an empirical analysis of the resiliency of ro/ro and ro ... · 9 disturbances affecting the...

Saurí, Morales-Fusco & Martín 1

An Empirical Analysis of the Resiliency of Ro/Ro and Ro/Pax Terminal 1 Operations 2 3 S. Saurí, P. Morales-Fusco, E. Martín. 4 5 S. Saurí (corresponding author), CENIT – Center for Innovation in Transportation, 6 BarcelonaTech-UPC, Jordi Girona 29, 2A, 08034 Barcelona (Spain), 7 Tel: +34 934.137.667, Fax: +34 934.137.675, [email protected]. 8 9 P. Morales-Fusco, CENIT – Center for Innovation in Transportation, BarcelonaTech-UPC, 10 Jordi Girona 29, 2A, 08034 Barcelona (Spain), Tel: +34 934.137.667, 11 Fax: +34 934.137.675, [email protected] 12 13 E. Martín, CENIT – Center for Innovation in Transportation, BarcelonaTech-UPC, 14 Jordi Girona 29, 2A, 08034 Barcelona (Spain), Tel: +34 934.137.667, 15 Fax: +34 934.137.675, [email protected]. 16 17 Submission date: November 14th, 2011. 18 6149 words (abstract and references included), 7 figures, 2 tables. 19

20

TRB 2012 Annual Meeting Paper revised from original submittal.


An Empirical Analysis of the Resiliency of Ro/Ro and Ro/Pax Terminal 1 Operations 2 3 ABSTRACT 4

Regular maritime lines with roll-on roll-off vessels must offer a reliable service without 5 substantial cost increases in order to be competitive. Port terminals need to be able to respond 6 quickly to any disturbance that might appear and return to a smooth operational state in the 7 minimum amount of time (resilient terminals). In this paper a complete taxonomy of the 8 disturbances affecting the operational processes in a roll-on roll-off terminal is introduced 9 together with a system able to assess the performance of any measure used to mitigate them. 10 The study is based on an overview of the existing literature on the topic, a detailed diagram of 11 the operational processes of the terminal, and an exhaustive set of interviews of the staff 12 involved in the processes occurring in a roll-on roll-off terminal, together with field 13 measurements. The main vulnerabilities are identified and possible corrective and preventive 14 measures are pointed out. 15

16



1 INTRODUCTION 1

Sea ports have experienced a boost in trade for the last decades. Nowadays more than 90% of 2 international freight trade travels by ship and transoceanic sea trade trebled between 1968 and 3 2008 (1). In the intracontinental scope, maritime transportation loses importance as it is less 4 favoured compared to road transportation: within the European Union, almost 40% of 5 domestic transportation of goods is done by sea, while 45.6% is done by road (2), the latter 6 being more flexible. 7

Seaborne trade in the shape of short sea shipping (SSS), understood as ‘movement of 8 cargo and passengers by sea between ports within a sea area’ extrapolated from ‘official’ 9 definition by the European Commission (3), has traditionally being favoured as the ‘clean’ 10 alternative to road haulage. In fact, despite its role as the ‘green means of transportation’ has 11 been downplayed (4), SSS comprehensive chains (door to door) continue to register fewer 12 external costs (basically environment and congestion derived) than alternative transportation 13 chains such as road (5, 6, 7) and it can be assumed that its ecological impact will decrease 14 even more once vessels adapt to the reduction of SO2 emissions for maritime transportation 15 and other policies under study by European and North American administrations (8, 9). 16

SSS can also be competitive in terms of cost and time when compared with road 17 transportation (10). This statement is especially true when using RoRo (roll-on roll-off) or 18 RoPax (RoRo carrying passengers) ships (11) and the routes connecting both ports are 19 motorways of the sea (MoS), understood as links between ports with higher requirements in 20 terms of time, cost, flexibility, reliability, and resilience (12, 13). 21

RoRo and RoPax vessels specialize in cargo on wheels (full trucks, rolled platforms, 22 trailers, automobiles, and even buses and trains). Ferry-like ships, aimed to the transportation 23 of passengers instead of freight cargo are not considered as being RoPax for this paper’s 24 purposes. 25

The decisive aspects that make a transportation chain with a maritime link operated 26 by RoRo/RoPax vessels competitive are both quantitative (time, frequency, or cost) and 27 qualitative/subjective (14) Among the qualitative aspects considered, the shippers especially 28 value the safety of the cargo together with the reliability (15), usually understood as 29 fulfilment of the expected travel time (16, 17). Other authors, such as Paixão and Marlow 30 (18) and Henesey (19), differentiate between quality and reliability. Henesey even 31 differentiated resilience or adaptability from quality, considering that they are all key 32 attributes for the success of any transportation chain. 33

Reliability is important especially when dealing with regular services, that is, with a 34 set schedule (20). But, what affects the reliability of SSS? Ports have been identified as the 35 weakest link in any transportation chain that includes an SSS link (hereafter called an SSS 36 chain) in terms of vulnerability or lack of resilience (21): Ports are break-bulk points and 37 require smooth running in order to ease the modal shift and ensure the competitiveness of 38 SSS chains when compared with other transportation chains (18) or even SSS chains calling 39 at other ports (22). Any disturbance in the proper performance of the port might compromise 40 all of the transportation chain (23). Paradoxically, and as stressed by Tang (24) and Barroso 41 et al. (25), the actual trend toward just-in-time (JIT) practices (travel time reduction without 42 increasing the operation costs) increases the vulnerability of the transportation chain. 43

Resilient terminals are required; that is, port terminals need to be able to respond 44 quickly to any disturbances that might appear and return to a smooth operational state in the 45 minimum amount of time. 46

The goal of this paper is to analyse the processes of a RoRo terminal and to identify 47 the disruptive events that might occur during its running. The knowledge of the frequency of 48 those events and how they affect time and cost, as a means of measuring the impact of their 49



consequences, makes it possible to establish which should be taken care of first. From there, 1 it is possible to distinguish which were the most efficient measures for improving the 2 robustness of the terminal operation. To help in the process, a compilation of interviews of 3 different users and agents involved in the operation of several Spanish RoRo and RoPax 4 terminals was used. 5

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the main terms 6 used thorough the paper and how supply chain risk has been approached in the literature. 7 Section 3 defines the main processes involving freight cargo in a RoRo/RoPax terminal. 8 Section 4 identifies the most relevant events that might occur together with their causes and 9 consequences and introduces the assessment system to be used. In Section 5 a compendium 10 of measures is given with the aim of increasing the resiliency of the terminal. Finally, (in 11 Section 6) some conclusions are presented. 12

13 2 RESILIENCY, RISKS, DISRUPTIVE EVENTS, AND VULNERABILITY 14

APPLIED TO THE SUPPLY CHAIN 15

As stated by Ponomarov and Holcomb (26), the resiliency of a supply chain is its capacity to 16 deal with unforeseen events, to respond to the disturbances they might cause, and to recover 17 while maintaining the chain performance at a desired level. The ability to recover from any 18 incident can be increased with redundancy in the resources and an increase in the flexibility 19 on the protocols, timetables, and so on. While the first measure means a direct cost increase 20 and will only be useful at the time the event happens, the second one can also bring benefits 21 to day-to-day operation (27). 22

At this point it is important to distinguish between risk and vulnerability. The first 23 concept deals with events derived from the human action or the environment and their 24 consequences. Vulnerability includes the study of the negative effects that the disturbances 25 have on the optimal performance of the system (or supply chain, SC) in both the short and the 26 long term. Vulnerability is tightly related to resilience: a resilient system is one that can 27 survive and recover from disturbances and, because of that, has little vulnerability (28). 28

In order to evaluate the resiliency of a specific process, it is necessary first to know 29 what disturbances it might face and their severity. Precisely, Jüttner et al. (29) pointed out 30 that supply chain risk management (SCRM) is based on four key aspects: assessing the 31 sources of risk (causes), defining what adverse consequences they might have, identifying the 32 risk (disturbance) drivers, and providing mitigating measures for the supply chain. 33

According to Tang (24) and Kouvelis et al. (30), risk assessment in SCs is still in an 34 embryonic state. A good starting point might be the study by Rao and Goldsby (31), who, 35 following the steps of Ritchie and Marshall (32) in risk management, classified SC risks 36 (disturbances) depending on the source/factor area (out of five) that produced them. The 37 source could be related to the environment/context, industry, organization, specific problem, 38 or decision-maker. 39

In the meantime, the taxonomy of causes (or risk factors) developed by Sheffi and 40 Rice (27) is especially relevant. Both consider that the causes can be internal or external. The 41 former, in general terms, have a bigger influence on the day-to-day operation of the terminal 42 and cover the following big areas/types: human resources, maintenance, human factors, 43 organization and management, technical failures/hazards, and system attributes. 44

Pettit et al. (33), after a process of recurrent analysis by means of eight focus groups, 45 built up a complete taxonomy with 50 vulnerability factors (disruptive events) and 106 46 capabilities. The disruptive events were grouped into seven broad categories: turbulence 47 (frequent changes in external factors beyond the control of the system manager), deliberate 48



threats, external pressures, resource limitations, sensitivity, connectivity and supplier 1 disturbances. 2

When quantifying the consequences of the disturbance events, there is agreement on 3 the opinion that both the probability of occurrence and the impact they would have on the 4 system’s performance are to be taken into account. In that sense, in (27) and (28) a chart is 5 used depicting the probability and impact (understood as the severity) of the disturbance 6 faced by any system as a way to assess its vulnerability. 7

In general, vulnerability in transportation chains that have a maritime link (like SSS) 8 is considered to be higher than in any other kind of SC. Maritime logistic chains include more 9 break-bulk points combined with an extremely complex port operation, intertwining logistic 10 chains and multiple transportation means (34, 35). 11

Specifically, Barnes and Oloruntoba (35) pointed out that there are two different 12 approaches to vulnerability in seaborne transportation, depending on whether it has to do with 13 overall logistics or the complexity of the processes in the terminal. Nedeß et al. (23) agreed to 14 a certain degree and proposed distinguishing strategic and operational vulnerabilities when 15 analysing the performance of maritime SCs. At the operational level they used a four-layered 16 model for risk assessment: definition of the disruptive factors, the processes of the analysed 17 system, the most probable events, and their consequences, whether or not they were 18 monetary. 19

This paper is based on the frameworks of Nedeß et al. (23), Sheffi and Rice (27), and 20 Einarsson and Rausand (28) and uses the taxonomy developed by Pettit et al. (33) and 21 exhaustive interviews of the different staff involved in the ship stevedoring process: 22 stevedoring hands, ship staff, drivers, and eventually shippers, and port authority staff. The 23 innovating contributions of this paper are twofold: building a complete taxonomy of the 24 disruptive events that can affect the operational performance of a RoPax terminal and 25 proposing a numerical framework to be used for estimating the real consequences that each 26 event has on the performance in terms of frequency and severity. 27

28 3 PROCESSES DESCRIPTION 29

In a RoPax terminal, both administrative and logistic (operational) processes take place. To 30 deal with the complexity of the system, port terminals are usually analysed in subsystems. 31 RoPax terminals can be split into three subsystems: berth area, storage area, and delivery and 32 receipt (36). 33 34 Unloading process (from sea to land) 35

When the ship is berthed and customs gives its approval, the unloading process starts. The 36 typical unloading process begins with the vehicles driven by their own drivers: passenger 37 automobiles, trucks, buses, and so on. The trucks and vehicles unloaded at this stage go 38 directly to the exit gates of the terminal, where the exit control takes place. After that, the 39 unloading process starts for all the vehicles/freight driven by the stevedoring team (i.e. 40 hands): platforms/semitrailers and whole vehicles (i.e. cars, vans, etc. to be sold). 41 42 Loading process (from land to sea) 43

The cargo to be loaded on board arrives at the terminal either by road or by railroad. Once the 44 cargo arrives at the terminal, it is parked in the yard, waiting to be loaded on board. The 45 passengers on board may access through fingers or by means of the stern access gate. 46



Stevedoring is carried out according to the “Stevedoring Plan” which includes a 1 “Cargo Manifest” and a “Cargo Plan”. 2

Platforms and semitrailers are usually loaded first and simultaneously with the 3 automobiles. Immediately after, the vehicles driven by their own drivers are loaded: 4 passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and so on. While waiting to be loaded, trucks and 5 passenger vehicles are stored temporally in the yard of the terminal. 6

The main processes in the day to day running of a RoRo/RoPax terminal are 7 summarized in Figure 1. 8

9

10 FIGURE 1 Main processes occurring in a RoPax terminal 11

Besides the physical flows, there is a second circulation level corresponding to the 12 information flow. Additionally, on each level, it is possible to distinguish among the different 13 transport systems, cargo/stevedoring units, and types of cargo and traffic. In a RoPax terminal 14 three main cargo types can be found: full trucks, platforms without tractor capacity, and 15 automobiles. Each kind of cargo has its own process chain. Figure 2 describes the 16 interrelations between all the processes occurring in a RoPax terminal in the storage area 17 (storage subsystem). 18

19

20

UNLOADING (sea land)

LOADING (land sea)

SHIP DEPARTURE, ETD

CARGO FASTENING

CARGO ENTERING THE TERMINAL

CARGO MOVEMENTS INSIDE THE STORAGE AREA

CARGO-TO-LOAD PLACEMENT (AND SORTING) IN THE STORAGE AREA

PROCESSES IN THE TERMINAL RELATED TO LOADING / UNLOADING

LOADING PROCESS IN THE SHIP / RAMP / TERMINAL INTERFACE

STEVEDORING (INSIDE THE SHIP)

SHIP BERTHING, ETA AT THE PORT

STEVEDORING (INSIDE THE SHIP)

UNLOADING PROCESS IN THE SHIP / RAMP / TERMINAL INTERFACE

IMPORTING CARGO PLACEMENT ON THE STORAGE AREA (YARD)

CARGO LEAVING THE TERMINAL

BERTHING LINE STORAGEDELIVERY / RECEIPT

CARGO TRANSPORTATION (WITH MAFI OR OTHER TRANSPORTATION MEANS)

ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE STEVEDORING STAFF

GENERAL PROCESSES



1

FIGURE 2 Processes in the berth while stevedoring (export movements) 2

3 4 5

VAN/TAXI

STEVEDORE

TRUCK/TRAILER

TRACTOR UNITS (MAFIS)

FORKLIFTS

CARGO PLAN ACTIVATION

Are there anyavailable mafis?

Are there anyavailable forklifts?

Are there any containers among the

cargo?

YES

NO

roll -trailer

container

Stevedoring needs?

Roll -trailer placement in slot

COUPLING CONTAINER WITH FORKLIFT AND PLACEMENT

ON THE ROLL-TRAILER

YES

CONTAINER BOARDING (rolltrailer)

YESNO

WAITING FOR IDLE MAFI/FORKLIFT

PLACEMENT AT SLOT

CONTAINER COUPLING

WITH FORKLIFT

CONTAINER BOARDING

PLACEMENT ONDECK AND

UNCOUPLING

CONTAINER FASTENING

BACK TO THE YARD

MAFI/FORKLIFT

OBJECTIVE: Minimizing operational time inside the ship

Infomration flow (stevedor)

Continue

LEGEND Information flow Decisons during planning Physical processes

Continues here

Are there any platforms among

the cargo?

YES

Are any Mafisavailable?

WAIT FOR AN IDLE MAFI

NO YES

MAFI PLACEMENT ON ASSIGNED SLOT

HITCHING OF MAFI TO

PLATFORM

PLATFORM BOARDING

DECK POSITION AND

UNHITCHING (TRESTLES)

PLATFORM FASTENNING

BACK TO THE YARD (MAFI)

Queues in the access gates to

the ship?

NO

YES

WAITING TIME (QUEUEING

SYSTEM)

NO Are there any trucks/vehiclesamong

the cargo?

Is there room in thequeue to access the

gate?

YESTRUCK

BOARDINGQueuing before the ramp queue

NO

INDICATE MOVEMENTS AND FINAL PLACEMENT

TO HE TRUCKER

DECK POSITIONTRUCK

FASTENING

YES

NO

WAITING TIME t max previous

SHIP DEPARTURE

NO END OF STEVEDORING

PROCESS

RAMP RAISING AND DECK CLOSING

YES

Function: Minimize time before boarding.

VAN/TAXI

STEVEDORE

TRUCK/TRAILER

TRACTOR UNITS (MAFIS)

FORKLIFTS



1 4 DISRUPTIVE EVENTS, CAUSES, AND DERIVED CONSEQUENCES 2

3 Identifying the disruptive events 4

In this paper, disturbance and disturbance are considered equivalent and are understood 5 according to the definition given by (25): A disturbance is any event, predictable or not, 6 which has a negative effect on the normal performance of the system. As established in the 7 frameworks by Einarsson and Rausand (28) and Sheffi and Rice (27), these kinds of events 8 happen because of certain threats or disruptive factors and cause certain consequences that 9 may affect the normal performance to a greater or lesser degree. 10

Three main sources were used to identify the main disturbances affecting the average 11 performance of a RoPax terminal: 12

An overview of the literature describing the logistic processes in both RoRo 13 and RoPax terminals. Moreover, the analysis was completed by identifying the 14 incidents most frequently referred to in the literature on port container 15 terminals, which was much more exhaustive. 16

A detailed analysis of the processes from Figure 2, identifying which agents 17 might affect the desirable performance of the process and to what degree. 18

40 people were interviewed in total: 5 captains, 5 first deck officer, 10 deck 19 officers, 5 consignees, 5 operations chief and managers, and 10 terminal’s 20 customers from the RoPax terminals at Port of Barcelona, Port of Valencia, 21 and Port of Algeciras. Among other questions, interviewees were asked about 22 the frequency of the disruptive events previously identified and how they 23 might affect the performance of the terminal. Table 1 resumes how and what 24 was asked in the interviews. 25

26

TABLE 1 Main characteristics and definitions of the survey 27

Type of Questions and Answers (HOW)

Closed questions: The answer should be quantified between 1 (lowest punctuation) and 5 (most value).

Open questions: The agents surveyed should answer in short but shout mention the main problems and specify their point of view regarding the service quality received.

Almost 80% of the surveys were done in situ and the rest was by internet or phone. Staff and agents surveyed (WHO)

Captain First Deck Officer /Chief Engineer Terminal’s customers and clients Truckers Consignee Stevedores Operations chief and managers

Topics and main incidents in terminal processes (WHAT)

Terminal accesses and inland connections Storage yard: layout and capacity Ship design: car-decks, ramps and internal configuration Quality, efficiency and productivity of stevedores Main incidents and their consequences (frequency and probability). Main variables and parameters that could be improved.

28 29



1 A specific taxonomy of disruptive events in RoPax (and RoRo) terminals has not been 2

done to date. Some papers record the lack of reliability in terms of time and JIT policy 3 fulfilment because of issues in the cargo handling at the port terminals (21). 4

The literature is much larger in the case of ship breakdowns. The hull design of the 5 rolled cargo ships makes them vulnerable to sinking. There are plenty of papers regarding 6 risk of accident or sinking assessment. However, from the point of view of this paper, the 7 accident (or breakdown) of the ship while at sea will only be considered in terms of its effect 8 on the performance of the terminal: causing either a delay in the beginning of the loading and 9 unloading processes or even the cancellation of some ships’ departures. In this sense, the 10 article by Tzannatos (37) stands out. The author analysed the ship breakdowns in RoPax lines 11 caused by the onboard equipment and, implicitly, how they affected the reliability. Tzannatos 12 stressed that the ship failures, when they were inside the port, usually happened in the engine 13 room, and to a lesser degree with the manoeuvring-propelling equipment and the deck 14 equipment (ramps, anchor winches, and mooring capstans). 15

The main risks (or disruptive events) identified after the thorough analysis of the 16 existing literature, the interviews conducted, and the analysis of the processes are as follows: 17

I1: Estimated time of arrival (ETA) delay 18 I2: Estimated time of departure (ETD) delay 19 I3: Ramp–ship interface blocked or having low productivity 20 I4: Last-minute modification of the stevedoring plan 21 I5: Cargo fastening issues 22 I6: Congestion at the exit gates/lanes (land side) 23 I7: Congestion at the entry gates (land side) 24 I8: Accidents (stevedoring staff, drivers, passengers) 25 I9: Cargo away from the berthing point 26 I10: Insufficient storage area 27 I11: Cargo traceability issues 28 I12: Low productivity of the stevedoring processes (with stevedoring staff 29

involved) 30 I13: Delay in the cargo loading 31 I14: Accidents or breakdowns of the equipment (towing units) 32 I15: Ship breakdown 33 I16: Interference with the normal performance of other ships 34

35 Causes (or risk factors), consequences, and their relationship with the disturbances 36

A vulnerability assessment must include, necessarily, the study of what the effects 37 (consequences) of the identified disturbances are. The goal of this paper requires 38 identification of what the causes are, the degree to which they cause the disturbances, and, 39 from there, the probability of occurrence of certain consequences. Identifying causes and 40 consequences is the fourth and last layer of those established by Nedeß et al. (23) as 41 necessary to make the taxonomy of the vulnerabilities in the processes of a terminal. 42

The relationship between causes, disturbances, and eventually consequences makes it 43 advisable to draw the relationship trees that intertwine them. Because of the relationship 44 complexity of the physical processes that occur in a RoRo/RoPax terminal, building a global 45 relationship tree is an overwhelming task, and its final result is likely to be difficult to handle. 46 To make the study easier, the relationships between each possible disturbance and both its 47 causes and its consequences were built independently, resulting in several trees with just one 48



connection level in each direction from the disruptive events themselves. The fact that the 1 very same cause (risk factor) can cause multiple disturbances only means that it can appear in 2 multiple trees. In a first iteration the focus was placed on identifying all the feasible causes 3 and consequences of the disturbance. The resulting relationship trees were subsequently 4 simplified, grouping causes (and consequences) with a similar profile. Figure 3 shows the 5 construction of one of the trees in the first iteration while Figure 4 shows its simplified form. 6

Once this level of definition was reached, a new complication was found: How should 7 the situation be handled when disruptive events or final consequences cause new 8 disturbances? Eventually, such a possibility was allowed in the relationship trees, but with 9 the requirement that the name and scope of the cause/disturbance/consequence were kept the 10 same at all times, to avoid confusion and to allow them to be dealt with more easily 11 afterwards. 12

13

14

FIGURE 3 Tree (exhaustive) showing all the feasible causes and consequences derived 15 from vehicle congestion at the gates of a terminal 16

At this point, the taxonomy of causes, disturbances, and consequences was complete, 17 and additionally the network of their main relationships was established. Annexes 1 and 2 18 provide a complete listing of the taxonomies and the relationships existing between them. 19

20 Disturbances assessment system 21

The premise that the disturbances can be assessed using two different aspects (occurrence 22 probability and the severity of the final consequences) (27, 28) is still valid. Because of that, 23 the effort to establish, numerically, the relationship between each cause–disturbance and 24 disturbance–consequence pair was made. That is, a probability value was assigned to each 25 link in the relationship trees (Figures 4 and 5). Note that each probability value is 26

Issues with the storage area (not enough circulation lanes, bad design…)

Insufficient gates

Low performance of the gates of the terminal

The cargo of other ships affects the circulation inside the terminal

Congestion at the entry gates (land side)

Delay in the cargo arrival (land side) into the terminal

Issues with security and safety of cargo and truckers

CAUSES DISTURBANCE CONSEQUENCES

Interference with cargo to / from other ships. Effect on the normal performance of other ships

Congestion at the exit gates (land side)

Delay in the cargo arrival at the terminal

Overbooking of cargo / passengers

Inappropriate manouveringareas (turning radius, etc…) especially for railroad access

Delay in the end of the stevedoring process

Delays in the ship boarding (trucks, “last in first out effect”)



independent from the others (i.e. the probabilities of the cause-disturbance that lead to certain 1 disturbance will not add to 100). 2 3

4

FIGURE 4 Simplified tree with the causes and consequences associated with vehicle 5 congestion at the gates of a terminal 6

It is considered that any disturbance Ij has n feasible causes and may lead to m 7 different consequences. The probability of the incidence Ij happening because of the i-th 8 cause, ci, will be known as p(Ij | ci). Whenever the cause i cannot happen or when its 9 occurrence would not lead to the disturbance Ij, p(Ij | ci) takes a zero value. On the other hand, 10 if it is assumed that there is a lack of correlation between any pair of causes leading to the 11 event Ij (since all causes with a similar profile have been grouped together), the probability of 12 occurrence of the event p(Ij) can be obtained as: 13

1 21

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ... ( ),n

j j i j j j i j ni

p I p I c p I c p I c p I c p I c j

(1)

or equivalently: 14

1 1 1

11

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ...

... ( 1) ( )... ( ),

n n n

j j i j i j j j i j j j ki i j n i j k n

nj j n

p I p I c p I c p I c p I c p I c p I c

p I c p I c j

(2)

However, it is necessary to know the probability of occurrence of the final 15 consequences and their severity (to quantify the real impact on the performance of the 16 terminal). In that sense, when considering that there are m distinct possible consequences and 17 r disturbances that can lead to them, and maintaining the no-correlation hypothesis, the 18 probability of occurrence of the k-th consequence (qk) can be expressed as: 19

Congestion at the entry gates (land side)

Issues with the pace of entry flows at the terminal

Concern for the safety and safety of cargo and truckers

Interference with the normal performance of other ships

Delay in the cargo arrival at the terminal (land side)

Overbooking of cargo / passengers

Delays in the ship boarding (trucks, “last in first out effect”)

Deficiencies in the terminal design (insufficient storage area, not enough entry gates of with low performance, insufficient maneuvering areas,…)

Interferences with the normal performance of other ships

Delay in the end of the stevedoring process from its estimated end time

20%

20%

5%

5%

25%

25%

5%

20%

30%

CAUSES DISTURBANCE CONSEQUENCES



1 1 1

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,r r n

k k j j k j j ij j i

p q p q I p I p q I p I c k

(3)

Then, the numbers assigned to the links between disturbances and final consequences 1 reflect the probability of occurrence of the consequence because of the given disturbance. To 2 quantify all the links available, the interviews were the main data source used, together with 3 in situ measurements of operatives in 25 loading and unloading operations. 4

Additionally, and in a first assessment of the problem, probability values associated 5 with links where their causes are, at the same time, disturbances or consequences of other 6 links were considered to be independent of the final probability of occurrence value 7 associated, after calculation, with such disturbances or consequences; that is, the final 8 probability of occurrence of a given consequence does not affect any cause–disturbance or 9 disturbance–consequence link value, even when the consequence, cause, and/or disturbance 10 might be the same. 11

12

13

FIGURE 5 Sketch of the global existing links among causes, disturbances, and 14 consequences. The probability values assigned to each link which are necessary to 15 estimate p(q2) afterwards are highlighted in red. 16

Additionally, each final consequence must be quantified in terms of severity. The 17 values given at this stage are merely qualitative, having been assessed with the interview 18 series as well as the knowledge of the processes occurring in the terminal. The categorical 19 classification used has four severity levels: light, medium, severe, and very severe. 20

The fact that the assessment of the consequences is qualitative makes it difficult to 21 extrapolate it to the disturbances in order to evaluate them, especially when considering that 22 it is possible to reach the same final consequence from multiple paths. Moreover, since the 23 developed system allows it, evaluation of the effect of the disturbances implicitly, through 24 their consequences, becomes more adequate. As a result, the vulnerability framework used in 25

I1c1

CAUSE (RISK FACTOR)

DISRUPTION (RISK)

CONSEQUENCES (IMPACTS)

q1

c2

ci

cn

I2

Ij

Ir

q2

qk

qm

p(q2|I1)

p(Ij|cn)

p(Ij|ci)

p(I1|c1)

p(Ij|c2)

p(q2|I2)

p(q2|Ij)

p(q2|Ir)

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. .



Einarsson and Rausand (28) and Sheffi and Rice (27) now becomes a disturbances on the 1 processes of the terminal framework (Figure 6). The consequences included in Figure 6 are: 2

: Ship departure cancellation 3 : Extra cost of handling stevedores 4 : Changes in berth/storage area (variation in the operational planning) 5 : Issues with the entry/exit gate flows to/from the terminal (land gates) 6 : Interfaces with the normal performance of other ships (I16) 7 : Concern for the safety and security of cargo and truckers 8 : Cargo fastening issues (I5) 9 : Internal (inside the ship) rehandles 10 : Yard reorganization 11 : Delay in the ship’s ETD (estimated time of departure) (can lead to I2 for 12

the next incoming ship) 13 : Delay in the beginning of the stevedoring process 14 : Delay in the cargo exit time (land side) from its estimated value 15

16 Changing the value (probability) of any of the links from any of the obtained 17

relationship trees will result in a movement of the consequences on the chart in Figure 6 18 (Figure 7) on the ordinates axis. 19

20

21

FIGURE 6 Impacts on the processes of the terminal framework for a RoPax terminal. 22 Feasible final consequences in the event of any disturbance in the processes. 23

According to Figure 6 there are some final consequences that require little attention 24 (q7, q8, q9, and q6) since they are infrequent and have low severity. The consequences with 25 high probability and severe effects on the operative (q2, q10, q11, and, to a lower degree, q4) 26 are where measures should be applied more urgently to reduce both the consequence severity 27 (corrective measures) and its probability of occurrence (preventive measures). On the other 28

q10

q5

q2

q9q8

q4

q7

q12

q11

q6

q3

q10

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1

Consequence probability (frecuency)

Severity of the consequences

LOW MEDIUM SEVERE VERY SEVERE

Ship departure cancellation

Extra cost in handling stevedores

Changes in berth/storage area (variation on the operational planning)

Issues with the gate of entry/exit flows to/from the terminal (land gates)Interfaces with the normal performance

of other ships (=I16)

Delay in the ship’s ETD

Delay in the beginning of the stevedoring process



hand, those consequences that are frequent but have little impact on the performance (q3, q5, 1 and, to certain degree, q12) are due to events happening on the average day, and should be 2 addressed in order to improve the performance of the terminal. Finally, severe consequences 3 that rarely happen (q1) should be taken into account, eventually, in order to establish some 4 kind of preventive measure or protocol to be activated in case of occurrence, to allow a quick 5 reaction and reduction in the severity of the negative consequences. 6

The analysis undertaken stresses that, in the studied RoPax terminal, the disturbances 7 that need to be addressed urgently are related to either the delay in the ship’s ETD, the delay 8 in the beginning of the stevedoring process, or the extra costs incurred in hiring the 9 stevedoring hand for a longer time period. In fact, these aspects are closely related since a 10 delay in starting to load/unload the ship means a delay in its departure from the port, and an 11 increase in the length of time for which the stevedoring hand must be hired. 12

At the second level are the disturbances related with the congestion at the land gates 13 of the terminal, as well as last minute changes in the yard distribution and planning forcing, 14 in the later case, to extend (in time) the contract of the stevedoring team. 15

Once the worst (and more probable) consequences are identified, it is time to discuss 16 the paths that led to them, that is, to analyse the relationship trees followed to reach the 17 common and severe final consequences (q2, q10, and q11). This time all possible loops due to 18 consequences coinciding with causes and/or disturbances should be considered. Figure 7 19 shows the complexity of the links leading to the final consequence q10 and the relative 20 importance of the different connections with the potential disturbances and their causes 21 leading to its occurrence. The q10 relationship tree happens to be the most complicated of all 22 the trees considered and involves all the feasible disturbances to a greater or lesser degree 23 and, thus, presumably a single measure affecting one or few initial causes will not have a 24 huge effect on the final probability of occurrence of q10. 25

26

27

FIGURE 7 Whole relationship tree for the final consequence q10 (delay in the ship’s 28 ETD) (see Annexes 1 and 2 for a complete listing of the codes for each 29 cause/consequence identified) 30

c5

q10

I4 I5 I8 I11 I12 I13 I14 I15 I16

c6 c7c8 c9C12, 14, 15 C17c3 C18 C19 C20C21 C22C25C26 C27 C28C29 C31, 32, 37C39C41

I3

c10 c16

I9 I10

C40 c2 c12 c30 c33

q5

I6

I7

C11

C24

C12, 13, 14

C34

c35

I1

I3

c6

c9

c30

I8

I12

I13

I6 I7I1 I8

C11 C24 C12, 13, 14 c35c6 c9 c30

I10

I10

I10

c5

I15

c5

I15

> 20%> 5%< 5%

Link probability

Xy Incoming links omitted



1 5 ASSESSMENT OF FEASIBLE MEASURES TO INCREASE THE RESILIENCE 2

In the SCRM literature, two kinds of measures to improve the resilience are considered, 3 depending on their target: the causes or the consequences of a given event that compromises 4 the optimal performance of any SC. More specifically, Tomlin (38) differentiates between: 5

Preventive and mitigation actions. They affect the causes (risk factors), 6 reducing their chance of happening, or the relationship between the causes and 7 the disturbances themselves, (i.e. reducing the probability of occurrence of the 8 disturbance when the cause has already occurred). 9

Contingency and corrective actions. They reduce the disruptive effects either 10 in duration or severity. These measures are applied only if the disturbance 11 takes place. 12 13

Translated into the consequences framework of Figure 6, it can be considered that 14 preventive measures are aimed at reducing the probability of occurrence of the disturbance 15 while contingency measures are aimed at reducing the severity level, that is, reducing the 16 severity value on the abscissa axis of Figure 6. However, it has to be taken into account that 17 some preventive measures might reduce the severity of the final consequences, becoming 18 both preventive and mitigation measures. 19

Assessment of the measures affecting the resiliency of a RoPax terminal is out of the 20 scope of this paper. A first approach to the families of measures available was made using the 21 developed taxonomy of causes, disturbances, and consequences, that is: 22

Agreements between terminals 23 Management improvement and cargo traceability (investment in technology) 24 Stevedore trainmen 25 Quality control and management 26 Investment in equipments (overcapacity and better performance) 27 Investment in infrastructure (overcapacity) 28

29 Almost every single disruptive event leads to a delay in the stevedoring process. This 30

can be reduced by contracting extra stevedoring units, which is one of the most used 31 corrective actions available to the shipping company. Once again, and considering the 32 taxonomy of causes, disruptive events, and final consequences, it is possible to suggest the 33 following main lines of corrective actions: 34

Increase flexibility of the stevedoring workforce/Adapting stevedoring units to 35 the needed work 36

Financial/monetary compensation (to customers) 37 Express (rapid) repairs (breakdowns) 38 Temporary equipment rental 39 Express training (terminal/ship/stevedoring staff) 40

41

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 42

The goal of this paper was to elaborate the taxonomy of the disturbances affecting the 43 operational processes in a RoPax terminal. The study is based on an overview of the existing 44 literature on the topic, a detailed diagram of the operational processes of the terminal, and an 45 exhaustive set of interviews with the staff involved in the processes occurring in a RoPax 46 terminal together with field measures. 47



In this study the following conclusions have been obtained: 1 A complete taxonomy of the disturbances that happen in a RoPax terminal has 2

been developed. In addition, a framework to evaluate their consequences on 3 the normal performance of the terminal, in terms of severity and frequency, 4 has been built. 5

Delay in the ship departure, delay in the beginning of the stevedoring process, 6 and extra costs incurred after hiring the stevedoring hand for a longer time 7 period (when the stevedoring process takes longer than expected) are the most 8 common disruptive events a RoRo/RoPax terminal can face. 9 10

Assigning a ‘single’ number to each relationship might be oversimplifying since the 11 ‘intensity’ of the disturbance is never evaluated, for instance lack of storage area can have 12 small or high final consequences depending on how much extra area is needed. This is 13 somehow addressed already by using the set of values in the disturbance-consequences links, 14 since in the interviews and terminal records, ‘more intense’ disturbances will be accounted 15 for with more probability. However, this paper would benefit from a further research on how 16 to work with fuzzy or probability values instead of ‘single values’ and their effect on the 17 consequences framework and relationship trees used in this paper as well as a larger set of 18 terminal records conducted specifically to quantify the disturbances. 19

20

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 21

This paper is part of a project funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation (Spanish 22 Government) entitled DISTEMAR. 23 24 REFERENCES 25

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31



ANNEX 1 Causes 1

Code Cause c1 Accidents with stevedoring staff involved c2 Cargo arrival before its expected time c3 Route change (ship) c4 Accidents/breakdowns with drivers/passengers involved c5 Adverse weather c6 IPSI security controls too slow, too thorough, or lacking in a specific area c7 Deficiencies in the coordination/planning of the stevedoring process c8 Lack of cargo control, traceability c9 Delay in the truck loading (last in, first out effect) c10 Deficiencies in the terminal design (berthing line) c11 Deficiencies in the terminal design (lanes) c12 Deficiencies in the terminal design (storage area insufficient) c13 Deficiencies in the terminal design (entry gates too few or with low performance)c14 Deficiencies in the terminal design (insufficient manoeuvring areas) c15 Deficiencies in the terminal design (signalling) c16 Deficiencies in the ship design c17 Untrained stevedoring staff, unqualified personnel c18 Lack of training for particular fastening issues c19 Lack of stevedoring staff

c20 Lack of machinery spare parts, idle machinery (towing equipment), and/or machinery repairs

c21 Deficiencies in the management of the terminal c22 Unforeseen events (boarding, running aground) c23 Ship issues/breakdowns c24 Interference with the normal performance of other ships (yard operations) c25 Deficiencies in the deck maintenance c26 Deficiencies in the maintenance of the ship access points c27 Deficiencies in the maintenance of the fastening points (inside the ship) c28 Deficiencies in the ship maintenance c29 Deficiencies in the stevedoring equipment maintenance c30 Overbooking of cargo/passengers c31 Crew issues c32 Pilotage issues (delay or accident)

c33 Mechanical issues with vehicles stored in the yard for a long time (flat tyres, unloaded batteries, etc.)

c34 Delay in the beginning of the loading/unloading (delay in arrival of the cargo inside the terminal, congestion at the terminal entries)

c35 Delay in the cargo arrival at the terminal (land side) c36 Delay in the estimated time for ending the loading/unloading process c37 Delay in the estimated time for ending the maintenance of the ship c38 Delay in the ship's ETD (estimated time of departure) c39 Vehicles with special needs when fastened c40 Last-minute changes in the stevedoring planning (berth or storage area change) c41 Changes in the stevedoring planning (ship), not updated

2



1

ANNEX 2 Linkage between disruptive events and their causes and consequences 2

Code Disturbance Causes Final

consequencesI1 Estimated time of arrival (ETA) delay c5, c23(I15),c38 (q10) q2, q5, q9, q11

I3 Ramp/ship interface blocked or with low productivity

c1(I14), c4(I8),c10, c16, c23(I15), c34 (q12)

q2, q5, q10

I4 Last-minute modifications of the stevedoring plan

c3, c26,c41 q2, q8, q10

I5 Cargo fastening issues c18, c25,c27, c39 q7, q10 I6(q4) Congestion at the exit gates/lanes (land side) c6, c11,c24(q5) q5, q11, q12

I7 Congestion at the entry gates (land side) c9, c12,13,14,c24(q5), c30, c35

q4, q5, q6, q11

I8 Accidents (stevedoring staff, drivers, passengers)

c5, c12,14,15, I9 q5, q10, q11

I9 Cargo away from the berthing point c21, c40 (q3) q2 I10 Insufficient storage area c2, c12,c30, c34 (q12) q2, q3, q4 I11 Cargo traceability issues c8, c21, I10 q10

I12 Low productivity of the stevedoring processes (with stevedoring staff involved)

c1(I14), c4,c17, c19 q2, q5, q10

I13 Delay in the cargo loading c4, c6,c9, c33 q5, q10

I14 Accidents/breakdowns of the equipment (towing units)

c5, c17,c20, c29 q10

I15 Ship breakdown c22, c28, c31, 32, 37 q1, q10

I16 Interference with the normal performance of other ships

c7, c24(q5) q2, q10

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10


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