the threats of populism: europe’s reluctant radicals marley morris st antony’s college, oxford...

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THE THREATS OF POPULISM: EUROPE’S RELUCTANT RADICALSMarley Morris

St Antony’s College, Oxford

12 November 2013

Leaving aside the committed radicals, we focused on:

The reluctant radicals who have cast a vote for a populist party but do not ‘feel close’ to those parties (much less than committed core voters do).

The potential radicals who have not cast a vote for a populist party but agree with their views.

This enables us to map the softer outer-core of support for these parties.

Why the reluctant radicals?• The uncommitted, soft supporters of right-wing populism• Two reasons to focus on them.• (1) They make up a significant proportion of the right-wing

populist electorate

Germ

any

Denm

ark

Finlan

d

Franc

e

Hunga

ry

Nethe

rland

s

Norway

Sweden

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Committed radical

Reluctant radical

Potential radical

Mainstream

Beyond the headlines• Anti-Europeanism, anti-elitism, or anti-immigration views

are hallmarks of right-wing populist politics, but tackling them generically is both ethically (for progressives) and practically difficult.

• Understanding – and acting on – the specific historical, cultural and emotional springs of the surface mobilisation against Europe or immigration would allow policy-makers to make a more appealing and, above all, more implementable offer to the reluctant radicals.

France: the disconnected radical• Low levels of trust in people• Low levels of interest in politics• Reside in peri-urban areas

05

101520253035

Reluctant radical

All

The Netherlands: the nostalgic radical

• Social conservatism in a new guise?• Deep distrust in modern politics• Nostalgia for an older form of consensus

Very much Fairly much Not so much No trust at all0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Reluctant radical

All

Finland: The alienated radical• Thirty-three per cent say their main reason for voting for

the True Finns was to generate change.• Working class and middle-aged• A crisis of modernity and masculinity?

18–24 25–34 35–49 50–64 65+0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Reluctant radical

All

The prospects for populism

Image: Ssolbergj

GUE-NGL

S & D

Greens / EFA

ALDE

EPP

ECR

EFD

Non-Attached

Policy-making in the European ParliamentAverage number of reports per MEP for each of the political groups

Voting powerPercentage of votes won by each of the political groups on all policy areas (14.07.09 — 14.07.12)

Voting coalitionsEFD matching other European party groups on all policy areas (14.07.09 — 14.07.12)

SpeechmakingAverage numbers of questions and speeches per MEP

Conflicted Politicians

Group CohesionComparative cohesion rates of political groups in the European Parliament (14.07.09—14.07.12)

The price of nationalism?

Stigmatisation

Conflicting nationalisms

Ideological divergence

Scenarios for the next Parliament

UKIPFinns PartyDanish People’s PartyLega NordOrder and JusticeIndependent Greeks

Front NationalPVVVlaams BelangFPÖ

Europe of Freedom and Democracy

A new populist group

Non-Attached Members

JobbikMS5

Image: Remi Noyon, Niccolò Caranti

Scenarios for the next Parliament

Front NationalPVVVlaams BelangFPÖLega Nord

A new populist group

Non-Attached Members

JobbikUKIPMS5Finns PartyDanish People’s Party

Image: Remi Noyon,  Jennifer Jane Mills

Scenarios for the next Parliament

Image:  Niccolò Caranti

UKIPFinns PartyDanish People’s PartyLega NordOrder and JusticeIndependent Greeks

Europe of Freedom and Democracy

Non-Attached Members

JobbikMS5Front NationalPVVVlaams BelangFPÖSweden Democrats

Thank you!

counterpoint.uk.com

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