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5132 مايو 31الأربعاء

شؤون عربية Yemen ceasefire is a distant prospect The Oxford Analytica

Saudi snub at US-Gulf summit will not affect Iran deal The Oxford

Analytica

It’s time to stop holding Saudi Arabia’s hand Foreign policy

Al-Qaida's local branch set to dominate Syria rebels The Oxford

Analytica

US-trained Syrians will not pressure Islamic State The Oxford Analytica

Lebanon's Syria border faces new upsurge in fighting The Oxford

Analytica

Beyond the 'easy part': Next steps in Iraq Brookings

How to keep Iraq from burning Brookings

Israel's new coalition will escalate Palestinian issue The Oxford Analytica

New Algerian family law reveals resurgent Islamists The Oxford

Analytica

Djibouti stokes fears over China influence The Oxford Analytica

بروكنجزالأسد؟ يخسر لماذا

معهد واشنطنديفيد كامب في الخليج ودول المتحدة الولايات نبي الانقطاع إدارة

قطاع الاعلام والاتصال

إدارة الأزمات

تغطي قضايا إقليمية ودولية حليلية المختارةمجموعة من المقالات والأوراق الت

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دولية شؤون UK election result lowers risk of EU exit The Oxford Analytica

Cameron pulls off a surprise win: What now for Europe and

Scotland? Brookings

Iran: The danger of politicized intelligence after a nuclear deal Law

fare

COP21 will reach weak global climate agreement The Oxford

Analytica

Tides of change: Taiwan's evolving position in the South China Sea

Brookings

New leader to revitalise South Africa's opposition The Oxford

Analytica

Resignations to hamper South Africa anti-graft bodies The Oxford

Analytica

New Turkish Cypriot leader is chance for settlement The Oxford

Analytica

Israel heads for diplomatic crisis with Europe The Oxford Analytica

مركز الجزيرة للدراسات كيف تلعب إيران بأوراقها في غرب إفريقيا؟

اقتصادية شؤون Dollar trend to shape EM hard currency corporate debt The Oxford

Analytica

Economic conditions boost stability in Middle East The Oxford

Analytica

BITs represent foreign trade policy shift for Brazil The Oxford

Analytica

Economic focus aids Eritrean diplomatic rehabilitation The Oxford

Analytica

Reviews on Ghana IMF deal to happen this year The Oxford

Analytica

Funding questions shadow Nigeria's new economic path The Oxford

Analytica

Algeria will tighten import regulations The Oxford Analytica

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Yemen ceasefire is a distant prospect

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

Despite the Saudi offer, a ceasefire is a distant prospect. Neither the Huthis nor the Saudi leadership

are ready for a pause in the fighting, with both believing the momentum to be on their side

militarily.

The Saudi-led coalition today warned Yemenis to leave the Huthis' northern stronghold of Sa'adah

after it promised a severe response to mortar attacks by Yemeni rebels on populated areas on the

Saudi side of the border. Under US pressure, the Saudi foreign minister had earlier indicated that

the kingdom was ready to observe a humanitarian ceasefire if the Huthis also complied. On the

ground the fighting remains in stalemate. Despite more than a month of the coalition bombing

campaign and blockade, the Huthis continue to dominate in fighting in Marib, Ta'izz and Aden.

Under its new leadership, Saudi Arabia is pursuing a more aggressive military policy in the region

in an effort to roll back perceived Iranian expansionism. For their part, the Huthi militants and

their allies among forces loyal to former President Ali Abdallah Saleh are seeking a greater role in

Yemen's new government.

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Saudi snub at US-Gulf summit will not affect Iran deal

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Monday, May 11 2015

Saudi Arabia may be signalling its opposition to US policy in the Middle East, but it will likely

have little effect. US policies on Syria, Yemen and Iran are higher priorities for the Obama

administration than smooth relations with Riyadh -- minimising entanglements in the first two

cases and ensuring passage through Congress of a key part of Obama's legacy for the third.

Conciliatory language will be used at the summit, but the White House will not change its policies.

The Saudi government yesterday announced that King Salman will not attend the May 14 meeting

of Gulf Cooperation Council leaders with US President Barack Obama at Camp David. The move

is ostensibly because of the five-day ceasefire in Yemen, where the Saudis have conducted an air

campaign against Huthi rebels. However, it has been widely interpreted as a signal of displeasure

from Saudi Arabia with the United States over US engagement with Iran and commitment to the

P5+1 deal on Iran's nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia in recent years has criticised US involvement

in Syria as insufficient and the US position on the Arab uprisings as misguided.

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It’s time to stop holding Saudi Arabia’s hand

Foreign policy – by Jeremy Shapiro and Richard Sokolsky

The picture of President George W. Bush leading an aged Saudi King Abdullah by the hand

through the gardens of his Texas ranch in 2005 has become both iconic and symbolic of the U.S.-

Saudi relationship. For over 40 years, the United States has walked hand-in-hand with Saudi

Arabia through the thicket of Middle Eastern crises.

On May 14, at Camp David, another bucolic presidential setting, President Barack Obama is

convening a special summit with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners

to begin a new phase in their relationship. But, for the first time, it appears there will be less hand-

holding and more tough talk. The United States will use the summit to hear the GCC’s concerns

about Iran, but will likely explain frankly to the Arab monarchies that there will be no new U.S.-

GCC defense pact or blanket security assurances from the United States. If the president delivers

the right messages to whomever shows up at the summit, the U.S.-GCC relationship has the

potential to become more productive than ever before.

The Saudis are clearly angry about this approach. On Sunday, they announced that King Salman,

the new Saudi king who took power in January, will remain in Riyadh, sending the crown prince

to Camp David in his stead. (In the end, only two GCC heads of state — from Kuwait and Qatar

— will attend.) Such petulance is a common negotiating tactic in these circumstances. It often

produces the desired ripples in the American media to the effect that U.S. influence in the region

is waning and the Saudi-American relationship is in trouble.

In part, the media’s focus is warranted. President Obama has implied that the purpose of this

summit is to assuage the concerns of those countries most worried about the Iranian nuclear deal.

Reassuring partners under such circumstances is a natural and normal reaction. It is certainly the

traditional U.S. response to placating irritated and frightened allies. There is pressure within the

government to cook up “deliverables” for the summit that might make the Saudis and their GCC

partners feel loved by the United States.

But as the decision of most GCC leaders not to attend indicates, there is not much on the table that

will reassure them. And that’s fine. It would be wrong to make reassurance the centerpiece of this

summit — for three fundamental reasons.

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First, Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners are not formal treaty allies of the United States and,

moreover, they often do not act as friends. The United States is a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional

democracy committed to universal human rights. Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian monarchy

committed to maintaining a society based on harsh political repression, religious intolerance, and

a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam at odds with universally recognized human rights. Some

GCC countries are in fact often the source of both the ideology and the money that supports

Islamist terrorism around the world. And GCC interests and U.S. interests increasingly diverge

over issues such as Iran, Syria, the need for internal reforms in the Gulf states, and how to deal

with the regional threat of political Islam. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and its GCC partners

can and do cooperate on a selective basis, but their relationship with the United States will

necessarily remain transactional — more a long series of one-night stands than a committed

relationship.

Second, America’s commitment to Saudi and GCC security is not and should not be absolute.

Since the mid-1970s, the United States and the Gulf Arab countries have been allies on a variety

of security issues. But this has been based on a hard-nosed bargain: “The United States will protect

you against external threats to your security and you will support America’s goals and interests in

the region and help stabilize global energy markets.” Over time, this bargain has allowed the Arab

states to foist their regional security responsibilities onto the United States — and then blame

America when things go wrong. Regardless of the rhetoric from both sides, the Arab states get the

better end of the bargain. And they need it more than the United States does. This is particularly

true now that the global energy market has diversified and is less subject to volatile price spikes.

Yet paradoxically, even though Gulf states’ dependence on the U.S. security guarantee and

changes in energy markets should increase Washington’s leverage, American officials often

convince themselves that they need to change U.S. policy more than Persian Gulf partners need to

change theirs. To paraphrase former President Bill Clinton, every now and then we have to remind

ourselves who the superpower is in the relationship.

Third, Washington’s never-ending reassurances over the years have created an unhealthy

dependence on the United States, instead of encouraging the Gulf countries to become more

independent, capable, and to stand up on their own feet when it comes to providing for their own

security from external aggression. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so does the United States

government. The collective weakness of the GCC states has created a security deficit in the region.

It is long past time for the GCC states to produce more security than they consume. As Obama has

noted, “the biggest threats that [Sunni Arab States] face may not be coming from Iran invading.

It’s going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries.” U.S. reassurances to protect these

countries against external attack distract from their problems at home that include a growing

population of disaffected youth, chronically high levels of unemployment, and poor human rights

records. Instead, the United States should be leaning on them more heavily to enact domestic

reforms.

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As the GCC states become more independent, the United States will not always like the solutions

they come up with to deal with regional security issues, such as the ongoing civil war in Yemen

or whatever crisis might arise next. At times, U.S. officials will need to seek difficult compromises.

But in most circumstances Gulf state ownership of their problems — and the solutions — will lead

to better outcomes than American-led efforts, particularly military intervention.

Iran will continue to harbor ambitions for regional domination and pursue policies that pose a

serious threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. The Iran nuclear deal, if successful, will

nonetheless allow the United States to begin to recast its bargain with the GCC countries, because

it will remove the principal direct threat to U.S. interests from Iran. The United States will be able

to insist that the GCC states assume greater responsibility for their own security — and that means

the United States will be able to avoid direct military interventions in messy Middle Eastern civil

wars. The willingness of Saudi Arabia to seek its own solution to instability in Yemen and the

Arab League’s decision to form a joint Arab military force are positive signs of increased burden-

sharing from the Gulf.

The long-term goal is not to get into bed with Iran. Rather, it is to use the relationship with Iran to

get out of bed with Saudi Arabia. The United States will increase its diplomatic leverage with the

GCC states if they know that Washington is playing the field. The GCC needs to understand that

the U.S. goal in the Persian Gulf is to maintain a regional balance, not to allow them to emerge

victorious in their struggle with Iran.

This week’s GCC summit is the perfect venue to deliver these messages. It is an opportunity for

the president to demand more responsible behavior and greater cooperation from Gulf leaders

instead of again reassuring them of an undying American commitment to their security. In the end,

this will make for a scratchier summit, but a much more realistic, and therefore more productive,

relationship between the United States and the GCC states. Hand-holding is nice, but in

international relations at least, promiscuity also has its advantages.

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Al-Qaida's local branch set to dominate Syria rebels

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Thursday, May 7 2015

Hezbollah is preparing for a major offensive against Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and other radical

Islamist militants in the Qalamoun mountains located between Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah

leaders said on May 5. JaN's standing among the Syrian rebel movement has been bolstered by a

series of major strategic wins against the regime in north western Syria. The capture of Idlib city

and Jisr al-Shughur have given the group and its allies control of Idlib province and provided a

strategic vantage point for the group to extend their control in the north and challenge the regime

in its Alawi heartland on the coast. However, the group's affiliation with al-Qaida raises questions

over whether it has longer-term ambitions to refocus on the global jihad.

Impact

JaN is unlikely to become a focal point for the Syrian rebellion so long as it remains affiliated with

al-Qaida.

Its guerrilla attacks will weaken the regime, but not unseat it, due to the latter's monopoly on aerial

power and heavy weaponry.

The rise of Jabhat al-Nusra poses a particular risk to Lebanon where the group has many

sympathisers.

Moderate, mainstream secular rebels will struggle to regain position in the north without a

substantial increase in US backing.

What next

JaN is rapidly becoming a dominant force in the Syrian rebel fight against the regime. This will

have a radicalising effect on other Syrian rebel groups and will deter the United States from

allowing the transfer of game-changing weaponry to insurgents. However, JaN will continue to

focus on the defeat of the Assad regime as its primary goal. With no end to the civil war in sight,

global jihad against the West will remain an aspiration, rather than an operational objective for the

group in the forseeable future.

Analysis

The increasingly sectarian nature of Syria's civil war has been a major factor in the rise of Salafi

jihadist groups to a dominant position within the insurgency. The main rebel groups fighting the

regime in northern Syria are now all Salafist jihadist. JaN is one of the strongest of these groups.

Fighting superiority

JaN fighters are known to be well armed, trained and organised. The group commands some 6,000-

8,000 armed men, making it one of the larger militias in Syria.

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It specialises in guerilla warfare, including political assassinations, suicide attacks on checkpoints,

and destruction of media infrastructure. It has particular expertise in the production of large

Improvised Explosive Devices, and deploying suicide bombers in offensives.

JaN's capabilities have sometimes tipped the balance in favour of the rebels in major operations.

Examples include the attack on Wadi al-Daif base in Idlib in December 2014, and the defence of

Aleppo against the government's ongoing offensive (see SYRIA: New defensive strategy allows

Assad to fight on - April 28, 2015).

Alliance building

JaN's strength lies not in its numbers, but in its ability to position itself among the Syrian rebel

movement as a strong and reliable jihadist group that is focused on fighting the regime.

Its strategy stands in contrast to its former ally, Islamic State group (ISG), which has built a

reputation among Syrian rebels of prioritising battling rebel forces and opportunistically seizing

territory over the fight against the regime.

JaN has worked effectively in alliances with other rebel groups. However, it has fought and won

in recent confrontations against northern Syria's remaining secular groups such as the now

dissolved Hazm Movement and the Syrian Revolutionary Front.

The group's skill at forming alliances has been crucial to its success

The success of its campaign in Idlib province was partly the result of a newly formed 'operations

room', the Fatah Army, to coordinate rebel groups. This provided highly effective command and

control between JaN and other Islamist rebels, including Jund al-Aqsa, Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-

Sham, and Ajnad al-Sham.

The coalition has the potential to replace the now defunct Saudi-funded Islamic Front and the

separate Levant Front to become the main rebel bloc in northern Syria. JaN has signalled that the

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Fatah Army is a long-term strategic alliance used to expand JaN's control there (see SYRIA: North-

south divide will ease rebel tensions - February 13, 2015).

Governing capabilities

If JaN manages to assert control over Idlib city, it will be forced to develop its governing

capabilities and forge deeper relations with the local population.

So far, JaN has avoided governing on its own in the areas that it has taken control of. Instead, it

has tended to work through establishing sharia councils to govern areas in which a number of

opposition groups are represented.

If it is to hold large parts of Idlib province in the longer run, JaN must expand sharia councils into

proper governing infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and taxation, and move beyond its

current focus of aid provision. This would take crucial manpower and resources away from the

group's expansive military campaign.

JaN leaders have promised to protect minorities, but face challenges from radicalised members

who, in the heightened sectarian climate of the war, may not respect this.

Al-Qaida funding dilemma

JaN's rise to prominence comes at a time when outside funders in Qatar and other Gulf states are

increasing pressure on Syrian groups to coalesce around an Islamist agenda that is less radical than

that of ISG and al-Qaida. This situation has faced JaN's leadership with a hard choice since the

group is al-Qaida's official representative in Syria:

Much of their constituency is committed to a deeply anti-Western and even terrorist agenda, and

will oppose any move to cut ties with al-Qaida.

However, its affiliation with al-Qaida prevents it from receiving direct support from Gulf states

and other state backers of the rebel movement.

Since early 2015, there have been reports that JaN is considering leaving al-Qaida to merge with

smaller Islamist groups, apparently lured by promises of Qatari funding. Some leading members

of JaN are rumoured to favour such a move.

The leadership has denied reports that it plans to leave al-Qaida

However, leader Abu Mohamed al-Jolani recently rebutted these reports and reaffirmed JaN's

allegiance to al-Qaida. Economic considerations may have played into his decision as al-Qaida

and individuals sympathetic to its agenda in the Gulf provide crucial funding.

Global jihad or local rule?

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The rise of JaN to lead the Salafist pack could have several effects that threaten Western interests

in the region. Through its alliance with, and dominance of, less hardline Islamist groups, JaN is

helping radicalise the Syrian opposition.

Its leadership remains committed to confrontation with Western interests in the region and in the

world. Their anti-Americanism was exacerbated by the US bombing of the "Khorasan" foreign

fighters unit in September 2014. Moreover, local alliances between JaN and ISG in Qalamoun and

the Palestinian camp Yarmouk show that some JaN members are comfortable working with their

jihadi rivals.

JaN's strategic decision on whether it will continue to prioritise the rebel fight against the Syrian

regime or switch to a global jihadist agenda and operations will depend on a variety of factors,

most notably funding channels, relations with local groups, US policy towards the rebels, and

competition between al-Qaida and ISG for leadership of the global Salafi jihadist movement.

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US-trained Syrians will not pressure Islamic State

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

In its present form, the US training programme is not substantial enough to make any dent in ISG's

presence on the ground or tilt the balance within the insurgency from hardline to moderate rebels.

Moreover, the programme's narrow focus on fighting ISG, rather than unseating the regime is

highly unpopular among Syrian rebels, raising the risk that the US-trained militants will be

regarded as US mercenaries, not allies.

The United States announced yesterday that it has started a training programme for Syrian militants

as part of its campaign to destroy the Islamic State group (ISG). While US air strikes have held

back ISG advances in Iraq, they have failed to stop the group's expansion in Syria largely due to

the absence of allied local forces on the ground. The programme, which is taking place in Jordan

and Turkey, aims to train 15,000 fighters over three years. However, only 90 fighters who have

passed vetting requirements are participating in the initial round. Frustrated with the pace and scale

of the programme, US allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey are working together to boost logistical and

financial support to hardline Islamist rebels in northern Syria, despite US reservations.

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Lebanon's Syria border faces new upsurge in fighting

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Wednesday, May 6 2015

A new outbreak in fighting appears imminent in the Qalamoun mountain region. This increases

the risk of overspill into Lebanon, in the form of clashes between jihadists on the one hand, and

the Lebanese army and Hezbollah on the other, and also raises the potential for sectarian attacks

and political assassinations by jihadist groups.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said yesterday that the movement's fighters would act to secure

the Qalamoun mountain region on Lebanon's border with Syria. The Lebanese Shia group is

planning an imminent offensive on jihadists from Islamic State group (ISG) and Jabhat al-Nusra

(JaN) who remain in the border region. The Syrian army and Hezbollah recaptured most of the

area from militants in a major campaign last year on the Syrian side of the border which helped

seal the border and reduce the flow of radical Sunni militants travelling between Lebanon and

Syria. However, JaN and ISG are seeking to reopen the area in order to bolster both their campaign

inside Syria (by improving their logistics networks) and their efforts to expand their presence in

Lebanon itself.

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Beyond the 'easy part': Next steps in Iraq

Brookings – by Michael E. O'Hanlon

In the campaign against ISIL, there are two main theaters of combat — Iraq and Syria. Of course,

the conflict is more than a military fight, and it extends beyond just those two countries, but they

are the center of the action at present.

Currently, the Iraq strategy is seen as the more promising of the two main lines of effort. At least

in Iraq we have a friendly government led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and an improved

cabinet, with an army that at least sometimes is willing to fight at its beck and call. At least we are

still welcome, and 3,000 Americans are now training Iraqis while U.S. pilots also fire ordnance

fairly often from the air. At least ISIL is confined to roughly just 1/4 of the country, and is

increasingly cut off from reinforcement in those areas of northwestern Iraq. Moreover, the recent

liberation of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown and an important city in the country's main

Sunni-dominated regions, would seem to augur well for the future.

But alas, it is not so simple. While we still do have an even more daunting task in thinking through

future strategies within Syria, the Iraq challenge is far from straightforward, and any expectation

that Mosul as well as other major cities now held by ISIL would be quickly liberated this year

appear less and less accurate.

The dilemma is even worse than that — because it is not just a question of whether the cities and

other populated parts of provinces such as Ninewa, Anbar, and Salahuddin will be liberated, but

by whom, and how. It is also crucial to think through who will hold them afterwards.

All these dilemmas were recently underscored in a visit to Washington, and an appearance at

Brookings, by one of Iraq's two or three best Sunni politicians, former Deputy Prime Minister Rafe

al-Issawi. Issawi was also finance minister in former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government

— until the latter contrived an arrest warrant for Issawi that drove him first into internal hiding

and then a form of exile. Issawi and Abadi fare much better together — and Issawi had good things

to say about Iraq's new prime minister in his visit to the United States, including a speech at

Brookings in conjunction with the Sunni governor of Ninewa province. But the substance of

Issawi's remarks, delivered with courage and balance and yet great passion, was troubling.

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Three points stuck out for me with Issawi's broader message to Americans, and I will simply offer

a word of comment about each.

Issawi equated the behavior of the Shia militias in Iraq with the behavior of ISIL. It is those

militias, many working for warlords and ultimately commanded by Iran, that have helped protect

Baghdad starting last summer when ISIL moved into the country in force, and then helped liberate

Tikrit. But according to Issawi, they are just as brutal, just as corrupt, and just as threatening to

Iraq's long-term future as ISIL. Empowered and even armed by Maliki, they are now numerous

and foreboding.

To my ear, Issawi slightly overstated his point. I do not believe the Shia militias are quite as bad

as ISIL, and in fact, it is only fair to note that Baghdad might have been much more seriously

threatened last year had they not intervened in its defense. But the overall argument is compelling,

and suggests that the current path Iraq is following, which depends heavily on those militias for

the defeat of ISIL and liberation of Sunni-majority regions in coming months, may sow as many

problems as it solves. My colleague Ken Pollack, who moderated the event with Issawi, has warned

of "catastrophic success" should the successful liberation of cities like Mosul be accomplished by

unregulated militias who are more loyal to their immediate masters and to Teheran than to

Baghdad, and as usual, Ken has a point.

Issawi emphasized the need to build up the Iraqi army, police, and the newly conceived national

guard. In so doing, he suggested that the Shia militias not be able to simply "re-hat" their members,

but that any such former militia irregulars be individually recruited, vetted, trained, and assigned.

In principle, this is a very good idea. In practice, there might need to be some accommodation to

the fact that these militias are powerful and unlikely to accept demilitarization and demobilization

in a happy way. There might need to be some allowance for smaller groups of former militia

fighters joining the official security forces of the state. Provided that leadership is good and that

the militia forces are broken down into reasonably small chunks, I think the situation might prove

tolerable. I hope Issawi and his fellow Sunni will be prepared to accept some compromise,

admittedly with some risk to the state and the interests of their fellow Sunni, to make the idea

work. There probably is no other realistic path forward.

Finally, Issawi favored the serious development of the national guard, an idea that has languished

in Baghdad and Washington, as a way of empowering Sunni tribal fighters and other local security

forces. He called this a "modified Petraeus method" and I think he is basically right. But to decide

which fighters could join these groups, and which of the groups would get arms, he favored

creation of joint committees of central government leaders and local officials. Again, this seems

sound — give Baghdad oversight of things, while enlisting locals in the fights to defend their own

towns and cities. But it will require flexibility in implementation. For example, will these joint

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committees decide matters of personnel and weaponry by majority vote or consensus? And who

will choose the individual members?

So Issawi's visions and ideas raise many practical questions of implementation. But make no

mistake — he is right on the central point, that we are a long ways from being out of the woods in

Iraq, either in the fight against ISIL or the enhancement of the country's longer-term prospects for

stability. We do need to think much harder about Syria, but we mustn't take Iraq and its future for

granted.

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How to keep Iraq from burning

Brookings - by Jennifer R. Williams

On May 11, the Center for Middle East Policy hosted a conversation with two influential Sunni

leaders from Iraq on the country’s future. Moderated by Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack, the

discussion featured Rafe al-Issawi, who served as deputy prime minister and minister of finance

under former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and Atheel al-Nujayfi, governor of Ninewah

Province, whose capital, Mosul, is controlled by the Islamic State.

Dismantle the militias, institutionalize the security forces

Rafe al-Issawi began by asserting that Iraq’s Shiite militias—many of which are backed by Iran—

are equally brutal as the (Sunni) Islamic State forces which they are fighting. While the Shiite

militias may help defeat IS, Issawi warned that it will result in a fragmented Iraq ruled by militias

and warlords. He advocated dismantling the militias and replacing them with government forces

that recruit individual members, both Sunni and Shiite, rather than absorbing entire militias into

the official cadres.

Issawi presented his vision of a new counterinsurgency approach, which he described as a modified

version of General David Petraeus’s model. His plan would establish “joint committees”

composed of representatives from Iraq’s central government, U.S. advisors, and local forces,

restructure Iraq’s army into a national, non-sectarian fighting force, and recruit and train Sunni

(and Kurdish) fighters as a national guard.

Issawi argued that all resources should be devoted to unifying Iraqis to fight against the Islamic

State, but he also emphasized that creating robust, inclusive political institutions in Iraq is equally

important.

Federalism, decentralization of power, and the constitution

Governor Atheel al-Nujayfi offered his vision for Iraq’s post-Islamic State political landscape.

Although adamant that Iraq should remain unified, Nujayfi recommended decentralization as

outlined in the Iraqi constitution and called for significant provincial autonomy. He explained, “I

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believe authority in Iraq should be split up, but not Iraq itself.” Nujayfi offered the Kurdistan

Regional Government (KRG) as a model.

Issawi agreed that the solutions for building a strong, stable, democratic Iraq are already contained

in the constitution; the problem, he said, is that the constitution is not being respected and

implemented. “There is no shortage of the right ideas” in Iraq, he said. What is needed is “a real

action plan, not just promises.”

Reconciliation, amnesty, and compensation

Issawi lamented that when it comes to Iraq’s political institutions, “Everything needs to be

restored. Everything is damaged. We have to rebuild again.” Reconciliation, especially between

Shiite and Sunni communities, is a critical piece of the rebuilding project. However, Issawi warned

that it will take time and will require confidence-building measures to restore trust, including

amnesty for Sunnis who allied with the Islamic State as a means of protection. Finally, Issawi

explained that humanitarian aid and financial compensation for the thousands of refugees and

internally-displaced persons (IDPs) produced by this latest conflagration is essential for Iraq to

stabilize itself.

America’s role

Issawi listed four ways the United States can help Iraq toward a more stable future:

Help dismantle the militias and rebuild the national security forces;

Enable the rapid arming of Sunnis and Kurds via the “joint committees”;

Support the creation of a national guard;

Provide financial support to help compensate the thousands of refugees and IDPs.

Issawi said that Iraq’s Sunnis are Washington’s greatest potential allies in the fight against the

Islamic State. He declared, “I came [here today] not as a politician but as a man warning his allies

that there’s a burning Iraq. Come to extinguish it.”

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The future is key

In the end, all the discussants agreed that overcoming Iraq’s current challenges will require

commitment to a unified, inclusive, and democratic future. “Is democracy a real solution?” asked

Issawi. “Yes. Is democracy a real option? Yes. But it is fragile.” Ultimately, they argued that Iraq

must develop political institutions that are capable of resolving its internal conflicts as well as

preventing them from reigniting.

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What happens when Arab foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria go home?

Brookings - by Daniel L. Byman

Although much of the attention on foreign fighters has focused on Europeans and Americans going

to fight in Iraq and Syria, the conflict has particularly inspired Sunni Muslims in the Arab world.

Exact figures are elusive, but in February 2015, the head of the National Counterterrorism Center

testified that over 20,000 foreign fighters from at least 90 countries had gone to Iraq and Syria.

Only 3,400 from the United States and Western Europe—the rest came from Muslim countries,

particularly those in the Arab world. Few countries are spared: longstanding jihadist hotbed Saudi

Arabia is again a reliable supplier of fighters, but so too are countries far from Syria and Iraq like

Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco.

But what happens when these fighters return home?

Foreign fighters who gain combat experience in Iraq and Syria pose a double danger. Many of

those who go to war will come back as hardened veterans, steady in the face of danger and skilled

in the use of weapons and explosives—ideal terrorist recruiting material. More important, their

worldview may change. While in the conflict zone, they will form networks with other radicals,

embrace techniques like suicide bombings and beheadings, and establish ties to jihadists around

the world, making them prone to further radicalization and giving them access to training and

weapons they might otherwise lack.

Several countries in the Arab world, notably Libya and Lebanon, face considerable risk of bleedout

from returning fighters and several more face more modest dangers, particularly Algeria, Egypt,

Tunisia, and Yemen. However, there is no simple model of bleedout, in part because the groups in

Syria and Iraq, and the global jihadist movement in general, are divided as to focus and strategy.

In addition, different countries have different mitigating factors. In particular, the presence or

absence of strong and focused security services will have a profound impact on the risk of bleedout.

Although many countries are at risk of violence, the strategic impact of returning fighters is likely

to be more limited. Militarily and tactically they can create new groups or strengthen existing ones;

however, their ambition, regional focus, lack of discipline, and brutality often mean they create

more enemies than they vanquish and anger local populations, strengthening the government’s

hand.

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While it is likely that they will use terrorism, it will primarily be locally and regionally focused,

with international terrorism probably less of a priority. Terrorism against Western targets in the

region is also likely to grow. Those who fight with the Islamic State imbibe its hostility to the

West, both as a military enemy but also as a presence that ideologically is opposed to “true” Islam.

Kidnapping of Westerners for ransom is also likely, largely for financial reasons but also because

of the publicity such actions bring.

Arab states can reduce the risk of bleedout by hindering the travel of volunteers and constraining

their ability to organize, countering the narrative more effectively by stressing the internecine

nature of the violence in the Sunni Muslim community, and developing effective deradicalization

programs. Regional and international cooperation to monitor and disrupt travel is also valuable.

On the other hand, these regimes are likely to take advantage of the jihadists’ presence to gain

more support from the United States, delay democratic reforms, and crackdown on non-jihadist

opposition.

Returning foreign fighters offer new opportunities to gather intelligence that regional services may

be slow to collect and process. In particular, the heavy use of social media like Facebook and

Twitter by today’s foreign fighters is a source of vulnerability, allowing for easy collection and

knowledge of broader networks as well as real-time information about the movements and

activities of fighters. Improving intelligence sharing and offensive counterintelligence is therefore

critical to mitigating the terrorism threat. This is where the United States can play an important

facilitating role by bringing the different intelligence services together and facilitating the flow of

information, particularly in cases where suspicions (or just politics) limit cooperation.

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Israel's new coalition will escalate Palestinian issue

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Thursday, May 7 2015

The new government coalition is likely to drive Israeli policy on the Palestinians further down the

road of escalation, by expanding settlements and scaling down cooperation with the Palestinian

Authority. However, Netanyahu may seek to bring in more secular centrist parties later in the year

in order to reduce the leverage of other coalition members, a move that would likely moderate

government policy.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu succeeded in forming a coalition yesterday, securing the

minimum number of seats (61) just hours before the constitutional deadline was due to expire.

However, he has had to pay a high price in terms of ministerial portfolios in order to bring the

smaller parties on board, with finance going to Likud breakaway party Kulanu, and HaBayit

HaYehudi (Jewish Home) taking justice and education. Moreover, by managing to secure only the

barest majority in the 120-seat parliament, the next government will be vulnerable to the demands

of each faction and, therefore, more prone to collapse.

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New Algerian family law reveals resurgent Islamists

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

The National Assembly on March 5 voted a new law setting out harsher sentencing for perpetrators

of violence against women. The law does not introduce any major legal innovations, but appears

to be a concession to the long-neglected progressives. The bill provoked virulent opposition among

Islamist deputies, who declared it contrary to Muslim law and a threat to family stability. The

debate around the bill has revealed a resurgence in public acceptance of Islamist political language.

In an authoritarian political system that is neither autocratic nor democratic, social and cultural

policy provides the main outlet for political debate.

Impact

The new law is unlikely significantly to improve the protection of women from violence.

Other laws touching on cultural identity will follow, eg new legislation on the status of the

Tamazight (Berbers).

Such debates are likely to increase as the government seeks to distract from concerns over low oil

prices and constitutional reform.

A mismanaged cultural identity debate, coupled with limits on the regime's ability to buy social

peace, could lead to social instability.

What next

The new law is likely to be followed by a revision to the Family Code, and changes to women's

access to divorce. The government could choose either to restrict women's rights in order to appeal

to conservative sensibilities, or increase them to signal an open, forward-looking Algeria.

Whatever it decides, the aim will be the same: to seek legitimacy and social peace by dominating

debates about cultural identity.

Analysis

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Women's roles and rights both in the family and in society have been a major area of debate since

independence from France in 1962. The basis of family law today is largely the 1984 Family Code.

The code was the result of a resounding victory by conservative religious forces over more

progressive, secular tendencies in 1980s Algeria. It legally obliged women to obey their husbands,

fixed in law both 'repudiation' (the right to divorce one's wife by saying "I divorce you" three times

in front of witnesses) and polygamy for men, and only permitted women to divorce on limited

grounds.

Women and family law

This year's debate on domestic violence has taken place against a background of increasing

numbers of women reporting spousal abuse. Some associations have interpreted this as evidence

of an increase in violence against women. Yet it is more likely that reporting one's husband to the

police has become less socially taboo.

Moreover, because women are obliged to prove their husband's fault in order to obtain a divorce,

it can be particularly important to have acts of violence documented and sanctioned.

Apart from fault, the only other way for women to obtain a divorce is by using the practice of

'khol', whereby women can be released from marriage on payment of compensation to their

husband. Denounced both by progressives (who argue it reduces women to slaves by forcing them

to buy their freedom) and conservatives (who complain that 'khol' is used too freely to end

marriages), the practice nevertheless provides a way out for women in unhappy relationships.

60% of university graduates in Algeria are women

Increasingly present in the work place and now numerically dominant in higher education,

Algerian women are better placed than ever before to use and challenge the law.

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Cultural indicator

The legal framework governing family law is a key indicator of which political forces are dominant

at any given time:

2005 revision

In 2005, the Family Code was revised with much fanfare, although, due to entrenched social

conservatism, the revisions were limited. Former husbands were now obliged to provide

maintenance to their wives if they had children together. However, polygamy, repudiation and

women's limited access to divorce remained in place.

The 2005 law criminalising violence against women needs to be understood in this context: talking

about women and the family is a way to position oneself politically, to consolidate a base and to

reach out to new supporters. The utility and efficacy of the law is a secondary consideration.

2015 revision

The new law passed by the National Assembly in March recognises violence within marriage for

the first time, and introduces harsher sentencing (1-20 years in prison for acts of violence, six

months to two years for financial abuse, the introduction of the notion of harassment in public).

However, the rest of the law is already largely covered by other areas of the penal code.

An obvious flaw in the new law is that it allows husbands to be acquitted if they are forgiven by

their wives, which opens up the risk of women being put under family pressure to drop charges.

While women's rights associations have welcomed the law, they have highlighted the lack of

infrastructure to accommodate women fleeing violent relationships -- there are only ten refuges in

the whole of Algeria.

Women as a political symbol

The debate on the bill points to a domestic resurgence of Islamist discourse

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The law provoked outrage among Islamist parties and some religious commentators. Their

insistent opposition revealed a resurgence of Islamist discourse in the public sphere:

Islamist preachers have been increasingly vocal on social and traditional media.

Former Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) leader Ali Benhadj made a fleeting reappearance during the

2014 presidential elections.

During a demonstration in Algiers in January 2015 over the publication in the French magazine

Charlie Hebdo of more caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed, old FIS slogans which had not been

heard since the 1990s were shouted on the streets of the capital.

Inflamed debates took place at the local and national level about the sale of alcohol, while posters

appeared in some towns informing women of the 'right' and 'wrong' way to veil.

The Islamist rise in the public sphere could be attributable to the increase in international

prominence of jihadi groups such as the Islamic State (see INTERNATIONAL: Islamic State

reinvigorates jihadism - January 9, 2015), but also as a consequence of the 1990s becoming more

distant, leading to a somewhat less toxic image for Algerian political Islam.

Regime challenge

The challenge for the government will be to strike the right balance between co-opting aspects of

social conservatism, but without alienating the progressives or allowing these conservative cultural

demands to transform into structured political movements that could make a play for power.

With an ailing and absent president and an economy in a weaker position than this time last year,

the politico-military system may well struggle to muster the resources required to meet such a

challenge

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Djibouti stokes fears over China influence

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Monday, May 11 2015

The suggestion from Djiboutian President Ismael Omar Guelleh that negotiations are underway

for a Chinese military base will be highly provocative for those with an existing military presence

in Djibouti. Guelleh may be using the real and perceived threats of China's growing military reach

across the Indian Ocean to exert influence over existing players when negotiating base leasing

terms. Were a Chinese base in Djibouti to be seriously proposed, the United States would lobby

vigorously to prevent it, possibly urging regional states to join in pressuring Guelleh.

China's foreign affairs ministry said today that Beijing is willing to make a greater contribution

towards peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. However, the ministry's spokesperson neither

confirmed nor denied claims made last week by Djiboutian President Ismael Omar Guelleh that

discussions were underway for a Chinese military base in the country. Beijing's military

engagement in the region has so far been restrained and multilateral: namely, counter-piracy

operations off the coast of Somalia. Djibouti hosts the only permanent US base in sub-Saharan

Africa, training facilities for French troops and a Japanese naval base.

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الأسد؟ يخسر لماذا

بقلم تشارلز ليستون –بروكنجز

النظام أن إلا .معهم وتعمل الإسلاميين المقاتلين تدعم الأجنبية القوى وأن سيما لا كبيرة، مكاسب سوريا في المتمردون يحقق .يحارب أن دون من يتهاوى لن

يف. البلاد شمال في ضخمة مكاسب يحققون بدأوا دفاعي، وضع في خلالهما السوريون المتمردون كان عامين حوالي بعد تراتيجيةالاس الانتصارات من سلسلة وحققت إدلب مدينة على المتمردين المقاتلين ائتلافات استولت أسابيع، ستة غضون

عفبأض له الداعمة والميليشيات السوري الجيش بدا المعارضة، مع المواجهة عند. المحافظة من أخرى مناطق في الأساسية .3102 العام أوائل منذ حالاته

بعيدين نزال لا أننا إلا الأسد، بشار الرئيس نظام نهاية بداية اعتبرتها النجاحات هذه تلت التي التعليقات أغلبية أن رغم ولكن وألقى ويةالج الغارات مئات شن البلاد، شمال في النظام تكبدها التي الفادحة الخسائر إزاء الحقيقة، في. النهاية هذه عن جدا

ية هجمات شن كذلك. وحلب وحماه إدلب ريف على الكلور بغاز هجوم وشن المتفجرة البراميل بعضو دمشق شرقي في بر بين تركا مش كبيرا هجوما أن يبدو ذلك، غضون في. اللبنانية الحدود من مقربة على بالزبداني المحيطة والجبال حمص مناطق .وشيكا الآن أصبح القلمون جبال في الله وحزب النظام

ضغطت: المعارضة دفة إلى تميل النفسية الموازين أن بوضوح الأخيرة الأحداث أظهرت سوريا؟ في يحدث الذي ما إذا ،

. البشرية وى الق إلى الشديد افتقاره يوم بعد يوما يتضح بدأ الذي الأسد على بشدة الجنوبية درعا ومحافظة إدلب في الخسائر – السوري ساحل على حماسة الأكثر للأسد الداعمة المناطق عبر الاحتجاج حوادث وحتى والسخط الاستياء حدة ازدادت الانسحابب بدأت الإيرانية القوات وحتى أمور عدة على اهتمامه الله حزب يصب. مباشر لهجوم حاليا بعضها يتعرض والتي .النظام استمرارية لضمان الأهم تُعتبر التي السورية المناطق إلى قدرته ولح يحوم الشك أن حين في أهمية، الأكثر أراضيه خارج فعليا ناجحة عمليات شن على عسكريا قادرا النظام يعد لم

تبدو عدت لم روسيا وأن سيما لا الدبلوماسي، الصعيد على أضعف النظام يبدو ذلك، على علاوة . منظ م هجوم ضد الدفاع على الفرص أفضل يؤمن أن شأنه من منظ م انتقال لفكرة أكبر انفتاحا تُظهر الآن وأنها الطويل المدى على الأسد باستمرارية متشبثة

لمتوقعةا ومشاركتها المتحدة والولايات إيران بين الواضح التقارب إن ذلك، غضون في. النظام بعد ما مرحلة خلال للاستقرار

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مناقشات امأم المجال يفسحا قد ميستورا، دي ستافان سوريا إلى الخاص المتحدة الأمم مبعوث يعقدها التي جنيف محادثات في .تقدير أقل على سوريا في تفاوضي حل إلى للتوصل

ن حتى. سوريا في الصراع لإنهاء حل لتأمين كافية وحدها الدبلوماسية تكون أن المرجح غير من ولكن، حةشري كان وا أن لاإ السوري، الشأن بخصوص جديدة كبيرة دبلوماسية مبادرة إطلاق عن الكواليس وراء تتحدث الدولي المجتمع من واسعة

.لا أم للنجاح فرص المبادرة لهذه ستكون هل سيحدد الذي هو سوريا داخل العسكري الضغط سيكون المطاف نهاية في

* * *

. السابق في عليه يبدو كان مما بكثير أكبر استراتيجي تخطيط عن إدلب في مؤخرا المعارضة حققتها التي الانتصارت كشفت على املك بشكل للسيطرة أشهر ثمانية مدى على عملت كبيرة استراتيجية مث لت المتمردون أحرزها التي الأخيرة فالنجاحات .للمعارضة تابعة أساسية تحكم منطقة إلى ولتحويلها المحافظة

بحد وكان ،3102 العام شتاء منذ بدأ له التخطيط أن إلا – مارس 32 في إدلب مدينة على الهجوم بدأ المثال، سبيل فعلى لعسكريةا المراكز على الاستيلاء إلى أدى الذي طويلة فترة منذ له والمخطط الناجح بالهجوم معقد بشكل مرتبطا هجوما ذاته شن إدلب، مدينة على الاستيلاء بعد. 3102 ديسمبر منتصف في النعمان معرة بلدة خارج والحميدية الضيف وادي في

نمابي المجاورة، اللاذقية محافظة من المعارضة قوات بقيادة إدلب، غرب الشاغور، جسر بلدة على هجوما سريعا المتمردون .وأريحا والقرميد المسطومة في الرئيسة النظام مراكز في إدلب مدينة عملية من القوات انتشرت

إلا. لإعجابل مثيرا بطوليا عملا بالتالي تمثل إدلب في المعارضة مكاسب فإن السوري، الشمال في التمرد تعقيد لشدة ونظرا المنافسة، الفصائل نبي التنسيق من أفضل مستوى أيضا العمليات بي نت إذ: الانتصارات لتحقيق كافيا يكن لم لوحده التخطيط أن

ين،والمحافظ المعتدلين السوريين بالإسلاميين مرورا المتحدة، الولايات من المدعومة الحر السوري الجيش ألوية من بدءا لا كةالمشار المجموعات أن ورغم. المستقلة الجهادية الفصائل من وعدد القاعدة لتنظيم التابعة النصرة جبهة إلى ووصولا

لىع الحقيقة فإن القاعدة، بقيادة أنها أو بالجهادية إدلب على الهجمات الإعلام وصف وبينما واسع، نحو على بذلك تقر .جدا المختلفة الأيديولوجيات ذات المجموعات من عدد بين جمع الأخير الهجوم أن إلى أشارت الواقع أرض

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م عملية في صغيرا دورا الحر السوري الجيش مجموعات لعبت منع في جدا كبيرا دورها كان ولكن إدلب، مدينة باتجاه التقد أهمية رأكث الشاغور جسر على السيطرة في دورها كان ذلك، على علاوة. المدينة في الدفاع مواقع إلى النظام تعزيزات وصول .أخرى مناطق في ناشطة اليوم حتى وهي مع يقبالتنس يتعلق ما في رأيهم الفصائل أنصار غي ر كيف الحر السوري الجيش مجموعات مشاركة تبي ن الحقيقة، في

لمتحدةا الولايات تقودها التي العمليات غرفة أن الأخيرة إدلب عمليات قيادة في شاركوا الذين القادة من عدد أك د. الإسلاميين شاركتهام لتسهيل ضرورية كانت المختارة، المعارضة لمجموعات المدمر وغير المدمر الدعم تأمين تنسق التي تركيا، جنوب من – سوريا جنوب تغطي التي الأردن، في أخرى غرفة إلى بالإضافة – تلك العمليات غرفة أن يبدو. أبريل أوائل منذ العملية في .الأخيرة الأسابيع في المختارة للمجموعات للمعلومات تأمينها ومن مشاركتها مستوى من كبير بشكل رفعت قد

مع تنسيقال العسكرية المساعدة على الحاصلة الجهات تنهي أن هذه الجنسيات المتعددة العمليات غرف طلبت أن سبق بينما حناتش عدد يزداد لم. مختلفا شيئا أظهرت قد إدلب في الأخيرة الديناميكيات أن يبدو النصرة، جبهة غرار على مجموعات ثقأو تعاون إقامة على خاص بشكل العمليات غرفة شجعت بل فحسب،" المختارة المجموعات" بـ يُعرف لما الواردة الأسلحة

.الأمامية الجبهة عمليات يقودون الذين الإسلاميين مع تركيا ضمي والذي بالتشجيع حديثا يحظى الذي الإقليمي الائتلاف مارسه الذي الضغط هو النقلة لهذه الأرجح التفسير إن

لسنةا حلفائها مع المستمر تحالفها لإثبات وسائل عن كذلك المتحدة الولايات تفتش. وقطر السعودية العربية والمملكة .إيران مع لتقاربها الأوسع السياق ضمن الخليج، في التقليديين

طبق يوسف العلوان، أحمد. المتمردين بين الحديث التنسيق عزز قد العسكريين إدلب قادة على الحملة اعتماد أن شك لا

سرج في الأول القائد أن حين في إدلب؛ مدينة على السيطرة في بارزا دورا أدوا محليون متمردون قادة هم بكر أبو وحسام من عارالش ينحدر. المعارضة صفوف بين جدا كبيرة بهيبة ويحظى الشام أحرار قادة أحد وهو – الشعار إياد كان الشاغور. سوريا في المسلمون الإخوان قاده الذي التمرد بدايات أثناء عاما 23 منذ أهله مع سوريا ترك أنه إلا الشاغور، جسر منطقة أسهر مسقط إلى بعودته أطيافها بجميع المعارضة احتفلت الشام، لأحرار مؤسس وعضو سابق أفغاني كمحارب مركزه رغم .رحيله منذ الأولى للمرة

لت بشكل ليميةالإق الهوية فيها تتميز مناطق في سيما لا – كبير حد إلى سوريا في قيما موحِدا عاملا المحلية العلاقات شك دلب كحمص بالقوة خاص من كانوا الأخيرة إدلب عمليات على أشرفوا الذين البارزين القادة من العديد أن رغم. وحلب وا

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أماكن يف نشأت التي والأيديولوجية المجموعة داخل المنافسات أثبطت قد المحافظة مجتمع في جذورهم أن يبدو الإسلاميين، سبيل على الحر السوري للجيش التابعة 02 والفصيلة النصر جبهة بين الحقيقية الفوارق نغفل أن يجب ولا. البلاد من أخرى

أنها لىإ إشارة إلا ليست النظام سيطرة تحت الواقعة الأراضي داخل إلى التقدم على سلبا تؤثر لم أنها حقيقة أن إلا المثال، .قوي موحد عامل

* * *

علاوة . عركةالم أرض على السورية المعارضة نجاح ضمان لصالح مؤقتا ، أقله والأيدولوجية، الدولية الفوارق إبعاد تم أنه يبدو إلى أدى الأمر هذا أن حقيقة إن . المعارضة أظهرته ما نادرا العسكري النضج من مستوى عن الأخير الهجوم كشف ذلك، علىلت قد كبير بشكل النظام ثقة زعزعة في وساهم إيجابية نتائج يدوم؟ أن يمكن هل ولكن،. للمعارضة عظيمة ثقة مصدر شك

ن رغم سوريا، يف النصرة جبهة بأهداف يتعلق ما في السوريين يساور العميق الشك يزال لا المعركة، أرض على التعاون تحس ؤشرا م دائما العلنية الخطابات تشكل لا طبعا ،. الإسلاميين مع بحذر تعمل المتحدة الولايات من المدعومة الفصائل تزال ولا

نع بالنفس النأي تعه دت التي الفصائل إن المثال، سبيل على سوريا، شمال في: المعركة أرض على العمل عن دقيقا .ذلك بعد أياما المجموعة مع تعاونت أن لبثت ما أبريل منتصف في النصرة كجبهة المتطرفين

على ومستدامة فعالة مدنية حكومة إرساء على التصميم هو الآن حتى كافة الأحزاب بين يجمع الذي الوحيد العامل إن

التي المتعددة الكيميائية والهجمات والعشوائية الضخمة التفجيرات بسبب مستحيلا تقريبا يبدو الأمر أن إلا. المحررة الأراضيت حال وفي. النظام شنها من تفادةالاس إلى المتطرفين سعي هي المتوقعة الوحيدة النتيجة فإن العنيف، القمع حالة استمر .القاعدة ستنتصر أخرى، بعبارة. الفراغ

الشام حرارأ أي سوريا، في المتمردة المجموعات أكبر من اثنين اتحاد العلني الشكل بهذا تركيا سهلت تحديدا ، السبب ولهذا تركيا قدمهت الذي الكبير الدعم يرمي لا الضمنية، الجديدة وقيادتها السعودية العربية المملكة موافقة ظل في. الإسلام وجيش اعدةق جمع إلى أيضا إنما فحسب، النظام ضد فعالية أكثر جبهة إرساء إلى سوريا شمال في الإسلامية الوحدة لتشجيع لدولةا وجه في أقوى دفاعيا حاجزا سيؤمن الذي الأمر المتواصل، القاعدة نمو ضد التوازن لتحقيق واسعة سورية إسلامية

.سوريا غربي شمال إلى بالعودة ما يوما هددت إن الإسلامية

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اتذ وحدات كانت ما غالبا الأخيرة، الأسابيع في جناحيهما تحت المتمردة الفصائل الإسلام وجيش الشام أحرار من كل ضم قريبا ينضمس المسلمين الإخوان بتوجهاته يشبه الذي الشام فيلق أن تفيد شائعات انتشرت مؤخرا ،. تحفظا أقل إسلامية رؤى بعيدا ، الا احتم يبدو الشام وأحرار الإسلام جيش دمج أن رغم. التقارير هذه الآن حتى نفت الفيلق قيادة أن إلا الشام، أحرار إلى ليص قد العدد هذا أن إلى تشير التقديرات بعض أن علما – الأقل على مقاتل ألف 21 ستضم مجموعة الفريقين قوات أن إلا .مقاتل ألف 31 إلى

* * *

اعدةللمس مكم لا " المعتدلة" الحر السوري الجيش لفصائل المتنامي والسعودي الأمريكي الدعم يبدو اليوم، الأمور تبدو كما ليس – لعوائقا من عددا تواجه الاستراتيجية هذه أن إلا. السابق في كان كما لها منافسا وليس للإسلاميين، والقطرية التركية دمةخ في السورية المعارضة بديناميكيات التلاعب في للإعجاب مثيرة مهارة عن برهنت التي النصرة جبهة أعمال أقلها

.مصالحها

تغلغلت ،3102 العام أواخر منذ. المعارضة حققتها التي الأخيرة النجاحات سلسلة بعرقلة كذلك الإسلامية الدولة تهدد هذه دتأ النقطة، هذه حتى. سيطرتها تدريجيا لتوسع محليين حلفاء وضمت جديدة مناطق إلى سريعا الجهادية المجموعة

في الاعتداءات اندلاع إلى – 3102 العام أوائل في سوريا إلى ولهاوص منذ كثيرا المجموعة استخدمتها التي – الاستراتيجيةا البلاد عبر مختلفة مناسبات يف حماه محافظة إلى ووصولا دمشق بالعاصمة مرورا الجنوب، في والقنيطرة درعا من بدء

حاليا تمي التي الأوسع السورية المعارضة ضمن الأيديولوجية الانقسامات فتح بإعادة التوسعية السياسة هذه تهدد. الغرب .تجاهلها

اتحاد يشكل. الدولي للمجتمع بالنسبة حرجا وقتا الراهن الوقت من تجعل سوريا تعتمدها التي الجديدة الديناميكيات إن

لذيا الأمر القاعدة، مع للتعاون بديل من ما الآن حتى إنه إلا – النظام ضد الصراع في إيجابيا تطورا الحديث المتمردينيهو سوريا في المتمردة المجموعات مع تعاونه يوسع أن بد لا أفضل، حلا الغرب أراد حال في. أهم يتها بالتالي يسهل وأن يقو م فادةاست لضمان الضرورية الجهود كذلك يبذل أن بد ولا. المقبولة المجموعات من أوسع لشريحة المساعدة من المزيد يقد

تخداماس من النظام منع يبدو الصدد، هذا وفي. ومدنية تمثيلية حكومة إرساء من سوريا شمالي في حديثا المحررة الأراضي .جدا ضروريا أمرا شرعية غير بطريقة الجوية القوة

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التعامل نأ إلا. المخاطر من خاليا أو سهلا أمرا يبدو لا معه بفعالية التعامل فإن وتعقيده، الهائل السوري التمرد لحجم نظرا .أكبر خطرا ويشكلوا ليتطوروا فرصا الخصوم تمنح أكيدة طريقة يضمن وبسهولة متقطع بشكل معه

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واشنطن معهد ديفيد كامب في الخليج ودول المتحدة الولايات بين الانقطاع إدارة

بوغارت بلوتكين لوري -معهد واشنطن

أوباما الأمريكي الرئيس مع للاجتماع والبحرين السعودية العربية المملكة عهد وليا قريبا واشنطن الى يصل أن المقرر من يفيدد وكامب الأبيض البيت في ستنعقد التي الاجتماعات تتناول وسوف. «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول من آخرين وقادة علنتأُ التي المعالم أعقاب في «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» ودول المتحدة الولايات بين الأمني التعاون مايو،/أيار 02-02 في

ناقشاتالم نتائج من سلمان الملك رضا عدم والبحرين، السعودية ملكي غياب يعكس وربما. إيران مع نووية صفقة عن مؤخرا لأكثرا القضية إن إلا . وباريس الرياض في الخليج، دول من ومسؤولين المتحدة الولايات بين الماضي الأسبوع جرت التي

ي النوو الإطار حول «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول عواصم ولمعظم الأبيض للبيت مختلفة نظر وجهات وجود هي جوهرية .الأوسط الشرق على وتداعياته الإيراني

ترضةالمف والنهاية العقوبات تخفيف أن من الخصوص، وجه على بالقلق «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول قادة معظم يشعر من يزيد مما العربية، الدول في المسلحة الشيعية للجماعات دعمها زيادة على طهران تشجع سوف الإيرانية العزلة لحالة فتيشت عمليات إجراء دون طهران مع اتفاق إبرام أن من قلقه عن أيضا سلمان الملك أعرب وقد. المنطقة في الاستقرار زعزعة وتتفاقم .الأوسط الشرق في نووي تسلح سباق اندلاع خطر إلى يؤدي أن شأنه من الإيراني النووي التطور وقف لضمان كافية في لسنةا حلفائها عن بعيدا تتحول بينما طهران مع التقارب إلى تسعى واشنطن بأن القائم التصور جراء من المخاوف هذه

.الإقليمي التشابك من المزيد حدوث إلى يؤدي الذي الأمر الخليج

لخلا كلمات سماعهم مجرد من أكثر فعلية مخرجات رؤية «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول قادة يرغب قد السياق، هذا وفي تمثلت جديدة خطط بوضع المتحدة الولايات قيام هو الأفضل السيناريو يكون قد نظرهم وجهة ومن. ديفيد كامب اجتماعات في ادةج أمريكا بأن إقناعهم نحو طويلا شوطا ذلك يقطع وقد. سوريا في وخاصة الإيراني، التدخل ضد حازمة مبادرة باعتماد على لحصولا عن فضلا واشنطن، مع خطية دفاع اتفاقيات[ على التوقيع في رغبتهم] أيضا أكدوا كما. الايراني النفوذ احتواء .إيران على نوعي تفوق لهم توفر أسلحة

ليها،ع الحصول في «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول ترغب التي الأمنيات من القائمة هذه بين كبيرة فجوة هناك ذلك، ومع ببناء يةمعن أوباما إدارة إن. ديفيد كامب اجتماعات في الواقع في لمنحها استعداد على الأبيض البيت يكون التي تلك وبين

باتترتي تعرض أن المرجح غير من ولكن الأسلحة، ومبيعات والتدريب التعاون مجالات في بالفعل، القوية أمنية، علاقات الواقع، هذال ونظرا . الإيراني التدخل تجاه المتحدة الولايات سياسة في كبير تغيير إجراء في تبادر أو جديدة جوهرية دفاعية

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نحو سعيوال قدما ، الاستراتيجي التحالف لدفع ساعات عشر تستمر أن المتوقع الاجتماعات من الاستفادة واشنطن على يجب :جديدة عسكرية ترتيبات إلى بالإضافة رئيسية محاور أربعة تضم جهود بذل

جودو حول الخليج في القائمة النظر وجهات إلى واللهجة اللغة في كاملة مصداقية يعطي أن أوباما الرئيس على يجب .1مون التفاوض في وشركائها واشنطن أن يبدو الذي الوقت في. طهران من مباشر تهديد إيران مع اقاتف إلى التوصل نحو يتقد ز سلاميةالإ الجمهورية إحراز من بالقلق «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول قادة يشعر النووية، الأسلحة على ضيق بشكل يرك خاص بشكل حصحي وهذا. حدودهم عبر التدخلي نموذجها توسيع إلى وسعيها المنطقة، في القوى ميزان بتغييرها ثابتا ، تقدما

عبد كتب لصدد،ا هذا وفي. بايران المرتبط بالعنف مستهدفة كانت التي والكويت، السعودية العربية والمملكة للبحرين بالنسبة ضيق نووي اتفاق على التوقيع أن من تخشى الخليج دول بأن مايو،/أيار 01 في العربية قناة موقع على الراشد الرحمن على توجبي ولا". وجودهم وتهدد المنطقة، في لتعيث مفتوحا القفص باب لها سيترك" لكنه نوويا ، إيران أظافر يقل م سوف .العميق لقلقهم تفهمه عن لإبلاغهم النووي الاتفاق فعاليات حول معهم التوافق أوباما الرئيس

لتقليديةا غير التهديدات ضد التعاون توسيع كيفية حول مبدعة أفكار أمام منفتحا يكون أن الأمريكي الرئيس على يجب .2 إليه أشار ام أساسا بتعديله الإيراني، للتهديد الدقيق فهمه على الضوء يسلط أن شأنه من وهذا. الألكترونية الهجمات مثل في الملكية الحكومات قلق يثير ما أكثر بأن قال عندما أبريل/نيسان 2 في" تايمز نيويورك" صحيفة مع أجراها مقابلة في

عام وديةالسع آرامكو شركة على الإلكترونية الهجمات يناقش قد المثال، سبيل على[". بلدانها] بغزو إيران" قيام هو الخليج لقياسل القابلة الفعلية بالمخرجات «الخليجي التعاون مجلس» دول قادة يرحب وقد. ايرانية بمساعدة شُنت ربما التي 3103 .حدودهم داخل الإيراني التهديد لمواجهة الكم ي

عوديالس العهد ولي ولي على التعرف حيث من سيما لا القمة، اجتماع أثناء المعرفة وكسب الاستماع واشنطن على يجب .3

لعائلةا أفراد وأحد الشاب الأمير كان لقد. الدفاع وزير منصب أيضا يشغل الذي للملك المفضل الإبن سلمان، بن محمد الأمير من التحقق أوباما للرئيس بالنسبة الحكمة من سيكون لذلك اليمن، في الحوثيين ضد السعودية العسكرية الحملة وجه المالكة سوريا،: عاون الت وتعم ق[ الانتباه تسترعي أن يجب] التي الهامة المجالات وتشمل. الإقليمية بالسياسة المتعلقة الأخرى خططه .التطرف ومواجهة ،«والشام العراق في الإسلامية الدولة» تنظيم ضد والحملة

أمرا العلاقات بناء إن. المستقبل في الاتصالات وتوقيت مكان حول[ واضحة] لأفكار يرو ج أن أوباما الرئيس على يجب .4

دافعة وةق تكون لكي ديفيد، كامب بقمة تتعلق إحباطات أي استخدام واشنطن على يجب لذلك الحلفاء، هؤلاء لطمأنة ضروريا

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التعاون مجلس» ودول المتحدة الولايات بين الاستراتيجية العلاقات إن. معا للتقدم سبيل لرسم إضافية فرصا تخطيط نحو .محددة بسياسات علاقة ذو انقطاع أي من أهمية وأكثر أقوى هي «الخليجي

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UK election result lowers risk of EU exit

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

In yesterday's general election the Conservatives were returned to office, this time with an overall

majority, expected to be narrow but secure at six to ten seats. The election of a Conservative-only

government will ensure broad continuity in both economic and international policy, as well as

more stable government than had been expected. The new Parliament is likely to last its full five-

year term. There will be a referendum by the end of 2017 on the United Kingdom's EU

membership, but the likelihood of a UK vote to stay in has risen. Scotland may represent the new

government's principal policy challenge.

Impact

Financial markets are likely to receive the outcome with relief, given that the likely alternative was

pronounced and atypical uncertainty.

The greatest risk of 'Brexit' is now a renewed euro-area crisis harming the EU economy and UK

public opinion.

Serious bargaining over a future UK constitutional settlement may be deferred until after the

Scottish Parliament election in May 2016.

In the medium term, the Labour Party is likely to conclude that it needs to return to a more centrist,

business-friendly, 'Blairite' stance.

The extent to which the result defied pollsters' and forecasters' predictions could prompt significant

change in the business.

What next

Absent unexpected shocks, David Cameron is likely to dominate UK politics as prime minister for

the next three to four years, overseeing a renewal of the United Kingdom's EU membership and

an attempt to find a more coherent constitutional framework that keeps Scotland in the United

Kingdom, before standing down as promised, possibly in 2018.

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Analysis

After five years in government, the Conservatives are set to post a small increase in their vote

share and a significant rise in seats. The Conservatives' victory was achieved largely at the expense

of their outgoing coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, who suffered a devastating collapse.

The main opposition Labour Party's failure to make headway against the Conservatives in England

was compounded by its wholesale loss of its historically dominant position in Scotland to the

separatist Scottish National Party (SNP), which took all but three of Scotland's 59 seats. Labour,

the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats each have only one.

The election results highlight the disproportional effects of the voting system

Prime Minister David Cameron is likely to form a new Conservative-only government today, while

both the Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg, have resigned. The

scale of electoral losses among both parties' senior figures will leave them grappling with

leadership and strategic questions for some time.

Two smaller parties, the anti-EU United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Greens,

polled respectably but failed to make a breakthrough in terms of seats. UKIP is now the country's

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third-largest party by vote share, but it will have only one seat. Party leader Nigel Farage failed in

his bid to enter Parliament and has resigned.

Unpredicted outcome

The scale of the Conservatives' victory was unexpected even by those closely involved with the

campaign (see UNITED KINGDOM: Poll will bring political instability - May 4, 2015).

The Conservatives had originally hoped and expected that the campaign would be dominated by

the themes of economic management and prime ministerial credibility. Voters' late and decisive

tilt to the Conservatives seems to have been driven less by these than by a widespread concern in

England, encouraged by the Conservatives and the Conservative-supporting media, that the

country was heading for an unstable outcome, in which there was a real prospect of the SNP having

a decisive voice over matters affecting England.

Although apparently at odds, the SNP's overwhelming performance in Scotland and the resilience

of the Conservative vote in England (and to some extent Wales) may thus be inter-related. This

will only increase the sensitivity of the relationship between the prime minister of an

overwhelmingly English party in the UK parliament, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other,

where there is not only a nationalist-dominated Scottish parliament but now also a virtual

monopoly nationalist hold over the territory's representation in the UK parliament.

Further Scottish devolution

The SNP landslide in Scotland is unlikely to generate an immediate constitutional crisis or the

swift emergence of a new constitutional model for the United Kingdom, despite speculation to the

contrary. Under the deal offered during last year's Scottish independence referendum campaign,

legislation providing for substantial additional devolution to Scotland is already in preparation for

the incoming UK parliament (see UNITED KINGDOM: Devolution will complicate election -

December 15, 2014).

SNP strategy for the 2016 Scottish parliament election is now key

In theory, further fiscal autonomy might be attractive to the SNP in the short term, but it would be

almost unaffordable for the Scottish government. Lengthy discussions about details may thus suit

both sides, while the SNP decides whether to make a quest for a second referendum on

independence the central element of its strategy for the Scottish parliament elections in May 2016.

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Those elections will be contested under proportional representation, not Westminster's 'first-past-

the-post' system, which may challenge the SNP's ability to maintain its momentum of electorial

dominance.

EU referendum outlook

Relations with the rest of the EU under a new Conservative government might prove less

problematic than widely expected. There will be a referendum on the United Kingdom's continued

EU membership in 2016 or 2017. However, compared with the potential power of Conservative

Eurosceptic parliamentarians had the party not won a majority, Cameron's win has strengthened

his capacity to choose his own 'red lines' in negotiations with EU partners, not least Germany.

The certainty now of a referendum, along with Cameron's greater capacity to deliver an 'in' result,

mean that he is more likely to be able to extract concessions from his EU partners that can be

presented as more than symbolic.

If -- as is likely -- Cameron endorses continued EU membership for the referendum, the vast

majority of his senior colleagues will opt to follow him, whatever their private instincts, rather

than risk splitting the party by aligning with UKIP and dissident right-wing Conservatives in

campaigning for withdrawal.

The greatest risk to a UK vote for continued EU membership would now appear to be a new euro-

area crisis -- probably triggered by Greece -- having a signifcantly adverse effect on the EU

economy, and making continued membership appear far less attractive and advantageous.

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Cameron pulls off a surprise win: What now for Europe and

Scotland?

Brookings – by Richard V. Reeves

David Cameron’s startling victory in the UK’s general election was the result of competing

nationalist sentiments. It puts a question mark over the state of two unions: the European Union,

and the Union between Scotland and the rest of the UK.

Nationalist feelings helped Cameron to win in England and Wales, and nationalist feeling resulted

in a spectacular triumph for the Scottish National Party in Scotland. Last night saw the political

birth of the Dis-United Kingdom. The shock waves are likely to be felt for years to come.

Against all predictions, Cameron’s Conservatives took 37% of the national vote and won just

enough parliamentary seats to form a government without another coalition. David Cameron held

off the threat from the outright English nationalists of the UK Independence Party, but he did so

in large part by playing the role of the patriotic Englishman himself. His election night dinner was,

of course, a beef pie.

The result means that the coalition known as the Conservative Party is where the negotiations will

take place. Cameron’s very slender majority hands more power to the dozens of anti-European

Conservative MPs. Now that the Conservatives have dispensed with their coalition partners the

Liberal Democrats, the pro-European forces within the government are virtually non-existent.

Cameron will certainly deliver the promised 2017 ‘in or out’ referendum on the UK’s membership

of the European Union. Right now, you’d be a fool to bet that the Brits will vote to remain tied to

Brussels.

Meanwhile, north of Hadrian’s Wall, the Scottish National Party (SNP) virtually swept the other

parties out of Scotland, transforming the political geography of the country. Before last night, the

SNP held six seats out of 59 in Scotland: today they have 56. Labour, who started the night with

41 Scottish MPs, now have just one. This is the equivalent of the Republicans being banished from

the Wyoming state legislature. The British Ambassador to the United States knew what he was

doing when he welcomed guests to his election night party with a pair of bagpipers.

For me, the most extraordinary moment of the night—and it was a night full of Alice-in-

Wonderland moments - was watching Labour’s election chief Douglas Alexander—a tough, smart,

veteran politician—lose his seat to Mhairi Black, a 20 year-old student, the youngest member of

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parliament since 1667, on a 27% swing. In her acceptance speech, she virtually apologized to Mr

Alexander.

David Cameron will immediately introduce legislation to give Scotland more power over its own

economic and social affairs. This will help a little to placate the Scots. But the biggest challenge

will be the decision over the replacement of Trident, the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which relies on

submarines based in Scotland. Cameron is committed to a replacement. The SNP, who made much

of the issue during the campaign, is bitterly opposed.

If the SNP repeat last night’s performance in 2016 in the elections to the Scottish Parliament,

another referendum on independence will be unavoidable—and this time it will be won. Having

rejected independence last year, the Scots seem to be having second, third and fourth thoughts.

If Cameron forces through Trident, the fracture will widen. If the 2017 referendum takes the UK

out of the EU, but most Scots vote to stay in, it will become inoperable.

Labour had a horrific night in Scotland, but a very bad night everywhere, posting an even worse

performance than Gordon Brown managed in 2010: and that was after 13 years of Labour

government, in the midst of recession, and Brown being caught on tape castigating a loyal

supporter as ‘that bigoted woman’. Last night, Brown’s old seat fell to the SNP.

The Liberal Democrats—who put Cameron into Downing Street—were almost wiped off the

political map. Leader Nick Clegg, my former boss, survived as an MP—though not as party leader.

The party’s MPs can now travel together in a large minivan. Of their 56 parliamentarians, only

eight survived the cull. The lazy analysis is that they simply paid the price for coalition. In fact, a

string of bad political decisions, especially the breaking of a promise on student tuition, fatally

damaged the party’s brand. Cameron was fond of describing the Liberal Democrats as his ‘human

shield’, absorbing much of the political damage for his unpopular decisions. The shield melted last

night—but it did its job for Cameron.

Three political lessons can be drawn from the UK’s surprise result.

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Leaders matter. In the old days of two strong parties turning out their core votes, leaders were not

a decisive electoral factor. Those days are long gone. As fixed party loyalties dissolve, voters can

be wooed or repelled by individual leaders. Ed Miliband was a very poor choice of leader for the

Labour Party. Everyone knew it, all along, and yet the party somehow persuaded itself that it could

win anyway. Nicola Sturgeon, SNP leader, is a superb communicator and ran a stunningly good

campaign. The Conservatives won not because of their policies, or their organization, but because

Cameron was seen as a strong leader.

Don’t trust the polls. Nobody—and I mean nobody—predicted a straight Conservative victory,

however narrow. All the polls running up to the election suggested that Labour and the

Conservatives were running neck and neck. Everyone was getting ready for another coalition, or

cobbled-together deal of some kind. In part this is because British voters are making up their minds

much later than in the past: with just three days to go, more than a quarter had yet to make up their

mind. It looks like most of these ‘undecideds’ decided, in the end, for Cameron.

The political pendulum is not swinging to the left. After the recession, after austerity policies, amid

rising inequality and stagnant living standards, Miliband and his team convinced themselves that

the British people would almost automatically seek a more progressive and redistributive

government. Not so. The hard truth is that in tough economic times, the vital political quality is

competence (or the appearance of it), not compassion. It is too easy for liberals and progressives

to look at economic trends and assume that a left-of-center pitch will be a winning one. They will

have to work much harder than that.

Today is the 70th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, the day when the Allies finally defeated

Hitler’s Germany. Yesterday’s election in the UK was a reminder both of what was fought for,

and of the modesty of the actual stakes. After all, only parliamentary seats were lost last night, not

lives.

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Iran: The danger of politicized intelligence after a nuclear deal

Law fare – by Joshua Rovner

Secret intelligence is playing a public role in the ongoing debate over the Iran nuclear deal. If the

deal is finalized in June, Iran will sacrifice much of its existing uranium enrichment capabilities in

return for lifting some economic sanctions and will have to accept an intrusive inspections regime

to verify its compliance for more than a decade. The presence of inspectors will create new

opportunities for intelligence collection: Not only will intelligence agencies benefit from

inspection reports dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, but they will be free to explore other areas

of Iran’s scientific and associated industrial infrastructure.

Obama administration officials have expressed confidence that the intelligence community will be

able to watch Iran closely, and the intelligence community has returned the compliment. In a recent

public appearance, CIA Director John Brennan expressed satisfaction that Iran had made so many

concessions and applauded U.S. diplomats for securing a deal that was “as solid as you can get.”

There is no reason to doubt Brennan’s sincerity. Indeed, while relations between U.S.

policymakers and intelligence leaders are sometimes fractious, the two sides are on the same page

when it comes to Iran. Declassified U.S. estimates are broadly consistent with administration

statements on Iran’s nuclear progress. Since 2007, the intelligence community has assessed that

Iran does not have an active nuclear weapons program, but that it is committed to maintaining its

enrichment capability. While some hawks have criticized these estimates, there is nothing to

suggest that they were disputed by President Bush or President Obama. And if intelligence on Iran

is as good policymakers believe, then there is no reason the intelligence community would worry

about its own ability to monitor Iranian compliance.

But this synergy between intelligence and policy may not last forever. What will happen, for

instance, if the intelligence community discovers that Iran is cheating? Having staked itself to the

nuclear deal, the administration may be reluctant or unable to accept this kind of bad news. Worse

yet, the intelligence community will be under pressure to report on Iranian activities in public,

given that policymakers used intelligence as a major selling point in the U.S. ability to verify

compliance. Instead of keeping intelligence under wraps, policymakers will be tempted to

politicize it by pressuring officials to report findings that are aligned with their own views.

At this point intelligence officials will face a difficult choice. On the one hand, they can push back

and resist pressure to change the tone or substance of their estimates. At the same time, they might

worry about spending all their political capital in one shot, leaving them isolated and pushed out

of the policy process. As in any advisory relationship, intelligence-policy relations are iterative.

However much intelligence officials would like to speak truth to power today, they fear the price

will be losing influence in the future. Iran is not the only game in town, of course, and intelligence

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officials presumably want a seat at the table in discussions of issues ranging from counterterrorism

to great power politics. For this reason they may engage in “soft politicization” by toning down

their conclusions or making it appear as if there are a range of equally plausible interpretations

from the same underlying evidence. If this occurs, policymakers will be able to claim that they

made decisions on the basis of the best available information.

Intelligence officials have often yielded to the temptation to soft-peddle estimates that cut against

policy views. It is not hard to understand why. Confronting policymakers with bad news seems

like a recipe for losing access and influence, especially when intelligence findings challenge the

logic of policy decisions. “Outright pandering clearly crosses the line,” Columbia University’s

Richard Betts writes. “But what about a decision simply not to poke a policymaker in the eye, to

avoid confrontation, to get a better hearing for a negative view by softening its presentation when

a no-compromise argument would be certain to provoke anger and rejection?” Moreover, some

issues are more important than others, so it makes little sense to alienate policymakers on relatively

minor issues. If it is true that intelligence chiefs have a finite stockpile of political capital, they

should spend it wisely.

Engaging in this kind of soft politicization might seem like common sense. Unfortunately, there is

little evidence that it actually works. Consider the case of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

Richard Helms, who on more than one occasion bent to policy pressure in order to keep

intelligence from becoming irrelevant to the policy process. In 1969, for instance, the Nixon

administration leaned on Helms to exaggerate the capabilities of a new Soviet missile while it was

trying to secure Senate approval of a new missile-defense system. Even though many analysts

were skeptical of Soviet capabilities, Helms intervened to ensure that published estimates were

consistent with the administration’s public position. He also appeared before Congress alongside

the Secretary of Defense as a show of support. As he explained later, “I was not prepared to stake

the Agency’s entire position on this one issue… I was convinced we would have lost the argument

with the Nixon administration, and that in the process the Agency would have been permanently

damaged.” Unfortunately for Helms, his action did little to improve his position or the standing of

the intelligence community, which was increasingly excluded from high-level discussions. Helms

was unceremoniously fired in 1972, and the Board of National Estimates, which had once been

the focal point for intelligence community analysis, was dissolved in 1973.

The case of DCI George Tenet is a more recent cautionary tale. Following the perceived

intelligence failure that led to the September 11 attacks, Tenet worked hard to restore the Bush

administration’s confidence in the intelligence community. At the outset this meant moving

aggressively against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, but Tenet also came under pressure

to help the administration make the public case against Iraq in 2002-2003. Although he was well

aware of analysts’ doubts about the Iraqi threat, he chose to declassify intelligence that was

consistent with the president’s claim that Iraq was a “grave and gathering danger.” These efforts

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to mollify the administration proved to be futile. In the aftermath of the March 2003 invasion,

when it became clear that Iraq possessed no real weapons of mass destruction, relations between

the White House and the intelligence community broke down completely. Policymakers claimed

that shoddy intelligence analyses were responsible for their false claims about Iraqi capabilities.

Intelligence officials accused the administration of bullying them into exaggerating the threat. And

Tenet himself accused administration officials of feeding stories to credulous reporters to shift the

blame to the intelligence community. He resigned one year later.

What should we draw from these cases? For intelligence officials, the main lesson is to stop trying

to curry favor by softening estimates. In the last decade the U.S. intelligence community has

weathered repeated controversies, not because it has played politics but because it has performed

well. If it detects Iranian cheating in the aftermath of the nuclear deal, it should say so bluntly,

even if this means upsetting policymakers who invested so much in the effort. The long-term

consequences of soft politicization far outweigh the short-term discomfort of being honest.

For policymakers, the lesson is to take intelligence out of the spotlight. Using intelligence to sell

the Iran deal will reinforce the expectation that future assessments will also be public. This will

create a temptation to pressure intelligence agencies to make sure their findings are consistent with

administration statements, and intelligence officials might tailor their findings so they are

inoffensive. The result will be mushy conclusions useful to no one. Intelligence on Iran is very

solid today, and intelligence-policy relations are healthy. The best thing the administration can do

to preserve this happy status quo is to remove secret intelligence from public view.

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COP21 will reach weak global climate agreement

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Tuesday, May 5 2015

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), also known as the 21st

Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UN Convention on Climate Change, will take place in

Paris in December. Its goal is drafting a successor to the expired Kyoto Protocol, in the form of

the first universal climate agreement, which should enter into force in 2020 at the latest. In the

coming months, UN parties will put forward their proposed emissions reduction targets for the

Paris summit. As of May 1, only Switzerland, Russia, Gabon, the United States, Mexico,

Liechtenstein, Andorra, Norway and the EU had disclosed their official intentions, representing

around 17% of all parties to the negotiations and only 30% of global emissions.

Impact

Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris text is likely to be an 'accord' instead of a 'treaty', meaning

that its legal power will be weak.

The mitigation commitments put on the table so far are insufficient to spare humanity from the

consequences of climate change.

Climate resilience becomes an ever-urgent goal to be advanced in Paris; adaptation costs will be

high in future decades.

The Paris summit will need to deliver a global insurance scheme covering loss and damage for the

most vulnerable countries.

What next

The delay in countries submitting their proposed targets could delay the global assessment of

mitigation commitments scheduled for October 2015. The key event will be when China submits

its official commitment, which will be the first time the country accepts some international climate

constraint. The way expectations are managed beforehand will be key to the success of the Paris

summit.

Analysis

Ahead of the Copenhagen summit in 2009, negotiators promised a global legally binding

agreement, but they could not deliver it. This is why Paris negotiators have adopted a flexible

position on the legal form of the text that is likely to be politically, but not legally binding.

This is close to the US position, where a legally binding text would require the Senate's approval

and thus would probably be rejected. The EU and its member states contest this position. In their

intended nationally determined contribution, released on March 6, they called for "adopting a

global legally binding agreement applicable to all Parties". The US position is likely to prevail,

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meaning that the Paris text will not have the same legal force as the Kyoto Protocol, itself deprived

of any sanction for non-abiding parties.

Therefore, a climate agreement is likely to be reached in Paris, but its legal format will most likely

be weak. The same can be said about its substance.

Insufficient mitigation

Parties to the UNFCCC have agreed that the world needs to keep global warming below 2 degrees

Celsius compared to the pre-industrial era, to keep most of humanity safe from climate change.

This threshold is based on climate science, but not endorsed by the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change. It is already too high for some countries (eg, Pacific islands), which push for a

1.5 degree limit (see INTERNATIONAL: Small islands will face climate change - August 29,

2014). But even a 2 degree limit now seems unattainable.

2014 may have seen the first global emissions decline in 40 years

It is possible that 2014 has seen the first decline in global emissions in the past four decades, as

recent International Energy Agency data revealed. However, they still have to be confirmed by the

BP energy review in June. In any case, such a fall is possibly accidental and too slow: the

February BP Energy Outlook predicts a 25% increase in CO2 emissions until 2035, based on

current and future energy consumption patterns.

Mitigation commitments

Existing mitigation commitments are too low to curb this trend. The climate commitments by the

top four emitters, covering roughly 60% of global emissions, are as follows:

China

China accounts for 27% of global emissions. In November 2014, within an unofficial bilateral

agreement with the United States, it committed to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 at the latest,

increasing the share of non-fossil energy carriers of the total primary energy supply to at least 20%

by then (see PROSPECTS 2015: Climate change policy - November 12, 2014).

United States

The United States accounts for 14% of global emissions. In March 2015, it committed to reduce

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels in 2025, which is equivalent to 14-

17% below 1990 levels (see CHINA/US: Deal sets stage for new climate regime - April 6, 2015).

EU

The EU accounts for 10% of global emissions. In October 2014, the EU and its member states

committed to a binding target of at least a 40% domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030

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compared to 1990, to be fulfilled jointly (see EU: Climate deal will be used for global agreement

- October 29, 2014).

India

India accounts for 6% of global emissions. In 2010, it committed to reduce the emission intensity

of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020, compared to 2005 levels.

The experts at Climate Action Tracker are following the announcements and commitments in order

to track their compatibility with the 2 degrees Celsius threshold. They currently conclude that

existing and announced measures lead to an increase above 3 degrees in global temperatures,

possibly as high as 3.8 degrees.

It is hard to see how these national commitments will be raised before or in Paris, because of the

amount of work that still needs to be done to clarify existing positions. The negotiating text that

came out of the Geneva conference in February is full of options and brackets that stand for

unresolved disagreements between member states to the UNFCC.

Building Climate Resilience

Given the disappointing state of mitigation negotiations, adaptation costs will be higher than

expected in the 2 degrees increase scenario. This is an issue for the most vulnerable countries, such

as the Philippines, ranked as the most exposed country to climate disasters by The World Risk

Index 2014. The devastation of Vanuatu, another highly exposed country, by Cyclone Pam in

March 2015 has heightened the need for global financial solidarity.

Many hope that the Paris summit will see progress on the 'loss and damage', which should replace

urgency aid by a stable and reliable funding mechanism. The aforementioned negotiating text

refers to an adaptation mechanism that "should be established to integrate the existing mechanisms

associated with adaptation and loss and damage", a vague formulation.

$70-100 bnEstimated yearly cost of adapting to a 2 degree Celsius increase in the average global

temperature

The World Bank estimates that the cost of adapting to a 2 degree Celsius increase in average global

temperature during 2010-50 is 70-100 billion dollars yearly. The East Asia and Pacific Region will

bear the most cost of climate adaptation in absolute terms, but Sub-Saharan Africa will suffer from

the highest cost as a percentage of its GDP.

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Tides of change: Taiwan's evolving position in the South China Sea

Brookings- By Lynn Kuok

Taiwan, along with China and four Southeast Asian countries, is a claimant in the South China

Sea, though this fact is sometimes overlooked. On paper, Taiwan and China share the same claims.

The dashed or U-shaped line encapsulating much of the South China Sea appears on both

Taiwanese and Chinese maps.

Neither China nor Taiwan has officially clarified the meaning of the dashed line which could be

seen as making a claim to the wide expanse of water enclosed within the dashed line or (merely)

to the land features contained therein and to maritime zones made from them in accordance with

the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law.

In the past year, Taiwan has taken small but significant steps toward clarifying that its claims are

from land and in accord with UNCLOS and international law. It has also adopted a more

conciliatory position by advocating that its East China Sea Peace Initiative, which calls on parties

to shelve disputes and promote joint exploration and development in the East China Sea (where

China, Taiwan and Japan have competing claims), be applied in the South China Sea as well.

These movements are significant in that they could have a stabilizing effect in the South China

Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) inherited its claims from the Republic of China (ROC)

after the Chinese civil war. Thus, the ROC’s interpretation of its claims is relevant to the PRC’s

claims. Notably, a more limited reading of the claims would not be inconsistent with China’s

official position as set out in its 2009 and 2011 statements to the United Nations.

Taiwan’s overtures have largely, however, been ignored. At the root of this is China’s “one-China”

principle, which has cast a long shadow over Taiwan. This paper argues that in order to carve out

a modest political space for itself in the South China Sea, Taiwan should:

Clarify that its claims accord with UNCLOS and international law without expressly eschewing

the dashed line.

Tread carefully on any public education on Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea to avoid

unleashing nationalist sentiment, which would limit policy options.

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Continue promoting President Ma Ying-jeou’s plan for the East China Sea in the South China Sea.

Push behind the scenes for participation in code of conduct negotiations and in cooperative

activities involving all claimants.

Provide evidence that Taiping Island is an “island” capable of sustaining human habitation or

economic life under UNCLOS Article 121.

The paper also argues that all parties who have an interest in better management of the dispute and

a more peaceful region—including China—have an interest in supporting Taiwan’s inclusion in

negotiations and activities relating to the South China Sea. This can be done in ways consistent

with China’s one-China principle. Proper management of the dispute necessarily involves Taiwan:

Taiwan controls the largest land feature in the South China Sea, its vessels regularly patrol the

area, and it has one of the biggest fishing industries in the Pacific.

For China, supporting Taiwan’s participation in cooperative activities would support both

Beijing’s desire for better cross-strait relations, and its dual-track approach to the South China Sea

dispute, which seeks one-on-one negotiations on sovereignty issues and multilateral arrangements

within the region to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.

The paper lays the foundation for these arguments by taking a closer look at calls within the United

States for Taipei to “clarify” or “abandon” its dashed line; examining Taiwan’s claims in and

evolving position on the South China Sea; and highlighting salient Chinese responses and the

broader context within which Taiwan operates as a means by which to gauge the viability of

various courses of action.

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New leader to revitalise South Africa's opposition

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Monday, May 11 2015

South Africa's largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) yesterday voted Mmusi

Maimane as its first black leader, receiving 88.9% of delegates' support at a party congress held

on May 9-10. Outgoing leader, Helen Zille, resigned on April 12 -- two years earlier than expected.

Party strategists see Maimane as critical for attracting black voters, whose support is essential for

its growth.

Impact

The radical left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters' appeal among young, educated black voters

may dilute the DA's attraction strategies.

The DA will struggle to transform its Values Charter into specific policy proposals, due to the

departure of senior policy figures.

Consequently, DA-controlled sub-national governments will formulate their own policies,

tailoring them to appeal to local constituencies.

Its media team will struggle to communicate with the ANC's rural supporters, who are often

influenced by traditional leaders.

What next

Maimane's limited leadership experience will be tested in the short term: by possible coalition talks

following the 2016 municipal government elections, and by healing party rifts. Holding the party

leader and parliamentary leader positions will help improve coordination over strategy. Together

with populist messaging, this will help to grow its support base, but not displace the ANC in the

2019 poll.

Analysis

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Maimane (34 years old) defeated the far more experienced outgoing party chairman, Wilmot James

(61 years), a US-trained sociologist. James previously led the development of party policy, notably

its Growth and Jobs Plan, and used his international connections to build a global network of

advisers and funders. However, Maimane has better oratory skills, developed as a pastor in an

evangelical church.

The DA also adopted a new Values Charter at the congress, which will ostensibly form the basis

of future policy-making. It emphasises "family structures" as the foundation for national success,

in contrast to the DA's traditionally liberal emphasis on individuals.

Maimane's mission

Maimane joined the DA in 2009, stood as its mayoral candidate in Johannesburg in 2011 and as

premier of Gauteng province in the May 2014 general election. Though he lost both races, the DA

elected him as its parliamentary leader last year, which has helped him build a constituency and

national media profile (see SOUTH AFRICA: Poll continuity belies new ANC strains - May 12,

2014).

Maimane's appointment will help the DA to counter ANC claims that it represents 'white' interests

The conditions are fertile for opposition growth. There are divisions within the ANC and its

alliance with trade unions -- the largest of which has split off. Public disgruntlement is growing

over multiple corruption scandals, high unemployment and power shortages. However,

perceptions that the DA represents 'white interests' have persisted, limiting its appeal to around 6%

of black voters.

Such perceptions were reinforced by ANC statements prior to the 2014 election that the DA would

"bring back apartheid".

Zille's legacy

Under Zille's leadership, the DA grew considerably.

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In 2009 it won a majority in the country's second most developed province, the Western Cape.

Following this, it won an outright majority in the City of Cape Town in the 2011 municipal

elections (having governed since 2006 in a multi-party coalition). In 2014, it retained the Western

Cape with an increased majority and increased in national share of the vote to 22.2%, from 12.3%

in 2009.

She proactively recruited public figures such as James and former Eastern Cape Premier Nosimo

Balindlela to the party. She also negotiated a tie up with the Independent Democrats in 2011, led

by anti-apartheid activist Patricia De Lille, who then became Cape Town's mayor. These helped

the DA consolidate its support among most minority groups.

Zille is a capable leader but by the end of her tenure pressures were becoming unmanageable from

holding both the premiership of the Western Cape and the party leadership. This was exacerbated

by the 2012 departure of her chief strategist, Ryan Coetzee, to join former UK Deputy Prime

Minister Nick Clegg's office.

Double trouble

This dual role meant her responsibilities often overlapped with those of former parliamentary

leader Lindiwe Mazibuko, occasionally leading to contradictory statements and strategic mishaps

(see SOUTH AFRICA: Split is blow to forging opposition - February 3, 2014).

In 2013, the DA parliamentary caucus voted to support stricter employment equity legislation,

without fully considering its contents and despite the bill contradicting core party principles against

racial categorisations. This caused public confusion over its underlying values.

It admitted its "mistake", but Zille publicly blamed Mazibuko. The latter had been tipped to

succeed as leader, but resigned in May 2014 to study in the United States, leaving the way open

for Maimane's rise.

More damaging was an attempted tie-up with social movement Agang, led by anti-apartheid figure

Mamphele Ramphele, who Zille planned to make the DA's presidential candidate. Ramphele then

withdrew, damaging Zille's credibility.

These events, combined with various public relations embarrassments -- many caused by

arguments with media figures via Twitter -- damaged Zille's standing, which usually polled higher

than the party as a whole. In contrast, her tenure as premier has been largely successful, overseeing

reforms that cut corruption and improved civil service effectiveness.

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Zille says she will remain as premier. However, it will be difficult for the party -- and especially

Maimane -- to accommodate a figure of Zille's prominence while simultaneously forging a fresh

strategic direction. One scenario could see De Lille (who was in April appointed party leader in

the Western Cape) succeeding her as premier, possibly after the 2016 municipal polls.

Party prospects

Identity politics pose the greatest challenge to growing the DA's support base. It is possible that a

Maimane-led campaign to appeal to disgruntled ANC voters could lead it to become 'ANC lite',

supporting strong state intervention and race-based redistribution, but more efficiently and less

corrupt (see SOUTH AFRICA: "Radical" plan to hit mines, oil and gas - February 11, 2015). This

could upset the DA's core minority constituencies.

In particular, appeals to African nationalist sentiment risk alienating coloured supporters in the

Western Cape, who underpin its majority there.

Maimane will need to reassure traditional liberals and coloured voters, who may feel alienated by

his populist positions

Maimane's advisers claim this approach is critical for gaining support from black South Africans,

who constitute 79% of the population. Yet he may face a backlash if he pushes on populist policies

too soon. There are signs of this already, particularly among Mazibuko supporters, who criticise

his openness to holding referenda on the death penalty (banned under the constitution) and aspects

of gay rights.

Yet, Maimane's amenability to populist positions may help the DA to find common ground with

other parties during likely coalition bargaining following municipal polls in 2016. His win also

avoids the prospects of a bruising leadership battle playing out during the poll. The election could

see the DA run one or more major cities with other parties, eg Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth,

where ANC support may dip below 50%.

Measuring the success of Abe’s U.S. visit

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Brookings – by Jennifer Mason

The highly anticipated, week-long state visit by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the United

States and his April 28 meeting with President Obama were, overall, a success. Abe became the

first Japanese prime minister to address a joint meeting of Congress and together with President

Obama, he announced a joint vision statement for the two allies. Prior to the prime minister’s

arrival in Washington, Brookings Senior Fellow Mireya Solís identified three major priorities for

the visit: security, trade, and historical reconciliation. These issues were advanced to varying

degrees.

The most tangible results were achieved in security. New bilateral defense cooperation guidelines

were announced on the eve of the Obama-Abe meeting, a much needed update from the previous

1997 guidelines. At a Brookings event on May 4, Brookings Senior Fellow Jeffrey Bader noted

that the guidelines represent incremental—not abrupt—change in the alliance, and clarify roles for

the United States and Japan. They provide an outline for the legislation that Abe will seek from

the Japanese Diet later this year. Senior Japanese politicians who spoke at Brookings were cautious

in their assessments of the defense cooperation guidelines. Koichiro Gemba, of the opposition

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), expressed concern that the announcement of the guidelines may

lead to misunderstandings between the United States and Japan regarding Japan’s ability to

conduct collective self-defense, since full legislation on the revised guidelines has yet to be

discussed in the Diet and explained to the public. Isamu Ueda from Komeito, the ruling party’s

coalition partner, acknowledged that the government would need to carefully and clearly explain

the legislation to the public in advance of the Diet deliberation. Debate on draft legislation is

tentatively scheduled to begin in the Diet in mid-May.

In the Obama-Abe meeting, trade was perhaps the area in which there were the highest hopes and

expectations, but which achieved the fewest results. Both administrations had earlier hoped to

announce the conclusion of bilateral negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

(TPP), which would have been a huge confidence booster for both sides and would have gone a

long way in reassuring the other TPP members. However, these expectations were tempered as the

visit drew closer. Although both President Obama and Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed their

commitment to the TPP negotiations, they were not able to make any groundbreaking

announcements on progress in the bilateral negotiations. Before Abe’s arrival, Mireya Solís said

that without this type of announcement “the summit can at best be only a partial success,” a

sentiment that she echoed in a media interview following the summit, stating that the meeting was

“a missed opportunity,” since it did not force a conclusion to the bilateral negotiations.

The increasing importance of TPP was emphasized by both Japanese and American speakers at

Brookings. Yasutoshi Nishimura, state minister for the Cabinet office, said that TPP is a “main

pillar of [Japan’s] growth strategy” and Solís added that it is a litmus test for Japan’s ability to

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successfully undertake structural reform. For the United States, the TPP is an integral part of the

Obama administration’s Asia rebalance strategy. And while none of the panelists stated that the

lack of trade promotion authority (TPA) was holding Japan back in the bilateral negotiations, the

strong belief that TPA is essential to the success of TPP negotiations is shared by many.

Historical reconciliation was the most controversial topic during the trip. Although the substance

of the trip was mainly U.S.-Japan relations, there had been speculation whether Abe would use

this opportunity to address some of Japan’s historical issues with South Korea and China. In his

address to Congress, Abe offered his condolences for the American lives lost during World War

II and referenced the suffering caused by Japanese actions in Asia, saying that he would “uphold

the views expressed by the previous prime ministers.” Jeffrey Bader noted that this acceptance of

the Kono Statement on “comfort women” and endorsement of the statements made by previous

prime ministers was sufficient for an American audience. But many Korean and Chinese observers

were underwhelmed by the address, and Prime Minister Abe will be under even more intense

scrutiny from these neighbors as he prepares for his August 15 speech commemorating the 70th

anniversary of the end of World War II.

While Abe’s visit was successful to varying degrees, it left no doubt about the continued strength

of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the shared interests and goals of the two countries. However, in each

of the areas touched upon during Abe’s visit there will be challenges in the near future: The

Japanese Diet will deliberate on potentially unpopular legislation regarding the new defense

cooperation guidelines, the U.S. Congress will debate the passage of trade promotion authority

while the U.S.-Japan bilateral TPP negotiations try to finally reach an agreement, and there will

be heightened pressure surrounding Abe’s August 15 speech. In recent years, the United States

and Japan have striven to establish a more multidimensional, global alliance. How they meet and

work to overcome these challenges will define the type of alliance we can expect to see in the

future.

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Resignations to hamper South Africa anti-graft bodies

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Thursday, May 7 2015

Gordhan's stature may suffer if links to the anti-Zuma 'spy unit' emerge. This would help shift the

power balance in the cabinet to left-wing ministers. 'Voluntary' resignations by investigators

leading probes into high-profile politicians will help the government avoid drawn-out appeals

processes, with the resulting leadership turnover delaying key investigations.

Senior South African Revenue Service (SARS) officials Ivan Pillay and Peter Richter yesterday

resigned -- despite charges over them operating a covert unit spying on President Jacob Zuma

being withdrawn. Former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo will now lead a new inquiry, which may

unearth fresh evidence. Earlier probes advised that the unit -- established when Cooperative

Governance Minister Pravin Gordhan was SARS commissioner -- was unlawful, but were

ultimately inconclusive. Meanwhile, the National Prosecuting Authority is in turmoil. Its head,

Mxolisi Nxasana, faces an inquiry into his fitness for office, as does his deputy, Nomgcobo Jiba,

who also faces a perjury charge. The detective handling the latter's case was himself dismissed on

May 6. Former head of anti-graft agency 'The Hawks', Anwar Dramat, resigned on April 21 after

a campaign to remove him.

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New Turkish Cypriot leader is chance for settlement

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Monday, May 4 2015

Mustafa Akinci, a veteran left-of-centre politician, was sworn in as president of the self-proclaimed

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on April 30. Reunion of the island is now an option,

for the first time since the Turkish invasion of 1974. There is strong international support, but

designing a deal acceptable to both sides may be more difficult than some politicians and public

opinion on both sides suppose. Tough choices and sophisticated compromises will be necessary in

the next few months and may not be forthcoming. Yet among both Greek and Turkish Cypriots,

there are expectations that a settlement could revitalise the island, where both sides' economies are

stagnating.

Impact

Agreement would ease decades-old tensions between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern

Mediterranean, benefiting NATO and the EU.

However, a settlement would not significantly unblock the path of Turkey's EU accession bid.

Cyprus would become a more appealing destination for foreign investment and tourism.

With left-wing politicians on both sides deciding the deal, NATO and US interests would have to

be safeguarded during talks.

Turkey must decide how to respond to the unwinding of a four decades-old foreign policy.

What next

Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders must now work out a framework plan for reunion and present

it to both communities in a referendum later this year. Some Greek Cypriot politicians have

rejected the outline -- envisaging a single bizonal, bicommunal country, with entrenched rights for

each community -- as conceding too much to the Turkish Cypriots. Yet it will be hard for Akinci

to accept anything less if he is to win the referendum. He must also sell it to a Turkish government

that initially reacted to his election with alarm. If these hurdles can be surmounted, a period of

campaigning will begin. If they cannot, then the island may return to stalemate.

Analysis

Akinci's election as Turkish Cypriot president was initially received exuberantly among the public

on both sides of the UN Green Line in Cyprus. The belief is that conditions for a swift peaceful

settlement and reunion now exist -- and that a settlement will prove workable.

Conditions in Cyprus have certainly changed drastically since 2004, judging by the congratulations

sent by Greek Cypriot politicians to Akinci, and the presence of Greek Cypriots at the celebration

of his victory. Akinci, a veteran socialist, has the backing of two out of three Turkish Cypriot

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electors and a proven track-record as Turkish mayor of Nicosia of working constructively with his

Greek Cypriot colleagues.

Turkish Cypriot aspirations

After a decade of isolation on the edge of the EU, Turkish Cypriots mostly want to be able to take

full advantage of EU membership. They are also wary of what the future might bring them, under

the wing of an increasingly Islamic Turkey with its autocratic President Recep Tayyip Erdogan,

who is widely unpopular on the island. A particular cause of alarm is a large Islamic religious

faculty being built on Cyprus, about which little is known and which -- it is said -- will take more

than 10,000 students.

Although the subject is taboo, Turkish Cypriots would probably also welcome the scaling down

or even departure of the large Turkish military presence in the north, usually put at over 30,000.

This is widely thought to be unnecessary under present conditions and to enjoy a

disproportionately privileged position. Turkey has missed a political opportunity by not reducing

its military presence sharply during the last decade.

However, the most important factor is that the fears of the Greek Cypriots have largely evaporated,

after being acute for many years following the 1964 clashes. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots no longer

worry that they might face minority status in a Greek island. Instead, reunion is seen as a business

opportunity for both sides (see CYPRUS: Hydrocarbons finds could prove game-changer - June

7, 2013).

Mutual fears have largely evaporated

Before his election, Akinci spoke of settlement plans in gradualist terms, through steps such as the

creation of a unified cellular telephone system for the island. This approach is of course based on

his own accomplishments as Turkish mayor of Nicosia. In his inaugural speech, he referred to the

need to reopen Famagusta, a once-lucrative tourist area closed since 1974.

Obstacles to a settlement

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However, Cypriots are also well aware that practical and political obstacles still exist:

Nationalism

There are the ideological nationalists on both sides who reject compromise. The elections suggest

that among Turkish Cypriots, nationalists currently number less than one-third, but that could

change.

Turkish settlers

There will also be a serious question mark about the future presence on the island of the 80,000

non-Cyprus nationals, mostly but not entirely, immigrants from Turkey.

Turkish immigrants could be deal-breaker

The future of a larger group of immigrants from Turkey who settled on the island after 1974, have

been there for decades, and who have acquired citizenship, is less clear. These make up about half

of the North Cyprus population (whose total size, variously put at between 280,000 and 500,000

is a matter of dispute).

Greek Cypriots see these as the major stumbling block to a deal.

Ankara's objections

Turkey and Erdogan seem uneasy. Turkey could find itself in effect eased out of Cyprus -- and the

present government in Ankara may see reunion as a retreat from full Islamic rule in the north. If

Turkey disapproves of any deal, it has a simple weapon -- to cut funding to the TRNC government,

which depends on its subsidies.

Property restitution

Turkey will probably also want indemnification against the potentially enormous cost of legal

compensation for Greek Cypriots who lost property in the north: Turkey has declined to accept

rulings from the European courts on this issue for more than a decade.

Greek Cypriots are likely to seek compensation and some restitution, as well as some Greek

resettlement in the north -- a feature of the Annan Plan in 2004 that they rejected (but Turkish

Cypriots accepted) in a referendum. President Nicos Anastasiades (see CYPRUS: President's

honeymoon may be coming to an end - March 11, 2014) will have to tread a very fine line between

disappointing Greek Cypriot aspirations over the north, and alienating Turkish Cypriot support.

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Question of expulsion of Greeks from north in 1974 will need to be addressed

The way ahead?

Both sides will probably agree fairly easily to reopening Varosha -- 'New Famagusta' -- and things

would have to go very awry early on for this not to happen. The other stages may not follow as

easily.

UN talks, adjourned last autumn, are due to start again this month. A first question is whether

the joint declaration on a framework of principles, agreed between Anastasiades and Akinci's

predecessor Dervis Eroglu in February 2014, still applies.

In practice, politicians on both sides are already in direct contact. However, a planned first meeting

between the two presidents on May 2 has been delayed: the way ahead may be tougher than either

leader expects.

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Israel heads for diplomatic crisis with Europe

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Wednesday, May 6 2015

France is reportedly considering a US request to delay a UNSC resolution it is sponsoring which

lays out a framework for an independent Palestinian state. Paris announced on March 27 that it

would renew efforts to pass a resolution that would include a fixed timeframe for resolving the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and establishing a Palestinian state. Frustration and mistrust of Prime

Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is growing even among Israel's strongest European allies, resulting

in increased pressure on Israel on the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu's rejection of a Palestinian state

on the eve of the March 17 Israeli general elections is moving European governments to reassess

policy. If he succeeds in returning to office, Israel's relationship with the EU and European

governments will face significant strain in the months ahead.

Impact

The EU will accelerate efforts to label settlement products and warn European companies of risks

in settlement-related activities.

Military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and military sales between Israel and national

governments will continue.

Escalatory Israeli actions in the West Bank or a new conflict could prompt European sanctions and

legal action on settlements and firms.

Israel will seek to boost ties and trade with Asian countries to offset mounting pressure from

Europe.

What next

Israel's new government will find itself on a diplomatic collision course with Europe if it fails to

find a way to restart credible talks with the Palestinian Authority (PA). European governments will

resume efforts to recognise Palestinian statehood and debate a number of measures that sanction

Israel's occupation of and settlement activity in the West Bank. However, close cooperation in

trade and security affairs will endure the rising diplomatic tensions.

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Analysis

EU foreign ministers issued a stern warning to Israel last November that future relations would

depend on "engagement toward a lasting peace based on a two state solution".

On April 17, 16 EU foreign ministers sent a letter to EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini

calling on the EU to label goods originating in Israeli settlements differently from those produced

in Israel.

The EU and individual European governments could take several other steps to demonstrate

engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and protest against Israeli settlement policies, such as:

extending the guidelines for European businesses by warning about the risks of engaging with

settlements activities and enterprises;

boycotting or denying visas to Israeli officials living in West Bank settlements; and

supporting the French-sponsored UNSC resolution on a two-state solution.

Deflecting EU pressure

If Netanyahu succeeds in forming a new coalition, he will attempt to de-escalate the Palestinian

issue by arguing that any European sanctions on Israeli settlements would be purely punitive and

would escalate tensions on the ground.

Following the March election, Israel's government announced a number of de-escalatory measures:

It said that it would release PA tax monies frozen in January after the PA applied to the

International Criminal Court's Rome Statute.

It announced the suspension of the construction of 1,500 housing units in the controversial Har

Homa area near Bethlehem.

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These moves were intended to deflect immediate US and European pressure following

Netanyahu's acknowledgement in the last hours of his election campaign that a Palestinian state

would not be established on his watch (see ISRAEL: Netanyahu win puts Israel on path to isolation

- March 18, 2015).

Netanyahu has pledged to Israeli voters that he will not allow the creation of a Palestinian state

Diminishing Israeli leverage

Israel has traditionally preferred to harness strong bilateral cooperation with Germany, Italy,

Poland and other allied governments to offset EU pressure on settlements. However, in the coming

months its diplomatic efforts in Europe will be constrained by several factors:

European parliamentary statehood initiatives

National parliaments are increasingly voting to recognise Palestinian statehood, and governments

are seeking to demonstrate engagement on the Palestinian issue. Parliaments in the United

Kingdom, France, Spain and Sweden have already voted in favour of recognising a Palestinian

state, although the votes are largely symbolic.

Changing US stance

President Barack Obama's administration could withhold diplomatic protection for Israel in

international fora following the conclusion of nuclear negotiations with Iran, scheduled for next

month. The Obama administration has signaled that it is reassessing its policy toward the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict and examining options in the absence of credible negotiations (see

ISRAEL/US: Netanyahu's Congress gamble may backfire - February 26, 2015).

Mistrust of Netanyahu

Even Germany, Israel's closest European ally, no longer trusts Netanyahu. If he returns to office,

Netanyahu will likely do so at the helm of a narrow nationalist government coalition. This means

he is likely to call for more aggressive settlement policy, a move which will prevent him from

repairing his image in Europe.

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Weakened diplomatic channels

Israel's weakened diplomatic corps will be constrained in its dialogue with the EU. The diplomatic

corps has been victim to mistrust between the prime minister and Foreign Minister Avigdor

Lieberman, who announced earlier this week that he would not be part of the next government.

The result of these personal tensions has been the freezing out of the foreign ministry from the

most sensitive discussions and some of the most important areas of the European dialogue, much

of which is conducted with Israeli civil society unofficially.

Security cooperation and trade

Tactical and operational cooperation on military and intelligence between Israel and its key

European allies will not be affected. Israel will continue selling military technology to Europe,

valued at over 700 million dollars last year (compared to nearly 4 billion dollars to Asia and the

Pacific).

Israeli-European trade topped 30 billion euros last year, making Europe Israel's most important

trade partner. These relations will also largely be protected from rising diplomatic tensions:

EU guidelines issued in 2013 limiting EU money from supporting settlements did not make a

strong impression on Israeli policymakers despite public protest.

Israel's participation in the EU's Horizon 2020 research programme is already contingent on Israel

agreeing not to use the funds for institutions operating in West Bank settlements.

However, stiffer EU guidelines on trading with Israeli firms based in the West Bank could dissuade

new European business in the settlements.

In October, Israel's SodaStream company announced that it would move its factory located near

Maale Adumim in the West Bank, after international controversy.

France's Suez Environment withdrew from a 30 million dollar cable car project running through

East Jerusalem.

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Greater scrutiny could prompt additional Israeli companies operating there (estimated at 1,000) to

relocate inside Israel's pre-1967 borders.

Outlook

European governments will resume efforts to recognise Palestinian statehood and debate a number

of measures that sanction Israel's control of the West Bank.

Netanyahu will attempt to downplay these differences, deepen cooperation and trade with friendly

European national governments, and discredit the initiatives by accusing backers of European anti-

Semitism.

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كيف تلعب إيران بأوراقها في غرب إفريقيا؟

مركز الجزيرة للدراسات

ملخص نفوذهم يزدادو باستمرار اللاعبين هؤلاء لائحة وتتوسع كثيرين، دوليين لاعبين لاهتمام مسرحا زالت وما الإفريقية القارة كانت نفوذ اتمساح كسب إلى منها سعيا إفريقيا في هامة اختراقات حققت التي إيران اللاعبين هؤلاء بين ومن القارة، هذه في

لى عموما الخليج دول إلى أقرب قريب وقت إلى ظل استراتيجي فضاء في متجددة . خاص بشكل السعودية العربية المملكة وا الإفريقية مةالق في شاركت القارة هذه من دولة أربعين أن كما إفريقية دولة ثلاثين من أزيد في ديبلوماسي حضور لإيران صار

على والمحسوبة الكثيرة اللبنانية الجاليات به تقوم ما الدور هذا إلى يضاف. 3101 نيسان/ إبريل في طهران في الإيرانية .طهران لحةمص في النهاية في يصب دعوي عمل وهو عشري الاثني للمذهب نشر من الإفريقية القارة في اللبناني الله حزب

في قيةالإفري الدول مع تعاون من أكثر في ذلك وتجسد إفريقيا إلى إيران منه ولجت مدخل أبرز الاقتصادي النشاط شكل وقد

العداء موظفة الإفريقية الدينية الدوائر من بالعديد الدينية علاقاتها تعزيز إيران استطاعت كما. المتعددة التنمية مجالات مثل لاميةالإس والعقدية الفقهية المدارس بعض وبين الإفريقية الدول بعد في المنتشرة الصوفية الجماعات بين التقليدي .الوهابية المرجعية ذات السلفية الحركات

مع وعلاقات صلات لهم ممن القارة هذه رؤساء بعض دعوة في تمثل الإفريقية القارة باتجاه سعودي تحرك مؤخرا ويلاحظ من أمر ووه مسبوقة، وغير بالغة بحفاوة الرياض في استقبالهم تم وقد وموريتانيا والسنغال السودان كرؤساء مثل إيران

غابت التي يجيةالاسترات فضاءاتها إلى العودة الرياض ومحاولة إفريقيا في الإيراني التمدد من السعودية بانزعاج تفسيره السهل التقليدي ااهتمامه حساب على للسعودية بالنسبة أولوية شكلت إقليمية بقضايا لاهتمامها نظرا الماضية السنوات في عنها الإفريقية بالقارة متجدد تقليدي تنافس

وجيرانها رانإي بين الحاصل للتوتر المحتملة الانعكاسات حول التساؤل الآن لأوانه السابق من يزال لا أنه الذهن إلى يتبادر قد غير هةومواج بل توتر حالات الراهن الوقت في تشهد التي البؤر عن نسبيًّا بعيدة أخرى ساحات على العربي المشرق في

العربي ربالمغ بلدان بعض مستوى على المذكورة التطورات عن تنتج قد التي الانعكاسات طبيعة خاص وبوجه أحيان ا، مباشرة .إفريقيا وغرب

69 | P a g e

ا يبدو التساؤل هذا أن بيد وشبه ليجالخ في المواجهة أطراف من واحد كل يملكها التي الأوراق إلى بالنظر للغاية ومنطقيًّا وارد لت التي الإفريقية بالقارة الفرقاء هؤلاء يبديه الذي والاهتمام العربية الجزيرة ظلت لمنافسة امسرح الأخيرة السنوات خلال شكَّ انيينالإير ثقة مؤشرات تزايد مع لاسيما باطِ راد، الدوائر ومتسعة الحلقات متلاحقة مؤخر ا باتت لكنها الغالب في صامتة

بالتركيز ناعمال النفوذ أساليب وتنويع التحرك مجالات بتوسيع أغراهم ما إفريقي؛ بلد من أكثر في حققوها التي بالاختراقات أكثر وذنف مربعات كسب إلى سعي ا المذهبية، الدعاية الأحوال وبطبيعة الثقافية والنشاطات التجارية المبادلات على خاصة لا وتاريخية ةمذهبي ولاعتبارات وسياسية اقتصادية لأسباب- ارتباط ا أكثر قريب وقت إلى ظلَّ استراتيجي فضاء في اتساع ا .السعودية العربية المملكة هؤلاء مقدمة وفي الخليج، منطقة في إيران بغرماء -تخفى

لسمراء،ا القارة من مختلفة مواقع في نفوذ حلقات كسب إلى حثيث وبشكل مدة منذ سعت إيران إن: -مبالغة دون - القول يمكن مثيلهات مستوى فارتفع محور، من أكثر على طهران عملت حيث الماضية القليلة السنوات خلال تكثفت التي الجهود وهي

ا 21 من أكثر في لها سفارات فتحت إذ ملحوظة بصورة القارة في الدبلوماسي دائرة وتوسعت الأخير، الع قد خلال إفريقيًّا بلد إفريقية دولة 21 من أكثر مشاركة مع ذروتها لتصل الدبلوماسي، النشاط هذا مع توازي ا قيمتها وازدادت التجارية المبادلات

فريقيا إيران قمة في فريقيا إيران بين التبادل حجم ليتضاعف ،3101 أيلول/سبتمبر بطهران وا نشاط ازدهر كما ذلك، بعد وا على وساعد ي،إفريق بلد من أكثر في الإيراني بالنظام مباشرة غير بصفة أو رسميًّا المرتبطة والدينية الثقافية الدوائر بعضا( 0)لبنانية- عربية شيعية جاليات انتشار ذلك ل ت عديدة عقود إلى يعود المنطقة في متجذِ ر حضور لها -تحديد وتتمتع خ

من نتهامكَّ طائلة ثروات امتلكت حيث البلدان تلك في المتحكمة النخب مع متشعبة مصالح وعلاقات معتبر اقتصادي بنفوذ النفوذ بفعل ةالإفريقي البلدان بعض في رسميًّا طابع ا التأثير هذا بعض وأخذ أبيدجان، إلى داكار من القرار صُنَّاع على التأثير الشيعية انيةاللبن الجالية امتلاك إلى رسمية شبه معطيات تشير حيث فيها؛ الشيعية للجاليات المتزايد الاقتصادي المتزايدرت والكاكاو، القهوة وتصدير جمع شركات من %01و العاج، ساحل في الحيوية الاقتصادية القطاعات من %01 حوالي وقدَّ .(3)سيراليون في الماس تجارة في %01 بحوالي حضورهم نسبة الدراسات بعض

العربية المملكة خاصة الإقليميين، إيران منافسي طرف من واهتمام متابعة محل ظل الإيراني التمدد هذا أن الواضح من

المغرب مثل لدو مع التنسيق من عالية بمستويات وترتبط المنطقة، في مؤثرة بلدان مع قوية بعلاقات تتمتع التي السعودية، متجذرة خيةتاري بصلات العلوي العرش يتمتع حيث خاصة، والساحل الصحراء منطقة بلدان معظم مع وثيقة صلات تربطها التي

المغربي لنفوذا هذا أن افتراض تمام ا الوارد ومن. البلدان تلك في وتأثير ا نفوذ ا الأكثر الدوائر معظم مع قوية سياسية وتحالفات ببعض لرسميةا علاقتها في طهران واجهتها التي المتاعب عن غائبين يكونا لم والسعودية المغرب بين الاستراتيجي والتحالف

علاقاتها قطع على أقدمت قد المغرب كانت أن بعد ،3101 سنة أواخر السنغال أقل وبدرجة غامبيا مثل الغربية إفريقيا بلدان

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لإساءةا تستهدف" نشاطات الإيرانية السلطات ممارسة بأنه وُصِف ما بينها من كان عديدة بمبررات إيران مع الدبلوماسية .(2")السني ومذهبه عقيدته ووحدة المغربي للشعب الراسخة بالهوية والمس للمملكة، الجوهرية الدينية للمقومات

ملحوظ إيراني نفوذ مداخل

ذلك في بما القارة داخل خلالها من تتغلغل أن إيران في الإسلامية الجمهورية استطاعت منافذ مثَّلت المداخل من جملة هناكا ووضعت حكومة، من بأكثر الدبلوماسية علاقاتها توطيد من تمكنت حيث إفريقيا؛ وغرب شمال بلدان بعض شراكة بناءل أسس

من عدد داخل علاقات شبكة نسج في نجحت أنها ذلك من والأهم صعيد، من أكثر على التنمية مجال في وتعاون اقتصاديةت الاجتماعية الأوساط ل أن يمكن التي الدوائر بعض مع للتواصل جسور ا ومدَّ في عيالشي المذهب لنشر طروادة حصان تشكِ :هي المنافذ تلك أبرز ولعل منها، المالكي المذهب لاسيما السنية للمذاهب خالصة ظلت بلدان

ريقيةالإف الدول من عدد مع علاقاتها توطيد على الماضيين العقدين خلال إيران عملت فقد: الدبلوماسية المحاور على اللعب القارة، يف التقليدي ونفوذها الغربية القوى لسياسات -ذاك أو القدر بهذا- مناهضة مواقف اتخاذ إلى قياداتها تنزع التي

هكذاو الممانعة؛ سياسة على قائم نهج من عنها يُعرف ما المالية، إمكاناتها إغراء عن فضلا المسعى، هذا في إيران وساعد التي تلكو للإمبريالية المناهضة التقاليد ذات الإفريقية البلدان من واحد من أكثر مع وتشاور تعاون قنوات تفتح أن استطاعت

وحالات ةالداخلي الأزمات بعض إيران استغلت كما الماضيين، العقدين خلال الجفاء أو التأزم من مستوى بالغرب علاقتها عرفت سعيك دبلوماسي، أو اقتصادي سند عن للبحث خاصة ظروف اضطرتها أنظمة مع للتقارب الإقليمي المستوى على التوتر

النظام وكتقارب ،3110 بداكار الإسلامي المؤتمر لقمة ناجح وتنظيم هادئة استضافة لضمان إيران مع للتقارب السنغال ساعد كما ،3110 العام نهاية انقلابه بُعيد عليه فُرض الذي الغربي الحصار بُعيْد طهران مع المسبوق غير الموريتاني

موغابي الرئيس دفع في( 2)البِيض أراضي مصادرة خلفية على -عموم ا والغرب- وبريطانيا زيمبابوي بين المتصاعد الخلاف أحمدي يرانإ رئيس بزيارة تُوِ ج الذي التحالف وهو إيران، مع القوي تحالفه في للمضي -الإفريقي للاتحاد الدوري الرئيس-

.3101 العام في لهراري نجادا الأخيرين العقدين امتداد على طهران بذلت السياق، ذات في: الرسمية العلاقات تطبيع إلى السعي لتطبيع ةاستثنائي جهود والحذر يةالغرب بالعواصم علاقتها توتر عن الناجمة النسبية العزلة على للالتفاف مسعى في الرسمي، الدبلوماسي وضعها أقل من يقفزل الإفريقية البلدان في الإسلامية الجمهورية سفارات عدد تضاعف وهكذا. جيرانها بمعظم علاقتها يطبع ظلَّ الذي الاتصالات كثفتت الدبلوماسي الانفتاح هذا وبتأثير. الزمن من عقدين تتجاوز لا فترة خلال الأربعين قرابة إلى سفارة عشرين من

.الإفريقية والبلدان إيران بين والتبادل التعاون مظاهر وتنوعت

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آثار من للتخفيف موضوعية بحاجة مدفوعة إفريقي بلد من أكثر في تجاريًّا إيران نشطت حيث: الاقتصادي التبادل تعزيز إيران جَّعش وربما. الرقابة عن ما حد إلى وبعيدة التنظيم محدودة اقتصادية فضاءات في الدخول عبر عليها الغربية العقوبات

على فايةالك فيه بما ومطَّلعة القارة بلدان من لكثير الاقتصادي النسيج في متجذرة شيعية جاليات وجود التوجه هذا على شاريعم خلال من الفنية وخبرتها منتجاتها تسويق إلى طهران سعت وقد. هناك القرار بمراكز صلة وذات والمخاطر الفرص بناء وعرضت السنغال، في السيارات لتركيب مصنع ا المثال، سبيل على شيدت، حيث المنطقة؛ حكومات بعض مع مشتركةا اهتمت طهران أن يبدو العادي التجاري النشاط عن وفضلا . موريتانيا في آخر مصنع الإطار ذاه وفي الأسلحة، بتجارة أيض .3101 سنة الإفريقي الغرب موانئ أحد قرب بالأسلحة محملة إيرانية سفينة احتجاز حادثة تندرجر فريقيا إيران بين التجاري التبادل حجم متكي منوتشهر السابق الإيراني الخارجية وزير وقدَّ ،(5)سنويًّا ولارد مليارات بخمسة وا ث كما فريقيا إيران بين التجاري التبادل أن مردِف ا ،"وشاملة جديدة مرحلة" الإفريقية-الإيرانية العلاقات دخول عن متكي تحدَّ وا الجراراتو السيارات، إنتاج" لتشمل مجالاته تنوعت كما ،"الأخيرة السنوات خلال الدولارات مليارات إلى ملايين بضعة" من قفز

نشاء النفط، عن والتنقيب الزراعية، .(0")الكهرباء توليد محطات وا داخل العلاقات من واسعة شبكة بناء على نشط بشكل إيران عملت مختلف صعيد على: والشعبية الثقافية الدبلوماسية تنشيط يعيةالش للجاليات التقليدي الحضور على وبالاعتماد خاصة، إفريقيا غرب في والاجتماعي الديني التأثير دوائر من عدد

،(3)يعيالش بالمذهب محليًّا للتبشير أسس وضع بغرض والمجموعات الأشخاص بعض استقطاب إلى السعي جرى اللبنانية داخل الشيعي الاختراق مدى حول المتداولة المعلومات تظل المسعى هذا نجاح مدى حول موضوعية معطيات غياب وفي

لين بين متأرجحة إفريقيا غرب مجتمعات مجرد لأمرا باعتبار شأنها من والمقلِ لين الاجتماعي، الانسجام على خطرها من المهوِ .(0)لها تأثير لا محدودة ظاهرة المحلية، ةالإسلامي والتيارات المؤسسات بعض مع علاقات ربط بها المرتبطة الشيعية والقوى إيران استطاعت الوقت نفس في

الشيعية الجماعات بعض به حظي الذي الأل ق: أحدهما: عاملان ذلك على ساعد وقد الصوفية؛ الجماعات بعض خاصة الجماعات بين التقليدي العداء توظيف: والثاني الصهيوني، الاحتلال مقاومة في مواقفه بسبب الماضيين العقدين خلال العربية

.أخرى جهة من الوهابي المنشأ ذات السلفية والتيارات والحركات جهة من المحلية الفقهية المدارس وبعض الصوفية

متحول لمشهد صعبة حسابات

بلدان مع ةالعلاق بتوثيق السعودية العربية المملكة لدى استثنائيًّا اهتمام ا المراقبون لاحظ الحزم عاصفة عملية انطلاق منذا متقارب وقت خلال الرياض استقبلت حيث إفريقيا؛ غرب نغاليالس الرئيسان هما المنطقة دول رؤساء أبرز من اثنين جدًّ

علىأ في السعودية السلطات قبل من لافت اهتمام موضع وكانا مسبوقة غير بحفاوة استقبالهما تم الذين والموريتاني وما اليمن يف بالأوضاع المتعلقة والتطورات المذكورتين الزيارتين بين الربط محاولة شيء في التكلف من وليس. مستوياتها

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علامية دبلوماسية مواجهة من رافقها من لاًّ ك ربطت التي المتميزة العلاقات استحضرنا إذا لاسيما والرياض، طهران بين وا إيران لهاتبذ حثيثة جهود حول حديث من لآخر حين من يتردد وما الماضية القليلة السنوات خلال بإيران وموريتانيا السنغال .إفريقيا غرب في نفوذها لترسيخ

أول يف السعودية العربية المملكة تقودها التي الحزم عاصفة عملية مع بلاده وقوف صال ماكي السنغالي الرئيس أعلن لقد

الموقف إن بل ،إفريقيا إلى العربية الجزيرة وشبه الخليج في الصراع تأثيرات لامتداد مؤكدة مؤشرات يحمل إفريقي رسمي موقف سنغالال نزوع إلى بالنظر لافت موقف وهو العملية، في للمشاركة الاستعداد إعلان إلى الدعم مجرد من أبعد مضى السنغالي

ية المواقف عن بنفسها النأي إلى عادة ظتحاف فقد ذلك، أمكنها ما الوسط من العصا إمساك على التقليدي وحرصها الحدِ السنغال يف أنشطتهم الإيرانيون واصل حيث وطهران الرباط بين الأزمة أوج في حتى إيران مع المتميزة علاقاتها على السنغال

السنغالية-يرانيةالإ العلاقات على الإيرانية-المغربية الأزمة تنعكس بأن حينها الإفريقية للسياسة المتابعين بعض توقعات رغم .والرباط داكار بين التاريخي الترابط بسبب

حد إلى فاترة البلدين بين العلاقات ظلَّت حيث الطارئ السعودي بالاهتمام كثير ا متفائلة نواكشوط تبدو السنغال من بعيد غيرن سنوات، عشر من أكثر منذ كبير وبالتزامن. 3115 سنة الطايع ولد بنظام الإطاحة بعد العافية بعض استعادت قد كانت وا ح الحزم عاصفة لعملية تأييدها نواكشوط إعلان مع رأى حفل يف انتدابه نهاية بمناسبة إيران سفير الموريتاني الرئيس وشَّ

من مستوى فحةص طي إلى ليرمز مغادر لسفير روتيني توديع حفل باعتباره البروتوكولي بُعده يتجاوز قد أنه المراقبين بعض .قائمة إليه دعت التي الظروف تعد لم العلاقة

أنظمة بعض يغري قد تحالفاتها نطاق توسيع في الكبرى أقطابه وتنافس المشرق في الدائر الصراع تطورات أن يرى من هناكا مواقفها بمراجعة إفريقيا غرب بلدان لها يحقق ماب الإقليمي الخلاف محاور لحركة وتبع ا القوى موازين تغير لمقتضيات وفق

ل خاصة مهارة فيها تمتلك وباتت الأنظمة تلك بعض عليها اعتاد لعبة وهي أكبر، مكاسب بعض اوزلتج كثير ا عليها وتعوِ ا أكثر يبدو الوضع لكن. بها تمر التي الأزمات المؤثرة لدوليةا وبتحالفاتها القوي الإقليمي بنفوذها فإيران المرة، هذه تعقيد

علاقتها في انفراج بوادر من يلوح ما ضوء في لاسيما وجيهة، أسباب دون استعداؤها يصعب المعلن الدبلوماسي وبطموحها دول من مطلوب ا يكون قد ما فإن ذلك عن وفضلا . واعدة واقتصادية سياسية آفاق من أمامها ذلك يفتحه وما الغرب مع

بل شاطها،ن مجالات وتقليص إيران على العزلة فرض في والإسهام الدبلوماسي الاصطفاف مجرد على يقتصر لا ربما المنطقة طوراتت تتطلبها ربما عسكرية عمليات في -رمزية بصورة ولو- البلدان هذه مشاركة طلب إلى الأرجح على ذلك سيتجاوزا ليس أنه والمشكلة اليمن؛ في حالي ا الجارية العملية لتقديم طلوبةالم الجاهزية أو الكافي الاستعداد لديها البلدان هذه أن مؤكد

.الخدمة هذه مثل

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خلاصة

ل إفريقيا غرب منطقة أن الواضح من الأحوال، كل في اتتأثير ظلت لو وحتى والسعودية، إيران من لكل اهتمام محط تشكِ

ا قائم ا يبقى الإقليميتين القوتين هاتين بين التنافس فإن محدودة الآن الجارية التطورات . جديدة صولف في للدخول ومرشح طاعتاست إيران إن: القول يمكن أكبر، المشتركة والمصالح وأوثق أعرق المنطقة وحكومات بشعوب السعودية روابط أن ورغم التعامل في اأسلوبه وبفضل تملكها، التي الأوراق لعب في براعتها نتيجة المنطقة في قدم موطئ لها تجد أن قياسي وقت خلال ما تظاران وفي. غالب ا مباشرة غير طرق عبر المجتمعات إلى الهادئ التسلل على القائمة واستراتيجيتها الأنظمة، مع المرن

الآن حتى لَّ ظ المنطقة في الإيراني النفوذ إن: القول نستطيع والاستراتيجيات الرؤى في تغير من الراهنة التحولات تحمله قدا، شعبية أبعاد ذا أفقيًّا، فوقيًّا، يبدو منافسةال الإقليمية للقوى تقليدي نفوذ مقابل في حين؛ إلى ولو وخفيًّا للغاية، ناعم ا أساس ز ا ا الرسمية، الأبعاد على مركِ .أحيان ا ومستفزًّا بل للعيان، وظاهر ا محسوس

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Dollar trend to shape EM hard currency corporate debt

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Thursday, May 7 2015

Recent weakness in the dollar, which is currently trading at a two and half month low against a

basket of currencies, is contributing to the strong performance of emerging market (EM) dollar-

denominated corporate bonds, whose returns in the first four months of 2015 exceeded those on

both EM local currency and dollar-denominated government debt. While improving sentiment is

mainly due to the recent tightening in Brazilian and Russian corporate bond spreads, the marked

deterioration in the credit quality of this asset class, in which Chinese property companies and

Russian banks are the largest borrowers, poses significant risks given the fragility of market

conditions.

Impact

If sustained, the sell-off in global government debt markets could damage sentiment towards EM

external and local currency sovereign bonds.

The oil price rebound is contributing to the narrowing of spreads on dollar-denominated bonds

issued by EM energy corporates.

The measures taken by China's central bank to stimulate the economy will buoy sentiment towards

the country's vulnerable property companies.

What next

The outlook for EM hard currency corporate bonds will hinge on both the direction of the dollar

and on sentiment towards China's property market in the wake of Shenzen-based real estate

developer Kaisa's default on its dollar-denominated bonds. While demand for EM external

corporate debt is likely to remain robust given the 'hunt for yield' among international investors,

the renewed spread tightening will raise the stakes for the sector at a time when EMs are still

suffering sizeable capital outflows.

Analysis

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On April 29, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis published weak first-quarter GDP figures,

showing annualised growth of just 0.2%, a fraction of the 2.2% growth seen in the fourth quarter

of 2014. Both transitory and longer-term factors weighed on the data. The former (eg, harsh winter

weather and West Coast port disruptions) should dissipate soon and a growth rebound is therefore

expected in the second quarter. However, longer-term factors (eg, long-term dollar appreciation

and low oil prices) will prevent overall 2015 growth from reaching 3.0%. An outcome in the 2.5-

2.7% range is more likely (see UNITED STATES: Dollar will weigh on exports to Europe - May

4, 2015).

This news caused investors to push back their expectations about the timing of the first increase in

US official interest rates in almost ten years. Markets now expect the Federal Reserve (Fed) to

start tightening monetary policy in September at the earliest.

The shift in perceptions of US monetary policy contributed to weakening of the dollar. The dollar

index, which tracks the greenback's purchasing power against a basket of currencies, fell by 1.6%

in the week ending on May 1.

Perceptions of a more dovish Fed are helping underpin the improvement in sentiment towards

emerging markets, with EM equities up almost 6% over the last three months and local currencies

strengthening against the dollar. Marked strength has been seen for the Russian rouble and the

Brazilian real, which have risen a further 13.1% and 5.3% respectively since end-March.

The EM hard currency corporate debt market, roughly 85% of which is dollar-denominated, is

benefiting from the weakness of the greenback, with JP Morgan's benchmark corporate EM bond

index (CEMBI) generating returns of nearly 5.0% in the first four months of 2015. This compares

with 4.2% and 2.7% respectively for dollar-denominated and local currency EM sovereign debt,

according to JP Morgan.

Brazil and Russia

The outstanding amount of EM external corporate debt currently stands at 1.7 trillion dollars and

has nearly doubled in size in just four years. It now exceeds the size of the US high-yield market

(see UNITED STATES: Energy bonds spur default risk - March 19, 2015). Chinese, Brazilian,

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Russian and Mexican borrowers dominate this market, with China replacing Brazil last year as the

country with the largest amount of external corporate debt outstanding, around 260 billion dollars.

$69bnOutstanding external corporate debt issued by Russian banks

In terms of EM external corporate bond issuance by country and sector, Russian banks retain the

largest amount of debt outstanding (around 69 billion dollars), while Chinese banks and real estate

companies now occupy the second and third spots respectively, according to JP Morgan. These

two country-sectors combinations, along with Turkish banks, are among the fastest-growing

segments of the asset class. The two sectors issued almost no hard currency debt as recently as

2009.

Russian banks and Brazilian energy companies are also among the largest components of the

CEMBI, helping explain the sharp tightening in EM hard currency corporate bond spreads over

the past few months.

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On April 22, Petrobras, Brazil's embattled state-run oil company and the largest single issuer of

EM dollar-denominated corporate bonds averted a technical default on its 137 billion dollar debt

by publishing its long-delayed 2014 financial results, which its auditor had refused to approve due

to a high-profile corruption scandal (see BRAZIL: Petrobras fallout hits business and politics -

April 24, 2015). This led to a significant tightening in the spreads on Latin American dollar-

denominated corporate debt, whose returns in the first four months of this year exceeded those on

Asian and Emerging European corporate debt, according to JP Morgan.

13.2%

Year-to-date rouble appreciation versus the dollar

Russian bank debt has benefited from the dramatic improvement in sentiment towards Russian

assets, because of the recent rebound in oil prices and the ceasefire accord in Ukraine. The rouble

is up 13.2% against the dollar this year, having lost half its value last year.

According to JP Morgan, the Brazil and Russia country segments in the CEMBI have reversed 50-

70% of the widening of their spreads that occurred since mid-2014.

Kaisa default

The woes of Shenzen-based Kaisa, which in April became the first Chinese property firm to default

on its dollar-denominated bonds, is focusing attention on the vulnerability of China's real estate

market amid a downturn in the economy (see CHINA: Housing market reaches turning point -

December 11, 2014).

In a sign of the sector-wide repercussions from Kaisa's default, dollar-denominated issuance by

Chinese property companies in the first quarter of this year, normally a period of intense activity,

fell by nearly 50% compared with the first quarter of 2014, according to NN Investment Partners

(see CHINA: Debt mismatch calls for currency convertibility - April 29, 2015).

Chinese policymakers have recently taken aggressive steps to avert a hard landing in the country's

property market (see CHINA: Room remains for stimulus as economy slows - April 16, 2015).

However, the near collapse of Kaisa throws into sharp relief the risks in the EM external corporate

debt market, whose recent growth has been propelled by a surge in issuance by Chinese property

firms.

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According to JP Morgan, the credit quality of EM corporate issues has deteriorated over the past

several months. Credit rating downgrades of Petrobras and a large number of Russian corporates

have increased the speculative grade share of the asset class to 40%, with the non-investment grade

share of the Emerging Europe component of the CEMBI surging to above 70% from 40% last

year.

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Economic conditions boost stability in Middle East

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Wednesday, May 6 2015

Improving economic conditions in oil-importing countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and

Lebanon, alongside resilient growth in the oil-exporting economies of the GCC bloc, should help

reinforce political stability at the national level despite an increasingly turbulent regional

environment. However, with growth still too low to make any difference to living standards and

unemployment, longer-term stability questions persist.

The IMF predicted a modest recovery in economies in the Middle East and North Africa in its

regional economic outlook published yesterday. Growth in oil-exporting countries was forecast to

remain steady at 2.4% in 2015 (3.4% in Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, states), as governments

used their financial reserves to cushion the sharp decline in oil prices. The IMF expects growth in

oil-importing countries to increase from 3% in 2014 to 4% this year on the back of fiscal and

monetary policy changes, improved consumer confidence and euro-zone recovery. However, it

notes that growth will remain well below the levels needed to reduce the region's high

unemployment rates, particularly among the young.

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BITs represent foreign trade policy shift for Brazil

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

Although Brazil signed a dozen Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in the 1990s, they never came

into effect. Since then, Brazil has steadfastly opposed participation in the network of BITs

currently in force, addressing foreign investment protection through domestic legislation and

international instruments such as double taxation treaties. However, in April, Brazil concluded

investment agreements with Mozambique and Angola and is negotiating others. This is a major

shift in foreign investment policy and also sets the stage for a new form of BIT that may be

attractive to other emerging countries.

Impact

How these vaguely worded BITs will work out in practice is still to be determined.

Coverage of intellectual property rights and sovereign debt as protected investments is uncertain.

Private sector and civil society involvement is a novel feature that could be included in future

BITs.

What next

The drafting of these new BITs represents an effort to go beyond a standard form agreement and

emphasise features likely to make a difference in practice. The many references to the necessary

dialogue between the private sector, civil society and governmental entities, framed as central to

the success of a foreign investment policy, could be interpreted as a lesson learned from past

decades of BITs practice worldwide. However, the wording leaves much room for interpretation.

Analysis

Brazil has historically prioritised multilateral trade negotiations in its foreign economic policy (see

BRAZIL: Foreign trade policy focuses on WTO - November 6, 2014). Moreover, although Brazil

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has focused on bolstering its economic relations with Lusophone Africa in recent years (see

AFRICA: Brazil, China aid may boost agriculture - November 15, 2013; and see

BRAZIL/AFRICA: Economic ties may see steady growth - July 30, 2010), that relationship is

already well-entrenched and is perhaps less a motivation for the recently concluded BITs than the

fact that their structure may offer a precursor for other negotiations.

Brazil's multilateral trade focus has generated criticism

Unlike traditional BITs aimed at protecting foreign investments and investors, these treaties

emphasise investment promotion and cooperation between state parties. The Brazil-Mozambique

treaty includes both familiar features and some novel elements. (The Brazil-Angola treaty is

mostly similar, with some key differences in line with Brazil's goal of a customised approach.)

Familiar features

The familiar features of the Mozambique treaty include:

'Investment' definition

In line with language often found in US-style BITs, the parties adopted an expansive definition of

investment which includes "any kind of asset or right owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,

by an investor of a Party." The only explicit limitation is that the investment has to be for the

production of goods and services (Article 3). It is therefore possible that intellectual property rights

would be protected investments but more questionable whether sovereign debt instruments would

be covered.

National treatment standard

Article 11 guarantees that foreign investors will be allowed to establish investment and conduct

business on terms no less favourable than those available to domestic investors. Non-

discrimination between domestic and foreign investors is also provided with respect to restitution,

indemnification or compensation in the case of losses suffered as a result of exigent circumstances

including war and uprising (Article 12).

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Most-favoured nation (MFN) provisions

Investors of one of the parties will not be treated less favourably than other foreign investors with

respect to conditions of establishment and conduct of business. However, MFN treatment does not

include any benefit or preferential treatment that accrues to other investors under a free trade

agreement, customs union or common market scheme, or double taxation treaty in force or that

may be entered into by Brazil or Mozambique in future (Article 11). This is therefore a carefully

circumscribed MFN clause designed to avoid any ratcheting-up effect as other treaties are

concluded that might include more liberal concessions. However, other BITs are not specifically

excluded from the MFN clause, unlike trade liberalisation agreements and double taxation treaties.

Compensation

The parties commit not to nationalise or expropriate without adequate and effective compensation

defined as the "fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the

expropriation to be provided in a liquid and transferable instrument (not necessarily currency)"

(Article 9). Additionally, due process and non-discriminatory safeguards also reflect norms of

customary international law.

Novel features

The treaty also includes provisions less common in BITs:

Formal institutional governance mechanism

Unlike most BITs, this agreement sets up specific institutions to monitor and assist

implementation:

The agreement establishes a joint committee composed of government representatives appointed

by each state. The committee is to meet at least once annually, under alternating presidencies, to

discuss implementation, work towards deeper coordination and cooperation and help resolve

disputes (Article 4). An annex to the agreement lists priority areas of cooperation for the joint

committee.

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Alongside the committee, the states are each to designate a domestic "focal point" tasked with

offering governmental support to investors of the other state. The focal point implements the joint

committee's guidelines, and liaises with other governmental authorities domestically and with the

counterpart agency in the other state. The focal point is also designated as an "ombudsman" for

dispute settlement purposes.

No investor-state arbitration

The Brazil-Mozambique treaty does not provide for investor-state arbitration

A longstanding feature of BITs now increasingly under scrutiny, investor-state dispute settlement

typically takes the form of arbitration triggered by the investor against the host state under the

auspices of the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes

(ICSID) or the UN Commission on International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) arbitration forums.

The resulting awards have often been criticised for being pro-investor.

The Brazil-Mozambique treaty includes no investor-state arbitration. Instead, it relies on the

ombudsmen, backed by the joint committee, to assist in conciliatory dispute settlement (Article

15). A dispute may be officially initiated by the investor's state party by filing a request to the joint

committee. The latter then has 60 days, renewable by mutual agreement, to present relevant

information and invite to joint discussions representatives of the investor, as well as of

governmental and non-governmental entities involved. If the dispute has not been resolved, the

states may then proceed to arbitration using procedures to be developed subsequently. No specific

procedure is created for private investors.

Private sector and civil society engagement

Another remarkable feature of the Brazil-Mozambique treaty is the opportunities it creates for

including the private sector (beyond the protected investors) and civil society at the policy

coordination level, the implementation stage, and in dispute resolution efforts. The parties also

recognising that transparency and access to information are key to such an endeavour. Article 7

underlines the crucial role of the private sector in ensuring the success of the agreement; it urges

the parties to communicate with the private sector for that objective.

Corporate social responsibility

The main text of the treaty and a detailed annex spell out principles for the corporate social

responsibility of investors. Through voluntary standards detailed in the annex, the treaty urges

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investors to "achieve the highest possible level of contributions to the sustainable development of

the host state and the local community" (Article 10).

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Economic focus aids Eritrean diplomatic rehabilitation

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

Eritrea and the EU this month are expected to sign a new aid package under the 11th European

Development Fund (EDF). The EU's push to take a more comprehensive approach to an exodus

of migrants from Eritrea comes amid a spike in migrant deaths in the Mediterranean during April.

For its part, Asmara's stance has evolved significantly since it was criticised for a slow and callous

response to the death of more than 300 Eritreans off the Italian coast in 2013. The government is

working to take advantage of EU momentum to divert the focus away from political issues and

towards economic factors.

Impact

EU relations may improve, but Eritrea will continue facing difficulties in the UN and with the

United States.

Ethiopia is not threatened militarily by Eritrea but prefers Asmara to remain isolated, and will

work against lifting UN sanctions.

Recent diplomatic visits with Saudi Arabia and Egypt suggest that Eritrea may be able to leverage

its proximity to insecurity in Yemen.

What next

Recent European rhetorical shifts on Eritreans claiming refugee or asylum status are helping

Asmara to downplay the risk of persecution for returnees. Its commitment to political reform is

likely to remain designed for external audiences. Yet along with the EDF package, growth in the

mining sector is improving government finances, and in general bolstering its position.

Analysis

A confluence of factors has recently produced a dramatic upsurge in deaths among those

attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach southern Europe:

Migrant flows increase in spring due to better weather.

Instability in Libya has almost destroyed border controls and depressed the economy, pushing

more people towards human smuggling(see LIBYA: Halting migrant flows to Europe will take

years - April 20, 2015).

Most significantly, the EU's decision to scale back its search and rescue operation, Mare Nostrum,

in late-2014 reduced its capacity to respond to the increase in migrant numbers.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported that from January 1 to May 3 arrivals in Italy,

Greece, Malta and Spain had totalled nearly 51,000, compared to about 32,500 for the first four

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months of 2014. The number of dead and missing has passed 1,800 so far this year (1,300 during

April alone), compared to 3,500 deaths during all of 2014.

Eritrean exodus

The top five nationalities to May 3 were Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans, Somalis and Nigerians.

Partial figures reported in April indicated that Eritreans comprised about 9% of total numbers of

migrants to Europe -- 3,400 Eritreans out of 36,400 detections since the beginning of 2015 .

Eritrea's relatively small population, estimated by the IMF at about 6.5 million and by the UN

Development Programme (UNDP) at 3.5 million, make the figures more striking.

There has been no sudden shift in conditions in Eritrea. Reports over the last two years suggest

that emigration has been rising -- around 2,000 people were reported to be arriving at camps in

Ethiopia and Sudan per month, occasionally rising to as high as 4,000.

Those leaving are typically young, reporting that they are avoiding or deserting the compulsory

National Service/National Development Campaign. Nominally an 18-month commitment and

poorly remunerated, national service has become indefinite since the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia.

Most of those reaching Ethiopian and Sudanese camps move on, with Europe as a target

destination.

EU-Eritrea relations

The EU, led largely by Italy, seeks a comprehensive solution to arrest the Eritrean exodus.

Negotiations on the 11th EDF (2014-10) have been ongoing since 2013. The 10th EDF, agreed in

2009, was a 122 million euro (160 million dollar) package, with a focus on food security. The new

package is expected to be larger and to support energy infrastructure in particular.

The EU's new aid package signals a greater level of engagement with Asmara

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The 11th EDF has taken shape following some shifts within the Eritrean domestic climate. Political

power remains overwhelming concentrated in the hands of President Isayas Afeworki. However,

following the January 2013 army mutiny in Asmara, and criticism of its handling of the October

2013 Lampedusa tragedy, the government has been moving to rehabilitate external relations (see

ERITREA: Regime seeks to shift isolation dynamics - June 10, 2014):

Millennium Development Goals

With support from the UNDP mission, the government has promoted its progress towards

achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The figures are unverifiable but it is reportedly on

track to meet goals four, five and six, covering reduction of child mortality, reduction of maternal

mortality and combating HIV and AIDS.

National service

Since early-2015, and only to external diplomatic audiences, Asmara has claimed an end to the

practice of indefinite national service and that many have been demobilised. A Danish government

investigation, released in late 2014, concluded that deserters from the national service were not at

risk of persecution if they returned, potentially undermining many asylum claims. The United

Kingdom signalled that its asylum policy could follow suit. Both countries have backtracked on

this after a wave of criticism of the Danish report.

Nevertheless, it has raised questions about the future of national service and its role in driving

emigration, assisting Eritrea's diplomatic re-engagement.

Economic outlook

The EDF energy sector focus reflects the alignment of external assistance with a national priority.

In February, the government awarded an 8 million dollar contract to design and build a solar energy

facility in 2015-16 to the Italian firm Enertronica & Rossi Impianti. The ageing port infrastructure

at Massawa is also set for an upgrade, following the award of a 400 million dollar contract to China

Harbour Engineering Company, which will see development of two terminals along with

improvements to the port facilities and access roads.

Mining revenue

Most significantly, the mining sector is improving government finances. Canadian miner Nevsun

has indicated that it has generated about 1 billion dollars in revenues for Eritrea since 2011, about

half of overall revenues from its Bisha mine. About 750 million dollars of this was from taxes,

duties, royalties and dividend payments to the Eritrean National Mining Company (Enamco), the

state-owned entity with which foreign miners are obliged to partner. The remainder was paid for

local supply of goods and services, via various state-owned entities.

Mining revenues are improving government finances

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Mining revenue will grow, as Enamco has a range of other joint ventures:

Chinese firm SPECO, a subsidiary of the Shanghai Construction Group, is expected to begin

production at the Koka gold mine in September 2015.

Canadian Sunridge Gold is developing a number of assets, including the Emba Derho field, which

contains copper, zinc, gold and silver; it expects to begin production in 2016.

Australian South Boulder Mines is evaluating potash deposits at the Colluli field.

Diplomatic challenges

Ethiopia remains opposed to Eritrea's diplomatic rehabilitation. In February, Ethiopia and Djibouti

called for UN sanctions on Eritrea to be tightened, following a bilateral meeting. Despite limited

evidence to support continued sanctions (which were based on alleged Eritrean support for

militants in Somalia), US policy towards Eritrea under the current administration has not shifted.

Eritrea has made tentative steps at engagement with the South Sudanese civil war, hosting the lead

government negotiator, Nhial Deng Nhial, for talks in late April. Cultivating functional relations

with South Sudan -- alongside Sudan, Uganda and Kenya -- could presage a renewed effort to

resume its participation in the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Horn of

Africa's regional bloc, which Ethiopia has opposed (with tacit support from Somalia and Djibouti).

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Reviews on Ghana IMF deal to happen this year

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Friday, May 8 2015

The government will be under pressure to meet near-term targets of its IMF programme. All

reviews will happen within 2015, with the next two disbursements based upon whether the

government has complied with early fiscal conditions. Frontloading reforms are designed to put

the country in a stronger position as it goes into an election year in 2016, when slippages are far

more likely.

The new Bank of Ghana Act, bringing financing of the budget deficit down to zero, may take effect

from next year, Bloomberg reported yesterday. Reducing monetary financing of the budget and

increasing the central bank's autonomy through legislative changes are key pillars of the three-year

IMF programme. The measures are designed to support the "sizable and frontloaded fiscal

adjustment", which targets mainly public sector wages and energy subsidies. The IMF has set

eleven quantitative indicators for April and August 2015. The second disbursement is scheduled

for July 15 (based on review using April 30 data). The third disbursement is scheduled for

November 15 (using August 31 data). If the government does not meet the indicators, funds can

be withheld, although waivers are also allowed.

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Funding questions shadow Nigeria's new economic path

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Wednesday, May 6 2015

Investor and popular confidence in the incoming Muhammadu Buhari administration are high. The

new president's perceived incorruptibility is seen as the antidote to President Goodluck Jonathan's

ineffectiveness. However, a lack of clarity over how the All Progressives Congress (APC) can

fund its economic policies remains a source of uncertainty, compounded by low oil prices.

Impact

Nigeria's debt levels are relatively low, although the government may be forced to dramatically

increase borrowing.

However, the sharp devaluation of the currency will complicate the CBN's goal of maintaining

single-digit inflation over the medium term.

Slowing non-oil sector growth reflects the depreciation of the oil-linked naira and curbed public

investment.

What next

The incoming government is likely to prioritise remitting 'unaccounted for' federal funds to fund

social expenditure. However, its election-winning anti-corruption platform will force a balance

between a 'zero tolerance' approach and protecting those central to Buhari's victory. Deteriorating

macroeconomic fundamentals imply a sharper slowdown in growth than the 4.8% predicted by the

IMF for 2015, limiting policy options.

Analysis

The Nigerian stock exchange (NSE) has continued the strong post-election rally in the All Share

Index. The index rose by an unprecedented 8.3% following the announcement of Buhari's victory

on March 31 (see NIGERIA: Poll signals profound political shift - April 1, 2015).

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According to NSE data, the stock market rose by 14.5% during April, led by returning foreign

investors who had retreated following the oil price slump since last June. Despite the external

shock, the subsequent devaluation of the naira can be partly linked to the Jonathan administration's

failure to save the country's oil windfall over the last four years when prices averaged more than

100 dollars per barrel.

According to the IMF's Article IV report on Nigeria published in 2011 (the year Jonathan was

elected president), Nigeria should have accumulated at least 45 billion dollars by 2015 in the

Excess Crude Account (ECA). Instead, the ECA reportedly contained 2 billion dollars at the end

of 2014 -- the amount Jonathan 'inherited' at the end of late former President Umaru Yar'Adua's

government.

Zero tolerance for corruption?

The federal state could raise billions of dollars by reclaiming unaccounted revenue

The Buhari administration hopes to end deteriorating public financial management -- which

reportedly worsened under Jonathan -- by adopting 'zero tolerance' for corruption. The government

could potentially realise tens of trillions of naira in federal revenues that are currently 'unaccounted

for' each year.

According to the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Accounts,

federal ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) fail to remit around 16 trillion naira (80

billion dollars) of internally generated revenue to the state treasury each year -- or nearly four times

the annual federal budget. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) may account for

a large portion. If these figures are accurate, the company could already be generating around 20%

of GDP in revenues, which is over twice the amount (in percentage terms) officially recorded.

A PwC review of NNPC's accounts submitted to the government in February was only made

publicly available in full on April 27. It partially vindicates former Central Bank Governor Emir

Muhammadu Sanusi who in February 2014 claimed that NNPC failed to account for around 4

trillion naira in oil revenues that should have been deposited into government accounts at the

Central Bank (CBN) between January 2012 and July 2013.

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The APC estimates that 20% (or 910 billion naira) of annual budgetary revenues appear to have

been misappropriated at the Federal level. A further 2 trillion naira in full subsidies was reportedly

stolen in 2011 alone.

Policy clarity

Buhari is due to take office on May 29. Practical comparisons with his short stint in government

as a military leader in 1983-84 fall short given the vastly different political and economic context.

However, his austere image is underpinned partly by past economic policies, particularly the "war

against indiscipline" that penalised corrupt officials.

Buhari will face a delicate task in defining the contours and depth of his 'zero tolerance' approach

with regards to most of the country's political and business elite. Many of his party members were

recently ruling People's Democratic Party officials; the defectors, particularly from the south-west,

were instrumental to Buhari's victory (see NIGERIA: Vote breakdown will shape poll outcome -

January 23, 2015).

So far, the APC's message has focused on reclaiming lost funds, but with vague signals on

consequent prosecutions. Last December, Buhari said that he would not probe past corruption in

the Jonathan administration as long as those guilty "repent". However, after achieving victory

largely based on an anti-corruption mandate, Buhari appears to have partially reversed his stance.

On April 27, a party official said that if corrupt officials return stolen government funds, then

Buhari "may consider" granting amnesty.

Funding APC's manifesto

Some MDAs have begun releasing withheld government funds -- possibly to get ahead of APC

reform. Last month Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke announced that

NNPC had started remitting the minimum 1.48 billion dollars recommended by PwC to the

federation account.

APC policies promise a welfare state manifesto

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Whatever revenue the incoming government realises from its corruption 'amnesty programme' may

amount to only a fraction of lost oil revenue from lower prices over the medium term. According

to the IMF, Nigeria's oil and gas exports are projected to generate 52.1 billion dollars in 2015,

down 40% from 86.7 billion dollars in 2014.

This may diminish the APC's capacity to deliver its ambitious 2013 campaign manifesto, which

outlines a massive, front-loaded socio-economic agenda, including:

tripling health and education spending (in percentage terms) over the next five to ten years;

providing free primary education and school meals;

instituting a social welfare system focused on the youth, the elderly and the unemployed;

building 1 million homes a year over the next decade; and

creating a 300 billion dollar fund to finance a public infrastructure development programme that

will generate 1 million jobs a year.

The party's growing complaints about both dwindling government revenues wrought by the PDP

government and its 'interference' in the smooth handover of power to the APC, could be calculated

to lower public expectations. Calls for an increase in government expenditure to 30% of GDP in

the APC's first term in government (from 10% projected in 2015) are likely to be revised after May

29

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Algeria will tighten import regulations

The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ® - Monday, May 11 2015

The government is tightening the screws on imports to reduce its current account deficit. Budgetary

pressures are building as a result of the low energy prices: the IMF estimates Algeria's budget

deficit in 2015 will be 15.1% of GDP. Further restrictions on imports are therefore likely.

The Banque Exterieure d'Algerie (BEA) took measures to "secure" payments for imports,

according to a May 6 internal directive to its central and regional branches that local press

published yesterday. The directive instructs branches to raise scrutiny of payments and make sure

imports have the correct documentation, especially from countries that do not have transparent tax

systems. The BEA directive is the latest in a string of measures curbing imports -- in late April a

new law controlling the safety and quality of imported cars led to thousands of new cars being

stranded at port and on shipping vessels. Low oil prices are affecting Algeria -- IMF estimates that

Algeria's 2014 break-even price was at 136 dollars per barrel, against a current price of Brent crude

at around 65 dollars per barrel.