anthropology of religious belief

8/10/2019 Anthropology of Religious Belief

1/18

Religious Belief

Author(s): Martin SouthwoldSource: Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 628-644Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802151.

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2/18

RELIGIOUS BELIEF

MARTIN OUTHWOLD

Universityf

Manchester

Those who loyally

ubscribe o a

religionnormally

do believe at

least tsbasic

tenets.

uch

believing

s an

important art

of

religiousbehaviour,

nd we should

understand

nd describe

it more exactly.

To

dismissbelief as a matter

for

psychology

s

an

error,

which rests n

a

fallacy. hough Leach

has

fallen

nto this rror

he has also

pointed

o

a fruitful

pproach.

The

truth f at leastbasicreligious enets s differentromfactual ruth: tmaybe calledsymbolic

truth.

t is

argued

that basic

religious

tenets are

empirically indeterminate, xiomatic,

symbolic,

nd

collective.

From

this

the

mostappropriate ognitive

attitude o

them

can be

inferred: t

is

suggested

hat

religious

belief

may commonly approximate

o this.

Religious

believersdo not ack

rationality

n

believing

enets

which have the

four

haracteristicsoted:

it would

be less

rational o prefer rticles f

faithwhich did not have

them.

I

Justwhat does belief' mean n

a

religious

ontext?

Of all the

problems urrounding ttempts

to conduct anthropological nalysisof religionthis s theone thathas perhapsbeen most

troublesome

and

therefore

he most often

voided, usually by relegating

t

to psychology,

that

raffish utcast

discipline

to which social

anthropologists

re forever

consigning

phenomena they

are unable to deal with

within

the

framework

of a

denatured

Durkheimianism. ut theproblem

will

not go away,

t

s not merely' psychological nothing

social is),

and no

anthropological heory f religion which fails o attack t is worthyof the

name

(Geertz I966: 24-5).

Shortly

fterwards each

produced

n

apt llustration

f this vasion when

he wrote,

n

his paper Virgin birth':

When an

ethnographer eports

hat

members of the X

tribe believe

that.

.

.' he is

giving

a

description f anorthodoxy, dogma, somethingwhich strueof the culture s a whole. But

Professor

piro (and all theneo-Tylorianswho think ike him) desperatelywants to believe

that the

evidence

can tell us

much more

than that-that dogma and ritual must somehow

correspond to the

inner

psychological attitudesof the actors concerned. We need only

consider he customs f

our

own

society

o

see

that his s not

so

(Leach I967: 40).

II

By

these remarks each

appears

to be

saying

that

an ethnographic eport

that

people

believe a certain

roposition eports

heir dherence o a

dogma

andonly hat: tdoesnottell us that hepeoplebelieve-in theordinary ense

of

'hold as

true' -the proposition.Put like this, the contention ppears

implausible,not

to

say perverse.2 each's reference o 'inner psychological

attitudes',

n

place

of the second believe',

serves o obscure this fact. t also

provides

an

argument, lbeit fallacious,

n

support f the contention.And it

Man

(N.S.) 4, 628-44.

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3/18

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD 629

also

has the effect

f

confounding

wo contentions:

he one

we have

noticed,

which s

wrong,

nd

anotherwhich s

right

nd fruitful.

Let us firstustify ur interpretationf inner psychological ttitudes' s a

paraphrase or believe'.

i) Immediately

fter he

passage ited,

each writes f

women

going through

the Englishmarriage ervice,which

he

briefly

utlines.He

comments:

But

all

this tells me absolutely nothing

about the inner

psychological

state of the

lady

in

question: I cannot nfer rom he ritual itherwhat

she feels r what

she

knows. She

may

be

an outright theist.Alternatively

he

may

believe

that

church

marriage

s essential

or

the

well-beingof her future hildren I967: 40).

2) Leach explainswhat he is trying o say.

... partly I am interested n the problem of method .. how should we interpret

ethnographical tatementsbout palpable untruth?

. .

Why

do all

thesepeople believe

in

somethingwhich is untrue? I967: 44).

Intermittentlyt least,Leach supposes hatwe have to understand eports

that

people

believe

what s

palpably

untruefor

hem:

hat,

hat

s,they

do not

believe,

.e.

hold as true.

3) Spiro interpreted

each's words

as I have: thus he

summarises

each's

argument

s

containing:

... two main theses: the culturalbelief

concerning onception

does not

mean what it

says,

and,even if tdoes,the nativesdo notbelievewhat itsays

I968:

243).

4)

So too did Needham

(I972: 5-7);

thus

n

repudiating

each's

approach

he

states

luntly:

Something

that

s

believed

by nobody

is not a

belief...

(I972: 6).

Now

there

s

a

grain

of truth n this ontentionwhich we

have understood

fromLeach's

words. t does

happen

that

ndividuals

who

publicly dhere

o a

dogma nevertheless,

ore or less

privately,

isbelieve t:

certainly

found

his

among my

Sinhalese

nformants. here can be situationsn

which

a

dogma

is

maintained

n

a

society

ven

though most,conceivablyall,

members f the

societydisbelieve t. But it is mostunlikely hat a competent thnographer

reporting

n such a situationwould

barelyreport

hat

he

people

believe the

dogma:

he

would

surely realise,

nd

report,

hat the

people

maintain the

dogma

but

do

not

believe it.

If

a

competent thnographer eports

hat

his

people

believe

something,

e

surely

means hat

hey

do

believe

t,

.e. hold it as

true

n

some

sense.

Leach

was misled

by

the few

obscure

reports

which

appear

to

say

that

certain

peoples

maintain

dogma

that

opulation

does not

cause

conception:

which,

as

he

argues,

mustbe

palpably

untrue orthem. do

not

wish to take

space

to

re-open

his

hoary ontroversy;

ut t

shouldbe

remarked hat

Leach,

like many otheranthropologists, isreadthe evidence.The principal

ocus

disputandi

as

a

passage by

W. E. Roth

describing group

of

Australian

Aborigines;

t

may conveniently

e consulted n

Spiro I968: 242, citingRoth

I903:

22. Leach seems to

have

supposed

that Roth

reported that these

Aborigines

maintained

hat

opulation

s not a

cause of

conception.But Roth



4/18

630

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

did not. What he wrote was that heydo not recognise' his onnexion.There

is a subtle distinction etween not recognising fact n certain ontexts

f

discourse, nd denying hat t s a fact. his is similar o the distinction hich

Spiro (I968: 256)

draws between

gnoring

known fact nd

being gnorant

that t

s a

fact.

Malinowski

was indeed more

positive

bout the

Trobrianders,

oth

n his

early eportI9I6) and n hismore onsideredater ccountI932: I53-78).

He reports ategorically

hat heTrobrianders

eniedthat

onception

s

caused

by copulation.

But

he

also makes

it obvious

why they

did. Christian

missionaries

ad

preached

the doctrine nd ideal

of

Paternity' gainst

the

Trobriandethos:

Only during my third xpeditionto New Guinea did I discoverthatthenativeshad been

somewhat exasperatedby having an 'absurdity' preached

at

them,

and

by findingme,

so

unmissionary' s

a

rule, ngaged

n the same futile

rgument I932:

I

59).

What

people say

n

understandable

xasperation ught

not

be

interpreted,

or

reported, s their stablished ogma,

still ess s what

they

believe.

When ethnographerseport

hat heir

eople

believe

something, hey

mean

what

their words

would

naturally

be understood o mean.

They may

be

mistaken

r

confused bout the

facts,

s Malinowski

was, ust

as

theymay

be

wrong

about facts f other

kinds.But

it

does

not

appear

that our

fallibility

concerningbelieving

s of such

an

exceptional

order that

all

ascriptions

f

believing must be discounted.Leach does, however, seem to imply that,

whatever

thnographersmean,

we cannottake

their

reports

s

evidence

that

dogmas

are

believed,

in

the

ordinary

sense

of

the term.

By referring

o

believing

s inner

psychological

ttitudes'

each

suggests

hat t

is,

normally

at

least,

unknowable

because

naccessible.

e

confirmed hatthiswas

indeed

his

mplication

when he

wrote,

n

a

letter eplying

o his

critics:

I claim that he

anthropologist

as

absolutely

no information bout what

is

inwardlyfeltby

any professed

eliever

I 968:

65

5).

On

a

simple nterpretation

his s

plainlyuntrue;

n a

subtler

nterpretation,

whichLeachsurely ntended,trests n a confusion.Whatevermaybe thecase

regarding

vowals of

believing

n

the

first

erson 'I

believe

.

.'),

t s

fallacious

to

supposethatascriptions

f

believingto

a

thirdparty 'he believes . .' or

indeed they believe.. .') necessarily escribe

his inner tate

f

mind, nd are

thereforenwarranted

o

the extent

hathis nner tate

f

mind s

unknown.

I

explain below (p. 633) why this s a fallacy, howing that ascriptions f

believing

to others

re

statements

bout theirobservable

behaviour,

which

ethnographers

an

make,

hould

make,

nd do

make,

for hemost

partreliably

and

informatively.

s

Geertz

said,

to

categorise uestions

bout

believing

as

psychological,

nd thus

beyond

our

competence,

s to shirk

ssues

of

major

anthropological oncern n which we can,andshould,bringourcompetence

to bear.

III

Leach's

unsatisfactory

ormulation

istracts he reader from another, nd

valuable,

contention

hat

an be understood rom

ater

parts

f

his paper. He



5/18

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

63I

comes to concede

that n ethnographic eport hat people

believesomething

does imply

that

hey

hold

it

to be true

n

some sense:

the mportant uestion

then s, nwhat sense?

If we are

not

Tylorians

we can

say

what Powell's Trobriand

informants aid.

There are

different indsof truth.Which

is also what good Catholics say

.. (I967: 44).

An alternative

way ofexplaining

beliefwhich isfactually

ntrue

s

to

say

that

t s a

species

of religious

dogma; thetruthwhich it expresses

oes not relate o

the

ordinary

matter-of-fact

world of everyday hingsbut

to metaphysicsI967: 45).

This takes

us right away from the obscurantism

f 'inner psychological

attitudes'.

t

directs

ur

attention

o

the cognitive ttitudes-which,

though

inferential,

re inferable

from

overt

behaviour-appropriate

to truthsof

differentinds. t invites sto examinewhether elieving-holding astrue-

is a more complex and subtle

matter hanwe have sometimes

upposed.

In English

heword true'has

a

wide span

of meaning.Much the ame seems

to

apply

to

parallel

terms

n other

anguages

e.g.

Dinka: Lienhardt

96I:

I

39):

and thismight

ause

an

ethnographer

o

misinterpret

hat

an informant

is sayingwhenhe employs

uch a term.But it is more

important o consider

the

meaning

f our

English

word:

chiefly

ecause his ffects

ow we use true'

and

hence

hold astrue', .e. believe';

and

perhaps

lso because

similar

attern

may

be

present

n

other

anguages.

The

ShorterOxford

EnglishDictionary

lists ixteen

enses nd sub-senses

or

theadjective

true'.

Only one

of these

s

specified s of a statementr belief', nd this s:

'Consistentwith

fact; greeing

with reality;representing

he thing s it s'.

This is

of course

heordinary,r unmarked,

ense f true' n modernEnglish;

I

shall refer o it henceforth

s 'factual truth'.Some of

the other senses, r

something ikethem,might

be applied topropositions,nd

notablyreligious

tenets. nspection uggests

hat themewhichunderlies

most, f not all, senses

is the notion

of

fitting',

whether

n

the direct ense

of

taking

ts

place

in

a

structure, hysical,

ocial,

or

conceptual,

or

in

the derived sense

of

being

'proper', appropriate',

seemly'. Indeed we

say that factuallyrue tatement

'fits hefacts'.)

It is conceivable, hen, hat personwho

describes dogma

as true' might

mean that

t

is

seemly: presumably

most adherentswould

consentto that.

There

are

in

our own society, nd presumably

n others,

ersonswho regard

religious enets

s eyewash,but appropriate

or keeping

the lower orders n

their

properplace.

But

I

assume that

such attitudes, eld exclusively,

re

exceptional;

mostof

thosewho believe

a

tenethold it

to

be true

n

a

stronger

sense

than this.

This was

my experience

n fieldwork

mong

two notably

sophisticated

nd

rational

peoples,

he

Ganda and the

Sinhalese;

nd it is what

I

understand rom

monographs

n

otherpeoples. have

the mpression hat

manySinhaleseheld their enets s true withoutqualification,.e. in a sense

including

factual

truth.This

is

hardly surprising

when one considers

hat

fundamentalistsre common enough

n our own highly ritical ulture.

But

I

also had the

mpression hat

ome peoplewere not fundamentalists,

utheld

their enets s

true

n

a subtler,

more discriminating

ense.

I

regret

hat can report nly mpressions;

did not get

harder acts ecause



6/18

632

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

I did not at the time grasp

these

ssues.

explore

them now with a view

to

better

research n the

future, y

others nd

by

me. It should

be

possible

to

determine, or representativeampleofpeople,what thecognitive ttitudes

to religious enets eally re;

and it shouldbe done.

Cognitive

attitudes re not

wholly

inner

and

psychological:

we do have information bout

them,

nd

could and

should have

more. There is not a

dichotomy

between mere

adherence

nd fundamentalism:hemost

mportant

ttitudesie between hese

two.

Not

to

get

this

lear s both to demean those

people

whose

believing

we

write

about,

and

also to fail

to

understand

fundamental

spect

of

religious

behaviour.

Just

what does belief mean n a

religious

ontext?'

IV

As I have

indicated,

within

one community

different

ersonsmay

have

different

ognitive

attitudes owards

religious

enets. he

same

person may

have differentttitudes n differentituations

nd contexts

see,

e.g.,

Powell

I956: 277-8 quoted

n

Leach I967: 48 (note

5),

and

of courseEvans-Pritchard

I937 passim).

And there may be differentttitudes

o

different

enets:

hus

among

the Sinhalese found

t

not uncommon

for

people

to

express

dissent

from ome tenets,whereas here

were other enetswhich no one

told me, or

even

showed me,

that

he doubted.

These unquestioned rticles f faithwere,

unsurprisingly,hosewhichare ogicallybasictopractical uddhism:those o

deny

which

would

carry

away

a

large part

of

what is

characteristically

Buddhist.

Thus religious

belief s not

one thing:

t

is a

complex

of

cognitive

ttitudes

which,

am

arguing,

we

should

describe

more

exactly hanwe usuallydo. My

immediatepurpose s to define

cognitive ttitudewhich s mostappropriate

towards at least basic

religious

tenets, nd which

I

sensedwas actually the

attitude

f at

least

my

more sensitive nd thoughtful

nformants.ecause we

anthropologists urselves

are

either unbelievers

or at

best

rather crude

believers,

we find t difficulto

identify his ttitude nd to distinguish

t from

others. ut ifwe cansee whatto look for,we may n fact ind t s as common

as

what

we should

recognise

s

intelligentttitudes o othermatters.

o do so

should lead

to

considerable

evisionof our udgementsof the

rationality f

religiousbelievers:

t

might

even enhance our understandingf the place of

religion

n

our

culture-which,

as Durkheimremarked n the

first age of his

Elementary

orms

f

the

religious

ife,

s an objective of the anthropology f

religion 9 I 5: I-2).

The

tenets

f

Buddhism

an

be broadly rdered long a continuum

anging

from

the most

basic and indispensable

o the most accessory nd optional; as

I have

remarked,

uch

distinctionsre reflected

n

the cognitive

ttitudes f at

least ome Buddhists. or example, tis basicto hold thatrebirth, etermined

by Karma,

s

real;

thatNirvana

s a real

state

ttainable

y

humanbeings;that

the

Buddha and

othershave

attained t; thatthe Buddha's teachingprovides

efficacious

irections

for

attaining t. But it is optional to

hold, e.g., that

participationn rites

s conducive to attainment; hat he services f Buddhist

clergy

re essential t

funeralsnd mortuary eremonies; hat

godlike beings



7/18

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

633

exist.Similardistinctions

may

be made

among

the tenets f

any

religion

hat

have been subjected o rational nalysis.What I have to say applies

primarily

to more basic tenets,nd may be lesstrueof more accessory enets. seek to

show

that t

leastbasicreligious

enets

re

i)

empiricallyndeterminate, 2) axiomatic,

3) symbolic,

nd 4)

collective.

From these characteristics

e can inferthe appropriate ognitive attitude

towards

them;

and

I

suggest

hat

his

ppropriate

ttitude

ctually

ccurs nd

could

be

identifiedfwe looked for t.

Leach suggested hat

he

truthwhich a

religious ogma expresses

does

not

relate to the ordinary

matter-of-fact orld of

everyday things

but

to

metaphysics'

I967:

45). Let us start from this appropriately ndefinite

characterisation.

ven in that

mode

of

discourse

which s concerned

o describe

and

analyse

the

objective

physical world-i.e.,

in

physics-metaphysical

propositionshave a place.

Here,

a

metaphysical roposition

does not serve

directly

o

describe

he world-rather

it serves o establish framework or

mode of

discoursewithinwhich the world can be

described. ince

it does not

directly escribe heworld

t s not

directly alsifiable;

nd

if

t s not falsifiable

it

is not verifiable

either (i.e.

it cannot

be

sufficiently

onfirmed or

corroborated).

But

if

the

physical

statementsmade within the

mode

of

discourse t founds re

directly alsified,

hen

t

may

be

indirectly

alsified.

Religious tenetsmay be used to founda mode of physicaldiscourse, s

Horton

has

argued (i967; I973, etc.).

But sometimes

t least

they

are so

formulated

hat

hey

annot

be falsifiedven

indirectly:

husfor

xample

the

proposition hatGod exists

eems o be undecidable, irectly

r

indirectly, y

referenceo empirical

vidence. Propositions doctrines, enets, otions, tc.)

which

are so

formulated

hat

they are inherently mmune to

empirical

falsification

r

verification have termed

'empirically indeterminate'

(Southwold I978: 374).

As

theterm indeterminate'

as

been used of

mystical

propositions

n a

slightly ifferentenseby Cooper

(I97 5)

and Salmon

I978),

I

must

clarify. do not use the term indeterminate' n precisely

he senseof

Reichenbach

I944),

which Cooper claims to have taken over. I am not

suggesting,

s

Cooper does,

that

religious

believers

ctually mploy

a

three-

valued logic.

I

do not know of

any language

which

admitsto the

true/false

paradigm third ermof equal weight.Referringo Putnam

I957), Salmon

writes: To

say

a

sentence

s

indeterminatentails hat

he sentence

will never

be

verified

or

falsified'

I978:

448).

I

say

that

basic

religious

tenets

are

objectively

ndeterminate

n this

ense. neither ssert or

deny

that

believers

themselves

recognise

precisely his;

I

find

it '. . .

difficult

r

impossible

to

distinguish

n attitude

f

doubt

or

suspended elief,

.e.

no

assignment

f

truth-

value,

from an

assignment

f the

value indeterminate'

Salmon I978).

This

uncertaintyan bebridgedby saying hatbelievers o nottreat eligious enets

as

factually rue

nor as

factually alse. uch non-assignment

f

true/falsealue

seemsto be described or

the Azande

by

Evans-Pritchard

I937: 8i).

I

argue

that it is

appropriate

for doctrines which

objectively

are

empirically

indeterminate,

nd

maybe

common, ven normal.



8/18

634 MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

Now

although

basic

religious enetsmay

serve o found mode of

physical

discourse, his s not their ole nor even theirprincipalfunction.Religious

discourse ervesrather o interpret,nd shape, ur experience f reality, han

directly

o

describe

reality cf.

Lienhardt 96I:

I48).

It

includes

myths nd

similar imaginative

and evocative forms. It

normally

includes ethical

propositions, hich are of course prescriptive ather han descriptive.ndeed

religious

enets oundmore

than an

reasonably

e includedunder 'mode of

discourse':

theyfound,

for

example,

ethical

conduct,

nd

ritual.

They

found

not ust

a

mode

of discoursebut a

way

of

life, nd one which is socially

established. ince neither rescriptions

or

conduct,

neither

way

of lifenor

a

society,

ave

factual

ruth-value,

t

s

obvious

why religiouslymetaphysical

propositions annotevenindirectly e falsified.ontrary

o the conventional

wisdomconcerning ur own religioushistory, religion omesto be rejected

not as simplyfalsebutrather s inappropriate r unfitting.

V

The relation between a basic tenet and the religion it serves to found

resembles that between an axiom and a theory based on it. Boudon's

observation

s

illuminating:

The epistemologicaldifficulties

aised

by the concept of axiom

did not vanish

until

t was

understood

that

an axiom was not

a

proposition placed

at

the

beginning

of

a

deductive

argumentbecause t

was

untestable-but

rather

proposition

made

untestable

y

its

ocation

at the

beginning

of

the

argument I97I: IO).

We

have

often

sked ourselves

why religionspropound mystical' or,

as

I

prefer o say, mpirically ndeterminate) octrines,

nd

have tended o answer

by disparaging

he

rationality

f

believers.

t

should be evident

hat

religious

tenets

re,

like

axioms, necessarily

ntestablebecause

of

their

place

at the

beginning,

he

foundation,

ot ust of a

deductive

rgument

ut of a

way

of

life.

f

they

were

cast

n

falsifiable

orm

hey

would

be

falsified,

nd

could then

serve heir urposewithgreatdifficultyfatall: what s to serve ffectivelys

an

axiom

for collective

way

of

ifemustbe immune

to

falsification.

e

are

grosslymistaken

when we criticise

therpeoples

s not rational or

holding s

true

tenetswhich

are

mystical,

on-demonstrable:

heir

rationality

would

rather

ail f

they

based their ives

on

tenetswhich

were

not

so.

If we have often

assumed

the

religious

tenetsof othersto

be false-an

assumption

which Evans-Pritchard

mistakenly

uilt into his definition f

mystical

otions

I937:

I

2;

see Southwold

978: 375)-this

has

usually

been

because

we

did not

share,

r

greatly espect,

he

ways

of

ifewhich

they ound;

religious

tenets

n

fact are

normally

not false but

unfalsifiable,mpirically

indeterminate.

By

similar

measure,

the tenets not

only

are

objectively

axiomatic,

n

the senseof

serving

s axioms:

they

lso seem to

believers o be

axiomatic

n the ense f

unquestionable see, .g.,

Evans-Pritchard

956:

9

for

the

way

in

which the

existence f God is taken for

grantedby Nuer).

This

must

be

so:

if the truth f

a

basic tenet s seen

as

a

necessary recondition or



9/18

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

635

the religion

for

which

it

is

axiomatic,

hen o consider t

might

not be true

s

to impugnthereligion, he culture

t

orders,

nd hence

the

self hat

s

shaped

by the culture.To doubt is not only to think thatone's thought s wrong

(Evans-Pritchard937: I95),

it

is

to

suppose

hat ne's

elf s

invalid. hose

who can

sincerely

onsideror discuss

he

truth

f basic tenetshave

already

ceased to be

believers,

n the sense f

fully articipating

n the

religious

ife.

VI

I have

suggested

hat

believers, r at leastthemoresensitive

mong them,

show

signs

f

recognising

hat

eligious

enets re neither rue

nor

false;

have

now arguedthatneverthelesshese enets reregarded sunquestionablyrue.

These two positions re consistent

f

we

recognise

hat

the

truth

f

religious

tenets

s

not factual ruth ut

another

kind:

I

shall

call it

symbolic ruth.

Something

like this

was

recognised by

Leach when

he

wrote,

in

the

Introductiono hisPolitical

ystems

f

highlandurma:

In

sum

hen,myviewhere s that itual ction ndbelief re like o be understoods

forms

of

ymbolic

tatementbout he

ocial rder

I954:

I4).

That

formulation equires orrection.

eligiousbeliefs,

r

tenets,

re

certainly

symbolic

of much

more than the social

order.And

symbols ommunicate

n

a way that s much less ike thatoflanguagethanLeach assumed cf Langer

I95

I:

74-7).

But withthese orrections

made,

Leach'sview

is sound.

Religious

tenets

re indeed

symbols,functioning

n

very

much the same

ways

as the

concrete bjects

or actions hat

re

more readily ecognised

s ritual

ymbols;

and

the cts

of

affirming,

ssenting o,

or

even adhering o, uchtenetsreritual

acts, ikeimmolation,

enuflexion,

nd so

forth.

I

offerno exact definition

f ritual symbols or symbolism: ndeed the

category ppears

to be

far from

homogeneous.

But

I

do

outline some basic

distinctions,

ased

argely

n

Langer

95

I

.

In

the mostgeneral ense

Symbols

re

not

proxy

or heir

bjects,

ut

re

vehiclesor

he

onception

f

objectsI95:

I

60: I).

This

formulationwas adopted

by Geertz I966:

5);

and it doubtless nderlies

Barth's characterisation

f ritual acts and

objects

as

'vehicles for

concepts,

understandings,

nd

emotions'

I975:

i

i).

If

we allow

symbols o include

linguistic orms,

n

the

everyday sage of anguage, hen t s essential

hatwe

make

a

distinction f thekind thatLangerterms hatbetween

discursive' nd

'non-discursive'

r

presentational'

ymbolismI95

I:

94-7,

and

passim).

he

former overs the

manner

n which

language

n its

everydayusagesignifies;

the

atter he

different

inds f

meaning

o

be found n

art,music,

itual,myth,

and of coursereligiousbelief. At leastpartofthe distinctions that which

Barth

raws

etween

digital'

nd

analogic'

odes

I975:

ch.

5).

There

eems

too to be a

striking arallel

with the

differentmodes

of

thinking

which

psychologists

nd

neurophysiologistseport

o be

specialised

n the eft nd

the

righthemispheres

f

the

cerebral

ortex

see Sagan

I977:

ch.

7).

Presentational

ymbolismdoes

convey conceptionswhich are, at

one or



10/18

636

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

more removes, bout

reality. ust ow

it does so isnot easy o

grasp, ut at

east

it

is

clear that tnormally

differs romdiscursive

ymbolism. ome

thingswe

call symbolsseem to signifymuch as metaphors;forotherswe need a less

familiar

model.

Sperberrightly

draws

our

attention o the

term that

the

Ndembu use

to

designate

ymbols:

... theword

chijikijilu,

hichmeansa landmark'. landmarks

not

sign

but an

index

which erves

ognitivelyoorganise

ur

xperience

f

pace.

his

Ndembu

metaphor

eems

muchmore

pposite nd ubtleomethan

he

Western

metaphor

hich

omparesymbols

to words I 975:

3 3)3.

It is

certainly majortaskfor he

anthropology

f

religion

o

describe

nd

analyse

more

fully

and

precisely ust

how

presentational

ymbolism

does

convey conceptions boutreality; nd it sonewhich swell in hand. Formy

present urpose

t

s

necessary either

o

reviewtheresults e

already

have nor

to

anticipate hosewe

may

hope

to

get.

t s

enough,first,

o

acknowledge

hat

ritual

symbols-including

tenets, eliefs,dogmas-do

convey conceptions

about

reality,

nd

hence

may

be

regarded

s true r false.

And

second,

hat

ince

the relationof such a

symbol

to

reality

s

different rom

that

of

discursive

symbolism

everyday

or

scientific

anguage),

this kind of truth s different

fromfactual ruth s we

normally

understandt.

If

people regard a presentational

ymbol-more

especially

a

tenet-as

having

a

'fitting'

r

'appropriate'

relation

o

reality, say

they regard

t

as

'symbolically rue'. Hence there s a senseof believe' which means hold as

symbolically

rue',

nd this

may

be

marked s

believehts'.

t is distinct

rom

'hold as

factually rue',

which

may

be written

s

'believehtF'4-though

the

two

are easily

nd often onfused. seekto

explore

ome

of the

differencesnd

similarities

etweenthese wo

kinds

f

believing.

Cooper

(I975: 252-3)

suggests hat t may

be

unjustified

o

say

that

people

'believe'

magico-religious ropositions

which

theyregard

s

untestable,

nd

which have

some

similarity

with

metaphysical

ropositions.

n

view

of the

wide

variety

f

senses f theword believe', and the

difficulty

f

distinguishing

and

controlling

hem,

think

t

is

prudent

o

try

to avoid

using

the word

altogethern scientificontextscf.Needham

972: I92-3).

But

t

is quite

impractical otry orestrict

he ense fbelief-terms

i.e. theverb believe' and

the noun

belief)

to hold as

factually

rue',

nd

to ruleout their

pplication

o

religious belief.

The

latter

pplication

s a

salient nd

ineradicable

eature

f

English

usage;

what

we have

to

do

is

to

make

sure

hatwe

understand hefacts

that

have

been,

nd

may be,

reported

hrough

he

usage.

VII

The

way

in

which

believehts'

iffers rom

believehtF'

an

bestbe brought

out

by considering

arefullyust what

the attermeans.To

say that person

holds

a proposition s

factually rue s to say

that he

regards t as correctly

describing

ome

part r

aspect f

reality; r thatheholdsthat

he tate faffairs

it

describes

xists

n

reality.Or, better

till, t is to

say that his

proposition s



11/18

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

637

an

element n his nternalmodel

of

reality y

reference

o

which

he assesses nd

guides

his

transactions ith

reality.

Hence there re four onditionswhichmustbe satisfiedfwe are to sayof

a person,

with sufficient

arrant,

hathe

believeshtF

certain roposition:

i)

There

mustbe some

situationsn which some

sets f acts re consistent ith

(or better,

f

possible, rationally

entailed

by) the

proposition's

being

factually rue,

nd a differentet

of acts re

consistent ith or entailedby)

itsbeingfalse; nd he must ncounter

uch ituations

ufficientlyrequently

to allow us

to

make sufficient

bservations.-Under

acts'

I

include

verbal

acts,

and

notably

those

of

asserting

or

unequivocally

implying the

proposition, nd of avowing

it

as

true/false.

2)

In such

situations

e must

predominantly

o those cts that re consistent

with tstruth ather han hose hat re consistent ith tsfalsity.

a)

To

requireperfect onsistency

f

conduct

with

belief

would

deprive

he

concept

of

use:

normal

people

are not

perfectlyonsistent. ut there s

often nougha clear distinction

etween onductwhich

s

as consistent

with a belief as it is reasonable to

expect,

and that which

is

grossly

inconsistent

ith t.

b) Though

the

relevant cts

ncludeverbal

cts,

hey

hould

f

possible

lso

includenon-verbal cts.As Gombrich I 97I: 4-5) rightly emarks, e

say

a

person

does not

really

believe what he

professes

f

his

non-verbal

acts are seriously nconsistent ith it. There are two good reasons or

this:

i)

If

to

believehtF

proposition s

to

have it

as an element n one's

internalmodel

of

reality, hen all one's reality-oriented

onduct s

potentially elevant n decidingwhether tactually s an element n

thatmodel.

ii) If person s deceiving thers, nd perhaps lso

himself, y simulating

a beliefhe does not

reallyhold,

t s normally asier, nd cheaper, o

do

so

by

verbal

falsehoods han

by

non-verbal retences.

3)

There must be evidence that he

entertains

his

proposition

n association

with theseacts.Philosophers re agreedthata personcannot be held to

believe a

proposition

hat

he has never entertained'

r

considered;

nd as

we have

known inceEvans-Pritchard

I 937)

that

eoplepractise

ituational

selection

of their

beliefs,

we have to establish

that

the

proposition

s

entertained

n

the context

of

the acts

relevant o

believing

t.

One

cannot

infer that a certain

proposition

s believed

merely

from

the fact that

observed conduct

is

consistent

with

it,

since

any

course

of

conduct is

consistent

with

more

than one

proposition Gombrich

I97I)

overlooks

this-see

my

comments

n

Southwold

I978: 366).

Entertainment

f a

propositions mostplainlyestablished

f

the person

expressest n or withhis act: this swhyverbal ssertions r endorsements,

though

unreliable vidence

of

holding

s

true,

re mportant s evidenceof

believing.

t

may

be lessobvious that

ntertainment

s also

established

f

the

actor

denies heproposition s he acts-provided hedoes so spontaneously,

and not

merely

n

replyto a leading question.

f

this

were all, we should

have

the

frustrating

esult hat t

is hardest

o

establish hat

people

believe



12/18

638

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

just whatthey

do

most

firmly

elieve: forf

a

tenet saxiomatic t tends

o

be

taken

for

granted

rather

han stated

xplicitly.

Hence we must

allow

that f n act scustomary n theculturen question, ndifwe can establish

that t is also

customary o entertain

particular

roposition

n

association

with such acts,then any member

of

the culturedoing that act

may

be

assumed o

entertain hatproposition.

4)

His conduct cannot with

comparable

plausibility

be

explained by

an

alternative ypothesis.

a)

It

may happen

that heevidence

givesequal

support

o

the

ascription

f

several different

eliefs.This is no

problem: people

do

operate

with

alternativechemes f

nterpretation,

nd so to

say

that

person

believes

one

thingneed

not be understood s

precluding

is

believing

omething

else-not even when, abstracted romcontexts, he two beliefs re

logically

nconsistent.

b)

A

person's

onduct

may

be

fully

ccounted

orwithout eferenceo the

belief

by

which he

explains

t.

This does

not n itself how thathe

does

not believe what

he

professes:

t most t

may

show

thathis belief s

not

the cause,

or

theonly

cause,

of his conduct.

c)

The kind of alternative

ypothesis

which

really

calls

in

question

an

ascription

f belief s one that he actor s

deceiving thers,

nd

perhaps

himself.

We can neverbe

certain

hat his

s

not

so;

but we can

often

e

sufficiently

onfident.

ertainty

s

unattainablenempirical cience, nd

especially

n that

concerning

human

behaviour;

the

uncertainty

hat

attends

scriptions

f

belief s not

so

special

s to

place

them

outside

he

normal area of scientificikelihood.

This

analysis erves o make

plain whyit is that

scriptions fbelieving-

statementshat

omeone

other

han neself

elieves omething-do

not require

special

knowledge

of

the nner

mental tate

orpsychological

ttitudes) f the

believer.

t

should

be

evident

hat he

verb believe'

designates relation ather

than a

state:

a

relation, irstly etween

the believerand a

proposition, nd

secondly

from

the

believer

through the

proposition to reality.What is

purported o occur s doubtlessmental n largepart, nd specialpsychological

knowledge

would

doubtless

elp us to assess

ndunderstandt

better. ut such

specialknowledge s not

necessary,ince n

factwe use

believe' in away which

enablesus to

regard

he

mind of

the

believer s a 'black box' (see,

.g.,Ashby

i964:

86sqq.).

The factswe

refer o are

the

nputs

nd

outputs

f

the black

box',

and the relationsbetween

them: we are not

committed o

giving

an

account

ofjust

what goes on within he

black box'.5

VIII

Now since we use believe' for hold as symbolically rue' as well as for

'hold as

factuallyrue',

t

s

implied

that his ame

schema

hould be

applicable

to

ascriptions

f

believinghtS.

n

largepart t

s. But

the rucial

difference

s that

the

first

ondition,

nd

consequently

he

second,

annot

be satisfied,

tically t

least.

Cooper

(I975:

253) points

out that f a

proposition s untestable in my



13/18

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

639

terms, mpirically ndeterminate)

t

is hard to see

how behaviour could be

distinguished s consistent ith its truth ather han ts falsity. proposition

is empirically ndeterminatef and only if every state f affairs hich can be

determined s

holding

n

the real

world is

as consistent

ith ts truth s with

itsfalsity.

f

ome

courseof actionwere

objectively

emonstrable s consistent

with

ts

truth,

nd a different

ourse

of

action

demonstrable s consistent

ith

its falsity, hen the differentonsequences f these coursesof action would

provideevidence of thetruth-valuef theproposition, ontrary

o

definition.

This

would

not be so only

if

the two coursesof action had no

discernibly

different

onsequences;

which s

perhaps ommon,

s the ncient

lea, why

do

sinners

prosper...?', bears

witness.

Empirically

we do in

fact

find

that

a

remarkably

wide

range

of kindsof conduct s held to be consistent

ith,

nd

indeed egitimated y,a given religious enet.

Yet it is also clear,and important,

hat

the range

is

usually

not infinite:

within

particular eligious

radition ome kinds

of

conduct

re difficult nd

some

virtually mpossible,

o

legitimate y accepted

enets.

n

Buddhism,

or

example,

it

is difficult

o

legitimate

he

participation

f Buddhist

clergy

n

war:

though

tradition

does,

albeit

reluctantly,

llow the factthat Buddhist

clergy, temporarilydisrobed,

served

in the

army

of

King Dutthagamani

(Gombrich I97I: 29).

It would be

virtually mpossible

to

legitimate

he

service

of a

Buddhist cleric as

general

or

war-leader,

nd

history, think,

records

no instance f this.

This is plainly

an

important

ifference etween

Buddhist nd slamic ocieties-with Christendomallingomewhere etween

thesepoles.

There are certainly mic, hough

not

etic,

riteriawhich

distinguish

arious

kindsof

conduct

as

consistent,

nd

others

s

inconsistent,

ith

believinghts

particular eligioustruth.

n

Sri Lanka, for example, t is maintained hat a

Buddhist ayman

who

believes the Dhamma (the Buddhist doctrines)will

endeavour to

observe

the Five

Precepts.

Hence a man who

regularly

nd

wantonly kills iving beings in breach of the FirstPrecept), r is regularly

drunk

(in

breach

of

the

Fifth),

s

shown

thereby

not

really

to believe the

Dhamma.

But the criteria re characteristicallymprecise.Most Buddhist

laymendeliberatelyake ife:e.g. theyuse nsecticides,nd will killat east he

most dangerous

kind

of

snake

(the

Russell's

Viper);

and in

their

own

judgements,

nd those

of most of their

fellows,

this does not make them

unbelievers.

And

many men,

at

least,

onsider t allowable

to

drink

iquor

in

moderation.

The standards

re not

precisian

but

customary:

those of the

reasonable ather

han he

upright

man

(Gluckman 955: I25-6).

Not

only

s

it

emicallydetermined

what kinds

of

conduct

shall

be held consistent

r

inconsistent ith

religious

elief: t s also

emically

etermined hat

behaviour

is or is not

to be classified s

falling

within hosekinds

of

conduct.

This makes it difficult o argue (as Spiro

I

97

I

does) that customary

behaviour

itself s inconsistent ith

accepted religious enets, hus showing

that hetenets re not

really

believed.When we

perceive

uch

nconsistency

t

is between the

behaviour and what we take to be the meaningof the tenets;

but t

may

be thatwe have

misinterpreted

hat

meaning,

nd

the behaviour s

consistent ith their

propermeaning.Now

if

we take eriously he view that



14/18

640

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

religious

enets

re ritual

r

presentational'

ymbols,

heirmeaning

annot

be

discovered y

translating

hewords

n which

they

re

expressed,

s ifwe

were

dealing with the ordinarydiscursiveuse of language.The meaning of a

religious enet,

s of

any

other

kind of ritual ymbol,

s theway it

functions

n

shaping,

rdering,

nterpretingxperience;

tsfunctions a landmark'

perhaps:

This can

be discovered nly by

determining

ow it

s n fact elated otheway

of ife

for

which

t serves

ymbolically.

he

significance

f a

symbol,

ike

the

meaning

faword, ies

n

tsuse:

it

can

be determined

nly

byanalysis

f

what

people actually

do,

and cannot

then

be turned

to

udge

what

they

do.

The

anthropologist

must

determine

ow a tenet s

actually mployed

n theway

of

life

n which

it functions:

nd he must

report

his s the

symbolic

meaning

t

actually

bears.

f,

for

example,

he

finds,

s he

will,

thatmost Buddhists

peak

of nirvanaas the summumonum, etso far from activelyendeavouring o

attain hat tate

s

soon

as

possible

hey

ctually ursuegoals

they

cknowledge

as

inconsistent

ith

t,

while

postponing

heir ventual ttainment

f

nirvana

into

the

remote

future:

henthe

conclusion

mustbe

that he doctrines

bout

nirvana

do not

signify

o

them

a

prescription

or

attaining

n immediate

personalgoal,

but

ratherhave

some transformed

eaning

which we

have to

discover.

As Tambiah (I970:

4I-2)

suggests,

piro's rror

erives

rom ssuming hat

the meaning

of

Buddhisttenets an be

known

by

reading

them as

they

are

presented

n the Scriptures.

ven ifwe

allow the rather

argeassumptions

hat

we can know whata tenetmeant nthecontext f the criptural ritings,nd

that his an be

taken n some

defensible ense

shaving

once been

ts tandard

meaning,

t

still

does not

follow that

this s

its

meaning

in

contemporary

practical

Buddhism:

f

practice

s inconsistent

iththatmeaning,

we have to

register

he fact hatpractice

eveals

different eaning,

no doubt

as a result

of

symbolic

ransformation.

It

must,

however,be

said that t

is not only Spiro and

otheroutsiders

who

give

Buddhist enets

meaning

which s inconsistent

ithpractice

n practical

Buddhism:

so,

n

Sri Lanka at east, o many

Buddhists ven

n the

mallworld

of

the villages,

nd theyuse

this nconsistency

o

point

to theunworthiness

f

practice.We should not be surprised hatreligioustenets,ike otherritual

symbols,

ustain

variety

f

meanings.

And we

may

remark hat twould be

a

poor

sort

of

religion

that could only

validate the actual,

without

also

proclaiming

n ideal matched gainst

which

the ctual

canbe seen

to fall hort.

The tension etween

the normative

nterpretations

f Buddhist

doctrines

nd

the

symbolic

meanings hey

bear n the

context f actual ife s

an aspect

f

an

important

ynamic

n

Buddhist ocieties.

utneither his

nor

other eaturesf

Buddhistreligious

ifecan be

correctly

rasped

withoutrecognising

hat

the

doctrines

o have

symbolic

meanings

n actual

ife.

It follows

that assessment f a symbolic

proposition

must be radically

different

rom hatof a

factual

roposition.With a factual roposition,f t is

properly

formulated,

t is relatively

imple

to know

what it means:

the

important

uestion s

whether

t

is true.6

But a symbolic

proposition-and

especially

basic

religious

enet-is,

forthosewho maintain t,

axiomatically

true: the

important

uestion

s,

whatdoes it mean?

For the anthropologist,



15/18

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

64I

then, he question s not whetherheybelieve t but how.This throws ight

on

a notable oddity in Christian heology. n the Bible-as among the Nuer

(Evans-Pritchard

956:

9)-the existence f God is taken for granted: t is

axiomatically rue, nd the focus

of

concern s

with

thereligious ignificance

of thisdatum.But formanymodernChristians,s

for

vowed unbelievers, he

significance

s

taken

for

granted,

ut the truth

s

considered

o

be at ssue.

This

is, n effect,o mistake symbolicproposition

s a factual

roposition:

which

may be why the religious esult ends

o

be somewhatprosthetic.

Ix

Sometimes

hings

ecome

symbolic

for

particular

ndividualbut

not for

his fellowsgenerally:we may speak of these as privateand idiosyncratic

symbols. imilarly ropositionsmay acquire diosyncraticymbolic

ruth

or

particularndividuals.

uch

private ymbolisms

hould

not have

a

large place

in

ethnographic eports,

he

primary

oncern

of

which is

to

report

what is

common to

members

of

a

society,

what constitutes

heir culture.

t

seems

likely,moreover,

hat the

greater art

of

the

symbolic

truths hat

a normal

personholds are collective,

n a number f senses nd forvariousreasons.

i)

Most

people

do in fact earn

most of their deas

and

attitudes

rom

thers,

and are

not much nclined

o

be

original

nd

creative.

A

person's ymbolic

truths re therefore,or he mostpart, ikely o be collective

n

the obvious

senseof

having

been

acquired

fromhis culture.

2) They

will therefore e

collective

n a

second obvious

sense,

hatof

being

common to

and

shared

by

the

members f a

community.

Much

of

their

power

as

symbols

derives

from hisfact.

3) Through being

shared

hey cquire

a

kind

of

verisimilitude hich,while

not

being

thetruth f matters

f

fact,

as that aura of

factuality'

hat

Geertz

(I966)

sees

s

fundamental

o

religion

s

a

cultural

ystem.

ur warrant or

saying

hat

omething

xists

s

simply

hat he

hypothesis

hat t does

is

the

most

satisfactory ay

of

accounting

for

a

set of

given experiences.

he

claimthat, .g.,God exists s warranted o the extent hatobserved vents

are bestfitted o that upposition: nd this eems obe so ofsocial events f

members f

society

re

ndeed

acting

on that

upposition. We may prefer

to account

for

theseeventsby thehypothesishatthe actorsbelieve that

God

exists;

but believers annotbe

expected

o

recognise his s a distinct

hypothesiswithout llowing that he beliefmightbe false, nd this, s we

argued

above

(p. 635), is hardlypossiblefor hem.)

4)

It is

not only that, hrough eing shared, eligious enets cquire that ura

of

factuality hich makes

hem

ppear

to

be simply rue: nasmuch s they

are

empirically ndeterminate

his s the

only way they an come to seem

factually rue. As I remarkedn an earlierpaper, The apparent ruth r

falsity

of such

doctrines seems

to

depend wholly

on social factors'

(Southwold I978: 374).

5)

Further, s we have seen, he criteria or reallybelieving ymbolic ruths

are

emic, customary,

nd hence

collective: e.g.

a

man

really

believes the

Dhamma

only

f

he sufficientlyefrains rom aking ife.



16/18

642

MARTIN

SOUTHWOLD

6) Thus symbolic ruths ecome representative

f

membership

f a

group,

community, Church. Not to overload the term symbolic' stillfurther,

I would follow a hint f Nadel's and saythat hey re emblematic'of such

membershipNadel 95

I:

262,

cited

n

Firth

973:

I

74). Theyrepresent

such membership

oth

internally,s expressing

ttachment o the

group

and solidaritywith

fellow

members,

nd

externally

s

identifying

ne

as a

member

of

this group

in

contrast

with outsiders nd with other

groups.

This emblematic unction

s

prominent

n credalaffirmationsn

liturgical

and

other formal

occasions,

nd is

perhaps lways present

n avowals of

believing

a

religious

enet.

We should ask ourselves

how

far

nformants'

avowals of belief o

an

ethnographer

an

safely

e

interpreted

s

conveying

cognitive ttitudes

ather han s

simply sserting roup dentity.

7) Ifthe ymbols re andmarks or rdering world, t s mportanthat hey

be shared

mong

thosewhose nteraction

onstitutes

person's

ocialworld.

8) When symbolic

truths re held

in common

they

can be

acted

upon

collectively hrough ritual; they

serve thus

to alter

as

well as to order

experiencecf.

ienhardt96I:

250, 291).

9)

The awareness

that

symbolic

truths

are

held

in

common,

and their

activation

n

collective itual, vokes,

nd

charges

he

ymbolic

ruths

ith,

the sense

of

strength

hatmen feel

n

the

support

f

their ellows:

Individualsre

weak,

ut ocial

roups

re

trong,

oth n the

rdinary

ecular

ffairs

f

life nd ndealingwith hePowersLienhardt

96I:

247).

i

o) It would seem

that

ymbolic ruths

re

usually,

fnot

nvariably,

ollective

in yet another ense: theirprincipal

references

to collective ffairs nd

concerns,

whether t

be morality

n

the most general sense,

or more

specific ocial orjural values such

as

matrilineal escent.

Thus

it

would seem

that

ymbolicpropositions,

nd the

holding

of

them s

true,

re

eminently

ollective. t

is

of

course ndividuals

who

believehts

hem:

but

they

do so

primarily

n their

apacity

not as individuals

ut as

members

f

a

collectivity.

Because

this s

so,

the fact of

such

believing

s

most

exactly

reported y saying, fthebelievers,theybelieve . . .' inthecollective ather

than the

distributive7

ense.This

is the

germ

of truth n Leach's contention

which

we

began by considering.

As we

have

argued, however, 'they

believe

. . .'

is

normally

lso true

n thedistributive

ensewhich sums

set,of

'he believes

.

. .'

ascriptions;

his s

not,

as

Leach

supposed, xcluded,

but it

would seem to be

secondary

nd derivative.

When,

as

is

all

too

easy,we

interpretthey believe . . .' reports imply in the distributive ense, this

conduces

o

understanding

believe' in the

ense f'hold as factually rue'.This

in

turn eads to those misconceiveddebates about rationalitywhich Leach

(I

954:

I

3) dismissed s mostly scholasticnonsense'.

x

I

have attributed

our

characteristicso

basic religious tenets: they are

empirically ndeterminate,xiomatic, ymbolic, nd collective.These charac-

teristics re

closely

connected.

t is because they are axiomatic that they are



17/18

MARTIN SOUTHWOLD 643

collective, nd because hey re collective hat hey re axiomatic.Their power

as symbols argely erives rom heir eing collective: heir bility s symbols

to sustain variety

of

meaningshelps

to

make them

commonly and

hence

collectively cceptable.

heir

place

as axioms

makes

t

natural hat hey hould

be

empirically ndeterminate; nd,

as we

argued,

t is functional hat

they

should

be,

since f

falsifiable

hey

would be falsified.

heir function s

symbolic

truths lso makes

t

desirable hatthey hould

be

empirically ndeterminate,

lest

question

and

doubts about their

factual ruth onfuse

or

confute heir

symbolicrole.

The logically proper

attitude owards such

propositions,

f

one

maintains

them,

s

that

hey

re

symbolically

ruebut not

factually

rue.This

s

a

difficult

position o maintain xplicitly, hen one's anguage ndconceptual ystem o

notclearlydistinguishetween hese

wo kinds f

truth,

nd do

assume two-

valued logic by

which 'not

factually

rue' is

equivalent

to

'factually

alse'.

Despite this difficulty, do see signs that the cognitive attitudeof more

sensitive elievers s

at

least

mplicitly

lose

to what s

logicallyproper:

and I

urge

that

we

should ook forfirmer

vidence

of this.

I

have

little oubt that

many,

f

not

most, eligious

elievers ake

he

impler

and more robust

iew

that heir enets

re

factually

rue s well as

symbolically

true.This is but

subtly

different

rom

the

appropriate iew,

and

we should

hardly

describe

people

as irrational ecause

they

fail to mark such a difficult

distinction:hemore so since, y definition,nassumptionhat nempirically

indeterminate roposition s factually ruecan never conflictwith empirical

evidence.

They

are

no

more mistaken

r

irrational

n

taking heir enets

o

be

factually rue hanwe are, s we often ave been, n assuming hem o be false;

and

theyhave

far

better xcuse.

NOTES

Shorter

Oxford

English

Dictionary,

under

believe':

'3.

With clause or

infinitive

hrase:

To hold

it as

true that . .,

to think'.

-Leach

actually

llustrates

hissense n

the

same

sentencewhen

he writes,

But

Professor

Spiro .

.

. desperatelywants to believe that

2

As Needhamn

rgues

I972:

5-7).

3

Sperber

cites

Turner

I969:

I

5

as his

source;

Turner

reports

here

further

ubtleties f

the

Ndembu idiom.-As

Firth

I973: i68)

has

reminded

us,

the

notion

of

a

symbol

as a

landmark

had

earlier

been

employed

byFortes:

Totemic and

other

ymbols re

the

deological

andmarks

that

eep

he

ndividual

n

his ourse'

I945:

I44).

4

I

have made

myself rule

that when

using

subscripts

o

distinguish

ifferentensesof a

word,

a

change to

differentevel

of

distinction

houldbe

marked

by

a

changeof

fount lower

case,

capitals,

numerals,

tc.). Thus

the two

lower-case ettersht'

can

be

understood s

making

one

distinction: he

change to

capitals,S' and

'F',

indicates hatthese

erve

further o

segment

the

sensemarked

by

ht'.

5

It is not

only

Leach who

fails o see

this: the error

s

very

common. Most of

the

problems

with which

Needham

(I972) wrestles rise from

the

fallacious

ssumption hat

belief

must

be

regarded s an innermental tate; nd, sheshows, hefallacyswidespread mongphilosophers.

It

seems to

arise from wo

basic

errors f method:

i) If

one

analyses

sageofthe

noun belief

rather han he

verb

believe' it s far

ess

vident hat

a

relationrather

hana

state s

designated.

2)

Again concentration n

usage

of the noun

obscures he crucial

fact hat

he

semantics f'he

believes' are

significantly

ifferentrom

hoseof

I

believe'. If

the atter s

erroneously

aken

to

be

paradigmatic

for

both,

then

the

way

is

opened

for

indulging

the

favourite

philosophical



18/18

644 MARTIN SOUTHWOLD

techniqueof

introspection. he results re irrelevant

nd confusing

or

nalysing

scriptions

f

believing to third

parties-i.e.

statements

f the form he believes' or

they

believe'.

These points refarfromobvious,and to that xtentdeserveto be proved. am assuming hat

anthropologists re too little

committed

to

the

philosophical

errorsto

care to see

them

extensively

efuted.

6 And

the

harder t is to get itproperly

ormulated o

as

to make thequestionof its

factual

truth t

least

n

principle

decidable,

he more

ikely

t s to

be

functioning

ot as a factual

ut as

a

symbolicproposition.

'Distributive: referring o

each

individual of

a

class

separately;opposed

to collective '

(Shorter

Oxford

EnglishDictionary).

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