threat convergence in pakistan: countering terrorist aspirations and improving nuclear security
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Threat Convergence in Pakistan
Countering Terrorist Aspirations and Improving Nuclear Security
Ryan Costello
THREAT CONVERGENCE | THE FUND FOR PEACE
Copyright © 2011
The Fund for Peace.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means
without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.
The Fund for Peace 1720 I Street NW 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 T: +1 202 223 7940 F: +1 202 223 7947 www.fundforpeace.org The Fund for Peace Publication CR-11-01-TC (11-04A) Circulation: PUBLIC
Executive Summary 5 Map of Pakistan 6 Nonproliferation Overview 7 Terrorism Profile 9 Pakistan’s Nuclear Security 12 Pakistan-United States Cooperation 17 Conclusion 22 About The Fund for Peace 23
List of Acronyms CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas
HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence
NCA: National Command Authority
NWFP: North-West Frontier Province
PAL: Permissive Action Links
PPP: Pakistan People’s Party
PRP: Personnel Reliability Program
SPD: Director of the Strategic Plans Division
TTP: Tehrik-i-Taliban, a.k.a. Pakistani Taliban
Contents
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Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the
context of state instability and fragility, the legacy of
the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the
government and Islamist militants. The possibility that
terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials,
either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with
internal assistance, should not be underestimated.
Pakistan possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal estimated
to contain more than 100 nuclear weapons. This
nuclear stockpile is likely to continue to expand as
Pakistan develops new nuclear-capable missiles and
increases its capacity to produce weapons-grade
material. An expansion will require supplementary
security to guard the additional nuclear material,
facilities, and waste. As a result, there will be more
vulnerabilities in the system and a greater chance that
Pakistan’s nuclear security could break down.
There are several terrorist groups operating within
Pakistan that have challenged and weakened the
Pakistani state. For example, as part of an upsurge of
violence within Pakistan, suicide bombings have
increased from two in 2002 to eighty-nine in 2009. In
addition, Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have utilized
the mountainous, semi-autonomous Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan as a safe
haven in order to launch local, regional, and
international attacks. Al-Qaeda has also expressed its
desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, demonstrated by the
reported meeting between two Pakistani nuclear
scientists and Osama bin-Laden prior to the September
11th attacks. The scientists allegedly provided bin-
Laden with a “rough sketch” of how to construct a
nuclear weapon.
Given the numerous terrorist groups threatening the
Pakistani state and its nuclear materials, Pakistan
remains one of the world’s greatest nuclear security
vulnerabilities. The threat of terrorist attack on nuclear
facilities is high, and there is a strong potential for
collaboration between terrorist groups and rogue
elements within the Pakistani security services. The
threat of insider collaboration with terrorist groups is
enhanced by the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network and
allegations that elements of the Pakistani government
support Islamist militants. Over the long-term, there is
a somewhat distant threat that the Pakistani state could
collapse or weaken to the point that nuclear safeguards
would be unable to protect Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons. However, the threats of external attack and
internal collaboration are partially addressed by
current safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely,
particularly if the United States and the international
community remain engaged in the region.
Nevertheless, nuclear Pakistan is a state confronting
multiple internal and external threats to its security
from rogue and terrorist entities and, as such, remains
at significant risk for exploitation and proliferation.
P akistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a significant
proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating
within the country and in neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan.
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Executive Summary
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pol_2002.jpg
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Pakistan
alleged ties between the government and Islamist
extremists raise international fears regarding Pakistan’s
nuclear security. These fears are justifiable. The
possibility that a terrorist group could acquire nuclear
materials, either through an assault or with assistance
from rogue elements within Pakistan’s security
apparatus, is real.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been a source of
tension between the United States and Pakistan for a
long time. Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign
policy has oscillated between engagement and
isolation. Throughout the 1980s, the United States and
Pakistan cooperated to support the Afghan mujahideen
and oust the Soviets from Afghanistan despite
Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Once
the Soviets were gone, however, the United States
withdrew from the region and sanctioned Pakistan
after the army refused to end its nuclear weapons
program.1 According to former Pakistani Ambassador
Riaz M. Khan, the United States left Pakistan “high and
dry” after the 1980s.2 Pakistan felt betrayed by its
former American ally which now sought to prevent
Pakistan from having a weapon deemed critical to
Pakistani national security. Further sanctions were
imposed on Pakistan (and India) by the international
community following its nuclear tests in 1998.
American sanctions on Pakistan were lifted after the
September 11th attacks when the invasion of
Afghanistan necessitated cooperation with Pakistan.
However, many Pakistanis have not forgotten about
U.S. efforts to derail the nation’s nuclear weapons
program and distrust America’s interest in Pakistan’s
nuclear security.
Today, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is estimated to be
greater than 100 nuclear warheads. Pakistan’s guiding
principle for its nuclear strategy is “minimum credible
deterrence.” As a result, the arsenal is used to deter
external aggression, particularly from India, and act as
a force-multiplier for its conventional forces.3
Pakistan appears to be rapidly increasing the size of its
nuclear arsenal through the development of new
nuclear-capable missiles and the expansion of its
capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.4
Pakistan is currently building two new plutonium
production reactors and an additional chemical
separation facility. These efforts will help upgrade the
arsenal from its first-generation design based on highly
enriched uranium (HEU) to a new plutonium-based
design.5 This nuclear expansion could have a negative
impact on Pakistan’s nuclear security. An expansion
will require supplementary security to guard the
additional nuclear material, facilities, and waste. As a
result, there will be more vulnerabilities in the system
and a greater chance that Pakistan’s nuclear security
could break down.6
T errorist groups operating within Pakistan and neighboring countries
could potentially target Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials. The
Pakistani state’s fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and
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Non-proliferation Overview
Endnotes
1. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United
States and the Failure of Nation-Building in
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Penguin
Books, 2009), 287.
2. Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, “Pakistan’s
Afghanistan Policy,” East-West Center,
Washington, DC, (Talk), June 17, 2010.
3. Karen DeYoung, “New Estimates put Pakistan’s
Nuclear Arsenal at More than 100,” Washington
Post, January 31, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/01/30/AR2011013004136.html.
See also: Paul K. Kerr & Mary Beth Nikitin,
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation &
Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service,
February 23, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/RL34248.pdf
4. This is potentially a response to recent Indian
nuclear advances, including the U.S.-India nuclear
pact.
5. Robert Norris & Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear
Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/
October 2009, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/
content/f828323447768858/fulltext.pdf, 82-83.
6. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Nuclear Security in
Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear
Terrorism,” Arms Control Today, July 1, 2009,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/19191/
nuclear_security_in_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%
2Fproject%2F62%2Fusrussia_initiative_to_prevent_
nuclear_terrorism.
Non-proliferation Overview
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challenged and weakened the Pakistani state.7
Pakistan has experienced a steady rise in terror attacks
since 2001. In 2007, the U.S. Director of National
Intelligence asserted that there were more deaths
resulting from Islamist militancy in Pakistan that year
than during the previous six years combined.8 In 2009
there were eighty-nine suicide bombings and over
3,000 terrorist-related deaths, which was another
record year for terrorist attacks and civilian casualties.9
By comparison, there were only two suicide bombings
in Pakistan in 2002.10
The following terrorist groups are a serious threat and
could potentially target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
and materials. Understanding the threat these groups
pose is essential to ensuring the security of those
weapons and materials.
Al-Qaeda
Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks and the
subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan, al-
Qaeda and many of its Afghan Taliban allies fled their
former safe haven and reconstituted themselves across
the border in the mountainous, semi-autonomous
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of
Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have used FATA,
in addition to sections of Baluchistan and the North-
West Frontier Province (NWFP) in West Pakistan, as a
safe haven in order to launch local, regional, and
international attacks.11 Some analysts believe that
Osama bin-Laden and other top al-Qaeda leaders are
hiding within Pakistan’s tribal areas.12
A great deal of the rising tide of violence in Pakistan
can be attributed to al-Qaeda and its efforts to unite its
affiliate groups against the Pakistani government.
Many experts believe that al-Qaeda has trained or is
training most of Pakistan’s extremist groups in terror
tactics. For example, they are believed to have
introduced suicide bombings to the Tehrik-i-Taliban
(TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, one of al-Qaeda’s affiliate
groups (for more on the TTP see below).13 Al-Qaeda
has rallied support against the Pakistani government
by “serving as a mediator and coalition builder for
militant groups,” providing technical expertise to assist
in terrorist attacks, and casting their efforts as part of a
religious struggle.14 This may demonstrate that al-
Qaeda relies on more legitimate local militants in order
to achieve its regional goals.15
Al-Qaeda’s stated regional objectives include toppling
the Pakistani state, undermining American efforts in
Afghanistan, and driving a wedge between the United
States and Pakistan.16 These regional objectives are
part of al Qaeda’s global fight to eliminate American
and Western influence in the Islamic world and replace
the governments of Muslim countries with religiously
fundamentalist regimes.17 Al-Qaeda has also indicated
a desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Osama bin Laden
has described the task of obtaining a nuclear weapon as
a “religious duty,” and several al-Qaeda operatives
have attempted to purchase a weapon or gain nuclear
T here are several terrorist groups operating within Pakistan’s borders that
have demonstrated increasing cooperation. Thus, distinctions between
the groups are not clearly defined. This growing nexus of terror has
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Terrorism Profile
expertise. Before the September 11th attacks, two
Pakistani nuclear scientists allegedly met with bin
Laden and senior al-Qaeda members and provided
them with a “rough sketch” of how to make a nuclear
weapon.18 Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, one of the
Pakistani scientists, believed that Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons belonged to the worldwide Muslim
community, or ummah.19
The threat of al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates obtaining a
nuclear weapon or nuclear materials should not be
underestimated. Many reports have indicated that
terrorists could fashion a crude nuclear device with the
right materials, though, it seems that this has not yet
happened. Nuclear materials could be seized from
poorly secured nuclear facilities, intercepted during
transport, or obtained from the black market. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
indicated that there have been eighteen confirmed
cases of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
or plutonium to date.20 It is likely that there are many
more unconfirmed cases of loss or theft which have
resulted in nuclear smuggling, which is extraordinarily
difficult to prevent given the weakness of state borders
and the difficulty of detecting small quantities of
radioactive material.21
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) or Pakistani
Taliban
The formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), also
known as the Pakistani Taliban, under the leadership
of Baitullah Mehsud in late 2007 has also been
instrumental to the recent upsurge of violence in
Pakistan.22 The TTP formed as an umbrella
organization, incorporating thirteen former militant
groups from the tribal areas of Western Pakistan that
had lent support to the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Members of the TTP, which are expected to number
between 30,000 and 35,000, come from all of FATA’s
seven agencies as well as several frontier provinces in
the NWFP.23 The TTP has sought to unite pro-Taliban
groups within the country, assist the Afghan Taliban in
its insurgency campaign against American and allied
forces across the border in Afghanistan, and establish
an Islamic state in Pakistan based on the model of the
Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.24 According
to U.S. ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism
Daniel Benjamin, the TTP cooperates with al-Qaeda
and acts as a force multiplier for the terrorist network.25
The group has been accused of the December 2007
assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
in addition to many other terrorist attacks across the
country.26
Recent attacks have demonstrated that the TTP targets
the United States and seeks to export terrorism beyond
Pakistan’s borders. On December 30, 2009, a Jordanian
born double agent working for the Pakistani Taliban,
who professed to have knowledge of the whereabouts
of senior al-Qaeda members, set off a suicide bomb
outside Forward Operating Base Chapman near Khost,
Afghanistan, killing the base chief, six other CIA
employees, and two Blackwater private security
contractors.27 Additionally, the TTP trained and
assisted Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad in his
failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square
on May 1, 2010.28 On September 1, 2010, the United
States formally declared the TTP a terrorist
organization and charged their current leader,
Hakimullah Mehsud, with conspiracy to murder
American citizens.29
Other Extremist Groups
Aside from al-Qaeda and the TTP, disparate extremist
groups have stepped up attacks against the state,
possibly as a result of the groups’ increasing drive for
cooperation. According to Pakistani journalist Imtiaz
Gul, terrorist groups that were formerly confined to
FATA “are now joining forces with groups around the
country -- and the result is a networked terrorism outfit
with an ever-growing capacity to produce pain and
mayhem.”30 Extremist groups such as Jaish-e-
Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba,31 which have
supposedly been supported by Islamabad as pawns to
undermine India and liberate Kashmir, forged links
with the TTP and al-Qaeda after they were banned by
the former Pakistani president General Pervez
Musharraf. As a result, extremists have been able to
conduct attacks outside of the tribal areas, which have
become the recent focus of Pakistani military
operations and U.S. drone strikes.32
Terrorism Profile
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Furthermore, individual Islamist extremists or
alienated members of Pakistan’s security services could
potentially launch devastating attacks throughout the
country. This was demonstrated by the January 2011
assassination of the secular governor of Punjab, Salman
Taseer, by a member of his own police guard. Mumtaz
Qadri gunned down Taseer over his stance on
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy law. The governor had
supported amending the law so that it couldn’t be used
to persecute religious minorities, and had urged
leniency for a Christian mother sentenced to death for
blasphemy. Although Qadri confessed to the crime, he
has received disturbing levels of support from
sympathetic segments of the Pakistani population.33
Terrorism Profile
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Endnotes
7. Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror,”
Foreign Policy, June 10, 2010, http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/10/
pakistans_new_networks_of_terror?page=0,0.
8. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,”
Congressional Research Service, February 6,
2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33498.pdf, 7.
9. Gul.
10. Kronstadt, 7.
11. Don Rassler, “Al Qa’ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC
Sentinel, June 2009, Vol. 2, Issue 6, http://
www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-
Vol2Iss6.pdf, 1.
12. Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, “al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al
-Qaida, al-Qa’ida),” Council on Foreign Relations,
Backgrounder, December 30, 2009, http://
www.cfr.org/publication/9126/
alqaeda_aka_alqaida_alqaida.html?co=C005001.
13. Ibid.
14. Rassler, 1.
15. Ibid, 3.
16. Ibid, 4.
17. Bajoria & Bruno.
18. Bunn, 13-14.
19. Ibid, 14.
20. Ibid, 16-17.
21. Ibid, V, 5.
22. Baitullah Mehsud was killed on August 5, 2009 by
a U.S. Predator drone strike. See: Jane Mayer,
“The Predator War,” The New Yorker, October 26,
2009, http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?
printable=true.
23. Bajoria, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists.”
24. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the
political entity formed by the Afghan Taliban in
the mid-1990s, lasting until the U.S.-led invasion
of Afghanistan in 2001. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S.
Relations,” 10.
25. Spencer S. Hsu & Greg Miller, “U.S. Government
Charges Pakistani Leader Hakimullah Mehsud in
CIA Attack,” Washington Post, September 1,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/09/01/
AR2010090107160.html?hpid=sec-nation.
26. Mayer.
27. Hsu & Miller.
28. Benjamin Weiser, “Call to Taliban After Failed
Bomb Attempt in Times Sq.,” The New York
Times, September 29, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/
nyregion/30shahzad.html?ref=faisalshahzad.
29. Hsu & Miller.
30. Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror.”
31. Lashkar-e-Taiba is the group that is believed to
have orchestrated the Mumbai terrorist attacks in
November 2008. See Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S.
Relations,” 26-27.
32. Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror.”
33. Karin Brulliard, “As Progressive Pakistani Politician
is Mourned, his Suspected Killer is Lauded,” The
Washington Post, January 5, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/01/05/AR2011010500341.html
existence of ties between elements of the government
security apparatus and Islamist extremists. These
threats are partially mitigated by a robust nuclear
security system that has improved over time.
However, no nuclear security system is foolproof,
despite the claims of Pakistani officials to the
contrary.34
Command and Control
Pakistan has taken many steps to boost nuclear
security, including the creation of a three tiered
command and control structure. The National
Command Authority (NCA) oversees all organizations
involved in nuclear research, weapons development,
strategy, deployment and employment.35 The NCA is
headed by the Prime Minister and includes the chair of
the joint chiefs of staff, the Director of the Strategic
Plans Division (SPD), Commanders of the various
branches of the Armed Services, and Ministers of
Defense, Interior, and Finance. A full consensus is
required for any nuclear strike.36 The SPD is tasked
with the daily management of Pakistan’s nuclear assets
and oversees approximately 10,000 personnel involved
in securing the arsenal and strategic infrastructure.37
The SPD also formulates nuclear doctrine and strategy;
the chain of command; and plans for the storage,
transport, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.38
The Army, Air Force, and Navy of Pakistan each have
their own strategic forces command, which comprises
the third tier of command and control.39
External Security Measures
Pakistan appears to have robust security measures in
place to moderate the threats posed by external assault.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are believed to be scattered
and disassembled. Reports indicate that the weapons
are stored at up to six locations and are likely buried in
deep underground facilities in order to prevent their
destruction or seizure during an attack on the facility.40
Analysts believe that the weapons are stored in
component form in separate buildings or facilities, thus
necessitating multiple operations to seize control of a
complete nuclear weapon.41 The SPD’s official position
is that the weapons will be ready when needed but will
not be on “hair trigger alert.” It should be noted that if
the weapons are stored in component form, this
measure might make the theft of a fissile nuclear core
easier if its location within the facility is known and can
be accessed.42 This indicates that Pakistan’s nuclear
security is principally designed to safeguard against an
attack by states, such as India, and not by extremist or
rogue forces interested in obtaining nuclear
components rather than a full-scale, strategic nuclear
device.
Pakistan implements security measures that are
integrated into the nuclear weapons themselves.
Pakistan claims to have developed its own Permissive
Action Links (PALs) technology and has integrated the
PALs into its nuclear security system. Assuming this is
the case, anyone seeking to utilize a nuclear weapon
would need to have authorizing codes, which are
T he threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials is extensive given
its proximity to well organized Islamist extremists, the relative fragility
of the state, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and the possible
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Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
controlled by the NCA. Additionally, Pakistan
operates a standard two-man or three-man rule so that
multiple individuals are needed to activate the
weapons.43 If terrorists seek to acquire the fissile core
for use in a dirty bomb, however, the PALs will be
unable to prevent them from doing so.44
The physical security measures in place also present
considerable challenges to potential external assaults.
It is believed that the SPD and its 10,000 member
security force exclusively guard Pakistan’s weapons
sites.45 Shaun Gregory, a scholar focused on Pakistani
security, indicates that Pakistan “operates a layered
concept of concentric tiers of armed forces personnel to
guard nuclear weapons facilities,” in addition to
utilizing “barriers and intrusion detection systems.”46
Perimeter security measures such as strengthened
fencing and heightened surveillance are also utilized.
Counter-intelligence teams operate within nuclear
facilities in order to identify both external and internal
threats.47 It appears as if external attacks by extremist
forces would not be able to overcome the physical
safeguards in place without internal assistance.
Another tool that Pakistani forces utilize to safeguard
their nuclear weapons is the secrecy of the program
itself. The location of nuclear weapons sites and other
critical aspects of the program are kept secret, and
transport of nuclear components and materials is
generally conducted clandestinely and avoids highly
visible security measures.48 This approach offers both
strengths and weaknesses for countering external
attacks from extremist forces. The secrecy of the
location of nuclear components limits the ability of
extremists because they will not know where to look
for the weapons without insider assistance. Ideally, not
only will outsiders not know precisely which facilities
house nuclear components, but they also will not know
where to look within those facilities for the components
in question.49 However, this emphasis on secrecy
rather than overt security could create vulnerabilities
during transportation. If a terrorist group obtained
intelligence on the timing and route of transported
nuclear components they could be susceptible to
theft.50
Although Pakistan’s external security measures
significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists would
be able to obtain nuclear weapons or materials, they are
far from invincible. Many of Pakistan’s suspected
nuclear weapons facilities are located near or within
areas contested by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As a
result, this increases the likelihood that terrorists
would be able to launch an attack on the facilities.
According to Gregory, three terrorist attacks have been
launched against Pakistan’s suspected nuclear facilities
in recent years.51 The facility at Sargodha, which
allegedly stores nuclear missiles, was attacked on
November 1, 2007. On December 10, 2007, there was a
suicide bombing at Kamra, a suspected nuclear airbase.
Finally, on August 20, 2008, Pakistani Taliban suicide
bombers attacked several entrances to the Wah
cantonment, considered to be one of Pakistan’s main
nuclear weapons manufacturing sites.52 These attacks
are alarming, and suggest that a better organized attack
aimed at obtaining nuclear weapons or materials could
potentially succeed. However, it bears emphasizing
that these attacks were all suicide bombings targeted
against the Pakistani military which occurred outside
of the respective facilities. Terrorists were not
necessarily targeting nuclear materials and they did not
breach the facilities during these attacks.53
The Obama administration is apparently confident that
Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are secure from external
assault. However, the administration harbors deep
concerns regarding the potential insider threat to
Pakistan’s nuclear materials.54
Internal Security Concerns: Support
for Extremist Groups?
Concerns regarding Pakistani nuclear security are
heightened by accusations from journalists and
scholars55 that the Pakistani government has supported
and continues to support Islamist extremist groups.
According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid,
following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and
America’s loss of interest in the region, Pakistan
supported the Taliban’s rise to power. This strategy
was based on the notion that a friendly government in
Afghanistan could check Indian influence and provide
Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
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strategic depth in any future conflict with India. Such a
strategy fundamentally ignored the destabilizing
influence that strengthening Islamist groups would
have on Pakistan and the region.56 According to
Rashid, Pakistan also supported the creation of Islamist
extremist groups in Kashmir as they sought to
undermine India’s control of the disputed territory.57
Rashid asserts that although al-Qaeda became allied
with the Taliban and began to use the region as a safe
haven, Pakistan turned a blind eye to al-Qaeda’s
operations due to the group’s support for the Taliban
and Kashmiri militants.58 Following the September 11th
attacks, Rashid argues that Pakistan has engaged in a
“duplicitous game” in which the government has
tolerated the presence of and supported certain
terrorist groups it deems valuable as counters against
India, such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in
addition to many Kashmir oriented groups, while
making efforts to hunt down al-Qaeda militants on
behalf of the United States.59 Although several high
profile arrests of al-Qaeda leaders have been made by
Pakistan, including Abu Zubaydah in March 2002 and
Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the so called “Mastermind
of 9/11,” in March 2003,60 Rashid asserts that many al-
Qaeda operatives eluded capture and were able to
coalesce in FATA without interference.61 As several
terrorist groups continue to use Pakistan as a safe
haven, accusations regarding active Pakistani support
for these groups have persisted.
The notion that Pakistan supports extremist groups is
highly disputed by Pakistani officials. Following
Harvard scholar Matt Waldman’s recent assertions that
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supports and
partially controls the Afghan insurgency, a Pakistani
military spokesman denounced Waldman’s report as
an untruthful, malicious account.62 Former Pakistani
ambassador Riaz M. Khan rejected the notion that
Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban in order to
provide “strategic depth” in any future conflict with
India. Rather, Ambassador Khan insisted that it was
the strategy of Pakistan to promote a stable and strong
neighbor in Afghanistan.63 Furthermore, an alternative
explanation exists for the prevalence of terrorist safe
havens within Pakistan. Rather than evidence of active
Pakistani support for terrorist groups, the safe havens
could be indicative of the semi-autonomous nature of
Pakistan’s tribal areas and the inability of the central
government to reclaim them.
U.S. officials have confronted Pakistan over alleged ISI
links to militant networks. U.S. concerns have
extended to the highest level of government, as former
President George W. Bush reportedly confronted the
Pakistani Prime Minister and asked who was in control
of the ISI, claiming that members of the ISI were
leaking sensitive intelligence to terrorist groups.64
Currently, the Obama administration has been
frustrated by what they deem as Pakistan’s
unwillingness to confront the Haqqani network and the
Afghan Taliban, which continue to use Pakistan as a
base to plan and launch attacks across the border in
Afghanistan.65 State Department cables leaked in
November 2010 reveal that the former U.S. ambassador
to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, remained deeply skeptical
that Pakistan would abandon its ties to certain militant
groups. Ms. Patterson wrote that “[t]here is no chance
that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in
any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning
support for these groups, which it sees as an important
part of its national security apparatus against India.”66
Although Pakistan’s relationship with Islamist
militants is unclear and disputed, allegations of ties
raise concerns regarding the security of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons. If the ISI or its members actively
support Islamist militants or are sympathetic to their
cause, the chances are stronger that a rogue member
would attempt to divulge critical intelligence regarding
the nation’s nuclear security or otherwise assist the
networks in obtaining nuclear materials.
Internal Security Concerns:
The AQ Khan Network
The legacy of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation
network is also a serious cause for concern. In order
for Pakistan to obtain nuclear weapons technology, Dr.
Khan set up a black market network to purchase and
manufacture the equipment. Technology was bought
secretly in Europe and copied in factories run by Khan
around the globe. Khan then used this network to
supply other nations seeking to obtain nuclear
Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
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weapons, apparently believing that the more nations
with nuclear weapons programs, the less pressure that
there would be on Pakistan’s proliferation efforts.67
It was later found that the network sold nuclear
weapons-related technology, uranium enrichment
materials, and possibly blueprints for the construction
of advanced nuclear weapons to countries including
North Korea, Iran, and Libya.68 Khan was blamed for
Pakistan’s proliferation activities, which he initially
accepted while insisting that the Pakistani government
and army were not involved.”69 The United States
accepted this version of events, and Khan was placed
on house arrest. However, many experts believe that it
is highly unlikely that the head of Pakistan’s most
prominent nuclear research lab, Dr. Khan, could have
acted on his own without the knowledge and support
of the Pakistani army.70 Although Khan has been
closely monitored and restricted from talking to U.S. or
international officials, he has recently backed away
from his prior confession, indicating that it was forced
upon him so as to protect other officials from blame. In
2008, Khan stated that a shipment of centrifuges to
North Korea in 2000 was supervised by Pakistani
security officials with the consent of President
Musharraf.71
Experts have indicated that several Pakistanis involved
in the proliferation network remain at large and as a
result there is reason to believe that the network could
be revived.72 Additionally, some believe that the
Pakistani army cooperated with A.Q. Khan in order to
assist global proliferation efforts. If either scenario is
true, it could mean that Pakistan, or elements within
the country, could revive the network and seek to sell
nuclear secrets or materials, potentially to a terrorist
network. These fears are further enhanced by the
meeting between two Pakistani nuclear scientists and
senior al-Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden,
before the September 11th attacks.
Internal Security Measures
Pakistan has acted to improve its nuclear security
measures in response to international pressure.
Individuals involved in the nuclear program must
undergo a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which
examines a person’s background for evidence of
Islamist sympathies, improper group affiliations, and
other potential personality problems such as drug use
and sexual deviancy.73 An 8,000 member workforce
from four intelligence agencies, including the SPD and
the ISI, is involved in the vetting process. Security
clearance renewal is required every two years or when
a worker is transferred to a different post and random
checks are performed when needed.74 The SPD has
instituted a monitoring system to follow the
movements of all personnel involved in nuclear
security.75 Officers are drawn primarily from Punjab
province, which is believed to have fewer extremist
sympathies and ties. As described previously, a two or
three man rule is in effect to limit the risk of a lone
rogue agent colluding with external actors.76
Furthermore, General Kayani, the former head of the
ISI, took measures to weed out members of the
organization with known Islamist sympathies.77
These measures reduce the likelihood of insider-
outsider collusion. However, no personnel security
system guarantees complete protection. Should an
insider be able to assist in the proliferation of nuclear
materials, technology, expertise, or weapons, they
would greatly increase the chances that terrorist groups
could acquire a radiological dispersion device, or dirty
bomb. Despite relatively robust security measures,
there is a chance that sleeper agents could slip past
security measures unprotected, provided that they
displayed no overt sympathies or links to terrorist
groups.78 Finally, serious concerns remain regarding
Pakistan’s nuclear expertise. A.Q. Khan and Sultan
Bashiruddin Mahmood’s separate attempts to assist
global proliferation efforts underscore this problem.
As Pakistan’s nuclear program expands it is necessary
to monitor and carefully manage those possessing
nuclear knowledge. Efforts to retrain and assist those
who are leaving Pakistan’s nuclear program may be
needed.79
Summary of Pakistan’s Nuclear
Security
The existence of well organized Islamist extremist
groups within Pakistan’s borders, the relative fragility
Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
www.fundforpeace.org 15 The Fund for Peace
of the state, allegations of governmental support to
terrorist groups, and lingering doubts concerning the
legacy of the A.Q. Khan network raise red flags
concerning Pakistan’s nuclear security. Fortunately,
Pakistan has a robust system in place to mitigate many
threats to its nuclear security. However, no system is
perfect. Given the enormous threats to the country’s
nuclear arsenal, Pakistan remains one of the world’s
greatest nuclear security vulnerabilities. The threat of
terrorist attack on nuclear facilities, and potentially of
insider collaboration with terrorist groups, is high.
Over the long-term, there is a somewhat distant threat
that the Pakistani state could collapse or weaken
significantly so that nuclear safeguards would be
unable to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
However, the threats of external attack and internal
collaboration are partially addressed by current
safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely, particularly
if the United States and the international community
remain engaged in the region.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Security
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Endnotes
34. Nick Schifrin, “Pakistan Calls Nuke Security Program ‘Foolproof,’” ABC News, January 26, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/International/Story?id=4195055.
35. Kerr & Nikitin, 8-9. 36. Ibid, 9. 37. Kenneth N. Luongo & Naeem Salik, “Building
Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, December 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo.
38. Kerr & Nikitin, 9. 39. Luongo & Salik. 40. Vikram Jagadish, “Pakistan’s Ultimate Nightmare
Scenario: Preventing Islamic Extremists from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons,” Texas Review of Law & Politics, Spring, 2009.
41. Bunn, 29. 42. Kerr & Nikitin, 10. 43. Jagadish, 3. 44. Ibid, 3. 45. Ibid, 4. 46. Gregory, 2. 47. Jagadish, 4. 48. Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing
the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.” 49. Jagadish, 2. 50. Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing
the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.” 51. Gregory, 2-3. 52. Ibid, 3. 53. Robert Mackey, “Have Pakistani Nuclear Facilities
Already Been Attacked?” The New York Times, The Lede, August 11, 2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/have-pakistani-nuclear-facilities-already-been-attacked/.
54. Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, “Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/asia/01wikileaks-pakistan.html?_r=1&emc=eta1
55. See Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” and Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan Rejects Report Saying Nation’s Intelligence Agency Aids Afghan Taliban,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/06/14/
AR2010061405056.html. 56. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 25. 57. Ibid, 40-41. 58. Ibid, 48. 59. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink,” The New
York Review of Books, June 11, 2009, Volume LVI, Number 10, (12-16), 14.
60. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 50. 61. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 223. 62. Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan Rejects Report Saying
Nation’s Intelligence Agency Aids Afghan Taliban,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/14/AR2010061405056.html.
63. Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, “Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy.”
64. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 16-17. 65. Jayshree Bajoria, “The Strained U.S.-Pakistan
Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/23210/strained_uspakistan_alliance.html.
66. Perlez et al. 67. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 287-288. 68. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 62. 69. Rashid, “Descent into Chaos,” 288. 70. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 63. 71. “Pakistani Says Army Knew Atomic Parts Were
Shipped,” Associated Press, New York Times, July 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/world/asia/05pstan.html.
72. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 63. 73. Gregory, 2. 74. Jagadish, 4. 75. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan:
Separating Myth from Reality,” July/August 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/khan.
76. Gregory, 2. 77. Gul, “Pakistan’s New Networks of Terror.” 78. Jagadish, 5. 79. Feroz Hassan Khan.
sharing of best practices, disrupting terrorist networks,
and promoting strong Pakistani democracy and good
governance. Protection against a threat as catastrophic
as nuclear terrorism cannot be limited to a single
dimension. As Matthew Bunn argues, “reducing the
risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan must include both steps
to further improve nuclear security measures and steps
to reduce extremists’ ability to challenge the Pakistani
state, to recruit nuclear insiders, and to mount large
outsider attacks.”80 Efforts to address these issues are
ongoing and should be reexamined to ensure that they
are effective.
Pakistan’s nuclear security is an important, yet
sensitive, issue in U.S. foreign policy. Pakistan takes
great pride in its nuclear arsenal and the United States
has attempted to deter Pakistan from obtaining nuclear
weapons, to rollback Pakistan’s nuclear capability, and
has sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear arsenal. Many
Pakistanis view American skepticism regarding
Pakistan’s nuclear security as evidence of further
interventionism in Pakistani affairs. Thus, the United
States must carefully balance efforts to address the
threat with sensitivity to Pakistan’s desires for secrecy
and national control of the program. Assistance efforts
should avoid pressing Pakistan to divulge too much
critical information. A false step on this issue could
jeopardize the overarching U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
Consultations
Consultations between the United States and Pakistan
have reportedly involved the sharing of best practices,
technical measures to prevent theft or accidental launch
of nuclear weapons, personnel reliability and the
physical security of nuclear facilities.81 Pakistan has
also accepted high-level training on nuclear security
from the United States.82 For the most part, these
consultations are shrouded in secrecy. According to a
Pakistani official, Pakistan reserves the right to “pick
and choose” which aspects of nuclear security the
consultations will address, and only “non-intrusive
measures have been accepted.”83 American diplomatic
cables leaked in November 2010 have revealed that the
United States has tried and failed to get Pakistan to
remove highly enriched uranium from a nuclear
research reactor since 2007. The uranium stockpile is
believed to be large enough to build several dirty
bombs or, in the hands of a skilled nuclear physicist,
potentially a nuclear bomb. U.S. officials feared that
the uranium could be seized by a terrorist group,
whereas Pakistan feared a potential media backlash if
they agreed to American requests to secure the
uranium.84
Despite Pakistan’s aversion to cooperate on every
issue, these consultations may have helped Pakistan
improve its nuclear security measures in recent years.
In light of recent improvements, the United States has
denied the charge that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are
not secure. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage asserted that “we have spent considerable
time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and
working with them on the security of their nuclear
P akistan’s nuclear security could potentially be strengthened by increased
cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. Beneficial
cooperation between the two countries might include consultations and
www.fundforpeace.org 17 The Fund for Peace
Pakistan-United States Cooperation
weapons. I think most observers would say that they
are fairly secure.”85 While Pakistan does have robust
measures that have likely been enhanced with input
from the United States, nuclear security is an ongoing
process that requires constant improvement.
Consultations between the two should continue and
should aim to reduce vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal.
In order to cooperate on this issue, the United States
and Pakistan need to build confidence in one another
and lower the levels of persistent mutual suspicion and
mistrust. Thus, there is a strong need for clear
communication regarding the threat that nuclear
terrorism poses to both countries.86 Pakistan has
traditionally focused more on external threats to its
nuclear arsenal than on internal threats. This includes
India, but also the United States. The United States
needs to reassure Pakistan that it is respectful of
Pakistan’s sovereignty and is not seeking to seize
control of its nuclear arsenal. Pakistani fears that the
United States is once again interfering with Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal could jeopardize any potential working
relationship. Furthermore, there is a tendency for some
Pakistanis to underestimate the threat posed by
Islamist extremist groups, writing them off as “men in
caves.”87 It must be clear to Pakistan that terrorist
groups do pose a threat to the Pakistani state and that
its nuclear arsenal has to be robustly defended against
internal threats.
Once Pakistani fears regarding American intentions are
allayed and Pakistan understands the common threat,
close cooperation on the identification of vulnerabilities
is necessary. For example, the two countries could
cooperate on securing Pakistan’s nuclear expertise.
Consultations should consider long-term trends that
could create new vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s nuclear
security system, such as rising levels of extremism
within the country and Pakistan’s expanding nuclear
arsenal. Rising levels of extremism could mean that
there is a greater likelihood of insider collaboration
with external threats. Pakistan’s nuclear expansion
will result in more facilities, weapons and materials to
protect.88 Furthermore, Pakistan and the United States
ought to consider developing contingencies for
communication in the event of a crisis in order to
promote predictability and ease tension if an
emergency arises.89
Finally, joint public outreach efforts to the Pakistani
public could increase transparency and support for
U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. It is important for the
Pakistani public to see that joint cooperation on nuclear
security is normal and that the United States does not
have ulterior motives. Joint cooperation is currently
kept secret, leading many to doubt American
intentions.90 Some Islamic extremists have played
upon Pakistani fears, suggesting that the United States
seeks to scoop up Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Sultan
Bashiruddin Mahmood, the nuclear scientist who met
with Osama bin Laden, suggested that Pakistan should
support extremists to guard against a potential
American seizure of the weapons.91
Counter-Terrorism
Efforts to strengthen Pakistani nuclear security cannot
simply cover Pakistani safeguards. They also have to
counter the growing terrorist threat within Pakistan.
Ongoing counterterrorist operations within Pakistan
consist of two separate initiatives. The first is CIA
operated drone strikes within FATA to eliminate
known insurgent leaders. The second initiative is
comprised of counterinsurgency operations conducted
by the Pakistani army to eliminate terrorist safe havens.
The “Drone War” over Western Pakistan is
controversial and is shrouded in secrecy. Drones are
unmanned, remotely flown aircraft that utilize video
surveillance and launch missiles onto targets from
miles above. The U.S. government runs two drone
programs, one controlled by the military in
acknowledged war zones and one controlled by the
CIA that seeks out terrorists around the world. The
program in Pakistan is run by the CIA and is operating
not in a war zone, but in an allied country. The CIA’s
efforts are classified, and thus there is no official
information on where the drones operate, how they
select their targets, who oversees the program, and
how many civilians are killed.92 However, Peter
Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of the New America
Foundation indicate that drone strikes in Pakistan have
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been limited to FATA, primarily focusing on the
terrorist safe havens in North and South Waziristan.93
This is likely due to restrictions placed on the United
States by Pakistan and to the fact that FATA possesses
virtually no infrastructure, is highly rural, and has been
the principal safe haven for terrorist networks in the
region. As a result, civilian casualties and attention to
the program are minimized.
In Pakistan, drone strikes have been conducted by the
United States since 2004. They have relied on a human
intelligence network established during the Bush
administration to inform the CIA of the whereabouts of
al-Qaeda militants and other terrorist groups in the
region.94 The pace of drone strikes has been rapidly
accelerated by the Obama administration. According
to Bergen and Tiedemann, there were only forty-five
drone attacks in Pakistan during the entire Bush
administration. In 2009, the Obama administration
launched 51 drone attacks.95 This total was more than
doubled in 2010, with as many as 118 drone strikes.96
It appears as if the drone program has severely
disrupted the operations of al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The drone program has killed many terrorist leaders -
more than half of the CIA’s “high value” targets were
killed by the drone program in 2009.97 An atmosphere
of fear and distrust has allegedly been created among
the extremist groups operating in FATA due to the
constant threat of drone strikes. Militants have taken
to sleeping outside among the trees rather than risk
being killed inside a building. As the drone program
depends on a human intelligence network, al-Qaeda
and its affiliates have regularly executed suspected
spies.98
However, several factors complicate the supposed
success of the drone program. First, terrorist groups
have continued their operations despite the threat of
drones in FATA. The sharp rise in drone attacks
undertaken by the Obama administration has not
resulted in a sharp reduction of terrorist attacks within
Pakistan. Militant leaders are killed, but replaced. Al-
Qaeda and its affiliates are still able to use Pakistan as a
base to recruit and train future terrorists from around
the globe, including from Western countries.99 After a
years-long sustained drone campaign, many of the
militants originally limited to FATA may have fled the
region to undertake operations in more urbanized
settings, potentially further destabilizing Pakistan.
Furthermore, Pakistanis overwhelmingly view the
drone strikes negatively as violations of sovereignty
and attacks against civilians. A Gallup poll from
August 2009 found that only nine percent of Pakistanis
approved of the attacks.100 The number of civilian and
terrorist deaths in these strikes is extraordinarily
difficult to determine. Peter Bergen and Katherine
Tiedemann estimated that 114 drone attacks from 2004
through early 2010 killed between 830 and 1,210
people. Of those killed, between 550 and 850 were
reported to be militants, or approximately two-thirds of
the total.101 Given that considerable civilian casualties
accompany the program, whether or not the drone
program kills or creates more terrorists is a matter of
debate that should be openly discussed. However,
Bergen and Tiedemann argue that civilian deaths
declined in 2010 due to better intelligence, more
accurate targeting, smaller missiles, and enhanced
cooperation with Pakistan.102 Reducing the number of
civilian deaths is an important trend that should be
continued so as to reduce blowback against the United
States and Pakistan.
The second major ongoing counterterrorist initiative
within the country is the Pakistani army’s
counterinsurgency operations against domestically
based militants. According to many American
observers, Pakistan has been slow to address the rising
threat of militancy emanating from within its borders.
These observers argue that despite Pakistan’s
longstanding promises to reign in terrorist groups,
Pakistan has continued to serve as the base of
operations for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The United
States has sought to convince Pakistan of the need to
reorient the military from its traditional focus on a
conventional war with India to a counterinsurgency
war against domestic terror groups.103 Since 2001,
Pakistan has conducted several operations to reign in
militants and assert control over the semi-autonomous
tribal regions. Many of these efforts have proven
largely unsuccessful, although Pakistan’s 2009
operations in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan
may have shown some improvement.104
Pakistan-United States Cooperation
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Measuring the Swat Valley and South Waziristan
operations in purely military terms could yield the
conclusion that they were moderately successful. The
operations succeeded in temporarily ousting
insurgents from the targeted areas, but at a steep cost.
They resulted in a huge wave of internally displaced
persons. Efforts to stabilize and revitalize Swat and
South Waziristan have stalled. Many civilians are still
displaced by the fighting and guerrilla groups have
challenged the Pakistani army. Safe havens persist,
such as in North Waziristan, and violence continues to
grip the country.105
The Role of Democracy, Development
& Good Governance
Over the long-term, the stability of the Pakistani state
and its nuclear materials depends on Pakistan’s ability
to undercut support for extremist groups by promoting
democracy, good governance, and development. An
economically sound, democratic Pakistan would limit
the appeal of terrorism by providing avenues for
economic advancement and political participation
through the state. A sole focus on military efforts
against terrorist groups will result in casualties and
increase the political appeal of extremists if not
accompanied by measures to benefit the people of
Pakistan.
Pakistan has been directly controlled by the military for
more than half of its existence. Former General Pervez
Musharraf assumed control of the country in a
bloodless coup in 1999 and ruled until 2008, when the
late Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
gained power in elections that rejected Musharraf’s
policies.106 Unfortunately, the new civilian government
that took power in 2008 under President Asif Ali
Zardari (Benazir Bhutto’s widower) has been weak and
divided. Internal strife and a bad economy have
limited his government’s appeal and contributed to the
feeling that Zardari is out of touch with the people. As
a result of Zardari’s unpopularity and diminished
power, the army still retains significant power,
autonomy and influence in Pakistan’s foreign and
national security policy.107
Economic development is needed, but the outlook in
January 2011 is grim despite U.S. aid efforts. Pakistan
has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid at
approximately $10.4 billion since 2001, $6 billion for
development and humanitarian assistance and $4.4
billion for security related assistance.108 Additionally,
Pakistan is reimbursed for many counterterrorism
related expenses. The United States expanded its
assistance with the Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act of 2009, which provides Pakistan with
$1.5 billion per year for five years in nonmilitary aid
while making military aid to the country conditions-
based.109 Although the bill resulted in a huge
expansion of aid for economic development, concerns
remain as to how effective it will be and how much will
get to the Pakistani people.110 High inflation and
unemployment, food shortages and an energy crisis
have gripped Pakistan in the past few years. Recent
recovery has been modest at best, and Pakistan’s
growth outlook is troubled. Investors fear operating in
an atmosphere as chaotic as Pakistan.111 Expanding
access to American markets for Pakistani exports is a
goal that could assist the country’s economic
development, but the United States has stalled in
efforts to do so.112
During July and August of 2010, Pakistan was
devastated by torrential rains that caused widespread
flooding. Thousands died, as many as 20 million
Pakistanis were displaced, and countless villages were
destroyed.113 The flooding is likely to create a food
shortage and devastate the economy, thus straining an
already cash-strapped Pakistani government.
Pakistan’s precarious security situation could also
deteriorate. Flooding has disproportionately impacted
poorer, rural areas that were already prone to
militancy.114 The NWFP and Swat Valley, recent
havens for terrorist groups, were flooded, potentially
creating an opening for militant groups to retrench and
gain support among the people by providing their own
relief.115 Amid the deepening chaos, the Pakistani
central government must remain vigilant regarding its
nuclear security so that its nuclear weapons and
materials remain secure. Given America’s strong
interest in a stable Pakistan, relief efforts should
continue to be a top priority of the United States.
Pakistan-United States Cooperation
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Endnotes
80. Bunn, 31. 81. Kerr & Nikitin, 13. 82. Khan. 83. Kerr & Nikitin, 14. 84. Perlez, et al. 85. Kerr & Nikitin, 14. 86. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Building a Strategic U.S.-
Pakistan Nuclear Relationship,” CTC Sentinel, April 2010, Vol. 3, Issue 4, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss4.pdf, 1-2.
87. Ibid, 2. 88. Ibid, 2. 89. Ibid, 2. 90. Ibid, 3. 91. Ibid, 3. 92. Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker,
October 26, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?printable=true.
93. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” The New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf, 3.
94. Matt Irvine, “On Drone Strikes,” Abu Muqawama, Center for A New American Security, April 16, 2010, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/04/drone-strikes.html.
95. Bergen & Tiedemann, New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones, (summary of Bergen & Tiedemann’s findings – updated frequently)
96. Ibid. 97. Mayer. 98. Bergen & Tiedemann, “Year of the Drone,” 5.
99. Ibid, 4. 100. Ibid, 1. 101. Ibid, 3. 102. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “The
Hidden War,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_hidden_war?page=0,5.
103. Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 18. 104. C. Christine Fair & Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War
Within,” Survival. December 2009-January 2010. http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/51-6-13_Fair_and_Jones.pdf, 161.
105. Terrence Smith & Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, “Pakistan: In the Cauldron” Center for Strategic & International Studies, South Asia Monitor, Number 139, March 3, 2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/sam_139.pdf.
106. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments,” Congressional Research Service, June 1, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41307.pdf, 52.
107. Ibid, 54. 108. Kronstadt, “Key Current Issues & Developments,”
57. 109. As discussed above. 110. Ibid, 57-58. 111. Ibid, 51. 112. Ibid, 53. 113. Ahmed Rashid, “Last Chance for Pakistan,” New
York Review of Books, August 16, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/16/last-chance-pakistan/.
114. The country’s northern provinces, including the NWFP and Swat Valley, Sindh province in the South, and Balochistan, home to a separatist insurgency, have been among the hardest hit territories. Rashid, “Last Chance for Pakistan.”
115. Ibid.
Pakistan-United States Cooperation
www.fundforpeace.org 21 The Fund for Peace
P akistan’s expanding nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the context of
state fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties
between rogue elements of Pakistan’s security services and Islamist
militants. Al-Qaeda, which seeks to conduct a nuclear
attack, has challenged the Pakistani state along with
numerous homegrown militant groups. Efforts to
bolster Pakistan’s nuclear security should address
safeguards, counterterrorism, and the promotion of
democracy and development. As long as Pakistan
remains unstable and the home of the world’s most
dangerous extremist groups, it will continue to be one
of the world’s most significant nuclear security threats.
Given the stakes, reducing the nuclear threat in
Pakistan must be a top international priority.
www.fundforpeace.org 22 The Fund for Peace
Conclusion
www.fundforpeace.org 23 The Fund for Peace
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