine

countermeasures, the Entente shifted their focus to an earlier measure that had mixed results.

60 Marder, The Road to War: 1904-1914. Vol. 1 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 360-361. 61 Rear-Admiral William Sowden Sims, The Victory at Sea (Garden City: Doubleday, Page, & Company, 1921), 198-199, 211. 62 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 205. 63 William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2006), 492 64 Ray Milholland, The Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936), 109-110

18

The new focus for the campaign against the U-boats was to stop and destroy the U-boats

and protect shipping. Entente leaders quickly realized that all German and Austrian submarines

had to pass through the forty-mile wide Strait of Otranto to enter the Mediterranean Sea when

leaving their ports in the Adriatic Sea.65 The depth of 3,600 feet at the strait was too great for

Figure 1. The Otranto Barrage66

anti-submarine nets to be used.67 Thus the Entente started their first major coordinated anti-

submarine countermeasure by creating a barrier of ships that would patrol the narrow strait. This

65 Hilary Ranald Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and the Attack on Durazzo 1920 (New York: Kessinger Legacy Reprints, 1920), 41. 66 Drawing by author. 67 Sims, Victory at Sea, 229.

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led to the start of the Otranto Barrage, which was a British, French, and Italian effort to keep the

U-boats bottled up in the Adriatic and keep them from entering the Mediterranean Sea. This

barrier of Entente ships stretched across the Adriatic Sea, beginning at the northern tip of Corfu,

Greece, continuing to Otranto, Italy.68 The overall command of the barrage was under Italian

Admiral Alfredo Acton, while British Commodore Howard Kelly was in charge of operations.69

The barrage started off as a modest line of defense and grew over time to a formidable and well

organized barrier of ships.

British drifters started to form this line of defense in September of 1915.70 Early attempts

at creating a barrage for anti-submarine warfare consisted of 120 trawlers and 30 motor launches.

These small boats were armed with depth charges as well as one small caliber deck gun, which

was smaller than the gun mounted on U-boats. The vessels would only patrol the strait during the

day and would return to port at night. This left the strait unmonitored at the night, which led to

increased losses to Entente shipping in the Mediterranean. German and Austrian submarines

simply waited for the patrolling vessels to leave and then moved through the unprotected strait

under the cover of darkness. Along with this limitation, the vessels patrolling the strait were not

equipped with submarine detection equipment. Vigilant crewmembers could only rely on their

vision and hearing to pinpoint the location of a marauding submarine. This greatly reduced the

effectiveness of the patrolling ships. Several hindrances and problems plagued the barrage in its

first two years of operation. 71

68 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 109-110. 69 A.B. Feuer, The U.S. Navy in World War I: Combat at Sea and in the Air (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 107. 70 Halpern, Naval History, 159. 71 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 107-108.

20

The width of the strait was simply too large for the Entente to patrol effectively. Most

importantly, the British and Italians lacked the number of trawlers and drifters to make effective

patrols in 1915 and 1916. In addition, the Italians did not provide the destroyers and trawlers and

drifters they promised they would send to conduct patrol duties at the strait.72 On many

occasions, the Italian vessels would wait in port to be radioed by the drifters, but the U-boat

would be long gone by the time the destroyers reached the submarine's reported area.

The Entente was so desperate to stop U-boat activity that unorthodox countermeasures

were used on more than one occasion. By the end of 1915, the Royal Navy sent four converted

colliers, Penhallow, Saros, Werribee, and Remembrance to Malta to act as decoys. When viewed

from a submarine's periscope, these vessels appeared to be defenseless supply vessels, but in

reality they were armed with concealed deck guns. As lethal as these ships were, none ever sank

any U-boats during the war. In addition, Entente surface vessels rammed U-boats around the

Strait of Otranto on two occasions. On 12 August 1915, the Italian Citta de Palermo followed the

wake of a torpedo at full speed. At the end of its run, the ship hit U-3's conning tower causing

moderate damage to the submerged vessel. U-3 survived the encounter and attempted to return to

Cattaro, but was destroyed in its attempt by the French destroyer Bisson. In a strange twist of

fate, the second ramming occurred on 4 December 1915 when U-65 torpedoed the SS Caledonia.

As the Caledonia was slowly sinking, the captain of the stricken vessel ordered full speed ahead

while following the torpedo's wake. U-65 was rammed and severely damaged by the sinking

vessel, but only the Caledonia sank. Lieutenant Fischel called off his patrol and returned his

damaged U-boat to Cattaro. While the Entente surface vessels faced their own problems, the

Entente faced a further setback from the anti-submarine nets they laid in the strait.

72 Marder, The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland. Vol. 2 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 329-332.

21

Nets laid early in the operation were set at too shallow a depth and did not descend deep

enough to stop German and Austrian U-boats. On many occasions, U-boats would pass under

nets or go above them under the cover of darkness. On only one occasion was a U-boat destroyed

as a result of the nets. On 3 May 1916, the British drifter Evening Star II disabled U-6 with her

12-pound gun after the U-boat had gotten caught in the nets. Even though the nets were generally

ineffective, the Entente laid more nets in April of 1916. Some of these new nets had anti-

submarine mines attached to them to increase their effectiveness.73 It was not until 3 August

1918 that UB-53 commanded by Lieutenant zur See Sprenger, struck one of these mines.74 As a

result of the damage caused by this mine, Lieutenant zur See Sprenger ordered to scuttle the

submarine.75 Even with the large number of resources that went into the Otranto Barrage,

Austrian and German submariners claimed that the Otranto Barrage was ineffective in its first

two years of operation.

Austria claimed by mid-1916 that the Otranto Barrage was not a great threat to their

submarines. Once the U-boats passed the barrage and entered the Mediterranean, there was very

little that could stop the submarines because Entente anti-submarine capabilities were largely

ineffective in the open sea.76 Austrian submarine commander Forstmann explained that all he

had to do to pass through the Otranto Barrage was remain submerged while passing through the

barrage vessels. If he was located, he remained submerged and waited till dark to pass through

73 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 197-199, 207-208. 74 Arthur J. Marder, Victory and Aftermath: January 1918-June 1919. Vol. 5 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 35. 75 Robert M. Grant, U-boat Hunters: Code Breakers, Divers, and the Defeat of the U-boats, 1914-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 144. 76 Arthur J. Marder, 1917: Year of Crisis. Vol. 4 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 95.

22

the strait on the surface. This commander said the barrier of ships would have been much more

effective if the Italians and British expanded the barrage.

By the start of 1916, the Austrians pushed the Serbian Army out of Montenegro, which

gave them port facilities that were even closer to the Strait of Otranto.77 During the Serbian

evacuation, 134,000 men and nearly 36,350 horses were transported to Corfu. The majority of

the convoys that evacuated the Serbian Army were comprised of Italian ships.78 Italy alone

committed 81 transport ships, which made 560 crossings during the evacuation.79 Austrian

surface ships were not used against the convoys that were part of the evacuation, but submarines

did carry out a few attacks. By the end of the evacuation, the Entente had lost eleven light

warships and eight steamers.80 The Italians believed the Austrian Navy would move vessels from

Cattaro to Durazzo, which was further south and closer to the Mediterranean Sea. The close

proximity to the Strait of Otranto meant Austrian surface ships could even be used against the

barrage vessels. On more than one occasion, there were small surface engagements between

Austrian and Italian surface warships at the mouth of the strait. The loss of Montenegro was

another setback for the Entente Powers' anti-submarine warfare campaign in the Mediterranean

and Adriatic Seas.81 Military setbacks and the largely ineffective Otranto Barrage caused Entente

leaders to search for a much more effective anti-submarine defense to protect shipping in the

Mediterranean.

77 Charles W. Koburger Jr., The Central Powers in the Adriatic, 1914-1918 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 58-59, 61. 78 Newbolt, History of the Great War, 120-121. 79 Royal Italian Navy (Historical Section), The Italian Navy, 33. 80 Newbolt, History of the Great War, 121. 81 Koburger, Central Powers, 58-60.

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Before the United States joined the war, Entente Powers regularly asked the neutral

nation if it could help counter the U-boat threat. Although Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. were

angered by German's unrestricted U-boat campaign, the nation remained neutral.82 In fact, many

Americans still had strong feelings of isolationism that endured throughout the late 19th and early

20th centuries. Most Americans simply did not want the nation to get entangled in foreign

adventures.83 However, the rising losses to civilian shipping from the U-boats, especially the loss

of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915, pushed the U.S. closer to the Entente powers.84 Wilson was so

disgusted by the loss of 1,198 passengers in the Lusitania sinking that he lashed out so strongly

that Germany stopped U-boat attacks on the west coast of Britain on 5 October 1915.85 However,

Germany began to focus more attention on the U-boat after the sinking of this Cunard Liner and

it was at this point that Germany realized that U-boats were the most effective vessels in their

navy.86 Nonetheless, the U.S. did start to increase ship building, in the event the nation joined the

war. President Wilson even claimed in a 1916 speech that the America was constructing

"incomparably the greatest navy in the world."87 In addition, Congress and the Department of the

Navy authorized several naval ships to be built. Training of naval personnel and technological

developments became a focus of American pre-war preparations. Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Franklin D. Roosevelt believed the U.S. Navy would need to have a force of 200,000 men if the

82 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United States, April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1958), 328-329. 83 Geoffrey Wawro, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2000), 165-166. 84 Hough, The Great War at Sea, 174-175. 85 Geoffrey Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1968), 276, 279. 86 Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era, 143. 87 Michael D. Besch, A Navy Second to None: The History of U.S. Naval Training in World War I (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 4.

24

country were to go to war.88 During the second half of 1917, American engineers and researchers

worked on the development of anti-submarine equipment, particularly the hydrophones that were

later installed on American subchasers. The British had previously tried to use hydrophones

against submarines, but had no success.89 By 1917, the U.S. was preparing for a war that became

increasingly inevitable.

All of this changed once the U.S. declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. Although

the U.S. was allied with the Entente Powers, they never formally joined the Entente and were an

associate power. Thus, the Entente Powers, the United States, and other associate powers were

referred to as the Allies.90 Admiral William Sims, later commander of American Naval Forces in

European waters, demanded that the destroyers and anti-submarine vessels should be sent

overseas as fast as possible. Winston Churchill even claimed that if the U.S. could not contribute

to the anti-submarine effort, that it would be "impossible to go on with the war."91 The heavy

losses due to U-boats had nearly forced the island power to surrender by the time America joined

the war.92 At this time, U-boats were sinking around 900,000 tons of Entente shipping a month

worldwide, while only 177,000 tons a month were being built.93 A message sent by the U.S.

Navy claimed that "the Adriatic was practically an Austrian lake" because of the high number of

Austrian U-boats operating in this sea.94 Admiral Sims later pointed out that Austrian submarines

88 Ibid, 5, 7. 89 Sims, Victory at Sea, 202-203. 90 Walter Millis. Road to War: America 1914-1917. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), 456-457. 91 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 3. 92 William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000), 125-126. 93 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 2-3. 94 Lawrence Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918 (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1994), 329.

25

originating from Cattaro were inflicting so much damage to Entente shipping that all steps

should be taken to bring this threat to an end.95 The Entente Powers realized that without a

solution, it was only a matter of time before the U-boats would cut off their maritime supply

lines throughout the world.

Great Britain and Italy viewed America's entry into the war as an opportunity to refocus

their attention on the U-boat threat in the Mediterranean Sea. Shortly after the U.S. joined the

war, both Entente Powers requested that American ships be sent to the Mediterranean.96 At this

time, British and Italian shipping losses in the Mediterranean due to U-boats had risen to as high

as 150,000 tons in the month of May 1917. However, the U.S. was still not at war with Austria-

Hungary and did not see any interest in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. While America

initially refused to get involved in the Mediterranean, Japan sent fourteen destroyers to conduct

anti-submarine sweeps in this area.97

Japan joined the Entente on 23 August 1914 with the intent to gain control of the German

Shantung territories in China. In the final decades of imperialism, Japan saw the war as an

opportunity to spread its Empire. Japan's main contribution to the war against the Central Powers

was the destroyers sent to the Mediterranean.98 On several occasions, Japanese destroyers were

spending more time out in the open sea looking for submarines than British, French, and Italian

destroyers. Several British Naval Officers mentioned that the Japanese sailors manning these

destroyers were extremely dedicated to their duty. There devotion was so strong that a few

95 Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 346. 96 Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1920), 147, 153. 97 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 486-487. 98 Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: Offensive Operations 1914-1915 (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 126-127.

26

Japanese officers committed hara-kiri after a vessel under their protection was torpedoed and

lost.99 These destroyers primarily acted as convoy escorts and had mixed results in this role.

In February of 1917, the Japanese destroyers began anti-submarine operations in the

Mediterranean Sea. Rear Admiral Kozo Sato was in charge of the Japanese destroyers operating

in the Mediterranean and was under orders to assist the British Royal Navy in protecting

shipping. One destroyer, IJN Sakaki, was torpedoed by the Austrian U-27 on 11 May 1917. The

destroyer did not sink, but the ship's captain and sixty-four crewmen were killed. Following the

attack, the other Japanese destroyers with the Sakaki attacked U-27 with depth charges for six-

hours straight. The Japanese were unsuccessful in sinking the submarine; but its commander,

Lieutenant Robert Teufl von Fernland was so startled that he returned to the Austrian port at

Cattaro. Defenses against U-boats gradually increased as more powers slowly joined the Entente

war effort.100

By the summer of 1917, American cruisers and U.S. Coast Guard Cutters were tasked

with protecting Entente convoys around Great Britain. These cutters were transferred over to the

U.S. Navy, were usually 190 feet in length, and armed with three small caliber deck guns. In

addition, the Department of the Navy planned to send fifteen armed yachts to protect convoys

around Gibraltar. However, most of these went to France and only two, the Yankton and Nahma,

were sent to Gibraltar in September. By December of 1917, three more yachts, a small number of

Coast Guard Cutters, and five Bainbridge-class U.S. destroyers had arrived at Gibraltar to protect

shipping. Even with this increase of force, these vessels had little success against U-boats due to

the ships' slow speed and faulty depth charges. The officer in charge of the U.S. gunboat

99 Marder, Victory and Aftermath: January 1918-June 1919. Vol. 5 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 36-37. 100 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 206.

27

Marietta mentioned that "one American escort was so slow that, when she dropped astern of her

convoy to "kick up a straggler," she required nineteen hours to regain her position."101 In fact,

many of the U.S. yachts and gunboats deployed to Gibraltar were constructed for use in China.

The gunboat Nashville (PG-7) fired the first American shot of the Spanish-American War. Even

with severe limitations, these vessels were pressed into service to combat the growing threat

from Central Power U-boats. At this time, Entente focus on anti-submarine warfare was near its

peak and the convoy system started to gain more and more attention.

By September 1917, Entente convoys escorted by U.S. warships to and from North

Africa increased. A standard convoy route between Gibraltar and Algeria was established in

September under escort of American ships. Convoys on this route had great success because

Austro-Hungarian submariners were under orders not to torpedo American ships, which resulted

in them steering clear of convoys under American escort. In October, a convoy left Great Britain

for Egypt also under escort by U.S. warships. This convoy route remained in use until January

1918 when Tunisia became the new destination. American warships provided the much needed

defense for Entente convoys in the Mediterranean resulting in decreased losses. American

participation in anti-submarine duties in the Mediterranean increased drastically when the nation

declared war on Austria-Hungary on 7 December 1917.102 Because of the convoy system, for the

first time since the start of 1917, more British cargo vessels were produced in May of 1918 than

were sunk by U-boats.103 In addition, increased Allied anti-submarine countermeasures in the

101 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 488. 102 Ibid., 488-489. 103 Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, 285.

28

Mediterranean during 1917 resulted in 43 U-boats being sunk in the final five months of the

year.104

By the start of 1918, British, Italian, and French military leaders discussed changes that

could be made to the Otranto Barrage to increase its effectiveness. Italian and French officials

wanted to put in place an anti-submarine net long enough to cross the Strait of Otranto. The

British on the other hand, wanted to continue using surface warships to patrol the area. To

strengthen this anti-submarine defense, British officials proposed sending light cruisers to join

the patrol operations at the strait. Until this point, destroyers were the largest Entente warships

searching for submarines at the strait. At this time, the main focus of the Otranto Barrage was

preventing Austrian and German submarines from entering the Mediterranean Sea.

Despite these desputes, Austrian and German submarines continued to enter the

Mediterranean Sea to sink British, French, and Italian supply ships. In January of 1918 alone,

Austrian submarines based at Cattaro sank 26,020 tons of shipping in the Mediterranean. In

addition to commerce losses, U-27 sank the British destroyer HMS Phoenix in May 1918.105

While submarines continued to launch attacks against shipping, the Austrian surface fleet

remained in port and no longer carried out raids.106 Even though the British, Italians, and French

believed improvements were made to the barrage, the U-boat threat remained present in the

Mediterranean.107

American interest in the safety of convoys in the Mediterranean increased when

American transports began unloading troops at Marseilles, France. The arrival of American

104 Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002, 178. 105 Koburger, Central Powers, 99, 101. 106 Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: The United States in the War 1917-1918 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 257. 107 Koburger, Central Powers, 101.

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troops in Europe caused French ports in the Atlantic to become crowded with activity, which led

to the use of the port of Marseilles, France.108 Admiral Sims highlighted U-boat successes in the

Mediterranean and called for an increased presence of American ships in the area to protect

convoys bringing American troops to the Western Front.109 In May 1918, Sims asked the

Department of the Navy to send three destroyers and several subchasers to the Mediterranean to

participate in the anti-submarine effort. These ships were tasked with locating and destroying

submarines, not with performing escort duties.110 In addition, Sims headed the growing push for

action to destroy the Austrian and German U-boat bases in the Adriatic.

Between 15 and 21 May 1918, Entente and American representatives met in Rome to

discuss plans for offensive action against the U-boat ports. However, Lloyd George, Georges

Clemenceau, and Vittorio Orlando could not agree on planning for an offensive. As a result,

Sims' plans were quickly dismissed by the lack of agreement. This represented one of the lowest

points in the Mediterranean war in relations among the Allies.111 Fortunately, a substitute for the

largely ineffective Otranto Barrage was not far off.

A solution to the problems hindering the effectiveness of the Otranto Barrage came in

June 1918, when a group of American subchasers arrived at Govino Bay in Corfu, Greece.112 At

this time, the Royal Navy alone was losing on average thirty-four ships a month in the

Mediterranean to U-boats.113 From 12-16 June, these subchasers conducted their first patrol on

108 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 491. 109 George W. Baer One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 67-70. 110 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 491. 111 Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 348. 112 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 107-108. 113 Anne Cipriano Venzon, ed, The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995), 750.

30

the Otranto Barrage. The vessels would patrol for six days and then would be relieved by another

group of chasers.114 Their arrival increased the number of Allied ships operating on the barrage

to 280 vessels.115 By this time, the barrier of patrolling ships consisted of three individual lines

of defense, which worked together to increase the barrage’s effectiveness. British and Australian

destroyers composed the first, northern-most, line, which was tasked with protecting the other

two from any raiding Austrian cruisers or destroyers as well as searching for U-boats attempting

to leave the Adriatic.116 The second line consisted of small trawlers and launches.117 American

subchasers comprised the third line, which was the last line of defense. These subchasers had the

mission to destroy all German and Austrian submarines that managed to get past the first two

lines before they were free to enter the Mediterranean. In addition, they were tasked with

locating and destroying all submarines that tried to re-enter the Adriatic.118 This system had its

handicaps but was the best the Allies could do to keep German and Austrian submarines

contained within the Adriatic.

114 Messimer, Find and Destroy, 201. 115 Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War: Naval Operations: Volume V (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1931), 286. 116 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 50, 109-111 and 119-120. 117 Sims, Victory at Sea, 230. 118 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 110.

31

Figure 2. Subchasers 227 and 324119

Historians have often described the subchaser as America’s greatest contribution to the

war against U-boats during the First World War.120 Even with this honor, the subchaser had both

an interesting and bumpy history. The idea for a small patrol ship began in 1915 when Assistant

Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, stressed the importance of a National Navy

Reserve equipped with patrol vessels.121 In March 1917, the General Board approved a

design for a 110-foot subchaser by designer Albert Loring Swasey. To speed up construction and

to circumvent the shortage of materials used in the construction of larger naval ships, subchasers

119 Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, S.C. 227 and S.C. 324, NH000391. 120 Theodore R. Treadwell. Splinter Fleet: The Wooden Subchasers of World War II (Annapolis: Naval institute Press, 2000), 12. 121 Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants: including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown Water Fleet (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 19-21.

32

were made of wood. 122 This later became a benefit for the subchaser because their wooden hull

did not detonate German anti-shipping mines.123 These small anti-submarine vessels began being

commissioned around December 1917.124 By the end of World War I, a total of 448 subchasers

had been built.125

The hydrophone was the most valuable piece of equipment aboard this small vessel that

did so much to turn the tide against the U-boat. British Professor William Bragg had previously

experimented with the hydrophone concept but had little success.126 This device was used to

detect the sounds of a submerged submarine’s propellers, while being operated from the inside of

the subchaser when at a complete stop. The three types of hydrophones were the S.C. tubes, K

tubes, and M-B tubes; with the S.C. tubes being the most durable and easiest to use.

The S.C. tubes had two rubber pieces on the end of a reversed T pipe, which could be

placed into the water underneath the subchaser. The two small rubber pieces were hollow and

shaped like a ball that allowed a copper wire to be inserted inside. Connected to the copper tubes

were the earpieces to a regular physician’s stethoscope, which allowed the listener to hear any

noise. The listener could turn the submerged T-shaped device until the sound became steady in

the listener’s ears, which determined the direction of the sound. When the listener had a set

position on the submerged submarine, he would report the position to the subchaser’s

commander who then drew a line on the map. Since subchasers hunted in threes, he would radio

the other two chasers to exchange information, which resulted in three intersecting lines that

122 Robert Gardiner, Conway’s: All the World’s Fighting Ships 1906-1921(London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd, 1985), 132-133. 123 Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1941 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 496. 124 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 6. 125 Gardiner, Conway’s, 132-133. 126 Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, 276.

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would indicate the submarine’s position. At the time, this triangulation technique for locating a

submerged submarine was more effective than any other technique the British, French, or

Italians possessed.127 The hydrophones were used to locate U-boats, but it was the chaser's

offensive weapons that dealt the fatal blow to the submarines.

Figure 3. Hydrophone128

For its small size, the 110' subchasers were well armed for the anti-submarine role. The

main deck armament for the SC-1 class was a 3-inch/ 23-caliber gun mounted close to the 127 Millholland, Splinter Fleet, 119-122 128 Drawing by author.

34

vessel's bow. Two .30-caliber machine guns could be mounted on each side of the bridge. The

main anti-submarine weapon carried was the depth charge. Twenty-four of these charges were

usually carried by each chaser. These depth charges were set to explode at a preset depth and

were fired from a Y-gun which launched one charge to either side of the vessel.129

Unfortunately, the small size of the vessel made the crew's life challenging on many

occasions. Compared to the exciting life aboard the spacious and grand battleships, life on board

a cramped subchaser was dull and anything but enjoyable. The entire navy looked down upon the

little vessels and never missed an opportunity to harass both the crews and the undersized

chasers, calling them splinter boats, mosquitoes, or Cinderellas.130 At first sight, even the crews

of the subchasers laughed at the small size of the ships that were to carry them into battle.

However, it wasn’t too long until the crews realized that their anti-submarine mission was vital

to the survival of convoys as well as to the defense of the main fleet. Because the subchaser's

mission required the crew to work together, tight camaraderie grew among these men.

Subchaser crews formed strong bonds, which would prove vital once in battle. Every

crew member knew what he had to do and did it with the utmost co-operation with the rest of the

crew. As a result of the dependency on each other for survival and the success of their mission,

there was less formality between officers and the enlisted men among the subchaser crews.

Saluting was not enforced nor were there ever any dress inspections on board. The tight bonds

formed among the crewmembers later paid off, and, as a result, they saved countless Allied

merchantmen’s lives from U-boats and anti-shipping mines. Unfortunately, this friendship did

not make the living conditions on board the small vessel any better.

129 T. Garth Connelly, US 110' Subchasers in Action (Carrollton: Squadron/ Signal Publications, 2009), 4. 130 A. A. Hoehling, The Great War at Sea: A History of Naval Action 1914-18 (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1965), 260.

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Life on board a subchaser was exhausting and took every crew member time to master.

Poor ventilation was always a problem below decks, causing the crews to be drenched with

sweat.131 In the Adriatic, living conditions were especially harsh, with both days and nights

being hot and often reaching well over 100 degrees during the afternoon. Because of the high

temperatures, crewmen often slept on the open deck at night and were routinely kept on general

quarters throughout the night. Eating on board a subchaser was a chore in itself. As one crew

member described, “Eating became a fine art, of the impressionistic school, to be sure plastered

all over one’s person, as it were.”132 Among the most popular activities on the small ships were

playing poker and reading, with swimming being a rare luxury because of the threat of sharks in

the Adriatic. Subchaser officers did not permit shore liberty in Corfu, Greece, which meant the

crews could not leave their tight and cramped boats at dock. Due to the importance of the

subchaser's mission and the unsanitary conditions ashore, the crews were kept on constant alert.

There were numerous complaints among the crew because to these restrictions.133 On many

occasions, the maintenance required to keep the subchasers running kept crewmen occupied all

day.

All maintenance performed on the subchasers was the crews' responsibility, and they

often received little help from the U.S. Navy. Much of the crews' free time was spent repairing

the wooden vessels and their power plants which broke down regularly. One officer even

mentioned, “The boats are slowly going to pieces.”134 The subchaser tender, USS Leonidas

131 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 15, 27, and 85. 132 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500. 133 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 47, 51. 134 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.

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AD-7, provided spare parts and tools, but it was up to the crews of the subchasers to make the

repairs.135 With such a low priority on maintenance, the U.S. Navy had nearly no supplies set

aside for the small vessels.

Figure 4. Subchasers and USS Leonidas AD-7136

As with every other unique quality of these vessels, the subchaser officers were in a

league of their own. The officers in command of the individual subchasers were generally young

men who interrupted their college education to fight the war. Captain Charles P. Nelson, USN

was in overall command of the American subchasers operating in the Mediterranean and Adriatic

Seas. 137 Nelson graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1898 and was a career

135 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 27. 136 Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, USS Leonidas and Subchasers in Corfu, NH73480. 137 Sims, Victory at Sea, 207, 228.

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Naval Officer.138 Affectionately called "Juggy Nelson," he nonetheless demanded top

performance from his men and wanted to take the fight to the source of the U-boat threat.139

These commanders had a rare connection with their crews, as the absence of strict regulations

among subchaser crews made it possible for them to form strong bonds with the men under their

command.140 In addition to their youth, these commanders were all officers in the Navy Reserve

with no prior experience commanding naval vessels.141 However, these men managed to turn the

subchaser into the most formidable anti-submarine weapon the Allies possessed during the Great

War.

The subchaser crews worked together and kept their spirits high when faced with

unbearable conditions and tense situations. The tight bonds formed among these men are a fitting

testimony to what men can do under war’s harsh realities. The small wooden vessels might not

have provided a comfortable ship experience, but they did provide an invaluable service to the

entire U.S. Navy and Entente.

By the end of World War I, 235 subchasers had crossed the Atlantic to join the Allied

war effort. 142 Interestingly, the small subchasers left the United States for Europe under their

own power, which caused one U.S. naval captain to say, "Well, may God help them."143

Subchasers crossed the Atlantic in a protective convoy of destroyers, transports, and battleships.

On several occasions, larger capital ships depended on the subchaser for defense. One British

sailor on board a transport vessel mentioned "how happy everyone was at the sight of the little

138 Hoehling, The Great War at Sea: A History of Naval Action 1914-18, 262. 139 Sims, Victory at Sea, 207, 228. 140 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 21 and 85. 141 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 9. 142 Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants, 30-32. 143 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 9.

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ships."144 The majority of the small vessels left from New London, Connecticut, to Bermuda,

resupplied at the Azores, and arrived in Europe at Gibraltar. Several crewmen commented that

Bermuda was beautiful and "the water was clean and transparent, as the British forbid even bilge

pumping in this Queen's basin."145 The thirty chasers that were assigned to the Mediterranean

then traveled to Malta and finally Corfu, Greece. For these particular subchasers, the transit

voyage lasted two months. Although these vessels were hastily designed and built, the subchaser

quickly established a reputation as being a versatile and vital weapon. Through the baptism of

fire, the subchasers not only gained the respect of the U.S. Navy, but also the Entente Powers.146

Figure 5. American subchasers anchored at Corfu, Greece, 1918147

144 Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House, 1991), 311. 145 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 18. 146 Venzon, ed., The United States in the First World War, 574-575. 147 Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, Subchasers Based at Corfu, Greece, NH42570.

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Allied shipping losses in the Mediterranean decreased with the arrival of the American

subchasers. The U.S. subchasers increased the effectiveness of the Otranto Barrage once they

began operations in 1918. They were the first vessels exclusively designed and outfitted for anti-

submarine warfare.148 By July of 1918, U-boat commanders found it very difficult to attack

Allied shipping.149 Not only were the subchasers fully capable of destroying submarines, but

they were also successful at spreading fear and lowering the morale among Austrian and German

submariners, who knew it was always difficult to sneak past the waiting vessels. After the war, a

U-boat captain claimed that a subchaser located his submarine with listening equipment, saying

“We submerged to deep soundings, but when we put up to periscope depth again at 7:30 p.m. our

pursuers were still there and within three cables’ length of us.”150

Even though the chasers were well suited for the anti-submarine role, constant training

was necessary to make the vessels effective. On a few occasions when the American vessels

were not patrolling the Strait of Otranto, they would head to Gallipoli to practice their submarine

hunting skills with the Italian submarine Nautilus. In addition, the enlisted crewmen were

granted their first shore liberty at Gallipoli. This training and constant dedication to duty are

what turned the subchasers into such an effective anti-submarine weapon.151

The subchasers were so effective that German and Austrian submarine commanders

preferred to pass through the strait only when foul weather could camouflage their movement.

However, the subchasers were still able to locate submarines in rough seas. In fact, S.C. 129

crewman Carey Johnston claimed they were so skilled with the listening tubes that "the

148 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 50, 109-111 and 119-120. 149 Werner Fürbringer, FIPS: Legendary U-boat Commander 1915-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 117. 150 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500. 151 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 60.

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difference between the sound of an oil engine, and that of an electric motor" was easily

recognizable.152 The effectiveness of the subchasers had devastating effects on the Austrian and

German submariners towards the end of the war when many submarine officers had to get their

crews to board at gunpoint.153 Captured Austrians claimed that this led to a mutiny among

Austrian submariners.154

All together the Barrage commander credited British and American ships with over 150

submarine contacts and 63 sightings. As effective as this line of defense was, it failed to put an

end to the submarine threat. German and Austrian submarines still managed to sneak pass the

subchasers and drifters to continue their lethal operations against Allied shipping.155 It was not

long before Allied leaders in the Adriatic and Mediterranean Theater realized that they would

have to take the fight to the source of the problem in order to put an end to the submarine threat.

The method the Allies used to keep German and Austrian submarines contained in the

Adriatic was likened to “stomping on individual ants.”156 After four years of running the Otranto

Barrage, almost everyone associated with this defense realized they needed to destroy the ports

being used for submarine operations in order to end the U-boat threat. Planning among the Allies

began as to which Austrian port they should attack in order to maximize the damage. Strategists

considered the ports at Pola, Fiume, Spalato, and Durazzo; since submarines carried out missions

and received maintenance at these locations.157 However, Durazzo had importance for the Allies'

war effort.

152 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 107-108. 153 Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 507. 154 Sims, Victory at Sea, 231 155 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500. 156 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 223. 157 Ibid, 223.

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Durazzo had become the lifeline for the Balkans, as all supplies entering the area

originated from this location. In 1917 alone, the Austro-Hungarian Navy had shipped 960,000

tons of supplies to the port of Durazzo.158 Removing Durazzo as an effective staging area would

successfully cut off the Balkans, forcing the Central Powers in the region to sue for peace. In

September 1918, General Franchet d’ Esperey, the Entente Commander in the Balkans,

requested naval action to destroy the port.159 Problems immediately developed since Durazzo

was in the Italian zone and French forces would need permission from Italy to conduct

operations against the harbor.

French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau took the request to attack the port seriously

and asked the Italians to act or to let France lead the attack. With only a handful of destroyers

and support vessels, Italy was unable to carry out an affective raid against Durazzo alone. If the

Italians were to take action, they would have to ask the French for assistance, which would affect

the French convoy system and require British support from the Otranto Barrage. The Italians had

previously considered an attack on Durazzo, but did not think the risks would be worth the gains.

Seizing the moment, British Commodore Howard Kelly, commander of the British Adriatic

Naval Force, offered to support the operation by offering all forces, including the American

subchasers, under his command. This was the foundation for the Allied coalition operation

against the Austrian naval base.160

Durazzo was the Austrian naval instillation closest to the Otranto Barrage and posed the

biggest threat to Allied shipping. In addition to putting an end to the submarine threat, the

elimination of Durazzo would open a pathway for the Entente powers to spearhead an

158 Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918, 329. 159 Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 350. 160 Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 556-557.

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offensive across Albania to isolate the Austrian and Bulgarian armies operating in the Santi

Quaranta and Salonika Fronts. Santi Quaranta, known as Saranda in Albanian, is located in

Southern Albania and was the name of the front where Italian and French forces fought

Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian troops. The Salonika Front was located in Northern Greece

along the Aegean Sea. In addition, Entente forces would be able to confront Austria by going

through the Morava River Valley and then through Serbia. A course to certain victory could be

drawn out for the Entente powers, starting at this base, far from the bloody Western Front. For

these reasons, Austria made sure the port was impregnable to any attack.161

Planning for the attack on Durazzo called for the gathering of additional intelligence on

the port. Much of this intelligence came from reconnaissance planes as well as from a deserter.

Initial information confirmed Allied commanders' worst fear: Durazzo was a very heavily

defended port as well as a key spot for distributing military supplies to the Central Powers' war

effort in the Balkans. In addition, the port was more heavily defended than previously thought.

161 Millholland, Splinter Fleet, 224-225.

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Figure 6. Durazzo, Albania162

Durazzo was bristling with both anti-aircraft guns and coastal defense artillery. Aerial

photographs revealed that there were six heavy artillery batteries surrounding Durazzo. In the

center of Durazzo there was one anti-aircraft battery (A) as well as one near the coast (B), both

batteries having four artillery pieces. In between these two batteries was one gun (D) thought to

be of medium caliber. Slightly to the south of these gun emplacements was a three piece anti-

aircraft battery (C). South of this battery and against the coast was a recently constructed

entrenched position (G) with either three or four artillery pieces. Allied analysts thought that this 162 Drawing by author.

44

position was a heavily armed shore battery. Adjacent to this battery was another (F) with four

anti-aircraft pieces. To the north of the first two mentioned batteries was the believed position of

a two piece artillery battery (E). The letters accompany Figure 7. These artillery pieces were

180mm and posed a serious threat to both attacking aircraft and ships. After assessing the coastal

defenses, the Austrian and German operations originating from the port were covered in detail.

Figure 7. Allied intelligence map of Durazzo pinpointing coastal batteries163

163 September 2, 1918, Office of Naval Intelligence: Notes on Albanian Coast, including Durazzo: Durazzo-Defenses and Outside Communications, National Archives-RG38, Entry #98, K-6-b #10777, Entry #98, Box #1011, U.S. Naval Attaché Reports 1887-1939.

45

Equally important was a summary of the material and modes of transportation used to

keep the Austrian, German, and Balkan war effort afoot in the Balkans. The Central Powers used

a large railway system to bring supplies into Durazzo, which would also distribute supplies to the

Macedonian front. Supplies were shipped to the south of Durazzo to Segas for their troops in the

region. In addition to these rail movements, several supply warehouses were moved closer to

Segas to support operations. A repair shop that previously was at Ragosini was relocated to

Vorra, just northeast of Durazzo. Aerial reconnaissance showed that the main Central Powers

troop traffic in Albania was shifting towards San Giovanni di Medua, north of Durazzo. Reports

indicated that two torpedo boats or destroyers, along with two submarines, screened the convoys

moving these troops. The intelligence on the movement of supplies and troops from Durazzo

illustrated to the Allies the importance of this port to the Central Power naval effort.

Aerial reconnaissance made note of the presence of ships that were at anchor in Durazzo.

These reports emphasized the presence of steamers and small support ships, most likely used for

the transportation of supplies and troops. Also highlighted was that submarines, torpedo boats, or

destroyers screened the convoys leaving Durazzo. This informed the Allied commanders that

numerous warships were most likely anchored at Durazzo at any given time. However, the threat

from submarines would be the greatest to any Allied force that went to bombard the port. 164

Details of the activity originating from the port were gained from a deserter. Allied

intelligence reports indicated that two torpedo boats or destroyers, along with two submarines,

screened the convoys moving Central Power troops to the Serbian Front. Supplies were also

shipped south from the port to Segas for their troops who were in the Lower Semeni. The modes

of transportation and material used to keep the Austrian, German, and Balkan war effort alive 164 September 2, 1918, Office of Naval Intelligence: Notes on Albanian Coast, including Durazzo: Durazzo-Defenses and Outside Communications, National Archives-RG38, Entry #98, K-6-b #10777, Entry #98, Box #1011, U.S. Naval Attaché Reports 1887-1939.

46

were highlighted in these reports.165 Intelligence reports clearly indicated that Durazzo was vital

to the Central Power war effort and to their submarine campaign in the Mediterranean Sea. These

intelligence reports quickly led to the planning of an operation against Durazzo.

The Allies planned for a naval and air coalition force to bombard Durazzo, which would

provide enough fire power to make sure all Central Power activity originating from this port, was

brought to a halt. Italian, British, American, and French ships would participate in the naval

operation, while Italian and British airplanes would attack the port from the air. The main

objective was to disrupt the supply line used to deliver military supplies to Bulgaria and to put an

end to U-boat operations originating from the port. In addition, military installations, such as

warehouses and anchored ships were major targets for this operation.166 The combination of

naval and air forces in this operation was distinctive for the time.

This Allied attack plan was unique when compared to other World War I operations

because of the coordinated naval and air attack. In fact, the bombardment of Durazzo is the only

instance during the war in which warships and airplanes were used together to attack the same

target. No other operation during the war combined naval and air forces from four powers. To

insure maximum damage, the Allied ships would bombard in two separate phases on Wednesday

2 October 1918.

The Italian 3rd Division led the first phase of the attack, commanded by Italian Rear

Admiral Palladini.167 Three Italian armored cruisers comprised the division: San Giorgio, Pisa,

165 September 2, 1918, Office of Naval Intelligence: Notes on Albanian Coast, including Durazzo: Durazzo-Defenses and Outside Communications, National Archives-RG38, Entry #98, K-6-b #10777, Entry #98, Box #1011, U.S. Naval Attaché Reports 1887-1939. 166 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F1-4.

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and San Marco.168 Escorting the Italian ships were eight British destroyers, four of which were

given the task of sweeping during the duration of the bombardment, and two divisions of Italian

P.N. class torpedo boats.169 Since these torpedo boats were constructed at the Pattison Yards in

Naples, Italy, the P.N. stands for Pattison, Naples.170 The Italian cruisers were to bombard

Durazzo steaming from the Northwest to the Southeast.171 All three ships were to fire high

explosive shells from a distance of 12,000 meters offshore, while steaming at 6-knots. For escort

and protection, Rear Admiral Palladini had at his disposal two Italian torpedo boat destroyers,

four coastal torpedo boats, and an assortment of subchasers. Once the ships of 3rd Division

completed their bombardment, they were to steer back towards the Italian port of Brindisi.172

Immediately after the Italian bombardment, British cruisers would enter the port and continue the

onslaught.

A division of three British light cruisers, commanded by British Commodore Howard

Kelly, followed the Italian cruisers and composed the second phase of the bombardment. These

cruisers would shell the port after the Italian cruisers ships had finished and left the

bombardment area. The three 6-inch gun cruisers Lowestoft, Dartmouth, and Weymouth formed 167 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1. 168 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F1. 169 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1. 170 Robert Gardiner, Conway’s: All the World’s Fighting Ships 1906-1921 (London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd, 1985), 273. 171 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1. 172 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F1-2.

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the main part of this division, along with the torpedo boat destroyers Tribune (No.29), Badger

(No. 49), Shark (No. 08), and Fury (No. 68) acting as screening escorts. The cruisers would fire

at a range of 10,000 meters off the shore of Durazzo. As with the Italian 3rd Division, the British

Division was instructed to bombard, while steering from the Northwest to the Southeast at 10-

knots. 173 Once the British cruisers had completed their task, they too were instructed to return to

Brindisi, following the route of approach.

Steaming to the north of Durazzo was the Italian 4th Division under the command of

Rear Admiral Mola, which was comprised of three scout divisions. This division was instructed

to cruise near Cattaro in order to oppose any opposing forces that might attack the Allied

bombardment force.174 Along with the Italian ships were three cruisers and four destroyers from

the British Royal Navy, under the command of the captain of the HMS Glasgow.175 All of these

ships were to follow the usual route to Brindisi at the conclusion of the bombardment. Several

warships and submarines were tasked with support missions to protect the bombardment force.

173 Captain Nelson to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC K4-5. 174 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F2. 175 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G2.

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Figure 8. Two phase Italian and British bombardment of Durazzo176

.

176 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, MAP.

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In the event that an Allied ship from the bombarding force was damaged, an assigned

rescue ship, the HMS Titan, along with a torpedo boat was on station fifteen miles from

Durazzo. These two ships were to cruise in the general area and were scheduled to return to

Brindisi at 1:30 p.m. once the bombardment had ended. On the day of the operation, all tugs and

torpedo boats in Brindisi that were seaworthy were to remain on alert starting at 8:00 a.m.

onwards. For added protection, four French, two British, and two Italian submarines would be on

patrol in the Adriatic north of Durazzo, looking for any ships that might threaten the

bombardment force. These submarines were to return to their ports early on October 3 and

continue their usual assignments. While warships prepared for the bombardment, Italian torpedo

boats from Valona would attack Durazzo the night before the attack. While naval forces

bombarded from the sea on, aircraft would bomb and strafe the Austrian port.

Italian airplanes would bomb the port early in the morning on October 2, before the naval

bombardment. Starting at 9:00 a.m. shortly after the Italian planes had commenced their aerial

attack, British aircraft would continue the aerial attack. From 12:00-12:30 p.m., airplanes flying

out of Brindisi would bomb the batteries around the Cape of Durazzo. Finally, from 12:30-1:30

p.m., additional British planes would continue the aerial assault against the same coastal

batteries.177 Just as the Entente had depended on the American subchasers before for protection

against submarines, these reliable vessels were again requested for the attack on Durazzo.

At the request of Commodore Kelly, twelve subchasers commanded by Captain Charles

P. Nelson would participate in the raid.178 Nelson was a strong advocate of a coalition strike

177 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F2 and F3. 178 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.

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against the German and Austrian submarine ports in the Adriatic. When news of the planned

attack on Durazzo reached Nelson, he received the news with delight and told the subchaser

officers, “It’s going to be a real party, boys.”179 Admiral Sims said “the American Navy

possessed few officers more energetic, more efficient, more lovable, or more personally

engaging than Captain Nelson.”180 Plans called for the small boats to be used as screening

vessels for the bombardment force.181 In the event that an Allied ship was damaged, the

subchasers would assist the stricken ship back to Brindisi, Italy.182 Allied officers highlighted the

importance of the American role in the bombardment and stressed that the safety of the cruisers

depended on their actions.183

As with past operations, training became the most important method of preparation. If the

raid was to have any chance of success, intense training in anti-submarine warfare and ship

screening had to take place. Training became especially important for the American subchasers

because the ships of the large bombardment force depended on them for protection against

mines, submarines, and any hostile ships that attempted to pick up steam during the shelling.

Close cooperation among the Allied forces was essential to success because the operation against

Durazzo would be a joint operation of America, Italian, French, and British forces.

Allied commanders wanted the twelve best subchasers from Govino Bay, Corfu, to attend

an anti-submarine school at an Italian submarine base at Brindisi, Italy. For ten days, the

179 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 117. 180 Coffman, The War to End All Wars, 116-117. 181 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H. 182 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H. 183 Captain Nelson to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC K4.

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Americans trained and got up-to-date information on the newest submarine tactics as well as

anti-submarine operations.184 The small ships practiced their anti-submarine tactics and skills

against an Italian submarine, which played the role of the submerged enemy submarine. This

also served as an opportunity for the young sailors to learn how to identify the specific sound of

a submarine's engine. The training proved invaluable for the subchaser crews as well as for the

success of the operation against Durazzo.185

The twelve American subchasers that were to participate in the Allied attack on Durazzo

were divided into four units, with three chasers in each unit. These vessels were part of

Detachment 2, from the American subchaser base at Govino Bay, Corfu, Greece. The three

vessels of each unit would stay and work together, during the engagement.186

The American subchasers were scheduled to leave Brindisi at 3:45 a.m. on the morning

of 2 October. At a point fifteen miles offshore from Cape Durazzo, the vessels would meet the

Italian ships from 3rd Division and escort them to the bombarding site at 15 knots. Before

shelling began, the subchasers would reduce speed and proceed to their individual screening

stations. While carrying out screening duties, they were to steer a zigzag course and maintain a

speed of 12 knots. If the subchasers came under attack from shore batteries, they were to steer

out of gun range. Once the Italian armored cruisers completed their attack, the subchasers would

rendezvous with the approaching British light cruisers and continue screening operations in an

identical manner. One unit of subchasers was ordered to advance north and patrol near Cape Pali,

while another unit would proceed to the south near Cape Laghi. Once the British cruisers

184 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 199 and 212. 185 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 111. 186 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 303.

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concluded their bombardment, the subchasers would join together and return to Brindisi.187

Because planners were concerned with the safety of the cruisers and the secrecy of the

mission, some normal protocols were forbidden during the operation. Wireless transmission

among the Allied ships was strictly prohibited until the bombardment began. Only in cases of

extreme importance was the transmission of wireless messages allowed. However, wireless

communication was allowed by the flagships of the Italian and British bombardment divisions.

Under no conditions were the Allied ships to use signals in standard language throughout the

mission.188 In addition, every man was to do his specific duty and to refrain from any

unnecessary risks.

Due to the mission's importance, Allied leaders ordered that the ships involved were not

allowed to take any needless risks because the loss of a single ship could be seen as a victory for

the Central Powers. In the event of an emergency, the commanding officer of each ship was

responsible for the destruction of all secret documents. The defense and escorting to safety of

any damaged ship was of high importance throughout the attack.189 Well before the operation,

every ship involved in the operation was to gather at the port of Brindisi, Italy and the officers

were to begin final preparations.

At 10:00 a.m. on 30 September, the American subchasers arrived at Brindisi. Upon their

arrival, the subchaser officers received instruction on the upcoming attack of Durazzo from

187 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H. 188 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F5. 189 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G2.

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Allied commanders.190 Later, Captain Nelson called for all of these officers to assemble on his

flagship, S.C. 95. The twelve men remained huddled inside the boat for several hours after dark.

Nelson briefed the men on their assignments in the approaching operation and told them, “I can't

tell you where we’re going. Because we are not expected to come out. We’re a suicide fleet-slam

right through the enemy’s mine fields and smash their subs in their own harbor.”191 Preparing for

the worst, the subchaser crews “…padded in her crew’s mattresses, which had been rigged

around the bridge and charthouse as splinter mats. The men also sanded the decks to prevent the

gun crews' bare feet from slipping in their own blood…”192 All of the Allied ships that were to

participate in the bombardment of Durazzo arrived at the Italian port of Brindisi, Italy, by the

night of 1 October. Early on the morning of 2 October, at 1:30 a.m., the four units of subchasers

got underway. All of the chasers exited the harbor, except for S.C. 244 from Unit D, which

damaged its propeller and remained in port.193 The eleven remaining vessels began making their

way towards the Albanian coast at 12 knots, heading for Durazzo. The subchasers spearheaded

the Allied attack by leaving several hours ahead of the main bombardment force.194

190 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG-2. 191 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 226-227. 192 Ibid., 228. 193 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 2. 194 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.

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Figure 9. Captain Nelson in white shaking hands195

Meanwhile, at 7:30 a.m., ships forming the 3rd Division, consisting of the Italian armored

cruisers San Giorgio, Pisa, and San Marco departed Brindisi, under the command of Italian Rear

Admiral Palladini.196 Eight British destroyers escorted the Italian cruisers.197 These ships moved

cautiously towards Durazzo at 18 knots and planned to arrive off the coast of the port around

noon that day.198 While the Allied ships were steaming towards their objective, Italian airplanes

began the aerial attack at sunrise, followed by British aircraft that continued the aerial offensive 195 Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, Captain Nelson, NH52757 196 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F1 (sec). 197 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure G1. 198 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F1.

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at 9 a.m.199 At 8:40 a.m., the subchasers arrived and held their position six miles out from

Durazzo. At this point, the small vessels waited for the arrival of the bombardment force.

Spotting the advancing Italian cruisers shortly after 9:07 a.m., the subchasers steered

towards their assigned patrol areas. At this time, the Italian force was approximately seven miles

away. Unit B headed towards and patrolled to the northeast of the Italian cruisers near Cape Pali,

while Unit D screened an area to the south of the advancing ships. Unit G screened the left,

shoreline side, while on the right; ocean side of the Italian division was Unit H.200 The vessels

from Unit G and H screened the sides of the Italians at a distance of 1,000 yards.

Prior to starting the bombardment, the Italian armored cruisers and British screening

cruisers slowed from 18 knots down to 8.201 At 10:00 a.m., the Italian's began shelling Durazzo,

thus beginning the naval attack on the port.202 The Italian cruisers fired at the port at a range of

12,000 meters offshore.203 As one subchaser crewman mentioned, “Undoubtedly we caught the

Austrians completely by surprise.”204 Throughout the ensuing onslaught, Italian and British

aircraft bombed Durazzo.205 At 10:08 a.m., the batteries around Durazzo began firing on

199 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2,INC F3. 200 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2-4. 201 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H. 202 Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC K2. 203Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2,INC F1. 204 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 228. 205 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2,INC F3-4.

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subchasers from Unit G, Their shells fell substantially short of the patrolling subchasers.206

Meanwhile Carey Johnston, radio operator from S.C. 129, stated, "Although their projectiles

were high and off the mark, the missiles flew overhead with a wicked shriek and a menacing

ricochet when they hit the water. I was so frightened that I had a hard time remembering the

radio code.”207 As a result of the incoming shells, Unit G started zigzagging at 10:12 a.m. at a

speed of 12 knots, while continuing on their assigned patrol line.208 To the north, Unit B could

already see the approaching British light cruisers. Not long after the shelling begun, all three

subchasers from Unit B spotted moving wake and two periscopes breaking the surface of the

water, the telltale signs of lurking submarines.

During the attack of Durazzo, S.C. 129 distinguished itself among the American

subchasers as the first to spot a Central Power submarine underway.209 S.C. 129, along with the

rest of Unit B, was steering a course to the northeast in their designated patrol area, when at

10:25 a.m., S.C. 129 spotted a periscope from a submerged submarine 1,600 yards off the port

side.210 At 10:28 a.m., S.C. 129, at the back of Unit B, quickly turned to port, falling out of

formation.211 On board, Carey Johnston stated, “Sure enough, I could see an enemy submarine

206 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3. 207 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 113. 208 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3. 209 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG2-3. 210 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG4. 211 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.

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porpoising-alternately surfacing and diving. It was headed for the cruisers.”212 The other two

subchasers in Unit B observed S.C. 129’s turn to port and determined that it had sighted a

submarine and was preparing to attack.213 The crew of S.C. 129 positioned their subchaser so

that it could attack at right angles and rapidly determined that the speed of the submerged

submarine was 6 knots. The submarine was heading towards the south, getting into position to

attack the Allied force.214 As S.C. 129 began to make its attack on the submerged submarine,

S.C. 125 and S.C. 128 from Unit B spotted another periscope, which they pursued.215

At 10:34 a.m. when a crewmember of S.C. 129 accidentally blew a whistle, the signal to

release a depth charge, the crew released a stern dropped charge. The submarine fully submerged

after the explosion and returned to periscope depth a minute later. Not wanting to lose the

submarine again, S.C. 129 began laying a pattern of depth charges in front of the submarine at

10:36 a.m. These charges were set to detonate at a depth of fifty feet, except for the eighth

charge, which had a setting for one hundred and fifty feet. Following the release of the second

depth charge, the submarine periscope was still visible, but quickly faded. The third charge was

dropped just ahead of the submarine’s wake, while S.C. 129’s course would have delivered the

fourth directly on top of the submerged submarine. Following the release of fifth depth charge,

the subchaser had to reduce speed to five knots because of engine trouble. After the detonation of

212 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 113-114. 213 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1. 214 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1. 215 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1.

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the seventh charge, the crew reported that objects similar to pieces of metal appeared.216 Carey

Johnston recalled, “Over the noise of the exploding cans, I heard an excited yell from Ensign

Jacoby, ‘We got him!”217 The crew also noted an explosion separate from those made by the

depth charges, which immediately grabbed the crew's attention.

Subsequently, S.C. 129 returned to the area it had just bombed and noticed oil and

bubbles.218 One crewmember said, “In the midst of the floating oil, I saw a torso and head of a

U-boat sailor, encased in a life jacket.”219 At this point, the subchaser had come to a complete

stop to note the destruction. At 10:40 a.m., a patch of white water unexpectedly rose to the ocean

surface around twenty-five yards away from the subchaser. This white water continued to rise for

twenty seconds before subsiding, while bubbles continued to rise.220 After the attack, Johnston

stated, “We had sunk the U-boat, but also sustained damage to our chaser. The blasts from the

depth charges had severely shaken the ship and the gasoline feed to one engine was ruptured.”221

While S.C. 129 was attacking a U-boat, the other two subchasers from Unit B also started their

own separate attack on another submarine.

216 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1. 217 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114. 218 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1. 219 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 236-237. 220 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1. 221 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.

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Figure 10. S.C. 129’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo222

S.C. 215 and 128 of Unit B were heading on a course to the northeast when S.C. 129

turned out of formation. Realizing that S.C. 129 had located a submarine, S.C. 215 turned to port

to assist in the pursuit. At the same time, S.C. 215 spotted another moving periscope 750 yards

222 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-2.

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away, heading northeast. At 10:30 a.m., S.C. 215 raised the signal flag to attack and opened fire

on the submarine with the port machine gun and the 3-inch gun. The Commanding and

Executive Officer's aboard observed that the second 3-inch shot dropped two feet short of the

exposed periscope. This shell shattered the periscope and created a six foot high splash of water.

S.C. 215 fired six 3-inch shells at the submarine. As soon as S.C. 215 began the attack, S.C. 128

came alongside to join in the hunt.

S.C. 215 continued the attack by steering to port, while S.C. 128 followed and took a

position 100 yards off her starboard side. The crews of the two subchasers observed that the

submarine was turning south towards the British light cruisers. At this time, the cruisers were

two miles ahead of the submerged submarine, getting ready to turn into the bombarding area.

Both S.C. 215 and S.C. 128 approached the lurking submarine and began laying depth charges,

in forty fathoms of water. S.C. 215 released six charges from the stern, while S.C. 128 dropped

four. Both vessels also fired several charges from their Y-gun. All of the depth charges were set

to detonate at a depth of fifty feet.

The first four depth charges released from S.C. 215 left no signs of destruction.

However, when a charge launched from the starboard Y-gun exploded, the Executive Officer on

board observed an object resembling a plate come to the surface. Other debris rose to the surface

and later sank, but this was enough evidence for the Executive Officer to yell out, “That got

him!”223 Other crewmen on S.C. 215’s deck also reported that they saw the same debris.

Following the explosion from the fourth depth charge released by S.C. 128, two machinist’s

223 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.

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mates on board the subchaser said that a piece of wreckage rose to the surface and then quickly

sank. Shortly after, oil began rising to the surface in large quantities.

The officers of S.C. 215 and 128 determined that it was more important to search for

more submarines than to search the spot just depth charged. Following the attack on the

submarine, the two subchasers steered towards S.C. 129, which was now facing trouble from

disabled engines.224 While heading towards the crippled subchaser, S.C. 128 sighted a third

submarine. Both S.C. 215 and S.C. 128 turned west to hunt for the recently spotted submarine,

but found no traces. S.C. 215 and 128 then headed towards S.C. 129 to offer assistant. After S.C.

129’s crew finished engine repairs, the three subchasers resumed their original screening

operations.225 Allied officials concluded in the post-battle report that the depth charges dropped

by S.C. 215 and the fourth stern dropped charge from S.C. 128 destroyed the ominous

submarine.226 Unit B subchasers, spotted three submarines, with two most likely being sunk.227

224 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1-2. 225 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG5. 226 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1. 227 Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1.

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Figure 11. S.C. 215 and 128’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo228

228 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S. Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.

64

As the Italian ships fired at Durazzo and the British cruisers began to enter the

bombardment area, Italian torpedo boats raced into the port and attacked two destroyers and one

torpedo boat that were anchored in the harbor. These torpedo boats attacked two destroyers and a

torpedo boat. Once within range, the torpedo boats launched their torpedoes, which struck one

destroyer.229 A subchaser crewmen recalled, “The torpedo boat nearest the Austrian destroyer

suddenly pitched to a stop and swung her bow dead amidships on the Austrian…I watched the

streaks of her eighteen-inch torpedoes dart straight for the Austrian. There was a terrific

explosion; boilers flew skyward, spinning like pinwheels, with jets of steam still spurting from

them.”230 The damaged destroyer lost control and was quickly beached.231

Following closely behind the Italian 3rd Division were the advancing British light cruisers

Lowestoft, Dartmouth, and Weymouth coming from the north, which soon turned into the

shelling area. British Commodore Howard Kelly commanded the British force aboard the HMS

Lowestoft.232 The British cruisers were to begin firing without delay, once the Italians were at the

final stretch of the bombarding area. At 10:51 a.m., the Italian cruisers stopped firing and exited

the harbor.233 The screening subchasers from Unit G and H left the Italian ships to begin

229 Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 2-3. 230 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 233. The torpedo boats were referred to as Motoscafo Armato Silurante in Italian. 231 Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 3. 232 Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC K4. 233 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4.

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escorting the British cruisers. With the Italian ships out of the area, the British cruisers began

bombarding at a distance of 10,000 meters and continued the onslaught.234

Just as the British cruisers began entering the port, Ensign Henry R. Dann, commanding

officer on board S.C. 130, spotted an anti-shipping mine floating in the direct path of the

advancing British screening destroyers.235 The crew of S.C. 130 noticed that the mine had

characteristics of the German Mark IV anti-shipping mine. The alerted subchaser quickly left

formation to steer towards the mine, leaving S.C. 324 and 337 to guard the right side of the

British ships. S.C. 130 fired at the mine once with the 3-inch deck gun, which struck the mine

causing it to sink. Shortly after destroying the mine, the crew spotted another floating mine 500

yards away. Without wasting time, S.C. 130 headed towards the mine and idled alongside it in

order to caution the British destroyers of the danger in the area.236 Noticing the subchaser’s

warning, all four British destroyers changed their course, avoiding possible disaster.237

The three British cruisers continued their shelling with great accuracy, while the

screening destroyers were also relentless in their attack of the port. The American subchasers

continued screening the British vessels as they made their way through the bombardment area. In

the midst of the shelling, a submerged submarine torpedoed HMS Weymouth. At 11:08 a.m., the

British ships stopped firing and began to head back to Brindisi, Italy. While the cruisers left, the

234 Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC K4. 235 Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1. 236 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4. 237 Historical Section, 3 March 1922, United States Forces which operated; assisting and supporting Italian and British war ships in the Bombardment of Durazzo, Albania, October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.

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British destroyers and the subchaser from Unit G advanced closer into Durazzo and began

shelling at point blank range.238 In addition, Italian torpedo boats raced into the harbor to inflict

further damage.239 This continued until 11:25 a.m., when the destroyers stopped firing.240

Reports suggest that the third enemy submarine sighted by S.C. 128 was the submarine

responsible for torpedoing the Weymouth.241 Austria claimed that, “Lieutenant Hermann Rigele

in U-31 managed to torpedo the Weymouth, blowing off the cruiser’s stern and killing four

men.”242 The submerged submarine launched two torpedoes at the Weymouth, with the first

missing and the second striking the cruiser.243 The torpedo struck Weymouth in the stern, but the

ship continued bombarding and later returned to Brindisi, Italy, under its own propulsion.244 A

number of the participating American subchasers received orders to escort Weymouth, as the

British ships began to leave the Austrian port.

Around 12:45 p.m., subchasers from Unit D, G, and H headed towards the damaged

Weymouth and began to escort the ship. Although not badly damaged, protecting the Weymouth

from marauding submarines and warships on the way back to Brindisi was vital. The escorting

238 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4. 239 Force Commander, to Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, 9 October 1918, Engagement of Subchasers in Detachment Two, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1. 240 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4. 241 Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1. 242 Halpern, The Naval War, 558. 243 Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2-3. 244 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 238-239.

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subchasers, along with the Weymouth, returned to Brindisi at 8:30 p.m.245 While these three units

guided the Weymouth back to Italy, chasers from Unit B spotted an Austrian vessel moving

inside Durazzo.

Shortly after the British cruisers had finished bombarding, subchasers from Unit B

spotted the Austro-Hungarian hospital ship, Baron Call, picking up steam.246 The Baron Call

was trying to flee Durazzo to the north. Upon spotting the hospital ship, the British destroyers

HMS Nereide and Ruby began steering to the rear of the ship. While approaching the fleeing

ship, the Unit B subchasers raised the international flag, signaling “Stop Immediately.” The

Neredie placed a party of armed sailors on board the hospital ship. Once the Baron Call was

outside the port of Durazzo, Unit B subchasers began escorting the hospital ship back to Brindisi,

Italy. Once reaching Brindisi at 12:30 a.m. on 3 October, port officials instructed the subchasers

to release the Baron Call and to tie up in port.247

All of the eleven participating subchasers made it back to Brindisi, although they did not

return to port together. There were no casualties among the eleven small boats.248 Every one of

the ships that took part in the attack returned to the Italian port. Six men were killed and only a

few wounded among the British and Italian bombardment force. These were the men killed on

245 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3-6. 246 Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1. 247 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG5. 248 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1-4.

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the Weymouth, which was torpedoed by an Austrian submarine during the bombardment.249 The

extremely low casualty figures were just one of many reasons why the Allies claimed the

operation was a major victory.

The Allies considered the bombardment of Durazzo a strategic victory.250 Some officials

viewed the engagement as a sledge hammer being used against a fly.251 Heavy damage inflicted

on ammo dumps, docks, shore defenses, and the town near Durazzo were reasons enough for

Allied commanders to write Durazzo off as a functional military facility. The attack had left all

of the ships at anchor in the port of Durazzo either sunk or badly damaged. Torpedoes used

against the harbor dock facilities were especially effective in inflicting serious damage to port

installations.252 Four hours after the bombardment, British planes flew over the port and reported

that the destruction was extremely high.253 According to Allied reports, the loss of life on shore

was also extremely high. Many viewed the victory as devastating to the Central Power’s war

effort in the region.254 Among those celebrating were the crews of the subchasers that took part

in the engagement.

Several subchaser crewmen mentioned that the Allied naval force seemed to be more

skilled than did the defending Austrian force. The Austrian shore batteries did not achieve a

lethal hit on any of the attacking ships. So confident were the men that many mentioned that 249 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 238-239. 250 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG4. 251 Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 557-558. 252 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG4. 253 Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 3. 254 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 238-239.

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there seemed to be a lack of fear among the subchaser crewmen.255 The Allies credited the

subchasers from Unit B with sinking two U-boats during the attack.256

The actions these men displayed under fire gained the attention and respect of several

Allied leaders. In reference to the subchasers that took part in the bombardment, Commodore

Kelly, Commander of the British Adriatic Force, mentioned, “I am most gratified for the

valuable service rendered by the eleven American Chasers.”257 Furthermore, the subchasers

distinguished themselves by successfully neutralizing Austrian anti-shipping mines around

Durazzo before the cruisers and destroyers entered the port. When the Weymouth was torpedoed,

the subchasers successfully escorted the damaged ship back to port. Most importantly, the

subchasers were successful in locating and attacking Austrian submarines within the port. If it

were not for the actions of the subchasers, the casualties among the Allied bombardment force

would have been higher and more ships would have either been damaged or sunk. The raid on

Durazzo was such a success because of the presence and actions of the eleven American

subchasers.

Allied nations commended several subchaser crewmen who were present at the attack

for their exceptional leaderships and acts of heroism. Lieutenant-Commander Bastedo received a

commendation for his leadership over Unit B, during the unit’s engagement of two submarines.

Many praised Machinist’s Mate 1st Class John Fabris from S.C. 179, for his action during the

battle, which allowed his ship to continue fighting. Fabris used his hand to hold a vital engine

piece in place throughout the battle, which result in third degree burns on his hands and arms.

255Chambers, Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 76. 256 Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1941, 506. 257 Historical Section, 3 March 1922, United States Forces which operated; assisting and supporting Italian and British war ships in the Bombardment of Durazzo, Albania, October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.

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Finally, Ensign Henry R. Dann, commander of S.C. 130, was recognized for extraordinary

heroism in guiding his subchaser next to a floating anti-shipping mine, which served as a

warning for the advancing British destroyers. All of the subchaser crewmen who participated in

the action against Durazzo received special recognition from the British and Italians.258

Following the successful raid, Allied nations bestowed numerous decorations on Nelson.

He died in November 1935. One of his crewman remarked that devotion to him was so great that

peers actually believed that he would enter the Pantheon of “John Paul Jones, Perry, Farragut,

Dewey, in the Book of Glorious Tradition of the American Navy.”259 All of the American

subchaser officers present at the shelling of Durazzo performed remarkably in their duties, but

Lt. Cmdr. Paul Henry Bastedo is deserving of special recognition.

Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo was second in command of the American subchasers for the

operation.260 Bastedo was a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, class of 1908, and a career

Naval Officer. 261 During the bombardment, Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo was on board S.C. 215, part of

Unit B.262 As a result of his courageous leadership and S.C. 215’s assist in sinking a U-boat

during the attack, the Navy awarded Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo the Distinguished Service Medal. His

later commands included the ill-fated USS Indianapolis (CA-35) from 1932-1934 and USS

Quincy (CA-39) from 1937-1939. Both of these vessels were later sunk during the Second World

258 Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1. 259 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 240. 260 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG-1. 261 Rear Admiral Paul H. Bastedo, Twentieth Century Biographical Collection, Navy Dept. Library, pg 1. 262 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two: List of Officers on Vessels of Unit G, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC N.

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War. Bastedo retired from the Navy on 1 June 1946 as a Rear Admiral (Upper Half) and died in

1951. He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors.263

Figure 12. Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo (Commander in this photograph)264

As the Allies celebrated what they considered to be a highly successful mission, Austria

merely labeled the attack as a failure. Austrian reports of the bombardment tell a much different

story than that of the Allied accounts. They claimed that an Allied naval force, far greater than in

actuality, shelled Durazzo. A telegram from Vienna stated that four battleships, four cruisers, and

263 Rear Admiral Paul H. Bastedo, Twentieth Century Biographical Collection, Navy Dept. Library, 1-3. 264 Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo, NH54945.

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around 20 destroyers and torpedo boats attacked the port. Although the Austrians exaggerated

the size of the bombardment force, they greatly reduced the size of the Italian and British air

attack, stating that only 15 planes took part. Their reports also indicated that the Austrian

submarine U-31 torpedoed the British cruiser Weymouth and claimed the ship later sank because

there were only three cruisers spotted later on, instead of the assumed four. In addition, the

Austrians believed that U-31 successfully fled the area without receiving any damage from

Allied ships.265 There was even an Austrian claim of a direct hit on a British destroyer by one of

the shore batteries around Durazzo. Austria denied Allied claims that the port was inoperable,

instead they said the damage to the port and loss of life was very light.266 The Allied report that

American subchasers had sunk two submarines was seen as incorrect by Austrian accounts,

which asserted the subchasers did not sink any submarines during the engagement.267 Conflicting

with the American accounts of the Austrian shore fire, Austria claimed to have fired back with

great accuracy.

Austria stated that their shore batteries fired effectively and accurately, thus causing the

Allied naval force to pull back. Austria claimed to have sunk one torpedo boat during the British

phase of the attack when in fact none were damaged or sunk.268 In the wake of such devastation,

Austria acknowledged only minor damage to Durazzo.

Austrian accounts portrayed the Allied attack as being less effective than what the Allies

claimed. The damage listed was limited to one crippled steam ship and a small number of

265 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114. 266 Kolnische Zeitung, 7 October 1918, A Naval Attack on Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1. 267 Kolnische Zeitung, 7 October 1918, A Naval Attack on Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2. 268 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.

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destroyed warehouses.269 The claim was even made that the bombardment of Durazzo was not a

crushing defeat to the Austrian Navy because the only ships anchored at Durazzo were the

destroyers Dinara and Scharfschutze, torpedo boat Tb87, steamers Graz, Herzegovina, and

Stambul, and the hospital ship Baron Call.270 These reports indicated that far less damage was

done to the port than what the Allied declared. More than likely, the Austrians exaggerated the

attack on and damage to the Weymouth in an effort to portray the Allied attack as being less

successful. Despite the different interpretations, operations in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, as

well as on the Western Front were quickly coming to an end.

The combined naval and air operation against Durazzo was the final large-scale

engagement in the Adriatic, during World War I.271 In addition, the defense of Durazzo during

the Allied attack was the very last action for the Austro-Hungarian Navy. On 31 October 1918,

Austria-Hungary ceased to exist when Hungary severed ties with Austria.272 A few days

following the attack, the remnants of the Serbian Army set foot ashore at Durazzo.273 Entente

forces took control of the Austrian port on 14 October 1918.274 The landing of the Serbian Army

at Durazzo placed a strong Entente presence at the back of the Austrian and Bulgarian troops that

were fighting on the Santi Quaranta and Salonika fronts. This action was quickly followed by the

Austro-Hungarian Armistice on 3 November 1918.275 Although there was an Armistice with

Austria-Hungary, the German submarines trapped in the Adriatic Sea were not bound to this

269 Ibid, 114. 270 Halpern, The Naval War, 557-558. 271 Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 556-558. 272 Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918, 340, 349-354. 273 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 239. 274 Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War 1917-1918, 257. 275 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 239-241.

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agreement.276 On one occasion, several German U-boats left Cattaro for Germany, slipping right

past the Otranto Barrage. These U-boats managed to pass Gibraltar and later sank the British

battleship Britannia.277 However, American subchasers at Gibraltar located and sank two of the

fleeing submarines.278 All subchasers in the Mediterranean and Adriatic continued operations

until the German Armistice.

Shortly after the Austro-Hungarian Armistice, Germany signed an armistice with the

Allied forces on 11 November 1918. Warships of several Allied powers gathered in Corfu to

celebrate the end of the war. Returning an act of camaraderie by the subchaser crewmen, French

bands played the Star-Spangled Banner, the first time the Americans had heard the tune since

leaving the United States. After this, the subchasers traveled across the Adriatic and

Mediterranean as a sign of American presence, since they were the only ships in the region

representing the United States. Some crewmen even visited with Pope Benedict XV while in

Rome.279 By the end of hostilities in the Adriatic Sea, there were thirty-six subchasers based at

Corfu, Greece. With all the celebration and cheering over the armistice, the American crews did

not have time to think of the major importance of the attack of Durazzo for the United States.

The bombardment of Durazzo was the only naval engagement of World War I in which

American warships were present.280 Although their contribution was small, these subchasers

undoubtedly contributed to the successful result of the bombardment. If it were not for the

presence of the subchasers, the Allied bombardment force would likely have suffered far greater

casualties. In addition, more Austrian submarines might have gotten underway if it were not for

276 Sims, Victory at Sea, 239. 277 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 243. 278 Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114. 279 Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 78-89. 280 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 239, 245, 247, 250.

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the screening action of these vessels. Even though this engagement is easily overshadowed by

other larger naval actions, such as Jutland, the United States Navy made a key contribution to the

vital action against Durazzo. When the Allied anti-submarine campaign in the Mediterranean

climaxed on 2 October 1918, the American subchasers were there making the greatest impact.

Through the course of the First World War, the Entente Powers modified their anti-

submarine efforts in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas to guard vital shipping from U-boats.

Each new step was an improvement over the former and trial and error became the best way of

learning how to combat the U-boats. The use of the convoy system to protect transports greatly

decreased shipping losses. However, losses still remained high throughout the war. The creation

of the Otranto Barrage was the Entente's greatest anti-submarine effort in the Mediterranean

Theater during the war. Although this line of defense hindered U-boat operations, it failed to put

an end to the submarine threat. The barrage was most effective in 1918 when the American

subchasers arrived, but even then, this defense only destroyed three U-Boats during the entire

war.281 Central Powers' accounts claimed that seven German and Austrian U-boats were lost in

the Adriatic or Mediterranean to Allied anti-submarine defenses, however a true number has not

been determined. Out of all the kills reported by subchasers, only two have ever been

confirmed.282 An Austrian report "showed, the Austrian high officers said, that the Germans had

lost six submarines on the Otranto Barrage in the last three months of the war."283 Throughout

the war, Allied anti-submarine countermeasures in the Mediterranean were hindered by the lack

281 Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 315. 282 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 493. 283 Sims, Victory at Sea, 231.

76

of a unified command.284 Despite the Barrage, German and Austrian submarines still managed to

sneak pass the subchasers and continue their lethal menace of Allied shipping.285

With all the efforts and improvements made in the campaign against the U-boats in the

Mediterranean, none were as effective as the Allied raid on Durazzo. This raid attacked the core

of the U-boat threat and destroyed the main port that supported most U-boat operations. After

this operation, the port quickly fell to Entente forces and U-boats were forced to use Adriatic

ports that were further north of the Mediterranean such as, Cattaro and Pola. Not only did this

raid result in a decrease in the number of U-boat operations, it also started a chain of events that

led to the Austro-Hungarian and German Armistices and ultimately to the end of the war.

The lessons learned in anti-submarine and U-boat warfare by the Entente, Americans, and

Central Powers was later applied during World War II. Unlike World War I where the Entente

lacked an effective countermeasure to U-boats for most of the war, the Allies in World War II

started to fight the submarine threat shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Lessons learned

during the First World War were applied and in some cases, had to be relearned. As with the

First World War, heavily defended convoys were the best method for protecting shipping. The

convoy system was used much more during World War II and was accepted as the best form of

defense by the Allies. By 1945, the convoy system had evolved into a highly successful deterrent

against U-boats and even led to the creation of escort aircraft carriers, also known as Jeep

Carriers. In addition, land-based aircraft and blimps augmented the convoy system.

Countermeasures such as nets and anti-submarine mines which had little success in the First

World War were used in certain places, but were not the first line of defense. Even though

284 Arthur J. Marder, Jutland and After: May 1916-December 1916. Vol. 3 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 277. 285 Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.

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shipping losses to U-boats were at times higher in the Second World War, anti-submarine

counter measures were much more organized and effective than they were from 1914 to 1918.286

Although more effective anti-submarine weapons such as destroyers, aircraft, and even sonar

became the main concerns for submariners, American subchasers continued to play an important

role in World War II.

America's answer to the U-boat threat early in the Second World War was nearly the

same as the previous war and again involved heavy use of subchasers. Interestingly, a small

number of the original 110' chasers were still in active service. However, the beginning of a new

conflict started the construction of larger anti-submarine vessels designated the SC-497 class.

These vessels eventually became known as patrol craft or PC, once their missions expanded

beyond the anti-submarine role. These improved vessels were larger, fitted with the latest

equipment, and had more firepower than their predecessors. During World War II, U.S. Navy

and Coast Guard subchasers patrolled waters in every theater of the war, including the

Mediterranean. Again their contribution to the war effort was similar to that of the First World

War. The world's only surviving subchaser in its original configuration is KNM Hitra,

previously SC-718. This chaser is a veteran of World War II and is now displayed in Norway.

The legacy and successes of the 110' subchasers during World War I was carried on by the more

advanced subchasers during World War II.287

Although the Allies applied lessons learned in World War I in combating submarines,

there is also evidence that suggests World War I and the bombardment of Durazzo left a lasting

impression on Germany. Germany's indecisiveness in the First World War on the use of U-boats

286 T. L. Francis. Submarines: Leviathans of the Deep (New York: Friedman/ Fairfax Publishers, 1997), 67-71, 74-76. 287 Theodore R. Treadwell, The Wooden Subchasers of World War II, 13-20, 23, 89, 238.

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against shipping was not repeated in World War II. Germany learned from World War I that U-

boats could cut off the sea lines of communication Great Britain relied on for supplies.288 Two

days after the start of hostilities in Poland, Germany started a full unrestricted U-boat warfare

campaign against shipping which lasted until the end of the war. As with the previous World

War, U-boats were again sent to the Mediterranean Sea.289 U-boats had many of their early

successes in the Atlantic and at time nearly managed to isolate Great Britain from outside

communications. Unfortunately, guerre de course cannot win a war alone. In addition, the

construction of heavily protected U-boat pens, mostly along the French coast, could have

possibly been as a result of the devastation the Allied bombardment force caused to the

submarine base at Durazzo. These shelters protected U-boats from aerial bombardment on

numerous occasions and many are still intact to this day.290

A detailed outlook on the diverse Entente and later Allied, anti-submarine effort in the

Mediterranean illustrates how countermeasures were developed through experimentation and

time. This analysis shows how the Mediterranean anti-submarine operations protected the

shipping vital to the conduct of local theater operations and to the greater war effort on the

Western Front. Most importantly, the American subchaser was the most important weapon used

against Central Power U-boats in the Mediterranean during World War I. Archival material gives

an in-depth narrative of the bombardment of Durazzo, which enhances the minimal work that has

been done on this engagement. Too small to be used in the Atlantic; the subchasers proved to be

effective and deadly in the calmer waters of the Mediterranean and Adriatic.291 Not only did

288 Edwin P. Hoyt. The U-boat Wars (New York: Arbor House Publishing Company, 1984), 1-3. 289 Lawrence Paterson. U-boats in the Mediterranean 1941-1944 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 17-19. 290 Randolph Bradham. Hitler's U-boat Fortresses (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 9-10, 19. 291 Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1941, 496.

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these small vessels augment defenses already in place, but they helped reduce losses to the vital

shipping that kept the Allied war effort alive.292 Although confirmed submarine kills were low in

number, the subchasers were an effective deterrent to submarines as confirmed by statements of

submarine commanders. Even though destroyers had the weapons needed for the destruction of

U-boats, they lacked the necessary hydrophones the subchasers had to locate submarines. These

small boats were the only Allied vessels of the war that were specifically developed for the anti-

submarine role. Many Allied leaders were thankful for the contributions made by the subchaser

crews. In many cases the crews relished the excitement that accompanied the hunt for U-boats.

Although the subchasers were developed late in the war and had only one major engagement,

they were the forerunner of technology and tactics that would be expanded and undergo

widespread application during World War II.293

292 Marder, Jutland and After: May 1916-December 1916. Vol. 3 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 276. 293 Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 307.

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APPENDIX A

U.S. FORCES AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO

81

12 Submarine Chasers divided into 4 units

Unit B Unit D Unit G Unit H S.C. 215 S.C. 128 S.C. 129

S.C. 225 S.C. 327 S.C. 244

S.C. 95 S.C. 179 S.C. 338

S.C. 337 S.C. 130 S.C. 324

*S.C. 244 did not participate because of a damaged propeller blade294

294 Ray Millholland. Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage. app303).

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APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO

83

September 14, 1918 Entente Commander in the Balkans, General Franchet d’Esperey, started his assault against the Bulgarians. September 29, 1918 The Bulgarians are forced to an armistice as a result of General Franchet d’Esperey’s offensive.295 September 28, 1918 British Commodore Howard Kelly ordered Captain Charles P. Nelson, commander of subchaser Unit-B, to have twelve subchasers ready to escort an Entente cruiser force, for the bombardment of Durazzo.296 September 29, 1918 7:00 pm American Subchaser Units B, D, G, and H under the commander of Capt. Nelson, departed Corfu, Greece and headed for Brindisi, Italy to rendezvous with the rest of the bombardment force. September 30, 1918 10:00 am The four subchaser units moored up at Brindisi, Italy.297 October 2, 1918 1:30 a.m. Subchaser Units B, D, G, and H departed Brindisi. SC 244 from Unit D damaged her propeller and was not able to leave Brindisi.298 Dawn Italian airplanes began the aerial bombardment of Durazzo.299

295 Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 556. 296 A.B. Feuer, The U.S. Navy in World War I: Combat at Sea and in the Air. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 113. 297 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2. 298 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1. 299 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F3.

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7:30 a.m. Ships from 3rd Division, which consisted of the Italian San Giorgio, Pisa, and San Marco as well as eight British destroyers, depart Brindisi.300 8:40 a.m. The subchasers arrived off Durazzo and waited at a distance of six miles offshore, waiting for the bombardment force.301 9:00 a.m. British airplanes arrive over Durazzo and maintain the aerial bombardment.302 9:07 a.m. The Italian bombardment force, with screening vessels, approached within seven miles of the subchasers. At this time the American subchasers were ordered to head to their designated stations.303 9:10 a.m. Unit B headed to the northeast to their designated bombardment are that ran to the southwest. This course permitted Unit B to head to the north of the Italian Bombardment force, which was beginning to enter the bombardment area. 9:55 a.m. Unit G arrived at their designated station in the bombardment area and waited for the cruisers to advance.304 10:00 a.m. The planned time for the Italian bombardment force to begin bombarding Durazzo.305 300 Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1. 301 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1. 302 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F3. 303 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1. 304 1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG3-4. 305 Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC K2.

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10:08 a.m. Shore batteries of Durazzo started firing on Unit G. The shots fired fell significantly short of the subchasers.306 10:25 a.m. S.C. 129, at the back of Unit B, spotted a submarine periscope 1600 yards off to the port, while heading a northeastern course to their position on the patrol line. The submarine was on a direct course to get into position to attack the Italian cruisers.307 10:30 a.m. The crew of S.C. 125 started firing the port machine gun and the 3-inch gun on a submerged submarine they had spotted.308 10:34 a.m. The crew of S.C. 129 released a stern dropped depth charge, when a crewmember accidentally blew a whistle (the signal to release a depth charge). 10:36 a.m. S.C. 129 began dropping depth charges in front of the spotted submerged submarine. 10:40 a.m. S.C. 129 spots a substantial amount of oil and bubbles around the area where the submarine had been depth charged.309 10:51 a.m. The Italian cruisers stopped firing and exited the shelling area. Unit G moved to starboard and approached the advancing British cruisers, which were approaching the area from the north. Shortly after, the British cruisers began bombarding immediately. 11:08 a.m. Shelling from the British cruisers stopped and the ships departed the area. Unit G along with the British destroyers advanced towards Durazzo, while the destroyers kept firing at Durazzo. 306 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3. 307 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1. 308 1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two, Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1. 309 2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1.

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11:17 a.m. Unit G and the British destroyers began heading back to Brindisi. The destroyers continued firing, with no shots coming from the shore batteries. 11:25 a.m. British destroyers stopped firing on Durazzo.310 1200-12:30 a.m. Italian airplanes from Brindisi bombard the shore batteries near Cape Durazzo.311 12:00 a.m. Subchasers from Unit D took screening stations around the damaged HMS Weymouth. 1230-1:30 a.m. British aircraft continue bombing shore batteries around Durazzo. 12:30 a.m. Unit G and the destroyers altered course to 315 degrees to go assist the stricken HMS Weymouth. 12:45 a.m. Unit G approached the starboard beam of the HMS Weymouth and was part of the force that screened the damaged ship back to Brindisi. S.C. 95 was five hundred yards out on the starboard side of the Weymouth. S.C. 179 and S.C. 338 following behind at 150 yard intervals. This arrangement was maintained at 11 knots. 8:30 p.m. Unit G arrives at Brindisi and tied up in the harbor. October 3, 1918 12:30 a.m. Subchaser from Unit B returned to Brindisi and moored in the harbor.312

October 14, 1918 Durazzo is captured by Allied forces. 313

310 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3. 311 Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30 September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F4. 312 Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3-5. 313 Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War 1917-1918, 257.

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