HF Action: Enhancing Human Rights Policing in Kosovo

An Assessment Report on the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo

George Tugushi and John Wadham Council of Europe consultants

March 2018

This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

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Abbreviations: CoE – Council of Europe CPT – European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights ICITAP – International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program KAPS - Kosovo Academy of Public Safety KP – Kosovo Police OSCE – Office for Security and Co-operation in Europe MOIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs PIK – Police Inspectorate of Kosovo PPO – Public Prosecutor’s Office PSD - Police Standards Department

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1. Introduction

The Council of Europe Project “Enhancing Human Rights Policing in Kosovo”, which forms part of the “Horizontal Facility for Western Balkans and Turkey”, aims at enhancing the human rights protection by the police and further strengthening the system of independent police control. The objective of this report is to assess the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) functional and operational independence and training needs and capacities. In order to make this assessment two consultants, George Tugushi and John Wadham, analysed the relevant laws and by-laws, as well as internal guidelines and rulebooks; they took into consideration reports by international and non-governmental organizations, as well other bodies active in the field. The consultants also conducted a four-day mission to Kosovo from 5th to 8th February 2018 and during this mission they met the following1:

Representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo (Department for Public Safety, Department for EU Integration and Policy Coordination, Legal Department)

Representatives of Kosovo Police, including the Training Division, the Professional Standard Directorate and the Office for Human Rights

Representatives of Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (at least twenty members from all PIK departments)

Representatives of Kosovo Academy of Public Safety

Ombudsperson representative and NPM Head

Office of State Prosecutor

EULEX, Advisory Unit on Internal Matters

OSCE representatives

ICITAP representatives The consultants wish to extend their gratitude to all the above-mentioned stakeholders, who committed their time and insights to the assessment. Furthermore, the consultants particularly appreciated the cooperation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and PIK staff and leadership. Last but not least, the assessment visit and drafting of this report were greatly facilitated by Mr Shemsedin Aliu, Senior Project Officer of the Council of Europe, and the CoE team in Pristina, the consultants warmly thank them for all their support and hard work. 2. General Overview of International Practice

The development of Council of Europe standards on police oversight is mainly rooted in the absolute prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment given effect in Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection

1 more information available in the assessment mission agenda, presented as Annex 2 to this report.

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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). However, without an accompanying positive obligation on the State to investigate such treatment it is unlikely that principles or standards would have been developed and implemented.

Whilst Article 3 has driven the development of police oversight, the influence of the Right to Life (Article 2 ECHR) on investigative mechanisms should not be underestimated. The resulting overarching principles of police oversight have enabled the implementation of oversight models in countries across the 47 Council of Europe Member States that to varying degrees deliver on their positive obligations.

The Court developed five key principles for the effective investigation of complaints against the police that engage Article 2 or 3 ECHR:

Independence; no institutional or hierarchical connections between the investigators and the officer subject of the complaint, amounting to a real, practical independence2;

Adequacy; the investigation should be capable of gathering evidence to determine whether police behavior complained of was unlawful and to identify and punish those responsible3;

Promptness; the investigation should be conducted promptly and expeditiously in order to maintain confidence in the rule of law4;

Public scrutiny; procedures and decision-making should be open and transparent in order to ensure accountability; and,

Victim involvement; the complainant should be involved in the complaints process in order to safeguard his or her legitimate interests5.

In the view of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), complaints mechanisms constitute a fundamental safeguard against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, whether these persons are held in police or any other places where they are deprived of their liberty by a public authority. A well-functioning complaints mechanism can also serve as a valuable source of information for the management of the agencies and institutions concerned about potential problems. It may also allay tension among persons deprived of their liberty by ensuring that their concerns are treated seriously and, where appropriate, suitable remedies are proposed.

Internationally there are a number of models for police control/complaints systems. At one end of the spectrum, there is complete self-regulation, with the police

2 Halat v. Turkey, (23607/08) – judgment of 8 November 2011 and Mocanu and others v Romania (10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08) – judgment of 17 September 2014 3 Aksoy v Turkey (Application no. 21987/93) – judgment of 18 December 1996; Alder v United Kingdom (42078/02) - judgment of 22 November 2011 4 Aydin v. Turkey (57/1996/676/866) – judgment of 25 September 1997 5 Police Oversight Mechanisms in the Council of Europe Member States, Jonny Byrne William Priestley, 2017

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conducting and regulating investigation into complaints, without any external oversight or input. Another option is a body entirely independent of the police can deal with complaints against the police, where the body has complete responsibility for the investigation of all complaints against the police. Within these two extremes, there is range of systems with varying degrees of internal and external investigation and different levels of civilian oversight, supervision and audit of the complaint handling function. Complaints bodies may be concerned with investigating the particulars of the incident complained about, or be limited to an investigation of the procedures involved in handling the complaint6.

All over the world there are many examples when internal and external police oversight bodies supplement each other and deliver tangible results in their work. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages to be discussed below.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) “Handbook on Police accountability, oversight and integrity” effective police accountability involves many different actors representing the different layers of modern-day democracies, including government representatives, the parliament, the judiciary, civil society actors and independent oversight bodies such as national human rights institutions. Primarily, it involves the police themselves.

Key elements of an effective police accountability system include:

Legislation (in line with international human rights law) specifying the functions and powers of the police

Practical instructions based on the legislation that reflect both the spirit and the letter of the law

Opportunities for the public to voice their concerns Policies that set priorities on how to deploy police capacity Adequate police training, both basic and ongoing Equipment that is adequate for prescribed police functions Proper reporting procedures and facilities Adequate supervision that supports officers in carrying out their duties

professionally and reporting these correctly A working culture that promotes transparency and evaluation Monitoring of police actions and operations by both police leadership and

external organs Complaints procedures, both for making complaints to the police directly and

to independent bodies Fair and effective procedures and policies on how to deal with misconduct,

including both disciplinary and criminal codes, adequate investigative capacity, procedures for punishment and appeal procedures

An independent body to oversee such procedures Scrutiny and oversight involving feedback to the police in order to improve

future activities and prevent future wrongdoings Evaluation and complaints procedures that contribute to the development of

new policies, procedures and instructions

6 Policing the Police in the United Kingdom

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Reliable statistics on police performance, related both to effectiveness in dealing with crime and public order, as well as to their integrity and public confidence

Procedures for overseeing the feedback, evaluation and complaints procedures and statistics

In all countries, the police are accountable to the line of command within the police force and also to external authorities, usually, at a minimum, the minister of the interior and/or the prime minister (who can command the police), the judiciary (whose verdicts and other orders the police have to comply with) and the legislature (which drafts laws and approves the police budget); and there is often a national human rights institution that plays a role in police oversight.

Internal and external police accountability mechanisms both have strengths and weaknesses. While external systems are likely to be more credible in the eyes of the public, they are less likely to succeed in unraveling systematic police misconduct without the support of the police management. They often lack the necessary investigative skills, especially when having to operate within the context of insular police culture.

Internal mechanisms can be only as effective as the commitment of police managers to tackling misconduct, and such managers are often reluctant to expose large-scale misconduct because of its overall effect on the image of the entire force. As a result of the widespread belief that police managers will protect their own, the internal mechanism is less credible from the standpoint of citizens. Public confidence may also be compromised by the fact that obtaining access to information acquired using internal mechanisms is often difficult because the process can be opaque. In addition, internal mechanisms are often limited in scope and tend to concentrate only on reactive (punitive) measures, as opposed to proactive (preventive) measures. Nevertheless, the police bear the prime responsibility for the integrity and overall performance of their force, and as a consequence they should continue to carry out internal investigations. This can also help to prevent external bodies from becoming overloaded with work, which may seriously jeopardize their effectiveness.

The advantages of each system can be summarized as follows:

Advantages of internal accountability mechanisms:

Police take responsibility for the integrity of their organization

Internal mechanisms provide a better understanding of police misconduct and the ways in which such misconduct is covered up (including police culture)

Better investigative skills are often available

Advantages of external accountability mechanisms:

External mechanisms have more credibility in the eyes of the public

External mechanisms are not affected by police esprit de corps

External mechanisms are unbiased

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Procedures and findings are more accessible to the public

External mechanisms can strengthen police in upholding their integrity

Effective police accountability is a requirement under international law. Equally important, however, is that accountability needs to be a professional responsibility that serves as a measure of police leadership’s commitment to enforcing professionalism and integrity throughout the force. It starts at the top with leaders and managers who value integrity as evidenced by their daily behavior and decisions. The responsibility of police leadership to ensure police integrity and compliance with the law consists of the following aspects:

A clear line of command Clear and unambiguous instructions and orders Transparency of decision-making Installing an effective reporting system that is followed up by supervisors Standard operational procedures that give guidance to police officers on how

to implement laws and policies and carry out certain actions Establishing and reinforcing a mechanism for members of the public to lodge

a complaint about the police Unequivocal support for the independent oversight body and its authority

regarding the handling of complaints Establishing and reinforcing a mechanism for police officers to lodge a

complaint against, for example, a colleague or a superior Establishing and reinforcing a procedure for whistle-blowing A structure for effectuating disciplinary proceedings Taking corrective measures following proven neglect of duty or criminal

offences

3. Role and functions of the Ministry of the Interior

The executive is the branch of the State that is responsible for carrying out the State’s responsibilities. The police forms part of this executive pillar. In most countries, the Ministry of the Interior oversees the police, inspects the police and drafts guidelines for police operations. Internal accountability consists of installing an effective line of command headed by the national chief of police (or, in countries where policing has been decentralized, the Board of Police Commissioners). The national chief of police reports to either the Minister of the Interior or to the Prime Minister, who in turn reports to the parliament7.

The Police Inspectorate usually inspects police compliance with the policies formulated by the Ministry on a more strategic level, rather than individual cases of police misconduct. Such inspectorates exist in both common-law and civil-law countries, such as the following:

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in England and Wales, in Northern Ireland and in Scotland

7 UNODC Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity, Criminal Justice Handbook Series 2011, page 96.

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various inspectorates for the different police agencies in France, such as: Inspection Generale de la Gendarmerie Nationale, for the Gendarmerie; Inspection Generale de la Police Nationale, based in Paris and Inspection Generale des Services de la Police Nationale, for the rest of the country8.

Some inspectorates are internal structures that are not separate from the police, but are part of the police and report to the chief of police, for example, in Romania.

Also, some inspectorates, for example in Portugal (IGAI), investigate complaints against the police. The IGAI is an independent service for external control of police activity. It is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) and its action covers all services and security forces that depend on it ensuring the observance of citizens' rights, with attention to the protection of human rights and the maintenance of public order. In exercising this activity IGAI conducts regular inspections but also conducts enforcement actions without notice in police stations to ensure compliance with legal requirements and procedures and, in particular, the conditions of temporary detention centers and the treatment of detainees. In more severe cases such as police mistreatment, torture, injury or death of citizens - the IGAI proceeds directly to disciplinary inquiries and processes and proposes to the Minister to apply individual sanctions.

It is considered good practice for police to be accountable to a separate governmental structure. Following accountability to the law, for many police forces this is the first line of accountability outside the force9.

4. Introduction to the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK)

The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo was designed in 2006 by the OSCE with the assistance of experts from the United Kingdom and the United States who took into account models of police oversight worldwide to create the Kosovo model of independent oversight of police. PIK was established as an independent executive agency under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was designed to be independent of the Kosovo Police itself. The Law on Police Inspectorate of Kosovo was adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo in 2008 (and amended in 2010).10

PIK originally had two functions as an external mechanism of police oversight – (1) to inspect police structures and performance and, (2), to conduct investigations into all allegations of misconduct by police officers. In relation to the second function its job is to receive and investigate complaints about police officers from members of the public and to decide whether such complaints should be referred to the Kosovo Police for investigation or should be investigated by the PIK itself. The PIK is under an obligation to ensure that the Kosovo Police performs its duties and responsibilities in conformity with the European Code of Police Ethics.

8 Ibid, page 96. 9 Ibid. 10 Law no 03/L-231 and 03/L-036

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In 2010 it was decided to amend the law in order to allow PIK to investigate police officers for alleged violations of the criminal law and to give its operating staff the powers of police officers. As a result of this change of function the process of dealing with complaints from citizens was also changed. All complaints from citizens, wherever they are lodged, are sent first to the PIK for assessment. Complaints can be made via the PIK website, a dedicated complaints telephone (the Blue Line), by visiting one of the PIK offices, or by using one of the complaints forms found in special boxes in each police station. In general if the complaint does not allege a criminal act by the police it is then sent on to the Professional Standards Department of the Kosovo Police who investigate the alleged misconduct.11 PIK now primarily investigates alleged criminal activities and do so under the supervision of prosecutors. However, the PIK remains responsible for “high profile disciplinary incidents” and the disciplinary offences of the “highest rank of the senior police management level and senior appointed police positions”.12

The PIK can recommend to the KP that any police officer that they are investigating should be suspended with pay if it is necessary for the purposes of the investigation. It is common practice for all of these recommendations to be implemented by the KP. It is unusual for the prosecutor to be involved in the suspension process.

5. Police Standards Department

The Police Standards Department is the Department within the Kosovo Police run by a police Colonel whose staff investigate non-criminal allegations by citizens of police misconduct and makes recommendations to the Discipline Commission. Secondly, the PSD has responsibilities for making background and security checks. The PSD has regional offices and receives 60% to 70% of its cases from PIK. Most “light violations” of discipline are sent to the PSD regional office for investigation. The PSD can initiate discipline investigations ex-officio but refers criminal cases to the PIK.

Serious violations of human rights – such as a police failure to protect a vulnerable person from assault or a failure to investigate such a case – a credible allegation of a violation of Article 3 (the prohibition against torture or ill-treatment) – if not identified as a crime will be investigated by the PSD themselves.

The Discipline Commission consists of forty police members and are organised in to panels to consider recommendations from the PSD – panels of five for decisions involving demotion or dismissal and panels of three in other cases. The panels receive the file from PSD have hearings and hear evidence but rarely fail to support the recommendation made by PSD. Panels are held in private but can sit in public and either party can appeal.

It was suggested by the PSD that less controversial crimes – for instance traffic offences – could be safely transferred for investigation by the PSD – especially as PIK have to use police experts for such investigations.

11 Even “light injuries” caused by police officers are investigated by PIK. 12 Article 1.3, 1.4 and 1.4 of law 03/L-231

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The law in Kosovo requires that citizens who complain about police officers (even when they do so in a police station) have to have their cases sent first to the PIK for screening. Cases which do not Involve allegations of criminal conduct and which are not exceptional13 (the majority of cases) are then referred back by the PIK to the Police Standards Department for investigation. This obviously creates delays. From the citizens perspective it also creates an expectation that their complaint will be investigated independently of the police but this does not then happen. Although this is a consequence of the independent screening procedure operated by the PIK and to be welcomed, it is important that any delays are eliminated and that it is clear to the citizen from the very start exactly how the process works.

6. PIK in detail

(a) PIK mission:

“The mission of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo is through its activities to ensure a responsible, democratic and transparent police service in accordance with the applicable legislation and the required standards.”14

“The scope of PIK activity is:

1. prevention, detection, documentation and investigation of the criminal offences committed by Kosovo police employees, regardless of rank and position while on duty or off duty;

2. inspection of the structures and functions of Kosovo police to ensure accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of applicable laws, sub-legal acts and standard operational procedures that are in force;

3. investigation and/or inspection of high profile disciplinary incidents, involving Kosovo police employees;

4. investigation of all alleged disciplinary offences of police officers having the highest rank of the senior police management level and senior executive level police officers;

5. when there is a based suspicion that the general director of police has committed disciplinary violation, the prime minister may authorize the PIK to conduct the disciplinary investigations. Upon completion of disciplinary investigation the PIK shall report on findings to the Prime Minister;15 and

6. to receive all citizens complaints, as well as to review and determine where the complaints will be disseminated for investigation, either to the Kosovo police, or PIK.”

13 The PIK is responsible for high profile disciplinary incidents and the disciplinary offences of the highest rank of the senior police management level and senior appointed police positions. 14 Annual Report 2016, https://ipk.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Raporti-vjetor-ANG-2016.pdf 15 Article 2 (1.5) of the Law on the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo.

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(b) PIK Structure:

Currently PIK consists of 5 Departments falling under the direct control of the Chief Executive of the PIK. Respectively PIK operates department of investigations, department of complaints management, department of inspection, departments of planning, cooperation, legal issues and information as well as the department of finance and general services. Each department has few divisions. PIK also has procurement and audit services as well as the certifying officers. Those units are forming the part of the office of the Chief Executive as well.

(c) Staffing and resources

In 2015 the PIK had 45 investigators, 12 inspectors and 16 supporting staff, total of 73 staff.16 Initially in 2006 none of the staff were ex-police officers but police officers were recruited or transferred to deal with the need for their specific expertise when the PIK mandate changed and the investigation teams needed to deal with criminal cases. It was estimated that only some twenty of the staff recruited over the lifetime of PIK were ex-police officers. Recently an increase in the budget allowed the recruitment of four department directors, and 23 additional staff members. However:

“While the selection process of four department directors finished in March 2017, the recruitment of 23 staff members has been postponed due to delays in budget allocation. Given that the entire increase of the 2017 budget has been spent on new recruits and training, the second phase of regionalisation in the form of establishing three additional regional offices has also been postponed. Meanwhile, the PIK regional offices that opened in Mitrovica North, Gjilan/Gnjilane and Prizren in 2015 are functioning with only one officer each, limiting their work mainly to the collection of complaints. These offices are also underequipped and lack official vehicles. “17

(d) Complaints

During 2016 PIK received 1,362 complaints (compared with 1,237 in 2015) in relation to 8,902 members in the Kosovo police. There were 241 police employees who were the subject of investigation by PIK. After a review about eight hundred of these cases were sent to the Kosovo police itself for investigation with the majority of the rest investigated by the PIK. A preliminary investigation by the PIK then resulted in nearly half of these five hundred cases also being returned to the police for disciplinary inquiries. About one hundred and fifty cases were sent to the prosecution.18

16 Annual Report for 2015 https://ipk.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Annual-Report-2015.pdf 17 Eulex Compact Progress Report http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/CPR-2017.pdf 18 Annual Report for 2016

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(e) Inspections

The PIK evaluates the way the Kosovo police carries out its duties by:

“Defining if the laws, relevant regulations and principles and procedures of the Kosovo Police are implemented as they should if they are tailored in such a manner so to reach its goals;

Determining if Police resources are used in an effective and efficient manner so to reach the goals and the organizational objectives;

Prevent violations that may occur during the activity of Kosovo Police;

Identification of the shortcomings by recommending legal and organizational measures for better functioning of the Kosovo Police.”19

The Annual report summarises the inspection programme for 2016 as follows:

“Regular inspections

1. Evaluation of human resource management on the distribution of staff in Kosovo Police;

2. Evaluation of the organization and performance of police stations in the Division for Operations;

3. Inspection of detention rooms in Kosovo Police; 4. Inspection of management of weapons, ammunition and other equipment; 5. Inspection of procedures for escort, detention and arrest by the Kosovo Police;

Extraordinary inspections

1. Evaluation of the manner of the performance of police officers on November 28, 2015;

2. Evaluation of the efficacy of joint police patrols of Kosovo and Albania along the Kosovo-Albania border;

3. Evaluation of efficiency in the implementation of the memorandum of cooperation for the common organization of the road policing of the Kosovo Police and the Albanian State Police in the Republic of Albania during the summer season;

4. Evaluation of police performance during the shift taking 08-16 hour in police stations of category "A" dated 14.10.2016. “

The reports of inspections are sent to the Minister of Interior and the Director General of the Kosovo Police and then published on the website of the PIK.20

19 Annual Report for 2016 20 https://ipk.rks-gov.net/?lang=en

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7. Current situation on the ground and assessment made by the consultants

This assessment is based on three considerations:

it is evidence-based, the consultants met with significant number of people who worked within or along-side the PIK, including significant number of PIK staff and relevant NGOs active in the field of combating police ill-treatment and which represented citizens who had made complaints against the police;21

a detailed analysis of the relevant laws, PIK annual reports and other document; and

the current European standards, including laws, conventions, recommendations, soft law, and best practice.

For the purpose of this report we should distinguish the operation of the internal and external police oversight mechanisms. PIK is designed as an external oversight mechanism with a significant degree of independence from the police force but one that is accountable to the MOIA, therefore we have applied the standards that should apply to the bodies considered as independent, external police complaints mechanisms, often referred to as independent investigative mechanisms/bodies mostly mandated to investigate crimes committed by the police.

The Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland is a good example of a fully independent police complaints system and interesting because it arose in a post-conflict country.

“When the Office of the Police Ombudsman opened for business on 6 November 2000, it ushered in a new era in police complaints in Northern Ireland. Before then, complaints against the police were investigated by other police officers. The opening of the Office marked the introduction of a system of independent, impartial, civilian oversight of policing. With its own teams of professional investigators, it was the first fully-funded and completely independent police complaints organisation in the world.”22

The Independent Office for Police Conduct in England and Wales is also independent but, like PIK, does not investigate every police complaint instead only the most serious incidents and complaints involving the police.23

A few countries have opted for other types of independent internal control mechanisms through strengthening both the institutional independence of the service and securing tenure for the managers of the relevant bodies. Swedish experience is an interesting example. As of 1 January 2015 an Internal Investigation

21 As is the usual practice of Council of Europe assessment missions, the consultants were not able to investigate independently the statements, comments or allegations made about current or past specific cases handled by the oversight body. 22 https://policeombudsman.org/About-Us/History-of-the-Office 23 https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk This organisation has been recently re-structured and renamed, It was originally called the Independent Police Complaints Commission when it was created in 2003.

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Department of the Police was established. The Head of the Department is appointed by the Parliament for a fixed term reporting to the Government directly and not to the Police Commissioner. Despite significant changes the CPT still raised few concerns in its 2015 visit report to the Swedish Government. More specifically the CPT positively assessed the setting up of the new Internal Investigation Department as it considered that setting of the new body has addressed most of the CPT’s concerns regarding the investigation of police complaints. In particular, the independence of the mechanism has been strengthened significantly. However, the Internal Investigation Department may still rely on police officers working in “ordinary” police units in the course of its investigative activities, if this is necessitated by the complexity of the matter. Furthermore, it remains an open issue whether the general public will also perceive the new Department as independent, given that it is still formally a part of the Swedish Police Authority (as is even suggested by the Department’s name). Therefore, the Committee reiterated its recommendation that the Swedish authorities should reconsider the need for the investigation of complaints against the police to be entrusted to an agency, which is demonstrably independent of the police24.

Another option for the strengthening of the independence of the internal control mechanisms adopted by some other countries is appointment of the head of the mechanism by the Minister but for the fixed term and with solid safeguards enshrined in the relevant law to secure the term of appointment.

(a) PIK

The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in its report on the 2015 visit to Kosovo noted that a new Law on the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK)7 was adopted in October 2010. According to this law,8 the independence of the PIK has been reinforced and its competences extended in the context of criminal investigations against KP officers. The PIK is an executive institution under the Ministry of the Interior, whose task is to carry out criminal and high-profile9 disciplinary investigations into potential cases of misconduct (including torture and ill-treatment) by KP officers, as well as to conduct inspections of KP establishments and services. Criminal investigations are carried out under the auspices of the competent public prosecutor. The PIK is independent of the Kosovo Police and operates under the direct supervision of the Minister of the Interior whose authority does not include the operational management of the PIK. It is also noteworthy that the PIK may not disclose to the Minister or any other authority or person any information related to its investigations. The PIK is headed by a Chief Executive and comprises a total of 48 investigators and 13 inspectors25.

Indeed, PIK is well regarded as an important structure for police accountability in Kosovo by the Ombudsman, NGOs, international organisations and others. Its staff were enthusiastic about their tasks, dedicated to the PIK mandate and committed to trying to improve its effectiveness. It was agreed by most that Investigators’ skills and expertise do need some improvement. PIK staff, some NGOs and others during

24 CPT 2015 visit report to the Swedish Government, paragraph 24. 25 CPT Report on the 2015 visit to Kosovo*, paragraph 10.

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the assessment mission suggested however that it was not as effective when it came to the investigations of senior police officers. It is difficult to understand why this might be the case because the law and procedures necessary for such investigations are in place. A few of those who gave evidence to the consultants suggested this was because of the powerful influence of those officers, including their influence within the MOIA.

(b) Inspection

The PIK staff complained that during inspections the KP officers were sometimes reluctant to handover files for the PIK to review, especially when the PIK sought randomly selected files. This reluctance appeared to be partly because the disclosure had not been authorized by the supervising prosecutor (although the PIK do not need the prosecutor’s consent in such cases). Such refusals could only be resolved by the inspector contacting senior staff in PIK who, in turn, had to make contact with senior police officers. The consultants were told that on some occasions senior PIK staff were reluctant to take this action. The police have the power to refuse to disclose files to the PIK on the grounds of confidentiality. The PIK have not, so far, initiated criminal or disciplinary action against police officers who have refused to comply with such lawful requests. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has subsequently explained that these issues are not systemic, although some isolated cases might have occurred and those issues have now been resolved.

(c) Training

Considerable resources have been devoted to training PIK staff right from the very start of its existence in 2006 (by the OSCE and others).26 There were new training modules implemented when the mandate of the PIK was changed in 2010. The PIK are now developing their own training plan, with a dedicated staff member in PIK who has specific responsibility for this function. In-house training needs assessment was conducted and the staff of the PIK proposed the list of the trainings they wish to attend in the course of 2018. The list includes 26 training modules on different topics including advanced training on the investigation of cases of trafficking of human beings, investigation of drug related crimes, inspections of the crime sites, analyzing information sources, intelligence activities, investigation of financial and economic crimes as well organized crime and corruption/fraud cases, infiltration of the agents and management of covert operations, advanced interviewing skills, rules of procedures on arrest and detention by the police and concepts of community policing. In addition the PIK staff members identified such training needs as international cooperation and prosecutions, drafting of inspection reports, procurement procedures, auditing, control of public finances, human resource management, statistics, IT technologies, operational decision making and planning.

It is evident that most of the available trainings is likely to be provided in practice by the Kosovo Academy of Public Safety and will be held in conjunction with the training of police officers. It is also clear that the Academy does not have the

26 A summary of the training provided to PIK during its first few years is set out in the PIK’s Annual Report for 2015 and for 2016 in the 2016 Annual Report.

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capacity to provide training on all the topics listed by the PIK staff. PIK needs to come up with a short list of top priority training needs that should be planned and implemented during the coming year and it can then send these requirements to the organizations willing to assist PIK with the provision of the in-house training and with donor assistance.

It was clear that a great deal of training on human rights had been undertaken but it still had to be determined how much of this was practically based and could be easily integrated into PIK’s daily work.

Some concern was expressed about training – training by more experienced staff given to other PIK staff obviously reduced the overall capacity to deal with investigations and inspections.

There was a desire expressed by PIK staff for advanced training, perhaps from experts from other countries and study visits to other police oversight bodies, and that this should be designed specifically for the work of PIK (rather they restricted to more general training provided alongside other police officers).

(d) Role of prosecutors

The supervision of PIK cases by prosecutors at some stage was dealt with by specifically dedicated prosecutors but now the allocated prosecutor will depend only on the local area where the crime was committed. The consultants were told that conflicts of interest, which might result from prosecutors working regularly with police officers, are dealt with prosecutors themselves identifying these and requesting recusal (or being identified by their supervisors). In the “Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning independent and effective determination of complaints against the police” the Council of Europe Commissioner stated;

“In some member states there is concern that the close working relationship between the police and prosecution authority in standard criminal proceedings may undermine independence and impartiality in prosecution practice. A major cause of concern is that co-operation between police investigators and prosecution lawyers may tarnish the independence of prosecutors when working on cases against police officers. In an attempt to deal with this problem specialist criminal prosecution authorities with their own investigators have been established in some jurisdictions to investigate complaints against police officers and conduct criminal proceedings.”27

The distribution of PIK cases and the appointment of supervising prosecutors is not a responsibility of PIK and this competence rests with the Prosecution authorities. The Ministry of Internal Affairs believes that “the assessment that the assigning of prosecutors who would deal exclusively with cases submitted from KPI would make the process more efficient in handling cases against the police. “

27 https://rm.coe.int/16806daa54

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The consultants also received information about difficult communication issues between PIK staff and prosecutors. Sometimes they have difficulty with getting instructions from prosecutors on how they should proceed with an investigation. Concerns were raised that the prosecutor does not always report on the progress of a prosecution (whether or not it is sent to the court and/or the outcome of any proceedings).28 This is frustrating for any conscientious investigator and creates additional issues for any parallel discipline process and is not good practice for police officers under suspicion having his or her case dealt with promptly. Reportedly prosecutors are aware of these issues and wish to overcome them – possibly once a common case management system is in place – although this may be some way off. It was suggested that a Memorandum of Understanding agreed by PIK and prosecutors might assist in setting out the relevant responsibilities.

(e) Additional powers

The PIK staff were concerned about the difficulty of deploying integrity investigation on officers suspected of criminal activity or serious misconduct. There were two problems identified. Firstly, because of the need to obtain consent of the supervising prosecutor that proved to be difficult to obtain. Secondly (and perhaps partly the cause of the first problem), there was a gap in the criminal Code of Kosovo which means that such procedures are not possible for PIK. Attempts to amend this problem have not been successful. It appears that the principle of law enforcement agencies avoiding entrapment in criminal cases is appreciated by the PIK and this power will respect European standards. 29 There is no equivalent European prohibition on the use of entrapment in discipline only cases.

The PIK also suggested it should be given the necessary surveillance powers and the resources to set up a surveillance unit to use new technological devices to collect evidence. It was also suggested that this should include the facility to develop a network of informants. There is no doubt that such tools would assist the PIK with its work and to identify criminal activities by police officers and to route this out and ensure the conviction of the guilty. They can be developed and available to PIK as soon as PIK is in a position to use them properly and carefully, subject to relevant controls, and only in accordance with criminal procedural legislation of Kosovo and only in compliance with other relevant laws, such as data protection and European standards in order to prevent any possible abuse.

Any surveillance by the state, including by the PIK is likely to engage Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to privacy) which is a qualified right. In order to be justified therefore any interference by the state with a person’s Article 8 rights must fall within one of the exceptions detailed in Article 8(2) and must meet the general requirements of justification (it must be in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society). Relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights provides a detailed guidance on this issue30.

28 The lack of information also prevents the PIK from accurately reporting on statistical outcomes in its Annual Reports. 29 See for instance the judgment of the ECtHR Veselov and Others v Russia, 2012. 30 Khan v. the United Kingdom , 35394/97, 12 May 2000 36

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Both the Independent Office for Police Conduct31 and the Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman32 have the power to use these kinds of investigatory tools. As stated above, possession of such tools by the bodies in charge of police oversight can largely contribute to the increased effectiveness of their investigations when adequate legal and operational safeguards are in place. Those tools also make them less dependent on the involvement of the police in their work. The network European Partners Against Corruption also suggests that the following key principle:

“The police oversight body’s investigators must be provided with the full range of police powers to enable them to conduct fair, independent and effective investigations, in particular the power to obtain all the information necessary to conduct an effective investigation.”33

The customs law-enforcement service of Kosovo is not subject to the oversight of PIK. This is unfortunate and should be remedied but the present priority must be to build the effectiveness and capacity of PIK before adding to its remit.

(f) Delays and communications

The overall process of investigation, prosecution, criminal court hearings and resolution of discipline issues can be considerable. Any discipline investigations have to be resolved within a specific limitation period but time is suspended for the period of the criminal process. There is no legal prohibition to prevent a police officer being disciplined or dismissed before the conclusion of the parallel criminal process but it is not clear how often this has happened.

(g) Awareness

PIK has expanded its resources to promote awareness of its complaints handling system (including its Blue Line call centre) but, as in many complaints systems elsewhere in Europe, providing useful information on police complaints to everyone is a difficult task. The development of regional offices is also a very positive sign and the resources should be available to set more of these up quickly. NGOs were concerned that many citizens, particularly young people, did not understand the system. Information needs to be targeted widely so that citizens understand their right to complain and how it works. Perhaps information could also be targeted to those most likely to have difficult interactions with the police (young people, protest groups and vulnerable groups). There is also a need to ensure that the material is available in other languages (including on the PIK website), starting with the Kosovo official languages.

(h) Wall of silence and whistleblowers

Malone v. the United Kingdom 2 August 1984, § 84, Series A no. 82 Copland v. United Kingdom, 3 April 2007 No. 62617/00. 31 The Independent Police Complaints Commission (Investigatory Powers) Order 2004 32 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2013 33 Principle 2.5.1.and see paragraph 3(a) of the UN’s Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

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It was not clear whether or not there were any specific systems or procedures that encouraged or protected police officers who disclosed to the PIK criminal offences or the misconduct of their colleagues but PIK did not give examples of this having happened. In the United Kingdom all employees, including police officers, are protected from dismissal if they report a crime committed by their colleagues. The disclosure of this wrongdoing must be in the public interest. This means it must affect others, the general public. As a whistle-blower a person should be protected by law, should not be treated unfairly and should not lose his or her job because they ‘blow the whistle’.

(i) Resources and staff

PIK would benefit from additional staff and also needs additional experts in a variety of areas as well as the resources to pay for these (particularly forensic experts). However the use of police officer experts, if properly supervised and controlled by PIK investigators and for less controversial or sensitive parts of investigations, should not be ruled out. It would be reasonable for the PIK to have the capacities, including financial to directly employ all the experts that are required regularly and minimize the use of experts from the Police to the maximum extent.

Finally, it was suggested that PIK needed a secure evidence room during an investigation and before the whole file is transferred to the prosecution for consideration.

(j) Independence

There is clear evidence that the PIK is independent of the police both as set out in the law and in practice. There were allegations however from some NGOs and other interlocutors that the PIK was not as effective in its investigations of police officers as it should be.

The law provides that PIK as an executive agency of the MOIA. Article 6(1):

“PIK is an executive institution under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, independent from the Kosovo Police and under direct subordination of the Minister.”

Whilst this clearly confirms the independence of PIK from the KP, the relationship with the Ministry is less clearly formulated.34 Its budget, despite being a separate line, is also part of the MOIA’s budget.35 The Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the authors of this report that the Minister consistently supports the increase of PIK’s budget, publicly as well as in internal discussions with the government and the Ministry of Finance. The Minister has also requested support and involvement from the Assembly, the Commission for Internal Affairs, and other relevant actors to assist in solving recent problems in PIK as well as improving the functioning and accountability of PIK.

34 Article 10(1). 35 Article 9(1).

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Chief Executive is nominated by Senior Public Commission in accordance with procedure for nomination of high officials of civil service and this provides added independence. The Commission proposes three candidates to the Minister and the Minister appoints one of the three candidates proposed by the Commission. However protection from interference from the MOIA in its operational activities, including the cases investigated is robustly provided in the PIK law.36

“Each person in charge of governance and control of police oversight body should be appointed by and answerable to a legislative assembly or a committee of elected representatives that does not have express responsibilities for the delivery of policing services.” 37

There is always a possibility that a police oversight body’s reporting obligations to a government ministry allow influence beyond that set out in the law. This possibility is more likely when both the oversight body and the police report to the same ministry, potentially creating certain risks in undermining the required level of neutrality to be maintained by the Ministry in such a setting. This can be more difficult when the oversight body has responsibility for investigating senior police officers who are likely to know and regularly have meetings with senior ministry staff.

Administrative Instruction 01/2017 for work conditions and hiring of the KPI officers ensures that after the recruitment staff undergo a 6 month training period and then undergo a 6 month trial period, after successfully finishing both of these phases, they are then given a permanent contract. Senior staff raised the issue of the absence of permanent security of employment, as the senior officials of the inspectorate are required to undergo an internal review after four years from starting a job in PIK.

There are number of ways to further strengthen the independence of PIK. First of all, necessary resources should be committed to equip PIK with adequate human and financial resources. Continuous in-service training and capacity building to enhance PIK operational capacity and efficiency are also essential tools to strengthen its operational independence. Further consideration could be given to reviewing the relevant legal regime governing the PIK operations, including through the ongoing mechanism of the Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector. One of the possibilities is amending the Law on PIK to ensure greater independence for the PIK. For example the authorities can consider reformulating Article 6 of the law on Police Inspectorate.

The European Partners Against Corruption’s, Police Oversight Principles state:

36 Article 10(3). 37 https://www.epac-eacn.org/downloads/recommendations/doc_view/2-police-oversight-principles.

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“A police oversight body should have the necessary independence to carry out its duties. At least one should ideally not form part of the executive branch of the government and should report directly to Parliament.”38

European standards do not require a ban on police oversight bodies employing police officers although oversight bodies in some countries do impose some restrictions on police officers being the head of the body. There was particular concern expressed during the assessment mission about the possibility of operational independence being compromised by PIK staff leaving PIK to take up positions in the police. Such a restriction is designed to avoid any suggestion that a police officer working with PIK would not investigate his or her colleagues robustly because it might affect his future relationships when he returned to the police force. This is an approach which has been introduced in Northern Ireland and England and Wales and has general support elsewhere.39

5. Conclusion and recommendations As a result of the assessment mission and analysis of the documents and practice conducted by the consultants it transpires that the legal norms regulating the functioning of the PIK comply with most of the European standards. The staffing and structure of the PIK is generally sensible and it clearly has independence from the police themselves. The PIK also has functional independence from the MOIA and its staff are committed to implement the mandate in an efficient manner and also to develop the capacities as an inspectorate still further, through professional training and capacity building. At a constitutional level the supervision by the prosecution of criminal investigations undertaken by PIK is also a guarantee of independence. Still, there is a room for improvement as we have described above and summarised below. It is hoped that these recommendations will help to further enhancing PIK’s confidence and authority and, as a result, ensure greater effectiveness in a very challenging environment. List of specific suggestions and recommendations:

PIK should monitor any examples of police officers who are reluctant to handover files for the PIK to review, especially when the PIK sought randomly selected files. If the issue arises PIK should make use of available procedures, including through regular meetings, to resolve the communication issues and the problem of police officers. If this does not resolve the issue PIK should use its powers to sanction reluctant officers.

38 See also the Handbook for Evaluating the Effectiveness/Efficiency of Police Oversight Bodies. European Partners against Corruption is an independent network bringing together more than 60 anti-corruption authorities and police oversight bodies from Council of Europe Member Countries. 39 See 2.2.7 of the EPAC principles

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Resources should be made available to initiate advanced training for PIK staff, perhaps including from experts from other countries and study visits to other police oversight bodies. This advanced training should be designed specifically for the work of PIK.

PIK needs to produce a short list of top priority training needs that should be planned and implemented during the coming year and to seek external resources for the provision of the training which cannot be delivered by the Academy. PIK also needs a clear training regime:

o Induction training for new recruits – this needs to cover the law and the complaints system, investigation skills in different areas covered by the PIK and dealt more frequently, interview techniques, gathering and preserving evidence (including forensic evidence)

o Advanced training for the different roles in PIK, also specialized training to identify crimes and misconduct when the suspects themselves are experts in how the criminal justice system functions;

o Advanced trainings in budget planning, management and procurement for the specialized staff members only.

o Trainings on the development of the communication strategy and public relations with the aim to make PIK work more visible and increase awareness of general public on the PIK functions.

Although not the responsibility of PIK, conflicts of interest, which might result from prosecutors working regularly with police officers, should be avoided by having dedicated prosecutors for PIK to work with. There should also be a clearer set of rules for prosecutors to identify and avoid conflicts.

The difficulty with communication issues with prosecutors need to be resolved, perhaps with a detailed MOU setting out the responsibilities of both the prosecutor and the PIK.

The difficulty of deploying integrity tests should be resolved and developing greater better working relationships with the prosecution (but ensuring that the prohibition against entrapment is respected).

The necessary surveillance powers, the resources to set up a surveillance unit to use new technological devices to collect evidence and the facility to develop a network of informants should be developed and available to PIK as soon as PIK is in a position to use them properly and carefully in accordance with European standards as outlined above, the criminal procedural legislation of Kosovo and other relevant laws. If needed, additional safeguards must be put in place to prevent any possible abuse.

The headquarters of PIK is outside the city and in an isolated and unwelcoming area, this does not contribute to its importance, accessibility or confidence and consideration should be given to an office in the city to

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provide awareness and for visitors and complainants. The development of regional offices should also be continued. An awareness campaign focused on PIK should be initiated and properly resourced. Information needs to be targeted widely so that the majority of citizens understand their right to complain and how it works and should also be targeted to those most likely to have difficult interactions with the police. Such groups will include women, people from ethnic minorities, young people, protest groups and other vulnerable people and information needs to be available at the places that they are likely to visit, for instance, places that women suffering from domestic violence are likely to go to for assistance, such as police stations, specialised shelters, etc. There is also a need to ensure that the material is available in other non-majority languages (including on the PIK website).

It is clear that the PIK needs to recruit extra staff to handle its current workload, to set up and run more regional offices all around Kosovo and needs additional expertise in a variety of areas and the resources to pay for these (particularly forensic experts).

Consideration should be given to reassuring senior staff that their employment security will continue after four years provided that they are performing well and the four-year review will be based on objective and transparent criteria.

PIK needs a secure evidence room during an investigation and before the whole file can be transferred to the prosecution for consideration.

A significant number of the above recommendations will require a significant increase in the budget of the PIK. We recommend the budget is increased quickly with the support of the Minister of the MOIA.

Investing in human and financial resources, adequate training and other related actions should be taken as a priority in order to further enhance PIK’s functional and operational independence. Consideration also can be given to further legislative revisions, including through the ongoing process of the Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector (including, for instance, by removing the provision stating that the PIK is the executive institution of MOIA).

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ANNEX I: Short bios of the international consultants George Tugushi is a human rights lawyer with a practical and theoretical experience in the field of human rights with a particular focus on torture prevention and monitoring. He graduated as a lawyer Tbilisi State University, Faculty of International Law and Relations in 1999. In 2001 he graduated from the Georgian-American Institute of Public Administration (GIPA) with an MA in Public Administration. In 2004 he graduated from the Lund University, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law with LL.M. in International Human Rights Law. As of January 2012 he is a Doctoral Student at the Faculty of Law of the Tbilisi State University. George Tugushi is serving his third consecutive mandate as the elected member of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in respect of Georgia, having first been elected to this seat in March 2005. He is currently the chairman of CPT’s Jurisprudence Working Group. George Tugushi is also the former member of the UN Committee against Torture (UNCAT), Vice-Chairperson and Rapporteur on Reprisals of the Committee. He also served as the Human Rights Ombudsman of Georgia during 2009-2012 and Head of the National Preventive Mechanism formed under OPCAT. He is also the member of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). In addition he has served as an expert for the Council of Europe, European Union and UN on a number of occasions under individual assignments related to the establishment of the NPMs in Eastern Europe, analysis of the legislation related to the National Human Rights Institutions and NPMs and delivered trainings to the members of the NPMs and Ombudsman Institutions in different parts of the world including Europe and Asia. His working record also includes positions in the OSCE, UNDP and various EU Projects implemented by the Austrian Company “Human Dynamics”. Mr. Tugushi is lecturing international human rights law in the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs since 2005. John Wadham: Chair of the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism Previously: Executive Director, INTERIGHTS (International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights); General Counsel, Equality and Human Rights Commission; Deputy Chair, Independent Police Complaints Commission and; Director of Liberty. Member of the Law Society's Human Rights Committee; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Kings College London; Visiting Fellow, Bristol University; Visiting Lecturer, University of Auckland and, Honorary Lecturer, University of Leicester. Author of the Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act, the Blackstone’s Guide to the FOIA, and the Blackstone’s Guide to the Equality Act. Recent projects as an expert/consultant: Human Rights Implementation Project, University of Bristol: interventions & amicus in cases before the African Court & Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights Commonwealth Secretariat: (1) Assessment of the Seychelles National Human Rights Commission; and (2) Rule of Law, expert panel member

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United Nations Development Program: (1) Coaching & training Equality Council of Moldova non-discrimination principles & decision-writing; (2) Research report discrimination decisions by courts and Equality Council Moldova; (3) Research report on regional structures: Ombudsman, Ukraine; (4) Georgian government on Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (co-ordination, focal points & capacity building. Council of Europe projects: Albania: Effectiveness of the Albanian system of human rights protection and anti-discrimination; Armenia: (1) Discrimination and prohibition on torture; (2) Prohibition on torture and arbitrary detention - training judges); (3) Combating Ill-Treatment and Impunity; (4) Assessing the ECHR Compliance of the draft Criminal Code; Azerbaijan: (1) Liberty and arbitrary detention; (2) Development of ECHR Curriculum for training judges with the Academy of Justice; Georgia: (1) Gender violence and discrimination, and (2) Amicus Curiae and the Public Defender; (3) Justice academy training of judges on hate crime; HELP platform (1) Pre-Trial Investigations; (2) Article 5, arrest and detention; Kazakhstan: expert on National Preventive Mechanisms; “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”: (2) legal assessment of the Law on the Police and Protest; (2) training programme for police officers to avoid ill-treatment; (3) training programme for the Ministry of Internal Affairs: investigating misconduct by police officers; Moldova: (1) The Moldovan Constitutional Court: Protection of personal data; (2) Hate speech, Discrimination and Freedom of Expression; (3) Strategic litigation for human rights; Montenegro: Protection of human rights of detained and sentenced persons to avoid ill-treatment by police officers; Romania: Preparation of training materials and leading training of police officers responsible for remand detention in Romania on issues of ill-treatment in five two-day training seminars Serbia: (1) Assessing the police complaints system; (2) Assessing the independent oversight of police complaints system; Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: panel expert; Turkey: Freedom of expression and personal information, training judges; Ukraine: (1) Effective Police Investigations; (2) Council of Europe opinion on The Special Bureau of Investigation; (3) Training Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial in Criminal Proceedings; (4) Enforcement of judgments from the ECtHR, assessing internal governmental procedures.

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ANNEX II: Comments by the beneficiary on the Assessment Report on the Police

Inspectorate of Kosovo

Regarding the first recommendation, related to the communication with the Kosovo Police

and problems arisen in regard to the access in some sensitive documents, as mentioned in

the meeting, there could be some special cases, which were clarified with time and KPI has

not had any issues with receiving any kind of documents from Kosovo Police for

investigation or inspection purposes.

Regarding the recommendation related to the communication with prosecutors and the

potential conflict of interest with them, KPI in general has a good cooperation with all

prosecution offices, and all of these offices have an appointed prosecutor responsible for all

of the cases handled from KPI for initial consultations. Distribution of cases and appointment

of competencies for prosecutors is done according to the rules of the Prosecution and is

outside of the KPI domain, to determine which prosecutors should deal with KPI cases

submitted to the prosecution. We agree with the assessment that the assigning of

prosecutors who would deal exclusively with cases submitted from KPI would make the

process more efficient in handling cases against the police.

Regarding the recommendation which has to do with the status of KPI officers, referring to

the Administrative Instruction 01/2017 for work conditions and hiring of the KPI officers,

operational officers of KPI, after the recruitment undergo a 6 month training period, after

successfully finishing the training they undergo a 6 month trial period, after successfully

finishing both of these phases, they sign a permanent contract. Therefore, the conclusion

hat KPI staff has a temporary status is not true. The four year mandate is applicable only for

the senior management positions, and every four years they undergo internal recruitment as

set out by the procedures in the Administrative Instructions.

In reference to recommendation no. 12, the statement that the budget increase must be done “with the explicit public support of the Minister of the MIA”, the Minister consistently supports the increase of PIK’s budget, publicly as well as in internal discussions with the government and the Ministry of Finance. More specifically, in recent discussions on PIK, the Minister has requested support and involvement from the Assembly, the Commission for Internal Affairs, and other relevant actors to assist in solving recent problems in PIK as well as improving the functioning and accountability of PIK.

In reference to the recommendation on “further legislative revisions … (including, for instance, by removing the provision stating that the PIK is the executive institution of MOIA,” the report does not provide enough analysis and arguments that would support the recommendation to remove PIK as an executive institution within MOIA. Moreover there is no comparative analysis on the benefits of placing an agency under the supervision of the assembly in Kosovo. Furthermore, in reference to the statement within the same recommendation on “strengthening budgetary independence of PIK via removing it from the budget of MOIA”, the report does not provide any evidence that there are problems with the current system. PIK has the same budgetary independence as Kosovo Police and until today there were no concerns from PIK or KP with regards to budget management and independence. As such we recommend removing both of these recommendations.