ankersmit- commemoration and national identity
TRANSCRIPT
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eCommemorationandNational Identity
F. R. A N K E R SM I T
Groningen Universty
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Snce the publication of Nora'sUeux deMéoire somefifteen years ago
its has become a commonplacein corttemporaryculture: we live in an
age of commemorations. This should invite us to consider the question
of the significance of commemorations for our time. Should we see
commemoradons as attracdve and decorative social phenomena but without
any real import from an academc point of view? Or is there more about
commemorations than immediatelymeets theeye?More specifically, can, or
do theyreally add something to our understanding of thepast?Or should
weagreewithNorathat commemorations primarilyexpresssomething about
howwe relateto thepast,while not adding to our understanding of thepast
itself? Commemorationexpresses or exemplifies a feeling that wehave, or
are expected tohaveabout apastevent, and has, as such, its origins exclusivelyin ourselves and not in the past. Or, so it may seem. For this question
immediately raises a further one: namely the question whether a clear-cut
distinction can alwaysbemadebetween theissueof how werelateto, or feel
about thepast, on the one hand, and our understanding of it on the other.
Obviously, these feeelings about thepast will often be associations that we
havewith apastevent; and suchassociationsare notnecessarilyat odds with
ourunderstanding of thepastand may sometimes, evenimportantlycontribute
to it. For example, theassociationsthat survivers of the Holocausthavewith
this event maywell beworth the historian's attention,sincetheseassociations
could embodyor suggesta new and unexplored dimension to it. So it could
well be that commemoration not onlyshowsus how we feel about thepast,
but isalsoa deposit of hithertoneglected evidenceabout thepast itself. And
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F. R. A N K E R S M I T
there is no apriori reason to believe that theeventsof a remoter past shouldnecessarilybe excluded fromthis. So perhapscommemoration could in certain
casesbe a guide for how to transcend the limts of existing historical
understanding.
These, then, are some of the topics that I hope to investigate in this
essay
2. T H E T E R M ' C O M M E M O R A T I O N '
I n English the two words 'commemoration" and 'remembrance' can
both be used for our remembering the past. There is a slight difference in
meaning between the two terms: 'commemoration' is primarily related to
the act of remembering something, whereas 'remembrance'is more intimately
associatedwith the object, or content of what is remembered. Thanks to this
performative dimension (to use Austin's termnology) 'commemoration' ismore suggestive of a social and public event than 'remembrance'. In this
context it is of interest to note that French only knows the word
'commemoration' and has no equivalent of the word 'remembrance'. I f
language is areliable indication of the social practices of a communityof
languageusers,as has famously beenarguedbyPeterWinch1, it would follow
that for the French a commemoration is a more solemn and public event
than for the English. This difference between the two terms is furtherenhanced
by the fact that 'commemoration' is a remembering together, whereas'remembrance' primarilyis a private affair. This fact suggeststhat we should
doubt the commonsensical opinion that the contemporary memory cultus
shouldconflict with what weexpect fromhistory. I t has often been argued—
for example by Hobsbawm and by Megill2 — that memory is private and
uncertain, whereas history is public and, becauseof this, the repositoryof
truth. But the foregoing suggests already that things are more complicated
and thatsincememoryis notnecessarilyprivate it mght, in principie,shareinthe public revelation of truth. Unless, of course, one were to postulate a
necessaryconnection between memoryand falsity But the fact that memory
mayoftendeludeus, doesnot warrent the extrapolation that itahvaysdoesso.
Both the English and the French variants derive from the Ladn verb
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'commemorare', in which the emphasis is on the act of remembering.
'Commemorare' meansboth 'to recall to memory and 'to remnd somebody
of something', and inboth casesthe act of remembering and not its object is
at stake. 'Commemorare' and its English and French derivatesare therefore
halfway between memoryitself and its object or content, on the one hand,
and a remnding of, on the other, as in, for example, 'this building remnds
me of as cigarbox'. Here we mayalsodiscemthesemanticaffínity between
'commemorare' and its English and French derivateson the one hand and
the Latin word 'monumentum on the other. This Latin word is derivedfrom 'moneo' meaning 'ali that remnds somebody of something'. The
monumenttherefore is not itself theincorporationor expression of a memory,
but has a merelyintermediaryfunction. Wehavelearned toassociatea certain
memorywith a monument; but someother monument could fulfil this task
just as well, or may-beeven better. The monument is, in this way much like a
word or sign that also tiesa meaning to athing, but which is itself a wholly
arbitrarydevice for doing so.
'Commemoration' therefore presents us with a semanric tryptich. I n
the first placecommemoration maysuggest remembrance in thesensethat
somebody recallssomething to memory. I n thiscasethe subject of the act of
memoryand the person in whose mnd a memoryis evoked are identical.
A nd this even isnecessarilythecaseheresincemymemories aresuigenerisnot
identical with those of others persons, even if we recall ourselves thesame
events. Memories, like thoughts, are always tied to personsand do not float
in some im- or intra-personal limbo. I cannot recall your memories, for thesimplereason that your memories arenecessarilyyours, even if their content
doesnotdiffer in anyway fromthose ofmne. I n opposidon to this wehave
the 'remnding of' effected bythe monument;herethethingthateyokes the
memory— i.e. the monument — must be distinguished from the person or
persons in whoma memory has been evoked. A monument does not
remember itself something, but it maymakeusremember something. These
two opposed meaningsof 'remnding of' can be dramarized in the paradox
that ' I may remnd you of something or somebodywithout remnding you
of something or somebody. That is to say I can draw your attention to
something that you should remember, without evoking, as a person, any
special memories in you. Lastly, and in the third place, between 'recalling to
T E X T O S D EHISTÓRIA ,
vo. 10,n- 1/2,2002 ' " ' "TT)
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F. R. ANKERSMIT
memory and 'remnding of' lies'commemorare' (and their English and French
derivarives) combiningelementsof both. And this is at it ought to be. For
what we expect of a commemoradon is that itmakesus recall byremnding
us of something. There is, first, thephaseof remnding and onlythen, will
memories present themselves to us. Without remnders, memories will not
be 'acrivated', so to say And we can onlyadmre thegeniusof languagebyso
appropriatelycombiningthesetwo things in thenotion of'commemoration'.
Next, German is acaseapart. Let us, for a moment playHeidegger's
gameand try to connect somephilosophical insights to the etymologicalpeculiaridesof the German language.There is, in German, in the first place
the neutral term'Erinnerung' and, next to it, the more specific nodons of
'das Andenken' and of 'das G edáchtnis'. I t must strike us that theseGerman
words, unlike their English and French equivalents, associate memory and
monument with 'denken', hencewith hought and are, moreover, remarkably
free from associadons with pastness. Furthermore, it lacks the public and
performative dimension we found to be so clearly present in
'commemoradon' or 'commemoradon'. Andenken' and 'G edáchtnis' seemrather to belong to the private sphereof the human individual. Apparendy,
when commemorating something in Germany, one primarily does so
individually rather than collectively. Here the Germans show themselves,
onceagain, to be 'das berühmte Volk der Innerlichkeit', to quote Nietzsche.
This may suggest, next, that the nationalist collectivism in recent German
historyhas in ali likelihoodbeena forced and extremst attempt to overcome
a characterisdc of the German mnd rather than an expression of thischaracterisdc. And this mght explain why this German collecdvism could
takeon such nastyfeatures. For people are alwaysat their worst, when they
do not coincidewith themselves.
3. R E T H T N K I N G AN D RELTVING
Commemoration brings us back to thepast and has the pretensiòn to
momentarilyachieveakind of communionwith thepast. I t is suggestiveof
aclosenessto thepastand of adirectnessin our relationship to it that will be
absent in our more normal interaction with our collective past. I f we
commemorate some tragic past of our colelctive past during a solemn
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ceremonywe are for amoment close to those who fell for thefreedomof
our nation, or to those who were theinnocent victíms of the crimes of the
past. Andthis raises theobviousquestion towhat extent the past is actually
're-lived'at such occasions.
I f so, our experience of such ceremonies would come close to
Collingwood's well-known argument in his The dea of hstoryabout the
epistemological conditions of historical knowledge.C~!lingwood required
of thehistorian 'a re-enactment of the past in his own mnd'. For if the
historianwishes to explain the actions of individual statesmen or generais, heshould, accordingtoCollingwood, re-live the past in exactly thesameway as
itsrelevantaspectspresented themselves to thehistorical agent. I nthissense
thedistance separating thehistorian fromhisobject should temporarily be
undoneby thehistorian.
However, when wecommemoratesomething fromthe past, there can
be no question of a 're-enactment of the past' in theCollingwoodian sense;
for the past maywell be the occasion of, or theobject of commemorationbut noeffort is made todimnish, let alone to destroy the distance between
thepresent and therelivedpast.O n thecontrary,commemorationonlymakes
senseon thebasisof the distance of fifty, onehundred , twohundredyears
etc. that separateus from thecommemorated past. We commemorate the
past precisely because of the distance between it and the present.
Commemorationhas adifferent aisondêreandrelatesto adifferent experience
of the past, thanwhat is suggested by thenotion of 'relivingthe past'.
This does not exclude that a reliving of the past may be part of thecommemoration of the past. Commemorations of certain events of the
SecondWorld War, such as D-Day, theHolocaust, the resistance against the
Nazi's or of the Liberation mayinvite in people who participated in these
events a re-living of these events. And for them the commemorated past
maythen comequiteclose again. But even these people will not actually
relive the past in theCollingwoodian sense. For thequite real and intense
feelings that theywill then havewith regard to these events will be feelingsaboutthese events, feelings that they haveaboutthepast fromthe perspective
of the present, but certainly not a reproduction of the feelings they had
during these events themselves. They will then experience feelings about
feelings, though I should immediately add that feelings about feelings may
sometimes be no lessintense than the original feelings occasioningthem.
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F . R. ANKERSMIT
Remorse is a good example: remorsemay start with the feeling that we didsomething wrong in the post, but then this feeling of regretmaystart tohave
a life of its own and develop into a feeling about this inirial feeling of regret.
And as such it maybegin to domnate our frame of mnd that is whollyout
of propordonwith the event itself.
And so it is with history. For in historyit may also happen that these
'secondary feelingsbecomemore intensethan the 'primary ones.A striking
exampleis the first commemoradon of the Fali of the Bastille inJuly1790—
I shall return lateron to later nineteenth century commemorations of July
14th. Justly famous is Michelet's hyperbolic account of this first
commemoradon in hisHistorede IaRéolution Françase Preciselybecauseof
Michelet's intendon to identifyhimself completelywith this commemoration
and to present in his account a true 'résurrection' of the event - precisely
becauseof this can his account bring us closest to theenthusiasmthat must
haveinspired this first commemoration. 'Gleichesdurch Gleiches', to quote
Nietzsche. What must strike us in Michelet's account is how commemorationand reliving are inextricably bound up in this caseand how this made this
first commemorationof July14th 1789 intoaneventparadoxically surpassing
the commemorated event itself in symbolic meaning and significance. Michelet
himself is well awareof this and this may explain why, in his opinion, the
essenceof the French Revolution could announceitself more clearlyin this
first commemoration of july14th than in anyother event of the period. The
counter-intuitive fact suggestedbyMichelet is, therefore, that theessenceof
the Revolution is to be found in a commemoration, and, even more so, inone that took placewhen the Revolution still had to get under its way This
commemoration, spontaneous, emanating fromthe most vividand authentic
awarenessof the commemorated eventis trulyherearésurrection à la Michelet
of thepast in a waythat history— letalonehistorical wridng— is rarely, if ever
capable of producing. The commemoration here becomes more real and
more intense than what is commemorated and the re-lived past becomes
moreactual than thepast itself.
'Un sentiment inoui de paix, de concorde, avaitpénétré les ames'5, thus
Michelet when wridng about this commemoration: ali ofFrance, yes even ali
of Europe had itseyesturned toParison this july14th 1790 in theawareness
that the revolutionaryélan, and the unityand fraternizadon of the French on
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that day announced thebirth of a new epoch in the historyof mankind:
'Cettefoi, cettecandeur,cet immenseélan de concorde, au bout d'unsiècle de
disputes,ce fut pour toutesles nations 1'objetd'un grand étonnement comme
un prodigieux rêve'6.
I n this way the 'Fête de laFédération', as this first commemoradon of
the Fali of theBastillewas to be known, becameso much the realizadonof
the ideal of nadonal unitythat Michelet considered to-be theessenceof theFrench Revoludon, that the commemorated event itself lost its logical priority
to its commemoration. By aparadoxical inversion it now looked as if july
14th 1789, the Fali of the Bastille itself, acquired the character of a
commemoradon, of a commemorative anticipation of what would take
placeonlyoneyear later in the 'Fête de Fédération'. CharlesPéguy, who was
in his socialist phaseno lessa mythologist of the French Revoludon than
Michelet had been, expressed this inversion as follows :
'laprisede la Bastille, dit l'histoire, ce fut proprement unefête, ce fut lapremièrecélébration, lapremièrecommemoration at pouransidire le premeranniversarede laprisede la Bastille. Ou enfin lezeroième anniversare.Onsesttrompé,ditl'histoire. On a vudansunsens,il falatvoirdans1'autre.On avu. Cen'estpas
lafêtede laFédération qui fut lapremièrecommemoration, le premeranniversarede laprisede la Batille. Oest laprisede laBastillequi fut lapremière fête de laFédération, uneFédération avantla lettre'7.
Indeed, the perspective has been reversed and july 14th 1789 now
became birthday 'number zero' of itself or, rather, the 'mnus first'
commemoration of the"Fête deFédération'. And in this waythe simulacrum
of the relived commemoradon could cometo outshine even an event such
as the Fali of the Bastille.
4. T H E R E L I G I O U S ORIG INS O F C O M M E M O R A T I O N
There is one more element in Michelet's account of this first
commemoration of july14th thatwill demandour attendon. Lionel Gossman
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has emphasized that for Michelet the French Revolution has been an event ofan almost religious significance. And it is undoubtedlytrue that Michelet,
despitehis hatred of religion as the ideological support of polidcal repression,
deliberately usesa religious vocabulary in his exposidon of the 'Fête de
Fédération'. HecomparesFrance to the Infant Christ on thealtar, mracles
occur such as octogenarian sailors who suddenly recuperate the energyof
their youth and the no lessamazing mracle of Kant whoabandonshis daily
rhythm in order tohearthelatestnewsfrom France— and ali this is expounded
to thereader in twochaptersentided 'De la religion nouvelle'. I n this mood
of religious exaltation that Michelet ascribed to the French in 1790, a higher
and trans- tempotal realityannounces itself such as the one promsed to the
believer in the true creed. 'Le temps a péri, 1espaceapéri, ces deux conditions
matcrielles auxquelles la vie est soumse' - and if Micheletarguesherefor the
abrogation of the dimension of time, this may lend extra force to this
inversion of the commemorated past and its commemoration that we
observed a moment ago. The concepts 'before' and 'after' have lost theirmeaning and can no longer determne the relationship between thepast and
its commemoration.
Thisreligious dimension Michelet projects on commemorationwill lead
us to Freud's speculationsabout what one maywell see as thearchetypeof ali
commemoration: namelyFreud's account of the origins of societyas depicted
in his Totemund Tabu. According to Freud societycarneinto being after the
slayng of the primeval father byhis sons who wished to put an end his
sexual domnion over the femalesof the tribe. Ali that we see as essendal to
society conscience,social organization and social cohesion, the internalization
of social norms, sexual repression, religion, the incest taboo etc. was not
implausibly related byFreud to the drama of this murder of the primeval
father. And, as Freudgoeson to say
'Die Totemmahlzeit, vielleicht das erste Fest der Menschheit, wàre die
Wiederholungund die Gedenkfeer dieserG edenkwürdigen, verbrecherischenTat, mit welcher sovie ein Anfang nahm diesoziaeOrganisation, die sittliche
E inschrànkungen und die Religion'9
Hence, in this first commemoration in the historyof mankind, and that
would rituallybe re-enacted ad infinitumnothing lessis celebrated than the
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birth of society itself. Commemoration is thus, right from the beginning,inextricably tied up with taboo, ethics, the internalization of social norms,
hencewith thestrongestand most important foundations of ali society.So ali
the elements that we may hope to discover in the phenomenon of
commemoradon can be retraced byestablishing their placeand funcdon in
Freud'sstoryabout the origins of society.And this isalsowherewe can find
out about the mutual relationships between theseelements.Thus, as issuggested
byFreud's myth, this repertory of elements includes the ceremony of the
commemoration, the endlessly repeated rituais, the effort to let the
commemoration be the equivalent of the commemorated event and the
foundationalist potential of the commemoration in the double senseof
founding societyand of sacralizing its origins. I n sum, within Freud's
conception the commemoration is most intimatelybound up with religion
and we should be profoundlyaware of this in order to properlygrasp the
psychological and the sociological properties of the phenomenon of
commemoration.
Pierre Nora himself has also recognized this religious dimension of
commemoration as wil l be obvious from his characteristic of
commemorations as 'des sacralités passagères dans une société qui se
désacralise" 0. And sactality and religion will not have lost their hold of
commemoradon in asocietylike ours that still has so many remniscencesof
its Christian past. HenceJacquesLe Gof f : Tenseigement Chrétien est donc
mémoireet le culteChrétien est commemoration'11
. The Christian backgroundof our civilization not onlycontributed to our love of commemoration, but
has also confirmed its religious dimensions.
5. C O M M E M O R A T I O N , R E P E T I T I O N AND DECONTEXTU AL IZ AT ION
The close relationship observed by Freud between commemoration
on the one hand and ritua repetition is amplyconfirmed bythe organizarion
of theEcclesiastical Year.TheEcclesiastical Year is,amongstother things, the
yearlyrepeatedseriesof commemorations of the crucial eventsof thegospel
as told to thebelievers. Eachyear Christ isborn anewand eachyear Hedies
againon thecrossfor the remssion of our sins.Andeach time that such an
event is commemorated the suggestion reallyis that, in a certain sense, the
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commemorated events happen again. But of importance in the presentcontext is the fact that in this recurring commemoration historical reality is
robbed of its original cohesion and subjected, instead to the ritual and the
schematism of the commemoration. To return to the present example, the
cohesion of Christ's life, the way He lived it, is abandoned for the fixed
schematismof the Ecclesiastical Year. The major eventsof hislife,as recounted
in the gospel, are detached from their original context, their chronological
order is abandoned now that to each of themis assigned a fixed placeand
datein the Ecclesiastical Year.
And preciselyhereeachcommemoration, however sublime or humble,
shows itself to be the heir of the religious commemoration — its primeval
prototype. For just as with these major events of the gospel, so does
commemotation ordinarilyintroduce a schematism that is alien to what is
commemorated and to thepast itself. Crucial isherethe recognition that the
commemoration always complies with the compulsion of round numbers.
For example, Mozart's death was commemorated not in 1985, or in 1995but in 1991 when his death was exacdytwo hundredyearsago. And probably
onewill decideto commemorate his death again in 2041 or in 2091, but not
in somearbitrarilychosenyearsomewhere in between. Hence, the relationship
between the commemorated event and its commemoradon (and between
commemoradons mutually) is not determned byanylogic or aspect of the
historical processitself, but exclusivelybyour preference for the convenience
of roundyearsand for the logic of lustrums. And this has its grounds in the
contingent fact that wehave five fingers onboth our handsand— obviously- íis fact has nothing to do with history in general nor with the
commemorated event itself.
The direct occasion for commemoradon therefore is a-historical and
exemplifies a double de-contextualizadon. This will be clear if we realize
ourselves that in commemoration the crucial axis is the axis between the
commemorated event, on the one hand, and us who commemorate, on the
other.And thisaxiscutsrightacrossali contextualizations that historywoulddemand us to respect. For in the first placethe commemorated event is now
taken out of its own historical context and considered exclusively in terms
of its relationship to us. I n the second placewealsode-contextualize ourselves
with this same movement insofar as our historical present is temporarily
narrowed down to a fixation on the commemorated event. And in both
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casesthe brutalityof this double de-contexnaalization is symbolized bythesacrifice of therichnessof historical context itself to the attracrions of round
numbers.
But this is onlyhalf of the story. The human mnd is associative and
feesan irresisribleneedof contextualization.Afguablynothingis more unnatural
to us anddemandsagreater intellectual exertion than theeffort not torelate
something to somethingelse— we hardlyever succeed in doing this and our
invincible desire of contextualizadon will almost always gain the victory.
Probably this is part of the explanadon of whymathemadcs is so difficult
for most people; for mathematics requires of us an effort of de-
contexualization by means of the most rigorous abstraction and that
completely defies our natural propensity to contextualizadon. I n this way
mathematics is a discipline which is at odds with what one mght call 'the
logic of our mnd'. I f, then, we combine this with the de-contextualization
effected bycommemoration that wediscusseda moment ago, this mayfurther
contribute to our understanding of the nature of commemoradon.Perhapsthis canbestbeexpressedbymeansof thefollowingmetaphor.
Compare our memoryto aslate.Ordinarilythisslateiswrittenali over already
and itwill most often bedifficult to find an open and still inoccupiedplace
forwridngdown our newexperiences.We shall thenhaveto write the memory
of thesenewexperiencesover somethingelsethat was alreadywritten down
somewhere on theslate— hencethe complexityand thechãos of our memory.
And where italsodiffers so conspicuously fromthe memories of our PCs
where we havewell-defined maps for ali our old and new documents. De-
contextualizadon can, in this metaphor, best be compared to our wiping
clean of a litde corner on theslate. Becauseof this theexperienceswe may
have, just after havingcreated some cleancorner on theslate,will preferably
bewrittendown there. Wehavemadetheresomeemptyspace,after ali. And
this will produce a condngent, but,nevertheless quite intimate and almost
indestructible relationship between what is commemorated and thekindof
experiences we contingently happen to have when commemoratingsomething. I n short, it is part of the nature of commemoration to tie in this
way'macro-historical'eventsof the historical and polidcal past to the 'mcro-
events' of our personal life and that happened to occur when we were
commemorating something. I f, then, we conceive of commemoration as a
formof collective memory, wewill haveevery reason to agreewith David
Lowenthal when he writes that 'memory converts public events into
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F. R. A N K E R S M I T
idiosyncratic personal experiences"2
.Something simlar can be observed for statues and monuments — no
lessprototypkal of Nora's ieux deméoire than the commemoration. Takea
statue. I t ordinarilystandssomewhereright in the mddle of thebusdeof a
largecitywhereabsolutelynothing remnds us of the historical personality
who is honored bythe statue. This contextlessness of the statuemay thus
bringabout that the public, insofar as it isawareat ali of thepresenceof the
statue,will be inclined tosubsumethestatuein the context of its daily roudne
without there being anything in thestatuteitself, or in the collective memoryit incorporates in stone or in bronze, that could effectively resist this. The
statueis akindof protuberance of thepast in thepresentandwherethepast
and thepresent 'meet', while having turned there back to each other, so to
speak. In this sensethestatueis thehelplessvictimof ali that we can project
on it with impunity. As Diderot recognized already, byits imperturbable
contexdessnessthestatueis an object that meeklyand passively adapts itself
to even our most capricious desires of contextualization. 'Diderot himself
hadgreat reverencefor statues', thus Banville:
'he thought of themas livingsomehow; strange, solitarybengs, exemplaryaoof, closedon themsevesand at thesametime yearning in their mute andheplesswaytostepdown in ourworld, to laugh orweep,knowhappinessandpain, to be mortal, like us. "Suchbeautiful statues",he wrote in a letter to hismstressSophieVolland, "hidden in the remotest spotsand distant fromoneanother, statueswhich cal to me, that I seekout and encounter. Thatarrestme
andwithwhich I havelong conversations'13.
Preciselythisreadinessto start playng a role in ourconversationsand to
be carried along in our preoccupations is a fact that can be ruthlessly exploited
for the 'invention of tradirion' and for the construction and enhancementof
nadonal identity. I mention an example. When the celebration of July14th
was introduced in France in 1880, the government decided that the
schoolvacationsshouldalsobegin at that verysamedate. I t iseasyto imaginethat in this way akind of conflation was effected of the prospect of being
ftee for two months fromhomework and from stuffyclass-rooms, on the
one hand, and the freedomthat hadbeenpromsed bythe Revoludon and in
terms of which theThird Republic wished to legitimate itself on the other.
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Here wewill find the function that statuesand commemorations mayhavefor the constitution of a national identityor for the legitimzation of a certain
ideology, politics or of a specific regime — hence for thekind of thing that
has so intenselybeen discussed sincethe publication of Nora'sstudieson the
'lieux de mémoire'1 4.
However, the de-contextualization by the compulsion of the round
numbers observed a moment ago is not free fromits ironies. Indeed, human
memory is constituted bycontextualization and determned bya complex
and ever-changing web of associations. The anomymous author of the Ad
Herennium,the treatisethat determned Western thought about memoryfor
almost two thousand years,was verymuch awareof this fundamental aspect
of memoryand it was herethat he hoped to find theanswer to the question
of how to optimze thecapacitiesof our memory. 'Constat igitur artificiosa
memóriaex locis et imaginibus' (artificial memoryis constructed outof places
and images)— thus the author of theAd Herenniumb. That is to say memory
has its best and most reliable support in the association of what is to beremembered with certain spadal representations, places and other images
alreadypresent in our mnd. Hence, bythe way this nodon of the 'lieu de
mémoire'. We shouldrealize,then, that association is the most egalitarian and
and-elirist facultyof our mnd. UnlikeReason, association doesnot connect
what has equal rank; on the contrary, association has a natural affinitywith the
méaliance Reason is aristocratic and class-conscious, whereas association is
democratic and the leveller par excelllence of ali our mental faculties.
Association has no respect for what we respect most and itdoesnothesitate
toconnect the sublime and the most augustwith the banal and thetrivial.I n
his associations even the most narrow-mnded and boring neurodc may be
no lessfascinating than thegreatestartist or poet.
A n illustrative example of this democracyof association and, hence,of
memoryis theassassinationof Kennedyin november 1963, and the question
often askedin this connection 'do you still remember where youwerewhen
youheard about theassassinationof Kennedy?' The unintendedconsequenceof this contemporary mnemotechnical link between memory and place is
thatashift is effected fromthe object or content of memoryto theplacethat
weassociatewith the memoryin question. We tend to become more intrigued
bythe fact that wewereat that time at a specific placethan bythe remembered
fact itself. Put differendy, the support of the recollection maythen become
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F . R. A N K E R S M I T
stronger than the remembered fact itself. And something simlar will havetaken placewith those nineteenth century French schoolchildren to whom
eachyear their libertywas restored forseveral months onjuly14th. Certainly
thiswill havecontributed to their sympathies for the Great Revoludon and
for the Third Republic so emphatically presenting itself as the heir of july
14th 1789. Pavlov would not have organized it differendy. But the effect
aimed at by the regime produced a confladon of contexts — that of the
Ftench revolution and that of freedomfromschool for two months and the
prospect of a vacation on thebeachof Deauville or at theBassinof Arcachon.However, this confladon of contexts could just as well work in the wrong
way And in such acasethe unintended result will be that theassociationof
july 14th with the prospect of a vacation will trivialize the Revolution and
revolutionaryideology, insteadof enhancing and cultivatingit. The prospect
of a vacation then no longer contributes to the Revolution's prestige, but
reducesit to the homelylevei of the school-vacadon. Just as in the Kennedy
examplethe historical sublime is then infected byeverydaylifeinsteadof the
reverse— and it is impossible to predict whether association will lead up to
the sublime or downwards to the world of everyday life.
Selfevidendy this mechanism occluding the commemorated event behind
associations that are irrelevant for the commemorated event, may also be
effective on amacro-scale. Once again an example. The Eiffel Tower was
constructed in 1889 at the occasion of theWorldExpositionthat was organized
that year inParis in order to celebratethe one hundredthanniversaryof the
French Revolution. So initiallythe ideawas to anchor the memory of theFrench Revolution as deep as possible in the French mnd by such an
exttaordinary structure as the Eiffel Tower. However, now, more than one
hundred years later, few people still know what originallywas the occasion
for the building the tower. And in this way the extraordinary height of the
tower is a striking metaphor of the extent to which the the reinforcement of
a collective memory may stand supreme above the commemorated past
itself.
Thisdialecticsof memorywas alreadyrecognized at the time, asbecomes
clear from the fact that was aware of the dilemma of 'commémorer ou
célébrer', as Pascal Ory so succincdy put it1 6. For apart of the need to
commemorate the French Revolution, there alsoexisted, what Oryrefers to
as 'un volontarisme célébratif and which made one see in the
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commemoration of the Revolution littlemore thanawelcome occasion forcelebrating the triumphs of nineteenth centuryscienceand technology. I n this
way onewould celebrate thenineteenth century rather than theFrench
Revoludon— an objection that was contested atthe dmewith the somewhat
hypocritical argument that ainineteenth century sciendfic progresshad its
roots in theFrench Revolution17.Thequestion now arose how these two
elements hadbest bebalanced. And though onesincerelytried tofind the
justemlieubetween 'commemoration' and 'célébration', itcan not be denied
that in 1889 afust step hadbeen made into thedirecdon of acompletecontemporanizationofthis festivity. In thiswaythe commemorationof the
Revolution degenerated into litde more than awelcome occasion for a day
off, some collective fun and theenticing prospect ofending this day in
somebody esesbed. July14th now lost aicapacityofbreathingsome new
and ideological life into the memoryof an important historical event suchas
the French Revolution. 'Lerituel devenu routinier s'accomplit chaqueannée
dansuneambiancetouristique qui parait aprioridépourvue depuis longtempsdéjàdetoutcaractèrepartisan etmlitant'18.Thus ChristianAmalvi in his history
of the commemoration of July14th.
6. C O M M E M O R AT I O N AN D T H E WR I T I N G O F H I ST O R Y
I n thisphaseof myargument itmaybehelpful to disdnguish between
two kinds ofcommemoration. Compare thecommemoration of july14th,
asdiscussed amoment ago,with, for example, thecommemorationof the
discovery of America in 1994, or with the two hundredth anniversary of the
publicationofAdamSmtiVsWealtho Nationsin 1976. I n commemorations
such asthose ofjuly14th thefeeling ofsolidaritywith some conspicuous
event in the national pastgradually fades away;and sometimes each attempt
is even abandoned tocall attention to thecommemorated event. This is
different with theother type ofcommemoradon; forhere the aimis torescuesomething fromoblivion. Hereai thespotlightsarefocussed on the
commemorated event. Thedifference between the twokinds of
commemoradon can bestbeexpressed in terms of thenotionof 'collective
memory. Inbothcasescollective memoryis central. Butwhereasthekindof
commemorationasexemplified bythe festivities of July14thisnourished by
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F . R. A N K E R S M I T
what collective memorywe still have of July 14th 1789, the other kind of
commemoradon tries to add a new itemto collecdve memory— for example,
byattempting to show that the writings byAdamSmthhavemost importandy
contributed to the birth of the modern world and that we therefore have
every reason to honour thisgreat man at the occasion of the two hundredth
anniversary of the publication of hismagnumopusin 1776. This is also where
such a commemoration differs from, for "example, a conference on Adam
Smth. Theorganizersof such a conference maybe no lessconvinced of the
importance Smth's intellectual legacy— nevertheless, theyapparendy do notendeavor to include AdamSmth in our collecdve memory. Their interest is
exclusivelyhistorical.
But we may now ask ourselves, what is fot ali pracrical purposes the
difference between a commemoration of AdamSmth in 1976, on the one
hand, and a conference atsomeother rime devoted to hiswork and influence
on the other? Supposethat wehavetwo collections of papersofwhich one
was written for commemoradon of AdamSmth in 1976 whereasthe other
contains thepapersof a conference that took place, let'ssay in1993?Apart
from the title pageand the introduction there maywell be no appreciable
difference. Ofcourseone mghtargue1976 will haveproduced more books
and collections on Smth than theyear 1993, so the difference mght well be
the difference between existenceand non-existence. And this is obviouslyno
small difference. But thisdoesnot yet answer the question in what wayboth
collections of papersmaybe expected to differ.
I n order todealwith this question itwill behelpful, onceagain, to recallthenotionof collective memory. We owe this notion to Maurice Halbwachs
who developed in the interbelluma theoryon collective memorythat still is
thepoint of departure of most reflections on memoryand commemoration.
For Halbwachs eachmemoryessentiallyis a collective memoryand there are
no individual memories in the strictsenseof theword. His argument for this
surprising claimis that wealwaysmstakenlyinfer the non-collectivecharacter
of memoryfromits complexity.Sincememoryis so tremendously complex,
we tend to believe that the abstractumof the social collectivitycannot be thesubject and content of memory— or, at least, onlyin a derivative sense9.
Obviously, this is not a veryconvincing argument. For in thefirst place,why
shouldthere be a paralellismbetween the dichotomyof the collectivityversus
the individual on the one hand and the dichotomyof simplicityversus
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complexityon the other? Who would wish to contest that personal memories
can sometimes be quite simple, whereas collective memories may well be
quite complex? And, secondly even if weassumethat there should be such
a thing as collective memory, it does not follow that there could beonly
collective memory. Why shouldn't we have botbindividual and collective
memories?0
But if we elimnate this extremsm fromHalbwach's conceptions, we
will haveat our disposal this most fruitful notionof collective memory. Fruitful
in thisnotion isespeciallythe insight that thescopeof the notionsof memoryand of recollection should not be restricted to individual memoryand that
we should attribute a memoryto collecdvides, such as nations, social groups
or professional groups as well. We shouldrealize ourselvesthat memoryand
recollection often are social conventions, sometimes even intentionally
produced - as in Hobsbawms 'invention of tradition' - bythe collectivities
thatwe are part of. And that implies the no lesssurprising and fruitful insight
that each individual — as the representative of a certain group— mayrecall or
remember in the proper senseof theword apast that antedaring his or her
birth. Nobody will dispute that we can recall or remember statements or
historical narratives about a distant past, but we would normallyrestrict the
possibilityof actually recallingor remembering the past to the events that we
havewitnessed ourselvesduring our lives. You mayremember that the Bastille
fell onJuly14th 1789, but you cannot remember the event tsef. There is a
subtle, but nevertheless crucial difference between 'remembering' and
'remembering that'.But in agreement with the logic of his notion of collective memory
Halbwachs extendsthe domain ofeventsthat we effecdvely can 'remember'
beyond our birth. He gives as an example of how he himself still had a
'collecdve memory' of the atmosphere of the late Romanticismof half a
century before his birth21. Collective memory leads its own life, it diesoff,
renewsitself anddevelops in an indefinable limbo between pastand present.
Andwhere it isstill alive, thepastwill still bewith us; a direct and immediatecontact with thepast still is open to us. Here we may find at leastpart of the
explanation of the intense nostalgic feelings for a sometimes quite remote
partof thepastthat we mayfind in the effusions ofsomemajor representatives
of theWest'scultural tradition. One maythinkhereof Petrarca'sorHólderlin's
nostalgia for, respectively, Roman and Greek Antiquity, of that of Viollet-le
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F . R. A N K E R S M I T
Duc for the MiddleAges or that of Spengler for the second half of theeighteenth century2. And in ali thesecaseswe have to do with a nostalgic
remembrance of apast that one cannot have lived through personally. The
nostalgic past is not yet cut off fromus and fromthepresentand maypersist
in thekind of individuais that havea specific sensitivity for it. Indeed, it is a
remembrance of the past that we should primarilyattribute to individuais
and not to the collectivities that Halbwachs had inmnd himself; thegênesis
of this kind of remembrance of thepast takesplaceon the linesof fracture
between certain collecdve traditions and of how the historical awarenessoftheseindividuais articulated itself. Though, indeed, in this waythis individual
remembrance can onlycomeintobeingagainstthe background of a collecdve
cultural or historical past that is, in principie,sharedbymany.
O f importance now is how Halbwachs distinguishesbetween collecdve
memoryand the wridng of history. We mayagreewith Lowenthal when he
writes that our first intuition will be that memory is 'inescapableandprima
fade indubitable',whereashistorical wridng is 'contingent' and gropinglytries
to find its way around in the complexides of thepast23. But as we know
sinceNietzsche and Freud, memoryis, aboveali, what we want and wish to
remember. Memoryis not 'objecdve' — and therefore inneedof correcdon
byhistorical writing. I n continuationwith this Halbwachs seessome crucial
differences between memory-.nd historical wridng. Firstly, historical wridng
periodizes thepast in more or lessclosed temporal wholes, whereasmemory
knows of no such clear demarcations. Second, historical writing strives for
clarityand synthesis,whereasmemoryis as multiple as there are social groups
entertaining a specific relationship to thepast24.Norafollowsherein Halbwach's
steps when claimng a straightforwardly antithetic relationship between
collective memoryand thewriting of history. Though this may not be the
purpose of the wridng of history, its effect is, nevertheless, according to
Nora, to correct memory as deceitful and fraudulent — and as such it is a
'délégitimation dupassevécu'2 5.
But this distinction between memoryand historicalwritinggoesdeeper
than theseobservadonsat first sight seemto suggest. For we should recallnow that (collective) memoryshould be related not to knowledge about the
past but to the past itself: for as we saw a moment ago we should stricdy
distinguish between 1) knowledge of the past and 2) the remembrance of
the past. And the remembrance of the past is not merely an insecure and
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personalized form of pseudo-knowledge, that weshould always doubt
because of itsuncertain foundations —thedifference is, rather, that in
remembrance thepast itself persists in usand, therefore, still ispresent in
ourselves. So, in thesamewaythat we cannot say of thepast itself that itis
trueorfalse— for the terms 'true' and 'false' areonlyapplicable to what we
sayorwriteabout thepast - so it iswith memory. I t maywell bethat our
memorymaymakeus saytrue or falsethings about tii_ past,butwhatvte say
on thebasisofmemoryshouldbedisdnguished frommemory tsef.And the
crucial distincdon is,once again, that memorybelongs to theworld, morespecifically to theworld of he past, whereas speaking andwriting, more
speciftcally historical wridng,givesusknowedgeabout theworld. I t therefore
is acategorymstake tocriticize memory for itsbeing unreliable — for this
cridcismappliesto theworld (of thepast) criteria that can onlymeaningfully
be used forknowedgeof theworld. I nthis way we canadmre the
appropriateness of Nora's observation that historical writing achieves a
'délégitimadon dupassevécu'. There is anintrinsicoppositionbetween history,
on the one hand, and memoryor 'lepassevécu', on the other. But we should
not interpret this claimasexpressingthe victoryof sound historical knowledge
over thevagariesof memory. The claimexpresses,rather, theshift fromwhat
we have knowledge of — indeed, 'lepassevécu' — to knowledge.
Here, then, may wef ind thedifference between memoryand
commemoradon on the onehand andhistorical writing on theother - or
between acollection of essayson AdamSmth published in1976 andone
thatis published in 1993. The aimof the 1993-collection simplyis to contribute
toour knowledge and understanding of Smth's writings; the 1776-collecdon
undoubtedlyhasthis sameaim, but, primarily, also toadd anew dimension
to the thepast itself. A pasthascome into being that isricher than the one
that we had before: wenow carry alongwith us inthepresent the memory
of AdamSmth and his Wealthof Nations just aswe carryalong the memory
of the historyofour nationor ofWorld War I I . Historicalwritingaddsto
our knowledge of thepast,whereascommemorationenlargesthepast itself.I t should berecognized, however, that inpractice aclear and well-defined
dividing line between thetwo cannot bedrawn. The 1993-collection will
inevitablyhaveacommemorative dimension to itaswell,whereasthe 1776-
collectionwill alsoattempt to provide uswithnew insights in Smth's writings.
A l i historical writing is, to acertain extent, commemorative; and ali
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F . R. A N K E R S M I T
commemorationis, to a certain extent historicalwriting.But this is no argument
against the distinction nor against thenecessityof making it. For as Ernest
Nagel put it long ago, it maywell be that we cannot pinpoint with absolute
precision where our neckendsand our shoulder begins, but this is no argument
against the meaningfulness of thedistinction. I t is one of our most fallacious
and intellectuallyparalyzing beliefs that distinctions not permtting of clear
dividinglinesshould be abandoned (a fallacywhich is, bythe way the lifeblood
of deconstructivism).
Lastly, we wil l now also understand why commemoration almostinvariablygoestogether witha double de-contextualization that was discussed
in the previous section. At first sight we mght be tempted to discern in this
de-contextualization a movement againsthistory. For is contextualization not
the hallmark and condidon of ali historical understanding? We historicize, we
understand historically, bycontextualization. Hence, the de-contextualization
o f commemoration appears to effect a relationship between the
commemorated past,on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other, that is at
oddswith both the nature of ali historical understanding and anopennessto
how the past actually has been. But this is a misunderstanding of
commemotation. For recall now that this de-contextualization had no other
purpose than tocreateacleancorner on 'theslateof our memory — a corner
where now something new could be inscribed and that wouldrespect better
the authenticity of the remembered or commemorated event than when
new contents of memorymnglewith contents thatwerealreadypresent on
the slate of memory. I n this way commemoradon will come closer to a'résurrection' of thepast than we mayever expect from historical writing.
Historicalwriting,bycontextualizing thepast,inevitablydissolvesthe authenticity
of the past in the vagaries of its 'Wirkungsgeschichte'. There is no more
appropriate wayfor expressing this difference between historical wridng, on
the one hand, and commemoradon on the other than bysayngthat historical
writing may give us an understandingof the past, whereas commemoration
will give us thepast tsef.
7. C O N C L U S I O N
I n the lengthyafterwordNorawrote for thehugeserieson the 'lieux de
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mémoire' edited byhim, he spoke of 'an acharnement commémoradf desdeux ou troisdernières décennies'2 6. Sincethefirst ambitious commemorations
of the last few decades — that of the two hundredth anniversary of the
AmericanRevolution and thatof the French Revoludon thirteenyearslater—
the stream of commemorations gradually increased and would in the last
ten to fifteen yearserupt in a truedelugeof commemorations.
I f we ask ourselves how to interpret the coniemporray cult of
commemoration, two closely related considerations immediately come to
mnd. What must strike us in the first place is that commemoradon must
invitea certain trivialfzation of thepast.Traditional historical writingalways
sought to transcend personal or group inspired oriented conceptions of the
past— though,needlessto say it was far frombeingsuccessful in this attempt.
Nevertheless, onealwaysaimed atsomeintersubjective andtimelesshistorical
truth. Commemoration, however doesnot aimat historical depth and truth;
it is content with its superficiality. The banal and the trivial are openly and
unashamedlywelcomed. I n the secondplace,commemorationre-emphasizestheplaceof the historical subject. Traditional historical writingalwaysrequired
of the historian to beabsenthimself fromhis writings:think of Ranke's'ich
wünschte meinSelbstgleichsamaus zu lõschen'. But this is whollydifferent
with commemorations: it is wewho commemorate something and we
commemorate thepastonlybecauseof what itmeanstousCommemoration
is hodiecentric.
One wouldhaveexpected that this abandonment of supra-historical
truth and the celebration of the historical subject would have made
commemoration into the plaything of ideology and of political aims. And
this expectadon is byno means incorrect, as wehaveseenwhen discussing
above how powerfullycommemoration contributed to the 'invention of
tradition'. But two considerations should be taken into account. The first is
thathistoricalwritinghas been nolesstheeasyvictimof ideologyandpolitical
aims. Think of Michelet,thinkof the historians of thePrussianschool such as
Treitschke, Sybel or Droysen, think of Marxist historical writing. We needonlyrecall examplessuch as thesein order to realize ourselvesthe hypocrisy
of those historians believing that historicalwritingis the selfevident censorof
the irresponsible effusions of commemoration.And this brings me to a second
consideration. For thetruthof the matteris thatordinarilytwerethe historians
themselves who most powerfully contributed to the politicizarion of
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F . R. A N K E R S M I T
commemoration. The politicization of thepast beganwith historical writingand fromthere it triclded downintocommemoration. Moreover, Nora offers
anamazingargument suggestingthat commemoration is intrinsicallya-political
rather than political. Heobservesthat commemoration is most often inspired
bythe preoccupadon of individuais and of individual groups, whereas the
state, as the incorporadon of (national) polidcs, often is the outsider in
commemoradon. Of course the state also celebrates its commemorations,
but as we haveseen, thesenadonal commemoradons tend to be overgrown
bysendments that have litde or nothing to do with the occasion itself of acommemoration. Theyare likethesestatuesinlargecitiesto which everybody
attacheshis or her own personal associationsand that ordinarilyhavelitde or
nothing to do with the person or event that is honored bythestatue. In this
way the commemoration exemplifies, perhapsbetter than anythingelse,what
one maydescribeas 'the privatization of thepast'2'.
As Nora puts it, commemoration 'est devenu, pour chacun desgroupes
concernes, le fildissemnedansle tissu social qui leur permettra, aupresentà
établir un court-circuitavecunpassedéfinitivement mort'. The national and
political past is dead, and has now been replaced by the many individual
relationships to the past of individuais and of individual groups. Just as
traditional poütics died in the dissemnation, or 'displacementof polidcs', so
did the the politicizedpastof traditional nationalist historical writingdissolve
into how individuais and individual groups like to imagine their past. I n this
sense the contemporary cult of commemoration testifies to this death of
polidcs that has been observed and apprehensivelydiscussed by so manycontemporarypolitical theorists. We can thereforeagreewithCS. Maier when
he writes that 'the surfeit of memoryis as sign not of historical confidence
but of aretreat from transformative politics'28.
This privatization of the past does also have its consequences for
commemoration itself: the commemorations originating in, or stimulated by
the political center will more and more lose their power over the people
while the periphery will become the natural locus of ali commemorative
desire.Andherewe mayfind, onceagain,a striking illustrarion of Tocqueville's
capacityfor prophedc insight into the sociology of democracy. Forprecisely
this-hepredicted.alreadyin 1839 for that otherparadigmatic 'lieu de mémoire',
thestatue: 'ainsi, ladémocratie ne porte pas seulement à faire une multitude
demenusouvrages (i.e. of small statues [F.A.]);elleles porteaussi àélever un
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petit nombre detrês grandsmonuments. Maisentre ces deux extremes, il n'ya rien'2'. So it has primarilybeen democracy,and the de-politicizing potentialies
of democracy, that produced this movement awayfrom the political center
and towards the priority of the local over the national commemoration.
'L'histoires'estprodigieusement disséminée'3 0 as Nora puts it, and the vicissi-
tudesof the commemoration exemplify this process.
But the strained relationship between commemoration and historical
writingobeysa different logic. Crucial hereis, as wehaveseen, that historical
writing is to beassociated with knowledge of thepast and commemoration
rather thanwith thepast itself. Byits very nature knowledge of thepast is a
more helplessand vulnerable victimof polidcizadon than past reality itself.
Political ideologiesare themselvesalreadypartlyorganizations of knowledge
of the past and can therefore more easilybe infected byideology than the
past itself. Realityitself issupremelyindifferent to what we may or maynot
writeabout it, whether inspired bypolitical ideologiesor not.Surely, there is
a political dimension to what partsor aspectsof thepastwewill be interestedin — and this is whycommemoration alsocouldplayits role in the 'invention
of tradition'and in the formation of national identity. Butevenhereit followed
historical wridng rather than guiding it. So i f Norais right when claimng that
'le modele memorial l'a emporté sur le modele historique'31 we can observe
in this a pardal victoryof thepast itself over historical writing.
NOTAS:
' P. Winch, The dea o asocial sce/ ice, London 1958; Wittgensten's notion of the
language gamewas Winch's mansourceof inspiration. Thesameideawasexpressedareadysometwentyyearsbefore in the Sapir-Whorf thesis.
2
E.W.Hobsbawm The historian between thequestfor the universa and thequestforidentityDiogenes168 (1994); 51 -64; A . Megill, Historymemory identityHistoryo the
humansánces 11 (1998); 37 - 62.
3 F. Nietzsche, VomNut̂ en und Nachthel der Historieür dasL^ben, Stuttgart 1970
(Reclam);41.
4 But onlytemporarily For as CoUingwood insists the re-lived will aways reman
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F . R. A N K E R S M I T
'encapsulated' within the historiatVs thought. So re-enactment and the temporarydissolution of thedistancebetweenthe historian and his objectaways,andnecessarilytakesplacein the historian'spresent.
5 J.Michelet, Hw/lwv?de aRevoutionFrançase Vo. /,Paris1952; 419
6 Michelet,op. á.;4\ 4.
7 Quoted in C. Amalvi, 'Le 14 juillet', in P. Nora ed., Les ieux deméore Vo. : La
Republique Paris1984; 426.
8 L . Gossman, Between hstoryand iterature,Cambridge(Ma) 1990
9 S Freud, Totemund Tabu, inid.,StudienausgabeBandIX. FragenderGeselschaft,UrspriinderReigon, Frankfurt amMain 1982; 426.
10 P.Nora, Entremémoireet histoire,in id. éd., Les Lieux deméore Vo. :LaRepublique
Paris1984; xv.
11 j . LeGoff, Passeetpresentde lamémoire, inP.denBôer andW.Frijhoff eds., Lieux
deméoire e dentiténationales,Amsterdam1993; 35
12 D. Lowenthal,Thepast s aoregncountry,Cambridge1985; 195
13 J. Banville, Ghosts London 1993; 196,197.
14 See forexampleJ.R. Gillis ed.,Commemorations: he oiticso national dentity,Princeton1994.
15 Quoted in F.Yates,Theartof memory,Ayesbury1966; 22.
16 P.OryLecentenarede la RevolutionFrançaise, inP.Noraéd., ^es ieux deméoreVo.I : La RepubliqueParis1984; 546 ff.
17 Apparentlyone had forgotten the words pronounced bythe public prosecutor
Fouquier-Tinville when Lavoisier, thediscovererof theprocessof combustion, was
condemned to the guillotine: 'la Revolution n'a pas besoin desavants!'
18 C.Amalvi,Le 14 juillet, inP.Noraéd., Les ieux deméore Vo. : LaRepubliqueParis1984; 466.
19 M . Habwachs, He collectievegeheugen,Leuven 1991; 13 ff.
20 Habwachsweakenshis clamwhenspeakingof theparadoxthat we recal with the
greatestdifficultywhat, as memory is our mostpersona (andhencenot collectivey
shared) possession. When sayng this he seems to recognize the possibility of an
exclusiveypersona memory See Habwachs, Colectieveeheugen;14. A problemis that
Habwachsdoesnot distinguish between•!) the content ofamemoryand 2) memory
(3 8 M E M Ó R I A , I D E N T I D A D E E H ISTORIO GRAFIA
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C O M M E M O R AT I O N A N D N A T I O N A L I D E N T I T Y
as thestateof consciousnessof a certansubject.Forexample,it maywellbe that A andB bothremember that Kennedywasassassinatedin 1963— and fromthisperspectivetheir memories are identica - but fromthe other perspectivethe memoryof A can
awaysbe distinguished fromthat of B. We cannot remember the memories of other
personsevenif the memoriesof otherpersonsare, qua content,exactlythesameas our
own. See for ananaogousargument Lowenthal,Past, 195
2 1 Habwachs, Colectieve eheugen; 22.
2 2
See for this thelastchapterof myHistoryandtropoogy,Berkeey1994.2 3 Lowenthal,Past, 187.
2 4 Habwachs, Colectieve eheugen;31 ff.
2 5 Nora,Entreméoire ebistore;xix ff.
2 6 'P.Nora,L'èrede la commemoration', in id. éd., jesUeux deméore V ol . II: IJ:S
France 3: D e Farchiveà1emblèmeParis1992; 983. For furtherdetalson the contemporary
cult of commemoration, see asoWJ. Johnston,Postmodemsmeemlléare lecultedes
anniversairesdans aculturecontemporaine,Paris1992.
2 7 For this privatization of thepast, see my'Die postmoderne "Privatisierung"der
Vergangenheit', in H. Nagl-Docekal Hrsgb., Der Sinn des Historischen.
GeschchtsphlosophscheDebatten, Frankfurt amMain 1996; 201 - 235
2 8 CS. Maer, A surfet of memoryHistoryandMemory.Studies n he epresentationo the
past5 (1993); 150 Maer asoseesan intimate relationship between the contemporaryinterest for memoryand thelossof projects that are supported byai of society 'why
to return to the question that motivated thisdiscussionof public commemoration,doesmemorynowseemtoplayalargerrole in political and civiclife?Myown belief is
that at the end of the twentieth centuryWestern societieshavecome to an end of a
massivecollective project'(p. 147).
2 9 A . de Tocqueville,De adéocratie enAmêique V ol . I,Paris1981; 69.And becauseof
its aristocraticpastEuropespossessesfar more monuments than the US, as isamusingyobserved byDonadBartheme: 'everytackylittlefourth-ratedéclasséEuropean country
has monuments ai over theplaceand one cannotturna cornerwithoutbangngintoan
eghteen-foot bronze of LebroucheticklingtheChambermadsatVachewhile planningthe Battle of Bledsoe,orsomesuch'. Quoted in Lowenthal,Past, 322.
3 0 Nora, 'L'èrede la commemoration'; 1011.
31 Nora, 'L'èrede la commemoration'; 988.
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F . R. A N KER SMIT
R E S U M O : Vivemos emuma era de comemorações. Comemoração
exprimeou exemplifica o sendmento quepossuímos, ou que se supõe
que devamos ter, acercade umevento dopassado, e cuja origemestá
em nós e não nopassadoemsi mesmo. Comemoração seapresentaa
nós em um tríptico semântico: a rememoração a si mesmo, a
rememoração de alguma coisa e acomemoração, situada entre asduas
formas de rememoração. O repensar, o reviver como formas de
comemoração, suas origens no campo da religião, sua
descontextualização, os processos de sua privatização e de sua
apropriação pela autoridade, assim como sua contraposição à análise
historiográfica levamarefletir sobre a(pseudo)oposição entrememória
ehistória.
P A L A V R A S - C H A V E S : comemoração, memória, história,
historiografia