anthropology and ethics in common focus

8/13/2019 Anthropology and Ethics in Common Focus

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Anthropology and Ethics in Common Focus

Author(s): Abraham EdelReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol.92, No. 1 (Jan. - Jun., 1962), pp. 55-72Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2844321.

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AnthropologyndEthicsnCommon ocus*ABRAHAM EDEL

IN AnthropologyndEthics,A CO-OPERATIVEEXPERIMENTdesignedto bringanthropologyand philosophicalthicsnto ommon ocus nthe tudy fmorality,r May Edel andI (Edel & Edel I959) proposed concept fmorality hichhad a number funusualfeatures.n thefirst lace, twas oriented owards ultural escription;t lookedforthekind f onception hich nemight se f ne were sked o draw moralmapof heglobe, s onemight e asked odraw linguisticra religiousmap. Sucha descriptiveorientations taken orgranted y the anthropologist,ut s likely o startlehephilo-sopherwhothinksfmoralityntermsfmoraljudgment. oreover, hetherhephilo-sopher's pproachsanalyticrnormative,t is usually ot carried n n relationothesocial ciencesndthe tudy f ulture; uchmaterialsnter nly s furnishingnforma-tion n means r elseprovidingreasof llustrationnd application.n the econd lace,we treatedmoralitys a relativelyndependentimensionf culture. uch indepen-dence s ikelyo betaken or ranted y thephilosopher,ho susedto nsistingnthe'autonomy' fmorals. ut t s likely omeetwith nthropologicalesistence,incetheanthropologicalreatmentfmoralitysmore ftennmeshednone or another ftheareasof ocialandcultural escription,rdispersedver everal.n the hird lace,wefashioned generalized oncept fmorality,muchbroader hanthe informaletofindices hat reusually oundn anthropologicalield esearchnd thesharply-etchedthoughompetingonceptionshat refoundnformalthics.Sincethis onceptionfmoralitynd its nvestigationuns ounter o someoftheestablishedabitsn bothdisciplines,trequiresustificationoboth, fthey retobeinduced o co-operate-but n differentespects. o theanthropologistt is the nde-pendence ocus hatrequires onsideration;o thephilosopher,tis theextent ftheempirical escriptivetress. shouldike, herefore,o addressmyselfothese wo opics,and thereafteroadd a few ommentsn theappropriatenessfourproposed oncep-tion, s a scientificonstructseful or othdescriptivendtheoreticalurposes. needscarcelyddthatn settingo widea task cando usticeneitherothedetailed nalysisthatphilosophyncreasinglyightlyemands, orto thespecificityn which iesthegreat trengthfanthropologicalnvestigation.o-day rest ontentwithgroping orthe arger isionwhich eformulatesurquestions.

ISupposeone picksup the ittlevolumeofB.B.C. lectures ntitledThe nstitutionsfPrimitiveocietyEvans-Pritchardtal. I956). One finds treatmentfeconomic ndfamilial nd political nstitutions,nd in addition,ectures n Religion,Aesthetics,Law,Mind,ModesofThought.Wheres Morality?sittuckedway omewhere ithin,or ustomitted? hereare, t is true, ccasionalremarksboutvaluesat thebase of55


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56 ABRAHAM EDELeconomic choices (p. 23), theway in which aestheticvalues reflect thical standardsofartists nd patrons pp. 37-8), some values that appear in legal process pp. 48-9), themoral authority n language (p. 83). There are even search-lightglimpsesof how amorality might function-'the recognitionof a moral order which would allow thesociety s a whole to enjoy peace, and go about itsbusiness' Gluckman,p. 73); or howin turn a social systemmay produce an excessiveburden of moral decision for he ndi-vidual (Fortes,p. 89); or a view of aw and morals as means of ocial control ver nbornimpulses p. 94). Morality, n short, s taken forgranted, n the sense that one can invokeit or refer o it at will; but it is not explained, depicted, or analysed. It scarcely eemstobe amongthe nstitutionsf ociety.But after all, it can be said, the B.B.C. lectures are popular and limited by time.Somethinghad to be left ut. What do we find, hen,when we look to Notes ndQueriesonAnthropologyI95I), which is a professional rainingguide for fieldworkers?Wherehere do we find uggestions or he study fmorality?Notes and Queries ives us only a fewleads. Occasionally we find moralisticterms,such as 'socially recognized ties', dutiesand obligations',but theirmeaning and modeof identification end rather to be taken for granted. Most reference o moral contentis of an ostensive or denotative type: for example, rules of hospitality, f politeness,propriety nd respect, n social life; observationof action in cases ofhomicide, ncest,adultery, etc., in describing aw and justice; procedures of praise, blame, ridicule,ostracism, tc., in reference o sanctions.We are told that careful nvestigation fthedifferent orms fsanctions houldbe made notingthebasison whichtheyrest-beliefs,moral precepts, actual institutions' p. I45), but there seemsto be no specificguide towhatkindsofprecepts re identifiable s moralprecepts.Perhapsthe clearestreferencesto morality ome in the section on the ideologyofproduction,where it is recognizedthat moralvalues play a part n determining heefficiencyf ndividual abour (p. I63)But here, as in the chapter on rituals and belief,where it is stated that supernaturalsanctions are nearly always to be found for moral values, it seemsto be assumed thatmoral values have been separately dentified nd mapped. But nowhere is this taskcarried out. The index, incidentally, contains no listing of 'end', 'ethics', 'goals','morality', virtues', r vices'.I do not want to belabour in pedestriantabulation thisalmoststudied avoidance oftheproblemofmorality,what it is, what identifyingmarksare to be soughtfor t, andhow togo about mapping it. Nor am I suggesting hatthe absence oftheoretical ecog-nitionof moralitymeans the absence of materialson moralityn thefieldreports.Thereis a greatdeal to be found,but most often n the dispersedformwhich Notes ndQueriesmight ead us to expect. But equally important, here s a greatdeal not to be found-many questionsthat are not even asked.How are we to explain this ack of a well-articulated oncept to serve as guide toenquiry?Three preliminary nswers uggest hemselves.One is that t is assumed thatwe all knowwhatmorality s and no explicit ccountneed be given. fthis s so, it is anunsatisfactorytate ofaffairs.t runstheriskof ethno-centrismn ourworking oncep-tion ofmorality-for example, looking everywhere orpangs ofconscienceas a mark ofthe moral. Explicitnesshas been sought n mapping equally 'obvious' fields-legal orreligious.Why not n thecase ofthe moral?


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 57A second pathofexplanation s to stress hepractical difficultiesn ocatingthemoral.Morality s so abstractly deational. There are no moral institutions r moral productsto lay hold of,no priests r quasi-courts, r pictures nd books. Perhaps we are still nthe stage ndicated byNotes nd Querieswhen it says: 'The first ule in all investigationsis to advance from the concrete and tangible to the abstract. Social events must berecorded as theyhappen. Accounts of how natives "think" or "feel" are of ittlevaluewithout nformation s to how they actually behave in concrete situations' p. 37). Ido not want to argue here the question whethermorality s largely a matterof thoughtand feeling r how far n a Deweyan vein the moral situation s to be construed s oneofthe conflict f habits necessitating ecision. But even thoughts nd feelingshave tobe tackled n the long run, f the culture s to be understood.And interestinglynough,whenJohn Ladd, a philosopher,worked among the Navaho specifically n questionsofmoral discourse, his major informant xpressed to Kluckhohn (Ladd I957, P. xiv) agenuine delight that here at last he was being asked really mportantquestions (But,ofcourse, he was a sophisticated nformant, nd practicallysent Kluckhohn grade re-portson the differentnthropologicalworkerswho kept comingto consulthim.)A thirdpossible explanation s that there s some theoretical ifficultyn the conceptofthe moral itself. t may, after ll, be a residual or again a miscellaneousclass of sanc-tionsor motivations.Perhaps we only really discover a moral sanction by stripping ffwhat is not definitely eligious, r legal, or fear of violent action, and seeing that some-thing s leftmoving people. Obviously, however, once this s located, we should wantto pursue deliberately he dentification f such motives.Even the miscellaneous nvitesitemizationand thebreakingup oftheproblem.But this third ine ofexplanationdoesraise the possibility hat in principle ittle more can be done anthropologically n thedelineation ofthe moral than has so far been done practically. t is thereforemportanttoprobe for he mplicit onceptionsof the nature, cope, role, and relations f moralityin theworkofanthropologists, nd to differentiate hat may be differentssumptionsinfluencing he operation of research nd the formulation f results. et me try o do so,forbrevity's ake, in the form of a set of reassurances that anthropologistsmightbetempted o offer he enquiringphilosopher.REASSURANCE I. Anthropologist:ook here, old fellow,why are you makingsuch afussovermorality? Perhaps we don't put it in blazing headlines. But you're a scholar,you ought to be used to readingwhole booksand not complaining about chapterhead-ings.You'll findplenty about morals n any anthropological eport bout religion.Andit will call it morality, oo. For example, when Evans-Pritchard n his NuerReligion(I956, p. I8i) reports hat the Nuer say that were a man's nakedness often een byhiswife'sparentshis children mightgo blind,he adds, 'We may surmise hatthe conven-tion sfeltbyNuer tohave also a moral significance rom he violent ndignation havewitnessedn femalerelatives fwives at exposurebyhusbands n theirpresence lthoughtheywere not theirmother-in-law nd the exposures were entirely ccidental.' Themoral is here implicitly ied to what one feels ndignantabout when it is violated, asdistinct romwhat would have harmful onsequences as a resultofreligiousviolation.Isn't thatenoughforyou? You could even call it an operational definition r a pointer-reading fyou go infor hatkindof anguage.Philosopher:hanks, and I'm glad to have it underlined,but after ll, myinterest


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58 ABRAHAM EDELisn't ntellectualhousekeeping,but to see how far theunderstanding fmorality an befurthered y anthropology. t isn't enough to rely on a fewpointer-readings, speciallywhen theyare merelyutilized in passing,ratherthan culled out forcomparative con-sideration.What is this ndignation? Is therenota moral indignationdifferentrom nordinary ndignation?Do we have to go to psychology o understand t or can we relyon ordinary ntrospection? f thelatter, sn't therea danger, when we lookin, ofseeingthe mirror eflection f our own culture n our emotionalreactions? In general,whatwe need is a formulation fthe moral so that even the relationof thereligious nd themoralwould be an empirical comparative ssue.Thus theclaim, f t weremade, that na given society morals are wholly merged with religion,would have the statusof anempirical roposition, nd would require an understanding fwhat has not been dif-ferentiated,ust as in the claim that there mightbe no differentiated olitical institu-tions n a given society.But as I understand t, you are not saying that there s no fulleraccount of moralitybecause it hasn't been differentiatedn the societiesyou deal with,sinceyou are showingme an occasional differentiating ark.REASSURANCE I. Anthropologist:ut really,aren'tyou askingfor he mpossible?Togive the kind of systematic ccount you seem to want of moralitywould regard t as aninstitution. ut morality s rather a kind of pervasivespiritbetween people. When wesay a man is glad, do you want us to tie it down to some part ofhis body? We'll tellyou which people dance when they're glad, and which hug one another,and whichsimply itand smile,but don't ask us what wemean by glad' oran itemized istofmodesofrecognition.Morality s like that. Some anthropologists ave said as much. For ex-ample, Redfield I 953,pp. 20-I) talksof the moralorder as a bond, and denies that t sa category fculture.

Philosopher: o, that won't quite do. Even ifmoralitys a kindofspirit,you have tohave a clear account of t in some terms r other,or you'll get nto comparative trouble.For example, Redfield talks of the moral order as giving way to the technical order nwhich utility elations between individuals become more central.Yet whyshould thetechnical order not be regarded as a typeofmorality, hougha different ne from heprevious type? It will have its own characteristic irtues and obligations though thelattermay be regarded as issuingfrom ndividual will orconsent.A Benthamitemoralityis stilla morality. fwe don't clarify heconceptwe maybe smuggling n subtle valua-tionsofour owntradition.REASSURANCE III. Anthropologist:ou're barkingup the wrong tree completely.Thereason you don't see the anthropologicaltreatment s explicit s because you expecttofind t somewhere. But really, t's everywhere. o don't worry,we're expounding themorality f a society n all our descriptions f ts nstitutions. he very dea ofa deter-minatesocial order s that of structural ines embodyingwhatpeople regardas important.To have a kin system s to mark out patterns f preferred nd prohibitedmarriage, ndso a moral rule about incest; to have an ownership ystem s already to have implicitnormsofdistribution nd 'social ustice'; and so on.'Philosopher: o, this generous gift roublesme. Pervasiveness hould be a separableissue,and an empirical one. The religiousmay be pervasive n one societywithoutbeingindistinguishable romwhat it pervades; so too thepolitical. Why not themoral? Noris the reference o importanceclear enough. Things are important n different ays-as


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 59fundamental unavoidable means, as requiring considerable energy and attention,asintrinsically orth-while nds, and so on. What kind of mportant hings re moral?Anthropologist:ut surelyyou do not expect the anthropologist o point to a domainof particular moral phenomena? On this anthropologists nd philosophers must beagreed. For example, Raymond Firth (I95I, P. I84) says: 'We commonly speak ofexchange as an economic action, or worship as a religious action. There is no corres-ponding categoryof moral actionsper e.Morality refers o the qualities ratherthan tothe substance of actions.' Similarly, n a recent paper before the Aristotelian ociety,PeterWinch claimed that t wouldn't make sense to say you'd spent threehours doingmorality-unless you meant working t moral philosophy.Philosopher: omehow I do not find these assumptions onvincing. f I spend threehoursdecidingwhatis my duty n a particularly rying ituation,why s thisnot as mucha moral phenomenon of a very concrete and active sort as spending threehours bar-gaining overa house is an economic phenomenon? There are many distinctivelymoralphenomena to be found n that vast mass of data that s constituted y our desires ndaspirations,commitments nd appraisal activities.2And as to what is substance andwhat is quality, metaphysical ontroversies an arise n economic examples as well as inmoralones. My desireto have a home may equally well be the substanceofthe economicsituation.REASSURANCE IV. Anthropologist: ell, you know, we British anthropologists rekeen on social organization and social structure, nd so naturallywe put morality here.And that's where it really belongs. You'll find t in Chapter VI of Firth's Elements fSocial Organizationnder the title Moral Standards and Social Organization'. And youmight note the publication date-i95i-the same as Notesand Queries, ixthedition,which seems to have upset you so much.Philosopher:fmorality s not going to be given an independent treatment, erhapssocial organization is its best home. It helps convey some lessons: that morality sbasically a social not a pure-individualphenomenon-not a lone mind scrutinizing rexpressing ts feelings s so many philosophical theories eem to locate it-that ithas allsorts fcausal and functional elations, hat tis basically a regulativemechanism.AndFirth'sconceptual experimentswith ts ocation seem to be a consciouseffort o decidewhere it best belongs. The chapter you referred o comes perhaps closestto focusingon it directly. n his Marett lecture I 953) on 'The Study ofValues by Social Anthro-pologists' t is the widervalue-presuppositions f nstitutionshatare central; thestudyofvalues is taken to help us understandthe meaning of action. SocialChangen Tikopia(I 959), however,presents ts moral referencesn the frameworkf an operative conceptof ocial control.Anthropologist: ell, what objection do you have to this? Doesn't it answeryourconceptual quandaries?Philosopher:t maybe thecorrect nswer to some of the majorfactualquestions,butis it the best methodologicalpolicy? For example, the question of thestructure f dealsdoesn't fallcomfortablyn this, nd has tobe shippedoff o anotherchapter. supposethe fundamental bjectionto lettingmoralitybe cut loose would be that we might osesightof ts ntimaterelationsto social structure nd its functional oles.But there s theopposite danger nmerging hemorality oncept with ocial control oncepts.There are


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6o ABRAHAM EDELwholefacets f heproblemwhichwillhavegreater ifficultyncoming o ight. hereare psychologicaltudies-even n depth-of the kindsof feelings nd emotions n-volved, s well s of he tructuref onscience,hekinds f rientationshich cultureprovides or tsmembers,s Hallowell I955) has so fruitfullyrobed hem, r thede-greeof extension f theself, s Marian Smith I952) has suggested. hereare all theanalytic uestions aised about moral concepts y philosophers, hichpoint to thecomparative inguistic tudyof terms nd modes of moral discourse; bout moralreasoning, hich oint o thecomparativetudy fmodes fjustification;s well as allthe questions bout virtues nd vices and moral deals whichget ostwhen they remergedn a social tructurehapter r even n a chapter n personality.3Even the obviously ppropriate reatmentf sanctionsn a social structurerame-workwillnotyield n understandingfthe moralwithout oing onsiderablyeyondthe nitial onfines. or example, idicule s obviously n effectiveanctiono supportrule n manyplaces. But s it a moral anction? We may compare heway n whichpoliceforce onstitutes sanction or omemoralrulesbut s not usually onsideredmoral anction.)fwe recognize hat idicule ometimess a moral anctionnd some-times s not,we are driven eyond heovert ocial relation o questions bout thewayit s felt yagent nd recipient. or example, s t moralwhere trests n somenner enseofshameor sense f estangementrom ne's fellows? his would ead us to a psycho-logical orefor hemeaning fmoral.An alternative ouldbe to construeidicule s amoral anction imply here t s an expressionfpublicdisapproval.4here re seriousissues nvolved n these lternatives,nd they re not ikely o be faced f hetreatmentofmoralitys limited o social structure. ut what s more, ven the treatmentf therole ofmorality ithin ocial structureains n richness y a fullerndependenttudyofmoralitytself.fwe do notprobe nto he oots nd effectsfridicule, e cannot etclearpicturef hekinds f ocial tructuresnwhich idicule an and thosenwhichtcannotbe an effective echanism. imilarly,n independent omparativetudy fidealsand virtue-setsan sharpen mmeasurablyhe ocial and historicalesearchntothefunctioningfutopian ndrealisticdeals nsocialmovementsr theplaceofvirtue-sets nsupportingpecificocial ystems.he most eneral uestionf he xtentowhichthemoral smergedwith ther spects f ocial nd culturalife tselfcquires mpiricalmeaningwhen hemorals ndependentlydentifiednd clarified. nd beyond llthese,lie theconfigurationalropertiesfmoralitiesorwhichwe can lookwhenthevariousparts f moralityre gathered ogether,utwhichwe cannot ven skaboutwhenwesee morality nly n a particular ompartment.shallwantto comeback tothis ateron.I do not mean to minimize he methodologicalssues nvolved-bothtechnicalproblemsfdiscoverynd theoreticalroblems f nterrelationsithin society. herehave,of ourse, eenmany laims hatunderstandingn humanmatterss of he ocietyas a whole, hatthe extraction f themes r the breaking p intoelements,ven ntoinstitutions,s artificial. ut take t that he use ofconstructsnscientificorkneedsnodefence ythis ime; t s rather question fwhich onstructsre bestfor givenfield. hisholisticpproachnever eems o trouble nthropologistsndealingwith awor religion;but it does get invokedformorality.Maybe Durkheimwas describingtendenciesnanthropologicalheorys well as phenomena mongpeopleswhenheput


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 6Ithe sacred'nto he ore fmoralityIt should otmean oo acred oanalyse. fmoralityhas such a specialcharactert is certainly ime o spot t more xplicitlynd delineateit more learly.f t s not special mong nstitutionst ought lso to be explicated.Actually, here s a deeper ogicalproblem nvolved. everalclaimswould havetobe distinguished.ne is thatmoral oncepts ave no meaningithouthe ocialcontentreference. nothers thatthough heyhave independentmeaning,no instancesrefoundwithoutunctionalelationso socialorganizationnstitutions.third sthat hereare socialcauses ormoral oncepts rising nd remaining r changing. nd so on. Butin such case,nogeneralnswersrequired. orexample, heverymeaningfadultery'involves omereferenceo a marriage ystem,nd it s probable hat justice'mayturnout to be literally nintelligible ithout ome referenceo distributionystems; nyaccount n terms f giving ach hisdue' or through n idea ofequalitymaybe onlytemporaryetour.On theother anrd, concept ike ympathy ayhave an invarianttrans-culturaleaning, hough he ncidence nd contextsfsympathyn a societymaybe causally ependentnsocial conditions. ow then anwe tell n advance thatsome hasesofmoralityrenotbestregarded s a functionfother spects fculture,such s modeof hild-training,inship elations,tandardized ersonalityype, pecificaccumulated istoricalraditions,nd so on, fwe do not et t as an initially mpiricalenquirywith ome ndependentoncepts? do notthinkny theoryfthefunctionsfmorality as anythingo lose from he attempt o map moralityn a systematicallyindependent ay. ts claimswillrather e brought o the est f mpiricalnvestigationthanbe embodied n mplicit efinitions.REASSURANCE V. Anthropologist:ell, fwhatyou reallywant s theright o explorein manyuncharted egions-psychologicals well as social-if we British nthropolo-gists re moving oo slowly oryou, the Americans ave surely one ahead with etpropulsion. aybeyour earch or proper oncept fmorals anfindtsgoal n all thevalue studies nd all the materials n personalitynd culture.There'senoughonthoughtsndfeelingsnd attitudeshere o meetyourmost rasping emands ormoremodes f nquiry.Philosopher:ou put t almost s ifmy hoicewere tarvingn England r drowningin America. don't hink ithers the ase. Or, to shifthemetaphor,'m not nterestedin generalhunting ights;t isopen territory.'m interestedn the ogicofa workingconcept.Now take valueconceptikeClydeKluckhohn'sI 95 , P. 395): 'A value saconception,xplicit r mplicit,istinctivef n individual rcharacteristicf group,of hedesirablewhich nfluenceshe electionromvailablemodes,means, ndendsofaction.' He adds that t snotmerely preferenceutfelt r consideredo be ustified.)Once suchconceptswerepresented,herewas almost frontier-settlementuality otheway n whichpeoplerushed ntonewstudies n all directions.t was almost s ifpermissionad beengivento enter forbidden omain.Manyof the studies racedthemesn familiarreas-value patternsn law, familyife,mythology,cculturationsituations.ut omeplunged head nto he ensitivexplorationfuncharteredreas-orientationso ife, ttitudesotime, herelations fman and nature, oknowledge,ofeeling. ransitiono suchthemesnAmerican nthropologicaltudieswasno doubteasierbecauseofa priormorereceptivettitudeothe mpact fpsychologyndper-sonalitytudies.


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62 ABRAHAM EDELNow moralitys somewheren thatdomain s well as in thesocial structureield.But I don't think tsettles ur conceptual roblem or very imple eason. do notbelievethat theconcept fvalue is as simple s it sounds.Before hesocial sciencesappropriatedt, t had a wholehistorynphilosophy, herewith ven wider cope t

threw nto single asket verythingromconomicsoaesthetics,s well as religiousand moral values'. And so, unlesst smerely tag-word or hebasket-comparableto skill' r power' n other nquiries-italso has to ustifytselfy sometheory ftheunity f uchdiverse henomena.n somewriterst s a psychologicalnity f a singleEros running hroughverything;n others unity n thebiological ource f mpulseor appetite,with ll sorts f historical-evolutionaryroliferation;n still thers,t is aunity fspirit s such n itsdistinctiveifferencerom heorganic-materialCf. EdelI953; Krikorian Edel I959, ntroductionopart v).Thehistoryf hegeneral alueconceptnphilosophyoes notmake t ikely hat ts ocial-sciencenaloguewillpro-ducea theoreticallynified alueconcept.Whetherheunityhat henewvalue studiesseek sto be in terms fbiologicalneeds, sychologicalonstants,ocial structureela-tionships,ultural atternings,ocio-historicalevelopments,snotprejudged y use ofthe oncept.And so we cannot ellprecisely heremorality illfallwithinuch valueframework.t present hegrowth fvalue studieseavesus simplywith nlarged istasand greater reedomf nquiry.So muchfor hereassurances. amnotreassured. ut do seea pattern mergingfromheir ery iversity.ach isstressingomeparticulareaturefmorality. ne tellsus thatthe moral s a matterwhoseviolation rouses trong eeling; nother hat tpermeatesife ikea spirit,whichwecan translates saying hatmoral onsiderationsmayarise nanycontext; third hat t deals withwhat s mportant; fourthhat tsmajorcontexts theregulationfhumanrelations; fifthhat t s among heobjectsofvalueorpreferencen human ife, hat thas an independentttraction.t looks sif ll these eaturesre relevant hen o nterpreted.ut hopethat heir ery iversityshows henecessityor ocusingna clear and systematic ayon the tudy fmoralityas a relativelyndependentimension oth n conceptual nalysis nd in descriptiveinvestigation.

IICan we suggest o philosophyhepenetratingoleofempiricalmaterials n ethicaltheoryswehave suggestedoanthropologyheneedfor ndependentnquirynto hemeaning nd forms fexistencefthemoral? n somerespectshis s a moredifficulttask, ecausetheprofessionalttentiono methodologicalroblems as oftenmeanthardeningf hemethods mployed.In theold days,the recognized itualof enquiry n philosophicalthicswas acritique fthemajorschools.Outstanding ypothesesbout the natureofmoralitywere mbodied nUtilitarianism,antianism, udaemonism,nd therest. achmadeassertionsrrested n assertionsbout thenature fman andhisworld,humanprob-lemsand the humanpredicament.ach had itsdescriptionfthemoral onsciousnessand itsanalysis fmoral oncepts. thicalenquiry n its surveyf these chools skedwhichwasbasically rue r more dequate or acceptable, ndinwhatrespects:wasittrue hat ll menpursued leasure n all thatthey id, was the utilitariannalysis f


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 63obligationufficientlyefined, id thegood (amongmoralconcepts)presupposeheright r theright resuppose hegood.?And so on. In any case,therewere, t least nthebackground,actual ssertionsboutmen nd theirways.Contemporarythics-and British hilosophy,s iswellknown,s out frontnthisrespect-casts ts nquirynthe inguistic ode.Questions bout thenature fmoralityorthemeaning fmoral re nterpreteds questionsboutthe nalysis f he anguageofmorals. his sa specialized ype f nquiry aken o characterizeniquely hephilo-sophicalenterprise,uite independentf scientificmpiricalnvestigationr causalinvestigation.o undertake general ritique fthispositionwouldherebe too vastatask.5 erhaps he bestway to arguefor he viewthat nswers oquestions f ethicaltheory equire ata from hepsychologicalnd social cienceswouldbe towork hroughin outline particularxample.Let methen akean illustrationhichwill cut acrossbotholderformulationsndcontemporarynes.And n allfairness,et t be a hardcase.Kantis thefatherfcon-temporaryheories f he autonomy' fmorals-mistakenlyonstrued,ammaintain-ing, s the onelysolation fethics. ake thenhisfamous eclarationKant I 929, sec.I): 'It is impossible o conceive fanythingnywheren theworldorevenanywhereoutof t that anwithoutualificatione calledgood, xcept Good Will.' Let usmoremodestly onstruet as 'onlya good will s good withoutualification'. ow can wedecidewhetherhis s true?Or first,ather, hatdoes t mean? fwe do nottake titsfacevalue theKantianclaim for yntheticprioripropositions,here re two quitedifferentpproaches o thisproposition. ne of thesefollowsn empirical ath,theother oesbywayofproblems f onceptual elationsnd inguisticnalysis.The first ne to-day s quite unorthodox.We lookfor he kindsoftestsKant isofferingmplicitlyrexplicitlyor a goodwill' and forgoodwithoutualification'. emakes tamply lear hat goodwill sone that sready oact n terms fhisuniversali-zation est-toaskwhether hemaxim n whichtacts ouldconsistentlyewilled s auniversalaw.But t s not oeasy o seewhat s hismark f goodwithoutualification'-unless hemeans imply ood n everyontextor llpossiblenterpretationsf good'.Butthere s much n hisworkwhichwould ead us to nterpretgoodwithoutualifica-tion'as theunqualified bject of moralrespect; orKant takesthisfeeling f moralrespect obe thecentral onstituentfthemoral onsciousness,nd tobe everyman'scommon ossession.heplainmanneednotwaitfor hephilosophero tellhimwhat shisduty. utwhat s this eeling frespecttself?Weknow hatKanthangs great ealon it,that n hismorepsychologicalrobing ecarefullyistinguishest from ear fconsequences,rself-loveKant I930, e.g. pp. I35 seq., i85 seq.), that n the ongrunitbecomes he lender hreadeadinghim o thepostulatesfGod,Freedom f heWill,and Immortality.ut despite ts mportance,hisfeelingfrespects a psychologicalmissingink nKant's doctrine, nd when t s tracked ownwehave tosaywith hatmostcareful tudent f ethicalnotions, ohnLaird (I935, p. I05) that whatKantcalled"respect" or he moral aw is a ghost rom inai,a crepuscularhing hat insagainst henaturalight. hereforeonsistentantiansmust ither ring ivinityntotheir thics, otas a consequence ut as partoftheanalytic ftheir undamentalon-ceptions,relseretireo purely erreneamparts'.Now whathas all thisKantiandiscussionodo with nthropologynd theother

E J.R.A.I.


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64 ABRAHAM EDELsciences fman? Ifwe follow his venue of analysis nd succeed n a psychologicalidentificationfthis eeling, e are ed to thequestionwhether ction n a principle funiversalizations really he oleobject f ur moral espect.s law ts bject lways ndineveryoneButwhose nnerifehas this eeling-structureIs itthepeopleofKoenigs-berg, r allmankind,reveryonceivable ationalreature hethern earth r-Kant'sspeculation-evenon Saturn?Kant of course thoughtn terms f all conceivablerational reatures. ut was it not Marx who remarkedhatevery russian arries isgendarmewithin isbreast?Would a cultural roduct f other reas have the samestructure?reud I 950,p. I 03) tells he tory f he ign oncerningigh-tensionlectricinstallations:n Italy tsays imply,Who toucheswilldie'. In Germany t says,Totouchthewires s most trictlyorbidden, ecauseof danger o life'. n America,wemight dd, we shouldprobably ind imply: Danger: Exposed Wire'. Piaget, n hisTheMoralJudgmentf he hildI932, chap. , especially p. 95 seq.) treats hequestionwhethermoralfeelingttaches o lawor topersons s an observational-experimentalproblem fpsychology.e traces ts career s suchand from is ownstudies f rule-formationn childrenuggestshat here re two eparate espect ttitudesnvolved-an authorityype irectedo aw stemmingrom ross-generationontexts,nd a person-orientedype rising mongchildren n thesame generationevel. He is even ed tospeculate n what his atterdemocratic' onsciousness ould be like f generationfchildrenwerebroughtup without lders.Piaget'sconclusions oo may indeed beculture-bound.t is not so simple question,fwe think ftheroleofpeer-grouppressuresn strengtheningonformistendenciesndthefear fbeing outof ine'. Andfor hatmatter, ant himselfashioned iscategoricalmperatives involving espectfor aw chieflyn its first ormulation.n its famous econdformulation,he so-calledhuman mperative,t callsforrespect fpersons s ends,notto be treated s meansalone.Butwhatever e thecorrectnswers, inviteyoutocompare oryourselvesheclarityf he ssue s a psychological-social-scienceesearch roblemwith heobscurityoftheattempted eduction f thesecondformulationrom he firstn the reamsofKantian cholarship.The lineofthought am suggestingor thics as, however, moregeneral cope.It callsfor heapplication fan anthropological-comparativepirit. ant's sonly netheoryfobligation. he Utilitarians aveanother nd themoral entimentheoristsstill nother. nd these re buta smallpart.Supposewe read Kant andJ.S. Mill andAdam Smith, otfor hemoments theorists,uttoextract rom ach account he ypeofmoral onsciousnesshicht sdepicting.We read them s informants,6nd whatdowe find?The Kantian consciences a law-courtonscience;his actualdescriptionfconsciencen theCritiquef racticaleasons that f n inner ribunaln whichweudgeourselvesccordingo aw. The Millianconsciences a feelingfoverweighingmpor-tance,wheremportancenvolves sense fmassivenstrumentalityor eneralwelfare.The Smithian onsciences perhaps hemost ttractive,or t consists,s hisanalysisofduty hows, fa pyramidingfspontaneous ympatheticeactionsn a variety frelationships.have nottime oprobeforHobbesist ndStoic,PlatonistndHegelianconscience. utsurelyt is clear thatthequestionwhich f the theoriess correct e-comes n this ineof nalysis:what re the lternativeatterningsf bligation-feelings,whatconfigurationsfpersonalityo they itnto;howfar s anyoneeither niversal,


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66 ABRAHAM EDELlogic of ethical udgment nd expression. his is an autonomous iscipline, nd ineffect hat Kant is showing s that universalizabilitys partof the verymeaning f'moral', hat o regard nythings obligatorys to mply hat here re reasons or t ofuniversal orm, othat nyone lse without ifferentiatingeasonswould be bound bythe same obligation. ant himself,f course,nsisted n thenon-empiricalharacterofhis thical esults.As long as sucha logic of ethicswas considered o provide n analysis f someabsolute tructurefmind, r the nherent tructurefpractical eason, tsstatus e-maineda mysteryr a metaphysicalias. But contemporaryhilosophizingn thelinguistic odecanhavenosuchpretensions.n sofar s it s analysingmoral ermsnordinary nglish,t cannot laimthat ts resultsmusthold for ll possible anguages.If onecanunearth hefeature funiversalizabilityromrdinary nglish seof ought'by showinghat ne whorejectsttherebysled into ogicalparadoxeswith espectoacceptableuses-and I do notassumehere hat his an orcannotbe shown-onehasestablishedt best that he Kantianuniversal lement spartof the built-inmeaningof moral'or ought' n English.fyoudo not find t inordinary avaho or ordinaryAssyrian,t doesnotmean that hey ad no moral onceptions.his s familiar nthro-pologicalhistorynthe xtensionf he oncept freligion'nd t s ikely obe repeatedin thehistoryfcontemporarythicswhen tdevelops genuinelyomparative er-spective.n some thical heories f he inguistic hilosopherst smasked ya respectfor anguageas the accumulatedwisdom ftheages-a kindofcommon aw modelappliedto anguage, eminiscentfBlackstonendBurke n ts motionalvertones;relsebybeliefsnperennialr universallements,r universal raitsn modernanguages.Butall these re notpartoftheproceduref inguisticnalysis-they repropositionsofa factual ort boutanguages, nd they re thushistorical r anthropologicalrcomparativeinguisticeneralizations.In spite f tsfrequentlaimtobe a non-empiricalhilosophicalmethod,inguisticphilosophyeems ome, n its nternal roblems,obe inmanyrespects nalogous oanthropology-its a kindofanthropologyfthemindfilteredhrough peech.JohnAustin I956-7, pp. 7 seq.) used thephrase linguistic henomenology'n describingitsnature;but the social character flanguage analysismakesthepure-experiencereferencefphenomenology,hile uggestive,erhapsesspertinent.inguisticnalysishas itsstandard asesand itsaberrant ases, ts structuredules hathave to be un-covered. t is particularistic,ishingo see each usein its owncontext,ndfragmen-tariannbeing uspiciousfgeneral nities.Mychief omplaint ouldbe, especiallynethics,hat t does notcarry his nthropologicalpirit ar nough.tmoved romalk-ing boutthemeaningfwords otalkingbouttheir ses. thinkt sgoing rom ses oarecognitionffunctionserformedngiven ontexts.ut tdoes nottreat hese ontextsintheir ull ocio-culturalichness. orexample,nethics,inguistichilosophyeactedagainst heview hatmoral tatements eremerely motive,ndwent nan exuberanthuntfor ther ses,proudly xhibitingtsfinds n the ssues fMind.By the time hatNowell-Smith'sthicsppeared,he could ist Nowell-Smith954, p. 98) as someusesforvalue-wordsto express astes nd preferences,o express ecisions nd choices, ocriticize, rade, nd evaluate, o advise, dmonish,warn,persuade nd dissuade, opraise, ncouragendreprove,opromulgatenddrawattentiono rules; nd doubt-


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 67less forother purposes also'. Those are all very concrete activities.Why not extend thescope of ethicalenquiryto see how these activities re carried on in given societies,howwidespread is grading n the life of a people, how frequent nd effective dvising andwhether t is soughtor resented, nd in what human relationships t takes place, the fociand limits fpraise, and so on. Thus moral expression, nderstood n terms fcontextualfunctions,would become related to typical institutions nd processesof the society:imperative uses to structures f authority nd obedience, advisory uses to structuresembodyingguidance, leadership and suasion n the particularforms f thegiven society,and so on. The logical analysisof the anguage would thus provide clues to the relation-ships and built-in aluesofthemorality cf. Edel & Edel I959,pp. I 25 seq.).But there s anotherphase ofthe subject not to be omitted.Claims of neutralanalysisoftenobscure this.The analyst may be quite neutral in mapping the use of ordinaryEnglish, but thisdoes not make what he discovers neutral subject-matter.And he isusually led to take some stand, indirectly f not directly, n the aims or values or pur-poses embedded in thatsubject-matter. or example, he may accept heordinary sage fortheoreticalpurposes, or he may reconstructis theoretical anguage; in eithercase he isreckoningwiththeembedded values. He may reach the same resultby decidingthat oneor another aspect of the meaning of 'moral' is primary. ook back, forexample, toKantian universality.Whether you discover t in linguistic nalysis of modernEnglishor insociological analysisofmodern ociety, s theremuch doubt that t reflects,rom heeighteenth entury n, in its very weep, the growing conomic, social and culturalone-worldtendency?The issue s notmerely ne ofcausation butofbuilt-invalues in modesof thoughtand modes of expression.Our veryethical concepts have a history nd asocial content, nd there sno reason why we should not become consciousofthehumanaims that get built into them. And so, if afterdiscoveringuniversalizabilityn our lin-guisticuse of moral' we leave it unchanged,we are tacitly haringa moral schemeinadditiontoanalysing t.I have dwelt perhaps sufficientlyn the way in which questions of ethical theorywhether mpirically r conceptuallyor linguistically pproached involve matter-of-factassumptionsthat require certification y the sciences of man; and suggestedmorebrieflyhateven formal thical deas containbuilt-in alues related to the stateofhumanlife of the age. The conclusion that would followfrom his s that self-consciousthicaltheorizingto-day, hether onsidering hemeaningof moral' orspecifyingundamentalproperties nd methodsofmorality,has to pay careful ttention ofactual assumptionsof one or anotherkindthat t is unavoidably making,as well as to purposes mplicit nitsconstructions.7he formerwhen aid bare becomeresponsible oscientific nowledgein sofar s it s available; the atterbecomeopen to normative riticismnd refinement.And in so far as anthropology an furnishwide comparativematerialson moralitiesbymore systematic nvestigation, t can contribute markedlyto the relevant scientificknowledge. IIII turnfinally o theconceptofmoralitywhichwe elaborated in AnthropologyndEthics,consideredas a scientificonstruct or heoretical nalysisand descriptive esearch. t isclear thatanthropology as notfurnished systematic oncept. It is perhapsnotequallyclear that philosophy has not furnisheda systematic concept that can serve the


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68 ABRAHAM EDELanthropologicalurpose fdescriptivenvestigation.hilosophy asmany oncepts,iedto differentheoreticalpproaches. ometo-day alk fmorals n termsf he pprehen-sionofphenomenologicalualitiesof fitness r requiredness. ome begin withdis-tinctivelythical erms. omeprefer istinctivethical sesofterms,uch as to expres-scertain motions, r todecide, ocommend, rpersuadeor subscribe. ome delimitsetofbehaviourallyrphenomenallyescribed ctivitiesr tates,uch s being leasedby,or nterestedn,or approving f, r desiring ortsownsake, rreflectivelypprais-ing, r ascribing bligations,ecognizinglaims, valuating,nd so on.The verywealthofcandidates revents s from ommittingurselvesntecedentlyo any one ofthem.From descriptiveoint fview hey rovide s with set fvaryinghenomena n thelinguistic,sychological, henomenological,nterpersonal,nd social level. We maysuspect hat nthe ong runanychoice mong hemwillrestnot oninitial resupposi-tions ut on theresults fempiricaltudy fthesekinds fphenomenand their nter-relationsnhuman ife. utthe tudytself equires guiding oncept fwhat moralityis. Whatform,hen, hall t take tthe utset?I indicated t the beginninghat heconcept fmorality eproposedwasdescrip-tively riented, hat it was a generalized oncept, nd that t treatedmoralitysrelativelyndependent.t ispossible ow, n the ight four analysesn theprecedingparts, o sketchhe ustificationf hese eatures.The descriptiverientations,ofcourse, equired or n anthropologicalompara-tive nvestigation.o showthat t is a desirable rientationrom hepointofviewofethical heorizings a large and difficultuestion. ts obvious dvantages re that twouldfurnish more r lessdemarcated omainofphenomena owhichpropositionsabout morality ouldrefer, here erifyingbservationsor actual ssertionselevantto ethics ould be identifiednd the assertions ut to the test.The fullerustificationofthis rientation,owever,ould comeonly romakingtubbornssues n theoreticalethics nd showing n detail howthey an be reanalysed, aradoxesminimized,ndfamiliarontroversiest an impasse ive way to specific asks cf.Edel I962, chap. iofor sampling f uchanalysis). he analysis ftheKantianexample bovecan serveasone llustration.Our decision o fashion generalizedonceptwasguidedbyboth nthropologicalandphilosophicalonsiderations.hree onditions aybe setdown or contemporarydescriptiveoncept fmorality.i) It must voidethnocentrism,hat s,it mustnotchoose uch nitialmarks f hemoral swouldrule ut n advancematerialshatmightmake bidfornclusion. he policy obe followeds: better oo much t firsthan oolittle. or example,we cannot aythat t must eal with oncepts fright nd wrong,since tmay urn ut nsomepeoples odeal withwhat s safe nddangerous,rwhat sfolk nd un-folk.2) The verymarks f the moralmust llowof thewidest arietyfpossible ulturalpecialization.foneofthemarks,or xample,sa kind f ndividualfeelingorrelated ith ransgression,tmust e soformulateds nottoprejudgehat tbe a remorseype ra shame ype, utmust llow nadvance or aried ultural attern-ingas a theoreticossibility.3) It mustmakepossibletsownrefinements the yste-matic data on moralitiesre accumulated, s comparative mpirical eneralizationsgrow, r as established nowledgerom ther isciplinese.g.psychology)asts ight nthe moralmaterials. he aimis,ofcourse, ventualmbodiment,ithin hemarks,f


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 69knowledge hat s acquired boutmoralities: or xample, f here hould urn ut to beinvarianteeling-responsesotransgression,r f llinjunctionsurn ut to be addresseddirectlyr indirectlyo th-e roblem f nterpersonalggressionas Freud seemed othink), r f he ocialfunctionsfmoralities rove o be limited o a specificetof on-trol ims. n short, e expect ventual evisionntheconcept fmoralityust as therehas beenrevisionn the oncepts freligion nd of aw n anthropologicalnvestigation.Butthis s afteromparativenvestigation.A concept fmoralityatisfyinghese onditionsould embrace ll thephenomenapointed o by varying hilosophical pproaches nd provide field n whichtheseapproaches hemselvesould be put to thetest.Accordingly,n AnthropologyndEthics,thegeneralized onceptwas explicated hrough n inventoryfconstituents.he con-stituents ere partly ypes f content, nd partly eatures f the way the contentsorganized n the ife nd consciousnessf people.A moralitys thus aken o contain:selected ulesenjoining r forbiddinge.g. a set of commandments),haracter-traitscultivated r avoided virtues nd vices), atternsfgoals nd means ideals nd nstru-mental alues); a bounding oncept fthemoral ommunitynd a setofqualificationsfor responsibleerson; more r essdistinctiveelection f inguisticerms nd rulesformoraldiscourse; omepatterns f ystematization;ome electedmodes fjustifica-tion; some selection rom he rangeof humanfeelings hich n complexways s tiedinto the regulative rocedures; nd, involved n all of these, ome specific xistentialperspectiverviewofman, his equipment, is place in nature, he humanconditionand predicament.Suchanapproach ncoveredmany lues or nderstandinghe ntegratedatternfa morality,oth thekinds f configurationso be lookedfor nd the nterrelationsfmorality ith ther hasesofhuman ife. t also pointed o ways nwhich achoftheconstituents ight e sharpenedn furtheresearch. ake, for xample, configura-tional eatureike tringencyn a morality. omparatively,e found t could appear n:specific bligation-contentheremany cts are ruled n or ruledout; virtues, herefirmdherence orule smade themark fappropriate haracter; deals,where eaceofmind n doingone's duty s a dominating oal; organization fmoraldiscourse,wheremoralityscast nabsolute ules ather hanprobabilityudgments; ystematiza-tion,where eductiveertaintysthegarb hatmoralityakes; anctions, here unish-ment s heavyfor impleviolation;moralfeelings, here he weight f guiltfinds oready xpiation. hus the dentificationf the one modalityn a multitude f expres-sionsmade tpossible opushfurtheruestions boutcausal and functionalelations-where tringencys to be attributedo a traditionalersonalityype,where o socialpressuresndcontinuingensions,nd so on. t seemed o us,therefore,hat hegeneral-ized conceptpaid off' apidlyn opening p more learly reasfor nvestigation.As for hefeature f relativendependence ormorality, have npart arguedforthis y showinghat hereassurancesn behalf f a specificnstitutionalocation r onbehalf f dispersedoncept fmoralityre nadequate.n part, f ourse,heproposedconstructas to ustifytself y how tworks ut n anthropologicalndphilosophicalenquiry. ne of ts pecial dvantagess that t preventsmorality rom eingnarrowlyconstruedntermsf ome nitialhypothesisbout tsnature, auses ndfunctions-ashashappened o oftennwholesale ocial theories. he stress n independencemakes


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70 ABRAHAM EDELthe earch or ntecendentata a primary oal. Hypothesesboutwhatmoralityan becorrelated ith tand utseparately,nstead fbeingbuilt nto nitial efinitions.nde-pendentlystablishinghe data thus erves hemethodologicaloleofwidening herange f vidence or ocial heories. here s,however, furtherind fjustificationorthe tressn ndependence hich omes romeeing hat t s not n arbitraryeaturersimply happy hought-though ne wouldnotwantto belittle appy houghts-butinsome ense merges rom hedevelopmentf hefield nd isaddressed o thegrowthofproblemsn it.This can be shownn theanalysis fphilosophical nd sociologicaltrends n the question f ndependencetself. et me suggest ow t appears, n briefoutline.In philosophicalthics, s isgenerally nown,most thical heories or hegreaterpart fwestern hilosophy ere ound o a particular iew f xistence. ncient heorieswere eleological; hey ried o read offmen'smorals romn account fthepurposivenature f man.Religious hilosophieslsowereteleological, ithdivinity rescribingthe humanpurposes.Where cientificrends rew, hey ought o outlinehow men'sstrivingsnd obligations ollowed rom heir onstitutionnd the aws governingheirconstitution.nly fromKant's time nwards o we find xplicit ttemptst securingthe ompletendependencef thics. nKant, tsautonomy'means ismissingmpiricalconsiderations.n typical wentieth-centuryorms-for xample,Nicolai Hartmann'sEthicsrG. E. Moore'sPrincipiatlzica-it sprimarilynargumentorhendependenceofethicaludgment romheological,metaphysical,nd scientific,nbriefny existen-tialpictures ftheworld nd itsnecessities.t is a revolt rom ondage n ethical eci-sion.Whatever he extremeonceptst employs,whether realm ofpurevalues nHartmann rthefamiliar aturalisticallacy ccusation nMoore,when ll thephilo-sophical rguing s over nd done with, tshuman mport eems ometohave been astress n thefrontier-likeuality fmoraldecision, o enable thefree rextricatedelftofacetheworld n the ight fdemands cknowledgeds itsown. Perhaps heexag-gerated utonomyfthose heories onstituted-as believe he tress n theprescrip-tive nethical heory o-day tilldoes-a reaction o ulling eterminismsnd creepingconformities.t is, no doubt,theexpressionfa nowtraditionaliberalismwith tsemancipationfthe ndividual, aced n turnwithoverwhelmingroblemshat eemtosubmerge he ndividual.And if tstillhasthe elf-exaltationf Russell's lderfreeman'sworship,tdoes n itssubstanceorrespondoa pervasive eedfor ritical ndresponsiblendividual houghtnd action.This activeevaluative rocess s certainlyne phaseofmoralchoice;but thetiesoftheevaluating elf o therest ftheworld onstitute complementaryhase.A fullethical heory as to find placefor he scientifictudy f theself,tsgrowth,nd itsdeterminants,ather hantakependular wings etween n all-encompassingeter-minismnd an isolating bsolute reedom.o studymoralitys relativelyndependentgivesus thebestopportunityo see it in its evaluative rocessesnd in itscausal rela-tions.Now compare he deationaldevelopmentfautonomyn ethical heorywith hepicture fhistorical ifferentiationhatMorrisGinsbergI956, especially p. 2o seq.)givesformorality-the rowthfa distinctivelyoralattitudend theseparation fthemoralfrom hereligiousnd the egal.He relatestto thegrowthf ecularization


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ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS IN COMMON FOCUS 7Iand the widening f the area of ndividual ree hoice, nd regardst as one ofthedistinctivettributesfmodernmorality.Sucha sociologicalccount,uggestshat here re definitehenomenanddefiniteneeds to which the development fmorality s a relativelyndependentoncept saddressed. hiswouldconstituteartofthe ustificationor uch n independentreat-ment.But therewould also be required n appraisal fthephilosophicalnd scientificconsequencesf he mploymentf he oncept. longboth hese ineswewouldhavetoask uch uestions s thefollowing:s there n fact nincreasingevel fdecision heno-mena withqualities f ts own,stemming rom he complexityf modernife nd itsspecialized gencies or egulationnd solutionf pecific roblems? re moralpheno-mena,whethern ndividual r n social ife, ecomingiterally ore ifferentiatedo-dayin the same way as political orms id at one point n thepast,ortool-making as ineconomic rocesses? ow farwilla differentiatedonceptmakeover-sharpistinctionsin consciousnessnd be likely oobscure onnectionsorealistic ocialprocesses?Willthe oncept rove seful nly ormodern ifferentiatedoralitiesOr will t encouragea search n themoralitiesfprimitiveocieties or oints f ndividualmoraldecision?Can itbe that ttentivenessomoralitys embeddedn social controlees ess of theroleof he ndividual n relation oothers, r of he ocialcreativitynselectivelydapt-ing to changing onditions,han tdoes of thepressures f conformityashioningheindividual,more f he quilibriumendenciesn a society han f he rosion nd some-times harpoverthrowf olderpatterns Willconceptual ifferentiationf the moralmake harper he ery otion hat lder ocieties ere ess ifferentiatedn theirmoralityThese are provocativepeculations hat a philosopher an raise,thoughhe mayhavenoready nswers. ut concerninghecriteria or valuating proposed onstructthere eed be little ispute.We askhow far t willhelpmakeour concepts learer, owfarwe will be able to ask morefruitfuluestions nd open up more xtensivereas ofresearch, owfar twillhelp usanswer r reformulatehetheoreticaluestions lreadyon thescene. And in all theserespects, heindependent tudy fmoralitywhetheranthropologicallyr philosophicallypproached,s ngreatneedofdevelopment.

NOTES* This lecturewas delivered o theRoyalAnthropologicalnstitute n 9 June, 960. The writersgratefullyndebted o theNationalScience Foundation f the UnitedStatesfor grant o work n therelation f cience ndethics, uring he enure fwhich his nd othertudieswere arried ut.1 n his MarettLecture, peaking fvalues rather hanmoralitylone, and the way n whichtheyareofteneft ntouched, aymondFirth 1953, p. I48) says: Such abstentions ay be due toa convic-tion hat incevalues re basic to and inherentn all socialaction, hey rebestdealt with ndirectly,nddiscussedn terms f their ontent,without pecific eference.t is perhapsfor hisreasonthat contri-butors o a recentBritish eriesofbroadcast alkson thevalues ofprimitive ociety iscussed eliefs,behaviour, rganization,nstitutions,odes f hought smuch s they id values s such.'2 I haveelsewhereEdel I96I, sec. I7) suggestedlassifyinghese s aspiration-phenomena,inding-authorityhenomena, nd appreciation-phenomena,s a first tep n restoring heconceptofmoralphenomena ndmoral xperience o ourtheoretical ork.3 Forsome of thescope thattheenquiry n these reas gainswhenfocused nmorality irectly,eeBrandt I954) andLadd (I957); also Edel & Edel (I959, chaps. 0-I2).4 Fora fuller reatmentf his roblem f anctions,eeEdel & Edel (I 959, chap. 13).


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72 ABRAHAM EDEL6 he relation f methods n ethical nquiry sthe ubject f Edel (I962). For an analysis fanalysis,see chap.5.6I owe thisdescription f what I am doingto a suggestionn conversation ith the late RobertRedfield.7 have dealt nsomedetailwith heformerftheseby analysing heway n which cientificesultsenter nto ethical theory Edel I 6 I).

REFERENCESAUSTIN,J. L. I956-7.A Plea for xcuses.Aristotelianocietyroceedings,7,PP. 7 seq.BENEDICT, RUTH I946. TheCrysanthemumnd he word. ew York.BRANDT, R. B. I954.HopiEthics. hicago.EDEL, ABRAHAM 1953. Concept of Value in ContemporaryhilosophicalValue Theory,PhilosophyfScience,0, pp. I98-207.EDEL, ABRAHAM I96I. Science and the StructurefEthics, n InternationalncyclopediafUnifiedcience,vol. 2, no. 3. hicago.EDEL, ABRAHAM I 62. MethodnEthical heory. ew York.EDEL, MAY & EDEL, ABRAHAM I959. Anthropologynd thics. pringfield,llinois.EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. I 56. Nuer eligion.xford.EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. et l. I956. The nstitutionsf rimitiveociety.xford.FIRTH, RAYMOND I95 . Elementsf ocialOrganization.ondon.FIRTH, RAYMOND I953. The Study ofValues bySocial Anthropologists.MAN I953, 231.FIRTH, RAYMOND I959. Social hangen Tikopia. ondon.FREUD, SIGMUND I950. TheQuestionf ayAnalysis.ew York.FROMM, ERICH I947. Manfor imself.ew York.GINSBERG, MORRIS I956. Reason ndExperiencenEthicsAuguste omteMemorialTrustLecture,no. 2).Oxford.HALLOWELL, A. I. I955. Culturend xperience.hiladelphia.KANT, IMMANUEL I929. Fundamentalrinciplesf heMetaphysicf thicsed. IO). London.KANT, IMMANUEL I 30. Lecturesn thics. ondon.KLUCKHOHN, CLYDE et al. I95I. Values and Value-Orientationn the TheoryofAction, n TowardA

GeneralheoryfAction,alcottParsons& E. A. Shils eds.). Cambridge,Mass.KRIKORIAN, Y. H. & EDEL, ABRAHAM I959. Contemporaryhilosophicroblems.ew York.LADD, JOHN 195 7. The tructuref MoralCode. ambridge, Mass.LAIRD, JOHN 1935. AnEnquiryntoMoralNotions.ondon.MEAD, MARGARET 1940. Social Change and Cultural Surrogates,J. Educ. ociol.,4,PP. 92-109.Notes ndQueries951 (ed. 6). R. Anthrop. nst.,London.NOWELL-SMITH, P. H. 1954. Ethics.ondon.PIAGET, JEAN 1932. TheMoraludgmentf he hild.NewYork.REDFIELD, ROBERT I953. ThePrimitive orldnd tsTransformations.thaca, New York.SMITH, MARIAN W. I952. Different ultural ConceptsofPast,Present, nd Future:A StudyofEgoExtension.Psychiatry,5, PP. 95-400.

anthropology and ethics in common focus

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