an institutional critique of intergovernmental ism

8/4/2019 An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmental Ism

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An Institutional Critique of IntergovernmentalismAuthor(s): Geoffrey Garrett and George TsebelisSource: International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 269-299Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704079 .

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An nstitutionalritiqueof ntergovernmentalismGeoffreyarrettndGeorgeTsebelis

Intergovernmentalistnalyses fEuropean ntegrationavetended o focus nthe bargaining mong national governments ver the outcome of treatynegotiations. he epochsthat reaties emarcate re considered functionfgovernments' references nd their ability o furtherhose preferencesninterstateargaining.1his approach tands n marked ontrastoneofunction-alist approaches,whichcontendthat much of the important ction overEuropeanintegrationakesplace between reaty evisions. romtheneofunc-tionalistperspective, reaty evisions nvariably park"spillovers"thatem-power actors and generatepolicydynamics hat were unintendedby thegovernmentshat igned hem.2As the legislative utputof the European Union (EU) has increased nrecent years, the intergovernmentalisterspective ncreasingly as beenadaptedtothedynamicsfday-to-dayecisionmaking.Notsurprisingly,oststudies oncentratemyopicallyn decisionmakingn theCouncilofMinisters,which s the nstitutionalmbodimentf nterstate argaining etween reatyrounds.Numerousscholarshave computed"power indexes"-which are afunction f the portionof all mathematically ossiblewinning oalitionstowhich ach governments pivotal-to deduce the ability f ndividual overn-ments to influenceCouncil decisions.3The thrust f these studies is thatalthough overnmentsromarger U member tateshave more nfluence veroutcomes hanthose from maller tates, heirpower s notproportionateotheir otingweightsn theCouncilof Ministers.

The authors thankBruce Bueno de Mesquita, Daniel Diermeier, Jeffryrieden,RobertGibbons,Madeleine Hosli,JohnOdell,AndrewMoravcsik,nd an anonymouseviewer orhelpfulcommentsnd Neal Jesse ndAmie Kreppelfor esearch ssistance.GeorgeTsebeliswould iketorecognize financial upportfromthe Simon GuggenheimFoundation, and National ScienceFoundation rant BR 9511485.1. Moravcsik 993.2. See Ross 1995;and Sandholtz1992.3. See BramsandAffuso 985;Hosli 1993;Johnston995; Johnstonnd Hunt 1977;Lane andMoeland 1995; Widgren 994; and 1995.Internationalrganization0, 2, Spring 996,pp. 269-99? 1996 byThe 10 Foundation nd theMassachusettsnstitutef Technology


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270 International rganizationWe arguethatthisvariantof intergovernmentalismeneratesno analyticleverageover decisionmaking n the contemporaryU. Unlike traditional

intergovernmentalism,t ignores hepolicypositions fthebargainingmem-bers. This leads powerindexessystematicallyo overestimate he powerofgovernments ith xtreme referencesespeciallyfrom ig countries, otablythe United Kingdom) and to underestimate he power of more centristgovernmentsespecially rom maller ountries,uchas theBeneluxgroup).Moreover, ower ndex nalysis-alongwithmainstreamntergovernmental-ismand, ndeed,neofunctionalism-paysnsufficientttention o institutionalrules hatgovern ecisionmakingn thecontemporaryU. Most mportant,lltheseapproachesunderestimatehe mpact fthe 1986 SingleEuropeanActand the 1992 Treatyon European Union on "agenda settingpower"-theabilityo make proposals hat re difficulto amend.One canunderstandhe egislative rocess nEuropeonly hrough etailedinstitutionalnalysis ftheinteractionsmongthe Councilof Ministers,heCommissionftheEuropeanCommunities,ndtheEuropeanParliament,ndin particular he sequencingof decisions.Changes in agenda settinghavesystematic olicyconsequences that have been highlightedn onlya smallnumberof studies of European integration.4We develop this point bycontrastingikely policy outcomes under the four most frequently sedproceduresnEuropetoday: ssent, onsultation,ooperation,ndcodecision.The impact f our analysis s not imited o the ntricacies f the egislativeprocessbetweenEU treaty ounds. n a recent article,AndrewMoravcsikclaims that "from the signingof the Treatyof Rome to the makingofMaastricht, he EC (EU) has developed through series of celebratedintergovernmentalargains, ach of which etstheagendafor n interveningperiod of consolidation.The most fundamental ask facinga theoreticalaccount fEuropean ntegrationstoexplain hesebargains."5 ven fwe wereto agree withMoravcsik bout the importance f explaining he formativeevents fEuropean integration, e wouldnonetheless ontend hatthistaskcannotbe successfullyndertakennless hepolicymplicationsfEU treatiesare wellunderstood.f Moravcsiks correctnd f hesignatoriesftreaties restrategicallyational, nemust xplainwhy hesignatoriesf a treatyelectedone set of nstitutionalrrangementsver another.That is,one must nalyzethepolicy onsequencesofdifferentnstitutionalhoices. For thisreason, hetype of analysiswe presenthere is a prerequisiteeven for Moravcsik'sintergovernmentalistgenda.The remainderfthis rticle s dividedntofour ections.n thenext ection,we offer brief ritique f thepower ndexapproachto EU decisionmaking.The impact fpolicy referencesnlikelyoalitional ehaviorn theCouncilofMinisters s analyzedin the second section.The third ectionsituatesthe

4. See Garrett1992; 1995; Martin1993; Schneider 1995; Steunenberg 994; Tsebelis 1994;1995a;and 1995b.5. Moravcsik 993, 73.


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Intergovernmentalism71positionof the Council in relationto the Commissionof the EuropeanCommunitiesnd the European Parliament nder the EU's differentegisla-tiveprocedures. inally,we concludeby highlightinghe directions orfutureresearch hat ur approachpromotes.

Power ndex nalysesofdecisionmakingintheEuropean UnionWhile proponents f powerindexes disagree about some special issues,allsharea basicmethod.6 hey ssumethe Councilof Ministerss thepreeminentdecision-makingnstitutionn the EU. Council decisions increasinglyresubject o qualifiedmajority otingn which pproximatelyive-seventhsfallvotes are required opass a measure. Governmentsre allocatedvotes ntheCouncil n loose approximationo their ountries'populations, lthough hevotingweights re biased infavor fsmaller ountries. n theEU today, heseweights re: France,Germany,taly, nd the United Kingdom:10; Spain: 8;Belgium,Greece, the Netherlands, nd Portugal:5; Sweden and Austria:4;Denmark,Finland,and Ireland: 3; Luxembourg: . Sixty-twootesfrom hetotalofeighty-sevenonstitute qualifiedmajority.From the power ndexperspective,he ability f a governmento influenceCouncildeliberationss a function f theportion f allmathematicallyossible"winning" qualifiedmajority oalitions to which it is pivotal (i.e., thosecoalitionsthat would cease to attain the qualifiedmajorityhresholdfthegovernment efected). In order to determine government's ower,theBanzhafpower ndex, or xample, imply ivides he number f "vulnerable"coalitions o which t spivotalbythe totalnumber fvulnerable oalitions.Asa result, hepower ndexofa governments a score between0 and 1,and thesumof all these ndexes s 1.The application fthis pproachto the EU isbest llustrated ith eferenceto Madeleine Hosli'srecent rticlenthis ournal,whichs more ensitive othebroaderpoliticalenvironmentn Europe than are most other tudies.7Hosliconcludes hat venthough ower n theCouncilofMinisterssmonotonicallyincreasing n members'votingweights countrieswiththe same weights reequallypowerful),he relative owerofgovernmentsrom he arger ountrieshas decreasedwith very xpansion f the EU from tsoriginal ixmembers,and thatthistrendwill continuefollowinghe accessionof the threesmallEuropean Free Trade Association ountriesAustria,Finland,and Sweden)on 1January995.

6. See Banzhaf1965; and Shapley nd Shubik1954.7. Hosli 1993.


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272 International rganizationPerhaps the most strikinghing bout thepower ndexapproach s that tdoes notconsider he policypreferences fmembergovernmentsn Councildecision making.The only partial exception o this s Mika Widgren'smostrecent article.8Hosli, for example, acknowledges n the conclusionto herarticlethat t is possibleto discern onsistent olicypreferences orvariousgovernments,t least on certain ets of ssues. She states hat inreality,omecoalitionsmaybe more ikely oform han thers. or nstance,hepreferencesof Denmarkand the UnitedKingdom ften eem tobe rather lose,as is trueforthe Benelux countries, rance,and Germany."9However, he viewstheaddition of policy preferencesmerelyas a supplementto power index

analysis-informings of the ends to which overnment ight se their ower.Hosli thus mplicitlyssumes thattaking olicypositionsnto account has noimpacton the computation f power ndexes.10n the next section,we showthattheconsequencesof taking olicypreferencesnto consideration re farfrom enign. ndeed,this imple analyticnnovation alls fundamentallyntoquestion heutilityfthepower ndex pproach.In addition, ower ndexesdo not take nto ccount he egislative rocessesused in the EU. Hosli accepts thatformal nstitutional ulesconcerningheroles of the Commission ndtheEuropeanParliamentmayhave some mpacton legislation. he argues,however, hatbecause theCouncil "represents hefinal ecision-makingrganwith espect othe ntroductionfnew egislation"(at least untilMaastricht),t sunnecessary xplicitlyo take nto ccountpriorstages nthe decisionmaking rocess.1"n the third ection,we arguethat hisreasoning s flawed.ContraHosli,we assert hat he ability o make proposalsthat are difficulto amend (agenda-setting ower) is at least as important opolicy utcomes s ishaving he final ayon whether bill s ultimately assed(veto power).We then howthatdifferencesmong heEU's decision-makingprocedures can be expected to have significantonsequences for policyoutcomes.Policypreferencesnd power ndexesLet us beginour analysis y assuming-forthe moment-thatthe Council ofMinisters s thesole decisionmaker ntheEU. We consider seven-memberCouncil, in which each member'svote is weightedequally and fivevotesconstitute qualifiedmajority. his is the simplestway to represent ecisionmaking nder hequalifiedmajorityhresholds hathaveobtained n all actualconfigurationsfthe CouncilofMinisters. he critical ifferenceetween uranalysisnd thepowerndex erspectivesthatwe include hepolicy references

8. Widgren 995.9. Hosli, 1993,643.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.,629.


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Intergovernmentalism73SQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

FIGURE 1. (Ir)relevancefpower ndexesn one dimension, here Q = statusquo and 1-7 = governments'dealpoints: oalition 2346 s mpossible,ince5willoinof member governments.n the first art of this sectionwe analyze theone-dimensional ase and demonstrate hat hetype f calculations erformedby power ndexesproducescompletely ifferentesults fpolicypositions retaken nto ccount.Conventional ower ndex nalyses ystematicallyveresti-matethepower fextrememembers fcoalitions nd underestimatehepowerof centristmembers or wo reasons. First, nly onnected oalitions-that s,coalitions among governmentshat are contiguous n the relevant policyspace-should be consideredwhencalculating ulnerable oalitions. econd,the coalitions that actuallyformmay often even be oversized,ratherthan"minimalwinning" oalitions.We demonstratehattheseproblems btain nanynumberof dimensions.Finally,we addresspotentialobjectionsto ourargument oncerninghestabilityfgovernment references ver ssuesandtime.

A power indexin one dimensionAssume that the seven members 1-7) of the Council of Ministershavepolicypreferences"ideal points")thatcan be arrayed n a singledimensionfrom ess to more European integration see Figure 1). Accordingto thisapproach,the requiredfive-seventhsualified majority an be achieved intwenty-oneifferentays there retwenty-one7!/5!2!]distinct ays hat iveofsevenmembers an be put together). ince we assumethat ll members aveequal votingweights,hepower ndex pproachwould concludethat ach hasequal power one-seventh).Now considertheseexpectationsn Figure1. Our first rgument s that amore appropriateway of calculatingpowerwould be to include from hetwenty-oneecisive coalitionsonlythose thatare connected.Considerthecoalition12346. According o thepower ndex iterature,hiscoalitionhas aprobability /21to occur. We wish to argue,however, hatthe probability f12346occurrings not1/21but ero. This s because there snothinghatunites

members , 2, 3,and 4with thatwould not nclude5.To demonstratehis, ssumethat he status uo isto the eft fgovernmentand that thepreferences fgovernmentsre Euclidean (that s, theirutilitydecreases withthe distance of an outcomefrom heir deal points).All fivemembers f the coalition12346 would like a policy utcome that s closer totheir deal pointsthan s the statusquo (for example,at the preferences fgovernment). But so doesgovernment.When a vote comes to thefloor,hemembers f thewinningoalition annot xcludegovernmentfrom oting or


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274 International rganizationa proposalthat s in its nterest. similar rgument an be made ifthe statusquo is to theright f member . All sixgovernments1-6) willvote nfavor fmovingt to the eft.Nowconsider hat he status uo is somewhere etween1and 6.There s no movementhat1 and 6 can agree upon. n all threemutuallyexclusive nd collectivelyxhaustive ases, thecoalition12346 does not occur.Our argument ssumesthat there s no cost to voting or a proposalthatagovernmentreferso the status uo. One could envisage situationnwhichthis assumptionmightnot hold-when a governmentwishes not to beassociatedwith proposal t prefers,or xample, odeflect he criticism f tsdomesticopponents.However,this is most unlikelyn the contextof theCouncilof Ministers ecausevoting ehaviorhas been shrouded nsecrecy.Coalitions uch as 12346do notform ecausethey renotconnected; hat s,theydo not includea memberwhose preferences re located betweenthepreferencesf membersnthe coalition. n this ituation, ither n agreementamong hemembers f the coalition s notpossible inwhich ase thecoalitiondoes not form),or if an agreement mongthe nonconnectedmembers spossible, he excludedmemberwillgo along inwhich ase the coalition snotdecisive, ince tcan reduce ts size byone and stillwin). Consequently, hencountries ote on thebasis of policypositions, onconnected oalitionsdo notform.This outcome anbe contrasted ith hat fcoalition overnmentormation.WilliamRiker's theoryof minimumwinning oalitions was criticizedforignoring olicy positions.12 s a result, he notion of minimum onnectedwinning oalitionswas introduced.13n this iterature, onnectedcoalitionsere considered s a plausiblerefinementftheminimum inning pproachthatreducedthepossiblerangeof outcomes, ut Riker'sbasic insight as notchallenged.Coalitionbuildingngovernmentormationsvery ifferent,owever, romdecisionmakingn the CouncilofMinisters. arties na coalition anexcludewould-be (connected) member fromparticipatingn governmentthat is,holdingcabinet portfolios).Moreover, theyhave motivesto do so-forexampl ,to increase heperquisites f officevailableto each member. his simpossble in the Council of Ministers.No Eurogovernments formed; ndthere reno perquisites onnectedwithbeing nthe majorityn a given ssue.Moreover,member overnmentsanvoteforwhichever olicies heywish.As aresult, he nclusion fnonconnected oalitions n the calculations iases thecalculation fpower ndexes.Oversized oalitions hould also be considered.Assumenow that he statusquo inFigure1 is located far othe eft fgovernment and that decision oimplement policy tgovernment's ideal point sproposed for hemoment,

12. Riker1962.13. Axelrod1970.


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Intergovernmentalism75we will not discusshow this proposalwas made). All the membersof theCouncilprefer tothe status uo. If one were to allowfor versized oalitions,it s clear that nother hree ouldform: 23456, 34567, nd 1234567.We willsoon showthat uch coalitions ccur quite frequently:ither ecause they rerequiredbythe institutionaletting r because themembers f the Councilagreeon issues.Thus,exclusion fthepossibilityfoversized oalitions urtherbiasescalculations f power ndexes.The consequencesof thebiases introduced ytheunrealistic ssumptionsfnonconnectivitynd decisivenessare serious.We presentonlythe biasesintroduced ythe nonconnectivityssumption nd leave the size calculationsfor the interestedreader. If one considers only the connectedwinningcoalitions n one dimension, he onlypossible decisivecoalitions re 12345,23456, and 34567. n these coalitionsmembers and 7 participate nce each;members and 6 twice ach; and members , 4,and 5 three imes piece.Thus,thepower ndex PI) of the different embers s as follows: I(1) = 1/15,PI(2) = 2/15,PI(3) = 3/15,PI(4) = 3/15,PI(5) = 3/15,PI(6) = 2/15,PI(7) =1/15 PI(n) = 1].A comparison ftheseresultswith raditionalower ndexes hows hat ncea single policydimension s introduced, he potentialnumberof decisivecoalitions is reduced fromtwenty-one o three. All possible connectedcoalitionswill ncludegovernments, 4,and 5.The inclusion f thesemembersis one anda half imes s likely s the nclusion f2 and 6 andtwice s probableas the inclusion f members1 and 7. Even though hevotingweights f allmembers n our exampleare the same-and hence each memberwouldbeconsidered quallypowerful yconventional alculations fpower ndexes-thelikelynfluence f thesecountries verpolicies s clearly elated to theircentralityn thepolicy pace.

Power indexesin two dimensionsRobertAxelrod'ssuggestion fminimum onnectedwinning oalitionshasbeen criticized ecause itdoes notgeneralize nmultiple imensions.14erewe provide definitionf the connectedness oncept nmultiple imensionsand showthatourcritique fpower ndexesobtainsfor nynumber fpolicydimensionsour figuresnd proofswillbe in twodimensions).We need notdiscuss oversizedcoalitionsbecause there is nothing o be added to the

one-dimensionalase.Consider hetriangle 23composedof threemembers f a coalition ndanypoint4 inside t (Figure2). In the appendixwe demonstratehat so longaspolicy referencesreEuclidean,a coalition f members , 2, and 3willneverform. ither1, 2,and3 cannot greeto formny oalition r4willbe included14. Lijphart 984.


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276 International rganization

w~~~~~~~

123~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

FIGURE 2. Connected nd nonconnectedoalitionsn twodimensions, hereSQ = status uo,1-4 = governments'preferredositions,W= win et, ndW123 W4: oalition 23 isnonconnectedf4 belongso thePareto etof 1, 2,3in the coalitionwith hem.The logic ofthe arguments straightforward.f thestatus uo is ocated nside hetriangle 23, hen he coalition 23 cannot orm.On the otherhand,if the statusquo is outside the triangle123, any policyposition hat coalition 23 swillingosupport ver hestatus uowill lso besupported y4. Consequently,s longas 4 is inside hetriangle 23,123 cannotbe a vulnerable oalition.

This argument xtends the notionof connectedness n more than onedimension.Considern members f a legislative odyin a multidimensionalEuclideanspace.Without oss of generalityonsider coalitionM = (1,2, . .,m}outofN = {1,2, .. ,n}possiblemembers.DEFINITION. A coalition fm (outofn) memberssnonconnectedf t leastonememberelongsnthe areto etofM andif E {N} - {M}.PROPOSITION 1. Whenmembers oteon thebasisofpolicy ositions, oncon-nected oalitions o not orm.

What is the relevanceof proposition1 for our purposes? Consider aconfigurationf Council members s shown n Figure3, whereone of themembersgovernment) is included nside thehexagonformed ythe othersix.Whilepower ndex heorieswouldpredict achfive-memberoalition o bedecisive,ropositionindicates hat here sonly ne five-memberoalition hat


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Intergovernmentalism 77

6

3

FIGURE 3. Bias introducedy ower ndexesn twodimensions, here -7and 7' = govemments'preferredositions: oalition 2456 sdecisive utnonconnectedince t xcludes ,which elongso its areto etcan form hatdoes notinclude government: 12356. n particular,oalitions12345,12346,13456,12456, nd 12346 are not possible,because they re non-connected.fone moves heposition fmember a bithighernthefigure,ayto point ', there s no decisive oalition hat xcludes ' altogether.As inthe one-dimensionalase, conventional ower ndexcalculations rebiased. They nclude mpossible oalitions n the denominator nd they ountmembers f these coalitions n the numerator. his bias operates n favor fspatiallysolated ountries ndagainst entristountries.These examplesare hypothetical. owever,theycan be easily replicatedwith ctual positions f differentountries n differentssues. For example,Roland Stephenhas located thepositions fthe differenturopean govern-ments nthe"catalyticonverters" ase in twodimensions: he evel of controlof differentmissions and the variance in standardstoleratedby differentgovernments.'5t would be possible to use his two-dimensionalpace tocalculatedifferentower ndexes.Instead of makingelaborate mathematical omputationshere, we willpostpone he taskofdiscussinghecatalyticonvertersill untilwediscuss heimplications fthe EU's institutionaluleson policymaking.

The stability f policy positions and coalitionsThere is one possible objectionto the analysispresented bove: that t isimpossible o talk about thepolicypreferencesfgovernmentsnthe Councilof Ministers n anythinguta case-by-case asis. If thisweretrue, hespatial15. Stephen1995.


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278 Internationalrganizationallocation fgovernmentreferencesouldbe randomcross he range fissues nder U jurisdiction.more echnical ay othinkbout his cenarioisthat henumberfeffectiveolicy imensionsn theEU is so large hat llwinningoalitionsre connected. ne might hen rgue hatwhilepowerindexesreflawed,hey renonethelesshebest easiblepproximationf heabilityfgovernmentso nfluenceecisions ver heentire pectrumf EUjurisdiction.Is the ssumptionf randomistributionfgovernmentreferencescrossissues ppropriaten the aseofthe ontemporaryU? We agreewithmostcommentatorshatt snot.Considerhe ollowingell-knownxamples.Accordingo thepowerndex pproach, ermanyndtheUnitedKingdomare equally ble toinfluenceecisionsntheCouncil ecausethey avethesamenumberfvotes. ut his onclusionlatlyontradictsll the ournalisticand cholarlyiteraturehatpeaks bout he solationf heUnitedKingdomsince t joinedthe EU-an isolation esultingrom he great mportanceattached o national overeigntyyBritish oliticiansnd citizens like.'6Similarly,ost ommentatorsrequentlyeferotheconfrontationetweenthewealthynorth"nd the ess-developedsouth" nside heEU. Spain'sdemands or ohesionundst Maastrichtooffsethedislocationsssociatedwith hetransitiono economicndmonetarynionwere clear xample.17Moreover,he basic thrust f the literaturenalyzinghe distributionalconsequencesf the nternalmarket rogramnd theprinciplef "mutualrecognition"s that onsistentinnersnd osers ave mergedromhe1992agenda.'8Finally,onsiderhemplicationsor ouncil fMinistersecisionmakingftheaccession f Austria, inland,nd Sweden o theEU. Thepowerndexapproachssumeshat he nlyway o thinkbout hisssue s to assume hatthese ountriesre ustas likely o allywithGermanys with he UnitedKingdom. owever, oone whohas even passing nowledgefEuropeanpoliticalconomy ould ome othis onclusion.ather, e alongwithmostcommentatorselieve hat hemost ecentxpansionf theEU willbenefitGermanyndfurthereduce he nfluencef heUnited ingdom.Onecould itemore xamples,ut heyll eadto the ame onclusion.hedivisionsnEurope o not esemblehemotion fgasmoleculesna containerwhere tanypoint ftime ny womoleculesmay e closetogether.nstead,thecoalitionshat orm epend n issues.Thus, ne canform xpectationsabout olicy ositionsfgovernmentss well saboutikelyoalitionsetweenthem, ependingnthe ssueor thecombinationf ssues.The assumptionthat nythingoes,whichsfundamentalo thepowerndexpproach,liesnthe ace f llexistingvidence.

16. Moravcsik 991.17. Eichengreen 992.18. Smith ndWanke 1993;Streeck nd Schmitter991.


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Intergovernmentalism79Decision-makingroceduresThe analysis n the preceding ection cceptedthebasic assumption f powerindex analysis hatone can understand olicymakingynamicsn the EU byfocusingxclusivelyn bargainingmongmember overnmentsn the CouncilofMinisters.n this section,we arguethat this assumptions inappropriate.The balance of legislativepower between the Council of Ministers, heCommission f the European Communities,nd the European Parliamentvaries ystematicallyn the contemporaryU with heprocedures nderwhichdecisions re made. In contrastwithHosli's assumptionsharedimplicitlyymost ntergovernmentalists)hateffectiveower ies with heinstitutionhatacts last (i.e., thatcan vetonew legislation),we highlighthe importance fagendasettingi.e.,the ability o make proposals hat re difficulto amend).In almostall of the EU's decision-makingrocedures, he right o initiatelegislativeproposals is vested solely in the Commissionof the EuropeanCommunities. owever, hisdoes notnecessarily ive t effectiveontrol verthepolicymakingrocess.The Commission annotkeep issues off heagenda.Since the 1957 TreatyEstablishingheEuropean Economic CommunitytheTreaty fRome), theCommissionhas been bound to makeproposalswhenrequestedby the Council of Ministers.This power was extendedto theEuropeanParliament n theTreaty n EuropeanUnion. More importantorpresentpurposes, he fact hatthe Commissionmakes the first roposaldoesnot mean that it can always constrain-much less determine-the finalproposalthat s ultimatelyotedon in the last stageof the legislative ame.Who possesses this effective genda-setting ower varies with the EU'sdifferentecision-makingrocedures.

Assumptionsand methodsIn order to substantiatethis argument,we base our analysis on theone-dimensionalpatialmodelpresentednFigure1 (inwhich he Councilhasseven memberswithequal votingweights).The previous ection establishedthat once policy positionsare taken into account,the number of decisivecoalitions hat ouldform alls rom hetwenty-oneotheonly hree onnectedqualifiedmajorityoalitions:12345,23456,and 34567. n this ectionwe showhow the nteractionsetween he Councilof Ministers nd the otherrelevantdecision-makingnstitutionsn the EU-the Commission f the EuropeanCommunities nd the European Parliament-not onlydeterminewhichofthese coalitionswill form n the Councilbut also influence he likelypolicyoutcomes that will ensue. Our analysis can be generalized in multipledimensions, ut we examinethe one-dimensional ase forease ofpresenta-tion.'919. Tsebelis1994.


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280 InternationalrganizationWe make numberf dditionalssumptionsnthe nstitutionalnalysis:(1) The status uoat thebeginningf he nalysiss a policyhat eflectshepreferencesfthe east ntegrationistovernmentn theCouncil. his anbeunderstoodsthe utcome f ntergovernmentalargainingnderheLuxem-bourg ompromisehat ominatedecisionmakingntil he atificationf heSingle uropean ct seebelow).(2) All theother elevantctors-theothermembers fthe Council fMinisters,heEuropean ommissionftheEuropean ommunities,nd theEuropean arliament-prefero increasehe evelof ntegrationn theEU.This s the cenariohat estdescribeshe nvironmenthat asobtainedincethedemise ftheLuxembourgompromise. e ultimatelyelax his ssump-tion o analyze hepossibilitiesor ollingack ntegrationnder he odeci-sionprocedure.(3) The preferencesf the Commissionf theEuropeanCommunities(considereds a unitaryctor r,more recisely,s themedian oter n theCollege fCommissioners)remore xtremehan hose f nymemberf heCouncil fMinisters.his s consistentith he ualitativeiteratureighlight-ingthevested nterestsf commissionersnvigorouslyushingorwardheintegrationgenda.Thepro-integrationgendaof commissionersay eem

puzzlingivenhat ational overnmentselect heirwn ommissionersndcan replace hem t theendof their erms. owever,nformalonstraintsmilitate gainstgovernments'hoosing heirpartisans s commissioners.Considerablevidence lsosuggestshat ommissionersakeon increasinglypro-integrationositionsfterheyrrivenBrussels.20(4) The preferencesf heEuropean arliamentagain, hiss shorthandorthepreferencesf hemedian oternthefloor f heparliament)resimilartothose f heCommission.his ccords ith he iew fmost bserversf heparliament.2'erelax his ssumptionater otakento ccounthepossibilitythat hedegree f itizen ontrolver arliamentariansill ncreasentime.Ouranalysis ocuses n the aststeps f differentecision-makingroce-duresntheEU today. or these ast tepswe assume ompletenformation,that s,that ll actors now achother's referencesndthe ocation f thestatus uo.While ne couldreadilyxtend he ompletenformationssump-tionto the wholeprocedure-asopposedto thelaststeps-we avoidthetemptationecause it leads to conclusionshat are difficulto supportempirically.erhapsmostmportant,nderompletenformationhedecision-makingamewould ever each he inaltages. he nitial roposal ould eaccepted yall actors nd thegamewould nd. n practice, owever, ostdeliberationseachthe final tageof a given procedure. onetheless,hecompletenformationssumptions reasonabletthe ndof hegame ecause

20. Ross 1995.21. Tsebelis 1995a.


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Intergovernmentalism81by thistimethe relevant ctors have exchanged onsiderable nformation-bothby heir ehavior nder he decision-makingrocedure ndoutside t.

We also assumethat he actors ngaged n EU policymakingelievethat t snot feasible at least nthe short un) to reintroduce policy ssueonce it hasgone throughhe relevant rocedure. ndirect vidence upports his ssump-tion. Most important,t is extremelyare foranypolicy nitiativeo end in astalematewithno decisionreached. t is thusreasonableto analyzepolicymak-ing s a one-shot ame n which hefinal layern a gamewill cceptproposalsthat t preferso the status uo ante.It s theoreticallyossible, fcourse, or ssueson which egislativeffortsailto be raised again in the future. ntroducing he possibility f indefiniteiteration f these games complicatesmatters.One would have to analyzenoncooperativeargaining amesbetween he agendasetter ndthe actor hatmust cceptor reject he agendasetter's roposal.This actormustdeterminewhether oreject proposal tpreferso the status uo ante nthe expectationofsecuring morefavorable utcome n a subsequent layof thegame.Thereare unique equilibriato such games in theory.22t is extremely ifficultnpractice, owever, o put empirical arameters n the relevant actors. ne ofthe mostimportant eterminantsf bargaining utcomes nvolving overn-ments s likely o be their domesticpolitical environments,ut the preciseeffects f domestic onditions n internationalargainingre notyetknown.23Usingthis nalytic ramework,tis the ast twostagesof each EU decisionmakingprocess that are pivotal:which actor makes the finalproposal? towhom?underwhatvoting ules?We now addressthesequestionswith espectto the fourmajor decision-making rocedures in the EU today: assent,consultation,ooperation,ndcodecision.

The legacy oftheLuxembourg compromiseUnder the Luxembourgcompromisethat effectively overneddecisionmaking n the EU from t least 1966 until 1986,the Council of Ministersdominated hepolicymaking rocess.Figure4 depictsthis ituation. houghthe formalrightto propose lay exclusivelywith the Commissionof theEuropean Communities,proposals could only become law if theyweresupportedunanimouslyn the council.This effectivelyave all the decision-making owerto thegovernment ith he east nterestnchanginghe statusquo. There was thus powerfullowest ommon enominator" iasinCouncildeliberationsnd thepace of ntegration as accordinglylow,determineds itwas by the preferencesof the least integrationistmembergovernment(government inFigure4).

22. Rubinstein 982.23. Evans,Jacobson, nd Putnam1993.


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282 International rganizationStatus uo underthe uxembourg Winningroposal Winningroposal ndercompromisend ssent under odecision consultationnd ooperation

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CommissionndEuropean arliamentLess ntegration More ntegration

FIGURE 4. Decision-makingproceduresndpolicy utcomesn the uropeanUnion,where -7 = govemments'preferredositions

In thecontemporaryU, some ssues are stilldominated y owest ommondenominator ressures n the Council.24 irst, hemembergovernmentsrtheirrepresentativesn the Council of Ministers-actingunanimously-aresolelyresponsible orrevisinghe EU's treaties, or tsexternal elationships,and for the new areas added to EU jurisdictionn the Maastricht reaty(common foreign nd security olicyand cooperation n justice and homeaffairs). he dynamicsf decisionmakingnthese areas are identical othat nthe era of the Luxembourg ompromise. econd, some contentiouspolicyissuesare decided unanimouslyn the Council ofMinisters ut on a proposalmade by the Commission.These include indirect axation,exchangerateparities orEconomicandMonetaryUnion, ndustrial olicy nd environmen-tal issues concerning iscalmatters, nergypolicy, nd land use. Since theCouncilofMinisters an amend all Commission roposalsunanimously,hecommission as no agenda-settingowerwhere hecouncilvotesunanimously(because it s ustas easyto amend as topassproposals).Policymakingntheseareas is thus gain ikely o resultnoutcomes imilar o thosegenerated y heLuxembourg ompromise.The final legacy of the Luxembourgcompromise s more interesting.Numerous reas are coveredbythe assentprocedure nwhich he Council ofMinisters otes on a Commission roposalunder a unanimityule, ubjecttothe assent fa majorityntheEuropeanParliament. hese include stablishingcitizenship rights, he creation of cohesion funds to aid less-developedmembers, lectoralrulesfor electingmembers ftheEuropean Parliament,and the accession of new membersto the EU. The introduction f aparliamentary eto of Council decisionswould seem to be' a significantdeparturefrom hepure intergovernmentalismf the Luxembourg ompro-mise. However, so long as the median voter in the Parliament s moreintegrationisthan theleast integrationist ember f theCouncil, t is clearthatParliamentwillnot exercise tsvetoright.

24. Jacobs,Corbett, nd Shackleton 992,203-5.


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Intergovernmentalism83In sum, n all those nstanceswherevoting n the Council s byunanimity,t sreasonable to conceive of decision making n termsof the Luxembourgcompromise eriod andtoignore he rolesplayedbyotherEU institutions.nall theremainingreas ofEU jurisdiction, owever, ualifiedmajority otinghas been the rule of theday n the Council sincethe ratificationf the SingleEuropean Act. Below we demonstrate hat the consequences of qualifiedmajority oting arywith he relationships etween he Counciland the otherrelevant nstitutionalctors n the EU. Thus our analysiss more fine-grainedthanmostneofunctionalisttudies,which mplicitlyssumethat hespecificsfdifferentecision-makingrocedures ave no significantearing nthepace of

integration.The consultationprocedureThe threeEU decision-makingrocedures re illustratedn Figure 5. Thesimplest nd oldestof the proceduresusing qualifiedmajority oting n theCouncilof Ministerss the consultation rocedure see thetop panelofFigure5). It was elaborated in the Treaty of Rome, but its implementation as

blocked by the Luxembourg ompromise. oday, the consultation rocedureappliesto numerous reas, ncluding hefreemovement fcapital, ompetitionpolicy,and industrial ubsidies.The fundamentaldifference etween theconsultation rocedureand the Luxembourg ompromise and the assentprocedure) s that nthe former ommission roposalsbecome awifthey reacceptedby qualifiedmajorityf Councilof Ministersmembers.The consequences for policymaking f the consultationprocedure aredelineated nFigure4. Under qualifiedmajorityoting,heCommissionwantsto make the mostpro-integrationistroposal that will be supportedby aqualifiedmajorityn the Council of Ministers. his coalition s clearly 4567.Moreover,government replaces government as thepivotalplayer n theCouncil.The Commissionwillmake the proposalthat s closest to its idealpoint ndthatgovernmentprefersothe status uo (and to all solutions hatcan defeat he tatus uo unanimously). iventhepreferenceonfigurationsnFigure 4, theCommissionwould thus make a proposal ust to the left f theideal point f government, and thiswouldbe supported ygovernment.The likelypolicyconsequence of replacing he Luxembourg ompromisewiththe consultation rocedure s that thepace of integration ill ncrease.Recalcitrant overnmentsan be outvoted ya qualifiedmajority.Moreover,given hat genda-settingower ies with heCommission,hepivotal layernthe Council will not be able to set policyat its ideal point. Rather,theCommissionwillproposea morepro-integrationistolicy-but one that thepivotalplayer nthe Councilstillpreferso the status uo and hence willvotefor nthefinal tageof theconsultationame.


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284 International rganizationCONSULTATION Commission:roposal

Council(Council's ccept:"common Amend: QM SQposition") unanimity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .COOPERATION Parliament:bsolutemajority

~~~~~~~~~~melnIAccept mC) '~ 1 Rejctommission

Accept Reject Council verride:I ~~~~unanimityCouncil:QM Council vemde:unanimity

Acceptty SQcet SQ " SQcommonposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........................,CODECISION ConciliationommitteeCouncil:QMParliament:bsolutemajority

Agree o oint ext No oint extCouncil:QM

Affirmommon osition SQ [legislation ispassedQM: qualifiedmajorityoteParliament:bsolulte ajority SQ: bill apses|Accept| SQ FromGarrett,DecisionMakingnthe uropean nion."FIGURE 5. Consultation,ooperation,ndcodecision

Source. Reprinted romGarrett 995withkindpermissionrom lsevierScienceLtd.,Kidlington, nited Kingdom.The cooperation procedureThe SEA introduced a new legislative procedure for the EU. UntilMaastricht,he most mportantssues subjectto thiscooperationprocedurewere thosepertainingo thecompletion f the internalmarket the "1992"agenda). Today,thecooperation rocedure see Article189c of theTreaty nEuropean Union) applies to a rangeof policyareas including ocial policy(although heUnitedKingdom ptedout of thisprovision),mplementationfregional funds,researchand technologicaldevelopment, nd a numberofenvironmentalssues.


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Intergovernmentalism85The most mportantnstitutionalifferenceetween the consultationndcooperationprocedures s that the power of the European Parliament s

significantlyreater n the latter han the purely dvisory ole it playsunderconsultationsee the middle panel of Figure5). Under thisproceduretheEuropean Parliament gained "conditionalagenda settingpower"; it mayamendCommission roposals. f theseare acceptedbytheCommissionwhichis thecase for hree ut offour mendments), heproposals re thenpresentedto theCouncilofMinisters,making t difficultor heCouncilto modifyhem.25The European Parliament lso can reject proposalsthat are accepted by aqualifiedmajorityn theCouncil'sfirst eading f a bill. This rejection an beoverridden nly y unanimous ouncil. npractice, owever, his ower snotvery ignificantfthe Parliaments more pro-integrationhan anymember ftheCouncil.A proposal that s preferred o thestatus uo by theCouncilwillinvariablylsobe preferred ythe Parliament.If the European Parliament'spreferences re similar to those of theCommission f the European Communities,he policyconsequencesof thecooperation procedurewill be the same as those under the consultationprocedure.The Commission nd the Parliamentwill agree tomakethemostpro-integrationroposalthatwillwinthe support f a qualifiedmajorityntheCouncil. n thecontext fFigure4,thisproposalwouldbemarginallyothe eftofgovernment's ideal pointbecause this s the most ntegrationistolicy hatthepivotal overnmentprefersothe status uo.Given he nstitutionalnnovations fthecooperation rocedure nd thefactthat t was central o the effort o completethe internalmarket etweenthemid-1980s ntil the ratificationf the Maastricht reaty,we will examine nsome detailtwopiecesof egislationhat eveal he mpact fagendasettingnpolicyoutcomes.The first s the well-known atalytic onverters ase; thesecondpertains o thesystemf health nd safety egulation revailingn theEU.Withrespect o catalytic onverters,onsider hefollowing uotationfromthe authoritativework of Francis Jacobs,Richard Corbett,and MichaelShackletonon the strategic alculationsof the European Parliamentundercooperation:

A goodexampleofhowthe Parliament an use thesepowerswas when n1989 t considered xhaust mission tandards or mallcars.Here,itwasfacedwith Councilcommon osition hatfellbelowthestandardstsup-ported nitsfirsteading. arliamentwaskeen onraising hesestandards olevelsequivalent o thoserequired n,for nstance, heUSA andSweden,and it was known hat ome MemberStatessharedParliament's oncern,but had been a minorityn Council.Parliament's ommitteen the environ-ment hereforerepared econdreading mendmentshatwould restorethehigher tandards.n thedebate,pressurewasputon the Commissiono

25. Tsebelis 1994,136.


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286 International rganizationaccept theseamendments eforeParliament ook tsfinal ote. t wasmadeclearthat fthe Commission id notdo so,Parliamentwould nsteadrejectthe common osition, nd the egislationwouldfall s therewas clearly ounanimity ithinhe Councilto overrule arliament. he CommissionthereforecceptedParliament'smendments hichwere duly ncorporatedinto hereviewed roposal.Councilthenhadthreemonthsn which itherto approve tbyqualifiedmajority,r to amend t byunanimitywhich tcouldnot do as at least threeMemberStatesagreedwithParliament) r tosee it fall which t couldnotcountenance, s thiswould havecreatedhavocin the car ndustry ith divided nternalmarket nd uncertaintys to whatstandards oadaptto whilethewhole procedure tarted gain).A reluctantmajoritynCouncilthereforedoptedthereviewed ext which,nciden-tally, ould costeverymallcarpurchaser n extra 300 orso as a result,butwill ead to a major mprovementntheenvironment).26The quotationprovidesa verbal accountof the Parliament's onditionalagenda-setting ower under the cooperationproceduresand the strategiccalculationsnvolvednexercisinghis ower.Unlikethe cenarioweenvisagedinFigure4, theParliament's references ere not congruent ith hoseof theCommissionnd,as a result, n additional trategicnteractionetween hesetwo nstitutionss discussed.Nonetheless,t s clear thatthetypes f decision

made inthis ase are exactlyhoseanticipatedn our theoretical nalysis. heCommissionwas forced o agreewiththe Parliament ecause otherwise hestatus quo would prevail. Then, the Council was forced to accept theParliament's nvironmentalosition, ecause of fearof reversiono the statusquo.The outcomewasmuchmore dvanced nterms fenvironmentalrotectionthanwas preferredynotonlythe least environmentalistovernmentn theCouncilbut also probably y tspivotalmember.WhatJacobs,Corbett, ndShackleton all adoptionof the text y"a reluctantmajority"s essentiallyhestrategic alculation fgovernment in Figure4 (to accepta proposalat 5).Note also that the empirical ecordreportsno power-index-likealculation.The Council agendawas set by heparliamentaryroposal, ndtheParliamentselected ts allies. Winners nd losers n the councilcouldnot n thiscase bededucedfrom omea priori alculations fprobabilisticoalitions.The second example nvolves series of directives oncerning ealth andsafety t work ssues: the "Health and Safety t Work" directive89/391/EEC), the "Machinery"directive 89/392/EEC), and the "Display ScreenEquipment"directive90/270/EEC). In this xample, egislation vershot heextantpolicies in all member tates.VolkerEichener concludedthat"theEuropeanCommunityefinitetydoptedthehighest ealth ndsafetyt worklevel which s to be foundamongthe 12 Member States."27He arguedthatsometimest s difficulto comparedifferentegulations ecause theunderly-

26. Jacobs,Corbett,ndShackleton 992,186.27. Eichener1993,6.


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Intergovernmentalism87ingphilosophies re differentforexample, lectrical afety s reachedby safeelectrical tensilsnGermany utby safetywitches n France).Nonetheless,he was confidentbout his overall ssessment:To be sure, ooking t singleprovisions,here re someMemberStateswithsomewhat ighter egulations,uch as Denmark'sregulationsegarding ar-cinogenous ubstances,he Netherlands' egarding orkingime t visualdisplay erminalsr Germany's egardingadiation.But f evelsof healthandsafetyt work an be compared t all,the overall ssessmentsthat heCommunitystablished coherent ealth ndsafetyt work onceptwithlevelofprotection hich scertainlyt thevery op oftherankingndwhich venappearsto exceed theprotectiveevelsof all 12MemberStates.28

Similarly, iandomenicoMajone arguedthat"it is difficulto find quallyadvancedprincipleslikethe workingnvironment')nthe egislationfmajorindustrializedountries, nside and outsidetheEC. In order to explainsuchpolicy utputswe neednew,moreanalyticheories f thepolicy rocess ntheCommunity.'29Figure 6 summarizes he arguments f Eichenerand Majone. With someexceptions, he EU has tended to adopt more advancedlegislation n eachissue thanexists n any member tate. Consequently,hecombination f EUprovisionss outside thePareto set of ts members.A detailed accountof thestrategic alculationsthat led to this surprisingutcomewould yield verysimilarnsightso those nthe exhaust missions ase.30The more nterestingquestion regardingworkplacehealth and safety egulation sks why t waspossibleforEuropean egislationobemore tringenthan hat nanymemberstate.There are two possibleexplanations.The first s that whilethe observedresultmaybe outside the regulations f themember ountries, he existingregulationsn each country id notcomprise he deal pointof the ndividualgovernmentsn these countries.According o thisaccount, ach governmentmight avewantedmore dvancedregulation,uteach was unable orunwillingto adopt it unilaterally. he institutions f the EU solved the resultingcollective ctionproblem.We do not think hatthis s a plausibleargumentbecause although ommon egislation liminates ompetitionlong the socialdimensionwithinheEU, itcertainlymposes heavy urdenon theabilityfEuropean products ocompete utside heEU.

The secondexplanation omes from modificationfFigure4. Let the firstthreemember overnmentsemain t the samepoints.Butconsider case inwhich he dealpoints f theother our overnmentsretightlyackedaroundpoint . In this ase,theoutcome f thecooperation rocedure still tpoint5)28. Ibid.,8.29. Majone 1993.30. Tsebelis 1994.


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288 International rganizationIssue2

High Country Europe

Paretoet(lnear ombination)

Low Country B

Low High Issue1FIGURE 6. Europeanregulationutside he areto etofmembertates

is outside the Paretoset of the membergovernments.his outcomeassumesthatgovernmentsand2wouldnotbewillingosupport Councilamendmentatregulationtpoint4 (recallthat heCouncil of Ministers an always mendproposals unanimously), nd hence their intransigencewould leave thequalifiedmajority34567) withno otherchoice butto accept point5. In thisscenario, hebehavior f countries and 2 is "irrational" ince t eads to theadoption fpoint5 instead fpoint ,whichwouldbe better or ll members fthe Council. This behavior can be explained fone takes into accountthedomestic olitics ameofcountries and 2. Itmaybe thatgovernmentsand 2prefer o be on the record as havingvoteddownany significantncrease nregulationhantodecreasemarginallyhe evel of regulation from oint5 topoint4), because support fregulatory easures svery npopular ackhomeeitherwithvoters r national egislators.31fcountries and 2 prefer ovotedownany ncrease n regulation,herest ofthe countries annotmodifyheparliament's roposal nd have no other hoice but toacceptpoint5.The basicpoint o be derived romhis xample sthat, iven he nstitutionalinnovations f the SEA, one should not be surprised f outcomes of thelegislative rocesssometimes re outside the Pareto set ofmembergovern-ments.Under certain onfigurationsfgovernmentreferences,histypeof

31. Tsebelis 1990.


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Intergovernmentalism89outcomewillbe the product-a very ramatic roduct-of the agenda-settingpowers vested in the Commissionof the European Communities nd theEuropeanParliament.

The codecision procedureA final ecision-makingrocedurewas added at Maastricht. he codecisionprocedure see article189b of the Treatyon European Union) replacesthecooperation rocedure ormatters ertaining othecompletion f the nternalmarket. t also applies to various new areas of EU jurisdiction uch as

education, ulture, ublichealth, nd consumer rotection.The cooperationand codecisionproceduresdiffer nstitutionallyn twocriticalways (see the bottom panel of Figure 5). First,codecision greatlyreduces the agenda-setting ower of the Commissionof the EuropeanCommunities.he EuropeanParliament's mendmentsf egislation o notgoback to the Commissionbeforethey are consideredagain by the Council.Moreover,Parliament can effectivelynitiatea proposal if a conciliationcommittees convened see below).Second,the roles oftheCounciland the Parliament re reversed rom hecooperationprocedure.Under codecision, f Parliament's mendments o theCouncil's "common position" (i.e., a Commissionproposal that won thesupport fa qualifiedmajorityntheCouncil)on the firsteading fa bill arenot acceptableto a qualifiedmajoritynthe Council, conciliation ommitteeis convened. f this committee comprising ll members f the Council andnumericallyqual representationrom he Parliament) annot greeto a jointtext, roposalpowereffectivelyevertso the Council. n the final tageof thegame, he Councilproduces hefinal ext fthe aw unless n absolutemajorityintheParliament etoes t.What are the likelypolicyconsequences of codecision?Let us beginbyassuminghat he structuref actors'preferencesndthe status uo are thosein Figure4. The proposalsthat could be supportedby all three connectedcoalitions n the council-12345, 23456, and 34567-would clearlyall beacceptedby he Parliament. f thesethree oalitions, owever, 4567can offera better eal tothe Parliament hanthe other wo.The final olutionwillthusbe the one acceptedby34567 and theParliament.Withrespect o the nternalbargainingof coalition 34567, we know that any solution acceptable togovernment (that s, any position tprefers o the statusquo) is a fortioriacceptableto the otherfourmembers f the coalition nd to the Parliament swell.This reduces the expectedoutcomes o thesegment 5 inFigure4. It isconceivable hatgovernmentwillmakea statementhat t cannot cceptanyother utcomebut ts own deal point. fthis tatements considered redibleby heother overnments,willbe theoutcome fthecodecisionprocedure.Amore reasonableassumption, owever,s thatgovernment has the effectivebargaining ower, nd it will be able to impose ts will on the Council. twill


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290 International rganizationpropose a policy at its ideal point. This will be accepted by the fourgovernmentso tsright.nturn,heCouncil'sproposalwill lso be acceptedbytheParliament,nd legislationwillbe passed implementinghe deal pointofgovernment.Thus, we should expect a crucial differencen policy outputsbetweenconsultationnd cooperation, n theone hand,and codecision, n theother.Assuming hatthe Parliaments more ntegrationisthananymember ftheCouncil and that he status uo was achievedundertheLuxembourg ompro-mise,thepace ofEuropean integration ill be slowerundercodecision thanthe olderprocedures.The reason for hisdifferences the transfer fagenda-setting owerfromthe Commission and the Parliamentto the Council of Ministers. n theconsultation/cooperationndgame, heCommission rthe Parliamentmakesproposals o theCouncil hat an only e amendedunanimously. overnmentis pivotal n theCouncil,but t willacceptproposals o itsrighto longas theyarepreferableo the best amendmenttcould make thatwould be acceptableto all Councilmembersin Figure4, there re no suchamendmentsince thestatus uo is atgovernment's idealpoint).The agendasetters nderstand hisand thuspropose policy otherightfgovernment's idealpoint. n contrast,thesituations reversed ndercodecisionbecause agenda-setting owerrestswith heCouncil.Here, governmenteffectivelyontrols olicy utcomes, nditwillthusbe able to determine hepace ofEuropean integration.This implies hat common nterpretationsf thecodecisionprocedure rewrong.The fact thatthe parliamentgained an absolute veto overCouncilproposals is consideredby manyto give the Parliament onsiderablymoreinfluence ver policy han ever before.Jacobs,Corbett, nd Shackletonwritethatthecodecisionprocedure s "essentiallyn upgrading fthecooperationprocedure" and that "the right o say 'no' gives Parliament a bargainingpositionwhich t has hithertoackedregarding ommunityegislation." heyconclude hat he"codecisionprocedure sthus n important,ut imited, tepforward n Parliament's egislative owers" and that the "European Parlia-ment'spowerswereincreased .. through he introductionf the codecisionprocedure."32 eil Nugent adds that "The EP [European Parliament] s themostobviousbeneficiaryf theSEA and TEU [Treaty n European Union]reforms,or t splacedina muchmore dvantageous osition o pressurize heCommission nd the Counciltoaccept tsviews."33Emile Noel, formerecretary-generalf theCommission f the EuropeanCommunities, oncurswith this view of codecision. He claims that "inconferring onsiderably reater powers on the European Parliament, heMaastricht reatytipped the institutional alance," and that "as the Maas-trichtTreaty providesthe European Parliamentwithconsiderably reater

32. Jacobs,Corbett,ndShackleton 992,191, 192, 194, nd277,respectively.33. Nugent1994,326.


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Intergovernmentalism91powers, ts applicationwill gradually ead to a change in the institutionalbalance."34WilliamNicoll and TrevorSalmonadd thatunderthe codecisionprocedure the Parliament lwayshas thepossibilityfrejecting proposaland so enjoys heright fveto n the decision-makingrocess.The MaastrichtTreaty hus ncreasesParliament's ights."35But the Parliament's etopowerunder odecisionwas gainedattheexpenseof ts bility o nfluence heCouncil's genda.Underthereasonablepreferenceconfigurationsnalyzedhere, the Parliament s a less effectiveolicymakerunder odecision hanunder ooperation,ndone shouldexpect he ntroduc-tionof Maastricht's ew procedure o puta brakeon the pace of ntegrationntheEU. Unfortunately,t is not possible at thistime to testthis argumentempirically.he codecisionprocedureonly came intoforceon 1 December1993, and as yet there are no documentedaccountsof legislationpassedpursuant o t.Before losing ur discussion f codecision,we would iketo reconsiderwoof the assumptions uilt ntoour analysis.First, ecall thatwe have assumedthat hestatus uo wasgenerated nderthe Luxembourgompromise. his isentirely easonablefor cases wherenew issue-areasare brought nder EUjurisdiction,s was the case at Maastricht or manymatters ubjectto thecodecisionprocedure. t is notappropriate, owever, or he major rea undercodecision:the internalmarket.While the internalmarketprogramhas notbeen "completed"in a fewnotable cases (such as immigrationnd publicprocurement), he volume of legislation passed in this area under thecooperation rocedurehas nonetheless eengreat.Bythe endof1992, ver ixhundred measures had been passed in this manner-double the numberenvisaged n the commission's 985 White Paper on the Completionof theInternalMarket.36Forthe nternalmarket,t seemsmore ppropriate o discussfuture eformsassuminghat he status uo is one inwhichmuchof theenabling egislationsalready nplace. The questionnowbecomes can the Counciluse theagenda-settingpower to roll back this legislation?So long as the Parliament'spreferencesre more integrationisthanthoseoftheCouncil,the answer sclearly o.Figure depicts his ituation.We assume hemost xtreme ossiblecase-where the status uo isattheParliament'sdealpoint.Parliamentwouldveto nyproposal hat qualified ouncilmajority ouldmake. t isin this ypeof scenario hat heparliament's etopowerundercodecision s important-itallowsParliament oblockeffortsodismantle xistingegislation.A second assumption-that heParliament smore ntegrationisthan ll thegovernmentsn the Council-might also be relaxed. This assumption scontingentponthe freedommembers f theEuropeanParliament ossessto

34. Noel 199535. Nicolland Salmon1994,83.36. Thewhitepaper scited nJacobs,Corbett, nd Shackleton 992,193.


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292 International rganizationStatus uounder uxembourg Status uounderooperation;compromise;ulnerableo stable nderodecisiongovernmentunderodecision becauseofParliament'seto

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 EuropeanParliamentLess integration More ntegration

FIGURE 7. Policy tabilitynder he odecision rocedure, here -7 =govemments'referredositions

Winningroposal Statusuounderunder odecision cooperation

Parliament 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Less ntegration More ntegration

FIGURE 8. Theelectoralccountabilityfthe uropeanParliamentnd thecodecisionrocedure, here -7 = governments'preferredositionsact ndependentlyftheconstituencieshat lect them. nturn, his reedomsa functionf thegeneralpublic'sdisinterestnpolitics t theEuropean level.Today, this is an entirelyreasonable assumption.Turnout in the 1994EuropeanParliament lectionswasveryow,and the most ntense ampaigns(mostnotablyntheUnited Kingdom)were dominated ydomestic onsider-ations, ather hanbyEU policy ssues.In the future, owever, hissituation ould change.As citizenscome tounderstandhepoweroftheParliament,heymaywell takemore eriouslyheelectoralprocessthatgenerates ts members.f the current ivision etweenpoliticalelites and the mass public continues-withthe latterbeingmoreskeptical boutEuropean integrationhan thebulk of nationalpoliticians-one couldenvisage scenario n which hepreferencesf themedianvoter ntheEuropean Parliamentmight ome to be less integrationisthan thoseofgovernmentsn theCouncilofMinisters.Figure8 depictsthisscenario.Here we assumethat the statusquo is veryintegrationist-say,t the ideal pointofgovernment-but the Parliamentprefers ess integrationhandoes government . In thisextreme ase, it ispossiblethat someEuropean legislation,most ikely, oncerninghe internalmarket,ouldbe rolledback.The extent fthisrollbackwouldbe determined


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Intergovernmentalism 93by the preferences f thepivotalgovernmentn theCouncilunderqualifiedmajority oting government in thiscase). Government knows hat tcanpropose ts deal point, hat hiswillwin qualifiedmajorityntheCouncil, ndthat heParliamentwill lso accept t.

SummaryThe fundamental urpose of this sectionhas been to showthat studiesofdecisionmaking n the EU thatfocus exclusively n dynamicswithin heCouncil of Ministers re likelyto misperceivemost policy dynamics.TheCouncil-centricerspectivewas ustified uring heLuxembourg ompromise

periodand still s usefulforanalyzing ome issuestoday.But in thesecases,studies should not concentrate n votingweights ut on thepreferences fmember overnmentsnd the ability fcountries pposed to ntegrationitherto blockreformsr extract ighpricesfor heir cquiescence.In alltheremainingreas ofEU decisionmaking,owest ommon enomina-torpressures o not obtain.Moreover, ne cannotanalyzequalifiedmajorityvoting n the Council without nowing ow the agenda on which he Councildeliberates s set. In areas decided underthe consultation nd cooperationprocedures, he pace of European integrations likely o be significantlyasterthanunder a system fnationalvetoesbecause oftheagenda-setting owerspossessed by the pro-integrationommission nd Parliament.Contrary ocommon nderstandings,hepace of ntegration ill ikely e slower npolicyareas coveredby the codecision procedure because agenda-setting owerreverts o the Council-at least where new issues-areas re legislatedundercodecision nd so longas thepolicypreferences f members f theEuropeanParliament re detachedfrom hoseof their onstituents.ConclusionIn thisarticle,we have presented general critique fintergovernmentalismfromn institutionalointofview.The traditional ocus f ntergovernmental-ist attention n treaty argaining nly analysesthe tip of the icebergandignores he everyday eality f European integration. ut incompleteness sonly minor lawof theapproach.The major problem s intergovernmental-ism'spoortheoretical oundation. he modusoperandiof ntergovernmental-ism-that all important ecisionsmade in Europe pertain otreaties nd hencethat we need to understandhow the treatiescame about-seems obvious.Uponcloserexamination, owever,hispremise onceals morethan treveals.From strategic ointofview, heunderstandingf thepolicy mplicationsfdifferentreaties sa necessary re-conditionor heselection foneparticularinstitutional tructure y the founding ctors. Consequently, ne cannotunderstandheprocessoftreaty doptionwithout nderstandinghe likely)policy onsequences f differentossibletreaties.


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294 International rganizationA new variantof intergovernmentalism-thencreasinglyopular powerindex pproach-has tried o addressthis ssue.However, ecause itrelieson

the same fundamentalssumption-all decisions are products f bargainingamongnations, histime ntheCouncilofMinisters ather hanat the treatytable-power index analysisproduces an inaccurate pictureof Europeandecision making. t has two fundamental imitations. irst, power indexanalyses ome tomistaken onclusions bout theeffectivenfluence fdifferentcountries,he ikelihood f differentutcomes, nd the ikelihood f coalitionsthat support hese outcomesbecause such analyses gnorethepolicyprefer-ences ofgovernmentsn the Councilof Ministers.Second, the power index approach-togetherwith all other formsofintergovernmentalism-ignoreshe actual institutionaltructure f the EU.We have demonstrated hat differentrocedures,by giving he power topropose and the power to veto to different ctors, systematicallyead todifferentutcomes.This conclusion annotbe reachedwithout areful tudy ftheEU's institutions. hile nformal argaining rocesses nside the Councilof Ministersmay ead to differentoalitions,wehave shown hat hecoalitionsthatprevaildependnotonlyon policypositionsbut also on the institutionalstructurefEuropeanprocedures. orexample, oalition ormationnside heCouncilofMinisters annotbe studied n isolationunder either heconsulta-tion or cooperationprocedure. t is the Commission r theParliament hatmakesa proposalto the Council, nd thisproposalaims at thesupport fthemostfavorablefor heagendasetter) oalitionnside heCouncil.Evenin thecodecision rocedure-where genda-settingowers re vestedn theCouncil-coalitionformationn theCouncil s constrained. he Councilhas to selectaproposal thatwill not be rejectedby the Parliament, nd this restrictionincreases hepowerof members ftheCouncilwhosepreferencesre close to

thoseof theParliament nd weakens he hand of the members hat re furtheraway.Whethertis the old or the newform,whether ophisticatedmathematicalcalculations re present r absent, heproblemwith ntergovernmentalismsnot cosmetic ut congenital.National governmentsre not theonly mportantdecisionmakers n theEU. The Commission f theEuropean CommunitiesandtheEuropeanParliament lso play mportantegislative oles. t is onlybyanalyzing he effects f institutional ules on the interactionsmongtheseinstitutionshat ne can understandhepolicies hat reproduced very ay ntheEU andhence the nature f the ntegrationrocess tself.

AppendixAssume hatgovernmentsn theCouncil f Ministers ave dealpointsn space(combinationsfpolicies hattheywantadopted nd implemented)nd circular


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13

p 2N 3Wf>,fS2;

FIGURE Al. Win sets W) of governments , 2, and 3, where Q= statusquoand W13C W12C W2indifferenceurves;that is, theyare indifferentmong pointsthathave the samedistance rom heir dealpoint.DEFINITION 1. Call thewin etofthe tatus uo with especto a setofpoints i}the etofpoints hat repreferredothe tatus uo by ll i.DEFINITION 2. The Pareto set of a coalition M is the set of outcomes that cannot beimproved ponby llmembersfthe oalition.COROLLARY. The Pareto etofthree ountries, 2, 3 is the riangle23defined y heiridealpoints.

The proof is simple: any pointoutside the trianglecan be defeated by tsprojection onthe closest side of the triangle; t least one of the threecountrieswillobjectto anymovementfthe tatus uo if t s located nside hetriangle.In order oprovethat n two dimensions onconnected oalitionswillnot formtheproposition in the text)we will startwitha series of lemmas.Consider three members on the same line havingto agree on a movementof the statusquo (SQ) as inFigureAl. The winset of the status uo of1 and 2 isW12. he win setofthe statusquo for 1 and 3 iSW139


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296 International rganization

FIGURE A2. Win ets W) ofgoverments 1, 2,and3,whereW13C W12C W12'

LEMMA 1. Ifpoints , 2,and3 are ona straightine, nd2 liesbetween and3,thenW13Sa subsetfW12.Proof.The side3SQ ofthetriangle 3SQ issmaller han he umof theother wo ides,andconsequentlyhe distance P3 is smaller han he distance P2.Considernow three overnments, 2,3 and the status uo SQ in theconfigurationfFigureA2where ountry islocatedontheother ideof ine 13 than he tatus uo,andtheprojection ' of 2 on the ine 13 iesbetween1 and 3.LEMMA 2. Ifpoints ,2, nd 3 arenotona straightine, he rojectionf2 (2') on the ine13isbetween and3,and the tatus uo is ocated nthe therideof13 than ,thenW13Sa subsetfW12.Proof. According olemma1, Wi3 is a subsetOfW12.- ince2 is on theother ide of13than Q, the circle round2 intersectshecircle round1 atthesymmetricoint fSQ(withrespect o line12)which s furtherwayfrom he ine 13.ConsequentlyW12' is asubsetOfW12.The lemmafollows ytransitivity.LEMMA 3. Forany hreeoints ,2, 3,andany oint located nside he riangle23,Wi23isa subsetfW4.Proof. The proof omprises woparts. 1) If SQ belongs n the Paretoset (is locatedinside hetriangle 23),thepropositionstrivial,ecause thewin etof the threepointsisbydefinitionmpty.2) IfSQ does notbelong. o the Paretoset is located outside he


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triangle23) hen t east ne ide f he rianglewithoutoss fgeneralityssumeide13),the tatus uoandpoint will ollowhe ssumptionsf emma . Consequently,W13 s a subsetof W14.n addition, t s always he case thatW123s a subsetofW13;ndW14s a subsetfW4. DProvingropositioninthe ase ofcoalition23 s a simplematterf translation.The reader s remindedhatnonconnectedoalitions a coalitionhat xcludesmemberelongingn ts aretoet. n Figure 2coalition23 snonconnected,ecauseitexcludesoint ,which elongsn tsPareto et.Whatemma claimssthat heresnothinghat 1, 2, and 3 prefer verthestatus uo that4 does notpreferlso.Consequently,fgovernmentsoteon thebasis ofpolicy references,cannot eexcludedromhe oalition 23.Or,PROPOSITION 0. When otings based on policy ositions,oalition 23 is nonconnectedandwill ot orm.Generalizationnthe ase ofmore han hree ointssstraightforward.f point is nthePareto etof polygon,hen twill e includednat east ne trianglehat anbeformedy onnectinghreef he ngles f he olygon,nd ince he oalitionf hesethreememberssnonconnected,he oalitionf hemembersf he olygonexcludingj) is also nonconnected.n addition,member has the same preferencesith hemembersf hepolygonsince t greeswithmore estrictedhreememberoalition);consequently,t annot eexcludedor he oalition.PROPOSITION1. Whenotingased npolicyositions,onconnectedoalitionso notform.Althoughheproof fpropositionwaspresentedn twodimensions,he rgumentscanbereplicatedegardlessf henumberfunderlyingimensionsf he ssue-space.

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an institutional critique of intergovernmental ism

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