truthmaking – in defense of a dogmaphilipp.philosophie.ch/handouts/2012-10-25-dogma.pdfoct 25,...

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......Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

Philipp Blum

Université de Genève

PhilEAs, October 25, 2012

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Preliminaries: the business of philosophy

PresuppositionsThe business of philosophy is to make sense of the world,both as we find it and as it is in itself.

Part of this account is to provide explanations.Such explanations are of a special, ill-understood type.They are neither (purely) causal nor (purely) conceptual.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Preliminaries: the business of philosophy

PresuppositionsThe business of philosophy is to make sense of the world,both as we find it and as it is in itself.

Part of this account is to provide explanations.Such explanations are of a special, ill-understood type.They are neither (purely) causal nor (purely) conceptual.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Preliminaries: the business of philosophy

PresuppositionsThe business of philosophy is to make sense of the world,both as we find it and as it is in itself.Part of this account is to provide explanations.

Such explanations are of a special, ill-understood type.They are neither (purely) causal nor (purely) conceptual.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Preliminaries: the business of philosophy

PresuppositionsThe business of philosophy is to make sense of the world,both as we find it and as it is in itself.Part of this account is to provide explanations.

Such explanations are of a special, ill-understood type.They are neither (purely) causal nor (purely) conceptual.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Preliminaries: the business of philosophy

PresuppositionsThe business of philosophy is to make sense of the world,both as we find it and as it is in itself.Part of this account is to provide explanations.Such explanations are of a special, ill-understood type.They are neither (purely) causal nor (purely) conceptual.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege.

He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.

And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine.

He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.

And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis.

He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.

And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong.

He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.

And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. An opiniated history

First, there was Frege. He said that something is an object iff itcan be the referent of a name.And he ran into the paradox of the concept horse.

Then, there was Quine. He said that to be is to be the value ofa bound variable.And he did not allow for intensional contexts.

Then, there was Lewis. He showed how to interpret quantifiedmodal logic in an ontologically serious way.And he ended up with modal realism.

Then, there was Armstrong. He did ontological justice to thepredicate by accepting universals.And he ended up with a world of states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Problems with ontological commitment

it overgeneralises Does “there are three ways to makespaghetti” really commit us to ways of makingspaghetti?

it undergeneralises “Mary observed what John knows”, “Johnis something Mary is too, namely generous” and“John works a way Mary has never noticed,namely efficiently” have anaphoric links inpositions that are not for names.

General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newmanproblem.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Problems with ontological commitment

it overgeneralises Does “there are three ways to makespaghetti” really commit us to ways of makingspaghetti?

it undergeneralises “Mary observed what John knows”, “Johnis something Mary is too, namely generous” and“John works a way Mary has never noticed,namely efficiently” have anaphoric links inpositions that are not for names.

General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newmanproblem.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Problems with ontological commitment

it overgeneralises Does “there are three ways to makespaghetti” really commit us to ways of makingspaghetti?

it undergeneralises “Mary observed what John knows”, “Johnis something Mary is too, namely generous” and“John works a way Mary has never noticed,namely efficiently” have anaphoric links inpositions that are not for names.

General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newmanproblem.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Problems with ontological commitment

it overgeneralises Does “there are three ways to makespaghetti” really commit us to ways of makingspaghetti?

it undergeneralises “Mary observed what John knows”, “Johnis something Mary is too, namely generous” and“John works a way Mary has never noticed,namely efficiently” have anaphoric links inpositions that are not for names.

General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newmanproblem.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Problems with ontological commitment

it overgeneralises Does “there are three ways to makespaghetti” really commit us to ways of makingspaghetti?

it undergeneralises “Mary observed what John knows”, “Johnis something Mary is too, namely generous” and“John works a way Mary has never noticed,namely efficiently” have anaphoric links inpositions that are not for names.

General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newmanproblem.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Problems with ontological commitment

it overgeneralises Does “there are three ways to makespaghetti” really commit us to ways of makingspaghetti?

it undergeneralises “Mary observed what John knows”, “Johnis something Mary is too, namely generous” and“John works a way Mary has never noticed,namely efficiently” have anaphoric links inpositions that are not for names.

General defect: commitment is to domains only; Newmanproblem.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:

...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true bysomething.

...2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because theworld is how it is; truth is never brute.

These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:

...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true bysomething.

...2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because theworld is how it is; truth is never brute.

These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true by

something.

...2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because theworld is how it is; truth is never brute.

These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true by

something.

...2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because theworld is how it is; truth is never brute.

These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true by

something....2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because the

world is how it is; truth is never brute.

These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true by

something....2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because the

world is how it is; truth is never brute.

These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking: the basics

Ontological seriousness:. . . the truthmaker insight, as I take it to be, preventsthe metaphysician from letting dispositions ‘hang in theair’ as they do in Ryle’s philosophy of mind. For onewho espouses truth-makers, such hanging on air isthe ultimate sin in metaphysics. (Armstrong 2002: 29)

The truthmaking intuition:...1 Truth is relational: being true is being made true by

something....2 Truth is grounded: true truthbearers are true because the

world is how it is; truth is never brute.These two tenets are interrelated: the relationality of truthmeans that the grounds must enter into true ascriptions of truth;the groundedness means that the other relatum of suchascriptions must be of an ontological, rather than say of anepistemological or representational nature.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. First stab: necessitation and supervenience

Truthmaking as necessitation:a makes it true that p iff a exists ∧ !(a exists → p)

Two problems:

(A) The relation is not cross-categorical.(B) Dependence cannot be caracterised modally.(C) Specific focus on existence facts.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. First stab: necessitation and supervenience

Truthmaking as necessitation:a makes it true that p iff a exists ∧ !(a exists → p)

Two problems:

(A) The relation is not cross-categorical.

(B) Dependence cannot be caracterised modally.(C) Specific focus on existence facts.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. First stab: necessitation and supervenience

Truthmaking as necessitation:a makes it true that p iff a exists ∧ !(a exists → p)

Two problems:

(A) The relation is not cross-categorical.(B) Dependence cannot be caracterised modally.

(C) Specific focus on existence facts.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. First stab: necessitation and supervenience

Truthmaking as necessitation:a makes it true that p iff a exists ∧ !(a exists → p)

Two problems:

(A) The relation is not cross-categorical.(B) Dependence cannot be caracterised modally.(C) Specific focus on existence facts.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Supervenience is not enough

The strongest truthmaking principle Lewis (2003: 26) isprepared to accept:

. . . every proposition, no matter what lesser subjectmatter it may have, is entirely about being. It cannothave different truth values in two worlds exactly alikewith respect to being.

Three problems:

...1 It rules out indiscernible worlds (on plausible criteria for theindividuation of possible worlds).

...2 It does not solve problem (A): It does not captureontological seriousness.

...3 It does not solve problem (B): It does not rule outmalignant necessitators.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Supervenience is not enough

The strongest truthmaking principle Lewis (2003: 26) isprepared to accept:

. . . every proposition, no matter what lesser subjectmatter it may have, is entirely about being. It cannothave different truth values in two worlds exactly alikewith respect to being.

Three problems:

...1 It rules out indiscernible worlds (on plausible criteria for theindividuation of possible worlds).

...2 It does not solve problem (A): It does not captureontological seriousness.

...3 It does not solve problem (B): It does not rule outmalignant necessitators.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Supervenience is not enough

The strongest truthmaking principle Lewis (2003: 26) isprepared to accept:

. . . every proposition, no matter what lesser subjectmatter it may have, is entirely about being. It cannothave different truth values in two worlds exactly alikewith respect to being.

Three problems:...1 It rules out indiscernible worlds (on plausible criteria for the

individuation of possible worlds).

...2 It does not solve problem (A): It does not captureontological seriousness.

...3 It does not solve problem (B): It does not rule outmalignant necessitators.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Supervenience is not enough

The strongest truthmaking principle Lewis (2003: 26) isprepared to accept:

. . . every proposition, no matter what lesser subjectmatter it may have, is entirely about being. It cannothave different truth values in two worlds exactly alikewith respect to being.

Three problems:...1 It rules out indiscernible worlds (on plausible criteria for the

individuation of possible worlds)....2 It does not solve problem (A): It does not capture

ontological seriousness.

...3 It does not solve problem (B): It does not rule outmalignant necessitators.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Supervenience is not enough

The strongest truthmaking principle Lewis (2003: 26) isprepared to accept:

. . . every proposition, no matter what lesser subjectmatter it may have, is entirely about being. It cannothave different truth values in two worlds exactly alikewith respect to being.

Three problems:...1 It rules out indiscernible worlds (on plausible criteria for the

individuation of possible worlds)....2 It does not solve problem (A): It does not capture

ontological seriousness....3 It does not solve problem (B): It does not rule out

malignant necessitators.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers? (3) because

(2), (2) because (1):

(1) Sam is a dog.(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers?

(3) because

(2), (2) because (1):

(1) Sam is a dog.(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers? (3) because

(2), (2) because (1):(1) Sam is a dog.

(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers? (3) because

(2), (2) because (1):(1) Sam is a dog.(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.

(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers? (3) because

(2), (2) because (1):(1) Sam is a dog.(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers? (3) because

(2), (2) because (1):(1) Sam is a dog.(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explaining the T -schema

Tarski’s T -schema: It is true that p iff p

Eutyphro question: which side wears the trousers? (3) because

(2), (2) because (1):(1) Sam is a dog.(2) “Sam is a dog” is true.(3) “Sam is a dog” is made true by Sam.

So far, so good.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truth

Being true is (nothing but) being made true.

Denying truthmaker maximalism (every truth has a truthmaker)commits us to dualism about truth.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truth

Being true is (nothing but) being made true.

Denying truthmaker maximalism (every truth has a truthmaker)commits us to dualism about truth.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truth

Being true is (nothing but) being made true.

Denying truthmaker maximalism (every truth has a truthmaker)commits us to dualism about truth.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.

Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. TTT as an explanatory theory of truths

It is a mistake to think that the explanations of truths offered bytruthmaker theory are claims to the effect that they havesuch-and-such truthmakers. Consider:

(4) Sam is a dog because “Sam is a dog” is made trueby Sam.

(5) “Sam is a dog” is true because it is made true bySam.

(6) “Sam is a dog” is true because of Sam.Both (4) and (5) are false. (6), however, is true.

(6) is the statement that Sam is the truthmaker of “Sam is adog”.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking is explanation by things

Not everyone is happy with the identification of being made truewith being true because of.

A long tradition, from Kant to Brandom and McDowell holds thatexplanations necessarily stay within the realm of reason. TTT isopposed to this tradition, and derives from this opposition theright to claim to be a version of the correspondance theory oftruth.

Truthmaking, as explanation by things, is cross-categorical(solving problem (A)), non-modal (solving problem (B)) anddoes not privilege existence facts (solving ‘problem’ C).

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking is explanation by things

Not everyone is happy with the identification of being made truewith being true because of.

A long tradition, from Kant to Brandom and McDowell holds thatexplanations necessarily stay within the realm of reason. TTT isopposed to this tradition, and derives from this opposition theright to claim to be a version of the correspondance theory oftruth.

Truthmaking, as explanation by things, is cross-categorical(solving problem (A)), non-modal (solving problem (B)) anddoes not privilege existence facts (solving ‘problem’ C).

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Truthmaking is explanation by things

Not everyone is happy with the identification of being made truewith being true because of.

A long tradition, from Kant to Brandom and McDowell holds thatexplanations necessarily stay within the realm of reason. TTT isopposed to this tradition, and derives from this opposition theright to claim to be a version of the correspondance theory oftruth.

Truthmaking, as explanation by things, is cross-categorical(solving problem (A)), non-modal (solving problem (B)) anddoes not privilege existence facts (solving ‘problem’ C).

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Beyond dogs. . . – to facts?

From TTT to states of affairs:If it is said that the truthmaker for a truth could havefailed to make the truth true, then we will surely thinkthat the alleged truthmaker was insufficient by itselfand requires to be supplemented in some way. Acontingently sufficient truthmaker will be true only incircumstances that obtain in this world. But then thesecircumstances, whatever they are, must be added togive the full truthmaker. (Armstrong 1997: 116)

This presupposes necessitarianism. Better have contingenttruthmaking than states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Beyond dogs. . . – to facts?

From TTT to states of affairs:If it is said that the truthmaker for a truth could havefailed to make the truth true, then we will surely thinkthat the alleged truthmaker was insufficient by itselfand requires to be supplemented in some way. Acontingently sufficient truthmaker will be true only incircumstances that obtain in this world. But then thesecircumstances, whatever they are, must be added togive the full truthmaker. (Armstrong 1997: 116)

This presupposes necessitarianism. Better have contingenttruthmaking than states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Beyond dogs. . . – to facts?

From TTT to states of affairs:If it is said that the truthmaker for a truth could havefailed to make the truth true, then we will surely thinkthat the alleged truthmaker was insufficient by itselfand requires to be supplemented in some way. Acontingently sufficient truthmaker will be true only incircumstances that obtain in this world. But then thesecircumstances, whatever they are, must be added togive the full truthmaker. (Armstrong 1997: 116)

This presupposes necessitarianism. Better have contingenttruthmaking than states of affairs.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.

evidential: They must be at home because of the light.causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.evidential: They must be at home because of the light.

causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.evidential: They must be at home because of the light.causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.

theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.evidential: They must be at home because of the light.causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.

essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.evidential: They must be at home because of the light.causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.

mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.evidential: They must be at home because of the light.causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.

metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Explanation by things

rationalising: Sam left Maria because of Sally.evidential: They must be at home because of the light.causal: They had an accident because of the worn-offbreak.theoretical: Tritium is unstable because of its extraelectron.essential: Tropes are non-transferrable because of theirnature.mathematical: 2 is between 1 and 3 because of 1,2,3.metaphysical: “Humphrey possibly wins” is true becausebecause of his (winning) counterpart.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Just a connective?

Mulligan (2010) distinguishes the truth predicate “. . . is true”(which takes a singular term to make a sentence) from the truthconnective “it is true that . . . ” (which takes a sentence to makea sentence) and asks which one wears the trousers, answeringthat the connective, not the predicate is fundamental.

But non-committal quantification is mysterious.

And we lack an explanation of:It is true that p because p.Mulligan (2004: 407) bites this bullet.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Just a connective?

Mulligan (2010) distinguishes the truth predicate “. . . is true”(which takes a singular term to make a sentence) from the truthconnective “it is true that . . . ” (which takes a sentence to makea sentence) and asks which one wears the trousers, answeringthat the connective, not the predicate is fundamental.

But non-committal quantification is mysterious.

And we lack an explanation of:It is true that p because p.Mulligan (2004: 407) bites this bullet.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Just a connective?

Mulligan (2010) distinguishes the truth predicate “. . . is true”(which takes a singular term to make a sentence) from the truthconnective “it is true that . . . ” (which takes a sentence to makea sentence) and asks which one wears the trousers, answeringthat the connective, not the predicate is fundamental.

But non-committal quantification is mysterious.

And we lack an explanation of:It is true that p because p.Mulligan (2004: 407) bites this bullet.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Just a connective?

Mulligan (2010) distinguishes the truth predicate “. . . is true”(which takes a singular term to make a sentence) from the truthconnective “it is true that . . . ” (which takes a sentence to makea sentence) and asks which one wears the trousers, answeringthat the connective, not the predicate is fundamental.

But non-committal quantification is mysterious.

And we lack an explanation of:It is true that p because p.

Mulligan (2004: 407) bites this bullet.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Just a connective?

Mulligan (2010) distinguishes the truth predicate “. . . is true”(which takes a singular term to make a sentence) from the truthconnective “it is true that . . . ” (which takes a sentence to makea sentence) and asks which one wears the trousers, answeringthat the connective, not the predicate is fundamental.

But non-committal quantification is mysterious.

And we lack an explanation of:It is true that p because p.Mulligan (2004: 407) bites this bullet.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Facts on the cheap?

Recently, Kevin Mulligan has flirted with the idea thattruthmaker maximalism may even be strengthened:It is true that p iff “p” is made true by the fact that p.Such trivial truthmaking relegates all interesting questions tothe theory of fact-making.

But fact-making cannot play the theoretical rôle of truthmaking:

Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is notsolved).The dependence of truth on reality is not dependencebetween facts: the latter is constitution, the first isgrounding.Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existingcontains things such as negations and implications.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Facts on the cheap?

Recently, Kevin Mulligan has flirted with the idea thattruthmaker maximalism may even be strengthened:It is true that p iff “p” is made true by the fact that p.

Such trivial truthmaking relegates all interesting questions tothe theory of fact-making.

But fact-making cannot play the theoretical rôle of truthmaking:

Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is notsolved).The dependence of truth on reality is not dependencebetween facts: the latter is constitution, the first isgrounding.Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existingcontains things such as negations and implications.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Facts on the cheap?

Recently, Kevin Mulligan has flirted with the idea thattruthmaker maximalism may even be strengthened:It is true that p iff “p” is made true by the fact that p.Such trivial truthmaking relegates all interesting questions tothe theory of fact-making.

But fact-making cannot play the theoretical rôle of truthmaking:

Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is notsolved).The dependence of truth on reality is not dependencebetween facts: the latter is constitution, the first isgrounding.Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existingcontains things such as negations and implications.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Facts on the cheap?

Recently, Kevin Mulligan has flirted with the idea thattruthmaker maximalism may even be strengthened:It is true that p iff “p” is made true by the fact that p.Such trivial truthmaking relegates all interesting questions tothe theory of fact-making.

But fact-making cannot play the theoretical rôle of truthmaking:Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is notsolved).

The dependence of truth on reality is not dependencebetween facts: the latter is constitution, the first isgrounding.Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existingcontains things such as negations and implications.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Facts on the cheap?

Recently, Kevin Mulligan has flirted with the idea thattruthmaker maximalism may even be strengthened:It is true that p iff “p” is made true by the fact that p.Such trivial truthmaking relegates all interesting questions tothe theory of fact-making.

But fact-making cannot play the theoretical rôle of truthmaking:Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is notsolved).The dependence of truth on reality is not dependencebetween facts: the latter is constitution, the first isgrounding.

Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existingcontains things such as negations and implications.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Facts on the cheap?

Recently, Kevin Mulligan has flirted with the idea thattruthmaker maximalism may even be strengthened:It is true that p iff “p” is made true by the fact that p.Such trivial truthmaking relegates all interesting questions tothe theory of fact-making.

But fact-making cannot play the theoretical rôle of truthmaking:Pleonastic facts mirror sentences (thus problem (A) is notsolved).The dependence of truth on reality is not dependencebetween facts: the latter is constitution, the first isgrounding.Pleonastic facts do not exist. Nothing really existingcontains things such as negations and implications.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Conclusion

Rather than trying to make our life easy, we should bravely facethe explanatory demands imposed upon us by TTT.

The hard work has only just begun.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Conclusion

Rather than trying to make our life easy, we should bravely facethe explanatory demands imposed upon us by TTT.

The hard work has only just begun.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma

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.. Conclusion

Rather than trying to make our life easy, we should bravely facethe explanatory demands imposed upon us by TTT.

The hard work has only just begun.

Philipp Blum Truthmaking – in Defense of a Dogma