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An Evaluation of the FARC, MLN-T, FMLN :TheImpact of Guerrilla Warfare on DemocraticStability in Latin AmericaAnthony WrightUnion College - Schenectady, NY

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Recommended CitationWright, Anthony, "An Evaluation of the FARC, MLN-T, FMLN :The Impact of Guerrilla Warfare on Democratic Stability in LatinAmerica" (2017). Honors Theses. 256.https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/256

AnEvaluationoftheFARC,MLN-T,FMLN:TheImpactofGuerillaWarfareonDemocraticStabilityinLatinAmerica

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ByAnthonyMichaelWright

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SeniorThesisSubmittedInPartialFulfillment

oftheRequirementsforGraduation

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DepartmentofLatinAmericanCaribbeanStudiesUnionCollegeMarch2017

ii

GrandmaAnn,Idedicatethisworktoyouandalltheloveyoushowedmeandthroughmystudiesandthroughoutmylife.Yourloveandsupporthave

gottenmethroughsomuch,andwillneverceasetoguidemefortherestofmylife.I’msaddenedtoknowthatyouwon’tbeabletoreadthispaper,butI

knowthatyou’rewithmealways.

InLovingMemoryofmyGrandmother,AnnPerik,

November20th,1924-November26,2016

iii

Acknowledgements

Iwouldfirstlyliketothankmyparentsforallowingmetheopportunityto

studyatsuchanamazinginstitution.ThetimeIhavespentwritingthispaper,and

thetimeIhavespenthereatUnionhaschangedmyoutlookandmademeamuch

deeperandbetterperson.Yourguidanceandsupporthasbeeninstrumentaltomy

successandwhatIhaveachievedhereatUnionCollege.Iwanttothankyouforall

thelonghoursyoubothhavespentonmybehalfthroughouttheyearstomakesure

IhadeverythingIcouldeverpossiblyneed.

ProfessorGarcia,yourassistancetomeasmyadvisorthroughoutthis

processhasbeeninstrumentaltomyprogressandyourguidance,advise,and

supporthavehelpedmeimmenselyduringtheprocess.ProfessorMeade,Iwantto

sayhowmuchofanhonorithasbeentobeyouradvisee,andthatthegrowthand

developmentIhaveattainedwhilehereatUnionisinlargepartbecauseofyou.The

mini-termtoCuba,whichyoucourageouslytookon,hasforeveralteredmyoutlook

ontheworldandmyplaceinit.ProfessorSeri,Iwouldliketothankyouforyour

patience,understanding,andkindwordsthroughoutthethesisprocessandmy

undergraduatecareer.Myfouryearsasastudentherehavebeenafulland

wonderfulexperiencethankstotheconstantsupport,guidance,andmostofall

patiencefromyouthree,thankyou.

iv

Abstract

Wright,AnthonyM. TheImpactofGuerillaWarfareonDemocraticStabilityinLatinAmerica

ThroughoutthehistoryofLatinAmericatherehavebeenmanyrevolutions

thathavereshapedthepoliticalfabricoftheentirecontinent.Thisthesiswillseekto

exploretheimpactthatthefollowingthreemovementshavehad:TheFarabundo

MartíNationalLiberationFront(FMLN)inElSalvador,LasFuerzasArmadasdela

RepúblicadeColombia(FARC),andtheTupamaros(MLN-T)inUruguay.When

examiningthesethreemovementstheresearchwillincludehistoriesand

discussionsofeachrevolutionandtextregardingthestrengthofdemocracywithin

thecountries.Thesesectionswillthenbesupportedwithdataregardingdemocracy

andthepeople’sperspectivesondemocracy.Thesuccessofthesemovementswill

bejudgedprimarilyonthestrengthofthedemocracyinthecountrytheyarebased,

andadditionallybytherolethathaveplayedintheformationofthesedemocratic

principles.

Researchintotheguerillagroupswilldiscusstheirorigins,andtheprimary

reasonsfortheirarmedresistancetotheirgovernments.Inaddition,thesesources

willgointodetailregardingtheindividualmovement’shistories.Thedatafromthe

censusesfromsourcelikeLatinoBarómetro,andLatinAmericanPublicOpinion

Project(LAPOP)willhelpprovideconstructivepollinganddataonthestrengthof

democracyintherespectivecountries.

Thispaperwillseektoexaminetheguerillaandpoliticalmovementsina

historicalandpracticalperspective.Thebeginningofthepaperwillexaminethe

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historyofdemocraticandpoliticalrevolutionsandprovideanindepthdescription

ofthehistoryofguerillamovementsinLatinAmerica.Thentheevaluationofthe

groupswillprovidepracticalexamplesoftheimpactthatguerillamovementshave

hadondemocracywithinLatinAmerica.Finishingwithadiscussionoftheimpacts

thatthegroupshaveplayedondemocracywithintheirspecificcountries.

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TableofContentsDedication...................................................................................................................................iiAcknowledgement...................................................................................................................iiiAbstract........................................................................................................................................ivTableofContents.....................................................................................................................viPreface..........................................................................................................................................1 FormalandInformalInstitutions……………………………………………………………1 OperationalDefinitionofDemocracy……………………………………………………....4

Terrorismvs.GuerillaWarfare……………………………………………………………….41.HistoryofLatinAmericanGuerillaMovements………………………………….....7 EmilianoZapataandtheMexicanRevolution…………………………………………..10 JacoboArbenzGuzmanandthe26thofJulyMovement……………………………..12 TheRedScareandU.S.Intervention………………………………………………………..16 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………..182.TheTupamarosandUruguay………………………………………………………………..20 HistoryoftheTupamaros……………………………………………………………………….20 AmericanInterventioninUruguay………………………………………………………….23 TheMilitaryDictatorship………………………………………………………………………..26 RestoredDemocracyandIntegrationoftheMLN-T……………………………….....28 LatinoBarómetrodatasupportingtheFA…………………………………………………32 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………..333.TheFARC,UP,andColombia…………………………………………………………………35 HistoryoftheFARC………………………………………………………………………….35 DevelopmentoftheFARC………………………………………………………………….37 TheUP…………………………………………………………………………………………...39 KeyLatinoBarómetroDataforColombianDemocracy…………………………..41 Colombia’sconflictandPeaceProcess………………………………………………...43 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...454.ElSalvador’sFMLN……………………………………………………………………………….48 HistoryoftheFMLN…………………………………………………………………………48 U.S.InvolvementinElSalvador………………………………………………………….51 ThePeaceProcessandIntegrationoftheFMLN……………………………………54 TheFMLN”sPoliticalSuccessesandDifficulties…………………………………….56 DataexaminingthereceptionofDemocracyinElSalvador,……………………..60 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...63Epilogue…………………………………………………………………………………………………..65Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………69

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PrefaceFormalandInformalPoliticalInstitutions:

LatinAmerica,aregionthatisuniqueinitspoliticalideologies,hasmany

differentfactorsthatcontributetoitspoliticalidentity.Theidentityhasexperienced

manychangesandhasgreatlyevolvedthroughoutthecenturiesfollowingSimon

Bolivar’scampaignforindependence.1OnesuchtenantofLatinAmericanpoliticsis

theideathatindividualliberationmovementscansignificantlyimpactgovernmental

institutions.WithinLatinAmericatheideaofpopularresistanceandthe

organizationofindividualstoexpresspoliticaldiscontenthasbeencommonplace

throughoutLatinAmericanhistory.Theorganizationsthatconsistofcivilsociety

arenotformalgroupsandarelistedasinformalorganizations,orpopular

movementsthatengagemanyfollowers.

Informalorganizations,whichderivefrominformalinstitutions,aredifferent

thantherecognizedformalgovernmentalinstitutionsthattheyseektoinfluence

throughtheiractions.Informalorganizationsarebodiesthatdifferfromtheofficial

government,andworkinareasthatareoutsideofofficialchannels.Informal

institutions,intheviewsofProfessorGretchenHelmke,areorganizednon-

governmentalgroupswithincountriesthathavesignificantimpactswithinboththe

politicalsphereaswellasthesocialcultureofagivennation.2Informal

organizationshoweveraregroupsthatareseparateanddifferentthanpolitical

1Sherwell,GuillermoAntonio.SimonBolivar(theliberator):patriot,warrior,statesman,fatheroffivenations;asketchofhislifeandhiswork.BolivarianSocietyofVenezuela,1921.3.2 Helmke, Gretchen. Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006. Print.

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actorsthattheinformalinstitutionsinclude.AsHelmkeexploreswithSteven

Levitsky,thedifferenceisthatinformalorganizations,likeformalorganizations,are

separatetoinformalinstitutionsbuteachaffectstheothersignificantly.3

Informalinstitutionsandorganizationsaredifferentfromrecognized

institutionsinthattheystrivetoenactchangethroughdifferentmediumsandactas

separateautonomousgroupstothenationalinstitutions.Theseformalgroups,

whichincludetheformalrulesofpoliticalinstitutionsthatrunsovereignnations,

areaffectedbytheeffortsofbothinformalbodies.Eventhoughtheyremainas

outsiderstotheofficialpoliticalrealmandtheformalinstitutionslikethejudiciary,

legislative,andexecutive,theystillimpacttheseinstitutions.Theinformal

organizations,whicharesimilartotheformalorganizations,constitutegroupsof

peopleinvolvedinthepoliticalprocess,includegroupslikemafiasandclans.4

Whenfurtherexaminingthedefinitionofinformalorganizationsthereare

severalsimilaritiesbetweeninformalinstitutionsandpopularmovements.

ThedefinitionthatHelmkeandLevitskyprovideforinformalorganizations,asseen

above,issimilartowhatJoeFowerakerandAnnCraigexplainintheirtextPopular

MovementsandPoliticalChangeinMexico.Intheirbook,theydefinepopular

movementsasorganizationsthathaveaclearsocialcompositionandusetheir

organizationasamachinetocommunicateapoliticalbelief.5Thesepoliticalbeliefs,

3Helmke,Gretchen,andStevenLevitsky."Informalinstitutionsandcomparativepolitics:Aresearchagenda."Perspectivesonpolitics2,no.04(2004):730.4Helmke,"Informalinstitutionsandcomparativepolitics:Aresearchagenda."732.5Foweraker,Joe,andAnnL.Craig.PopularmovementsandpoliticalchangeinMexico.Boulder:L.RiennerPublishers,1990.13.

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asisthecasewiththeinformalinstitutions,arevoicedbypopularmovements

directlytothegovernment.

Whenexaminingthedefinitionsaboveforformalandinformalinstitutions,

andpopularmovements,mostgroupsthatvoicediscontentagainstthegovernment

areclearlydefined.However,thereisanothermethodofexpressingpolitical

discontentthathasn’treceivedadefinitionbutisstillasocialmovement.Thesocial

movementthatdoesn’thaveaplaceintheseboundariesareguerillamovements,

thathavebeenactiveinLatinAmericasincetheconquestofthecontinent.Thefirst

occurrenceofguerillaactivitythroughindigenouspopulationsandtheCacique

EnriquillooftheDominicanRepublicwhorebelledagainsttheSpanishfrom1519-

1533.6Thesemovementshavesinceproliferatedandbecomeapopularmethodto

expresspoliticaldiscontentandtoseektoenactchangeonthepoliticalinstitutions

throughoutthecontinent.

Guerillamovements,asmanytheorists,likeHelmkeandLevitskynote,are

verysimilarandcontainmanyattributesofinformalorganizations,butaren’t

categorizedalongwiththemduetotheirpoliticallyviolentstrategies.7Whilethey

maynotbelonginthecategoryofinformalorganizations,theyaffectformal

governmentinstitutionsandseektoenactpoliticalchangethroughtheiractions.

Guerillamovements,likepopularmovements,aregroupsthatseektousetheir

socialconstructiontoimpartachangeontheirsociety.Associalmovements,and

organizationsofpeoplewhoarestrivingtoenactpoliticalchange,guerilla6Castro,Daniel.RevolutionandrevolutionariesguerrillamovementsinLatinAmerica.Wilmington(Del.):SRBooks,1999.xvi.7Helmke,Gretchen,andStevenLevitsky."Informalinstitutionsandcomparativepolitics:Aresearchagenda."735.

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movementsareasuccessfulvehiclethatpeopleusetogivevoicetotheirideological

differenceswiththegovernment.

OperatingDefinitionforDemocracy

Astheideasofsettingupthedefinitionofthedifferentformsofinstitutions

is,thecreationofadefinitionfordemocracyisequallyasimportantforthecontext

ofthepaper.Thedefinitionfordemocracy,thatIwilluseisthefollowing,

We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really govern and the military is under civilian control.8

This definition can be applied to Uruguay, and is in Colombia and El

Salvador this definition is in the process of becoming applicable to their

democratic system. Through this paper, I will contend that the guerilla

groups, have through their efforts, brought their countries if not to this

level of democracy, but closer towards the ideals listed above.

Terrorismvs.GuerillaWarfare Whenexaminingguerillawarfare,specificallyguerillagroupsandtheir

desiredtransitionfromarmedgroupstopoliticalactors,itisessentialtoprovidea

separateofthedefinitionsforguerillasandterrorists.Thetwogroupsappear

similarinthattheybothuseviolencetoobtaintheirdesiredgoalsbeingpolitical,

ideological,orotherwisechange.Yetthesetwogroupsaredifferentandshouldnot

8Munck,GerardoL.,ed.RegimesandDemocracyinLatinAmerica:TheoriesandMethods.Oxford,GBR:OxfordUniversityPress,UK,2007.ProQuestebrary.Web.9June2015.

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beconsideredinthesamecategoricaldefinitionofoneanother.Terrorismand

guerillawarfareareinherentlydifferentandpossessidealsseparateofoneanother.

Terrorism,unlikeguerillawarfare,praysupontheweaknessofnon-

combatantsorciviliantargets.Thisistosaythatterroristgroups,likeguerilla

movementsorotherprotestsgroups,seektoenactapoliticalchange,whetherthat

bepolitical,economic,orsocial,theyseektousetheirviolentactionsforthis

purpose.Theseorganizationsseektogainmediaattentionthatisgarneredfrom

attacksonthevulnerableciviliansasanaspectofthedailylifetocreatethischange.

So,anoperationaldefinitionthatBoazGanorusestodescribeterrorismgoesas

follows,“Terrorismistheintentionaluseof,orthreattouseviolenceagainst

civiliansoragainstciviliantargets,inordertoattainpoliticalaims.”9Thedefinition

furtherexplainsthatthecollateraldamagetocitizensfromanattackonamilitary

institutioncannotbedefinedasterrorism,butanintentionalattackonuninvolved

civilianscanbeconsideredaterroristacts.

Whilethisisthedefinitionofterroristactivities,itisimportanttoprovidea

definitionofguerillawarfareandwhatconstitutesaguerillafighterincomparison

totheprovideddefinitionforterrorism.Guerillawarfareisdescribedasamilitary

tacticthatisadoptedbyaweakerforce,wheretheweakerforceselectstheplace

andtimeoftheconflictagainstalargerforce.Inadditiontothistheguerillaforce

locatesitsoperationsinliberatedareasinthecountrysidewherethegroupcangain

members,resources,andcreatetheirownseparateinstitutions.Guerillawarfare,as

9Ganor,Boaz."Definingterrorism:Isoneman'sterroristanotherman'sfreedomfighter?"MediaAsia29,no.3(2002):126.

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Ganor’sarticlecontinuestoexplain,takesontheappearanceofaformalconflict

betweentwonationalarmies.Meaningthatguerillawarfareseekstowageits

conflictwiththeiroppositioninaccordancetotheconventionsofstandardized

warfare.10

Terrorismandguerillawarfarearetwoformsofnon-conventionalconflicts,

butbesidesthisclassificationtheirdefinitionsareverydifferentfromoneanother.

Terrorismisdefinedasthetargetingofciviliansandusingactionthatinspirewide

rangingfearfromnon-combatantcivilianpopulations,whichterroristsusetoenact

politicalchange.Thisdefinitionissignificantlydifferentthanthemilitarytacticsof

guerillawarfare,whichisanirregularandsmallerformofconventionalwarfare,

whichseekstoenactapoliticalchangeonsocietyorgovernment.Ganorhowever,

examinesoneaspectofterrorismthatwillberelevanttothecontentsofthepaper.

Thistopicisthatofstatestate-sponsoredterrorism,whichinLatinAmericaisavery

importantconceptwhenexaminingguerillawarfareandwillbeaddressedlaterin

thisthesis.

10Ganor,128.

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Chapter1:HistoryofLatinAmericanGuerillaMovements

GuerillaWarfare,orasitistranslatedintoSpanishthe“littlewar”,was

coinedasaterminologytodescribetheirregularanduntraditionalwarthatthe

SpanishwerewagingagainsttheFrenchduringtheiroccupationinthe19th

century.11GuerillamovementsinLatinAmericabeganunderadifferentname,

“indigenousuprisings”andthefirstofthesewastheaforementionedEnriquilloin

theDominicanRepublicagainsttheSpanishimperialforces.Enriquillo’srebellionis

referredtoasthefirstarmedrebellionofthepeoplesofLatinAmericaagainstan

oppressiveforce.12HefoughtfortheTainoindigenouspeopleandasBartoloméde

LasCasasdescribed,wasaleaderofeminentability,committedtodefendingthe

rightsofhispeople.13Althoughhewasunsuccessfulinhiseffortstoridtheislandof

theSpanishoppressors,hisrebellionmarkedthefirstresistanceinLatinAmerican

fromanindigenousgroupagainsttheirimperialoppressors.14

Enriquillo’ssuccesswouldinspireanuprisingtwocenturieslaterledby

anotherindigenousman,calledTupacAmaruIIin1780.15TherebellionthatTupac

beganwastoreasserttheIncaEmpireinthePeruvianAndeanregion.Additionally,

basedhisdesirestoreassertthedominionoftheIncanempire,Tupacsoughtto

11Castro,Daniel.RevolutionandrevolutionariesguerrillamovementsinLatinAmerica.Wilmington(Del.):SRBooks,1999.xvi.12Altman,Ida."TheRevoltofEnriquilloandtheHistoriographyofEarlySpanishAmerica."TheAmericas.4thed.Vol.63.CambridgeUniversityPress.587.13Altman,589.14Altman,614.15Castro,1.

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rebelagainsttheBourbonreformsof1776.16Thesereformssawtheremovalof

CreolesfromgovernmentalpositionsinfavorofEuropeansupervisorsandthe

increaseoftaxesondifferentgoods.17Tupacfeltthathewasfightingtobringback

theIncanEmpireanddescribedhimselfasthedescendenttotheIncanEmperor.18

ThisinsurrectionbecameabloodycontestbetweenTupac’sindigenousfollowers

andthecolonialSpaniards.Tupac’sfightwouldendin1781withhiscaptureand

execution,whichincludedquarteringandthentheburningofhisremainsasan

example.19

Tupac’srebellionwasastrugglefortherepresentationoftheIndigenous

nationandtheIndianpeopleofPerubeforethecolonializationoftheSpanish

Empire.Thismovementsoughttousewarasawaytopreservetheirsocietyandthe

survivaloftheirculture.Theimpactoftherebellionwassignificantandlikeother

rebellions,byIndiannationsagainstcolonialism,bredcontemptbybothgroups.As

DanielCastronotes,

ThemassacresofSpanishimmigrants,especiallyofthosewhohadlivedamongtheIndians,furtherwidenedthegapbetweenthecolonizersandthecolonized.Oldimagesofimperialauthorityandkinghadbeguntodissolve.20

Therebellionwasanactofprotest,andtheoutcomemayhavebeendefeatbut

Tupacandhisfollowersexpressedtheirdiscontentwiththecolonialpower.This

16Castro,Daniel.RevolutionandrevolutionariesguerrillamovementsinLatinAmerica.Wilmington(Del.):SRBooks,1999.3-4.17Castro,5.18Castro,6.19Castro,7.20Castro,8.

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rebellionwastheactofagroupofmarginalizedmembersofsocietyusingviolence

asamannerofpoliticalexpression.

Some60yearsafterthefailureofTupacAmaruII’srebellioninPeruthere

wasapeasantinsurgencyintheYucatanprovinceofMexiconearwhatisnowthe

Belizeborder.Thisinsurgency,whichbeganin1847,wasreferredtoastheCaste

Wars,awarthatwasbeingwagedbytheYucatanprovinceforamultitudeof

reasons.Themovement’smainleader,SantiagoIman,wasawealthycaudillo,or

merchant,andthemovementwasfightingprimarilytoresisttaxescomingfrom

centralMexico,butalsototryandgetcontrolovertheirterritories.21This

movementgaverisetothefirstsignsofguerillawarfarewithinMexico,

Onlythendidtherebelsdiscovertheirtruecallingasguerillafighters.Retreatingwiththeirforcestotheeasternrainforests,theleadersofthisconflictralliedtheirsoldiersbyinstitutingthereligiouscultoftheSpeakingCross…Supportedbytheunyieldingcommandsoftheiroracle,thecruzob(peopleofthecross)institutedasocietyoftotalmobilization:themendividedtheirtimebetweenfarmingandmilitaryservice,whilethewomendidhouseholdworkbutalsopreparedthesuppliesforcampaigns.22

ThepeopleoftheSpeakingCrossweresuccessfulintheiruprisingandbecamea

separateautonomousregionwithinMexico.Althoughthisautonomousbodywould

dissolveandsplinterafterahalf-centuryorso,theirvictorywasahugemilestone.

ThemethodthroughwhichtheSpeakingCrossattainedtheirsuccessmarkedthe

successfulintroductionofguerillawarfareandruralinsurgencytoCentralAmerica.

21Castro,14.22Castro,15.

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EmilianoZapataandtheMexicanRevolution:

EmilianoZapata,aruralleader,whowasbornintotheMexicanstateof

Morelos,wasarevolutionarythroughandthrough.In1909,hewaselectedbyhis

villagetobeaPresidentofthedefensecommittee.23Hisrequeststothegovernment,

asthepresidentofthecommittee,werenotmet,andZapata’sresponsewasto

peacefullyoccupythelandsthatthegovernmentwouldnotrelinquishbacktothe

peopleofthevillage.Intheyear1910,FranciscoMaderoinitiatedarevolution

againstPresidentPorfirioDíazonthegroundsofreflectivesuffrageandno

reelection.ZapatarespectedthisinsurrectionduetothemovementsPlanofSan

Luís.24ThePlanofSanLuíswasapoliticalmanifestothatsoughttoredistributeland

tosmallerowners,whichhadbeenillegallystolen.WiththeseSanLuísgoalsin

mind,ZapatacontactedMaderoandaskedtobecomepartofthemovement,andby

doingsobroughtrevolutiontostateofMorelos.25

Followingseveralswiftconflictstherevolutionariessucceededintheir

uprisingagainstthegovernmentin1911.26ThisvictoryagainsttheDíaz

dictatorshipwasinnameonly,andtherevolutionarieshadtodealwiththefederal

combatantsremainingactiveinthecountryside.Theirdifferencesreachedaboiling

pointduetoMadero,whobecamepresidentelectandrejectedallofZapata’s

demandsforlandreform.FollowingtheopenrejectionofZapata’sdemandsMadero

23Castro,24.24Castro,25.25Knight,Alan.TheMexicanRevolution.Vol.1Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986.310.26Castro,25.

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endorsedamilitarycampaign,ledbyVictorianoHuerta,againsttheZapatistas.27

ZapataandhisfollowersresistedtheeffortsofthefederalforcesintheMorelos

region.Uponassumingoffice,Maderomovedawayfromagriculturalreformand

soughttoenactmoreelitefocusedpoliticalchange.Duetohispoliticalineptitude

andhowheturnedonhisallieslikeZapatistauponassumingoffice,hewaseasily

oustedbyaHuertabackedmilitarycoupin1913andwasexecutedthatsameyear.28

Bytheyear1914theZapatistasandthefollowersofPanchoVillaand

VenustianoCarranzahadsuccessfullydefeatedthefederalforcesoftheHuertacoup

andtookcontrolofMexicoonceagain.29Thiscontrol,similarlytothelastperiodof

governance,wasmarredbypoliticalstrife.Thisstrifewasmostlyfocusedonthe

ideologicaldifferencesbetweenCarranzaandZapataregardingagrarianreform.30

Carranzabelievedthatthegovernmentcouldnotaddresstheissueofagrarian

reformandwentsofarastosaythatthere-appropriationoflandswasillegalforthe

governmenttoperform.

ForthefollowingfouryearstheZapatistaswagedwaragainstthe

Carrancistaspushingthegovernmentfollowthroughonit’spromisedland

reforms.31TheZapatistashoweverfacedaverydifficultstruggleinthissense

becausetheCarrancistaswerebetterarmedandhadbetteraccesstosupplies.This

howeverdidnotstopZapataandhisfollowers,who,throughtextbookguerilla

27Castro,26.28Castro,2829Castro,2930Castro,31-3331Knight,Alan.TheMexicanRevolution.Vol.1,1986.317.

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warfaremethods,foughtthesuperiorCarrancistaforces.32Whiletheeffortsofthe

ZapatistaswerebeingrewardedwithsuccessonApril10,1919themovement

sufferedacripplingloss.WhileridingtonegotiatewithanofficeroftheCarrancistas

whowasclaimedtobedefecting,Zapatawasshotdead,leavingthemovement

withoutit’sleaderandforcingittothemarginsofMexicanpoliticalscene.33

In1920Carranzametthesamefate,ashewaskilledbyÁlvaroObregón’s

forces,whobecamepresidentofMexicountil1924.34Zapatahadbeenkilled,buthe

remainedtheembodimentoftheZapatistaarmedresistancemovementinMexican

historyseekingtouseitsinfluencetoenactsocialchange.Zapata’sinfluenceasa

guerillafighterandcharismaticleader,whorepresentedthedesiresofthepeasants

andfarmersofMexicoforagrarianreform,becameoneoftherevolution’smost

definingfeatures.ThroughhiseffortsandtheeffortsoftheMexicanRevolutionthe

ideathatguerillamovementscouldexperiencenotonlyminorsuccessbutalso

overthrownentiregovernmentsbecamereal.TheZapatistasleftalastingmarkon

Mexicansocialmovements,andthatmarkcanstillbeseentoday.

JacoboÁrbenzGuzmánandthe26thofJulyMovement:

ColonelÁrbenz,wholedtheOctoberRevolutionin1944,whichoverthrew

themilitarydictatorJorgeUbico,successfullyreinstatingdemocraticelectionsand

ruletoGuatemala.35Uponhisascendencytothepresidencyheattemptedtobring

aboutsocialreformsthatrevolvedaroundassistingtheimpoverishedandenacting

morelandreforms.Hisefforts,andtheeffortsofhisgovernmenthoweverweren’t32Knight,AlanTheMexicanRevolution.Vol.2.36233Knight,Alan.TheMexicanRevolution.Vol.2.1986.367.34Castro,4035Gott,Richard.GuerrillamovementsinLatinAmerica.London:Nelson,1970.5.

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enoughtoaidthepoorandwereconsideredtoodrastictoavoidtheattentionofthe

UnitedFruitCompany,whofelttheirwealthandfinancialsecuritybeing

endangeredbya“socialist”.TheattentionthattheÁrbenzgovernmentattractedfor

itselfwasfromtheU.S.onbehalfoftheirUnitedStatesindustriesheavilyinvolved

withinGuatemala.

TheresultingstatementfromtheU.S.StateDepartment,regarding

Guatemalaatthetime,wasthattheyweredisappointedinthecountry’svoting

withintheOrganizationofAmericanStates,RioDefensePact.Additionally,theU.S.

wasalarmedthatGuatemalawaspurchasinggunsfromEasternEuropeannations,

toprotectitselffromdifferentinternalandinternationalthreats.36Therealitywas

muchdifferent,accordingtoRichardGott,authoroftheGuerillaMovementsinLatin

America.TheissueinvolvedtheGuatemalangovernment’sdistributionoffallow

landsbelongingtotheUnitedFruitCompany,andÁrbenz’s“soft”stanceagainst

communism.37Theserealitiesledtotheoverthrowofthedemocraticallyelected

governmentofJacoboÁrbenzGuzmánbyamilitarycoup,ledbyCarlosCastillo

Armas,whichwasbackedbytheCIA.38

Theimportanceofthiseventtofutureguerillamovementsisimportantas

theinitialresponsetothisoverthrowwasthatevenifguerillamovementsand

politicaluprisingoccur,thereistheeverconstantthreatoftheU.S.intervention.The

otherconcernforrevolutionaries,asGottnotesisthatunlesstherevolutiongoesall

thewayandshutsdownthewealthyrulingclassandsuppressthegovernmental

36Gott,5.37Gott,5-6.38Gott,3.

14

structurewithinthenation,thereisthethreatofU.S.interventionwillalwaysbe

present.Atthetimeofthemilitarycoup,PresidentÁrbenzhadbeenadvisedbya

futurerevolutionary,whosuggestedthathefightagainstthecoupfortherightshe

desiredforthepeopleofGuatemala.Thisguerillafighterwantedhimtoarmthe

peasantsandworkerstofighttheimperialthreatposedbytheU.S.backed

GuatemalanCarlosArmas,thisadvicecamefromnoneotherthanErnestoChe

Guevara.39

WhileapopularrebellioninGuatemalatookplacelaterin1960andwasled

bytwoarmyofficers,LuisTurciosandMarcoYon,itsinfluenceonLatinAmerica

cannotbeunderstated.40WhiletheoverthrowoftheÁrbenzgovernmenttookplace

in1954aswaspreviouslymentioned,itwasaneventthatinspiredCheGuevara,an

advisortoPresidentÁrbenz,tocontinuefightingforjusticeinothercountries.Upon

theoverturnoftheÁrbenzgovernmentGuevarahadtofleetoMexicoandlivingoff

thestreetsofMexicoCity.41Chewasinluckhowever,becauseMexicoCitywasa

refugeeforotherbuddingrevolutionaries,mostspecificallyCubanswhofledfrom

theFulgencioBatistaregime.ItwasduringthistimethatChemetwithFideland

RaúlCastroandjoinedtherevolutionarymovementthatwouldalterthemodern

historyofLatinAmericanhistory,the26thofJulymovement.42

The26thofJulyMovement,beganasasmallgroupoffreedomfighterswho

metandtrainedinMexico,seekingtoendtheFulgencioBatistadictatorshipinCuba.39Gott,640Gott,2041Ross,John."Che’sMexicanLegacy."Www.counterpunch.org.February26,2016.AccessedJanuary20,2017.http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/10/19/che-s-mexican-legacy/.42Ross,2

15

ThemovementacquireditsnamefromtheunsuccessfulassaultontheMoncada

barracksinSantiagodeCuba,ledbytheCastro’sonthe26thofJuly1953.43The

survivorsoftheMoncadaattackandotherstravelledintheGranma,aleakyand

unstableyachtthatFidelCastro,theleaderofthemovement,hadacquiredtheir

returntoCuba.OnDecember2ndof1956thesmalldetachmentlandedinCubaand

wereimmediatelyambushed.44Followingthiscrushingblowthesurvivingmembers

ofthegroupfledtotheSierraMaestra,aheavilywoodedmountainareatorecover

andplantheirnextcourseofaction.Fromtheirmountainousposition,they

coordinatedwiththeirclandestineurbancohortinSantiagodeCubatoplanminor

battlestoraisetheconfidenceandsupportforthemovementintheSierra

Maestra.45

Followingseriesofminorvictories,theytookfulladvantageofmedia

coveragefromtheNewYorkTimes46togrowinsizeastheirskirmishesgrewas

well.Thesesmallvictoriessolidifiedthemovementandtheirpurposetoeliminate

theBatistaregimefrompower.Inthespringof1958,followingmanyvictoriesfrom

thesmallbandofguerillas,theCubanpeoplebegansupportingthemovement.47

Followingthedevelopmentofaunifiedfront,whichincludedtheAuténticos,

Ortodoxoparty,theDirectorioRevolucionario,andtheMontecristimovementthe

revolutionpressedontoremovetheBatistaregime.48Thisfinalpressbecamethe

43Goldenberg,Boris.TheCubanrevolutionandLatinAmerica.NewYork:Praeger,1965.153-15444Goldenberg,15545Goldenberg,15546Goldenberg,15647Goldenberg,15948Goldenberg,161

16

finaloffensiveinDecemberof1958andwithittheBatistafledthecountryandthe

infrastructurecollapsed.InJanuaryof1959FidelCastroandthe26thofJuly

movementtoppledtheBatistaregimeandtookcontrolofCuba.49

UponseizingpowerinCuba,themovementimmediatelyenactedchangesto

thepoliciesthathadsuppressedthecountryunderBatista’sregime.The

revolutionarygovernmentsoughttochampionsocialrevolution,whichwould

includeagrarianreformations,literacyreforms,thenationalizationofimportant

Cubanindustries,andthedesiretopromoteanindustrialCubaneconomy.50The

influenceoftheSovietUniononthesepolicies,andtheirMarxistideologiesisa

pointofgreatimportancetotheoriginofguerillamovements,especiallyduringthe

ColdWar.

TheRedScareandU.S.Intervention:

TheU.S.policytowardsLatinAmerica,incontextofthefearedspreadof

Marxistandleftistbeliefs,isanothercomponentthatiscrucialtounderstanding

guerillawarfareinLatinAmerica,andthepurposeoftheirstruggles.The

developmentofthesepoliciesbeganfollowingWorldWarIIandthedevelopmentof

theSovietUnionasapoliticalrivaltotheU.S.followingthecollapseoftheAxis

Alliance.Thepredominanttheorythatwouldinitiatethisinteractionwouldbethe

developmenttheory,whichsoughttoincreasetheinteractionandfinancialaidthat

theU.S.providedLatinAmerican.Developmenttheoryoperatedonthepretextof

supportingtheeconomicgrowthof“third”worldcountries,butthisidealismwas

49Goldenberg,16350Wright,ThomasC.LatinAmericaintheeraoftheCubanRevolution.NewYork:Praeger,1991.

17

merelyacoverforfullblownU.S.interventionthroughouttheentireregionagainst

LatinAmericangovernments51.

TheinterventionoftheU.S.inLatinAmericathroughoutthe20thcentury

shouldnothoweverbeviewedasanoperationtoassistlocalgovernmentsdevelop

morecompleteeconomies,butratherasapoliticalactionreactingtotheperceived

communistthreat.Themostnotableoftheseinteractionsweretheremovalof

SalvadorAllendeinChileandtheBayofPigsinvasioninCuba,buttheU.S.

involvementwentdeeperthanthesetwoincidents.52TheactionsoftheU.S.

governmentwerenotinresponsetoanydirectthreatfromthecountriesinquestion

orevenfromRussiausingthecountriesasabaseofoperations.TheU.S.wasacting

indefenseofanationalimageofstrengthenagainsttheperceivedthreatofthe

spreadofCommunismthroughouttheworld.

TheiractionsinLatinAmerica,asGrow’stextexplains,wereashowof

internationalstrengthtodeterthesoviets,

…U.S.leadersworriedthatfailureontheirparttomaintainfirmhegemoniccontrolovertheUnitedStates’traditionalsphereofinfluenceintheWesternHemisphere…wouldbeinterpretedbyothergovernmentsasanindicationofU.S.weakness,asignperhapsthattheUnitedStatesnolongerhadthecapability,orthewill,toprojectitspowerindefenseofinterests.53

TheU.S.thereforehadtopursuethesehardlinepolicies,dueinlargeparttothe

advicefromHenryKissinger,whoservedasSecretaryofStateandNationalSecurity51Hunt,MichaelH.IdeologyandU.S.foreignpolicy.NewHaven:YaleUniversitypress,1987.159-16052Grow,Michael.U.S.PresidentsandLatinAmericanInterventions:pursuingregimechangeinthecoldwar.Kansas:UniversityPressofKansas,2012.186-187.53Grow,U.S.PresidentsandLatinAmericanInterventions,187.

18

advisorforPresidentsNixonandFord,aswellasunofficialadvisortomany

leaders.54Kissingerwouldcontinueontoclarifythisideaevenfurtherwithhisown

doctrine,theKissingerCommissionof1984,wherehestatedthat“thetriumphof

hostileforcesinwhattheSovietscallthe‘strategicrear’oftheUnitedStateswould

readasasignofU.S.impotence”.55WithallofthistakenintoaccounttheU.S.foreign

policyintotheLatinAmericanregionreflectedaverymilitant,andnon-supportive

stancetowardsleftist,democraticgovernmentsthatwereperceivedascommunist

friendlygovernments.

Conclusion:

TheimportanceoftheCubanRevolutionwasthattheimperialeffortsofthe

UnitedStateswithinLatinAmericahadbeensuccessfullychallenged.Cubawasa

nationthathadthrownoftheshacklesoftheimperialismandhaddonesothrough

anarmedconflictledbythe26thofJulymovementanditsleadersCheGuevaraand

FidelCastro.Inthefollowingdecades,theCubannationwouldfacegreatdifficulties

andpunishmentfromtheUnitedStatesforthesuccessoftherevolution.Yet,no

matterhowsevereU.S.policyinCubawas,therevolutionarygovernmentwouldnot

cavein,andconstantlystrovetoliveuptotheidealsthattheywagedtherevolution

toinstitute.

LatinAmericancountrieswouldviewtheCubanRevolutionwithasenseof

prideandunity.ThroughouttheLatinAmerican,theU.S.backeddictatorshipsand

falsedemocracieshadreigneduncontested.Cuba,anditsrevolutionwouldinspire

notonlyleftistthroughoutLatinAmericabutwouldserveasaninspirationfor54Grow,U.S.PresidentsandLatinAmericanInterventions,98.55Grow,U.S.PresidentsandLatinAmericanInterventions,187.

19

socialmovementsglobally.Therevolutionwasuniquebecauseitwasaguerilla

movementthatachieveditsgoalandbecameasovereignnation,freeofdictatorship.

Throughtheirsuccess,theyinspiredmanyotherguerillamovementsthroughout

LatinAmericatoformandresisttheiroppressivegovernments.

20

ChapterTwo:TheTupamarosandUruguay

HistoryoftheTupamaros:

In1971,agroupknownastheFrenteAmplio(FA),ortheBroadFrontin

Uruguaycameintoexistence.TheFrenteAmpliorepresentedademocraticcoalition

ofaround12fracturedleftistpoliticalparties.Themovementreallybegantogain

tractionintheearly1970’sbutswiftlylostalotofpopularsupportbecauseofthe

terroristtacticsthattheywereemploying.TheTupamaros(Movimientode

LiberaciónNacional-Tupamaros)werenotlikeotherguerillamovements;theywere

moreofapoliticalmovementthatdecidedtotakeuparmsastheirmethodof

protest.Theywantedtomovethecountryawayfromanauthoritariandictatorship

andhelpsavetheworkersfrommarketcapitalism.However,withthe1973military

coupd’état,mostdemocraticrightsguaranteedinthe1967Uruguayanconstitution

werenotrespected,leadingeffectivelytothedeathoftheFAafterlittleovera

decadeinexistence.56

TheTupamarosofficiallybeganorganizinginlate1962intoearly1963,and

wereledduringtheirinitialformationbyRaúlSendricandotherdisgruntled

membersoftheSocialistparty.57Thenameforthemovementiswidelybelievedto

havebeentakenfromtherevolutionofTupacAmaruagainsttheSpanishEmpirein

1572.58InMartinWeinstein’sbookheaddressestheoverallstructureofUruguayan

56GarceAdolfo“Deguerrillerosagobernantes:ElprocesodeadaptaciondelMLN-TupamarosalalegalidadyalacompetenciaelectoralenUruguay(1985-2009)”Hal:1-24.57Weinstein,Martin.Uruguay:thepoliticsoffailure.Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1975.120.58Weinstein,121.

21

democracy,specificallydrawingattentiontothelackofrepresentationthatthe

Tupamaroshadingovernment.WeinsteinquotestheMLN-T’sfirstpublicstatement

tothenationin1967,

Forthesereasons,wehaveplacedourselvesoutsidethelaw.Thistheonlyhonestactionwhenthelawisnotequalforall;whenthelawexiststodefendthespuriousinterestsofaminorityindetrimenttothemajority;whenthelawworksagainstthecountry’sprogress;wheneventhosewhohavecreateditplacethemselvesoutsideofit,withimpunity,wheneveritisconvenientforthem.59

Thequotecontinuestointroducethemovementandannouncethebeginningofthe

Tupamarosguerrillawarfaretofightingthedictatorship.Themovementcameout

withthischargedstatementtoshowthattheyfeltitnecessarytocreateanarmed

rebelliontofightfortheirrights.Thedesireofthemovementtopromotethe

economicwell-beingandpoliticalstabilityofthecountrywouldmotivatethegroup

towageanarmedguerillawaragainsttheUruguayangovernmentformanyyears.

TheTupamaros,unlikeotherguerillamovementsinthepastdecade,suchas

theCubanRevolution,soughttobecomeanurbanguerillafightinggroup.Thisidea

ofurbanresistancewentcompletelyagainstthemoldofguerillafightingatthetime,

ascreatedbyCheGuevarathroughhisownbook,CheGuevaraGuerrillaWarfare,

whichhewrotefollowingtheCubanrevolution.InhisGuevara’sbookonGuerilla

Warfare,hediscussesthreemajorcomponentstoirregularwarfare,thethirdof

whichwasthenecessitytohaveacountrysidebaseofoperationstoconcentratethe

developmentofyourforces.60TheTupamaroshoweverdidnotfeelthatUruguay

wastheenvironmentforarural-basedrevolution,aswasthecaseintheCuban

59Weinstein,121.60Guevara,Che.CheGuevaraguerrillawarfare.NewYork:VintageBooks,1969.14.

22

Revolution,whichreliedonmountains,trees,andrallyingthepeasants,andrural

citizens.TheTupamarossawanopportunityinUruguaytodevelopanurban

resistanceinMontevideoandbegananurbanguerillawaragainstthedictatorship.

Theyfeltthatthismethodwouldbeverysuccessfulduetothedesignof

Montevideo,andthegreatermetropolitanareaofthecity.InDanielCastro’sbook,

hecitesananonymousinterviewwithaTupamarofighter,wherethefighter

addressedquestionsregardingthestrategies,policiesandbeliefsofthegroup.One

suchquestionaddressedtheideaoftheurbanrevolutioninUruguay,

Q:Andfortheurbanstruggle,dotheconditionsexist?A:Montevideoisacitysufficientlylargeandpolarizedbysocialstrugglestogivecovertothevastactivecommandocontingent.Itconstitutesafarbetterframeworkthanthatwhichotherrevolutionarymovementshavehadfortheurbanstruggle.61

TheTupamarosunderwentamilitarycampaignthatsoughttouniteothersocial

movements,laborunions,andtheimpoverishedUruguayanswhothedesperate

economicsituationmostsignificantlyaffected.62Theurbanguerillas,however,did

notachievetheirgoalofbringingdownthegovernment,andfollowingthecapture

ofseveralimportantleadersin1972,themovementcollapsedentirely.63Following

thedefeatoftheTupamarosthegovernmentofUruguaytookanevenmore

oppressivewhichledtotheprolongedimprisonmentandtortureofcaptured

Tupamaros.

61Castro,Daniel.RevolutionandrevolutionariesguerrillamovementsinLatinAmerica.Wilmington(Del.):SRBooks,1999.112.62Brum,Pablo.TheRobinHoodguerrillas:theepicjourneyofUruguay'sTupamaros.Charleston,SC:CreateSpace,2014.24.63Brum,282.

23

AmericanInterventioninUruguay

U.SinterventionthroughoutLatinAmericahasbeenaprolificanddramatic

occurrenceandUruguaywasnoexceptionduringthe1960’sand1970’s.Uruguay,

widelyreferredtoastheSwitzerlandoftheSouthAmericannationsduetoits

historyofsocialdemocracyandpeacefulsocietyhadbeenviolencefreesince1848.

ThisperiodofpeacewasdestinedtofallhoweverbecauseofU.S.interestsin

hemispherichegemonyandtheirinterventionpoliciesthatsupportsthis

dictatorship.64

TheinitialinterventionfromtheU.S.inUruguaytookplaceintheUruguayan

policeforcethroughoutthenation.TheU.S.OfficeofPublicSafety(OPS)began

trainingpoliceofficersinUruguayandadditionallyhundredsofofficerswere

encouragedbytheOPStotraveltotheInternationalPoliceAcademyandtheU.S.

ArmySchooloftheAmericasinPanamatogainfurtherU.S.training.TheOPS,

whichhadfunctionedinother“struggling”democracieslikeVietnam,hadgaineda

negativereputationforitsaggressivetorturetechniques.WhiletheOPSwere

supposedtomaintainanadvisoryroletotheUruguayanpoliceforce,in1966under

theleadershipofWilliamCantrell,theheadoftheprogramatthetimeandacovert

CIAofficer,movedtomarginalizethepoliceforces.

ThismarginalizationtooktheformoftheNationalDirectorateofInformation

andIntelligence(DNII),whichwasCantrell’sorganizationthatreplacedthe

64McSherry,PatriceJ."Deathsquadsasparallelforces:Uruguay,OperationCondor,andtheUnitedStates."JournalofThirdWorldStudies,2007.AssociationofGlobalSouthStudies.4.

24

UruguayanleddepartmentofAlejandroOtero.65Oterowastheheadofthe

Uruguayanpoliceforceandin1966,withthesuccessfulmarginalizationofOtero

andtheanti-tortureUruguayanpoliceforce,Cantrellbegantorturingpolitical

prisoners.WiththefloodgatesoftortureopenedinUruguaytheOPSbroughtinDan

Mitrione,whowasanadvisoronLatinAmericatotheCIA,toleadthePublicsafety

officeinMontevideoandtraintheofficers.Mitrionehadbeenheavilyactiveinthe

SouthAmericanpoliceforces,andpreviouslyhadtrainedtheBrazilianpoliceforces

ininterrogationandtorturemethodsbeforearrivinginUruguay.

UnderMitrionethecasesoftortureincreasedandinaninterviewin1970

OrteropubliclydenouncedMitrione’smethodsandnotedhisscientificand

psychologicaltorturemethods.OneCubanoperativewithintheCIA,ManuelHevia

Conculluela,describeoneofMitrione’smethodsinhisbookPasaporte11333,Eight

YearsWiththeC.I.A.66InitConcullueladescribedasoundproofedroom,where

Mitrioneandhismenperformeddifferentdemonstrationsoftorturemethods,using

electriccurrentsandchemicalsubstancesonfourhomelessbeggars.67Inadditionto

theU.S.sponsoredpolicebrutalityandtorturemethods,U.S.interventiontookon

anotherform,whichwasthedevelopmentandsupportofdeathsquadrons.

Inadeclassifiedtelegramfrom1971,theU.S.ambassadortoUruguay,

CharlesAdair,discussedtheexistenceofdeathsquadswithimportantUruguayan

MinistersoftheInterior.Thefollowingquoteacknowledgesthatnotonlydidthe

Uruguayangovernmentknowthesesquadsexisted,butthatbothgovernments65McSherry,5-6.66Langguth,A.J."Torture'sTeachers."NewYorkTimes(NewYork),June11,1979.67McSherry,"Deathsquadsasparallelforces:Uruguay,OperationCondor,andtheUnitedStates."6.

25

endorsedtheirexistence,"Recounterterrorism,particularlyformationof'death

squads'astactic,IsaidIwouldnotpresumetopassjudgmentondevelopmentsin

Uruguay..."68Theambassadorwouldlateraddthathetoldtheofficialsthatsuch

tacticsweren’teffective,butdidnotrecantthestatementhehadmaderegarding

deathsquads.BoththeU.S.andUruguayhaveadmittedthatthedeathsquads

existedandthattheywereanactivecomponentofcounterinsurgencyeffortsin

Uruguay.69

Theexistenceofdeathsquadsbecameevenmoreapparentwhen,in1972,

theTupamaroskidnappedandquestionedNelsonBardesio,whohadbeenOPS

directorCantrell’sdriver.Intheirlineofquestioning,whichBardesioacknowledged

waswithoutviolence,herevealedthatthedeathsquadswereprevalentthroughout

theUruguayanpoliceforceandtheDNII.HegavetheTupamarosthenamesof

officersHugoCamposHermida,VictorCastiglioni,andadmittedtohisown

involvementinthesquads.Theothertwoofficersheindicatedwereimportant

membersoftheDNII.CastiglioniwasthedirectorofintelligencefortheDNIIand

HermidawasinchargeofinvestigationsfortheDNII.Bardesioalsorevealedthat

thesedeathsquadswereresponsibleforassassinationsandbombattacksagainst

socialistandcommunistleaders.70

ThesetwoexamplesofU.S.intervention,coupledwiththeideaoftheU.S.’s

desireforhemisphericcontrol,ledtothemanipulationoftheUruguayanelections.

Thisinterference,whichwasspearheadedbyPresidentRichardNixonandhis68McSherry,7.69McSherry,9.70McSherry,"Deathsquadsasparallelforces:Uruguay,OperationCondor,andtheUnitedStates."7

26

NationalSecurityAdvisorHenryKissinger,encouragedtheBrazilianandArgentine

militariestotakeanactiveroleinsabotagingtheFrenteAmpliopoliticalcoalition.In

ameetingbetweenKissingerandBraziliandictatorEmílioMédici,Kissinger

commentedonthestatusoftheleftinUruguayandBolivia,"inareasofmutual

concernsuchasthesituationsinUruguayandBolivia,closecooperationandparallel

approachescanbeveryhelpfulforourcommonobjectives."71Thissupport,andthe

effectivedestructionoftheleftbythearmyandpoliceforcesinUruguay,ledthe

countrytotakeadramaticturn,whichwasledbythemilitaryseizingpowerin

1973.

MilitaryDictatorship:

In1973agroupofUruguayangeneralsandpresidentJuanMaríaBordaberry,

acivilianwhoassistedthemilitaryjuntaagainstthegovernment,establishedhis

owndictatorshipinUruguay.Oncethedictatorshipwasinplacethegovernment

beganahardlineapproachagainsttherisingleftandTupamaros.Thismilitary

regimebrutallysuppressedtheleftandkidnapped,tortured,andkilledmanyofthe

leadersoftheleftandtheTupamaros.AftercapturingTupamarosleadersduringthe

rebellion,theyimprisonedthemandbegantorturingthemandexactingtheir

revenge.OneoftheseleaderswasJoséMujica,whowasconsideredahighvalue

prisonerandwasneverkeptinoneprisonforlongerthansixmonthsbecauseofhis

abilitytorallytheprisonersandtheimportanceheheldfortheTupamaros.

JoséMujica,oneoftheleadersoftheMLN-T,wasabductedbymilitaryforces

whileroamingtheUruguayancountrysideandwasbroughtintothemilitary’s

71McSherry,8

27

interrogationfacilities.Duringhisinitialcapturein1972hewastorturedin

captivityforinformationregardingtheTupamarosandtheirleadershipstructure.

Thistortureincludedaparticularlyawfulmethodofusinganelectricprodonhis

nakedbody,whichledtoapermanentchangeinMujica’sincontinenceandsevere

mentaltrauma.UponreceivingwhatinformationtheydesiredfromMujica,hewas

releasedtopartakeinthenegotiationswiththegovernmentandtheremaining

MLN-Tfighters.Thesenegotiations,whichwereheldinundisclosedlocations

involvingthesurrenderoftheTupamarosfighters,andthegovernmentusedformer

members,likeMujica,tonegotiatewiththefighters.72

Withthecollapseoftheciviliangovernmentin1973Mujica’slifeasa

politicalprisonerchanged.Forthefollowingtwelveyears,heandseveralother

leadersoftheMLN-Twouldbetransferredaroundtodifferentmilitaryfacilities.73

Thiswasnecessarybecausethedictatorshipchosedifferentmilitaryfacilitiesso

thattheycouldkeepalltheTupamarosseparate.Intheseseparateandisolated

locations,theywouldcommitegregioushumanrightsviolationstothemduring

theircaptivity.Theseviolations,whichMujicaliststhoroughly,fundamentallybroke

himdownmentallyandwouldstaywithMujicalongafterhiscaptivity.

MujicawasheldwithacertaingroupofTupamaros,theothersbeing

EleuterioFernández,andMauricioRosencof.Thethreeeachexperiencedsimilar

conditionsduringthey’recaptivity.Mujica’sconditionsincludednotbeingallowed

tobathfortwoyears,waterboarding,physicalabuse,hallucinationsduetoguards

72Brum,Pablo.TheRobinHoodguerrillas:theepicjourneyofUruguay'sTupamaros.Charleston,SC:CreateSpace,2014.298.73“TheRobinHoodGuerillas”,335.

28

watchinghim,andsolitaryconfinement.74DuringhistimeasaprisonerMujica

spentover4,000daysinthesekindsoflivingconditionswithnohopeofreleaseand

nonewsfromtheoutsideworld.75

Atthesametimethedictatorshipwasfacingastruggletomaintainits

repressivetechniquesandcontrolovertheUruguayanpopulace.Duringthe1980’s

therewasaresurgenceinpoliticiansfromtheformerlybannedleftistgroupswho

desiredtobringaboutachangeinUruguay.Inresponsetotheriseofthesenew

politiciansin1980,themilitaryregimeunderAparicioMéndezsoughttoentrench

themselves,andtheirauthoritarianregime,withanewconstitution.Thistactic

failedandencouragedtheexiledandrepressedpoliticalleaderstoseektotheend

theregime.Thischangecameaboutin1984throughtheNavalClubPact,which

establishedtheconditionsforthetransitionbacktocivilianruleandtheendof12

yearsofdictatorship.76

RestoredDemocracyandtheintegrationoftheMLN-T

Oncedemocracywasrestoredin1985underPresidentJulioSanguinetti,the

FAcamebackasastrongcoalitionandservedasasignforthefutureofdemocracy

inUruguay.77ThisincludedthereintegrationoftheMLN-Tintopoliticalsociety.The

MLN-Thasseenmanyofitsleadersinpoliticaloffice,butnonemoreprevalentthen

JoséMujica.Mujicawaselectedpresidentin2009,andwasoneofthemostactive

Tupamaroskidnappedduringthemilitarycoup,releasedin1985.Uponhisrelease,74“TheRobinHoodGuerillas”,334.75“TheRobinHoodGuerillas”,1.76Garcé,Adolfo“Deguerrillerosagobernantes:ElprocesodeadaptaciondelMLN-TupamarosalalegalidadyalacompetenciaelectoralenUruguay(1985-2009)”10.77Luna,JuanPablo."FrenteAmplioandtheCraftingofaSocialDemocraticAlternativeinUruguay."LatinAmericanPoliticsandSociety(2008):15.

29

heandtheleadersoftheTupamarosdecidedtoforgoguerillawarfareandenter

politics.ShirleyChristian,oftheNewYorkTimes,belowillustratesformerpresident

Mujica’sdescriptionoftheinternalreviewthattheMLN-Tunderwentbeforejoining

theFA.78

Mr.MujicaalsoacknowledgedthattheTupamarosaregoingthroughan''internalreorganization''thatreflectsthevariedexperiencesofthemembersduringthepastdozenyearsaswellaswhathetermed''thecrisisallovertheworldinthetraditionalthinkingoftheleft”.79

ThismomentintheformationoftheFAisimpressiveduetohisincrediblepatience

tosuspendtheirpushfortheimmediatecreationofanactivepartyinthepolitical

structure.ThispatienceallowedtheTupamarostoachieveabetterunderstanding

ofthemselvesandtheworld.Theleadersofthemovementknewthattheyhadto

firstunderstandthemselvesbeforetheycouldtryandchangeUruguay.

InChristian’s1986NewYorkTimesarticleshedescribestheinfluenceof

otherworldlymovementsandhowtheleadersoftheMLN-Tsoughttousethese

eventstohelptheircauseandsolidifytheirpoliticalparty,

SomeTupamaros,hesaid,havereturnedfromexileinWesternEurope,wheretheywereinfluencedbysocialdemocraticthinking.Othersaremarkedbythelongyearsofprisonisolation.Stillothers,hesaid,arereturningtoUruguayfromCentralAmerica,wheretheywereinfluencedbytheSandinistasandtheSalvadoranguerrillas,bothofwhombelieveinleadershipbyanall-powerfulrevolutionaryvanguard.80

WithdifferentperspectivesinmindtheMLN-Tformedtheirownpoliticalparty

calledthecalledtheMovementofPopularParticipation(MPP),whichjoinedtheFA

78Garcé,12.79Christian,Shirley“TupamarosofUruguay:TheMystiqueSurvives”TheNewYorkTimesNovember3,1986.1.80Christian,3.

30

in1988andiscurrentlythelargestsinglefactionwithintheFA.81TheMPPandthe

MLN-Twantedtofullyendorsethesocialistmovementandcreateapartythat

wouldembodywhattheCubanRevolutionandotherrevolutionarymovementsin

CentralAmericahadfoughttoachieve.Theydidn’twanttocontinuetheviolenceof

thepast,butinsteadtohavetheirgoalsrepresentedthroughanopenand

democraticpoliticalprocess.

TheMPPpoliticalpartytookinseveraldifferentaspectsnotonlyregarding

themselves,butalsooftheworldaroundthem.In1995,theProgressiveEncounter

andtheNuevoEspaciocoalitionsjoinedtheFAandtheybegantocompeteonthe

nationalstageasaseriouspoliticalmovement.Inthe2004,nationalelectionsthe

partypulledoffamajorupsetagainstthetraditionalpartieslikethedominant

Coloradoparty(PC)andtheBlancoparties(PB).82Theywereabletocomeaway

with17outofthe31senateseats,52outofthe99inthechamberofdeputiesand

wonthepresidencybehindTabaréVázquez.83

TheresultsofthiselectionhelpedcementtheFAasamajorpoliticalgroup.

TheFAwasabletorepresentthefarleft,anditencompassedboththepoorandthe

conservativepopulationsthatsoughttobringbackimportindustrialsubstitution

(ISI)whichendorsedtheusageofforeignmadegoodstosubstitutenational

industry.84Itwasabroadmovementthathelpedpeoplefeelthattheyweretruly

81GarcéAdolfo“Deguerrillerosagobernantes:ElprocesodeadaptaciondelMLN-TupamarosalalegalidadyalacompetenciaelectoralenUruguay(1985-2009)”Hal:1-24.82Luna,JuanPablo."FrenteAmplioandtheCraftingofaSocialDemocraticAlternativeinUruguay."LatinAmericanPoliticsandSociety(2008):18.83Luna,21.84Luna,23.

31

beingrepresented.WiththesuccessfulpresidentialelectionofTabaréVázquezand

theFAcongressionalmajorityin2006,thecoalitionsolidifieditspresenceonthe

nationalstageandshowedthehugeprogressthatithadmadesinceitsformation.

TheFA’ssuccessrepresentedthenationalacceptanceofasolidifiedleft.This

successwouldleadtotheelectionofJoséMujicatothepresidency.85

ThelargestissuethattheMPPandtheFAcurrentlyfaceisthatthemajority

oftheirpoliticalleadersareadvancinginageandthereappearstobenoyounger

generationofleaderstofillthevoid.Christian’sNewYorkTimesarticleaccurately

showshoweverthatthisisnotthefirsttimethattheseissueshavebeen

encountered,

…Despitethegrayingimageoftheleadership,morethanhalfofthecurrentTupamarosmilitantsarelessthan25yearsold.AnopenconventioncalledbytheTupamaroslastDecemberattractedabout1,000people,thoughttoconstitutethetotalnumberofmembersandserioussympathizers.86

Thepartyhashadproblemsgainingyoungerleadersandtheolderleaderslike

LatinoBarómetro,whichisapollthatgatherstheopinionofcitizensthroughout

LatinAmericaonissuesregardingsocialnorms,economicissues,andpolitics.

LatinoBarómetroprovidesdataillustratingthesuccessofthepartyovertherecent

yearsandhasshownthattherehasbeenaseriousspikeinthepopularityofthe

partysinceitsformation.

85Lanzaro,Jorge."Uruguay'sSocialDemocraticExperiment."CurrentHistory(2014):77.86Ibid

32

LatinoBarómetrodatasupportingtheFA:

In2004LatinoBarómetrosurveyposedthequestiontoasampleof

UruguayanswhatpartytheywouldvoteforiftheelectionwerethisSunday.The

datathatcamebackdidn’tfavorthepoliticalsystem,64.6%ofthepopulationfelt

thattheywouldn’tvotewhileanother20.1%ofthepopulationfeltthattheydidn’t

evenknowwhomtheywouldvotefor.Thesenumbersarestaggeringbecausethey

representapopulationthathadlostfaithinthedemocraticprocess.Thenumbers

howeverchangeddrasticallyandinthemostrecent2013opinionpolls41.8%said

thattheywouldvotefortheFAcandidate.Thisnumberhasgoneupsince2001

whentheFAandtheEncuentroProgresista(EP)claimed34.6%oftheentire

population’svote.

LatinoBarómetrodatatablesregardingUruguay’sdemocratictransformation

from1995to2013areinteresting.Thedatashowsanimpressivenationalswing

towardstheleft.In1995,thetotalpercentageoftheUruguayanpopulationwho

claimedtobeleftistwasaround.2%ofthetotalpopulacewitharound11.7%ofthe

countryclaimingtoberightwing.Sothedataisshowingacountrythatwastypical

foritstimeandapoliticalsystemthatfavoredrightwingandconservativepolicies.

Howeverin2013themostrecentLatinoBarómetrosurveyshaveshownahuge

swingtotheleft.In2013about11.3%oftheUruguayanpopulationoriented

themselveswiththeleftwing.Thisisahugechangeinthenationalpercentagethat

considersthemselvestobeleftist.Thisnationalswitchinmanywaysisaresultof

theFrenteAmplioandtheinfluenceoftheirpoliticalcoalition.

33

In1995theLatinoBarómetropolledhowsatisfiedpeoplewerewith

democracyinUruguayandonly.5%ofthepopulationclaimedthattheywerevery

satisfiedwithdemocracyinUruguay.Thispollwastakenagainin2013regarding

satisfactionwithdemocracyand70.9%ofthepopulationnowclaimtobevery

satisfiedwithdemocracy.ThispollisrevealsofthesignificanceoftheFAbecauseas

thetotalamountofpeoplewhosupporttheFAhasincreasedsohastheincreased

satisfactionwithdemocracy.TheMPPandtheFAhavebeeninfluentialinUruguay

allowingthecountrytofeelthatdemocracyisbeingvaluedandthatitissomething

importanttotheircountry.TheFAhashelpedincreasethestrengthofdemocracyin

UruguayandthroughthesedifferentstatisticsthecorrelationbetweentheFAand

overalltrendofdemocraticstabilityinUruguayisclear.TheFAandtheMPPhave

helpeddemocracysolidifyandtheyhavehelpedpeoplefeelthatdemocracyis

possible.

Conclusion:

InthemostrecentpublicationofLatinobarometro’sdatain2015theideaof

Uruguaymaintainingastrongdemocracywassupported.Inthe2015datatables

75.8%ofallofthosepolledrespondedthatdemocracywasthebestgoverning

option,with11.1%claimingthatthemannerofgoverningdidn’tconcernthem.This

dataconfirmsthatdemocracyisstillanactivepartofUruguayancultureandthe

effortsoftheFAhavebeenpayingoff.Inadditiontothesedatapointsreflectingthe

nationalsupportfordemocracyisoverallhappinessregardingtheactionsofthe

parliamentandnationalcongress.ThedatathatcamebackfromUruguayregarding

34

thissatisfactionreflectsverywellontheinstitutions,with5.6%ofthosepolled

sayingthattheyaredoingverywelland57%sayingtheyhavedoneagoodjob.

InadditiontothesedatapointsLatinobarometroincludesthesurvey

regardingtheparticularpartythatvoterswouldbackiftheyhadtovotethis

Sunday.Inthesepolls49.8%ofthosepolledfeltthattheywouldvotefortheFA,the

closestgrouptotheFAwasthePN(PartidoNacional)with7.8%.Inadditional

pollingLatinobarometroaskedvotershowstronglytheysupportthispartyand

35%answeredstronglywhile50.5%answeredquitestrongly.TheUruguayan

politicallandscapehaschangeddramaticallysincethe1970’sdictatorshipand,

basedontheeffortsoftheFAandtheTupamaros,therevolutionaryidealsthatthe

movementcherishedhaveflourishedanddevelopedintoastrongdemocracy.

UruguayiscurrentlyoneofthemoststabledemocraciesinallofLatin

America.Thisisinlargepartbecauseofthecontributionsandhardworkofthe

Tupamarosfordemocracy.TheTupamarosbeganasamovementthattriedtofill

theholesthatdemocracywasunabletofill.Theythenbecamepartofthe

governmentasaformalpoliticalpartyandceasedtheirguerillaactivities.Forthese

reasons,Ithinkitisfairtosaythattheywereaninformalorganization,thatbecame

aninformalpartyandfinallybecameanofficialmovement.Thistransitionfrom

informaltoaformalmovementthroughtheformationoftheMPPandtheFAisa

testamenttothedesireoftheTupamarostostrengthendemocracyinUruguay.

35

ChapterThree:TheFARC,UP,andColombiaHistory of the FARC:

InordertounderstandtheformationoftheFARC,orLasFuerzasArmadas

RevolucionariosdeColombiaitisnecessarytoexplaintheimpactofaneventcalled

laviolencia.Laviolenciawasanineyearperiod,between1948-1957,wherestate

violencewas`wagedbetweentheliberalandconservativepartieswithinColombia,

whichresultedinahighamountofciviliandeaths.Laviolenciabeganwiththe

assassinationoftheliberalpoliticalleaderJorgeEliécerGaitánin1948,whichmany

liberalleaderscreditedtotheconservativeparty.Gaitán,whowasmeanttobethe

liberal’spresidentialcandidate,ledthewayfortheconservative,LaureanoGómezto

winthenextpresidentialraceinthe1950.87

Gómez’svictory,andthecontinuedcontroloftheconservativepartyinthe

countryside,greatlycontributedtotheformationofliberalguerillasquads,which

wereorganizedtocombatconservativeparty’scontrolinruralvillagesandfarms.

Gómezwouldlosethefaithofboththeconservativepartyandthemilitary,andwas

deposedbyamilitarycoupd’état,whichledGeneralGustavoRojasPinillato

presidencyin1953.DuringPinilla’spresidency,hesoughttoendthepolitical

insurgencythroughoutthecountrysidebyadoptingahardlineapproachusing

violentsuppressionmethods.Pinillaremainedinpoweruntil1957,atwhichtime

theliberalandconservativepartiesunitedtoformtheNationalFront.TheNational

Frontreachedanagreementthattheywouldalternatewhowouldwinthe

87Offstein,Norman."AnHistoricalReviewandAnalysisofColombianGuerrillaMovements:FARC,ELNandEPL."DesarrolloySociedad,September2003,101.

36

presidencylastinguntil1974.Thisagreementbeganwiththeelectionoftheliberal

AlbertoCamargotothepresidencyin1958.88

UndertheleadershipofCamargo,theColombiangovernmentsoughtto

combatthedamagethatlaviolenciahadbroughttotheColombianpeople.Bythe

timethatCamargohadcometopowerapproximately200,000peoplehaddied

duringthenineyearperiodoftheviolence.Carmargosoughttoendlaviolenciaby

puttingdifferentpoliciesintoplacethatwouldlifttheruralcommunitiesoutof

poverty.Thesepolicies,includedplanstoredistributelandstosmallplanters,

constructschools,healthclinics,waterandsewagesystems,roads,andcommunity

centers.Theprogramfacedmanyproblems,whichincludedalackoffundsanda

slowpaceoflandredistribution,thatgreatlyaffectedtheireffectivenessinthe

countryside.Thereformsalsocouldn’taddressthehighratesofurban

unemploymentandthelackoflowincomehousinginurbanareas,whichcreated

tensionthroughoutthecountry.89

Thistensionunifiedthedissentingliberalguerillagroups,thathad

previouslyremainedinisolatedandseparatejunglepocketsduringthe1950’s.

Theseguerillagroups,whichwouldeventuallyformtheFARCmovement,beganas

theSouthernGuerillaBloc.TheSouthernGuerillaBloc,whichdevelopedthroughout

southernfederaladministrativesections,developedastrongrelationshipwiththe

ColombianCommunistParty(CCP).Thisrelationshipwasextremelybeneficialfor

theSouthernGuerillaBloc,whoreceivedfinancialsupportfromthepartyaswellas88Offstein,101-102.89Offstein,103.

37

politicaldirectionforthemovement.TheconnectiontheCCPandthesupportthe

partyhadfromRussia,gavetheSouthernGuerillaBlocmuchneededresourcesand

confidencetoemergeasanationalguerillamovement.Withtheformationofthe

FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariosdeColombia(FARC)in1964,Moscowreleaseda

statementregardingU.S.imperialismandhowtheU.S.hadmilitarybasesin

Colombiacallingforworkersandpeasantstosupporttheguerillas.90

DevelopmentoftheFARC:

TheU.S.andColombia,duringtheriseoftheFARC,hadgoodinter-

governmentalrelations,andColombiawasoneoftheU.S.’sstrongestalliesinthe

region.DuringtheColdWarColombiahadopenlysupportedU.S.anticommunism,

andPresidentGeorgeW.BushstatedthatColombiawastheU.S.’sstrongestallyin

LatinAmerica.ColombiahadsentsoldierstoKoreaduringtheKoreanwarinthe

1950’sandmotionedtoexpelCubafromtheOASatthe1961conferencefollowing

theCubanRevolutionin1959.Additionally,andmostrelevanttocombatingthe

FARCandotherinsurgencygroupswithinthecountry,duringthe1960’sColombia

adoptedthenationalsecuritydoctrinepromotedbytheUnitedStates.The

Colombiangovernmenthadagreeduponanintelligencesharingplan,whichallowed

theU.S.toplacemilitaryofficialsintheBogotaembassyasadvisorstothe

government.91WithColombia’sclose,andsupportiverelationstotheU.S.inmind,

theformationoftheFARC,acommunistgroupthathadthesupportoftheCCPwith

90Offstein,103.91Nieto,JaimeZuluaga."U.S.SecurityPoliciesandUnitedStates–ColombiaRelations."LatinAmericanPerspectives34,no.1(2007):116.

38

supportfromtheSovietUnion,representedagravethreattotheU.S.andthe

Colombiagovernment.

TheFARCformallycreatedtheirnamein1966,declaringtheirstatusasa

communistarmedguerillamovementwithinColombia,whichtriggeredtheU.S.

fearsofthespreadofcommunismwithinLatinAmerica.ThebeginningoftheU.S.

interventionagainsttheFARCwasthroughPlanLaso,whichwasaU.S.led

counterinsurgencyeffortthatoverlappedwithColombianeffortstocombat

guerillas.TheimplementationofthesepolicieswerequitesevereontheFARC,with

themovementseeingalossof70percentofitsarmamentsandasignificantamount

oftheirsoldiersbetween1966and1968.EvenwiththeseeffortshowevertheFARC

wouldsurviveandgrowto1,000soldiersby1978.92AlthoughtheFARC’sforces

grewduringthisperiod,theyhadbeenpusheddeepintothejungleregionsof

Guaviara,Caquetá,andPutumayo.Theseregionswouldeventuallyserveasthebasis

forthedevelopmentoftheireconomicroleinnarcotrafficking.93

The1980’srepresentedabrightfuturefortheFARCandfortheir

development.WiththesuccessoftheSandinistaRevolutioninNicaragua,theFARC,

aswellasotherguerillamovementsthroughoutLatinAmerica,feltempowered.

ThisempowermentfortheFARCrepresentedthedevelopmentofadifferent

approach,thatwouldventureawayfromtheCubanhitandrunstyle,intoamore

directandfrontalassaultstyle.Thisrepresentedthedevelopmentof48different

92Rochlin,Jim."PlanColombiaandtherevolutioninmilitaryaffairs:thedemiseoftheFARC."ReviewofInternationalStudies37,no.02(2010):720.93Rochlin,720.

39

militaryfronts,withanincreasedpresenceinurbanareas,andimproved

communicationamongsttheguerillas.Thesedevelopmentswouldgreatlyassistthe

FARCinopeningnegotiationswiththeColombiangovernmenttofurtheradvance

theircause,notasguerillasbutasapoliticalmovement.94

The UP:

In 1985, the Colombian government signed an agreement to “ensure

political security and equality for the UP (Union Patriotica)”95 This was an empty

promise, however, as the government eventually did not honor this agreement.

Several different non-governmental organizations, with encouragement from the

government, were the major perpetrators responsible for subsequent deaths of

members of the UP. The paramilitaries, drug lords, and the Colombian army all

lined up against the UP and their officials for different reasons. The issue came to

a head when in 1987 a young fourteen year old boy, who was directly related to a

Medellin drug cartel, assassinated Jaime Pardo, the 1986 UP presidential

candidate and party figure head, leading to the FARC abandoning the UP and

returning to Guerilla warfare.96

The official death count of members of the UP is around 3,000 but many

believe that number to be closer to 5,000. The UP represented an opportunity for

the federal government to put aside their grievances with the guerillas and allow

them to reintegrate into normal life. The government however didn’t want to

94Rochlin,720-721.95Gomez-Suarez,Andrei."PerpetratorBlocs,GenocidalMentalitiesandGeographies:TheDestructionoftheUnionPatrioticainColombiaandItsLessonsforGenocideStudies."JournalofGenocideResearch:639.Print.96Gomez,640.

40

provide the FARC or other guerilla movements the opportunity to seek political

representation for fear of losing control over political landscape. The Álvaro

Uribe administration then deemed it necessary to exterminate the UP because

they were acting as a cover for the FARC to solidify their position in Colombia.

The violence levied against the UP and their supporters was so drastic that in

1987 the FARC saw themselves forced to renounce the UP party returning to

armed struggle against the Colombian government.97

The UP was going to represent the left in the country during the late

1980’s election cycles. In 1986, they won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy

positions in different assemblies, 9 congressional seats, 6 senators seats, and

4.6% of the presidential vote.98 These results were greater than any other leftist

party in Colombia, and more than any other third party in its history. The UP

wanted to represent the hopes of the people and the needs of the poor. These

desires were also synonymous with those of the FARC, which was why it was so

fitting that the FARC co-founded the organization. The UP’s goals were to fight

for land redistribution, better health care, educational improvements for the

poor, and the nationalization of businesses, banks and transportation99. These

desires to represent the people however were never offered to the UP as the Uribe

administration never followed through on its promises to help protect the party’s

leaders from governmental sponsored paramilitary groups.100

97Gomez,643.98Freeman,E.,Daniel,“PatrioticUnion”ColombianReports,January13,201499Ibid100Ibid

41

Key LatinoBarómetro Data for Colombian Democracy:

Democracy in Colombia has been severally affected by the actions of the

federal government against the FARC and the UP. The lack of democratic

legitimacy within the Colombian government as well as the lack of variety in

politcal parties is due in most part to state sponsored violence committed against

the UP. The current state of democracy in Colombia is in shambles. The

Colombian general populace has generally lost faith in the system, and the

following LatinoBarómetro data helps prove this claim.

In a 2013 poll 34.5% of the populace surveyed said that they wouldn’t vote

while another 6.4% said that they would submit blank ballots. In addition to this

data the overall satisfaction with democracy in 2013 was staggeringly low. In the

LatinoBarómetro poll of satisfaction only 4.1% of those polled responded as

saying that they are happy with the state of democracy. Currently some 49.35% of

those polled they are not very satisfied with the democratic institution in place.

Additionally, only around some 1.5% of the population believe that there is a

democratic process in place with some 48.6% saying that the government is

currently a democracy but that it has major problems. Another interesting piece

of data that LatinoBarómetro provides regarding current beliefs about democracy

in Colombia are the polls endorsing a one party system. In the 2013 polls for

Colombia of those interviewed who don’t feel that the one party system is the

most effective approach to governance. Only 25.1% agree or strongly agree with

the idea of a one party system while the other 74.9% of those polled believe that

there should be a multiple party system in place.

42

These two data sets support the case for the inclusion of the FARC in the

political structure go back to 1985. The people of Colombia clearly feel that the

democratic system is not working and that the parties that are in place aren’t

representing their needs as a society. The FARC, in their recent round of

negotiations with the Colombian state have asked for something similar to

Uruguay, when the Tupamaros became a political party. In their negotiations

with the Colombian government they sought to bring about a self-critique to try

and reform the state model. In 2013, Colombia Reports published a piece in 2013

regarding the response of one of the leaders of the FARC to a political controversy

regarding corruption in the armed forces. The current leader, Timoleon Jiménez,

directly addressed the letter to the current Colombian president Juan Manuel

Santos saying the following,

Se puede leer en las noticias. El modelo de imposiciones e intolerancias se ha agotado. La democracia colombiana, por encima de los discursos, es una vergüenza, Santos. Vamos a cambiarla.101

Roughly translated Jiménez is saying that one can see in the news that the

government is exhausted and that it is shame. I think that the idea of a complete

reform of the government is a valid one. When examining the effect of the

organizational review that the Tupamaros underwent, and their subsequent

success, this review could be of use for Colombia. The commitment to an internal

review would lead to very positive democratic results in Colombia and possibly

resolve the issues currently facing democracy within the country.

101"TimochenkoleenviócartaalpresidenteSantosrechazandolademocraciacolombiana”ColombianoJuly9th,2013

43

Colombia’s Conflict and Peace Process:

The war between the FARC and the government has claimed around

220,000 lives and 6.7 million people have been labeled as victims of the war

between the government, paramilitaries, and the guerillas.102 The reform of the

UP and the ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the FARC

are reassuring for the future. The negotiations began in 2013 and a the

LatinoBarómetro survey regarding people’s belief’s for democracy in ten years

showed a remarkable increase as previously described.

The general sense of all those in Colombia is that the future for the country

still lies with democratization. This claim is supported by a LatinoBarómetro

survey where 52.3% of Colombian’s believe that democracy is the preferable

system of governance. In this poll, only 12.7% said that they would prefer an

authoritative form of governance to democracy. LatinoBarómetro also has

surveys that show that the people believe that the future for democracy is bright.

The current polls reflecting the scale of democratization of Colombia show that

only 10.1% of Colombians feel that the government is completely democratic.

LatinoBarómetro also takes polls for where the people think that democracy is

going to be in ten years from now and the results from the 2013 survey were

interesting. Some 63.4% of those polled believe that in 10 years the state will be

completely democratic with only 1.4% believing that the state will be

undemocratic. This data is encouraging as recent news described the UP party as

attempting to return to the political arena in Colombia. They also refuse to call

102Aldwinckle,Jack,“HowColombiaplanstoturn32,000ex-jungle-dwellingguerrillasintousefulmembersofsociety”Quartz,May31,2015

44

themselves communists or Marxists but seek to gain the trust of millions of

impoverished people on the fringes of the country.103

The relationship that has developed between the FARC and the political

institutions of the Colombia government is extensive historically speaking. With

these negotiations underway, the process trying to stabilize Colombia can begin.

As such it is important to note that the FARC, through the UP, began as an

organization that sought political change through peaceful means. The

government used this to its advantage and invited them into the political process,

just to slaughter their candidates. This politicide was a negative turning point

that led to genocide. Colombia is now ready to move on past this period of

violence to reform their political process. The current negotiations between the

FARC and the Santos government are healthy and should lead to a positive

change in the overall democratic transition of Colombian politics.

The current negotiations currently with the FARC are still progressing and

are promising. They have reached several stalling points but they are seeking to

try and reach a point where the two can agree on issues as wide and varying as

land reform, governmental reform, drug trafficking, etc.104 The war that has been

waged between the government and the FARC is one that needs to end in order

for democracy to flourish in Colombia. If the two sides can reach an agreement

like that of the MLN-T and the Uruguayan government then the outcome would

be very productive for both sides.

103Freeman,E.,Daniel,“PatrioticUnion”ColombianReports,January13,2014104Neuman,William“Killingof10soldiersdealsasetbacktotheColombianpeacetalkswiththeFARCrebels”TheNewYorkTimes,April15,2015

45

Conclusion:

The UP party that the FARC co-sponsored is now fighting for it’s very

survival. How can we justify or explain this outcome for each guerilla movement?

In Racheal Rudolph’s From Terrorism to Politics, she says

These murders radicalized FARC, which felt legitimized in its actions: FARC officially interpreted the UP’s extermination as a sign of the government’s intolerance and of the impossibility of legal political action in Colombia. A serious chance, such as that witnessed in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, was therefore lost.105

The FARC began, as an organization that sought democratic reconciliation

through a political participation in Colombia but the Uribe organization didn’t

accept that they were an honest player. The previous quote is particularly

interesting because it reveals the frustration of not being able to reach a peaceful

agreement as what occurred in Ireland with the IRA and in Lebanon with

Hezbollah.106 While the other examples here, in both Lebanon and Ireland had

didn’t partake in the narcotrafficking, the political frustrations regarding

representation are similar.

The resulting ceasefire merely forced the FARC to prolong its battle

against the government and becoming even more violent. In the

LatinoBarómetro surveys the percentage of people who say that guerilla

movements are a crucial issue, these polls are very high but they have gone down

significantly over the last decade. From 2001-2003 for example the number of

105Engeland, Anisseh Van, and Rachael M. Rudolph. "Failed Attempts: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (FARC) and the Union Patriotica (UP)." In From Terrorism to Politics. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.106Ibid

46

people that said the guerillas and their armed insurrection were the major issues

facing the country was high 40.5%. Whereas in 2008 that number dropped

significantly to 16.6% and in 2013 it was down to 12.4%.

The violence experienced in the aftermath of the failed integration of the

FARC-UP coalition was extensive and devastating. As was previously mentioned

Colombia is a country where political development is in a state of disarray and

one of the major issues that they are contending with is guerilla and paramilitary

violence. If one relies on the surveys taken by third parties, like LatinoBarómetro,

using methods described by Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbel Pérez

Liñán then several key aspects are going to be missing. In their own words they

define democracy as,

We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really govern and the military is under civilian control.107

These categories are useful when examining countries with established and

secure democracies, but when evaluating a situation like Colombia they are not

adequate. This is not to say that democracy is non-existent in Colombia, but

rather that there are discrepancies within the strength of democracy being high.

The system is in disarray because democratic values do not extend past the major

cities where the federal government can oversee the democratic process. The

government of Colombia must seek to extend the parameters of democracy past 107Munck,GerardoL.,ed.RegimesandDemocracyinLatinAmerica:TheoriesandMethods.Oxford,GBR:OxfordUniversityPress,UK,2007.ProQuestebrary.Web.9June2015.

47

the major metropolises and into the countryside. The issue that has violently

erupted looks to develop democracy, involves the war that the government and

the FARC are waging that puts all citizens in serious danger.

The issue of controlling the FARC, Colombian government, and

paramilitary violence through the ongoing war that the government is waging is

of the utmost importance to spread democratization across Colombia. In order to

try and negotiate with the FARC, the Santos administration is having to deal with

the outcome of forcing more guerilla warfare. They are effectively demobilizing

an army, and trying to reintegrate them back into society. The current

negotiations are hitting several reported “road-blocks” including narcotrafficking,

land-redistribution, and political representation or a political change of some

kind. These negotiations are crucial for the advancement of democracy in

Colombia and will allow for the country to constructively on raising the quality of

institutions while maximizing the effectiveness of the participatory process.

If Colombia had allowed the FARC to take an active role in the democratic

structure of the country, then the shape of democracy today might be completely

different. The exclusiveness of the Colombian political system is one of the major

reasons for the continued violence within the nation. If the political system was

allowed to be open, like that of Uruguay, then the FARC would not need to

continue guerilla warfare. The most significant aspect related to this is that the

negotiations between the government and the FARC haven’t broken down yet

and the peace progress is continuing. The inclusion of the FARC and other

movements is crucial to developing a healthy democracy.

48

ChapterFour:ElSalvador’sFMLN

HistoryoftheFMLN:

TheformationoftheFarabundoMartíNationalLiberationFront(FMLN),

whichwasformallyannouncedonOctober10th,1980,wastheresultofalong

processofnegotiationsthatwereheldinCubabetweendifferentleftistgroupsfrom

ElSalvador.Thefivegroups,whichincludedtheFuerzasPopularesdeLiberación

FarabundoMartí(FPL),ThePeople’sRevolutionaryArmy(ERP),TheResistencia

Nacional(RN),ThePartidoComunistaSalvadoreño(PCS),andthePartido

RevolucionariodelosTrbajadoresCentroamericanos(PRTC).108Thenegotiations

heldinCubatriedtosortoutthepoliticaldifferencesthesegroupsattemptedtoiron

throughoutthe1970’sduringtheirdevelopment.Thepoliticaldifferences,which

includedconflictsoverguerillastrategiesaswellascompetingpoliticalinterests,

themostimportantinvolvingpeasantsupportinElSalvador,hadtoberesolved

beforetheFMLNcouldbeformedintoaviablepoliticalparty.109

TheguerillamovementinElSalvadorbeganinthe1970’sasanoffshootof

theCommunistpart.Duringthisitwasdividedovertheissueofwhatapproach

wouldreapthemostsuccess;1)armedinsurgencyor2)engageElSalvador’s

politicalsystem.Thedissentingvoiceswithinthemovementhoweversoughtto

enternegotiationsfollowingtheSandinistasdefeatoftheAnastacioSomoza

108MacClintock,Cynthia.RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica:ElSalvador'sFMLNPeru'sShiningPath.Washington(D.C.):UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,1998.68.109Oñate,Andrea."TheRedAffair:FMLN–CubanrelationsduringtheSalvadoranCivilWar,1981–92."ColdWarHistory11,no.2(April15,2011):137.

49

dictatorshipinNicaragua.ThestrengthoftheSandinistascamethroughthe

unificationofvariousdissentingguerillamovementsintooneorganizedfront

againsttheSomozadictatorship.110ThetriumphofSandinistasinNicaragua

inspiredagreatdealoffearwithinthegovernmentofElSalvador,andencouraged

themtofullyendorseaviolentpolicytodestroypoliticalresistance.111

TheviolencethattheguerillagroupsenduredledtotheFMLNconference

heldinHavana,Cuba,foranaccordamongstthelargerguerillagroupsfightinginEl

Salvador.TheaccomplishmentofthesenegotiationsallowedtheFMLNtoreleasea

statementregardingtheobjectivesofthemovementandwhattheywerefighting

for.TheFMLNandtheirleaderswerefightingagainstthegovernmenttocreatea

socialdemocracyinElSalvadorandtocontesttheauthoritarianregime.112Joaquín

Villalobos,oneofthemainleadersoftheFMLN,explainstheirposition,

TheFMLNisstrugglingforagovernmentoffullparticipation,withrepresentationfromallthedemocraticpoliticalforces,includingofcoursetheFMLN-FDR….TheFMLNmaintainsthatagovernmentoffullparticipationshouldguaranteefreedomofexpressionandorganization,respectforHumanRights,andtrulyfreeelectionswithparticipationbyallpartiesandforces113.

TheFMLNmerelysoughtdemocraticstabilityandagovernmentthatreflectedthe

demandsofthepeople.Thegovernmenthoweverfeltthatthegroupwasseekingto

enforceaMarxist-Leninistideologyforthenation.

Withthisinmind,theFMLNleadershipsoughttopersuadetheElSalvadoran

110Oñate,“TheRedAffair”138.111Oñate,138.112MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,56.113MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,58.

50

middleclassthatthegroupwasnotseekingtocreateasocialiststateinElSalvador,

butonlysoughttochangethepoliticalrealityofthecountry.Anotherleaderofthe

FMLN,CayetanoCarpio,whowasleaderoftheFPLuntil1983,wasperceivedtobe

oneofthemovementsmostprofoundMarxists-Leninists,whodescribedthegroup’s

efforts,

Therevolutionarygovernment…willnotbesocialist….Therevolutionarydemocraticgovernmentwillsupportallprivatebusinessmen,thesmallindustrialistsandmerchants,andallofthosewhopromotethedevelopmentofthecountryandtheapplicationofarevolutionarydemocraticprogram.114

TheFMLNwantedtooverhaulthegovernmentandfollowinthefootstepsofthe

CubanRevolution.Thiseffort,whichhadtheprimeopportunitytorealizethe

ambitionsofleadingthecountryfromarevolutionaryplatformfailedtocapitalize

onthemomentduetothecontinuationofinfightingwithintheFMLNafterthe

negotiationsended.

Thisfailuretograsptheopportunityofaweakenedgovernmentmaterialized

throughthepoorlyorganized“FinalOffensive”in1981,whichwasmeanttobea

broadsweepingmovementagainstthenationalmilitary.TheFMLNproposedplan

wasamulti-facetedassaultontwo-thirdsofElSalvador’smilitarygarrisons.The

timingwasidealforthegroupbecauseGeneralCarlosRomerowasinavery

unstablepoliticalpositionandlackedthesupportofwealthylocalelitesandtheU.S.

Theeventualfailureofthe“FinalOffensive”wasduetodissentamongstthefive

groupsthatmadeuptheFMLNcoalition,specificallytheRNandERP,whorefused

114MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,57.

51

tocommittotheaction.115Thefailureofthe“FinalOffensive”wouldsetbackthe

FMLNadecadebeforetheysawtheireffortsmaterializeintopolitical

representation.Effortstoendauthoritarianismbecamemuchmorecomplicated

followingtheelectionofRonaldReaganin1980andtherenewedcommitmentto

anti-communistinterventionasapolicyinCentralAmerica.

U.S.InvolvementinElSalvador:

ThroughoutLatinAmerica,especiallyduringthe20thcentury,theinfluence

oftheU.S.governmentcanunmistakablybeseen.ElSalvadorwasnoexceptionas

increasedsupporttothemilitaryregimewassynonymouswiththeriseoftheFMLN

inElSalvador.Theseinteractionsweremostnoticeableintherealmoffinancialand

militaryassistancebytheU.S.government.In1979,theU.S.gaveElSalvador11

milliondollarsoffinancialsupport,by1980thisjumpedto64milliondollars.From

1980onwardstheamountoffinancialsupportthattheU.S.providedtoElSalvador

continuedtorise,andin1987thetotalroseto574millionsdollarsworthof

support.Theincreasedassistancecanbeplacedinperspectivebyexaminingthe

percentageofsupportElSalvadorreceived,incomparisonwithotherLatin

Americannations.AswaspreviouslynotedtheU.S.hititsaidpeakin1987,at574

milliondollars,thislevelofsupportrepresented30%ofthetotalU.S.aidtoLatin

America,whichisimpressiveseeingasElSalvadoronlyhas5millioncitizens.116

ThetypeofaidthattheU.S.providedisimportanttounderstandwhen

115MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,57.116MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,221-222.

52

examiningtheFMLNasthemajorityoftheaidwasusedtodeveloptheEl

Salvadoranmilitary.From1980to1989theU.S.providedElSalvadoraround$1

billioninfinancialsupportfortheirmilitary.Specifically,in1984,thehighestyearof

aidduringthisperiod,theU.S.provided194milliondollarsformilitarysupport,

representingmorethanhalfoftheU.S.totalmilitaryaidinLatinAmerica.This

informationisrelevantbecause,whenexaminingthesizeofthearmedforcesin

comparisontotheFMLN,in1979theratiowas1.5militaryofficialstoeveryguerilla

fighter.Thisratiowouldrisebytheendofthe1980’stoaratioof8soldiersto1

guerilla.117

Thismilitaryaidwasdesignedtohelptheregimeinitseffortstoendthe

FMLNandtheirterroristactivitiesthroughoutElSalvador.TheaidprovidedtheU.S.

anopportunitytoapplypressuretotheElSalvadorangovernmentregardingtheir

electionssystemandhumanrightsviolations.TheU.S.,whilebeingafraidoftherise

ofthecommunismthroughoutLatinAmerica,werealsoconcernedabouttheuseof

theiraidforthesupportofdeathsquads.TheU.S.becameheavilyinvolvedinEl

Salvadoranpolitics,makingitverycleartogovernmentofficialsthatshouldhuman

rightsviolationscontinuetooccurU.S.aidwoulddramaticallydecline.This

realizationmotivatedthegovernmenttosupportcandidatesthattheU.S.backedas

apositiveexampleofU.S.aidtoElSalvador.118

TheU.S.believedthesuccessoftheelectionsinElSalvador,in1982,wasa

positivesignthatthecountrywasmovingtowardsasuperficialdemocraticprocess117MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,228-229.118MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,225.

53

andthattheFMLNlackedpopularsupportagainstthegovernment.Evenwiththis

attemptedtransitiontothePresidencyofÁlvaroMagaña,humanrightsviolations

persistedandtheFMLNcontinuedtogrowinstrength.Ascontinuingpoliticalstrife

ledtotheU.S.CongresstoseverallycurtailthemilitaryaidthatPresidentReagan

providedtoElSalvador.Intheelectionof1984,PresidentReaganandVice

PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushmadeitapparenttoElSalvadoranpoliticiansthat

humanrightsanddemocratizationhadtoimprovefortheU.S.tocontinueto

provideresourcestocombattheFMLN.The1984electionmarkedagreatsuccessas

theelectionwasperceivedassuccessfulandclean,andJoséDuarte,whowasthe

U.S.’sfavoritecandidate,wontheelection.119

Duarte’sadministrationhoweverfacedgreatdifficultiesincombatingthe

FMLN,whileattemptingtospreaddemocraticidealstotheElSalvadoranpeople.

Moreover,peopledesiredsocialreforms,butDuarte’sU.S.backedfreemarket

policiesmadethedevelopmentofeffectivesocialreformsextremelydifficult.

Duarte,whowonasacandidatefortheChristianDemocraticParty,received1-3

milliondollarsincovertfundsfromtheCIAin1984.120Theequivalentpercapitato

50-100millionforaU.S.electionandlosttherespectfromtheElSalvadoranpeople.

Intheelectionsof1989,DuarteandtheChristianDemocraticPartylostthe

presidencytoARENA(AlianzaRepublicanaNacionalista).Withthevictoryof

ARENA’sAlfredoCristiani,andofGeorgeH.W.Bushin1989,policyregardingthe

FMLNdramaticallychangedaspoliticalviolenceincreased.ThroughoutElSalvador

119MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,225-227.120MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,226.

54

changesinthisstrategyreflectedadesirebyboththeU.S.andElSalvadortoseeka

negotiatedsettlementwiththeFMLNratherthanusemilitaryforcetodefeatthe

guerillas.121

ThePeaceProcessandIntegrationoftheFMLN:

ThewarbetweentheFMLNandthegovernmentcametoaheadin1989

whentheguerillaslaunchedafinaloffensiveagainsttheU.S.backedmilitaryregime.

AfterafailedseriesofnegotiationswiththerecentlyPresident-electAlfredo

CristianifollowingadeathsquadattackontheFederaciónNacionalSindicalde

Trabajadores,thelargestlabortradefederationinElSalvador,theFMLNrevertedto

afullonassault.Thisapproach,wasswiftwithaseriesofconflictsbetweenthe

guerillasandgovernment’sforces,whichonlyservedtoshowthatthegovernment

wasn’tcapableofdefeatingtheguerillasincombat.Thislevelofpoliticalviolence,

whichtheconflicthadgenerated,ledtoaninternationalintervention,wherethe

U.N.SecurityCouncilandPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush’sadministrationcalledfor

peacebetweentheguerillasandthegovernment.122

TheFMLNoffensivelaunchedduringthatyearwouldeffectivelyhaltthe

counterterrorismeffortsofthegovernment.Withthesupportoftheinternational

communityandtheimpressivemannerwithwhichtheFMLNhadcombattedthe

governmentgavethemaseriousadvantageduringpeacenegotiationsin1990.The

conditionsforpeacetheFMLNpresentedtothegovernmentinvolvedreformingthe

securitysector,endingimpunity,andmajorpoliticalreforms.Whilethenegotiations121MacClintock,RevolutionarymovementsinLatinAmerica,226-227.122Chávez,JoaquínM."HowDidtheCivilWarinElSalvadorEnd?"AmericanHistoricalReview,December2015,1790-91.

55

failedtoprovideextensivemilitaryreforms,theamnestyreformstheywonwere

lateroverturnedbyARENAin1993.TheFMLNhoweverdidgetmanyofthe

politicalreformstheyhadsought.OnJanuary16th1992theFMLNandPresident

CristianisignedapeaceaccordatChapultepecCastleinMexicoCity.123

TheoutcomeofthesenegotiationswasthattheFMLNwentfrombeinga

potentarmedpoliticalmovementtoamajorpoliticalactorinthenewElSalvadoran

neoliberaldemocracy.ThispeaceprocesswasmadedifficultasboththeFMLNand

thegovernmentviolatedtheagreeduponpeaceaccords.TheFMLN,whichagreedto

handinalltheirweapons,remainedarmedbystoringcachesofweaponsin

Nicaragua,Guatemala,andHonduras.Mostnotably,inNicaraguaoneexploded

promptingthesurrenderingofseveralcachesindifferentcountries.LiketheFMLN,

theCristianigovernmentalsostruggledtocomplywiththeagreementsofthepeace

accords.Thefailureofthepeaceprocesstooktheformofstateagentsandright

wingextremistsengagingintheassassinationsofFMLNleadersandsocialactivists

atthesametimemaintainingparamilitarydeathsquadsbymerelychangingtheir

names.124

Aftersettlingthepeaceaccordviolations,theFMLNfinallydemobilizedits

guerillaforceandformallyenteredintoElSalvador’spoliticalprocess.Withthisin

mindthe,FMLNsoughttohaveapoliticalapparatusinplacetosupporttheparty’s

participationinthepresidential,municipal,andparliamentaryelectionsof1994.In

orderforthemovementtobeabletoachievethislevelofpoliticalsophistication

theytrainedtheirmembersinactivitiesrelatedtopoliticalactivismandelectoral123Chávez,1792-93.124Chávez,1794.

56

politics.Withthistransitioncamenewdifficulties,in1994whentheFMLNformally

dissolvedthefivedifferentpartiesmakinguptheguerillacoalitionalldifferedinthe

politicaldirectionwiththeFMLNmovement.Thesedifferencesinitiallytookthe

formofthePD,whichwasmadeupoftheRNandtheERP,whichwouldeventually

developintoaninternalpoliticalconflictfortheleftofElSalvador.125

FMLN’sPoliticalSuccessesandDifficulties:

ThedissentionofthemovementanddepartureoftheERPandRNfromthe

FMLNin1994wastheresultofdecisiontochangetoa9outof15majorityforthe

party’sdecision-makingprocess.Thedevelopmentofa60percentthresholdledto

theERPandRNbeingeffectivelyphasedoutbytheFPL,FAL,andPRTCduringthe

presidentialprimaryforthe1994election.Duringtheseelections,theFMLN

candidate,RubénZamora,wouldlosetoARENA’sArmandoCalderónSolinaclose

runoff.Inadditiontothislossatthepresidentiallevel,theFMLNaccrued21ofthe

available84seatsintheNationalassembly,makingitthesecondlargestpartyto

ARENA,butnotaffirmingtheirstrengthasapoliticalmovement.126

Followingarestructuringofthemovement,bymakingiteasierforthe

politicalpartytoallowpeopletojointheFMLNandnothavetoseekindividual

groupstotryandseekentryintotheparty.Thisreconstructionhelpedsolidifythe

FMLNasoneheterogeneouspoliticalpartyandallowedthemtoexperiencemore

successduringthefollowingelectioncyclein1997.Thiselectioncycle,whichwas

125Chávez,JoaquínM."HowDidtheCivilWarinElSalvadorEnd?"1795.126Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez."UnityandDisunityintheFMLN."LatinAmericanPoliticsandSociety54,no.4(2012):99-100.

57

thefirstonewherethePDwasanactivecompetitortotheFMLN,markedan

increaseinpoliticalrepresentationfortheFMLN.Whosawanincreasedinnumber

ofNationalAssemblyseatsfrom21to27,anda15-35increaseinmayors,gaining

politicalcontrolofcapitalofSanSalvador.127

TheseadvancesmarkedtheFMLNsuccessfullysurvivingthedefectionofthe

ERPandtheRNfromtheirparty,asthePDonlymanagedtoattain1percentofthe

popularvotefortheircandidatesin1997.Differenceswithinthepartycontinued

withthepresidentialelectionof1999,wheretheFMLNstruggledtoselecta

presidentialcandidate.Aftermuchinternaldebate,theydecidedonFacundo

GuardadoandNidiaDíazasthevicepresidentfortheirpresidentialticket.Thisled

toanunsuccessfulFMLNprimary,astheyonlycaptured30percentofthepopular

voteandlostonceagaintotheARENAcandidateFranciscoFlores.128

Followingthisdefeattheparty,itwasstillabletoincreaseitspresenceinthe

legislativeandmunicipalelectionsof2000,overcomingARENAintheNational

assemblyforatotalof31to29seatsinthenationalassembly.Thisvictorymarked

thefirsttimesince1989thatARENAhadnotheldthemajorityofseatsinthe

nationalassembly.Thefollowingelectionsof2002-2003theFMLNalsoachieved

greatsuccessmaintainingtheirleadagainstARENAinthelegislativeblocby

significantlyovertakingtheminopinionpollsforthepresidentialelectionin2004.

However,followingthelegislativeelectioncycletheFMLNonceagainfacedgreat

internalstrifeandtheselectionofapresidentialcandidatedividedtheentire127Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez.104.128Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez.106.

58

movement.ThecandidatethattheFMLNputforwardforthe2004presidential

electionwasSchafikHandal,whowaswellreceivedbythemajorityofFMLN

members,butfacedstiffdisapprovalfromthegeneralpublic.Handalwasperceived

asamemberoftheoldgenerationoftheFMLN.AstheARENAcandidate,Elías

AntonioSaca,representedanewandmoremodernapproachtoleadershipwitha

moreconstructiveimage.Saca’sdesirestoimprovetheirrelationsandoutreachto

thepopulationwonARENAtheelection,withHandalonlyreceiving36percentof

thevote.129

ThisdefeatforcedtheFMLNtocreateaunifiedvisionfortheirpoliticalparty.

Thisagreeduponposition,fromwhichtheywouldseektocommunicatetheir

desiresforthecountry,wasaMarxist-Leninistplatform.Thiscohesiondidnot

reflectwellinthe2006electionperiod,wheretheydidnotmakemuchpolitical

headway,buttheunitedvisionofthepartywouldassisttheminfuture.Themost

importantofwhichwouldbecomethePresidentialelectionof2009.130

OnSeptember11,2007,theFMLNannouncedthattheirpresidentialticket

wouldincludeMauricioFunesrunningforpresidentandSánchezCerénashisvice

presidentcandidate.TheselectionofFuneswasimportanttosuccessofthe2009

campaign,duetohisabilitytogainmorecentristvotesfortheFMLN.Funeswasa

journalistandnotamemberoftheFMLN,buthadexpressedgreatinterestin

runningwiththeFMLNpartysince2004.WiththedeathofHandalin2006while

returningfromEvoMorales’sinauguration,andthepoliticalunificationofthe129Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez.107-108.130Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez.109.

59

socialistleftoftheFMLNFuneswastheidealcandidatefortheparty.Inthe2009

electionFunes,withtheFMLNsupportandcentristvoters,wonthepresidential

electionagainstARENA’sRodrigoAvilabyafewpoints,51.3to48.7.131

ThiselectionmarkedthefirsttimethatacandidatefromtheFMLNhadbeen

electedtothepresidency,butwithitcameadifficultperiodforthedirectionofthe

party.DuringthepresidencyofFunestherewasadisagreementbetweentheFMLN

andFunesovertheirrespectivedomesticpoliciesandFunes’seffortstobuildhis

ownimageasaleader.FunesoperatedinanindependentnaturebecauseinEl

Salvadorthereisaconstitutionallawinplacethatdoesn’tallowcandidatestorun

twiceinarowforpresidencythroughthesamegroup.132ThislawledtheFMLNto

selectadifferentcandidateforthe2014presidentialelection,theformerVice

President,SánchezCerén.

Cerén’scandidacyfortheFMLNsignaledareturnoftheguerillapresence

becauseofhisstatusasacommanderintheFMLN’sguerillamovementduringthe

revolution.Cerénhoweversoughttoappeaseconcernsthathewouldseekto

replicateHúgoChávezpopulistpolicies,byaffirmingthathewantedtoposition

himselfmoretothecenterandtoreplicateJoséMujicaofUruguay.The2014

presidentialelectionbetweenCerénandtheconservativeNormanQuijanowasa

tightlycontestedracewithCerénnarrowlywinning.Hewonwithalittleover6,000

votesandhiselectionledtomanyaccusationsofpoliticalcorruption,whichled

ARENAtoinitiateseverallegalcasestocontesthiselection.Theresultwasthat131Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez.110-111.132Allison,MichaelE.,andAlbertoMartínAlvarez.112.

60

Cerénwontheelection,buttheaftermathofthecloseracecausedthepublicto

doubtthelegitimacyofdemocracy,leavingascarontheelectoralprocessinEl

Salvador.133

DataexaminingthereceptionofDemocracyinElSalvador:

WhenexaminingdataforElSalvador,recordedbyLatinoBarómetro,there

areseveraldifferentpointsthatstandoutasinterestingregardingtheFMLN,and

democracyinElSalvador.Thefirstisthedatasurroundingcitizen’spolitical

allegiancestodifferentindividualparties.Thepollaskedifyouhadtovotethis

Sundayforapoliticalparty,whowouldyousupport.In1996,whichwaswhenthe

FMLNwasallowedtoformasapoliticalparty,only7.4%ofthosepolledsaidthe

FMLNwouldhavetheirsupport,while19.9%saidARENA.Thisdatawastobe

expected,butthehighestgroup,28.9%,werethosewhosaidthattheywouldnot

voteatall,whichisinterestingwhenviewingthegrowthoftheFMLN.

Inadditiontothisvoterinformation,LatinoBarómetroalsopolledcitizens

regardingtheirperceptionofpoliticsinthecountryduring1996.Thetopthree

beliefs,whichcumulativelyequaled61.8%ofthetotalpopulationsample,were

indifference,distrustandboredom,inthatorder.Thedatawouldcontinuetoreflect

thisbeliefinthe2002-2003electionswiththecombinedtotaloftheFMLNand

133Partlow,Joshua."FormerguerrillawinspresidentialvoteinElSalvador."TheWashingtonPost.March14,2014.AccessedMarch08,2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/former-guerrilla-commander-wins-el-salvador-presidential-election/2014/03/14/ddaa0dda-b77c-4f33-bb2d-225330c3745a_story.html?utm_term=.e6ddc349877d.

61

ARENAequatingto36.6%andthosenotvotingequaling34.9%.Thesedatapoints

areparticularlyinterestingbecausetheyindicatethatthevoterpopulationstill

didn’tfeelrepresentedbyeitherpoliticalparty.Thesetrendshoweverwouldtake

onadifferentforminthepresidentialelectionsof2009.Thiscycle,aswasnoted

previously,wasthefirsttimeaFMLNcandidatewaselectedtobecomethe

presidentofthecountry.

ThedatatrendsfrompollsdonebyLatinoBarómetroin2009representeda

positivetransitionfordemocracywithinElSalvador.Onesuchpoll,inresponsetoa

questionregardingthepoweroftheindividual’svote,andthechangeitcancause,

showedthat76.4%felttheirvotemattered,while19.6%feltthattheirvotedidn’t.

Thispollmarkedadramaticimprovementtothesamepolltakenin1996,atthe

beginningoftheFMLNparticipatinginElSalvador’spoliticalsystem,where45.6%

ofthesamplefeltthattheirvoteheldnosignificanceforthefuture.Additionally,the

overallsatisfactionwithdemocracyincreasedfrom1996to2009.In199640.6%

feltunsatisfiedwithdemocracy,and26.8%werenotsatisfiedatall.Thesenumbers

weregreatlyreducedinthe2009poll,with42.3%claimingtobesatisfiedand

17.8%beingverysatisfied,andonly26%feltunsatisfiedand10.1%feltvery

unsatisfied.

InadditiontothesepoliticalimprovementsintheperceptionofElSalvador

becomingademocracyduringtheriseoftheFMLN,wasthechangingperception

regardingtheriggingofelections.WhenLatinoBarómetropolledElSalvadorin

1997aresounding54.2%ofthosepolledfeltthattheelectionsatthetimewere

62

rigged,whileonly36.9%felttheywereclean.Thesedatapointswouldlookvastly

differentwhenthesamepollwasaskedin2009.Theresultofthatpollwashow

62.3%ofvotersfeltthattheelectionswerecleanandonly25.4%ofthoseaskedin

thepollfeltthattheelectionssystemwasrigged.Thesepollsshowthat

democratizationinElSalvador,whichincludedtheFMLN,wasmovinginapositive

direction.Apositivedirectionthatwouldfaceaseriouschallengeinthemostrecent

2015pollsregardingthedevelopmentofdemocraticinstitutions.

Whilethedatafrom1996-2009showedanupwardtrajectoryfordemocracy,

thedatafollowingtheelectionof2014,andthecontroversythatsurroundedthe

results,reversedtheprogressthathadbeenmadewiththeSalvadoranvoters.The

dataregardingthemostrecentpresidentialraceshowthat39.6%ofthesamplefelt

itwasfraudulentand10.9%thoughtitwasveryfraudulent.Thisdatacanbeusedto

understandotherpollsregardingdemocracy,andhowsupportandsatisfactionfor

democracywererecordedattheirlowestpointssince2007.Withthesepointsbeing

acknowledgednotallthedatafordemocratictrendsinElSalvadorarenegative.

Thepollsregardingsupportforademocraticsystemofgovernmentwere

stillpositive,with48.8%believingthatitwasthebestand11.5%incliningstrongly

thatitisthebestsystemforgovernance.Inaddition,whenpolledabouttheimpact

thattheyfelttheirvotecouldprovidethefeedbackwaspositive.Theresultwasthat

54.1%ofthosepolledfeltthattheirvotewouldinfluencethefuture,andthe

structureofthegovernment,with37.9%sayingthattheydidn’tfeeltheirvote

wouldsecureanychangeingovernment.Thesetwotrendsrepresentpositive

63

perspectivesondemocracyinElSalvadortoday,andforthedemocraticstructure

movingforward.

Conclusion:

TheoveralleffortsofFMLN,likethoseoftheMLN-TinUruguay,havecreated

apositiveenvironmentfordemocracyinElSalvador,andimprovingpolitical

participationinthedemocraticprocesshasbeencrucialtothisdevelopment.The

FMLN’seffortssincetheyinitiallybrokefromthecommunistpartyinthe1970’sto

takeuparmsagainstthefailingElSalvadorangovernmenthavebeencrucialtothe

evolutionofdemocracy.TheFMLNresistednotonlythemilitaryregime,butalso

againstthefinancialaidandsupportprovidedbytheU.S.throughouttheconflict.

TheFMLNfoughtagainsttheseforcestosecureapositioninthegovernmentthat

meantsomethingandcouldprovidemeaningfulchange.

Uponsecuringapeaceagreementin1992,whichsawtheirvisionrealized,

theybegantheprocessofintegratingthemselvesintothedemocraticstructureofEl

Salvador.In1994,theFMLNwouldputtogetheritsfirstcandidatesintheelections

forlocalseatsthroughoutthecountry.TheFMLNthenbeganexperiencingsuccess

duringtheseandsubsequentelectionsthroughoutthefollowingtenyears.Building

offtheseelectoralsuccessestheFMLNlaunchedasuccessfulpresidentialcampaign

in2009withMauricioFunes.TheFMLNwouldfollowthissuccesswiththeelection

ofSánchezCerén,inthe2014presidentialelection,whoholdsofficecurrently.

WhenexaminingthepoliticalenvironmentofElSalvadoritisimpossibleto

64

ignoretheimpactoftheFMLN.Itwasaguerillamovementthatwentfrombeingan

anti-systemicmovementbytakinguparmsagainstpoliticalcorruption,tobecoming

anactivepartywithindemocracyseekingtoalterthegovernment.Throughtheir

efforts,theysawtheirpoliticalambitionsrealizedandchangedthesystemtoallow

theirbeliefstoberepresentedinElSalvador.TheFMLNprovidedlegitimacyto

democratizationinElSalvadorandsignaledthetransitionfromauthoritarian

politicstomulti-partydemocracy.ThefutureofElSalvador,andthesoundnessof

thegovernment’sinstitutions,isnowbeingguidednotonlybyARENAandEl

Salvadorianpolitician’sbutalsobytheFMLNguerillaswhooncefoughtforthis

formorrepresentativedemocracy.

65

Epilogue GuerillamovementsthroughoutLatinAmericahavewagedwarfordifferent

reasonsandinwidelyvaryingsituations.InthispaperIhaveevaluatedthree

differentguerillamovementstheFARC,MLN-T,andtheFMLN.Thesethreegroups

wereselectedbecause,unlikeothergroupsthroughoutLatinAmericanhistory,they

soughttotransitionintopolitics,ratherthantransformthementirely.Unlikethe

successfulrevolutionarymovementsofCubaandNicaragua,andtheunsuccessful

effortsofothergroups,theydidn’tseektotakeoverthegovernmentalsystemsthey

wereopposing.Theseguerillasrathersoughttobecomemembersofthepolitical

institutionsand,throughtheirarmedresistance,togainentrytothepolitical

institutionsoftheirrespectivecountries.

Whenexaminingthesegroups,itishelpfultogainsomeunderstandingof

guerillawarfareinaglobalsense,andhowothermovementshavebeen

internationalviewed.Tocomparewiththegroupsexaminedinthispaper,the

UmkhontoweSizwe(RK),whichwasthemilitantbranchoftheAfricanNational

Congress(ANC)inSouthAfricawasaninternationalmovementthatresortedto

violencetoattaintheirgoals.Likethemovementsthathavebeendescribedinthe

paper,theANC,apoliticalorganization,soughttobeapartofthegovernmentthat

hadnodesiretoincludetheminthesystem.Inthe1960’stheANCcreatedtheRK

branchoftheirmovement,whichwouldassumethemilitaryoperations.Through

theeffortsoftheANC,theRK,andinternationalsupport,theANCwasableto

66

participateintheSouthAfricanpoliticalsystem.134TheANCandtheRKarean

exampleofmovementsthatusedtheviolencethathasbecomeassociatedwith

guerillamovementsofLatinAmericatoattainpoliticalrepresentation.LiketheRK

thethreemovementsdescribedinthispaperweremovementsthatusedarmed

insurgencyasawayofattainingpoliticalrepresentationwithintheirowncountries.

TheTupamaros,anurbanguerillamovementthatsoughttoopposean

undemocraticandbrutaldictatorshipinUruguay,wereunabletoachievemilitary

successoranimmediatenegotiatedparticipation.TheTupamaros,andthosewho

soughtdemocratizationinUruguay,eventuallydefeatedthedictatorship,and

achievedtheirgoalofjoiningthepoliticalsystem.Theguerilla’sparticipationwould

havetowaituntildemocracywasrestoredinUruguay,buttheMLN-Tpartywould

eventuallyattainpoliticalsupportandwouldformallyenterastheFAcoalition.

TheirparticipationwouldseeJoséMujica,aformerMLN-Tguerillaleaderwhowas

torturedbythedictatorshipsurvivingtobecomethepresidentofthecountry.The

guerillaseffortswouldleadapoliticalcoalitionofpartiesthroughwhichtheywere

abletoexertdirectinfluenceoverthegovernment,andextendaccesstoallthe

politicallymarginalizedinUruguay.Thesuccessofthemovement,andthe

developmentofguerillaleadersshowstheabilityofnon-stateactorstotransition

andbecomeformalactorswithinthegovernment.

AswasthecasewithUruguay,ElSalvadorwasacountrythatwasrifewith

politicalmalpractice,andtheFMLNmovedtoarmedresistancetoattaina

134Lissoni,Arianna."TransformationsintheANCExternalMissionandUmkhontoWeSizwe,C.1960-1969."JournalofSouthernAfricanStudies

67

resolutiontoaddressthemilitaryregime.Thisrebellion,whichresembledthe

movementinSouthAfricainthattheFMLNhadapoliticalandmilitantbranch,

quicklydecidedtofollowarmedinsurrectiontoachievetheirpoliticalgoals.Aftera

longandbloodycivilwar,theFMLNandtheElSalvadorangovernmentreachedan

agreementthatsawtheFMLNgainpoliticalrepresentation.Thesuccessofthe

movement,andtheirabilitytotransitionfromaviolentactortoapoliticalactor,

showstheabilityoftheTupamarostobecomeformalpoliticalactors.

Thisideaofpoliticalinvolvementofnon-statearmedactorshasnotbeenthe

casewiththeFARCandColombia.TheidealsthattheFARCbeganwith,tocombata

corruptgovernmentalstructureandtoseektoenactchangedidnotlastforthe

durationofthemovement.WhenthegroupwasallowedtoformtheUPpolitical

party,theirinvolvementinthegovernmentwasacompletefailure.Thisresultedin

areturntoarmedresistancetocombatthecorruptionthathadbarredthemfrom

politicalparticipation.Followingthisbreakdownindirectpoliticalinvolvementthe

groupdivergedfromtheirinitialbeliefsandhaveonlyrecentlybegunrenegotiating

withthegovernmenttoseekpeacefulreentryintosociety.Partoftheirnegotiations,

includes,inasimilarpatterntotheothertwogroupsdiscussed,political

representationwithinthegovernmentandtheabilitytoformapoliticalparty.

Guerillagroups,likethethreethatthispaperhasdiscussed,aremilitant

groupsthatarefightingforapoliticalobjective.Whethertheseobjectivesare

ideologicalorifthegroupsarefightingtoattainpoliticalrights,theynonetheless

useviolentresistanceasawayofattainingtheirgoals.Inmypaper,Ihaveshown

thatguerillamovements,whiletheybeganasinformalandmilitantmovements,can

68

integrateandbecomepositiveformalpartieswithindemocraticstructures.The

FMLN,MLN-T,andtheFARC’sUPareallexamplesdescribingtheextenttowhich

guerillascanintegrateandbecomemembersofformal,stable,andrepresentative

democracies.

69

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FlagImages:

FARC:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Flag_of_the_

FARC-EP.svg/640px-Flag_of_the_FARC-EP.svg.png

Tupamaros:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0e/Band

era_dels_Tupamaros.svg/1200px-Bandera_dels_Tupamaros.svg.png

FMLN:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/10/Farabund

o_Mart%C3%AD_National_Liberation_Front_former_flag.svg/220px-

Farabundo_Mart%C3%AD_National_Liberation_Front_former_flag.svg.pn

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