§ 1.§ 2.§ 3.§ 4.§ 5.

§ 6.

§ 7.

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDThe Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

A N N O T A T I O N

THE SCOPE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSEBy

Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS

Introduction, p. 450.The Protected Entities, p. 451.The Protected Rights, p. 451.The Purpose of the Clause, p. 451.The Characteristics of Proper Classification,p. 452.Discrimination in Favor of Certain Groups, p.453.Application of the Equal Protection Clause, p.456.

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§ 1. Introduction

Equal protection of the law means that no person or classof persons shall be denied the protective mantle of the lawwhich is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in likecircumstances in their life, liberty, and their property, andin the pursuit of happines. (Moore vs. Missouri, 159 U.S.673).

Equal protection requires that all persons be treatedalike under like circumstances or conditions both in theprivileges conferred and the liabilities imposed (Barbier vs.Connoly, 113 U.S. 27).

The 1973 Constitution states that no person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection ofthe laws. (Article IV, Section 1 (1), 1973 Constitution).

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The equal protection clause does not imply the sametreatment to all, that it applies merely to persons, things ortransactions similarly or identically situated; and that it,consequently, permits a classification of the object orsubject of the law, provided the classification is reasonableor based upon real or substantial distinctions germane tothe statutory object or purpose. (Central Bank vs. Cloribel,44 SCRA 507).

What is required under the equal protection of law is theuniform operation of legal norms so that all persons undersimilar circumstances would be accorded the sametreatment both in privileges conferred and the liabilitiesimposed. (Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420).

§ 2. The Protected Entities

All persons whether citizen or alien without regard to anydifference of race, color or nationality, are protected underthe guaranty. Private corporations are “persons” within themeaning of the guaranty and are entitled so far as theproperty is concerned, to the equal protection of the laws.(Smith, Bell & Company vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136).

§ 3. The Protected Rights

The equal protection secured under the Constitutionextends only to civil rights as distinguished from thosewhich are political or such as arise from the form ofgovernment and its mode of administration. (Ex parteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339).

§4. The Purpose Of The Clause

The equal protection clause was designed as a safeguardagainst acts of the state and not against the conduct of

(1)(2)(3)

(4)

private individuals or persons. It does not add anything tothe rights which one citizen has against another under theConstitution. The right of equal protection is a restraint onall three grand departments of government and on thesubordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof.(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).

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§ 5. The Characteristics Of Proper Classification

Problems on equal protection have to depend on thereasonableness of the classification made by the law. Aclassification made by the legislature to be reasonable musthave the following requisites:

It must rest on substantial distinctions;It must be germane to the purpose of the law;It must not be limited to existing conditions only;andIt must apply to all members of the same class.(People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12).

The established and recognized principle is thatclassification is not only unreasonable where it is based onsubstantial distinctions that make real differences, isgermane to the aim and purpose of the law; is not limitedto existing conditions, and it applies equally to all membersof the same class, under similar conditions. (Tan Ty vs.Land Tenure Administration, 35 SCRA 250).

The equal protection clause is not violated by areasonable classification based upon substantialdistinctions that apply not only to present conditions, butalso to future conditions which are substantially identicalto those of the present and the classification which isgermane to the purpose of the law applies equally to allthose who belong to the same class. (Felwa vs. Salas, 18SCRA 606).

The question of classification is primarily for thelegislature and it can never become a judicial question,

except for the purpose of determining in any givensituation whether legislative action is clearly unreasonable.The courts cannot require the legislature to specify itsreasons for classification, but they will always presumethat the legislature acted on the legitimate ground ofdistinction if any such ground exists. (6 R.C.L. 384).

In this regard, one case held that Act 1639 satisfies therequirements of a valid classification, one of which is thatthe classification under the law must rest on real orsubstantial distinction. The classification here between themembers of the non­Christian tribes and the members ofthe Christian tribes is

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not based upon accident or birth or parental but upon thedegree of civilization or culture. The term “non­Christiantribe” refers to geographical area and more directly tonatives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade ofcivilization usually living in tribal relationship apart fromsettled communities. The purpose of the prohibition in thiscase is unquestionably designed to insure peace and orderin and among non­Christian tribes. It has been the sadexperience of the past that the free use of highlyintoxicating liquors by the non­Christian tribes has oftenresulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering theefforts of the Government to raise their standards of lifeand civilization. In this case, the second requirement thatthe classification must be germane to the purpose of thelaw has also been fully satisfied in that here the purpose ofthe law is to insure peace and order in and among the non­Christian tribes. (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12).

In another case, where it was alleged that a lawconstituted class legislation because it was designed tofavor one private organization to the exclusion of others, itwas ruled that the argument is without merit. TheP.A.E.A.E. (Philippine Association of Embroidery andApparel Exporters) was not singled out by the law in orderto favor it above and over others, but rather because it isthe dominant organization in the field. Under the law noprivileges are accorded P.A.E.A.E. members which are notsimilarly given to non­members. Both are within the

coverage of the Act. It is a rule that legislation whichaffects with equal force all persons of the same class andnot those of another is not class legislation and does notinfringe the constitutional guarantee of equal protection ofthe laws. (Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel CentralBoard, 21 SCRA 336).

§ 6. Discrimination In Favor Of Certain Groups

In one case wherein a law was passed limiting coastwiseshipping to Filipino citizens, it was decided that Act 2761denying to owners of foreign vessels the right to registerthem in the coastwise trade was not a deprivation ofproperty without due process of law, nor a denial of theequal protection of the

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424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDThe Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

law. The restriction has for its object the encouragement ofPhilippine shipbuilding, the safeguarding of the countryfrom foreign elements, promotion of its prosperity andlimitation of the use of common property in the PhilippineIslands to its citizens. (Smith Bell and Company vs.Natividad, 40 Phil. 136).

With regard to discrimination in employment, there wasa case which involved Republic Act 1180 excluding aliensfrom the operation of the retail trade in the Philippines.Petitioner sought to have said law declared asunconstitutional because it denied equal protection toaliens. It was held that the law is a legitimate exercise ofpolice power, the exercise by the state of the authority toinsure its existence and security and the supreme welfareof its citizens. The equal protection clause of theConstitution is not violated. There is a reasonabledistinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of theregulation of the occupation. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101Phil. 1155). In this connection, it was likewise declaredthat public markets are public services or utilities andunder the Constitution the operation of public services arereserved to Filipino citizens or corporations or associations60 per centum of the capital of which belongs to Filipino

citizens. The guaranty of equal protection of laws has togive way to the specific provision of the Constitution whichreserves to Filipino citizens the operation of public servicesor utilities. Operation of public markets is a part of thefunctions of government. (Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, 83 Phil.242).

In another case, pursuant to the power vested in theRice and Corn Board by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3018(reproduction of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended),Resolution No. 10, series of 1960 was promulgatedproviding that “no person who is not a citizen of thePhilippines shall be employed in any capacity in anyFilipino owned establishment engaged in any of the lineswhose employment may be authorized by the President ofthe Philippines upon recommendation of the Rice and CornBoard.” Petitioners, alien employees of the Universal CornProducts, Inc., challenged the constitutionality of theresolution on the ground that it violated the provisions ondue process and equal protection of laws. The SupremeCourt decided that it is hard to see how the

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nationalization of employment can run counter to anyprovision of our Constitution considering that its aim is notexactly to deprive a citizen of a right that he may exerciseunder it but rather to promote, enhance and protect thosethat are expressly accorded to a citizen. The nationalizationof an economic measure when founded on grounds of publicpolicy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressiveor contrary to the Constitution because its aim is merely tofurther the material progress and welfare of the citizens ofthe country. In nationalizing employment in the rice andcorn industry, the right of choice of an employer is notimpaired but its sphere is merely limited to the citizens tothe exclusion of those of other nationalities. (UniversalCorn Products, Inc. vs. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA1048). This was another example of discrimination in favorof Filipino citizens.

With regard to discrimination for the promotion ofpublic interest, Section 4 of Act No. 44 forbade a person orfirm to compel an employee or laborer to work during

Sundays and legal holidays, unless he was paid anadditional sum of at least twenty five per centum of hisregular remuneration, but exempted public utilitiesperforming some public service such as supplying gas,electricity, power, or water or providing means oftransportation or communication from such prohibition.The law was attached on the ground of beingdiscriminatory since a public utility company can force itsemployee or laborer to work without being required to payadditional compensation. It was ruled that said section isnot a class legislation. The classification made betweenordinary firms and public utilities is based on differenceswhich are apparent and reasonable. To acquire publicutilities performing public service to pay additional orextra compensation to employees whom they have tocompel to work during Sundays and legal holidays wouldbe tantamount to penalizing them for performing publicservice during said days in compliance with therequirement of the law and public interest. (Manila ElectricCompany vs. Public Utilities Employers’ Association, 79Phil. 409). In regard to public interest also, Section 19 ofthe People’s Court Act suspended Article 125 of the RevisedPenal Code so as to allow government prosecutors to filethe corresponding information

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against political prisoners within a period not exceeding sixmonths from the time said prisoners were delivered to theCommonwealth authorities. This provision was attached asa denial of equal protection since it applied only to politicalprisoners. It was decided that there was no denial of equalprotection. The equal protection clause does not preventthe legislature from establishing classes of individuals orobjects upon which different rules shall operate so long asthe classification was prompted by the desire of thegovernment to give the government prosecutors sufficienttime to investigate and file the proper charges or todischarge those whom it may find innocent. In thisparticular case, there were about 6,000 political prisonersagainst whom the prosecutors had to file information.(Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372).

§ 7. Application Of The Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause was applied to varioussituations. Among others, it was applied to penal statutes,procedure, certain business, and the giving of certainbenefits. But the latest application of this clause is withregard to election laws.

This case subject of annotation is the example of thesituation wherein equal protection was applied to electionlaws. This case decided that the assertion that Section 4 ofBP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protectionis neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equalprotection of the laws is subject to rational classification. Ifthe groupings are based on reasonable and realdifferentiations, one class can be treated and regulateddifferently from another class. For purposes of publicservice, employees 65 years of age, have been validlyclassified differently from younger employees. Employeesattaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement,while those of younger ages are not so compulsorilyretirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, ormunicipal positions, to require that candidates should notbe more than 65 years of age at the time they assumeoffice, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be areasonable classification although, as the Solicitor Generalhas intimated,

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a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergenceof younger blood in our political elective echelons. On theother hand, it might be that persons more than 65 yearsold may also be good elective local officials. Coming now tothe case of retirees. Retirement from government servicemay or may not be a reasonable disqualification for electivelocal officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees fromgovernment service at ages, say below 65. It may neither bereasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65­year oldretiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65­year old

elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify himfrom running for the same office from which he had retired,as provided for in the challenged provision. The need fornew blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retireefor government work is present, and what is emphaticallysignificant is that the retired employee has alreadydeclared himself tired and unavailable for the samegovernment work, but, which, by virtue of a change ofmind, he would like to assume again. It is for this veryreason that inequality will neither result from theapplication of the challenged provision. Just as thatprovision does not deny equal protection, neither does itpermit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56[1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.(Dumlao et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. L52245,January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 423.)

With regard to penal statutes, in one case, the accusedwas found stealing coconuts in a plantation and wasprosecuted for qualified theft under Article 310 of theRevised Penal Code. The counsel for the accused attachedthe constitutionality of this article of the Revised PenalCode on the ground that it punishes the stealing ofcoconuts more heavily than the taking away of similarproduce such as rice and sugar. The Court declared thathere there is no denial of equal protection to the accused.In the matter of theft of coconuts the purpose of the heavierpenalty is to encourage and protect the development of thecoconut industry as one of the sources of our nationalecocomy. (People vs. Isinain, 85 Phil. 684).

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With regard to procedure, in a certain case, the accusedappellant attacked the validity of the People’s Court Act onthe ground of equal protection in that the politicaloffenders accused in the People’s Court have a limited rightto appeal while those who may be accused of the samecrime in the Court of First Instance have an absolute rightto appeal to the appellate courts, inasmuch as under Sec.13 of the People’s Court Act, Rules 42 and 43 of the Rulesof Court which deal with appeals from the Courts of First

Instance to the Supreme Court and appeals from the Courtof Appeals to the Supreme Court, respectively, are madeapplicable to the latter. It was held that there is here nodenial of equal protection. There is a rational basis for thedistinction between the two classes of offenders. Theemployment of two modes of appellate procedure in the twoclasses of cases are suitably adopted to the differences inthe composition between the courts from which the appealsare taken. The People’s Court is a collegiate court, whereasthe Court of First Instance is presided over by a singlejudge. Appeal is not a constitutional but a statutory right.The admitted fact that there is no discrimination amongappeals from the same court or class of courts saves theprovision objected to from being declared unconstitutional.(People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535).

With regard to the application of the clause to certainbusiness, a case involving the transportation business wasbrought to court. In said case, the Batangas TransportationCompany questioned the right of the Manila RailroadCompany to establish a line for motor vehicles for thetransportation of passengers between Manila and the townof Batangas without previously obtaining a certificate ofpublic convenience for the purpose. It was alleged that theestablishment of such line will constitute an invasion ofterritory over which there was a certificate of publicconvenience and this would result in increased competition.Batangas Transportation Company alleged that there wasa denial of equal protection. The Court held that here therewas no denial of equal protection since in the enactments ofa regulatory measure, the legislature may withoutoffending such constitutional provisions, make exceptionsin pursuance of a

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policy designed to promote the public interest. It is soexpressly provided in the law that the Public ServiceCommission shall not exercise any control or supervisionover the Manila Railroad Company so long as the sameshall be controlled by the Government of the PhilippineIslands, except with regard to its rates. The ManilaRailroad Company can, therefore, establish and operate

lines of motor vehicles for the transportation of passengersabove­mentioned without obtaining a certificate of publicconvenience from the Public Service Commission.(Batangas Transportation Company vs. Manila RailroadCompany, 64 Phil. 312).

With regard to the giving of government benefits, therewas a case involving Republic Act 3836, which grantedretirement benefits to Senators and Members of the Houseof Representatives but not to other elective officials such asgovernors of provinces and members of the provincialboards, and the elective officials of municipalities andchartered cities. This law was challenged as being contraryto the equal protection clause. The Court ruled that theclassification here is not reasonable. One reason is that allMembers of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are givenretirement benefits after serving twelve years, notnecessarily continuous, whereas, most government officersand employees are given retirement benefits after servingfor at least twenty years. This is discrimination.Furthermore, all government officers and employees aregiven only one retirement benefit irrespective of theirlength of service in the government, whereas, underRepublic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senatoror Member of the House of Representatives upon beingelected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirementbenefits or equivalent to six years salary. (Philconsa vs.Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479). With regard again to governmentbenefits, in another case, the petitioner, widow of a policesergeant, filed a death compensation claim under theprovisions of Republic Act 784, which providedcompensation for members of municipal police forces andfire departments who died or were disabled in line of duty.The claim was dismissed. The issue was does the denial ofthe application of Republic Act 784 to chartered citiesrender said law discriminatory. The Court said

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that the provisions of Republic Act 784 are extended tomunicipalities which is not true of chartered cities.Municipalities and chartered cities differ both with respectto their resources and the scope of their taxing power and

cannot, therefore, be considered equally situated as todemand their equal consideration at the hands of thecentral government. The law is not discriminatory. (Tibonvs. Auditor General, 96 Phil. 786).

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