analysis on china's power (hanna kim)

8/3/2019 Analysis on China's Power (Hanna Kim)

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Should We Tremble atthe Sleeping Giant?

Analysis of China s Power in theModern World

Hanna KimIndiana University Bloomington

August 2010


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As China continues to be on the rise by advancing their military, having more

communicable relations with other countries, and building its economy, people are

starting to question their motives. Will the rise of China be a threat to global security and

international peace? If it is, this could have potential detrimental implications for the

wellbeing of all nations and the peaceful accord trying to be upheld by most nations. If it

is not, then this could be advantageous to the international community and could

potentially alter the hierarchical structure the worlds powers have created .

I will begin by addressing three schools of thought power transition theory,

bipolarity/successor-state theory, and institutionalist theory of the multiple

schools of thought that try and explain what could happen as a result of Chinas rise.

I will begin with the work of the founder of power transition theory, A. F. K

Organski. Then, I will discuss the contrasting ideology to power transition,

bipolarity, by usin g Robert S. Ross (1999) work. His work dedicates itself to the

prevalence of geographic conditions, but bases itself around the idea of stable

bipolarity. Having addressed pessimistic arguments, I will then focus on the

optimistic viewpoint of instituti onalist theory . John Ikenberrys (2008) work

commits to this theory by discussing the idea of states thriving through

international organizations to better themselves and creating international peace.

All of these theories has its own discrepancies and can be contrasted to one

another to see it. I plan to compare and contrast these theories while critiquing

their flawed ideas in terms of Chinas rise through the work of Avery Goldstein

(2007) and Renee Jeffery (2009).


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From this, I plan to explain three prominent East Asian conflicts: the struggle over

the South China Sea between China and the United States, the potential power conflict on

the Korean peninsula, and the U.S.-China dispute over Taiwan. Through these three

examples, I plan to explain the expectations of the power-transition theory and the

institutionalist theory. This will be able to explain which theory had a stronger empirical

basis.

At the end, I will assess the conclusions drawn from these three theories and

cases. By doing so, I will make recommendations to the United Nations, the United

States, and Chinas peripheral nations on how to handle Chinas rise and what this meansfor them.

Literature Review

Power Transition Theory

Emerging from the publication of A. F. K Organskis World Politics , the original

power transition theory argued against the realist interpretation of international

relations being anarchical and saw it as being hierarchical (Kugler and Organski

1989: 172). The hierarchy that is suggested is in pyramid form at the apex of

which sits the dominant nation that, for most of its tenure, is the most powerful

nation in the international order (Kugler and Organski 1980 : 173). This hierarchy

creates competition for states to be at the apex, creating a shift in power between a

rising state and the dominating state (Goldstein 2007: 647).

The states that challenge the status quo (dominant) power tend to be the

states that are not satisfied with where they are on the hierarchical pyramid. These


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challengers, as according to Jeffery (2009: 312), want to redraft the rules by which

relations among nations work.

Since first created, there have been many revisions to the power transition

theory. Through statistical tests conducted by Organski and Kugler (1980) of the

power transition hypothesis that the combination of parity and transition is

conducive to major war, they found that among those states capable of contending

for global leadership, no wars take place without a transition and, further to this,

half of t he observed transition were followed by the outbreak of war (Jeffrey: 2009

312). Power transition theory now tackles questions that deal with items such as

nuclear deterrence and democratic peace (Jeffrey 2009: 312).

However, the problem with power tr ansition theory is that there is little

support for any of power transition theorys main empirical implications (Lebow

and Valentino 2009: 389).

Lebow and Valentinos (2009) work consists of seven empirical implications

of the power transition theory, all of which they proved to have little evidence.

Several of these arguments cohesively pertain to Chinas rise.

The first implication states, the international system is dominated by a

single power capable of imposing order (Lebow and Valentino 2009 : 392).

According to Lebow and Valentino, however, there is little empirical evidence for

the existence of dominant powers in the modern state systemFor 41 of the

decades the system has been in existence it was multipolar, for eight bipolar, and for

one unipolar. Over the last 500 years, numerous powers have tried and failed to

impose their preferences on the system. (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 392).


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Implication two states, Dominant powers impose orders beneficial primarily

to themselves (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 393). Lebow and Valentino found two

reasons that made this empirical implication false. Firstly, there have been many

rising powers that have tried to enforce self-interested international orders but

have failed (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 393). Secondly, a hegemonic rule, by

definition, is a tyranny. A tyranny cannot gain respect or legitimacy on an

international scale, and so unless it transforms into a different type of rule, it cannot

impose anything and be taken seriously (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 394).

The fifth implication is the idea that rising powers will attack the dominant

powers to get ahead or vice versa (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 400). According to

Lebow and Valentino (2009: 401), it makes more sense, strategically, for dominant

powers to attack targets of opportunity, such as declining powers, to increase their

powers. Then, Lebow and Valentino (2009: 401) make an interesting

instituationalist argument that states, the most sensible policy for leading powers

in dealing with rising powers ought to be efforts to moderate their challenge by

incorporating them into the system if they are outside it (Lebow and Valentino

2009: 401).

Implication six states, hegemonic states and rising powers go to war to

defend or revise the international order (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 401). The

falsity to this can be seen in the examples used by Organski and Kugler and them

devot[ing] little attention to validating their claims by examining the motives,

calculations and decisions of his torical actors (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 403).

An example is of Hitlers war in the west and invasion of the Soviet Union during


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World War II. He did not do this because of fear of a growing Russian or French

Power. Hitler, Lebow and Valentino (2009: 403-404) argue, was more inclined to

the determining influence of will power, morale, leadership and racial purity than

to the utilization of standard measures of economic and military power.

The seventh, and final, implication of the power relation theory is that the

effective way to solve the conflicts of interest produced by power transition is war

(Lebow and Valentino 2009: 404). Yet, how can war solve these conflicts when

there has not been much damage to the states power (measured to be GDP and

po pulation)? According to Lebow and Valentino (2009: 405), the bloodiest wars

seldom kill more than 1- 2 percent of a combatant countrys population.

After giving a detailed description of power transition theory and then

thoroughly debunking all implications of it, Lebow and Valentino further invalidate

by making an interesting claim about the irony that would ensue if power transition

were, in their opinion, a true theory: It would be ironic if U.S. China relations

deteriorated because each power based its expectations on how the other will

behave on theories that lack empirical validation (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 408).

Bipolarity/Successor-State Image

Though bipolarity and the successor-state image are two separate theories, in order

to focus on the commonality of their over-lapping idea of two equally powerful

states combating for power, I have fused them into one.

Bipolarity occurs when two states wield, internationally or regionally, the

most economic, militaristic, and cultural influence. Unlike power transition theory,

this ideology believes that two states have equal and great influence. These two


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states, instead of being strategic partners to overcome the world, will be strategic

competitors engaged in a traditional great power struggle for security and

influence (Ross 1999: 96).

Similarly, the successor-state image portrays China in a bipolar relationship

with the United States, mainly because of Chinas correlation to the Soviet Union.

The ideology behind this is that because it is ruled by a Communist Party, todays

China must be aggressively expansive like the Soviet Union of yesterday (Overholt

2008: 226).

Ross (1999) argues that the bipolarity between China and the United States

is stable and is one of the factors that will create regional peace. However, how can

peace be created through two nations that could potentially consistently compete

with each other to be at the top?

The successor-state image does not see a positive outcome and due to its

basis being ideological considerations, it will always be biased to the fearful views of

the Communist Party. If the basis of a theory is purely opinion on trends, then it

does not seemingly make a strong argument. Without any empirical evidence, the

argument cannot even be credible.

Yet, through their equal strength, each state is weaker than the other in

certain aspects. The United States maritime and air supremacy is hard to match

while China has a quickly advancing economy and the natural resources to continue

this growth and have strategic autonomy (Ross 1999: 93). Their weakness shows

the bipolarity of the situation just as much as the strengths.


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The successor-state image sees only wrong in the rising power. Three

assumptions create the foundation of this argument: any rising power will

violently disrupt the system (Overholt 2008: 20), power is built and sustained

through the practice of territorial conquest (Jeffery 2009: 318), and any country

professing communist or leftist ideologies must somehow be aggressive, like the old

Soviet Union (Overholt 2008: 20- 1).

In response to bipolarity, China is demonstrating the need to balance that is

associated with it. To help strengthen their economy, China got rid of the binding

Marxist ideologies to pursue a more market-based economy. To be able to compete,

they improved the ground forces and modernized the technology for their navy and

air force. To diminish the potential of conflict with the United States, China has

become more cooperative with its peripheral nations as well as the United States

(Ross 1999: 97). Yet, it is important that though these may seem like advancements

toward peaceful relations, it is more so correlated to their preparation for their

possibility of heightened power (Ross 1999: 98).

Though bipolarity will cause the U.S.-China relations to be tainted by high

tensions, Ross argues that Washington does not have to be hypersensitive to

relative gains issues or to the prospect of Chinese military expansionism (Ross

1999: 118).

Overholts (2 008: 13) opinion, differing to the ideologies of the successor-

state image, state that not only does Chinas communism not constitute a threat to

the rest of the region or world, but notions that it is stubbornly defended by a cadre

of gerontocratsthe C hinese counterparts of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and


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Konstantin Chernenko slowly dying in their expensive chairs while their antique

system withers away are false.

Institutionalist Theory

Instituationalist theory sees Chinas rise presenting at least an opportunity for

building cooperation, rather than intensifying conflict (Goldstein 2007: 639). This

theory accepts the anarchic idea that all states are similar in the idea that they are

all self-interested and egotistical (Goldstein 2007: 646). However, institutionalists

feel that the consequences of anarchy can be controlled by international

organizations. The idea is that the institution can clarify the benefits that can come

from cooperation (Goldstein 2007: 646). According to Goldstein (2007: 646),

institutionalist theory provides a logic of contingent cooperation based on mutual

benefit among states as an alternative to intensifying conflict despite the constraints

of anarchy.

While power transition theory suggests a pessimistic view of the rise of

China, institutionalist theory offers optimism in the idea that the rise of China does

not necessarily mean great international conflict (Goldstein 2007: 650).

Ikenberry gives three reasons as to why the Western order has been

successful. These reasons, however, are closely-related to the positives of the

institutionalist theory. His first is that , in the Western system, the barriers to

economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has

already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating

within this open- market system (Ikenberry 2008). The second reason he gives is

that, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states and the resulting


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accumulation of geopolitical power shifts the balance in the orders favor

(Ikenberry 2008). The final reason is that the, system of rules and

institutionsrepresent one of the great breakthrough of the post war era. They

have laid the basis of unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority

over the global system (Ikenberry 2008).

Ikenberry is aware of the institutionalist idea that all states are anarchic, but

that can become beneficial if mitigated correctly. He states, The incentives [the

three reasons] create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are

reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment. The

most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the

game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the

world.

Critiques and Theory/Hypothesis

The rise of China will not be a global threat to security and international peace,

simply because nothing supports that claim. The power transition theory created

the idea that a rising power will challenge a status quo power of equal power.

However, all the implications of what the power transition theory stand for have

been critiqued and proven wrong by Lebow and Valentino (2009) through logical

explanations and the usage of historical references of revered power transition

theorists to disprove their claim. Bipolarity makes sense in the idea that two

equally powerful states are dominating as the lead power. However, China is a

nation on the rise, not at the level of the United States. It has just recently seen great

spikes in economic prosperity and the like. Also, Ross (1999) argument that


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bipolarity could actually create peace between China and the United States seemed

absurd, considering they are rivals, regardless of anything else. The Successor-state

image is based upon opinionated implications of a Community state having power.

It is justified through fear and does not have empirical evidence to make an

accepted conclusion.

However, the Institutionalist theory has legitimate evidence along with

structure that is logical. China being on the rise is not a threat simply because it is

inevitable through anarchic ideologies. However, to mitigate these anarchic ways,

international organizations can clarify benefits of cooperation and peaceful

transitions. Regardless of the peace that could be had through institutionalist

theory, it is inevitable that features of power transition tension, distrust, and

conflict will arise.

Through the institutionalist theory, if more international organizations place

more pressure on China, will it comply? I believe they would comply for their own

self-gain. China being on the rise shows its interests in gaining power, economic

prosperity, and advancements in various fields. By complying with an international

organization, China would no longer have to worry of petty conflict and be in a

globalized hemisphere of economic prosperity. If China were to combat, it would

face the United States and its allies of which have been created through the Western

order. The Western order is so dominating that though China is on the rise, the

likelihood of wanting to get tangled into a web of many enemies would hinder

Chinas growth and ability to rise higher as a power.


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Methodology

I will be using the controlled comparison method. In order to see how the theories

coincide with the event, one must compare and contrast the variables. Though this is the

best methodology for this case study, it is not without its shortcomings. The general

weakness of controlled comparisons is that in social science the characteristics of paired

cases are never nearly identical. The method of argument is even weaker because paired

cases usually deviate even further from having wholly different characteristics (Van

Evera 1997: 57-58). However, the comparative methodology will allow relationships to

truly be deciphered through each of these cases and the significance of each case can be

brought to light when they are put with the theories that correspond to them.

The congruence approach to analyzing these cases could have been used in terms

of an overall territorial conflict between China and its peripheral nations. However, the

South China Sea case happenings were around the same time as the Korean peninsula

ones. Then, the U.S-China disputes over Taiwan had happened twenty years before

either of the previously mentioned conflicts even began. Therefore, a sequence of events

in order to split the over-arching conflict would not have worked.

Process-tracing could have also worked, however, the research question as well as

the theory that I plan to represent as the most reliable theory do not subject itself to

historical cases that have taken long periods of time. Without this, it would be hard to

trace the decisions of a government and having a factor that would connect the

independent variable with the dependent variable.


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Case Study

The first case is the U.S-China relations on the South China Sea. This case portrays the

disputes over territory within the South China Sea and even claiming the sea itself. Then,

this case will be compared to the power conflict on the Korean peninsula that dealt with

Chinas relations with North Korea and how it had changed . Due to both of these cases

implementing the institutionalist theory as more empirically sound, I will end on

explaining the U.S-China disputes of Taiwan and how this case differs from the previous

two. From there, I will compare and contrast all three theories.

All of these cases have a focus with U.S-China relations. This effectively

controls for the players of both cases. Also, all of the dealings are with the U.S. and

China along with its peripheral states. China and the peripheral states have many cultural

similarities that can control for overall cultural differences.

Case: South China Sea

The South China Sea is a body of water encompassed by states such as China, Taiwan,

Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Though the English name for this

sea is the South China Sea, territorial claims have led to other names such as the

South Sea for China and the East Sea by Vietnam. China claims that mo st of the

territory in the sea belongs to them. Other nations disagree. According to the CIA World

Factbook, The Natuna Islands are disputed between Indonesia, China, and Taiwan. The

Malampaya and Camago gas fields are argued between the Philippines, China, and

Taiwan. The Spartly Islands are debated between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei,

Malaysia, and the Philippines.


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In 1992, China declared its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous

Zone. This asserted what territories belonged to the Peoples Republic of China that

includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands

including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha

(Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the Peoples Republic of China. The

states within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with the U.S.

greatly feared what this meant. As the Chinese economic and military capabilities were

increasing, along with their actions in support of their territorial claims, ASEAN nations

felt this to be a sure-fire threat to the status quo power.However, a different story began to emerge by the mid- 1990s. As Beijings

capabilities increased, they backed away from its previously assertive posture and began

to express surprisingly strong support for accelerating regional efforts at institutionalized

multilateralism (G oldstein 1999: 655). Regional organizations and informal regimes

started to arise and vary in significance.

After the mid-1990s, China became very involved with these institutions.

Goldstein (1999: 656) claims that, Beijing had apparently concluded t hat working

through multilateral institutions would more effectively serve its own interests than the

free-wheeling bilateral approach to dealing with smaller neighbors separately which it

had adopted in the first half of the 1990s.

By Beijing choosing to participate with the institutions more, they are falling in

line with the ideas of the institutionalist theory. Beijing has been essentially pursuing

their own interests that will end up benefiting all surrounding nations. In dealing with

problems such as competitive currency devaluation, devising arrangements for resource


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exploitation and agreeing to a common code of conduct in the South China Sea, and

signing a protocol prohibiting nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, Beijing has chosen

communication with other institutions instead of their exclusive gains. It would seem

that Beijing felt that their countrys interests would be served best through cooperative

solutions to the disputes that surrounded them.

However, this correlation and peaceful communication could all be a temporary

solution and tactic for a larger strategy (Goldstein 1999: 657). According to the power

transition theory, this could all just be a ploy to buy time. Since the ASEAN states

became alarmed at the actions of Beijing, they began to ally themselves with the UnitedStates. This over-shadowed China and creates the United States as an even greater

superpower. By creating peaceful relations, it gives China a temporary fix on the

situation.

Also, this cooperative behavior by China may simply reflect the military

requirement to focus on Taiwan, instead of provoking confrontation with the United

States and its allies.

Through all of this, there is no evidence stating that the assertions made through

the power-transition theory are true. However, one can see the correlations between the

actions of Beijing and the institutionalist theory. With their cooperation and their

investment in institutions, the institutionalist theory suggest that if the benefits continue

to come into fruition, than the desire to get rid of multilateral cooperation will be null.

Case: Korea

In the first half-decade of the post- Cold War era, Chinas policy toward the Korean

peninsula was comparable to the power- transition theorys general ideas. At th e core of


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Chinas policy was the remaining support for the Norths unification agenda and an

opposition to the presence of the U.S. military in the South.

However, after the Cold War, China worried that their power was being checked

by the U.S. through the actions of their ally of North Korea. The danger that North Korea

had posed to its neighbors conveniently allowed the United States to revise and updates

its Cold War security alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as

promoting the deployment of missile defenses. These actions can be seen through a

power-transition lens of China using its influence to shape the international order around

them and the United States standing strong to their power and position in that area.Yet, as is comparable to the South China Sea incident, the 1990s brought a new

wave of thoughts to China and its relations with Korea. The end of the decade revealed

that South Korea was one of Chinas key economic partners as well as the political

relations between th e Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of China

strengthening.

By the end of the twentieth century, Korea was becoming a venue where shared

interests presented one of the greatest opportunities for Sino- American cooperation

(Goldstein 2007: 662). This resulted in Beijing promoting a Korea policy since the 1990s

that makes cooperation a reality a policy with provisions for increased transparency and

standards of verification to reduce the fear that any participant will exploit agreements

to ac hieve a dangerous advantage over others (Goldstein 2007: 662).

Beijing began to play a participatory role that started with the four-party talks in

1999. This intensified as Chinas role in the nuclear crisis of 1993 -1994 changed during

the 2002-2003 announcement that North Korea had tested a missile from Pyongyang in


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2006. Before they would play a more passive role as the U.S. and Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea created the terms for the Agreed Framework. However, as the latter

happened, Beij ing began to be a more active and play a center role. Beijings main goal

was to edge the United States and Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea away from the

edge and push more multilateral talks that would yield a new bargain.

Though China can be seen doing more negotiations and following the highlights

of institutionalist theory, it can also be seen, through power-transition theory, that China

could be stalling for more time. Like explained for the South China Sea case, power-

transition would say th at the policy Beijing has tell more about its willingness toaccommodate necessity today than it does about the preferences that may motivate a

stronger China tomorrow (Goldstein 2007: 666). However, as is like the South China

Sea case, the power-transition theory interpretation of events has little evidence to

support it. Most of the claims made are based upon interpretations that would lead to

future projections of events. For the case of the Korean peninsula conflicts, there is more

empirical evidence supporting the ideas of the institutionalist theory being implemented.

Case: Taiwan.

In the beginning years of the post-Cold War era, there were talks between Beijing and

Taipei (capital of Taiwan/Republic of China) about a mutually acceptable answer to their

sovereignty that seemed hopeful. These two sides not only had regular discussions on

this issue, but also expanded indirect trade and investment, and relaxed restriction on

social intercourse (Goldstein 2007: 669). In the early 1990s, these effo rts leant itself to

thoughts of Beijing and Taipei being able to institutionalize cooperation and relaxing


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fears of either side jeopardizing that both could have by instead exploiting a temporary

advantage to win the sovereignty debate.

However, the problem that led to the beginning tensions originated from the

mutually perceived idea of focusing more on relative, rather than absolute, gains. Beijing

focusing on its relative gains had caused it to consider two positions on managing

tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

The first position, Goldstein (2007) states, reflects the fear that Taipei and its

ally in Washington may believe that the high costs of disruptive military action will keep

the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from responding to events that tes t itsdetermination to prevent Taiwans independence. Goldstein (2007) goes on to state that

due to wanting to combat these beliefs, China has developed a sharp reaction toward,

statements from leaders on Taiwan that suggest new definitions of the islands status

(Chen Sui - bians 2003 assertion that there was one country on each side of the Strait;

the decision to add Taiwan to Republic of China passports), a democratic political

process on the island that empowers supporters of independence, and moves to strengthen

Taiwans unofficial relationship with Washington.

Beijing feels that Taipei would not be foolish enough to rid the support of the

United States with an open declaration of independence. However, the mainland does

feel that Taiwan wi ll implement salami tactics in order to expand its international

space (Goldstein 2007: 671). In response to this, China declared that it would

jeopardize the economic benefits coming form the cooperative relations across the Strait,

if there is need to respond harshly to Taiwan and its potential of preventing reunification.


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669). These advocates of restraint can easily enlighten China on their potential losses if

they were to tarnish their reputation as a regional actor that is safe and responsible. The

second reason is that these mainland advocates of patience can argue that forbearance

rather than coercion also fosters trends on Taiwan that reduce the attractiveness of

independence (Goldstein 2007: 669).

In this case it is clear to see that the implications of power-transition theory are

more visible within the resulting events of the Taiwan case. Instead of continuing peace

and thinking of their interests being the peace of domestic issues, China feels threatened

and focuses on relative gains. Assessment

There are many similarities between the South China Sea case and the Korea case. Both

of these cases resulted in China being able to use the institutionalist theory to resolve the

issues it faced in the beginning. Though in both of these cases, China started out as a

rising power that seemed to be implementing the ideas of power-transition theory, China

seemed to always end by negotiating with nations and participating within institutions. It

is clear to see that the Chinese cooperation within institutions and with other nations was

to further the desires of China. However, within the institutionalist theory, they accept

that all states are anarchic in that they are self-interested and egotistical.

Also, both of these cases had the same reason as to why the power-transition

theory was invalid. By showing that the connotations of the power-transition theory were

based on projections of future behavior, it was simple to see that it was invalid due to its

lack of empirical evidence.


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The Taiwan case was different than the South China Sea case or Korea case

because the resulting reaction from China was more easily correlated with the power-

transition theory than the institutionalist theory. Instead of China and Taiwan continuing

their regular talks about the peaceful resolution to sovereignty, China and Taiwan began

to focus on the gains of their state and not the whole picture.

However, there is one similarity between the Korea case and the Taiwan Case.

Both of these cases become less about the state (Korea and Taiwan) and more about the

United States ability to preserve leadership and Chinas continued growth.

Goldstein (2007) mentions the institutionalist theory being a theory of optimism.Though there are strains of the institutionalist theory that can be pulled from the Taiwan

case, the optimism begins to wane as it becomes clear that the tensions between Taiwan

and China are still high.

However, the Taiwan case can be viewed as an important exception to the

broader usefulness of institutionalist theory (Goldstein 2007: 676). He goes on to state

that zero-sumness is what characterizes this dispute. The fact that very few international

issues rise to that level makes this case an anomaly.

Also, the actions taken in Taiwan gave the global community insight as to what

issues China would take a stronger stand. When it comes to the pride and overall safety

of the Republic of China, it would seem they will not budge. The fears of China

consisted of Taiwans ally of the United States and Chinas inability to show weakness.


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Conclusions and Policy Implications

Evidenced through three different cases in this paper, the institutionalist theory proves

itself as the leading contender to what China is really doing with their rise.

Yet, each theory is not without its share of discrepancies. The institutionalist

theorys foundation is that the nation acknowl edges its desire for self-gain and has the

willingness to work with others. As proved through various wars throughout history,

cooperation has not always been the answer to nations actions to further their self -gain.

However, in the case of Chinas rise , their reactions correlate well with the idea of

cooperation and willingness to compromise an idea that seemed previously impossible

for this nation. Chinas ability to find a middle ground with other nations puts it out of

the league with power transition theory and bipolarity/successor-state image theory.

In the future, research on how communism plays in part with the tension should

be done. By doing this, one can also assess the successor-state image theory that bases its

fear of Chinas rise on the possibility that it is the successor to the Soviet Union. Thus

far, the only knowledge that can be correlated to the successor-state image theory are

conspiracies. In order to give evidence for or against this theory, there needs to be more

empirical information. Seeing as how many people fear the rise of China due to the fear

of the rise of communism, I feel that it would be prevalent and pertinent to do so.

Chinas future with its continuing rise, through the predictions of the

institutionalist theory, shows a harmonious communication between nations. For

example, at the climate change conference in Cancun, Mexico for 2010, China has

already shown signs of this theory. They have been more flexible and willing to be a part

of the binding agreement that would allow outside verification on whether or not it is


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making good on its pledges to curb emissions a contrast to their previous years of

absolute refusal. Even in the arguable Wikileaks, China has apparently become more

agreeable to the idea of North and South Korea fusing into one democratic nation. This

is a huge contrast to their previous ideas of supporting North Koreas fight for a

communist-dictatorship society.

There are three main contemporary actors that are involved in Chinas rise: th e

United Nations, the United States, and Chinas peripheral.

The United Nations needs to continue to push China into cooperation. By

showing China what it could gain from cooperation at the climate change conference, theUnited Nations has the ability t o stabilize Chinas anarchic tendencies while also keeping

cooperation with other nations for peace. By cooperating, China has the ability to not

only ease the minds of other nations, but also to create a better environment for their

country by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and lower their current top rank of

emitting the most greenhouse gases. The United Nations needs to make it obvious to

China in every policy that their country has the ability to have tremendous gains by

simply cooperating.

The United States needs to cooperate with China. Though this nation is on the

rise, there is no indicator that it will harm the United States ability to be a dominating

status quo power. There needs to be constant dialogue between the United States and

China about the variety of areas of disagreement in order to create an actual relationship.

With issues such as humanitarian rights and the manipulation of the monetary system, the

only way to have China reconsider is to discuss with them what it would mean to them,

as far as gains, to not participate in these issues. By cooperating with other nations that


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view their actions as wrong, they will be able to hinder conflict and create a better image

for themselves which will ultimately lead to a vast amount of gains by simply gaining

the trust of other nations. The United States needs to keep in mind that despite the

feeling of threat that comes from Chinas rise, the most peaceful way to combat it is to

help China get more involved in the international community and to keep a constant flow

of dialogue with them.

Chinas peripheral nations need to keep a weary eye on China. There have been

many occasions in which China has implemented action based on its anarchic tendencies.

However, if these peripheral nations can keep dialogue with China and get theinternational community involved, China will see the advantages of cooperating. The

tensions that are felt by all nations that are involved with Chinas rise is inevitable.

When the security and well-being of nations are threatened, it is easy for them to feel the

need to combat through force. However, if China can constantly be involved in the

dialogues of the United Nations, or just one-on-one with the different threatened nations,

there is a chance that it will continue to cooperate, as it has shown in the past.


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Lebow, Richard Ned, and Be njamin Valentino. 2009. Lost in Translation: A Critical

Analysis of Power Transition Theory. International Relations 23:389-410.

Organski, A. F. K. 1958. World Politics . New York: Knopf.

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analysis on china's power (hanna kim)

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