DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

LUCKNOW

POLITICAL SCIENCE

FINAL PROJECT ON:

INDO - BHUTAN RELATIONS

Submitted for the project undertaken in partial fulfillment of B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)I Sem.

5 year integrated course at RMLNLU, Lucknow.

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

DR. MONIKA SRIVASTAVA ANANYA SINGH

PROFESSOR (POL. SCIENCE) B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) II SEM.

Dr. RMLNLU R. NO. 24

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to

My teacher and my mentor Dr. Monika Shrivastava for giving me this wonderful

opportunity to work on this project and for her able guidance and advice,

Vice Chancellor, Mr. Gurdeep Singh Sir and Dean (Academics), Professor C.M.

Jariwala for their encouragement and Enthusiasm;

My seniors for sharing their valuable tips;

And my classmates for their constant support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction………………………………………………………………...3

2. Historical Background....................................................................................4

3. India Bhutan friendship treaty 2007...............................................................5

4. Indo Bhutan trade...........................................................................................6

5. Bhutan’s stride for democracy.......................................................................7

6. Recent issues..................................................................................................9

7. Chinese influence..........................................................................................12

8. Conclusion.....................................................................................................14

9. Bibliography..................................................................................................15

INTRODUCTION

The bilateral relationship between the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Republic of India is a truly

exceptional example of how mutually beneficial cooperation is possible between two countries

that dispose of starkly different power resources. On the one hand there is India, the world‘s

largest democracy, second most populous nation, fourth most powerful military and fifth largest

economy, on the other hand there is Bhutan, one of the world‘s youngest and smallest

democracies, a Least Developed Country (according to the United Nations), the world‘s 167th

largest economy and a negligible military power.1

Relations between India and Bhutan have been warm. Bhutan is easily India's closest friend in

the neighborhood. India is Bhutan's largest donor, accounting for almost 80% of its foreign

assistance, and its largest trade partner. It has contributed generously to infrastructural

development in Bhutan. Besides, India provides military training to the Bhutanese forces and

maintains a permanent military training presence in Bhutan. Bhutan receives almost half of

India’s total foreign aid. This year New Delhi has committed Rs. 3600 crores to Thimpu.2

From the very beginning, India helped Bhutan to develop its economy, infrastructure, health and

education system as it almost entirely financed the first five-year-plans. Today, relations between

India and Bhutan have expanded far beyond their traditional fields of cooperation and are more

diverse than ever. Frequent visits and exchanges of top officials from both sides ensure a

constant flow of information and deepen trust and understanding for each other‘s problems,

challenges and sensitivities.

India‘s neutral and at times even pro Bhutan stance on the refugee issue, probably one of the

most sensitive issues for the Himalayan kingdom, has enabled Bhutan to follow and develop its

very own and unique vision of political change, economic growth and cultural preservation.

1 Figures available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last accessed on 20 October 2013)2 http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130802/jsp/nation/story_17186456.jsp (last accessed on 20 October

2013)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although traditional trade and cultural links between India and Bhutan existed for centuries, the

beginning of formalized diplomatic relations between Bhutan and British India can be traced

back to the treaty of Sinchula of 1865, followed by the 1910 treaty of Phunakha, in which

relations were further formalized and Bhutan agreed to be guided in its foreign policy by the

government of British India. The government of Bhutan was initially apprehensive about having

ties with independent India. It took two years of negotiations before a new treaty was in place.

TREATY OF 1949

On August 8, 1949 Bhutan and India signed the Treaty of Friendship, calling for peace between

the two nations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. However, Bhutan agreed to

let India "guide" its foreign policy and both nations would consult each other closely on foreign

and defence affairs. The treaty also established free trade and extradition protocols.

Although New Delhi formally held a prerogative over Bhutan‘s foreign policy, the government

in Thimphu began to diversify its foreign relations beginning in the mid-1960s. It joined the

Colombo Plan in 1963 and became a full member of the United Nations in 1971. Diplomatic

relations in the form of resident representatives between India and Bhutan were established in

1968 and later upgraded to full ambassadorial relations in 1978. Bhutan was also among the first

nations to acknowledge the independent state of Bangladesh.3

3 Gallenkamp, Marian (2012), ‘Indo-Bhutan Relations as a Model for Cooperation between Small States and Big

Powers’, in FPRC Journal, No. 9, Focus: India and South Asia, Foreign Policy Research Centre, New Delhi, 251-

256.

INDIA BHUTAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY 2007

The historic India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007, signed on 8 February in New Delhi,

updated the treaty of 1949 and ushered in a new era of friendship and economic cooperation,

when India took a step towards eliminating the irritant in the relations between the two nations

by agreeing to revise the treaty of 1949, whose article 2 and article 6 according to Bhutan seem

to circumscribe its sovereignty and signing a new treaty of friendship.  Article 2 requires Bhutan

"to be guided by the advice of India" in the conduct of its external relations, and Article 6 allows

Bhutan to import "arms, ammunition, machines, warlike material or stores" for its "strength and

welfare" but with India's "assistance and approval". The new treaty replaced the provision

requiring Bhutan to take India's guidance on foreign policy with broader sovereignty and not

require Bhutan to obtain India's permission over arms imports. This could also remove the sting

from criticism of India’s “hegemonistic ambitions” in the region.4 Although Bhutan had been

quietly raising these objections about these provisions restricting its sovereignty, what prompted

India to do so was the fact that Bhutan was democratizing, and India needs to acknowledge its

full sovereignty formally.

This treaty reflects the contemporary nature of India's relationship with Bhutan and aims at

strengthening the ties in a manner that is responsive to and serves each other's national interests

through close cooperation. It will enable the further intensification of cooperation in hydropower,

trade, and commerce and human-resource development. It will surely exemplify and elevate the

trust and maturity of the relationship between the two countries.

4 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IA17Df01.html (accessed on 16 October 2013)

INDO BHUTAN TRADE

India is not only Bhutan's main development partner but also its leading trade partner. A free

trade regime exists between India and Bhutan. The India-Bhutan Trade and Commerce

Agreement which expired in March 2005, has been renewed for a period of 10 years. Currently,

the major items of exports from Bhutan to India are electricity (from Tala, Chukha and Kurichhu

Hydroelectric Project), base metals and articles, minerals, vegetable fat and oils, alcoholic

beverages, chemicals, cement, timber and wood products, cardamom, fruit products, potatoes,

oranges and apples, raw silk, plastic and rubber products. Major exports from India to Bhutan are

petroleum products, mineral products, base metals and articles, machinery, automobiles &

spares, vegetable, nuts, spices, processed food and animal products, chemicals, wood, plastic and

rubber.

The Agreement on Trade and Commerce also provides for duty free transit of Bhutanese

merchandise for trade with third countries. Sixteen exit/entry points that India identified in the

Protocol for Bhutan's third country trade are the designated seaports of Kolkata, Haldia, Mumbai

and Chennai, Dhubri, the riverine route, air route of New Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata,

Raxaul’s rail route, Jaigaon, Chamurchi, Ulta Pani, Hathisar (Gelephu), Darranga, Panitanki,

Changrabandh, Phulbari, Dawki, the designated road routes.

During 2010, imports from India were of the order of Rs. 2930 crores and constituted 75% of

Bhutan’s total imports. Bhutan’s exports to India in 2010 amounted to Rs. 2600 crores and

constituted 90% of its total exports. Total trade in 2010 grew by about 26% from 2009.5

5 http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bhutan-February-2012.pdf (last accessed on 20 October 2013)

BHUTAN’S STRIDE FOR DEMOCRACY

The year 1998 was only the starting point of radical changes in the political landscape of the

Kingdom. Having pursued the modernization and development of Bhutan in the same

committed, passionate, and careful spirit as his predecessors for over two decades, the King kick-

started a revolutionary process of democratic transition.

In March 2005, after three years of work, the first draft of the new constitution was officially

presented. Members of the Royal Family and the King himself extensively toured the country,

presented the constitution to the people6, and discussed their concerns. This enabled the people’s

suggestions and concerns to be taken into consideration during the final drafting. In December

the same year, the King announced that the first democratic elections at the national level would

be held in 2008 and in 2006, the Electoral Commission of Bhutan was inaugurated and it started

to prepare for the general elections.7 On 14 December 2006, King Jigme Singye Wangchuk, the

fourth Druk Gyalpo, surprisingly announced his immediate abdication. “It was the first time in

world history that a monarch, who was initially vested with absolute powers, voluntarily reduced

the scope of these powers and eventually abdicated with no other reason than his own dedication

to political reforms.”8

In June 2007, the ban on political parties was lifted to allow for their formation in the face of the

upcoming elections. No parties on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity were allowed to contest.

The elections resulted in a majority for the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa or DPT Party which, with

45 out of 47 seats in the national assembly, garnered 67 per cent of the votes in an essentially

two-party contest against People’s Democratic Party.

The government has steadily increased its foreign network base and Bhutan now has diplomatic

relations with 52 countries and the European Union (up from 21 in 2008). It has diplomatic

missions in India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Kuwait, and the UN in Geneva and New York. Bhutan

is a candidate for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2013 and India is not only

supporting the Bhutanese candidature, but lobbying for it.9

6 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrpage=37&ccrcountry=150 (last accessed on 22 October 2013)7 Gallenkamp, Marian , “Democracy in Bhutan: An Analysis of Constitutional Change in a Buddhist Monarchy”, ,IPCS Research Paper No.24, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 20118 http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/RP24-Marian-Bhutan.pdf (last accessed on 10 October 2013)9 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-18/india/33261269_1_bhutanese-gross-national-happiness-bhutan-and-china (last accessed on 26 October 2013)

ELECTIONS 2013

Bhutan achieved an important milestone this year in July — its second multi-party election.

India’s relations with Bhutan came under the scanner ever since accusations were hurled at India

for attempting to influence the outcome of Bhutan’s general elections which were held in July

2013 in which the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) unexpectedly defeated the ruling party Druk

Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) by winning 32 out of 47 seats in the Assembly with 55 per cent of the

vote.

India was accused of unfairly influencing the results of the elections as when the election

campaign was at its peak, New Delhi withdrew subsidies on kerosene and cooking gas supplied

to Bhutan, which resulted in a steep price hike for essential products and led to a consequent rise

in fuel prices. The lack of subsidies also led to a credit crunch which led to import restrictions

after the country ran short of foreign exchange reserves of the Indian rupee. Additionally, New

Delhi, which has been one of the instrumental players in funding and implementing Bhutan’s

Five Year Plans, left talks on Bhutan’s current Five Year Plan in limbo.

India had provided Bhutan with nearly 2,000 EVMs and India's Chief Election Commissioner

V.S. Sampath was invited to oversee the election process. On 30 September, 2013 Indian

President Pranab Mukherjee said, “India looks forward to continuing close cooperation on issues

of national interest, including mutual security matters with Bhutan”, as its visiting Prime

Minister Lyonchhen Tshering Tobgay called on him in New Delhi.

RECENT ISSUES

CROSS BORDER KIDNAPPING AND INSURGENT GROUPS

Bhutan on the other hand was able to return that favor when it launched Operation All Clear in

December 2003, flushing out Indian militants from its southern borderlands. The surprising

success of that first ever test for the small but efficient Bhutanese military has shown that

defense cooperation between India and Bhutan has produced beneficial synergies for both

countries, securing a porous border from Indian militants that seek safe haven in the vast forests

of southern Bhutan to launch attacks on India and, on the other hand, from radical elements and

terrorists in the camps in Nepal that seek to carry out attacks against Bhutan. 10 To sustain the

success of the 2003 operation, both countries meet regularly to discuss border management and

security, the last time being the 7th meeting in September 2011.

Even recently, there have been reports about the increased activity of insurgent groups across the

India-Bhutan border. While Bhutanese officials claim that zero-tolerance and hot pursuit is

exercised when it comes to the question of insurgents influxing into Bhutan, it has been reported

by various media sources that the Paresh Barua faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom is

relocating bases to Bhutan. While such activities have been raising alarm bells in Bhutan, the

import of these issues for discussion is highlighted by the King’s itinerary, which included a

meeting with India’s National Security Advisor and Home Minister in January 2013.

INDIA CUTS OFF LPG SUBSIDIES TO BHUTAN

On 1 July 2013, India withdrew all subsidies on cooking gas and kerosene being provided to

Bhutan - arguably India's only unquestioned friend among its neighbours - creating a huge crisis

in the tiny, landlocked kingdom and bringing the bilateral ties under strain. This step was taken

after Bhutan’s 10th Plan expired on 30th June 2013.

Gas and kerosene prices more than doubled in Bhutan after this move, and the poor people are

the worst hit victims of this and it caused much heartburn because this step was taken at a time

when it was in the middle of its second Parliamentary democratic elections in Bhutan in 2013.

10 Gallenkamp, Marian ,“Between China, India and the Refugees: Understanding Bhutan‘s National Security Scenario”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2010.

Many said that the subsidy cut has come against the backdrop of New Delhi smarting since last

year when Bhutan PM Jigme Thinley appeared to be cozying up to Beijing. He had a meeting

with the Chinese premier in Rio and also imported some 20 buses from China. In fact, it was

being viewed as a shift in Thimpu's foreign policy due to which India was taken by a surprise.

However it could not be ascertained that the subsidy cut was due to this reason. Also there was

speculation that the subsidy cut was a considered step or some bureaucrat's ill-advised

enthusiasm. However the Indian officials said that since the Bhutan 10th Plan expired on June

30, the fresh terms of financial assistance, including subsidies, would have to be negotiated with

the new government. New Delhi was also miffed at the cost escalation of power projects in

Bhutan which it is financing. In some cases, the cost had almost doubled, raising suspicions of

some fund diversion. This badly affected the relations between the two nations. Infact,

Former Indian ambassador Pavan K. Verma Thursday criticized as "ill-timed and unwise" the

Indian decision to withdraw subsidy to the cooking gas.

However, on 11 July 2013, India said that it has assured Bhutan that it will discuss the issue of

fuel subsidy with the new government in Thimphu and does not want to create any hardship for

the people of the Himalayan kingdom. After the elections, Bhutan's incoming PM Tshering

Tobgay on July 17 thanked Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for his assurance of "steadfast and

unflinching" support from India, and asserted his "unwavering resolve and commitment to

preserve and strengthen the special ties" with India and two days later, India decided to restore

the subsidy on cooking gas and kerosene for the tiny Himalayan kingdom at a meeting chaired

by foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai on Friday, petroleum ministry officials were instructed to

reinstate the subsidy on both fuels from next month. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)

picked up the annual tab of Rs 50 crores from its budget for the same and restored the subsidies

granted to Bhutan.

POWER SUPPLY

Since 80 per cent of Bhutan’s total trade is with India, the resulting macroeconomic environment

makes it largely dependent on its southern neighbour. Hydro-power perpetuates this economic

dependence as it constitutes 45 per cent of Bhutan’s total exports to India.

In 1967, Bhutan started importing electricity through the Jaldhaka hydropower plant, located in

West Bengal, India. The turning point in power cooperation came with the commissioning of the

336 MW Chukha Hydel project in 1989, which was a significant test case in many ways and set

the pace for future cooperation. With 75 per cent of the total generation capacity from Chukha

being exported to India, Bhutan realised the potential of hydro-power projects as a means to earn

more revenues. The first phase was significant as it witnessed the successful commissioning of

three hydel plants (Chukha, Kurichhu and Tala) between 1987 and 2007. In all the three projects,

India has provided total investment on turnkey basis i.e. 60 per cent as grant and 40 per cent as

loan. Bhutan on its part provided free land, timber and firewood for the projects and waived

taxes on construction material. Since 2003, there has been a spike of revenues generated from

export of power; from Nu 2.3 billion to Nu 10 billion in 2009, thereby substantively increasing

revenues from Indian assisted projects.11

Given the benefits from bilateral cooperation in the power sector, India and Bhutan signed a

Memorandum of Understanding in December 2009, whereby India committed to buy 10,000

MW from Bhutan by the year 2020 for phase II to hydro power projects.

The transition to the phase II is reflected by the change in investment partnerships, as the

upcoming projects will be planned on a 70 per cent loan and 30 per cent grant basis (except for

Punatsangchu hydel project which is 60 per cent loan and 40 per cent grant). Further, the nature

of projects will change, as mega projects with reservoirs will be constructed. This will entail

huge financial costs, amounting to a notional Rs. 500 billion which is indicative of Indian

concerns about the sustainability of power projects.

CHINESE INFLUENCE11 http://idsa.in/system/files/IB_IndiaBhutanPowerCooperation.pdf (last accessed on 20 October 2013)

Bhutan is a small country located between the two giant countries of the world, namely India and

China. India confronts a new strategic situation in its neighborhood as its staunchest ally Bhutan

prepares to establish full diplomatic ties with China. Until now, Bhutan had been the only South

Asian country where China did not have a presence. That is about to change.12 While Bhutan has

not made official comments on establishing diplomatic relations with China, the Indian,

Bhutanese and Chinese media have been quite vocal on this front.  There is no denying the fact

that as the process of Democratisation takes roots in Bhutan, certain sections will be demanding

establishment of bilateral relations with China. Infact, internal pressures have already been

fomenting in Bhutan on establishing ‘limited economic ties’ with China. It is argued by certain

sections that goods imported from the Calcutta port in India increase transactional costs and that

these ‘costs’ could well be reduced, if goods were imported from Bhutan’s North-Western border

via Tibet. However, any decision on this front would require tampering with the much protracted

Sino-Bhutan boundary dispute.13

There are several contentious issues involved from Indian perspective if diplomatic relations are

established between Bhutan and China, and the most important being the Border security issue.

Bhutan is vital to India’s security calculus not only vis-a-vis China, but also in tackling some of

the north-east insurgent groups like its crackdown on the ULFA groups in 2004. Bhutan’s

position in the Chumbi Valley, the tri-junction with India and China, makes its border resolution

decisions key from a security point of view for India. China and Bhutan have border dispute

which can be dated back from 1950’s and diplomatic relations can be established between these

two nations if this dispute is settled. Like in previous negotiations with other countries, China

prefers the package deal solution, settling the complete border at once instead of agreeing to

sector wise understandings. The Chinese government proposed to concede to Bhutanese claims

in the central northern sector, comprising a total of 495 sq. km in, in exchange for 269 sq. km of

disputed territory in the western sector, comprising key ridges in tri-junction area which Bhutan

was unwilling to give as they were controlled by the Indian Government. The unfolding border

talks between Bhutan and China are a cause of concern for India as this can lead to a formidable

impact on security calculations for India with regard to connectivity with its northeast region. It

12 http://www.bhutannewsservice.com/column-opinion/analysis/chinas-coziness-with-bhutan-rings-security-alarm-for-india/ (last accessed on 20 October 2013)13file:///C:/Users/windows/Desktop/pol%20maT/Special%20Commentary%20%20India%20and%20Bhutan%20by %20Dil%20Bahadur%20Rahut%20&%20Medha%20Bisht.htm (last accessed on 20 October 2013)

is likely that primary objective behind this move of China is to gain diplomatic and strategic

advantage over India.

While the merits and demerits of Bhutan’s relationship with China and its influence on India and

Indo-Bhutan ties are being discussed, it is worth mentioning that India must acknowledge

Sovereignty of Bhutan and cannot pressurize Bhutan in concern with its relation with China, also

it is in best interest of Bhutan to establish essential minimum formal diplomatic relations with

China as it has been building up pressure to settle the border disputes but make sure not to come

under its influence Considering China’s attempts to strengthen its influence abroad by using aid

and investment as policy tools in other developing countries, it is safe to assume that it would

also try to do so in Bhutan. Even if that would boost economic development, Chinese presence in

Bhutan might ultimately chip away at its unique cultural heritage and its overall policy goal of

Gross National Happiness, which is precisely not about blindly following economic development

motive, but anchoring sustainable development within society and ensuring the people’s welfare

in more than just economic terms as the Chinese policies are just opposite to this. Infact it is

feared by conservatives that it can give rise to a Tibet like situation. However the prime concern

should be to maintain and strengthen its relationship with India as it is essentially Bhutan’s most

important ally and friend, given that India accounts for a total of 79 % of Bhutanese imports and

95% of its exports. Simply put, Bhutan could probably not exist, let alone function, without India

on its side.14

CONCLUSION

14 Marian Gallenkamp, “Between China, India and Refugees: Understanding Bhutan’s National Security Scenario”, IPCS Issue Brief, working paper no. 154, 2010.

One can safely assume that bilateral relations between India and Bhutan are destined to remain as

intense, respectful and cordial in the coming years, as they have been for the past decades. The

potential for even closer cooperation is great. The King of Bhutan Jigme Khesar Namgyel

Wangchuk has been quoted in the Indian media as saying that “My Grandfather told me that the

destiny of Bhutan is intimately bound with that of India and it is in our mutual interests to further

the bonds of friendship and understanding.” The ‘destiny’ referred to by the King points to the

geographical location of Bhutan, which underlines the geo-political significance of India as

Bhutan’s facilitator to South and South-East Asia. . Although Bhutan still is and will remain

dependent on India to an overwhelming extend, this huge dependency has not let India to simply take

and command from Bhutan what it wants, but to a relationship that is marked by respect and an

esteem for mutually beneficial cooperation.

It can be remarked that Bhutan is an important country in India’s neighbourhood. Given its

strategic significance, the country should not be taken for granted by India. India needs to

respond sensitively to its Himalayan neighbour, a move which will help create further goodwill

in the long term. Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh found the perfect words to express this

relationship, when he addressed the joint sitting of the first democratically elected parliament of

Bhutan in 2008, “As Bhutan enters a new era in its history, you can continue to count on India, as a

friend and – may I say – an admirer of Bhutan. India will stand by you as a factor of stability and

support in your quest for greater prosperity and happiness”.15

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

15 http://www.nab.gov.bt/speech/manmohan.pdf (last accessed on 20 October 2013)

1. Mitra, Debamitra, “Indo-Bhutan Relations: Political Process, Conflict and

Crisis”,Academic Excellence, Delhi, I edn., 2010

ARTICLES

1. Gallenkamp,Marian, Between China, India and Refugees: Understanding Bhutan’s National

Security Scenario, IPCS Issue Brief, working paper no. 154, 2010.

2. Gallenkamp,Marian, The History of Institutional Change in The Kingdom of Bhutan: A Tale

of Vision, Resolve, And Power, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics ,

working paper no. 61, April 2011.

3. Gallenkamp,Marian, Indo-Bhutan Relations as a Model for Cooperation between Small

States and Big Powers’, FPRC Journal, vol. no. 9, Focus: India and South Asia, Foreign

Policy Research Centre, New Delhi, 2012.

4. Gallenkamp,Marian, Democracy in Bhutan: An Analysis of Constitutional Change in a

Buddhist Monarchy, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Research Paper No.24, 2010.

5. Turner, Mark, Sonam Chuki, Jit Tshering, Democratization by Decree: The Case of Bhutan’,

Democratization, vol. 1, issue no. 18, 2011.

WEBSITES

1. http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/12042

2. http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/special-commentary-india-and-bhutan-3803.html

3. http://idsa.in/system/files/IB_IndiaBhutanPowerCooperation.pdf

4. http://idsa.in/idsacomments/

JigmeKhesarNamgyelWangchuksVisittoIndia_MedhaBisht_010213

5. file:///C:/Users/windows/Desktop/pol%20maT/India,%20Bhutan%20and%20the%20China

%20factor.htm

6. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=sl&nid=4551

7. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=n&nid=5451

8. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=vign&nid=5438

9. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=vign&nid=5397

10. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=vign&nid=5394

11. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=lite&nid=3435

12. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=vign&nid=5847

13. http://www.kuenselonline.com/bhutan-india-relations-sailing-in-troubled-waters/

14. http://www.kuenselonline.com/Our-foreign-policy-and-Indo-Bhutan relation/

15. http://ibnlive.in.com/blogs/suryagangadharan/79/64692/on-indiabhutan-relations-and-the-

china-factor.html

16. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-18/india/33261269_1_bhutanese-gross-

national-happiness-bhutan-and-china

17. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-06-23/india/32381541_1_sino-bhutanese-

jigme-y-thinley-thimphu

18. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-08-01/india/27833482_1_tawang-bhutan-

and-china-chinese-occupation

19. http://www.thebhutanese.bt/prime-minister-meets-chinese-premier-wen-jiabao/

20. http://www.thebhutanese.bt/very-positive-on-india-bhutan-relations/

21. http://www.eurasiareview.com/18072012-india-bhutan-china-strategic-triangle-analysis/

22. http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/bhaskar-balakrishnan/bhutan-a-tiny-

cold-neighbour/article5029374.ece

23. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=eco&nid=5916

24. http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bhutan-February-2012.pdf

25. http://www.bhutan-research.org/articles/2013/gallenkamp-2013-india-bhutan-relations-and-

the-rising-chinese-influence

26. http://www.bhutan-research.org/articles/2010/sharma-2010-south-asia%E2%80%99s-

rectangular-triangle-%E2%80%93-nepal-bhutan-and-india

27. http://www.bhutannewsservice.com/column-opinion/analysis/chinas-coziness-with-bhutan-

rings-security-alarm-for-india/

28. http://www.bhutannewsservice.com/column-opinion/commentry/bhutan-china-and-india-on-

border-fuel-and-economy/

29. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IA17Df01.html (accessed on 16 October 2013)

30. http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130802/jsp/nation/story_17186456.jsp

31. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html

32. http://www.bhutan-research.org/articles/2012/marian-gallenkamp-2012-indo-bhutan-

relations

33. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html

34. http://www.nab.gov.bt/speech/manmohan.pdf