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ublic of the Philippines

PREME COURT

nila

BANC

. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

G TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

TIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD,petitioners,

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,respondents.

ce of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.

onio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.

ro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".

e M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

UREL, J.:

Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a mot

onsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the m

nion of this Court:

respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the maj


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Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

hat Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it neces

to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records

eau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

hat the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the fo

his bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

hat Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the

but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine

That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodotence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are

ential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

hat the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war i

not and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legisla

erican origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

hat the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, In

ustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

hat the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they co

expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

hat the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would nec

an the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Unio

iew of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the resp

ional Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the So

neral. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, w

ecessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this na

ke several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain

ciples which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proc

before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of

orers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hear

more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit the

ws. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Common

No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be

eptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is i

deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will

m perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions

ermination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between em

employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to co

estigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employe

ployees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provis

mmonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlem

industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shmpensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, pr

t the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural

ubmitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secr

or as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake o

rest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the part

uce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President

ippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the ne

fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a ma

non" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to vo

tration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the


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ective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between lab

ital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure fr

d doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

he case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occa

t out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to po

t the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it

ording to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall

nd by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its m

h manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the sef claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, o

ision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the disput

venting further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to thi

e been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry i

ect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the

certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disrega

damental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are

ts which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his ow

submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L

9, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the right

asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. C

aw. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, witho

responding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to

evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which can

egarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy,

s principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a gran

tation upon power.

Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, prom

vember 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach

onal labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidencsonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board

F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting

ional Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in co

and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards fr

mpulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proce

uld not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 4

860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;

tes v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in adminis

cedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorrob

rsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. C

Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclose

ties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by co

administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and m

e against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purp

the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.

nquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and d

only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agric

pute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace

lic official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board o

cial such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not


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exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of t

facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the vol

rk is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the diff

ved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with th

ppeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the partie

ceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this

eparable from the authority conferred upon it.he right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement b

Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a

s upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

s result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union

leged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discha

members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner w

cords of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Broth

on of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are

tioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments"

ccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained th

ered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far r

ortance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered h

have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussio

e come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to presen

ring the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involve

slation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamenta

olved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial sh

the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relation

ruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance w

uirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

ncea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]

En Banc, Laurel (p): 6 concur.

Facts:

Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion fornew trial of

the National Labor Union.The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for

re considerat ion of the So lici tor -General, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89

laborers here was due totheir union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire

record of thiscase shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence asmaybe relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separation of powers

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the lawof its creation (CA

103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of thenation. It is not intended to

be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which isessentially passive, acting only when it

jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to itby th e par tie s li t ig ant , the fu nc tio n of th e

Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of itsorganic law, is more active, affirmative and

dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functionsin the determination of disputes between

employers and employees but its functions are far morecomprehensive and extensive. It has

jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,and se ttl e an y que sti on , ma tte


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controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers andemployees or laborers, and

landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them,subject to, and in accordance with, the

provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposesof prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement

of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely tocause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards

wageshares or compensation, hours of labor orconditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and

employees or laborers and between landlordsand tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number o

employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborersinvolved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultura

dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretaryof Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and

certified by the Secretary of Labor as existingand proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of publicinterest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, beforehearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to

reconcile the parties and induce them tosettle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When

directed by the President of thePhilippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the

industry concerned or to theindustries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity

and fairness of fixingand adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers o

tenants, or a maximumcanon or rental to be paid by the inquilinos or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section

5, ibid.) In fine,it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ

mediation orconciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and

comp u l s oryarb i t rat i on i n ord e r to d e te rmi n e s p e c i f i c con trov e rs i e s b e twe e n l ab or an d

c a p i t a l i n i n d u s t r y a n d i n agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which

is a departure fromthe rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

2 . T h e C I R f r e e f r o m r i g i d i t y o f c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s ,

b u t n o t f r e e t o i g n o r e o r d i s r e g a r d f u n d a m e n t a l a n d e s s e n t i a l

r e q u i r e m e n t s o f d u e p r o c e s s i n v o l v i n g p r o c e e d i n g s o f

Administrative Law, 2003 ( 1 )

Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)

administrative character

The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to act according to

ju st ic e an d equi ty an d su bs ta nt ia l merit s of the cas e, wit ho ut rega rd to tech ni cal it ie s or le gal forms and

shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem

ju st and equ it abl e. (S ectio n 20, CA 103.) It sh al l no t be restricted to the specific relief claimed o

demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decisionany matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or o

preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to thi

Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed

legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedura

requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the

fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

3 . C a r d i n a l p r i m a r y r i g h t s r e s p e c t e d i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s ; G u i d e l i n e s

a . R i g h t t o a h e a r i n g w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h e r i g h t o f t h e p a r t y i n t e r e s t e d o r a f f e c t e d

t o p r e s e n t h i s own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be

protected bythe rudimentary requirements of fair play.b.The tribunal must consider the evidence

presented, after t the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidencetending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce ev idence , wi thout the corres pond ing dut y on

the part of the board to con side r it, is vai n. Suc h rig ht is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom

the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. c . W h i l e t h e d u t y t o

d e l i b e r a t e d o e s n o t i m p o s e t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o d e c i d e r i g h t , i t d o e s i m p l y a necessit

which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely

nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the mo re fundam en ta

principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power

anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.d. N o t o n l y m u s t t h e r e b e s o m e e v i d e n c e

t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g o r c o n c l u s i o n b u t t h e e v i d e n c e must be substantial. Substantia

evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate


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to support a conclusion.The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not

be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion

of t e c h n i c a l r u l e s s o t h a t t h e m e r e a d m i s s i o n o f m a t t e r w h i c h w o u l d b e d e e m e d

incompetent in judicial proceedings would not inval idate the administrative order. But this

assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a

basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantia

evidence.e . T h e d e c i s i o n m u s t b e r e n d e r e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e

h e a r i n g , o r a t l e a s t c o n t a i n e d i n the record and d is cl os ed to the p arti es a ffecte d. Onl y b y

confining the administrative tribunal to theevidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in theiright to know and meet the case againstthem. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see

that the law is enforced, and for thatpurpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and

informing itself of facts material andrelevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be

a p po i nt e d fo r t he pu r po se o f in ve s t i ga t i ng a nd determining the facts in any given case, but their repor

and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.)The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter

under its consideration or advisement


Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)

to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of thePhilippines for

investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public officialsuch powers and functions

as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise ofthe Court itself of any of its power

(Section 10)f . T h e C I R o r a n y o f i t s j u d g e s , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t a c t o n i t s o r h i s o w n

i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the law and facts o f the con trov ersy , an d n ot si mp ly acce pt the

views of a subordinate in arriving at adecision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally

impossible for the titular heads of theCIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no

statutory authority to authorizeexaminers or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board

or commission, to solvethe difficulty.g . T h e C I R s h o u l d , i n a l l c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s , r e n d e r

i t s d e c i s i o n i n s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h e parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved

and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Theperformance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred

upon it.

4 . N e w t r i a l g r a n t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s

The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present atthehearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main

issueinvolved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. Thefailure

to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected bythe result.

[2]Carino vs. CHR [G.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991.]

En Banc, Narvasa (CJ): 9 concurring, 1 concurring in result, 1 concurring in separate opinion, 1 dissenting inseparate

opinion

Facts:

On 17 September 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among

themmembers of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers(ACT

undertook what they described as mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plightresulting from the

alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again beenbrought to the lattersattention. According to them they had decided to undertake said mass concertedactions after the

protest rally staged at the DECS premises on 14 September 1990 without disrupting classesas a last call for the

government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from theSecretary o

Education. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at theLiwasang Bonifacio

gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachersparticipating in the

mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in24 hours or face dismissal, and

a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissalp r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t t h o s e w h o

d i d n o t c o m p l y a n d t o h i r e t h e i r r e p l a c e m e n t s . T h o s e d i r e c t i v e s notwithstanding, the

mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days thatfollowed. Among those

who took part in the concerted mass actions were Graciano Budoy, Julieta Babaran,Elsa Ibabao, Helen Lupo, Amparo


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Gonzales, Luz del Castillo, Elsa Reyes and Apolinario Esber, teachers atthe Ramon Magsaysay High School , Manil a

who had agreed to support the non-political demands of theMPSTA. For failure to heed the return-to-work

order, Budoy, et. al. were administratively charged on thebasis of the principals report and given 5 days to answer the

charges. They were also preventively suspendedfor 90 days pursuant to Section 41 of PD 807 and temporarily

replaced. An investigation committee wasconsequently formed to hear the charges. In the administrative case

(Case DECS 90-082) in which Budoy, et.al . f i le d se pa ra te an sw er s, op te d fo r a fo rm al in ve st ig at io n,

a n d

a l s o m o v e d f o r s u s p e n s i o n o f t h e


to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of thePhilippines for

investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public officialsuch powers and functions

as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise ofthe Court itself of any of its power

(Section 10)f . T h e C I R o r a n y o f i t s j u d g e s , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t a c t o n i t s o r h i s o w n

i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the law and facts o f the con trov ersy , an d n ot si mp ly acce pt the

views of a subordinate in arriving at adecision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally

impossible for the titular heads of theCIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no

statutory authority to authorizeexaminers or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board

or commission, to solvethe difficulty.g . T h e C I R s h o u l d , i n a l l c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s , r e n d e r

i t s d e c i s i o n i n s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h e parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved

and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Theperformance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred

upon it.

4 . N e w t r i a l g r a n t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s

The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at

thehearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main

issueinvolved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. Thefailure

to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected bythe result.

ang tibay-to be printed

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