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THE PERFORMANCE OFPALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES
AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE
WEST BANK AND GAZAJune 2017
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ReportNo:ACS22456StandardDisclaimer:
ThisvolumeisaproductofthestaffoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheExecutiveDirectorsofTheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.TheWorldBankdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthiswork.Theboundaries,colors,denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyanyjudgmentonthepartofTheWorldBankconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries.
CopyrightStatement:
Thematerialinthispublicationiscopyrighted.Copyingand/ortransmittingportionsorallofthisworkwithoutpermissionmaybeaviolationofapplicablelaw.TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBankencouragesdisseminationofitsworkandwillnormallygrantpermissiontoreproduceportionsoftheworkpromptly. Forpermissiontophotocopyorreprintanypartof thiswork,pleasesendarequestwithcomplete informationtotheCopyrightClearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470,http://www.copyright.com/. Allotherqueriesonrightsandlicenses,includingsubsidiaryrights,shouldbeaddressedtotheOfficeofthePublisher,TheWorldBank,1818HStreetNW,Washington,DC20433,USA,fax202-522-2422,e-mailpubrights@worldbank.org.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................. i
Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................................... ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................ iii
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 11.1 Country Context ............................................................................................................................. 21.2 Sector Context ............................................................................................................................... 31.3 Key Challenges ............................................................................................................................... 91.4 Objective and Methodology ........................................................................................................ 12
II. The State of Basic Service Delivery in Palestinian Local Governments ............................................ 142.1 The Institutional Framework Governing Local Service Delivery .................................................... 182.2 Water and Waste Water ............................................................................................................... 242.3 Solid Waste Management ............................................................................................................ 322.4 Local Roads .................................................................................................................................... 342.5 Socio-Demographics of Service Provision .................................................................................... 392.6 Citizen Willingness to Pay ............................................................................................................. 41
III. Drivers of Service Delivery Performance ......................................................................................... 473.1 The LGPA Performance Index ....................................................................................................... 483.2 Geography and Administrative Set-up ......................................................................................... 503.3 Population Size, Density, and Wealth ........................................................................................... 523.4 Area C and Separation Barrier ..................................................................................................... 543.5 Joint Service Councils ................................................................................................................... 593.6 Fiscal Capacity .............................................................................................................................. 613.7 Governance and Accountability ................................................................................................... 63
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations ................................................................................................ 714.1 Prioritize the Improvement of the Quality and Reliability of Services ......................................... 724.2 Reform the Local Government Financing System as a Pre-condition for Success ........................ 734.3 Strengthen LGU Accountability and Responsiveness to Increase Citizens’ Willingness to Pay ... 754.4 Consolidate and Professionalize Service Delivery ........................................................................ 804.5 Increase Density and Connectivity, and Support the Marginalized that the PA Cannot Reach .... 814.6 Benchmarking for Improving Local Government Performance .................................................... 82
References ............................................................................................................................................. 83
Annex .................................................................................................................................................... 85Annex 1: Methodology of Household Survey ........................................................................................ 85Annex 2: Methodology Qualitative Analysis .......................................................................................... 86Annex 3: Methodology LGPA Performance Index .................................................................................. 87Annex 4: Regression Results .................................................................................................................. 88Annex 5: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions ...................................... 120Annex 6: Key Informant Interviews and Focus Groups Discussions Referenced ................................. 121Annex 7: LGU Performance Ranking .................................................................................................... 125Annex 8: LGU Revenue Assignment, Management Responsibility, and Final Destination of Funds ... 139
ReportNo:ACS22456StandardDisclaimer:
ThisvolumeisaproductofthestaffoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheExecutiveDirectorsofTheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.TheWorldBankdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthiswork.Theboundaries,colors,denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyanyjudgmentonthepartofTheWorldBankconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries.
CopyrightStatement:
Thematerialinthispublicationiscopyrighted.Copyingand/ortransmittingportionsorallofthisworkwithoutpermissionmaybeaviolationofapplicablelaw.TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBankencouragesdisseminationofitsworkandwillnormallygrantpermissiontoreproduceportionsoftheworkpromptly. Forpermissiontophotocopyorreprintanypartof thiswork,pleasesendarequestwithcomplete informationtotheCopyrightClearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470,http://www.copyright.com/. Allotherqueriesonrightsandlicenses,includingsubsidiaryrights,shouldbeaddressedtotheOfficeofthePublisher,TheWorldBank,1818HStreetNW,Washington,DC20433,USA,fax202-522-2422,e-mailpubrights@worldbank.org.
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
List of Figures:
Figure ES-1: Service Access across Sectors ............................................................................................. viFigure ES-2: Satisfaction with Service Quality and Reliability .................................................................viiFigure ES-3: Population Size (left) & Density (right) as Performance Drivers ..........................................ixFigure ES-4: Operating Revenues (left) & Operating Expenditures (right) as Performance Drivers ........... xFigure ES-5: Citizen Service Center Use (left) & LGU Responsiveness (right) as Performance Drivers .....xi
Figure I-1: Fiscal Decentralization in the Palestinian territories and World Regions ................................ 4Figure I-2: Revenues by Type in Municipalities (left) and VCs (right) ........................................................ 5Figure I-3: Expenditure Allocation by Budget Type in Municipalities (left) and VCs (right) ..................... 5Figure I-4: Total Per Capita Expenditures with (left) and Without Outliers (right) .................................... 6Figure I-5: Average Per Capita Expenditures in Operating Budget (left) and Enterprise Fund (right) ...... 6Figure I-6: Operating Budget Expenditure Categories Municipalities (left) and VCs (right) ..................... 7Figure I-7: The Dynamics of Net-Lending in the West Bank ................................................................... 11Figure I-8: LGPA Survey - Municipality and Village Council Size-Groups and Population ........................ 13Figure II-1: Service Access across Sectors .............................................................................................. 16Figure II-2: Satisfaction with Service Quality and Reliability .................................................................. 17Figure II-3: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Improved Drinking Water ................................. 25Figure II-4: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Piped Water ...................................................... 25Figure II-5: Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability: Piped Water ......................................................... 26Figure II-6: Trends in Service Delivery: Change in Quality of Piped Water in Last 3 Years ....................... 27Figure II-7: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities ........................... 28Figure II-8: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Piped Sewage .................................................... 28Figure II-9: Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability: Piped Sewage ....................................................... 29Figure II-10: Trends in Service Delivery: Change in Quality of Piped Sewage in last 3 Years ................... 30Figure II-11: Access to Improved Drinking Water Sources (% of Population with Access) ..................... 30Figure II-12: Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities (% of Population with Access) ........................... 31Figure II-13: Geography of Service Provision: Solid Waste Collection .................................................... 32Figure II-14: Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability: Solid Waste Collection ........................................ 33Figure II-15 : Trends in Service Delivery: Change in Quality of Solid Waste Collection in last 3 Years ..... 33Figure II-16: Geography of Service Provision: Paved Roads ................................................................... 34Figure II-17: Impact on the Poor: Likelihood of Service Access ............................................................. 39Figure II-18: Gender Gap: Likelihood of Service Access ......................................................................... 40Figure II-19: Impact on the Poor: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability ...................... 40Figure II-20: Gender Gap: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability ................................. 41Figure II-21: Payment across Sectors ..................................................................................................... 42Figure II-22: Likelihood of Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services ......................... 43Figure II-23: Maximum and Actual Willingness to Pay: Piped Water ...................................................... 43Figure II-24: Maximum and Actual Willingness to Pay: Solid Waste Collection ...................................... 44Figure II-25: Timely Payment without Major Problems .......................................................................... 45Figure II-26: Likelihood of Timely Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services ............ 45Figure III-1: LGU Performance Index: High and Low Performers ........................................................... 48Figure III-2: Differences in LGU Performance across Regions and LGU Types ......................................... 50Figure III-3: Remoteness: Distance to Governorate Center and LGU Performance ................................ 51Figure III-4: Remoteness: Built-Up Area and LGU Performance ............................................................. 51Figure III-5: LGU Population and Performance ...................................................................................... 52Figure III-6: Population Density and Performance ................................................................................. 53Figure III-7: Household Wealth and LGU Performance .......................................................................... 53Figure III-8: Area C and Separation Barrier ............................................................................................ 54
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
Figure III-9: Area C and Separation Barrier: Likelihood of Service Access ............................................... 56Figure III-10: Area C and Separation Barrier: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction ..................................... 56Figure III-11: Share of Households in Area C and LGU Performance ..................................................... 57Figure III-12: Share of Built-up LGU area in Area C and LGU Performance ............................................ 57Figure III-13: Joint Service Council: Planning & Development ................................................................ 59Figure III-14: Joint Service Councils: Water and Waste Water Management ......................................... 60Figure III-15: Joint Service Councils: Solid Waste ................................................................................... 61Figure III-16: LGU Finance I: Per Capita Operating Budget Revenues ..................................................... 62Figure III-17: LGU Finance II: Per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures .............................................. 63Figure III-18: LGU Finance III: Fiscal Sustainability.................................................................................. 63Figure III-19: LGU Responsiveness ......................................................................................................... 64Figure III-20: Usage of Citizen Service Centers and Performance .......................................................... 65Figure III-21: LGU Responsiveness and Performance ............................................................................ 65Figure III-22: Trust in the Role of Elections in Improving Service Delivery .............................................. 66Figure III-23: Participation in Future Elections ....................................................................................... 66Figure III-24: LGU Responsiveness and Trust in Role of Elections for Service Delivery ........................... 67Figure III-25: LGU Responsiveness and Future Voting Behavior ............................................................ 67Figure III-26: Knowledge about Existence of One-Stop-Shops ............................................................... 68Figure III-27: Usage and Satisfaction with Feedback Instruments across Sectors .................................. 69Figure III-28: Channels for Citizens’ Feedback and Complaints ............................................................. 70Figure IV-1: Pre-paid Meters and Citizens’ Willingness to Pay ............................................................... 77Figure IV-2: Non-payment: How Should Service Providers Respond? ................................................... 79
Figure A2-1: Municipalities and VCs Selected for Qualitative Analysis ................................................... 86Figure A3-1: Methodology LGPA Performance Index ............................................................................ 87
List of Tables:
Table I-1: LGUs in the West Bank and Gaza .............................................................................................. 3Table I-2: Shares of Government Budget by Administrative Tier in 2011 and 2012 ................................. 5Table I-3: Access to Core Services ............................................................................................................ 9Table II-1: Overview of the Current Institutional Arrangements by Service Sector .............................. 22
Table A4-1: Likelihood of Service Access - West Bank ............................................................................ 88Table A4-2: Likelihood of Service Access - Gaza ..................................................................................... 89Table A4-3: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - West Bank .................................... 90Table A4-4: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - Gaza .............................................. 91Table A4-5: Likelihood of Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services ......................... 92Table A4-6: Likelihood of Timely Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection ........................... 93Table A4-7: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) .............................. 94Table A4-8: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) ................................. 95Table A4-9: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) ................................. 96Table A4-10: Likelihood of Service Access: Area C ................................................................................. 97Table A4-11: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) .................... 98Table A4-12: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) ....................... 99Table A4-13: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) ..................... 100Table A4-14: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Area C ....................................................................... 101Table A4-15: Likelihood of Payment - Pre-Paid Meters & Citizen Willingness to Pay ........................... 102Table A4-16: Likelihood of Timely Payment - Pre-Paid Meters & Citizen Willingness to Pay ................ 103Table A4-17: Differences in LGU Performance across Regions and LGU Types .................................... 104Table A4-18: Remoteness - Distance to Governorate Center and LGU Performance ........................... 105
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
Table A4-19: Remoteness - Built-Up Area and LGU Performance ........................................................ 106Table A4-20: Population Density and Performance ............................................................................. 107Table A4-21: Household Wealth and LGU Performance ...................................................................... 108Table A4-22: Share of Households in Area C and LGU Performance ................................................... 109Table A4-23: Share of Built-up LGU Area in Area C and LGU Performance .......................................... 111Table A4-24: Joint Service Councils I: Membership in JSC for Planning & Development ...................... 111Table A4-25: JSC II: Membership in JSC for Water & Waste Water ...................................................... 112Table A4-26: JSC III: Membership in JSC for Water and Waste Water .................................................. 113Table A4-27: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste ......................................... 114Table A4-28: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste ......................................... 115Table A4-29: LGU Finance I: Per Capita Operating Budget Revenues .................................................. 116Table A4-30: LGU Finance II: Per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures ........................................... 117Table A4-31: LGU Finance III: Fiscal Sustainability................................................................................ 118Table A4-32: Usage of Citizen Service Centers and Performance ........................................................ 119Table A5-1: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions .................................. 120Table A6-1: Key Informant Interviews Referenced ............................................................................... 123Table A6-2: Focus Group Discussions Referenced ............................................................................... 124Table A7-1: LGU Performance Ranking ................................................................................................ 138Table A8-1: LGU Revenue Assignment (in the LGA), Management Responsibility and Final Destination of the Funds ........................................................................................................................................ 140Table A8-2: Expenditure Assignments According to Local Government Law ...................................... 142
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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Acknowledgements ThisreportwaspreparedtoinformtheongoingpolicydialogueandinvestmentprogramoftheWorldBankwiththePalestinianAuthorityonmunicipalandlocaldevelopment.TheteamwasledbyBjörnPhilipp (Program Leader,MNC04) and Tobias Lechtenfeld (Social Development Specialist, GSURR),withstrategicguidancefromMarinaWes(CountryDirectorforWestBankandGaza)andunderthedirectionofAyatSoliman(PracticeManager,GSURR).ThestudyteamwascomprisedofAdrianBlatt-ner(Consultant,GSURR),RafeefAbdelrazek(OperationsOfficer,MNC04),YahiaAbuhashem(Consult-ant,GSURR),AnnaPaluszek(Consultant,GSURR),andMahaBali(SeniorProgramAssistant,MNCGZ).ThedataanalysisandreportwritingwereorganizedbyAdrianBlattner.ThehouseholdsurveywasconductedbyAlphaInternational,withsupportfromtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDe-velopment(USAID)andtheRepresentativeOfficeofDenmarktothePalestinianAuthority(DRO).TheteamwouldliketoacknowledgeBenjaminP.Stewart(Geographer,GGSCE)andDanaAlmubaied(Con-sultant,MNCGZ)fortheirvaluablecontributions.BaderAlaraj(AssistantProfessor,BirzeitUniversity)conductedinterviewsforthequalitativeanalysis.USAIDalsosupportedseparatedatacollectionef-fortsviaanexitpoll,gatheringinformationoncitizenexperiencesinaccessingservicesinmunicipalofficesandcitizenservicecenters.Thereporthasbenefitedtremendouslyfromdiscussionswithandcommentsfromcolleaguesatdif-ferentstagesofpreparation,inparticularEllenHamilton(LeadUrbanSpecialist,GSURR),NorikoOe(UrbanSpecialist,GSURR),PhilipBottern(SeniorSocialDevelopmentSpecialist,GSURR),SarahKeener(SeniorSocialDevelopmentSpecialist,GSURR),andManuelFigueredo(Consultant,GSURR).Thepeerreviewers were Stephen Karam (Consultant, GSURR), Paula Restrepo Cadavid (Senior Economist,GSURR),andChristopherPablo(SeniorUrbanSpecialist,GSURR).WearealsogratefultoAlexanderKlaits(Democracy&GovernanceDirector,USAID),ReemJafari(Democracy&GovernanceSpecialist,USAID),andAstaOlesen(SeniorAdvisor,DRO)fortheircommentsandinputs.TheteamisindebtedtoofficialsfromthePalestinianAuthority,particularlytheMinistryofLocalGov-ernment(MoLG),theMunicipalDevelopmentandLendingFund,andothergovernmentagenciesandnon-governmentalorganizationsforprovidingkeyinputs,dataandhelpwiththeanalysis.TheteamisindebtedtoJamalNuman(HeadofGeoMOLGPortalforPalestineSpatialInformation)andtheteamatGeoMOLGdepartmentoftheMoLGfortheirsupportwiththeGISmaplayersofthelocalgovern-mentunitsacrosstheWestBankandGazautilizedforthesurveysampling.TheteamisalsogratefulforcommentsanddiscussionswithcolleaguesfromtheDevelopmentPartners.Thedataanalysisben-efittedtremendouslyfromtheinputsanddiscussionswiththeteamfromUSAIDandtheResearchConsortiumcomprisingofReneeHandley,BrianKirchhoff,CarlosFierros,andJeffreyTelgarsky(NORCattheUniversityofChicago);andFotiniChristia(MIT),RubenEnikolopov(UniversitatPompeuFabra),andErinYork(ColumbiaUniversity).AnearlyversionofthereportwaspresentedanddiscussedwithrepresentativesfromthePalestinianAuthorityandDevelopmentPartnersataworkshoporganizedbytheWorldBank,USAID,andDRO,heldinRamallahonMarch9,2017.
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms CAPEX CapitalExpenditureCoM CabinetofMinistersCSC CitizenServiceCenterDISCO DistributionCompanyEQA EnvironmentQualityAuthorityFCS FragileandConflict-affectedsituationsFGD FocusGroupDiscussionGDP GrossDomesticProductGoI GovernmentofIsraelICA IsraeliCivilAdministrationIEC IsraelElectricCorporationJSC JointServiceCouncilKII KeyInformantInterviewkm Kilometerkm2 SquareKilometerLGPA LocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentLGSIP LocalGovernanceandServicesImprovementProgramLGU LocalGovernmentUnitMDLF MunicipalDevelopmentLendingFundMDP MunicipalDevelopmentProgramMoEHE MinistryofEducationandHigherEducationMoFP MinistryofFinanceandPlanningMoH MinistryofHealthMoLG MinistryofLocalGovernmentMoNE MinistryofNationalEconomyMoPWH MinistryofPublicWorksandHousingNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganizationNIS NewIsraeliShekelNPA NationalPolicyAgendaNSP NationalSpatialPlanO&M OperationsandMaintenanceOPEX OperatingExpenditurePA PalestinianAuthorityPCBS PalestinianCentralBureauofStatisticsPENRA PalestinianEnergyandNaturalResourcesAuthorityPERC PalestinianElectricityRegulatoryCouncilPWA PalestinianWaterAuthorityRDP RegionalDevelopmentPlanUNICEF UnitedNationsChildren'sFundUNRWA UnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineVC VillageCouncilVIP VentilatedImprovedPitLatrineWASH Water,Sanitation,andHygieneWDI WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsWHO WorldHealthOrganizationWSRC WaterSectorRegulatoryCouncil
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Why does the performance of Palestinian Local Governments matter?
1. PalestinianlocalgovernmentsrepresentakeypillarofthefuturePalestinianstate.Predat-ingthePalestinianAuthority,manyhavelongandproudhistories,includingsomeoftheoldestinhab-itedcities in theworld.With increasingpoliticalandgeographical fragmentationover the last twodecades,LocalGovernmentUnits(LGUs)havebecomeofparamountimportanceregardingthepro-visionofservicestothelocalpopulation,particularlyinareaswheretherelativelyyoungcentralgov-ernment ispolitically,geographically,andfiscallyconstrained.SomeexistingLGUswerecreatedasearlyasthesecondhalfofthe19thcentury,andoverthedecades,theyhaveperformedunderthecomplexitiesofdisparatepoliticalandlegalregimes.Asthelowestlevelofgovernance,Palestinianlocalauthoritiesfulfillacriticalrole,notonlyasakeypublicserviceproviderbutalsoasthegovern-ment tier closest to citizens,withelectedcouncils critical for representationandaccountability tocitizens.ThemostrecentlocalelectionswereonMay13,2017,andinOctober2012,onlyintheWestBank;followingthemostrecentlocalelectionsinboththeWestBankandGazain2006.StrengtheningLGUsandenablingthemtoperformasfullyfunctionallocalgovernmentsaccountabletocitizensarekeyprioritiesforthePalestinianAuthority.
2. Ahighleveloffragmentationwithlargevariationsinfiscalandinstitutionalcapacityaffectslocalservicedeliveryperformance. In1997,therewere350localauthorities;todaythereare417.Thismaynotbefinanciallyviableandcouldadverselyaffectallocativeefficiencyinahighlyfinanciallyconstrainedenvironment.Inshort,Palestinianscouldbepayingforalargebutinefficientlocalgov-ernmentsectorthatisdrainingscarcepublicresourcesandexternalaidatthecostoferodinginfra-structure,decliningservices,andsuboptimaldevelopment.However,thereiscurrentlynoevidencetosubstantiatethisclaim,anditisimportanttogetabetterunderstandingofthedriversofservicedeliveryperformanceandthemosteffectivewaystosupportLGUstobetterperformforthebenefitofthePalestinianpeople.
3. AlackofcomprehensivedatathatisrepresentativeattheLGUlevelhasmadeitimpossibletoassessandcompareservicedeliveryoutcomesacrossPalestinianLGUs.DataonservicecoverageandbasicgovernanceindicatorsinPalestinianLGUsexists,butitdoesnotcoveralllocalservicesandiscollectedfromthesupplyside,i.e.,localauthoritiesandserviceproviders.AlthoughthePalestinianCentralBureauof Statistics (PCBS) conducts regularhousehold surveys,whichwouldallow for as-sessingserviceoutcomesfromthedemand-side,i.e.,citizensandserviceusers,thedataisnotrepre-sentativeatthelevelofindividualLGUs.Thoseconstraintshavelimitedthepossibilitiesforacompre-hensiveperformanceassessmentinthepast.However,itisimportanttounderstandwhatdrivestheservicedeliveryperformanceofPalestinianLGUsinordertomakemeaningfulpolicyrecommenda-tions,addresstheissuesthatarefullyunderPalestiniancontrol,andhighlighttheadverseimpactsthatexternallyimposedconstraintshaveonthelivingstandardsofthePalestinianpeople.However,todate,norobustevidencebaseexiststoanswerthosequestions.
How do Palestinian Local Governments perform and how can it be measured?
4. TheanalysispresentedinthisreporthastheobjectivetofillthiscriticalknowledgegapandhelptargetinginterventionstoimproveservicedeliveryintheWestBankandGaza.ThePalestinianLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessment(LGPA)establishesthequantitativebasisforanalysisandaperformancebaselineforfuturebenchmarking.Existing localservicedeliverydatahasbeenverylimited,despitesubstantialexternalsupporttothesectoroverthelastdecades.Generally,thescope
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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ofexistingdataonlycoversselectsupply-side informationcollectedfromLGUsorhouseholddata,which isnot representativeat theLGU level.Hence,under theLGPA,acomprehensivehouseholdsurvey,coveringmorethan380Palestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils,wasconducted,provid-ingthequantitativebasisforthefollowinganalysis.Inaddition,dataavailablefromearlieranalysesconductedbytheWorldBankwasusedtobetterunderstandthesupplysideofservicedelivery,in-cludinglocalgovernmentfinancing,performanceofJointServiceCouncils(JSCs),andinstitutionaldatacollectedundertheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram(MDP).Complementaryqualitativeanalysisandcasestudieswereimplementedtoallowforamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofperformancedriversanddeterminingfactorsrelatedtoinstitutionalcapacity,governance,andpoliticaleconomy.
5. ServiceoutcomesvarysubstantiallybothacrossLGUsandsectors.TheLGPAassessesservicedeliveryoutcomesforthekeypubicservicesundertheresponsibilityoflocalauthorities,i.e.,watersupply,sanitation,solidwastemanagement,andlocalroads.Theassessmentreviewsoutcomevaria-tionsacrosssectors,individualLGUs,andgeographicareas.Dataonelectricitysupply,educationandhealthwasalsocollectedbytheLGPAhouseholdsurvey,butarenotsubjecttothisanalysis.Althoughdataforthoseservicesectorswillbeimportantforfollow-upanalysis,theLGPAlimitsitselftothefourbasicservicesmentionedabove.LGUshavenooronlylimitedroleindeliveringeducationandhealthservices,whichareadministeredandoperatedbythenationalauthority, internationalagenciesornon-governmentalorganizations,orinelectricitydistribution,whichfallsundertheresponsibilityofelectricitydistributioncompanies.
6. Outcomevariationsalone,whileimportanttounderstand,donotallowforbettertargetingofinterventionsandpolicyrecommendations.AmorecomprehensivemeasureisneededtoassessLGUservicedeliveryperformancebasedoncitizenaccessandsatisfactionwithserviceoutcomesthatwouldallowforcomparisonsofLGUperformanceacrosstheWestBankandacrossGaza.Aperfor-manceindexwasthereforedevelopedforpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartnersasatooltoiden-tifyandtargetinterventionsinmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.
7. TheLGPAPerformanceindexusestenindicatorstomeasureoverallLGUperformance.Thetenindicatorsrepresentthethreedimensionsofaccess,qualityandreliabilityforpipedwater,pipedsewage,andwastecollection,andajointmeasureforlocalroads.TheLGPAPerformanceindexranksLGUsaccordingtotheirperformancescoresandallowsforananalysisofkeydriversforservicedeliv-eryperformance,includinggeographysize,wealth,fiscalstrength,institutionalcapacity,governance,andmodesofservicedelivery.
How satisfied are households with service delivery outcomes?
8. Palestinianshaveachievedhighratesofaccess,althoughservicesarenotalwaysavailableandqualitydiffers.PalestinianLGUshaveachievedremarkablelevelsofaccesstobasicservices,par-ticularlygiventhechallengingcircumstancesofoccupationandanoverallcontextoffragility,conflictandviolence.Pipedwatersupplyconnectionshavereachedalmostuniversalcoverageat94percentintheWestBankand88percentintheGazaStrip.Over80percentofhouseholdsinGazaandupto95percentintheWestBankhaveaccesstoregularsolidwastecollection.Around77percentofhouse-holdsintheGazaStripareconnectedtoapipedsewagenetwork.At30percent,accesstopipedsew-ageismuchlowerintheWestBank,althoughthisislargelyareflectionofthemoreruralcharacterofWestBankvillagescomparedwiththehighlyurbanizedGazaStrip:intheWestBank,accesstopipedsewageisat8percentinVillageCouncils,comparedto37percentinmunicipalities.Forthosehouse-holdsconnectedtoapipedsewagenetwork,around80percentreportthatthequalityandreliabilityofservicesisacceptable,suggestingthatwastewaterprioritiesshouldfocusonincreasingtreatmentcapacityandaccesstothosehouseholdsnotyetconnected.Comparingoutcomesinthewastewatersectortoothercountries,coveragewithimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisclearlyhigherinthePalestin-ian territories (96percent) than inLebanon (80.7percent)and theaverageof fragileandconflict-
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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affectedsituations(FCS;43.5percent),slightlyhigherthantheaveragefortheregion(89.6percent),andjustbelowneighboringJordanian(98.6percent).1
FigureES-1:ServiceAccessacrossSectors
9. Only1percentofGaza’spopulationhasaccesstoan improvedsourceofdrinkingwater.Despitehighaccessrates,decadesofunderinvestment,protractedrehabilitationandrepeatedepi-sodesofviolentconflictandwarhaveaffectedthequalityofservices,particularlyinGaza.Therapidlydeterioratingqualityofgroundwatercausedbyseawaterintrusionanddischargeofuntreatedsewagehasmademostof thepipedwaterundrinkable.Onlyonepercentofhouseholds in theGazaStripreporttohaveaccesstoimproveddrinkingwaterandmorethan97percenthavetorelyondrinkingwaterdeliveredbytankertrucks.AlsooverallsatisfactionratesforpipedwatersupplyarelowestinGazaacrossthePalestinianterritories.Only36percentofhouseholdsintheGazaStriparesatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwater,comparedwith54percentintheWestBank.Thisfindingisconfirmedbyqualitativeinterviews,whichshowthatdespitehighconnectionrates,watershortagesandqualityremaincriticalchallenges.Comparingserviceoutcomes inthewatersectortothoseofneighboringcountriesandcountriesofsimilarstructuralcharacteristics,accesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesinthePalestinianterritories(57percent)islowerthaninbothJordan(96.9percent)andLebanon(99percent),aswellastheregion(92.6percent;excludinghighincomecountries),andotherfragileandconflict-affectedsituations(67.8percent).2
10. Acrosssectors,accessratesarelowestforlocalroads.Fewerthan2in3Palestinianhouse-holdshaveaccesstopavedroads.Only42percentofhouseholdsinGazareporthavingimmediateaccesstoapavedroadfromtheirhome,comparedwitharound74percentintheWestBank.ThisfindingisconsistentwiththehighshareofroadsinvestmentprojectsprioritizedinlocaldevelopmentplansacrossPalestinianLGUs,suggestingthatinvestmentneedsforlocalroadswillremainhighintheforeseeablefuture.ItalsoreflectstheshortageoffundingLGUshaveavailablefortherehabilitation,extension,andmaintenanceofroads.Comparedtorevenue-generatingservices,suchassolidwastecollectionandwatersupplyforwhichserviceprovidersgenerallychargeuserfees,LGUshavenodirectincomesourcetocoverroadrehabilitationandmaintenancecost.Instead,LGUshavetorelyentirelyonownorsharedtaxes,grantsfromthecentralgovernment,orfromexternaldonorswhich,however,
1WorldDevelopmentIndicators.2ibid.
94%
30%
95%
74%
88%
77%
83%
42%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageSource:LGPA2017
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tendtoprioritizeothersectorsorinvestmentsintheirsupportprograms.
11. Thequalityofsolidwastecollectionhasroomtoimprove.Only59percentofhouseholdsintheWestBank,andsurprisingly70percentofhouseholdsinGazaexpresssatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservices.DespitetheincreasingcoverageofcollectionservicesandsubstantialinvestmentsinsanitarylandfillsinboththeWestBankandGaza,LGPAfindingssuggestroomforimprovingserviceoutcomes.Investingindisposalinfrastructureandcollectionequipmentalonewillnotsuffice.Experiencefromanoutput-based investmentprograminthesouthernWestBanktargetingLGUsintheHebronandBethlehemGovernoratesprovidesgoodlessonshowusersat-isfactioncanbeincreasedthroughimprovingthetimelinessofcollectionservices,cleanlinessatcol-lectionpoints,andeffectivenessoffeedbackandcomplaintmechanisms.Strengtheningthemanage-mentcapacityandimprovingresponsivenessofserviceoperatorsshouldbeapriorityforsupport.
FigureES-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability
12. Overall,municipalitiesachieveconsistentlyhigherserviceoutcomelevelsthanvillagecoun-cils.Ingeneral,serviceoutcomelevelsaredeclininginlinewithLGUsizegroups.Thisholdsforbothaccessandsatisfactionratingsacrosssectors,exceptwatersupply.Butsizealonedoesnotexplainthedifferenceinoutcomes.Interestingly,householdsrateaccessandsatisfactionwithwatersupplyser-viceshighestinsmallmunicipalities,whilelargeandmediumsizemunicipalitieshaveoutcomesmorecomparabletothoseofvillagecouncils.Thismaybedrivenbythemorerapiddemographicgrowthinmunicipalitiesoutstripping theavailabilityofbulkwater andadversely affectingwaterquality andavailability.However,withthisexception,LGPAfindingsconfirmthatserviceoutcomesaregenerallylowerinvillagecouncils.Villagestendtostruggletoprovideandmaintainthesamelevelofservicescomparedtomunicipalities.Thecurrentstatusquoisnotsustainableandmoreneedstobedonetoconsolidateservicedeliveryinvillagecouncilstobringthematparwithmunicipalities.
13. Serviceoutcomesvaryacrossregions.Forthemostpart,LGUsinthecentralandnorthWestBankachievehigheroutcomesthanthesouthWestBankandGaza.Thisfindingisconsistent,exceptforpipedsewage,forwhichaccessishigherinGazaasaresultofthehighlevelofurbanization;andsatisfactionisthehighestinthesouthforthosehouseholdswhoareconnectedtothesewagesystem.ThereisgreateraccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesinthenorthWestBank,withalmostuniversalcoverage,butsatisfactionrateswiththeserviceisthelowest;thisissomewhatcounterintuitivegiventhelong-standingsupporttoimprovingsolidwastemanagementinthenorthernWestBank.Thereis
54%
84%
59%
45%
36%
79%
70%
23%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageSource:LGPA2017
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tendtoprioritizeothersectorsorinvestmentsintheirsupportprograms.
11. Thequalityofsolidwastecollectionhasroomtoimprove.Only59percentofhouseholdsintheWestBank,andsurprisingly70percentofhouseholdsinGazaexpresssatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservices.DespitetheincreasingcoverageofcollectionservicesandsubstantialinvestmentsinsanitarylandfillsinboththeWestBankandGaza,LGPAfindingssuggestroomforimprovingserviceoutcomes.Investingindisposalinfrastructureandcollectionequipmentalonewillnotsuffice.Experiencefromanoutput-based investmentprograminthesouthernWestBanktargetingLGUsintheHebronandBethlehemGovernoratesprovidesgoodlessonshowusersat-isfactioncanbeincreasedthroughimprovingthetimelinessofcollectionservices,cleanlinessatcol-lectionpoints,andeffectivenessoffeedbackandcomplaintmechanisms.Strengtheningthemanage-mentcapacityandimprovingresponsivenessofserviceoperatorsshouldbeapriorityforsupport.
FigureES-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability
12. Overall,municipalitiesachieveconsistentlyhigherserviceoutcomelevelsthanvillagecoun-cils.Ingeneral,serviceoutcomelevelsaredeclininginlinewithLGUsizegroups.Thisholdsforbothaccessandsatisfactionratingsacrosssectors,exceptwatersupply.Butsizealonedoesnotexplainthedifferenceinoutcomes.Interestingly,householdsrateaccessandsatisfactionwithwatersupplyser-viceshighestinsmallmunicipalities,whilelargeandmediumsizemunicipalitieshaveoutcomesmorecomparabletothoseofvillagecouncils.Thismaybedrivenbythemorerapiddemographicgrowthinmunicipalitiesoutstripping theavailabilityofbulkwater andadversely affectingwaterquality andavailability.However,withthisexception,LGPAfindingsconfirmthatserviceoutcomesaregenerallylowerinvillagecouncils.Villagestendtostruggletoprovideandmaintainthesamelevelofservicescomparedtomunicipalities.Thecurrentstatusquoisnotsustainableandmoreneedstobedonetoconsolidateservicedeliveryinvillagecouncilstobringthematparwithmunicipalities.
13. Serviceoutcomesvaryacrossregions.Forthemostpart,LGUsinthecentralandnorthWestBankachievehigheroutcomesthanthesouthWestBankandGaza.Thisfindingisconsistent,exceptforpipedsewage,forwhichaccessishigherinGazaasaresultofthehighlevelofurbanization;andsatisfactionisthehighestinthesouthforthosehouseholdswhoareconnectedtothesewagesystem.ThereisgreateraccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesinthenorthWestBank,withalmostuniversalcoverage,butsatisfactionrateswiththeserviceisthelowest;thisissomewhatcounterintuitivegiventhelong-standingsupporttoimprovingsolidwastemanagementinthenorthernWestBank.Thereis
54%
84%
59%
45%
36%
79%
70%
23%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageSource:LGPA2017
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tendtoprioritizeothersectorsorinvestmentsintheirsupportprograms.
11. Thequalityofsolidwastecollectionhasroomtoimprove.Only59percentofhouseholdsintheWestBank,andsurprisingly70percentofhouseholdsinGazaexpresssatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservices.DespitetheincreasingcoverageofcollectionservicesandsubstantialinvestmentsinsanitarylandfillsinboththeWestBankandGaza,LGPAfindingssuggestroomforimprovingserviceoutcomes.Investingindisposalinfrastructureandcollectionequipmentalonewillnotsuffice.Experiencefromanoutput-based investmentprograminthesouthernWestBanktargetingLGUsintheHebronandBethlehemGovernoratesprovidesgoodlessonshowusersat-isfactioncanbeincreasedthroughimprovingthetimelinessofcollectionservices,cleanlinessatcol-lectionpoints,andeffectivenessoffeedbackandcomplaintmechanisms.Strengtheningthemanage-mentcapacityandimprovingresponsivenessofserviceoperatorsshouldbeapriorityforsupport.
FigureES-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability
12. Overall,municipalitiesachieveconsistentlyhigherserviceoutcomelevelsthanvillagecoun-cils.Ingeneral,serviceoutcomelevelsaredeclininginlinewithLGUsizegroups.Thisholdsforbothaccessandsatisfactionratingsacrosssectors,exceptwatersupply.Butsizealonedoesnotexplainthedifferenceinoutcomes.Interestingly,householdsrateaccessandsatisfactionwithwatersupplyser-viceshighestinsmallmunicipalities,whilelargeandmediumsizemunicipalitieshaveoutcomesmorecomparabletothoseofvillagecouncils.Thismaybedrivenbythemorerapiddemographicgrowthinmunicipalitiesoutstripping theavailabilityofbulkwater andadversely affectingwaterquality andavailability.However,withthisexception,LGPAfindingsconfirmthatserviceoutcomesaregenerallylowerinvillagecouncils.Villagestendtostruggletoprovideandmaintainthesamelevelofservicescomparedtomunicipalities.Thecurrentstatusquoisnotsustainableandmoreneedstobedonetoconsolidateservicedeliveryinvillagecouncilstobringthematparwithmunicipalities.
13. Serviceoutcomesvaryacrossregions.Forthemostpart,LGUsinthecentralandnorthWestBankachievehigheroutcomesthanthesouthWestBankandGaza.Thisfindingisconsistent,exceptforpipedsewage,forwhichaccessishigherinGazaasaresultofthehighlevelofurbanization;andsatisfactionisthehighestinthesouthforthosehouseholdswhoareconnectedtothesewagesystem.ThereisgreateraccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesinthenorthWestBank,withalmostuniversalcoverage,butsatisfactionrateswiththeserviceisthelowest;thisissomewhatcounterintuitivegiventhelong-standingsupporttoimprovingsolidwastemanagementinthenorthernWestBank.Thereis
54%
84%
59%
45%
36%
79%
70%
23%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageSource:LGPA2017
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nostraightforwardexplanationfortheregionalvariations,beyondthemorepronounceddividebe-tweentheWestBankandtheGazaStrip.However,somehavearguedthatalargernumberofmove-mentrestrictionsandproximityofLGUstotheseparationbarrierandAreaCmightbeamongthedeterminantsforregionalvariationsinserviceoutcomes.
14. Whilethelikelihoodforaccesstopipedwaterislowerforpoorerhouseholds,genderisnotadeterminingfactordrivingserviceoutcomes.Householdsatthebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionaremorelikelytobeaffectedbylowaccessratescomparedwithhigherincomegroups,particularlyintheWestBankandforpipedwatersupply.Non-poorhouseholdsintheWestBankarealmosttwotimesmorelikelytohaveaccesstopipedwaterthanthoseinthebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution.FindingsalsosuggestthatpoorerhouseholdsintheWestBankarelesssatis-fiedwithwastecollectionservicesthanthenon-poorare.ThelikelihoodofbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetworkisslightlyhigherforhouseholdsintheupperthreewealthquintilesinGaza,butthisgapisnotstatisticallysignificant.LGPAfindingsalsosuggestthatthereisnosignificantgendergapinbasicservicedelivery.Serviceoutcomesforfemale-headedhouseholdsarestatisticallynotsig-nificantlydifferentfrommale-headedhouseholds,exceptforaccesstopipedwaterandsatisfactionwithpipedsewageinGaza.Overall,PalestinianLGUshaveachievedremarkablyequitableservicepro-vision,despitesignificantneedstoimproveservicequalityandreliability.
What is driving the performance of Palestinian local governments? Size, Density and Location
15. Whilepopulationsizeandlocationmatter,municipalitiesperformbetterthanvillagecoun-cilsevenwhenrulingoutdifferencesinLGUsizeandgeography.Sizeandlocationaffectoverallper-formanceofPalestinianLGUs,but,importantly,theperformancedifferencesidentifiedintheLGPAgobeyondapuresizeorregionaleffect.Thisisanimportantfinding,underliningthatothercrucialfactorsdrivetheperformancegapbetweenmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.Whilehouseholdsinvillagesclearlyrateserviceoutcomeslowerthaninmunicipalities,afocusonmergingLGUsintolargerentitieswillnotnecessarilyimproveservicedeliveryperformancebyitself.Additionalpolicyinstru-ments,capacitydevelopment,andincentives,thatgobeyondsizeand‘amalgamation’arerequiredtoachievebetterperformanceinPalestinianLGUs.
16. Higherpopulationdensityisstronglyassociatedwithbetterperformanceoutcomes.Popu-lation density varies substantially across Palestinian LGUs, ranging from less than four people persquarekilometer(km2) inoneofthesmallvillages intheWestBank,theVillageCouncilofMarjalGhazalintheJerichoGovernorate,tomorethan11,000peopleperkm2inGazaCity.Inmorethan75percentofLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,theaveragepopulationperkm2islessthan1,000,andin34municipalitiesandvillagecouncils,itisbelow100.Thesewidegapsareseverelyaffectingservicedeliveryoutcomes,becauseLGUpopulationdensityandservicedeliveryperformancearestronglycorrelated.Themostpopulated20percentofLGUsonaverageperform6.2pointshigherthantheleastpopulated20percentofLGUs.Onaverage,a1percent increase inpopulationdensitycorre-spondstoa3.3-pointhigherperformancescore.Thisfindingisconsistentwithglobalexperience,sincethecostofinfrastructureandserviceprovisiondeclinesonapercapitabasiswithincreasingdensities.PalestinianLGUsshouldaimtoachievehigher levelsofpopulationdensityandavoidcostlysprawlthatishamperingservicedeliveryperformance.
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FigureES-3:PopulationSize(left)&Density(right)asPerformanceDrivers
Source:LGPA2017
17. RemoteandmarginalizedLGUsperformsignificantlyworse.MostPalestinianLGUsarelo-catedwithina5–10kmradiusoftheirgovernoratecapital,butdistancequicklytranslatesintolowerperformance.UsingthegeographicalspreadofLGUsrelativetotheirgovernorateasaproxyforre-motenessrevealsastrongcorrelationwithservicedeliveryoutcomes:themostremote20percentLGUsonaverageperform11points lowerthanthe leastremote20percentLGUs.Onaverage,a1percentincreaseindistancecorrespondstothestatisticallysignificantdecreaseinperformanceout-comesof5.2points.Economicactivityandfiscalcapacitytendtobeconcentratedintheurbancen-ters, explainingpart of theperformance variations associatedwithdistance.However, PalestinianLGUssufferfromadditionallayersofmarginalizationassociatedwiththemovementrestrictionsim-posedbytheGovernmentofIsrael,magnifyingtheadverseimpactofremotenessanddistancetotheurbancentersobservedelsewhereintheworld.
18. Ingeneral,households inAreaCorclosetotheseparationbarrierare less likelytohaveaccesstobasiclocalservices.SatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityofservicesisalsonotablylowerinAreaCandnearthebarrier.Incomparingthelikelihoodofserviceaccessforhouseholdsthatlivewithina1kmradiusoftheseparationbarrier,nostatisticallysignificantcoefficientsareobserved.However,ifthedistanceconsideredisnarrowed,significantdifferencesemergeinthewatersector:householdsliving500oreven250metersfromtheseparationbarrierareonaveragejusthalfaslikelytohaveaccesstopipedwaterthanthoselivingfartheraway.ThiseffectisstatisticallysignificantforboththeentireWestBanksampleandthesubsampleofLGUsthatare intersectedbythebarrier.WhilethecoefficientsfortheAreaCindicatorsuggestthat,onaverage,householdslivinginAreaCarelesslikelytohaveaccesstoallofthefourbasicservices,onlytheindicatorforsolidwastecollectionyieldsastatisticallysignificantresult:theoddstobecoveredbyawastecollectionserviceofhouse-holdsthatliveinAreaCareonlyone-thirdaslargeasthoseofhouseholdsthatliveinAreasAandB.
19. Overall,AreaC isassociatedwith lowerLGUperformancescores.This findingholdsevenwhencontrollingforimportantperformancedrivers,suchasremotenessandsizeofLGU.Onaverage,LGUsservingareaswhereatleast60percentofthebuilt-upareaisinAreaChaveastatisticallysig-nificantperformancescore,whichis5.8pointslowerthantheotherWestBankLGUs.LGUswithadevelopedAreaCareashareofmorethan70and80percentperform8.0and8.5pointsloweronaverage.PalestinianLGUshavelittlemeanstoimprovingservicedeliveryoutcomesofcommunitiesliving in Area C, given their limitedmandate beyond Areas A and B. Development Partners havesteppeduptheirsupporttocommunitiesinAreaC.Since2012,around113masterplanshavebeenpreparedtosupportcapitalinvestmentandservicedeliveryimprovementsin77LGUswithPalestiniancommunities living inAreaC.However, todate,only fiveof theplanshavebeenapprovedby theIsraeliCivilAdministration (ICA).Theothermasterplans submitted to the ICA forapprovalare still
ix
awaitingadecision,81ofthemhavebeenpendingformorethan18months.
Fiscal Capacity and Responsiveness
20. FiscalcapacityisamaindriverofLGUperformance.Overall,percapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformanceandarobustrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperformanceexists,disproportionallyconstrainingsmallermunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsduetotheirlimitedrevenuebaseandinstitutionalcapacity.A1percentincreaseinpercapitaoper-atingrevenuesonaveragecorrespondstoa4.7-pointshigherperformancescore;anda1percentincreaseinpercapitaoperatingexpenditurestoaperformancescoreincreaseof5.2points.Thiseffectisevenmorepronouncedamongmunicipalities,wherea1percentincreaseinpercapitarevenuesisassociatedwithanaverage6.5higherperformancescore,andan8.9higherscoreforpercapitaex-penditures.Fiscalcapacitycanbeidentifiedasone,ifnotthestrongestdriverofLGUperformance,evenwhen rulingoutdifferencesdue to sizeand location.Eroding localbudgets limit the fundingavailable to invest inextending,upgradingorevenmaintaining servicesat satisfactory levels. ThisfindingurgesgivinghighestprioritytoadvancinglocalgovernmentfinancingreformandaddressingthelargeimbalancesoffiscalcapacityacrossLGUs,inparticularbetweenvillagecouncilsandmunici-palities,butalsoacrossmunicipalities.Thecurrentinter-governmentalfiscalarchitectureinPalestineischaracterizedbylocalrevenueassignmentsthatareinsufficienttocovertheoperationalexpendi-tureneedsofLGUs;andlackofafiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernmentthatwouldincludeequal-izationelementstocorrectimbalancesacrosslocalauthoritiescharacterizedbyvaryingfiscalcapacity.Withoutaddressingthosehorizontalandverticalfiscalimbalances,onlylimitedprogresscanbeenvi-sionedforimprovingPalestinianlocalgovernmentperformance.
FigureES-4:OperatingRevenues(left)&OperatingExpenditures(right)asPerformanceDrivers
Source:LGPA2017
21. Citizens’ willingness to pay and actual payments vary significantly, suggesting that LGUsneedtoimprovebotheffortstocollectrevenuesandserviceoutcomes.Giventhelimitedresourcesmadeavailablefromtransfersandsharedtaxes,LGUshavetorelymostlyonown-sourcerevenues.However,LGPAfindingssuggestlargevariationsinthewillingnesstopayforlocalservicesandactualcollectionacrosslocalauthorities.Forexample,averagemonthlypipedwaterpaymentsarehigherinmunicipalitiesthaninvillagecouncils,andthehighestinmedium-sizedmunicipalitiesintheWestBank(136NewIsraeliShekel(NIS)). IntheWestBank,citizens inmunicipalitiesalsopaymoreforwastecollectionservices(NIS24)thancitizensinvillagecouncils(NIS21).AcrossthePalestinianterritories,morethanhalfofthehouseholds(52percent)reportamaximumwillingnesstopayforpipedwaterthatislowerthantheiractualpayment.Theseresultscorrespondtoaconsiderablenumberofhouse-holdsreportingdissatisfactionwithpipedwatercosts:39percentofhouseholdsinGazaand1in4
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awaitingadecision,81ofthemhavebeenpendingformorethan18months.
Fiscal Capacity and Responsiveness
20. FiscalcapacityisamaindriverofLGUperformance.Overall,percapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformanceandarobustrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperformanceexists,disproportionallyconstrainingsmallermunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsduetotheirlimitedrevenuebaseandinstitutionalcapacity.A1percentincreaseinpercapitaoper-atingrevenuesonaveragecorrespondstoa4.7-pointshigherperformancescore;anda1percentincreaseinpercapitaoperatingexpenditurestoaperformancescoreincreaseof5.2points.Thiseffectisevenmorepronouncedamongmunicipalities,wherea1percentincreaseinpercapitarevenuesisassociatedwithanaverage6.5higherperformancescore,andan8.9higherscoreforpercapitaex-penditures.Fiscalcapacitycanbeidentifiedasone,ifnotthestrongestdriverofLGUperformance,evenwhen rulingoutdifferencesdue to sizeand location.Eroding localbudgets limit the fundingavailable to invest inextending,upgradingorevenmaintaining servicesat satisfactory levels. ThisfindingurgesgivinghighestprioritytoadvancinglocalgovernmentfinancingreformandaddressingthelargeimbalancesoffiscalcapacityacrossLGUs,inparticularbetweenvillagecouncilsandmunici-palities,butalsoacrossmunicipalities.Thecurrentinter-governmentalfiscalarchitectureinPalestineischaracterizedbylocalrevenueassignmentsthatareinsufficienttocovertheoperationalexpendi-tureneedsofLGUs;andlackofafiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernmentthatwouldincludeequal-izationelementstocorrectimbalancesacrosslocalauthoritiescharacterizedbyvaryingfiscalcapacity.Withoutaddressingthosehorizontalandverticalfiscalimbalances,onlylimitedprogresscanbeenvi-sionedforimprovingPalestinianlocalgovernmentperformance.
FigureES-4:OperatingRevenues(left)&OperatingExpenditures(right)asPerformanceDrivers
Source:LGPA2017
21. Citizens’ willingness to pay and actual payments vary significantly, suggesting that LGUsneedtoimprovebotheffortstocollectrevenuesandserviceoutcomes.Giventhelimitedresourcesmadeavailablefromtransfersandsharedtaxes,LGUshavetorelymostlyonown-sourcerevenues.However,LGPAfindingssuggestlargevariationsinthewillingnesstopayforlocalservicesandactualcollectionacrosslocalauthorities.Forexample,averagemonthlypipedwaterpaymentsarehigherinmunicipalitiesthaninvillagecouncils,andthehighestinmedium-sizedmunicipalitiesintheWestBank(136NewIsraeliShekel(NIS)). IntheWestBank,citizens inmunicipalitiesalsopaymoreforwastecollectionservices(NIS24)thancitizensinvillagecouncils(NIS21).AcrossthePalestinianterritories,morethanhalfofthehouseholds(52percent)reportamaximumwillingnesstopayforpipedwaterthatislowerthantheiractualpayment.Theseresultscorrespondtoaconsiderablenumberofhouse-holdsreportingdissatisfactionwithpipedwatercosts:39percentofhouseholdsinGazaand1in4
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awaitingadecision,81ofthemhavebeenpendingformorethan18months.
Fiscal Capacity and Responsiveness
20. FiscalcapacityisamaindriverofLGUperformance.Overall,percapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformanceandarobustrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperformanceexists,disproportionallyconstrainingsmallermunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsduetotheirlimitedrevenuebaseandinstitutionalcapacity.A1percentincreaseinpercapitaoper-atingrevenuesonaveragecorrespondstoa4.7-pointshigherperformancescore;anda1percentincreaseinpercapitaoperatingexpenditurestoaperformancescoreincreaseof5.2points.Thiseffectisevenmorepronouncedamongmunicipalities,wherea1percentincreaseinpercapitarevenuesisassociatedwithanaverage6.5higherperformancescore,andan8.9higherscoreforpercapitaex-penditures.Fiscalcapacitycanbeidentifiedasone,ifnotthestrongestdriverofLGUperformance,evenwhen rulingoutdifferencesdue to sizeand location.Eroding localbudgets limit the fundingavailable to invest inextending,upgradingorevenmaintaining servicesat satisfactory levels. ThisfindingurgesgivinghighestprioritytoadvancinglocalgovernmentfinancingreformandaddressingthelargeimbalancesoffiscalcapacityacrossLGUs,inparticularbetweenvillagecouncilsandmunici-palities,butalsoacrossmunicipalities.Thecurrentinter-governmentalfiscalarchitectureinPalestineischaracterizedbylocalrevenueassignmentsthatareinsufficienttocovertheoperationalexpendi-tureneedsofLGUs;andlackofafiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernmentthatwouldincludeequal-izationelementstocorrectimbalancesacrosslocalauthoritiescharacterizedbyvaryingfiscalcapacity.Withoutaddressingthosehorizontalandverticalfiscalimbalances,onlylimitedprogresscanbeenvi-sionedforimprovingPalestinianlocalgovernmentperformance.
FigureES-4:OperatingRevenues(left)&OperatingExpenditures(right)asPerformanceDrivers
Source:LGPA2017
21. Citizens’ willingness to pay and actual payments vary significantly, suggesting that LGUsneedtoimprovebotheffortstocollectrevenuesandserviceoutcomes.Giventhelimitedresourcesmadeavailablefromtransfersandsharedtaxes,LGUshavetorelymostlyonown-sourcerevenues.However,LGPAfindingssuggestlargevariationsinthewillingnesstopayforlocalservicesandactualcollectionacrosslocalauthorities.Forexample,averagemonthlypipedwaterpaymentsarehigherinmunicipalitiesthaninvillagecouncils,andthehighestinmedium-sizedmunicipalitiesintheWestBank(136NewIsraeliShekel(NIS)). IntheWestBank,citizens inmunicipalitiesalsopaymoreforwastecollectionservices(NIS24)thancitizensinvillagecouncils(NIS21).AcrossthePalestinianterritories,morethanhalfofthehouseholds(52percent)reportamaximumwillingnesstopayforpipedwaterthatislowerthantheiractualpayment.Theseresultscorrespondtoaconsiderablenumberofhouse-holdsreportingdissatisfactionwithpipedwatercosts:39percentofhouseholdsinGazaand1in4
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householdsintheWestBankaredissatisfiedorverydissatisfiedwiththecostofpipedwater.Inlinewithglobalexperience,enhancinglocalrevenuecollectionneedstogohand-in-handwithimprovingservicedeliveryoutcomessinceusersatisfactiontendstobedrivingwillingnesstopayforservices.
22. CitizensaremorelikelytopaytheirbillsontimeiftheyaresatisfiedwithservicereliabilityandLGUresponsiveness.Onaverage,PalestinianhouseholdsthatagreetheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizens’concernsorcomplaintshaveabout1.75timeshigheroddstopayontimeforpipedwatersupplyandsolidwastecollection.AssumingthatareformofthePalestinianlocalgovernmentfinanc-ingsystemwouldyethavetoevolveovertimeandislikelytobeimplementedonlyinthemedium-term,asapriorityLGUswillneedtoincreaseown-sourcerevenuecollectiontoenhancetheirfiscalcapacityasthemaindriverofservicedeliveryperformance.Comparedtoallothermeasures,resultsfromtheLGPAsuggestoneshortcutforLGUstocollectmorerevenuesfromuserfees:increasere-sponsivenesstocitizens’needs.
23. Higher LGU responsiveness corresponds to better performance. Responsiveness helps in-creasingcitizens’willingnesstopay.However,inaddition,householdsthathaveusedacitizenservicecenter,orgenerallyagreewiththestatementthattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints,alsorateserviceoutcomeshigher.RegardlessofthesizeorlocationofaLGU,theLGPAfindsapositiverelationshipbetweenresponsivenessandservicedeliveryoutcomes:onaveragethe20percentofLGUswiththehighestshareofhouseholdsreportingtheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaintsperform16.4pointshigher.
24. Lessthanone-thirdofPalestiniansagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive.Thereisplentyofroomtomakelocalauthoritiesmoreresponsive,increasecitizensatisfaction,andenhancelocalrev-enuecollection.Governmentresponsivenesshasalsobeenfoundtobeakeyfactorintheparticipa-torybehaviorofcitizensandbelievedtobeakeydrivertoencouragingresponsiblecitizenry,regainingtrust ingovernment,andenhancingpoliticalparticipation. InthePalestinianterritories,theoverallsatisfactionratewiththeresponsivenessofLGUsislow:lessthanone-thirdofhouseholdsagreethattheirmunicipalityorvillagecouncilisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints.TherateintheWestBank(30percent)isonlyslightlylowerthaninGaza(37percent),butitvariessubstantiallyacrossgovernorates:inTubas,only1in10householdsagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,whileinTulkarmandQalqilya,almosthalfofthehouseholdsagreedwiththestatement.Comparingsatis-factionratesacrosstypesofLGUs intheWestBank, theshareofhouseholdsagreeing ishigher inmunicipalities(31percent)thaninvillagecouncils(24percent).
FigureES-5:CitizenServiceCenterUse(left)&LGUResponsiveness(right)asPerformanceDrivers
Source:LGPA2017
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25. While citizen service centers correspond tohigher LGU responsiveness, only fewcitizensseemtoknowthattheyexist.TherelationshipbetweenLGUresponsivenessandserviceoutcomesisalsopronouncedwhenassessingtheroleofcitizenservicecenters.ThequintileofLGUswiththehigh-estshareofcitizenswhousedacitizenservicecenter,includingone-stop-shops,onaveragehavea5.39higherperformancescore.
26. LGUsneedtoreachoutmoreactivelytotheircitizensandpromotetheexistenceanduseofacitizenservicecenter. InWestBankmunicipalitieswherecitizenservicecentersexist,only16percentofsurveyedhouseholdsreportknowingaboutit,37percentreportnotknowingwhetherornotitexists,and46percentreportnotbelievinginitsexistence.Knowledgeaboutfeedbackinstru-mentsisslightlyhigherinlargemunicipalities,whereatleast1in5householdsreportknowingthatacenterexists.Inmediumandsmallmunicipalities,onlyabout15percentofhouseholdsknowaboutcitizenservicecenters.Giventheeffortsandresourcesprovidedtoestablishone-stop-shopsandotherservicecenters inPalestinianLGUs,DevelopmentPartners, thePalestinianAuthority,and localau-thoritiesneedtogivemuchmoreattentiontopromotetheirexistenceandusebythepublic.
Institutional Arrangements
27. Institutionalarrangementsforservicedeliveryvaryacrossthebasicservicesectors,buttendtobefragmented.Functionsaredistributedacrosscentralandlocalauthoritieswithavarietyofstake-holdersinvolvedinthepolicymaking,prioritysetting,financing,operationandmonitoringofservices.LGUshave full authority over local roads and are responsible for theplanning, development, andmaintenanceofthenetwork,withtheMinistryofPublicWorksandHousingresponsibleforregionalroadsoutsidethemunicipalmasterplans.LGUsalsohavefullauthorityoversolidwastemanagementservices,althoughdisposalfunctions,andtoalesserextendprimarycollectionandtransferfunctions,aregenerallydelegatedtoaJSC.TheMinistryofLocalGovernmentisthepolicymakingauthorityandalsomonitorsLGUperformanceinthesolidwastesector.However,thewaterandsanitationsectorischaracterizedbyahigh levelof fragmentation,withpolicymakingandsector investmentplanningfunctionsatthePalestinianWaterAuthority,regulationandperformancemonitoringattheWaterSectorRegulatoryCouncil,andserviceoperationatthelocallevel.Intotal,therearemorethan100municipalwaterdepartments,andmorethan160villagecouncilsoperatingwaterservices.13JSCsdeliverwaterandsanitationservices,butthereareonly3operatingwaterutilities,2intheWestBankand1inGaza.Thehighleveloffragmentationcauseshighinefficienciesandaconstrainttogeneratingeconomiesofscale.
28. Jointserviceprovisioncanhelpinreachingeconomiesofscale,increasingfinancialsustain-ability,andimprovingservicedeliveryperformance.TheestablishmentanddevelopmentofJSCshasbeencrucialtoimprovingservicedeliveryinPalestinesincetheadoptionoftheLocalGovernmentActin1997andisan importantelementofthePalestinianAuthority’sconsolidationeffortto leverageeconomiesofscaleandsustainmanyexistingvillagecouncilsinrecentyears.Broadly,therearethreetypesofJSCs:thoseprovidingasingleservice,thoseprovidingmultipleservices,andthosethatwereestablishedforplanninganddevelopment.TheJointServicesProvisionAssessmentcarriedoutbytheWorldBankin2015identifiedthatoutofthe82existingJSCsintheWestBankandthe10inGaza,only55areactive.Most(32)activeJSCsarecategorizedasplanninganddevelopment,16assolidwastemanagement,and7aswatersupplyandsanitationservices.SomeJSCsprovidemultipleser-vicestotheirmemberLGUs.
29. JSCcapacityandgovernancearrangementsarecriticaltodeliveringbetterresults.Thecur-rentinstitutionalframeworkandgovernancestructureforserviceprovisionbytheJSCshaveseverallimitations.Themanagementanddecision-makingstructure,accountabilityframework,financingar-rangement,publicparticipation,and social accountability systemsaregenerally inadequateorun-clear.Aspartofthe2015assessment,amoredetailedreviewoftheactivecouncilswasconducted
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basedonagoodgovernanceframeworkassessingperformanceacrosssixthematicareas:ruleoflaw,effectiveandefficientservicedelivery, transparency,accountability, responsiveness,andparticipa-tion.Findingsoftheassessmentconfirmedlargeperformancevariations,withonly16councilsscoringatanacceptablelevel.Thewatersectorhadthebestscore;thescoresforsolidwastemanagementandplanninganddevelopmentJSCswereloweronaverage.
30. Membership inaJSCdoesnot in itself improveservicedeliveryoutcomes inLGUs,but itdoesappeartohaveapositiveimpact,particularlyforvillagecouncils.LGPAfindingssuggestthatamemberofaplanninganddevelopmentJSCachievesanaverage4.0-pointhigherperformancescorethananonmember, regardlessofpopulationsizeand location.Theperformancegain ishigher forvillagecouncils,performinganaverageof5.2pointshighercomparedwithmunicipalities,whichseeaverageperformancegainsof4.1points.Thisfindingconfirmsthatpoolingresources,includingforbetter institutionalcapacity inbasicplanninganddevelopmentfunctions,hasapositive impactonLGUperformance. It iscriticaltoreachaminimumscale inordertoachieveadequate institutionalcapacityforoperatingservicesatsatisfactorylevels,whichisparticularlyimportantforvillagecoun-cils.However,becausemanyplanninganddevelopmentJSCshavealsobeenestablishedatthere-questofDevelopmentPartnerstochannelandmanagedonorfunds,performancegainsmightalsoberelatedtotheadditionalfinancingthatisavailabletothem.Scalealoneisnotenough.
31. With increasingdegreesof specialization, the technical and institutional capacityof JSCsdrivesservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthewatersector,membershipinaJSCdoesnotguaranteesatis-factoryservicedeliveryoutcomes.However,remarkableperformancegainscanbeobserved,forex-ample,inJenin,whichwasratedoneofthebestperformingJSCsinthe2015assessment.Ingeneral,membershipinawatersupplyandsanitationJSCdoesnotyieldbetteroutcomesinthesector,butwhenlimitingthesampletotheJeninGovernorate,wheresomeLGUsbelongtoaJSCandothersdonot,membershipinaJSCcorrespondstoaverystrongandstatisticallyhighlysignificantperformancegaininwaterserviceoutcomes,scoringmorethan30pointshigherthantheaverage.Itwillbeimper-ativetocontinueandaccelerateconsolidatingthewatersector,sinceoperatingindividualmunicipalandvillagewaterdepartmentsisneithersustainablenorviableinthelongrun.However,significantinvestments in reducing technicalandcommercial losses, inparallel to targetedutility reformandinstitutionalstrengtheningprograms,arerequiredtoimproveserviceperformance.
32. For solid waste services, the effect of JSC membership on performance outcomes variesacrossregionsintheWestBank.Onaverage,membershipinasolidwastemanagementJSCseemstosuggestslightly lowerservicedeliveryoutcomes.However,thismightbeareflectionofthefactthatonlyasmallnumberofLGUscanbeusedascontrolgroup.Amoredisaggregatedanalysisisre-quiredtounderstandthedifferences.Forexample,focusingonperformance-levelvariationsbetweenLGUsinSalfitandQalqilyagovernoratesthatbelongtoasolidwasteJSC,andthoseLGUsthatdonot,JSCmembershipcorrespondstoanotable,howeverstatisticallynotsignificant,performancegaininsolidwastecollectionperformancescores.
GovernanceandAccountability
33. Morethan3outof4Palestinianhouseholdsthinkthatvoting inmunicipalelectionscanhaveapositiveimpactonlocalservicedelivery.ThisreflectsaverystrongbeliefintheimportanceofbasicaccountabilitymechanismstoimproveLGUperformance,butalsosuggestssignificantroomforimprovement.Households’trustintheroleofelectionsforservicedeliverydiffersacrossthePal-estinianterritories.InGaza,almostafifthofthehouseholdsdonotbelieveinsucharelationship,andalmostathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBankdonotthinkthatvotingandserviceoutcomesareinterrelated.Overall,trustintheroleofvotingisslightlyhigherinmunicipalities(69percent)thaninvillagecouncils(66percent).
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34. BuildingmoreresponsiveLGUsstrengthencitizens’trustintheimpactofvotingandtheirwillingnesstovoteinfutureelection.CitizenswhoaresatisfiedwithLGUresponsivenessonaveragereportmoreoftenthatvotinghasanimpactonservicedelivery.AmongthehouseholdswhostronglyagreetheirLGUisveryresponsive,86percentbelievethatvotinghasanimpactonpublicservices.Incontrast,amongthosehouseholdswhostronglydisagree,only59percentthinkthatelectionsandservicedeliveryoutcomesareconnected.Asaresult,amongcitizenswhobelievethatvotinginmu-nicipalelectionsinfluencesservicedeliveryoutcomes,80percentplannedtovoteinthenextelec-tions,comparedtojust28percentamongthosewhothinkvotingandpublicservicesarenotrelated.Overall,atthetimeoftheLGPAsurvey,morethan4outof10PalestiniancitizensintheWestBankdidnotplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections,aswasreflectedinthevoterturnoutofthelatestWestBankelectionsinMay2017.
35. BasicaccountabilitymechanismsneedtoimprovetoenhancecitizensatisfactionwiththeirLGUs.NotmanyPalestinianhouseholdsuseafeedbackorcomplaintmechanismandsatisfactionisonlymoderate.Overall,despitetheirexistenceinsomeLGUs,fewhouseholdsuseavailablemecha-nismstoprovidefeedbackorfileacomplaint.Only16percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankand8percentinGazareporthavingusedeitheracitizenservicecenter,municipalwebsite,LGUorservice-providerfeedbacksystem,orabooklettoaddressaserviceissue.Only6percentofWestBankhouse-holdshaveusedafeedbacksystemorLGUwebsitecomparedwith3percentand5percentinGazarespectively.NoneofthesurveyedhouseholdsinGazaclaimtohaveusedaservicecenter;intheWestBank,thefigureisaround4percent.Only40percentofthosewhohaveusedafeedbackmechanismreportedbeingsatisfiedwithit.ThevastmajorityofcitizenswouldratherfileacomplaintdirectlytotheirLGUratherthanworkingthroughacitizenservicecenterorafeedbackorcomplaintsystem.
Conclusion and the Way Forward
36. Palestinianlocalgovernmentshavealmostachieveduniversalcoverageintermsofaccesstobasicservices.Thisisaremarkableachievement,particularlygiventhecontextoffragilityandcon-flict inthePalestinianterritories.AlthoughsatisfactionratesvaryacrossLGUsandsectors,andthebottom40percentexperienceanoverallsomewhat lowerqualityofservices,household incomeisnotamaindeterminantof servicedeliveryoutcomes,and there isnogendergap.Theseareverypositiveachievementsunderextremelydifficultcircumstancesinahighlychallengingenvironment.
37. Increasingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatershouldbegiventhehighestpriority,particu-larly inGaza.Withalmosttheentirepopulation inGazadependentonpotablewaterdeliveredbytankertrucks,solvingtheGazawatercrisiswillremainthegreatestchallengeforlocalservicedeliveryforyearstocome.ImprovementsinLGUperformancewillnotsolvethecrisis,whichgoeswellbeyondlocalgovernmentissuesandrequirescriticalactionsfromthePalestinianAuthority,theGovernmentof Israel,andthe internationalcommunity, suchassupport to increasingbulkwatersupply to theGazaStrip, includingthroughpurchasefromIsraelandprivatewaterpurifierstoaddresstheshorttermneedsofagrowingGazapopulation,reducingtechnicalandfinanciallossesinamoribundwaterdistributionnetwork,treatingandpromotingthereuseofwastewater,andincreasinglocaldesalina-tioncapacity.
38. LGUsmuststrivetoconvergequalityandreliabilitystandardsforbasicservices.Whilethelocalgovernmentmandateisbroaderthanbasicserviceprovision,citizensatisfactionlevelswillnotincreaseunlesslocalgovernmentsdeliverontheirmaintasksofsupplyingreliabledrinkingwaterandsanitationservices,collectthegarbagefromhouseholds,andensureawellmaintainedlocalroadnet-work.KeyelementsofgoodgovernanceandprofessionalmanagementwillbecriticaltomakingLGUsmoreresponsive to theneedsofcitizens,andwillalsohelpmakeLGUsmorereliablepartners forprivateenterprisesandpromotinglocaldevelopment.Lackofreliablebasicservicesratesamongthehighestoftheconcernforinvestors.Inaddition,targetedpoliciestosupportcitizensinmarginalized
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communitiesneedtobedeveloped.LocalgovernmentsectorsupportalonewillnotsufficetoaddressthedisparatelivingstandardsacrossPalestine.AsignificantgroupofLGUshavereceivedsubstantialexternalsupport,butservicedeliveryoutcomesremainatlowlevelsof,includingmarginalizedLGUswithhigh ratesof poverty and/or those that aredeeply affectedby theprevailing restrictions tomovementandaccess.
39. Addressingverticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesiscriticaltoimprovinglocalservicede-liveryperformance.Whilesizeandlocationmatter,theirimpactonLGUperformanceislimitedcom-paredwithlocalfiscalcapacity.PalestinianLGUsarelargelydependentonservicefeesandchargestocovertheiroperationalexpenditures,nottomentioncriticalcapitalinvestments.AlthoughPalestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsareresponsibleforprovidingcriticalpublicservices,theyhavenotbeenassignedsufficient revenuesources.Onaverage,chargesandservice feesaccount for50–70percentoftotalrevenues,mostlyfrompublicutilityservices,suchaselectricityandwater.Asacriticalfirststep,MinistryofLocalGovernmentneedstoreviewandreviseLGUrevenueandexpenditureassignments.ThecurrentrevenueassignmentsarenotsufficienttodeliverevenonthecoreLGUfunc-tions.Thepropertytaxcouldprovidealargepotentialrevenuesourceformunicipalities,butcollectionneedstobeextendedtoallLGUsandshouldbedecentralizedfromtheMinistryofFinanceandPlan-ningatleasttothelargestmunicipalities.Finally,establishingafiscaltransfermechanismthateffec-tivelyaddressesimbalancesislongoverdueandrequireshighestattentionfrombothMinistryofLocalGovernmentandtheMinistryofFinanceandPlanning.
40. Changingthefinancialincentivestructureforserviceprovisionmustbeatthecoreofthereformagenda.Duetochronicunderfunding,LGUshavedevelopedapracticeofdivertingrevenuesfromservicefeestomeettheirexpenditureneeds.Cross-subsidiesandpaymentarrearsarewide-spreadandcommonpracticeacrossmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.Currentincentivesarestrong:datafortheyears2011–13showsthattotalrevenuespercapitaforvillagecouncilsinchargeofelec-tricitydistributioncanbeuptofourtimeshigherthanthosewithoutthatresponsibility.Villagecoun-cilswithelectricitydistributionfunctionswereabletospendovertwiceasmuchinpercapitaoperat-inganddevelopmentexpendituresthanthosewithouttheresponsibilityforeachyearduringthepe-riodof 2011–13. Formunicipalities, there is a differenceof almost 100percent between the twogroupsofmunicipalitiesintermsoftotalrevenuepercapita.Despitetherecentseparationofelec-tricitydistributionfromlocalgovernments,LGUscontinuetoreceivedividendsfromelectricityreve-nuesthattheyrequestfromdistributioncompaniesintheirroleasshareholders.Incentivesandcur-rentpracticesaresimilarinthewatersector.
41. Breakingthisviciouscirclewillrequiredecisiveactionatlocalandnationallevels.Keyprior-itiesinclude:(1)increaselocalrevenuecollection;(2)improvetransparencyofpaymentflows,includ-inginteragencyarrears;(3)sanctionentitiesthatdivertfundsfornonessentialorunproductiveuse;and(4)providefinancialsupporttoLGUswithoutthefiscalcapacitytoensurebasicserviceprovision.Absentaregularfiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernment,improvinglocalfiscalcapacitywillre-quireenhancingrevenuecollectionandexpenditureefficiency.However,ourknowledgeaboutthecostofserviceprovisionremainslimited.Althoughanewbudgetformatdistinguishingbetweenfunc-tionalcategorieshasbeen introduced,themajorityofLGUsdonotreportactualrevenuesandex-penses,whichmakesefficiencyassessmentsdifficult.Moreemphasisneeds tobegiven tocorrectreportingduringthebudgetreviewandapprovalprocess,includingasaconditionforallocatingcapitalinvestmentgrants.
42. Responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentsarecriticaltobetterperformance.Regard-lessofthesizeandlocationofaLGUortheinstitutionalarrangementforserviceprovision,theLGPAshowsaconsistentlybetterperformancebyresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernments.ThereisalargeandgrowingnumberofLGUsthathaveachievedhigherlevelsofservicedeliveryperformance
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throughstrengtheningcitizenengagement,improvingtransparencyandaccountability,andenhanc-ing local revenues.Moreattentionmustbepaidtosupportingeffectivegovernancearrangementsthatengagecitizensatallstagesofdevelopmentplanning,investmentprioritization,andfeedbackonservicedeliveryperformance.ThisshouldbeapriorityforthePAbutalsoforDevelopmentPartners.GiventhedualpositiveimpactonLGUperformancefromhighercitizensatisfactionandwillingnesstopay,supportingmoreresponsiveandaccountableLGUspromisesthehighestreturnoninvestmentinparallel toa localgovernment financingreformoverhaulingthe inter-governmental fiscalarchitec-ture.
43. Aclearpolicyneedstobedevelopedformoreprofessionalandcorporatizedservicedeliv-ery.JSCsplayacriticalroleinconsolidatingservicedeliverybecausetheycangraduallyassumeserviceoperationfunctionsfromsmallandmostlyweakLGUs,providethenecessaryscale,anddevelopintothenucleusoffutureregionalpublicutilities.However,JSCsdonotguaranteeimprovedperformanceinservicedeliveryiftheyarenotmatchedwithmoreprofessionalmanagementandstrongaccounta-bilitymechanismsintermsofserviceusersandthelocalauthoritiestheyrepresent.Overall,Palestin-ianpolicymakers shouldaim to integratevillagesandmunicipalities intomoredenselypopulatedurbanareastoachievebetterperformanceoutcomes.Publicutilitiesareaneffectivemeansofre-gionalintegration.Thereisanurgentneedtoestablishaclearactionplantoseparateandprofession-alizeserviceoperation,withclearlyassignedrevenuestreamsandmeasurableperformancestand-ards.Giventhehighfragmentationinthewatersector,thisinitiativeshouldbelaunchedjointlybe-tweentheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandPalestinianWaterAuthority.Afirstcriticalsteptodisen-tanglefinancialflowsandunderstandexpenditureefficiencywouldbetoestablishseparatecostac-countsforutilityservices,particularlyforwater,wastewaterandsolidwastemanagement.
44. Finally,performancebenchmarkingshouldbemadean integral instrument forevidence-basedpolicymaking.TheLGPAhasdevelopedaninstrumenttotrackperformancetrendsandim-provements,assessefficacyofpolicymeasures,andevaluatedonorsupportonaregularbasis,whichcanbereplicated.Palestinehasuniqueandsuccessfulexperienceinmanagingaperformance-basedgrantmechanismandprovidingtargetedcapacity-buildingsupporttomunicipalities,implementedbytheMunicipalDevelopmentandLendingFund(MDLF).Inparallel,MinistryofLocalGovernmenthasstarteddevelopinganonlinecitizenportalforallLGUsthroughtheirGeoMOLGDepartment.Thisex-perience,inadditiontothenewdatafromLGPA,canassistinthescaling-upthesystematiclinkingofcapitalgrantallocationstoclearperformancetargetsinLGUsandmeasuringexpenditureefficiencytobetterunderstandtheuseofscarcepublicresourcesatthelocallevel.LGUscanalsousetheLGPAtoproduceandpublishcitizenscorecards,whileDevelopmentPartnersmayconsiderusingthebase-lineestablishedbytheLGPAtomonitorprogressandmeasureimpactoftheirsupporttoPalestinianLGUs.ThesearetremendousassetsthatPalestinianlocalgovernmentscanrelyandbuildonastheystrivetocontinueimprovingperformancetobenefittheircitizens.
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I. Introduction
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I. Introduction
1.1 Country Context
1. PalestinianlocalgovernmentsareakeypillarofthefuturePalestinianstate.TheypredatethePalestinianAuthority(PA)andmanyhavealongandproudhistory,includingsomeoftheoldestinhabitedcities intheworld.With increasingpoliticalandgeographicalfragmentationoverthe lasttwodecades,LocalGovernmentUnits(LGUs)havegainedparamountimportanceprovidingservicestothelocalpopulation,particularlyinareaswheretherelativelyyoungcentralgovernmentwaspolit-ically,geographically,andfiscallyconstrained.SomeoftheexistingLGUswerecreatedasearlyasthesecondhalfofthe19thcenturyandoverdecades,LGUshaveperformedunderthecomplexitiesofdifferentpoliticalandlegalregimes.Asthe lowest levelofgovernance,Palestinian localauthoritiesfulfillacriticalrolenotonlyasakeypublicserviceprovider,butalsoasthegovernmenttierclosesttocitizens,withelectedcouncilscriticalforrepresentationandaccountabilitytocitizens.ThemostrecentlocalelectionstookplaceonMay13,2017andinOctober2012intheWestBankonly,whilethelastlocalelectionsinboththeWestBankandGazawerein2006.2. However,PalestinianLGUsoperateinachallenginganddeterioratingenvironment.Lackingapermanentpeaceagreement,prospectsforsocialandeconomicdevelopmentareheavilyaffectedbyfragmentationandrestrictionsonaccesstolandandresources.ThePAwasinitiallyestablishedforafive-yearinterimperiodaftertheOsloAccordsin1993withresponsibilityfortheadministrationoftheterritoryunderitsjurisdiction.However,theOsloaccordswereneverfullyimplementedandcametofullhaltwiththebeginningofthesecondIntifadain2000.Theconsequencetodayisamulti-layeredsystemofphysical,institutionalandadministrativerestrictions,whichhavefragmentedthePalestinianterritoriesintosmallenclaves.ThefragmentationgoesbeyondadividebetweentheWestBankandGaza,withtheWestBankfurtherdividedintoAreasA,BandC.Effectively,thePAonlyhasfullcivilandsecuritycontrolover18percentoftheWestBank(AreaA),andmanagescivilaffairsinaround21percentoftheWestBank(AreaB),withsecurityunderIsraelicontrol.Theremaining61percentoftheWestBankareunderfullIsraelimilitaryadministration(AreaC).33. Awell-functioning localgovernment sector is critical toensurebasic servicedeliveryandcreateaconduciveenvironmentforprivate-sectordrivengrowth.ThePalestinianeconomyisfailingtogeneratethejobsandincomesneededtoimprovelivingstandards.Restrictionsontradeandtheaccesstoresources,alongwithadecadelongblockadeofGaza,haveledtoacontinuingdeclineintheproductivebaseoftheeconomy.Unemploymentishighat30percentonaverage,withyouthunem-ploymentinGazaevenhigher,reachingaround60percent.ThePAisunderseverefiscalstress,expe-riencingamajordownturninbudgetsupportfromdonorswhichdroppedfrom32percentofGDPin2008to5percentin2016.Despiteadecline,thedeficitin2016amountedtoUSD1.09billion,equiva-lentto8percentofGDP.
3AreaCisdefinedbythe1995Israeli-PalestinianInterimAgreementontheWestBankandtheGazaStripas“areasoftheWestBankoutsideAreasAandB,which,exceptfortheissuesthatwillbenegotiatedinthepermanentstatusnegotiations,willbegraduallytransferredtoPalestinianjurisdictioninaccordancewiththisAgreement”.Source:WorldBank.2013.WestBankandGaza:AreaCandtheFutureofPalestinianEconomy.
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1.2 Sector Context
4. StrengtheningLGUsandenablingthemtoperformasfullyfunctionallocalgovernmentsac-countabletocitizensarekeyprioritiesforthePA.ThePalestinianNationalPolicyAgenda(NPA)2017-2022“PuttingCitizensFirst”assignsacriticalroletoLGUstoachieveitsambitiousobjectives.Respon-siveLocalGovernmenthasbeenidentifiedanationalpriority,alongwithimprovingservicestocitizens,strengtheningtransparencyandaccountability,andbuildingresilientcommunities.Bothcentralandlocallevelauthoritieswillneedtoworkintandemtodeliveronthisagenda.
5. TheMinistryofLocalGovernmentwasestablishedbythePAin1994.Increasingtheterrito-rialadministrationunderthePA’sautonomouscontrolwasamongtheMinistryofLocalGovernment’s(MoLG)initialobjectives,whichresultedincreationofseveralnewLGUs.By1997,thenumberofLGUsincreasedfrom139tomorethan350.Today,417LGUsexistintotal,outofwhich142areclassifiedasmunicipalitiesand275asVillageCouncils(VCs).However,exceptforslightdifferencesinrevenueas-signments,i.e.,VCsarenotassignedpropertytaxrevenuesbutcollecteducationtaxinstead,thereisnodistinctioninthefunctionalassignmentsbetweenthosetwogroupsoflocalauthorities.Inpractice,populationsizeisthedistinguishingfactor,althoughwithoutclearprinciples.Mostmunicipalitieshaveapopulationabove5,000inhabitantswhilegenerallyVCsaresmallerthanthat,althoughthereareseveralexceptionsandpopulationalonedoesnotdefinetheadministrativeclassification.
WestBank Gaza Palestinianterritories
Municipalities 117 25 142
Villages 275 - 275
Total 392 25 417
TableI-1:LGUsintheWestBankandGaza
6. Overall,Palestineishighlyurbanizedat74percent,withalmost1.9millionlivinginthe12largestcities.AroundhalfamillionPalestiniansliveinmedium-sizedmunicipalitiesbetween25,000to50,000inhabitants,whilethesecondlargestgrouplivesinsmallmunicipalitiesofthesizebetween4,000to25,000inhabitants.VCsarehometoonlyaround600,000people,althoughtheycomprisethebiggestshareofLGUs.
7. However,decentralizationhasmadeonlymodestprogress.Palestinianlocalgovernmentrev-enuesamountto11.5percentoftotalrevenues,equivalenttoaround4percentofGDP;whilelocalgovernmentexpendituresaccountforonly6percentofexpenditures,slightlymorethan3percentofGDP.Althoughinlinewithothercountriesintheregion,comparedtootherworldregions,thelocalgovernmentsectorinthePalestinianterritoriesisrathersmall,withfiscaldecentralizationstillbeingintheearlystages.
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FigureI-1:FiscalDecentralizationinthePalestinianterritoriesandWorldRegions
Sources:PAandIMFGovernmentFinanceStatistics2012
8. LGUsareassigned27functionalresponsibilities,butonlydeliverafractionofthose.Withincreasingpoliticalandgeographicalfragmentation,LGUshavegainedparamountimportanceprovid-ingservicestothelocalpopulation,particularlyinareaswheretherelativelyyoungcentralgovernmentwaspolitically,geographically,andfiscallyconstrained. IntheLocalGovernmentAct(LGA)of1997,some27functionsandresponsibilitiesforLGUswereoutlined,whichincludemostbutnotallofthepublicservicesthatarecommonlydeliveredatthelocallevelincountriesatasimilarstageofdevel-opment.Despitelargedisparitiesinpopulationsizeandadministrativeandfinancialcapacity,theLGAassignsthesamesetof functionsandresponsibilities tomunicipalitiesandVCsalike,anddoesnotdistinguishbetweendelegatedandownresponsibilities.4Inthecaseofdelegatedresponsibilities,thePAwouldbeultimatelyresponsiblefortheregulationandfinancing,whileimplementationwouldbeundertheresponsibilityofLGUs.5Incontrast,inthecaseofownresponsibilities,LGUswouldbegen-erallyresponsibleforallstagesofserviceprovision.6Theabsenceofconditionalgrantsortransfersfrom thePA to LGUs,apart from interceptedpartial revenue sharingandemergencygrants in thecurrentsystemof intergovernmental finance, indicates that theLGAof1997had little intentiontofosterthedelegationofresponsibilities.
9. LGUs’budgetsare insufficienttoprovidethefundingnecessarytofulfill thefunctionsas-signedtomunicipalitiesandVCs.DespitethecomprehensiverolesandfunctionsofLGUs,localgov-ernmentrevenueandexpendituresconstituteonlyaminorshareoftheoverallpublicbudget,indicat-ingthatfiscaldecentralizationisstillatanearlystageinthePalestinianterritories.7TheonlysourcesofsharedrevenuesandtransfersforLGUsincludethePropertyTax(notleviedinVCs),ProfessionalLicensingFees,andtheTransportationFee,whichiscentrallycollectedandthensplitbetweenLGUsandthecentralgovernment.8Asaconsequence,verticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesremainlargeand localgovernmentbudgetsare rather small compared toothercountriesandworld regions: in
4ArticleNo.1oftheLGA;seeAnnex8foralistoffunctionsassignedtoVCs.5Examplesinothercountriesincludeeducation,health,andsocialwelfareservices.6Examplesincludestreetlighting,localroads,andparks.7WorldBank.2016.PublicExpenditureReview-PalestinianTerritories8TheTransportationFee iscollectedbyMinistryofTransportationand50percentofthetotalrevenuecollected istobeallocatedtotheLGUsonpercapitabasis–however,inreality,themajorityofthe50percentshareisinterceptedbytheMoFPtorecoverthearrearsLGUsowetotheirelectricitysuppliers.
11.5 11.3
30.9
18.319.3 18.7
6.29.0
32.4
19.7
28.9
18.8
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
Palestine Turkey EasternAsia EasternEuropeandCentralAsia
Europe LatinAmericaandCaribbean
Subnationalrevenue,%oftotal Subnationalexpenditure,%oftotal
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2012,revenuesandexpendituresofmunicipalitiesaccountedfor10percentoftotalgovernmentrev-enuesand5.5percentoftotalexpenditures,whiletherevenuesandexpendituresofthe275VCscon-stitutedforlessthan2percentoftheoverallgovernmentbudget.
Municipalities VCs CentralGovernment
Revenues 10% 1.5% 88%
Expenditures 5.5% 1% 93%
TableI-2:SharesofGovernmentBudgetbyAdministrativeTierin2011and2012
10. Localbudgetsaredominatedbyrevenuesfromuserfeesandseverelyconstrainedcapitalinvestmentfunds.Localfeesandservicechargesrepresentmorethan50percentoftotalrevenues,butaredivertedawayfromtheservicesectorsandmostlycross-subsidizegeneraloperationalexpend-itures.Asaresult,servicenetworkrehabilitationandmaintenanceislargelyneglected,leadingtode-cliningservicestandardsandassetdepletion.Overall,capitalinvestmentfundsareverylimited,andoverallLGUslargelydependonexternalsourcesfortheirdevelopmentexpenditure.
FigureI-2:RevenuesbyTypeinMunicipalities(left)andVCs(right)
FigureI-3:ExpenditureAllocationbyBudgetTypeinMunicipalities(left)andVCs(right)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Actual2010
Actual2011
Actual2012
OperatingBudgetRevenue
EnterpriseFundRevenue
DevelopmentBudgetRevenue
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100%
Actual2011
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OperatingBudgetRevenue
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0
100,000,000
200,000,000
300,000,000
400,000,000
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2010 2011 2012
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0
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40,000,000
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80,000,000
2011 2012 2013
VCOperatingBudgetExpenditure
VCEnterprise FundExpenditure
VCDevelopmentBudgetExpenditure
Sources:PAandIMFGovernmentFinanceStatistics2012
Sources:PAandIMFGovernmentFinanceStatistics2012
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11. Adistortedsystemofinter-governmentalrelationscauseslargehorizontalandverticalfiscalimbalances.Noregularfiscaltransferexiststosupplementfortheshortageinown-sourcerevenuesandmanyLGUshaveengagedinlarge-scalediversionofservicefeerevenuesowedtoIsraelisuppliersintheelectricityandwatersectors,causingtheso-called“netlending”(seeBoxI-1).Thisdiversionofrevenuesfurtherdistortsexistinginequalitiesinthelocalfiscalcapacity,leadingtoahighconcentra-tionofpercapitarevenuesandexpendituresinafewLGUs.Forexample,municipalities’percapitaown-sourcerevenuewasmorethantwicethatofVCs’in2010and2011;andVCswithaccesstoelec-tricitydistributionrevenueswereabletospendalmosttwiceasmuchinpercapitaoperatingandde-velopmentexpenditureperyearcomparedtothosewithoutduringtheperiod2011-2013.
FigureI-4:TotalPerCapitaExpenditureswith(left)andWithoutOutliers(right)
FigureI-5:AveragePerCapitaExpendituresinOperatingBudget(left)andEnterpriseFund(right)
12. Thehighleveloffragmentationhaspotentialimplicationsonlocalservicedeliveryperfor-mance,giventhehugevariationsinfiscalandinstitutionalcapacity.Inaddition,alargenumberoflocalauthorities,thatcannotbefinanciallyviablebythemselves, iscostlyandmayadverselyaffectallocativeefficiency inahighly financially constrainedenvironment. In short,Palestiniansmightbepayingforalargebutinefficientlocalgovernmentsectorthatisdrainingscarcepublicresourcesandexternalaidatthecostoferoding infrastructure,decliningservices,andsub-optimaldevelopment.However,noevidenceexiststodatetosubstantiatethisclaimanditisimportanttogetabetterun-derstandingofthedriversofservicedeliveryperformanceandmosteffectivewaystosupportPales-tinianLGUstoperformbetterforthebenefitofthePalestinianpeople.
95
95
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PerCapitaExpenditures
PerCapitaRevenues
OperatingBudget
Municipalities
VCs
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328
295
381
PerCapitaExpenditures
PerCapitaRevenues
EnterpriseFund
Sources:PAandIMFGovernmentFinanceStatistics2012
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FigureI-6:OperatingBudgetExpenditureCategoriesinMunicipalities(left)andVCs(right)
13. Severalattemptshavebeenmade inthepasttoconsolidatePalestine’s fragmented localgovernmentsystem.Apolicyofamalgamation,adoptedin2010,hasaimedatmergingmunicipalitiesandVCstolargerentities.However,thispolicyhasyieldedonlymixedresultstodateandoverall,thetotalnumberofmunicipalitiesincreasedduringthelasttwodecadesfrom350in1997to417in2017.Inparallel, thePAhas increasingly focusedonconsolidatingservicedeliveryarrangementsthroughinter-municipalcooperationandtheestablishmentofJointServiceCouncils(JSCs).TheobjectiveistoharnesseconomiesofscaleandimprovebasicservicesacrossPalestine,withoutgettingtangledupinthechallengingprocessoftacklinglocalpoliticaldynamics,difficultquestionsoflocalidentity,andtheoveralldesireofestablishingandmaintainingPalestinianrepresentationacrosstheterritories.Suchanapproachhasthepotentialtoimprovethefinancialsustainabilityofservicedeliverywhilemain-tainingabroadbaseofpoliticalrepresentationandparticipationinlocalplanningandinvestmentpri-oritization.Inaddition,thisapproachisinlinewithsectoralpolicies,namelyinthecriticalbasicservicesofelectricitysupply,watersupplyandsanitation,thatareundergoingoraimingatacommercializationandregionalizationofserviceoperation.However,todate,nodatahasbeenavailabletotrackandsupportperformanceimprovementsacrossthelocalgovernmentsector.
0%
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HealthServices
Knowledge/educationalandculturalservices
Loanrepayment
GeneralServices
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BoxI-1:PopulationDiscrepancies
InternalmigrationtoleadingurbancentersintheWestBankhaveaddedsignificantlytotheloadonservicedeliveryinsomeLGUs.Ascertainareashavegainedeconomicpromi-nence, internalmigration to these locations has drastically increased, particularly in theRamallah-AlBirehurbanarea,whichhoststheseatofgovernmentforthePA.MigratorypopulationbulgeshaveaddedpressuretofinanciallyconstrainedLGUsandoverburdenedservices,affectingservicedeliveryqualityandavailability.Infrastructureinmanyofthear-easisnotsufficienttoaccommodatetheaddedload,especiallysinceLGUshavenotade-quatelyplannedforthelong-termeffectsofthepopulationinflux.Thishasledto:(i)height-enedtrafficcongestion;(ii)increasedOperations&Maintenance(O&M)costs;(iii)installa-tionofunplannedoff-site infrastructure;and(iv)opportunitycostsfor investing inotherneededmunicipalservices.
PotentiallysizeablediscrepanciesinofficialpopulationfigurescauseresourceconstraintsforsomelargemunicipalitiesinthePalestinianterritories.LGUshavereportedthatinac-curatenationalpopulationfiguresfurtherexacerbatethesituation.ThesharedrevenuestosupportLGUbudgetsarebasedonthePalestinianCentralBureauofStatistics(PCBS)popu-lationdata.ItisakeyfactordeterminingthetransferamountstoLGUsfromtheTranspor-tationFee,whichissharedbetweentheMoFPandLGUs.FiftypercentofthetotalrevenuecollectedfromtransportationfeesistobeallocatedtotheLGUsonapercapitabasis.Ad-ditionally,municipalgrantsfromtheSecondMunicipalDevelopmentProgram(MDP-II),oneoftheonlyreliablesourcesoffinancialsupportmunicipalitiesreceive,ispartially(30per-cent)basedonPCBSpopulationfigures.ThePCBSpopulationrecordsfortheLGUsarebasedontheregisteredresidencyofcitizens’nationalidentificationcards.Oftenresidency,how-ever,isnotupdatedwhenpeoplerelocate,asitisadifficultprocesswithveryfewinduce-mentsforupdating.UnlikePCBS,LGUscalculatetheirpopulationbasedonserviceuserfeeandtaxcollectionfigures.AlBireh’spopulationfor2016,forexample,is48,887accordingto PCBS estimates,however themunicipalityestimates their residentsataround81,000basedonwaterandelectricityuserratesandtaxcollection.
VariousproceduresshouldbeconsideredtoupdateresidencyandsupportLGUsdealingwith population discrepancies.While this isnotawidespread issue forall LGUs, the PAshouldconsidermeasures,whichcanbetakentosupportthoseaffected.Proceduresforestablishing residencyshouldbe reassessedand eased toencourageproper registration.Currently,unlessacitizenhasatenancycontractinhis/hernameitisverydifficulttorequestachangeofresidency.TheuseofasimpleregistrationformtobefiledatthelocalLGUcouldbeintroducedasanalternativewayforcitizenstoestablishresidency.Thisiscommonprac-ticeinmanycountries.Additionally,updatedresidencyisnotamitigatingfactorforaccesstogeneralservices,howeveritcouldbelinkedtothenationalIDdatabase.Afterasignificantperiodofusageandaccessforservicesinanareadifferingfromofficialresidency,acalltoupdateresidencycouldbetriggered.LGUsandserviceproviderscouldcollaborateonthis.Furthermore,asthefiscaltransferamountisdeterminedbytheMoLG,theycanconsideralternativeprocedureswhereLGUpopulationisdeterminedbyregisteredserviceusersandtaxpayers,rather thanPCBSpopulationdata.ThiscourseofactionwouldalsoencourageLGUs tocrackdownonillegalserviceconnections toensureallusersare in theofficiallycountednumbers.
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1.3 Key Challenges
14. LGUsareresponsiblefortheprovisionofcriticallocalservicesbutdonotfulfillthefullspec-trumofassignedtasksandresponsibilities.TheroleofLGUsinpublicservicedeliveryfallsfarshortofwhatisprescribedinthe1997LGA.Availabledatafromhouseholdsurveysandbudgetdocumentsindicatethatmostmunicipalitiesonlyprovideuptofourcoreservices,whichareshowninTableI-3:AccesstoCoreServices.Forotherimportantfunctionssuchaspublictransportationprovision,capitalinvestmentsinpublicinfrastructure,firefighting,primaryhealth,localschoolmaintenance,andsocialwelfareprograms,themandateandfundingremainsunclear.Often,thesefunctions,primarilypublicinfrastructure,arenotimplementedunlessinternationaldonorprogramsexisttospecificallyfinancethem.
WestBank Gaza Palestinianterritories
PipedWaterSupply 94% 88% 91%
SolidWasteCollection 95% 83% 91%
WasteWaterManagement 30% 77% 48%
PavedLocalRoads 87% 46% 62%
TableI-3:AccesstoCoreServices
15. Identifyingmeanstoaddressthechallengeofexcessivelocalfragmentationwillneedtobeakeystepinimprovingservicedelivery.Facingseverefiscalconstraints,smallandremoteVCsintheWestBankbelongtothelowestperformingLGUsinthePalestinianterritories,oftenfallingshortofguaranteeingservicesofsatisfactoryqualityornotprovidingaccesstothecoreservicesatall.AlthoughaclearpolicydirectiveexistsfortheestablishmentofjointadministrativestructuresamongbothVCsandmunicipalitiesintheformofJointServiceCouncils(JSCs)toaddresscapacitylimitations,sufficientincentivesremaintobebuiltintothesystemtofacilitatetheformulation,financing,andimplementa-tionofsuchinitiatives.Moreover,selectedVCswiththesizeandcapacitytoevolveintoviablelocalauthoritiesneedfurtherinstitutionalsupport.Suchsupportwouldneedtobeprovidedthroughacom-binationofincentivesandcapacitybuildingthatwillenableVCstofunctionasaccountableandfinan-ciallysustainable localgovernments.However,quantitativeresultspresented inthisreportsuggestthatacarefulassessmentofperformanceoutcomesforLGUspartofaJSCisdetrimentalbeforeaimingforawiderapplicationoftheJSCmodel.
16. Localgovernmentsectorreformwillbeacrucialkeyconditiontoimprovebasiclocalservicedelivery,particularlyinthewatersector.SecuringsustainablewatersupplyinthePalestinianterrito-rieswillrequirecollectiveactionacrosssectorsandstakeholders,butcannotadvancewithoutwell-functioningandmoreefficientlocalgovernments.Existingresourceconstraintsandgeopoliticalchal-lengesareamongthemainchallengestosecuringsustainablewaterinthePalestinianterritories.De-cliningaquifer yieldpairedwith rapidpopulationgrowthhas resulted inadecreaseof internal re-sourcesfordomesticsupplyintheWestBankfrom190literspercapitaperdaytoonly100litersin2013.9Morethan95percentof thewater fromtheGazamainaquifer isnon-drinkablebecauseofpollutionandseawaterintrusion.Inordertomeetinternaldemand,thePAincreasinglyreliesonwa-terpurchasesfromIsrael.However,whileincreasingbulkwatersupplytotheWestBankandGazawillbecriticaltomeetthegrowingdemandandaddresstheGazawatercrisis, improvingtheefficiency
9WorldBank.2017.WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic.
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andreducinglossesinthePalestinianwaterdistributionsystemisequallyimportant.Withmorethan230waterserviceproviders,mostlyembeddedinVCandmunicipalwaterdepartments,addressingthewidespreadperformanceissuesinthewatersectorwillnotadvancewithoutaparallelreformef-fortinthelocalgovernmentsectorthataddressestheunderlyingissuesoffragmentationandlackoffinancialsustainability.
17. Breakingtheviciouscircleofpoorservicequalityandreliability,consumers’limitedwilling-nesstopay,andunstableLGUfinances,willrequireamulti-levelapproach.Theprevailingnet-lend-ingissueposesasignificantfiscaldrainforthePAandcreatesperverseincentivesforLGUsthatcon-tradictreforminitiativestoimproveservicedelivery.Particularlyinthewatersector,serviceprovidersareentrappedinaviciouscircleofserviceprovision.AcrosstheWestBankandGaza,unsatisfactoryserviceoutcomesarecloselyrelatedwithconsumerdisengagementandfailuretopay.ThisisposingaseriousrisktothefinancialpositionofwaterserviceprovidersandLGUs,furtherunderminingthecapacitytofinanceregularmaintenanceletaloneinvestmentincapitalreplacementandnetworkre-habilitation,eventuallyaffectingoverallperformance.Breakingthisspiralofdegradingserviceprovi-sionwillrequiretargeting:(i)demandsidefactors,e.g.byaffrontingcitizens’deficientpaymentbe-haviorthroughinnovativebestpractices,suchaspre-paidservicedelivery,pro-poorsubsidiesorpay-mentplans;aswellas(ii)supplysidefactors,e.g.bylimitingunsustainablebudgetarypractices,suchascross-subsidizationofLGUactivitieswithenterprisebudgetfunds.
18. ExtendingaccessandraisingawarenessforaccountabilityandfeedbacktoolsisdetrimentaltoenablingLGUstorespondtocitizens’needs.Theestablishmentanduseofpublicfeedbackandaccountabilitytools,suchascitizenservicecenters(CSC),one-stop-shops(OSS)andLGUwebsites,en-hancestransparencyandresponsivenesstocitizens,andenablescitizenstoparticipateandmonitorlocalgovernmentperformance.However,themajorityofLGUsprovidesnoneoronlyonesuchfeed-backchannel.Moreover,evidencefrombothquantitativeandqualitativeresearchsuggeststhatonlyaminorfractionofcitizensinLGUswithsuchmechanismsknowoftheirexistence,letaloneusedthemtoredressgrievancesaboutservicedelivery.NudgingcitizenstoprovidefeedbackthroughinteractionwithlocalrepresentativesorserviceprovidersallowsLGUstoeffectivelytargetexistingservicedeliv-erybottlenecks,whileincreasingcitizensatisfactionwithbothserviceoutcomesandLGUresponsive-ness,whichareempiricallyshowntobecloselyrelatedtocitizenpaymentbehaviorandwillingnesstopay.
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BoxI-2:TheNet-LendingIssue
ThePalestinianterritoriesarehighlydependentonenergyimportsfromneighboringcoun-triesduetothelackofdomesticenergysources.TheIsraelElectricCorporation(IEC)isthelargestenergysupplierproviding88percentofelectricityconsumedinthePalestinianter-ritories.ElectricitydistributioninthePalestinianterritoriesiscarriedoutbyPalestinianmu-nicipalities,villagecouncils,anddistributioncompanies(DISCOs).NetlendingariseswhenPalestinianentitiesfunctioningasdistributorsofelectricityandwa-terservicescollectservicefeesfromresidentsandratherthanusingthoserevenuestopaywaterandelectricitysuppliers,makeonlypartialornopaymentatall,thusaccumulatingarrears.LGUsseecollectedfeesasanecessarysourceofrevenueandclearlyusethemtocross-subsidizeotheractivities,includingtheiroperatinganddevelopmentbudgets.OutstandingpaymentsowedtotheIEC,includinglatepaymentfees,areeither;1)deductedbytheIsraeliMinistryofFinancefromrevenuesthattheGovernmentofIsrael(GoI)collectsonbehalfofthePA(clearancerevenues)andarerecordedinthePA’sbudgetas“netlend-ing”;or2)accumulatedasdebtowedtotheIEC.Asaresult,thePAfindsitselfprovidingunplannedsubsidiesofoverUS$200millionperyear(2percentofGDP)totheLGUs.TheMoFPattempts to recover those lossesbywithholding revenues otherwisedue toLGUs(municipalpropertytax,professionalpermitfees,transportationtaxetc.),buttheseinter-ceptsbynomeansoffsetutilitynon-paymentsandleadtoacomplicated,opaqueanddis-tortedintergovernmentalfiscalrelationssystem.Onereasonforthepersistenceofthenetlendingproblemisthatithasallthefeaturesofa“perverse”equilibrium.First,Israeliauthoritieseventuallygettheirfundsplusafine,whichmeanshigherrevenues.ManyLGUsprefertokeepthe“cashinhand”fromelectricityfees,asopposedtothepromisedtransferredfundsfromlocaltaxes,whicharelikelytobesmallerinsize,assomeBankcomputationsalsoseemtoconfirm.ThePAgetssandwichedinthemiddlebutgetstoretainthepropertytax,professionalpermitfee,andtransportationtax,thusatleasttemporarilyminimizingtheblow.
FigureError!Notextofspecifiedstyleindocument.-1:TheDynamicsofNet-LendingintheWestBank
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1.4 Objective and Methodology
19. ThisreportestablishesthequantitativebasisforanalyzingperformanceofPalestinianlocalgovernmentsandabaselineforfuturebenchmarkingtotargetinvestmentandpolicyinterventions.Differenthypothesesaredetermininggovernment interventionsandpolicydecisions tostrengthenPalestinian localgovernments,drivenby theultimateobjectiveofenablingLGUs toprovidebetterservices.However,withoutreliabledataitisdifficulttoassesstheinterrelationbetweeninputs,out-puts,andoutcomesofservicedelivery.Thisreportfocusesonanassessmentofthe‘demandside’ofservicedeliveryoutcomes,suchasaccess,qualityandreliability,responsiveness,andwillingnesstopayforservicesmandatedtomunicipalitiesandVCs.Theanalysisisbasedonacomprehensivehouse-holdsurveyandan indexdeveloped toassessoverall LGUperformance.Theanalysis is furtherex-tendedwithinsightsfromqualitativeinterviewsandfocusgroups,andmatchedwithfactorsinfluenc-ingthe‘supplyside’ofservicedelivery,suchasLGUinstitutionalandfiscalcapacity.TheresultsallowforarobustunderstandingofthefactorsthatinfluenceLGUperformance,andprovideforstrongevi-dence-basedpolicyrecommendationsforfutureinterventionsinmunicipalitiesandVCs.
20. Asexistingmunicipaldataisverylimitedinitsscopeandonlycoversminimal inputsintoservicedelivery,ahouseholdsurveycoveringmorethan380PalestinianLGUswasconducted.Thehouseholdsurveydatafocusesonaccesstopublicservices,qualityandreliabilityofservicedelivery,andcitizens’participationandwillingnesstopay,whichallowsforanin-depthanalysisofthedriversofLGUperformanceinservicedelivery.ThestudyincludesapollonservicedeliveryoutcomesforallLGUsinthePalestinianterritories10,establishingabaselinedatasetforbothfutureanalysis,e.g.onwhetherthebottom40percentaredisproportionallyaffectedbyexisting limitations,anddevelop-mentprogramsinthelocalgovernmentsector.Thesurveymodulesincludeaservicedeliveryassess-mentofthefollowingsectors:(i)watersupply;(ii)wastewater;(iii)electricity;(iv)solidwastecollec-tion;(v)education;(vi)publictransport;(vii)healthcare;and(viii)localroads.Inaddition,themodulesalsocollecteddataon:(ix)householddemographicsandsocio-economics;(x)citizenparticipation;and(xi)willingnesstopay.DetailedinformationonthesurveysetupcanbefoundinAnnex1.
21. Parallelqualitativeanalysisallowsforamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofperformancedriversrelatedtoinstitutionalcapacity,governance,andpoliticaleconomy.ThequalitativeanalysisconductedfortheLGPAdrawsonbothKeyInformantInterviews(KIIs)andFocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs).KIIswereconductedwithasampleofmunicipaladministrations,civilsocietyorganizations,andotherrelevantstakeholders.KIIsprovideinsightsinto:(i)whichsectorsarebestcovered;(ii)pro-videamorecompletenarrativeoftheLGUperformancedrivers;and(iii)presentinsightsintothefi-nancialchallengesfacedbyLGUs.Inaddition,FDGswereconductedtogaininsightintocitizenpercep-tionsonthecurrentstateandexistingchallengesregardingserviceaccess,quality,affordability,andtrendsinthequalityofservices,whichallowsfortheformulationofprioritiesfortheexpansionandimprovementofservicedelivery.Thediscussionsalsoexaminedthequalitativedimensionofpartici-pation, transparencyandaccountability, investigatinghowcitizenswould like toengagewith theirLGU.Moreover,thediscussionsexploredcurrentfeedbackmechanismswithlocalpolicymakersandhowqualityandaccessproblemswithservicedeliveryarecurrentlybeingaddressed.FocusgroupswereheldinNablus,Hebron,GazaCity,Jabalya,KhanYunis,Rafah,Ramallah,andBethlehem,andanadditional10FGDswereconductedinsmallermunicipalitiesandselectedvillagesintheWestBankandGaza.Themethodologicalframeworkappliedinthequalitativeanalysisisdescribedindetail inAnnex2.
10Intotal,20LGUscouldnotbeaccessedduetosecurityrestrictions.SeeAnnex1foradetaileddescription.
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FigureI-8:LGPASurvey-MunicipalityandVillageCouncilSize-GroupsandPopulation
22. Theanalysisfocusesonthedriversforlocalservicedeliveryperformance.Existinghypothe-sescanbeexpressedinstatisticalmodelswithseveraldeterminants, including:thesizeof localau-thorities(economiesofscale);thelevelofincome(GDPpercapita);fiscalstrength(revenuespercap-ita,totalrevenues,expenditurepercapita,totalexpenditure);institutionalcapacity(planning,finan-cial management, etc.); governance arrangements (transparency, accountability, participation);modesofservicedelivery(individualLGU,JSC,utility);butalsoconsidertheenablingenvironmentandinstitutionalframework,e.g.,revenueandexpenditureassignments,sectorpolicyandstrategies,andservicestandards.Whileallmandatedserviceswillbeanalyzed,theemphasiswillbeonthecoreser-vices, (i)pipedwatersupply, (ii)wastewatermanagement, (iii) solidwastecollectionand(iv) localroads.
45
163
35
14
99
15 1227,721
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II. The State of Basic Service Delivery in Palestinian Local Governments
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II. The State of Basic Service Delivery inPalestinian Local Governments
23. ServiceaccessandsatisfactionratesvarysubstantiallybothacrossLGUsandsectors.Accessandsatisfactionwiththefourbasicservices,(i)pipedwatersupply,(ii)wastewatermanagement,(iii)solidwastecollection,and(iv)localroads,isgenerallyhigherintheWestBankthaninGaza,andthehighestinlargemunicipalitiesinthecentralWestBank.Overall,thevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesisconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork(91percent),eventhoughactualwateravailabilityislimitedandqualityinsufficientinmanyLGUs.91percentofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoawastecollectionservice,whileonly2outof3Palestinianhouseholdsreportsimmediateaccesstopavedroads(62percent),andlessthanhalfaconnectiontoapipedsewagenetwork(48percent).
24. ComparingservicedeliveryoutcomesbetweentheWestBankandGaza,notablegapsinac-cessratesemerge.IntheWestBank,95percentofhouseholdshaveaccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesand74percenttolocalroads,comparedtojust83percentand42percentinGaza,respec-tively.Alsointhewatersector,accessratesarehigherintheWestBankthaninGaza.94percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankhaveaccesstoapipedwaternetwork,comparedto88percentinGaza.Comparingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersources,coverageisalmostuniversalintheWestBank,whileonly1percentofthehouseholdsinGazaiscovered,and97percentrelyonwaterdeliveredbytankertrucks. Incontrast,overallcoveragewithsanitationservices ishigher inGazathan intheWestBank.AccesstopipedsewageismorethantwiceashighinGaza,where3outof4householdsareconnectedtoasewagenetwork(77percent),comparedtolessthan1outof3intheWestBank(30percent),whichismainlydrivenbyahighdegreeofurbanizationinGaza.Accesstoimprovedsan-itationfacilitiesisuniversalinGaza(99percent),andsimilarlyhighintheWestBank(94percent).
FigureII-1:ServiceAccessacrossSectors
25. Somewhatunexpectedly,accessratestocoreservicesarerelativelyhigh,whileavailability,
94%
30%
95%
74%
88%
77%
83%
42%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewage
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II. The State of Basic Service Delivery inPalestinian Local Governments
23. ServiceaccessandsatisfactionratesvarysubstantiallybothacrossLGUsandsectors.Accessandsatisfactionwiththefourbasicservices,(i)pipedwatersupply,(ii)wastewatermanagement,(iii)solidwastecollection,and(iv)localroads,isgenerallyhigherintheWestBankthaninGaza,andthehighestinlargemunicipalitiesinthecentralWestBank.Overall,thevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesisconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork(91percent),eventhoughactualwateravailabilityislimitedandqualityinsufficientinmanyLGUs.91percentofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoawastecollectionservice,whileonly2outof3Palestinianhouseholdsreportsimmediateaccesstopavedroads(62percent),andlessthanhalfaconnectiontoapipedsewagenetwork(48percent).
24. ComparingservicedeliveryoutcomesbetweentheWestBankandGaza,notablegapsinac-cessratesemerge.IntheWestBank,95percentofhouseholdshaveaccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesand74percenttolocalroads,comparedtojust83percentand42percentinGaza,respec-tively.Alsointhewatersector,accessratesarehigherintheWestBankthaninGaza.94percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankhaveaccesstoapipedwaternetwork,comparedto88percentinGaza.Comparingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersources,coverageisalmostuniversalintheWestBank,whileonly1percentofthehouseholdsinGazaiscovered,and97percentrelyonwaterdeliveredbytankertrucks. Incontrast,overallcoveragewithsanitationservices ishigher inGazathan intheWestBank.AccesstopipedsewageismorethantwiceashighinGaza,where3outof4householdsareconnectedtoasewagenetwork(77percent),comparedtolessthan1outof3intheWestBank(30percent),whichismainlydrivenbyahighdegreeofurbanizationinGaza.Accesstoimprovedsan-itationfacilitiesisuniversalinGaza(99percent),andsimilarlyhighintheWestBank(94percent).
FigureII-1:ServiceAccessacrossSectors
25. Somewhatunexpectedly,accessratestocoreservicesarerelativelyhigh,whileavailability,
94%
30%
95%
74%
88%
77%
83%
42%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageTHE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
16
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
13
II. The State of Basic Service Delivery inPalestinian Local Governments
23. ServiceaccessandsatisfactionratesvarysubstantiallybothacrossLGUsandsectors.Accessandsatisfactionwiththefourbasicservices,(i)pipedwatersupply,(ii)wastewatermanagement,(iii)solidwastecollection,and(iv)localroads,isgenerallyhigherintheWestBankthaninGaza,andthehighestinlargemunicipalitiesinthecentralWestBank.Overall,thevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesisconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork(91percent),eventhoughactualwateravailabilityislimitedandqualityinsufficientinmanyLGUs.91percentofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoawastecollectionservice,whileonly2outof3Palestinianhouseholdsreportsimmediateaccesstopavedroads(62percent),andlessthanhalfaconnectiontoapipedsewagenetwork(48percent).
24. ComparingservicedeliveryoutcomesbetweentheWestBankandGaza,notablegapsinac-cessratesemerge.IntheWestBank,95percentofhouseholdshaveaccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesand74percenttolocalroads,comparedtojust83percentand42percentinGaza,respec-tively.Alsointhewatersector,accessratesarehigherintheWestBankthaninGaza.94percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankhaveaccesstoapipedwaternetwork,comparedto88percentinGaza.Comparingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersources,coverageisalmostuniversalintheWestBank,whileonly1percentofthehouseholdsinGazaiscovered,and97percentrelyonwaterdeliveredbytankertrucks. Incontrast,overallcoveragewithsanitationservices ishigher inGazathan intheWestBank.AccesstopipedsewageismorethantwiceashighinGaza,where3outof4householdsareconnectedtoasewagenetwork(77percent),comparedtolessthan1outof3intheWestBank(30percent),whichismainlydrivenbyahighdegreeofurbanizationinGaza.Accesstoimprovedsan-itationfacilitiesisuniversalinGaza(99percent),andsimilarlyhighintheWestBank(94percent).
FigureII-1:ServiceAccessacrossSectors
25. Somewhatunexpectedly,accessratestocoreservicesarerelativelyhigh,whileavailability,
94%
30%
95%
74%
88%
77%
83%
42%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageTHE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF
SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
14
qualityandreliabilityofservicesfluctuatesignificantly.Onthepositiveside,therequiredinfrastruc-tureinvestmentsforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservicesarelargelyavailableinboththeWestBankandGaza,especiallyinlargemunicipalitiesintheWestBank.However,inpractice,servicesarenotavailablethroughout,andcitizensinmanyLGUsareaffectedbyinterruptionsandlackofser-vicedelivery,asexpressedbysatisfactionlevelswithqualityandreliability.
26. Overall,satisfactionratesarethehighestforwastewaterservices,andthelowestforlocalroads. IntheWestBank,54percentofhouseholdsaresatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityofpipedwaterservices,comparedtojust1outof3inGaza.Takingonlysatisfactionwithreliabilityintoaccount,thegapbetweentheWestBankandGazaisslightlynarrower:60percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankaresatisfiedwithpipedwater reliability,comparedto45percent inGaza. In thewastewatersectorincontrast,inboththeWestBankandGaza,roughly4outof5householdsaresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability.Somewhatsurprisingly,GazaoutperformstheWestBankintermsofsatisfactionwithsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileintheWestBankonly59percentofhouse-holdsstate tobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,morethantwo-thirds (70percent)ofhouseholdsinGazaaresatisfiedwithservicedeliveryoutcomesinthesolidwastesector.Thelowestsatisfactionratesarereportedforlocalroads.IntheWestBank,onlyeveryotherhousehold,andinGazaonly1outof4householdsissatisfiedwithboththephysicalconditionandthewaterdrainageduringrainoftheroadoutsidetheirhouse.
FigureII-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability
27. Followingadescriptionofthesector-specificinstitutionalarrangements,thissectiongivesanoverviewofthegeographicandsocio-economicvariations inserviceoutcomesacrosssectors.Notablegaps inservicedeliveryoutcomesacrossLGUsexist forall sectors,especially foraccess towastewaterservicesandpavedroads.Socio-demographicsatthehouseholdlevelplayaconsiderablerolewhenpredictingserviceoutcomes,particularlyinthewatersector,butcannotfullyexplainexist-ingdifferencesinservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthissection,firsttheinstitutionalarrangementsacrossservicesectorsarediscussed(Chapter2.1),thenthegeographicalvariation inserviceoutcomesforwaterandwastewater(Chapter2.2),solidwastemanagement(Chapter2.3),andlocalroads(Chapter2.4)isevaluated,differencesinserviceoutcomesacrosshouseholdsocio-demographicsareanalyzed(Chapter2.5),andfinallycitizenwillingnesstopayisassessed(Chapter2.6).
54%
84%
59%
45%
36%
79%
70%
23%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewage
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
14
qualityandreliabilityofservicesfluctuatesignificantly.Onthepositiveside,therequiredinfrastruc-tureinvestmentsforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservicesarelargelyavailableinboththeWestBankandGaza,especiallyinlargemunicipalitiesintheWestBank.However,inpractice,servicesarenotavailablethroughout,andcitizensinmanyLGUsareaffectedbyinterruptionsandlackofser-vicedelivery,asexpressedbysatisfactionlevelswithqualityandreliability.
26. Overall,satisfactionratesarethehighestforwastewaterservices,andthelowestforlocalroads. IntheWestBank,54percentofhouseholdsaresatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityofpipedwaterservices,comparedtojust1outof3inGaza.Takingonlysatisfactionwithreliabilityintoaccount,thegapbetweentheWestBankandGazaisslightlynarrower:60percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankaresatisfiedwithpipedwater reliability,comparedto45percent inGaza. In thewastewatersectorincontrast,inboththeWestBankandGaza,roughly4outof5householdsaresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability.Somewhatsurprisingly,GazaoutperformstheWestBankintermsofsatisfactionwithsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileintheWestBankonly59percentofhouse-holdsstate tobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,morethantwo-thirds (70percent)ofhouseholdsinGazaaresatisfiedwithservicedeliveryoutcomesinthesolidwastesector.Thelowestsatisfactionratesarereportedforlocalroads.IntheWestBank,onlyeveryotherhousehold,andinGazaonly1outof4householdsissatisfiedwithboththephysicalconditionandthewaterdrainageduringrainoftheroadoutsidetheirhouse.
FigureII-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability
27. Followingadescriptionofthesector-specificinstitutionalarrangements,thissectiongivesanoverviewofthegeographicandsocio-economicvariations inserviceoutcomesacrosssectors.Notablegaps inservicedeliveryoutcomesacrossLGUsexist forall sectors,especially foraccess towastewaterservicesandpavedroads.Socio-demographicsatthehouseholdlevelplayaconsiderablerolewhenpredictingserviceoutcomes,particularlyinthewatersector,butcannotfullyexplainexist-ingdifferencesinservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthissection,firsttheinstitutionalarrangementsacrossservicesectorsarediscussed(Chapter2.1),thenthegeographicalvariation inserviceoutcomesforwaterandwastewater(Chapter2.2),solidwastemanagement(Chapter2.3),andlocalroads(Chapter2.4)isevaluated,differencesinserviceoutcomesacrosshouseholdsocio-demographicsareanalyzed(Chapter2.5),andfinallycitizenwillingnesstopayisassessed(Chapter2.6).
54%
84%
59%
45%
36%
79%
70%
23%
WestBank
Gaza
SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewage
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
17
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
15
2.1 The Institutional Framework Governing Local Service Delivery
28. Institutional arrangements differ across sectors, with functions distributedacross centraland localauthorities.Avarietyofcentraland localstakeholdersare involved inthepolicymaking,prioritysetting,financing,operationandmonitoringofbasicservicedelivery.Anumberoflawsandbylawsgovernsservicedeliveryacrosssectors.Institutionalarrangementsarefragmentedandinmanycases,LGUshaveverylimitedauthorityovertheservicestheyaremandatedtoprovidebasedontheLGA.Forexample,educationandhealtharecriticalpublicservicesdeliveredatthelocallevel,butwithnoinvolvementofthelocalauthorities.Similarly,LGUsusedtoplayaroleinthedistributionofelec-tricityandcollectionofservicefees,buthavecededthisfunctiontotheDISCOs.Hence,theanalysisinthisreportfocusesonthefourbasicservicesunderthedirectcontrolofLGUs:watersupply,sewage,solidwastemanagement,andlocalroads.TableII-1providesanoverviewofthecurrentinstitutionalarrangementsbyservicesector.
29. De-factoassignmentsdonotalwaysreflectthelegalinstitutionalframework.Attimes,thedistinctioninjurisdictionalcoveragefromcentraltolocalauthoritiesresultsinserviceprovisiongapsforcitizenslivingoutsideLGUandJSCjurisdictions.ThePAhascometorecognizetheproblemsstem-ming fromconfusingandoverlappingmandates,andsomesectorshaveattemptedtoaddress thisthroughupdatedlawsandbylaws.However,inmostsectorsthedelegationoffunctionsinthelaws,policies,andstrategiesdoesnotaddressoraccountforthelackoffiscalandtechnicalcapacityatthedesignatedagencies.Therefore,andasaresultofthemismatchbetweeninstitutionalframeworkandcapacities,anumberofagenciesaredefactounabletodeliveronthedesignatedfunctions.
30. Inthewaterandwastewatersector,responsibilitiesaredistributedacrossseveralactors.At thecentral level, theprincipal stateactors include (i) thePalestinianWaterAuthority (PWA), ineffectthePalestinianwaterministry;(ii)theWaterSectorRegulatoryCouncil(WSRC),setupunderthe2014WaterLawwiththemandateofsectorregulator;(iii)theMoLG,supporting,monitoring,andregulatingLGUs, including theirwaterandsanitation services;and (iv) theMinistryofFinanceandPlanning(MoFP),allocatingsectorfinanceandmanagingfinancialflows.Atthesub-nationallevel,thestateactorsareLGUs:municipalwaterdepartmentsprovidewaterand/orsanitationservices(76intheWestBankand25inGaza).Inaddition,anumberofmunicipalitiesandVCshavejoinedtogethertoformJSCs(13single-servicewatersupplyandsanitationJSCstodate),whichprovidewaterand/orwastewaterservices.Some162VCsalsodeliverwaterandwastewaterservices.Inaddition,thereisalargenumberofdonorsthatoperateinthesector,andnumerousnationalandinternationalnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)thatveryactivelysupportdevelopmentandservicedeliveryinthewatersector.
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
18
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
16
Func
tion
Desc
riptio
n W
ater
&
Sew
age
Solid
Was
te
Road
s El
ectr
icity
He
alth
Ed
ucat
ion
Polic
y m
akin
g W
ho se
ts th
e m
ain
polic
y gu
idel
ines
?
Pale
stin
ian
Wa-
ter A
utho
rity
(PW
A)
MoL
G; E
nviro
nmen
t Q
ualit
y Au
thor
ity
(EQ
A); M
inist
ry o
f He
alth
(MOH
); Na
tiona
l Com
mitt
ee
on S
olid
Was
te M
an-
agem
ent (
in a
dditi
on
to th
e ab
ove
inclu
des:
MoF
P; P
WA;
Min
istry
of
Nat
iona
l Eco
nom
y (M
oNE)
; Min
istry
of
Educ
atio
n an
d Hi
gher
Ed
ucat
ion
Min
istry
of P
ublic
W
orks
and
Hou
s-in
g (M
oPW
H);
MoL
G (w
ithin
LG
U ju
risdi
ctio
n)
Pale
stin
ian
En-
ergy
and
Nat
ural
Re
sour
ces A
u-th
ority
(PEN
RA)
MoH
; Su
prem
e M
edica
l Co
uncil
MoE
HE; H
ighe
r Co
uncil
of E
duca
-tio
n
Legi
slatio
n W
hat a
re th
e ke
y le
gal p
a-ra
met
ers i
n th
e se
ctor
?
2014
Wat
er
Law
; 201
7−20
22
(SDP
); Lo
cal
Gove
rnm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
JS
C By
law
201
6;
Tarif
f Reg
ula-
tions
Byl
aw
2013
; Uni
fied
Regu
latio
n fo
r W
ater
and
W
aste
wat
er T
ar-
iff a
nd C
onne
c-tio
n Se
rvice
s Fe
es 2
017
(dra
ft)
Loca
l Gov
ernm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
En
viro
nmen
tal L
aw
No. (
7) o
f 199
9;
Publ
ic He
alth
Law
of
2004
; JS
C By
law
s 201
6;
Pale
stin
ian
Min
ister
ial
Cabi
net D
ecisi
ons N
o 53
(200
8), 4
9 (2
010)
, 50
(201
5), 1
08 (2
016)
, 15
0 (2
017)
; JS
C By
law
201
6;
Natio
nal S
olid
Was
te
Man
agem
ent B
i-Law
(d
raft)
;
Loca
l Gov
ern-
men
t Act
(LGA
) of
1997
; Dr
aft R
oad
Law
20
00;
Road
Tra
ffic L
aw
(No.
5)
Gene
ral E
lect
ric-
ity La
w 2
009;
Re-
new
able
Ene
rgy
and
Ener
gy E
ffi-
cienc
y (R
E&EE
) La
w 2
015
Coun
cil o
f Min
ster
s
Com
miss
ion
for
Deve
lopi
ng
Teac
hing
Pro
fes-
sion;
Ac
cred
itatio
n an
d Q
ualit
y As
-su
ranc
e Co
mm
is-sio
n fo
r Hig
her
Educ
atio
n
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
19
tiona
l); D
istrib
u-tio
n Co
mpa
nies
(D
ISCO
s)
Ope
ratio
n W
ho d
eliv
ers (
“pro
duce
s”)
the
serv
ice?
Publ
ic or
pri-
vate
ope
rato
rs, o
r a m
ix.
Publ
ic (L
GU/ J
SC
wat
er d
epar
t-m
ents
, util
ities
) Bu
lk S
uppl
y:
Wes
t Ban
k W
a-te
r Dep
artm
ent
purc
hase
d fro
m
Mek
orot
; LG
U w
ells
Publ
ic; p
rivat
e op
era-
tors
MoP
WH;
LGU;
Hi
red
Priv
ate
Cont
ract
ors (
con-
stru
ctio
n &
m
aint
enan
ce
wor
k)
Publ
ic (D
ISCO
s, LG
Us);
Priv
ate
(JDEC
O; G
PP)
MoH
; UNR
WA;
NG
Os;
Priv
ate
Sect
or
MoE
HE; U
NRW
A;
Priv
ate
Sect
or
Mon
itorin
g
Who
mon
itors
serv
ice d
eliv
-er
y in
cl. re
gula
r rep
ortin
g,
eval
uatio
n of
out
puts
, dat
a co
llect
ion,
stat
istics
, & co
n-su
mer
feed
back
mec
ha-
nism
s.
WSR
C
MoL
G (m
ainl
y Gr
iev-
ance
Red
ress
); M
oH a
nd E
QA
(Out
-sid
e LG
U ju
risdi
ctio
n);
JSCs
(with
in ju
risdi
c-tio
n);
LGUs
(with
in ju
risdi
c-tio
n)
MoP
WH;
MoL
G;
LGUs
PE
RC; i
ndiv
idua
l DI
SCO
s
MoF
P; U
NWRA
; NG
Os; P
rivat
e Se
c-to
r; Pa
lest
inia
n Ce
ntra
l Bur
eau
of
Stat
istics
(PCB
S w
ith M
oH re
gula
rly
cond
ucts
the
Na-
tiona
l Hea
lth A
c-co
unts
and
oth
er
natio
nal h
ealth
sur-
veys
); Pa
lest
inia
n Pu
blic
Heal
th In
sti-
tute
MOE
HE; N
a-tio
nal I
nstit
ute
for E
duca
tiona
l Tr
aini
ng; H
ighe
r Ed
ucat
ion
Inst
i-tu
tes;
UNW
RA;
PCBS
Tabl
e II-
1: O
verv
iew
of t
he C
urre
nt In
stitu
tiona
l Arr
ange
men
ts b
y Se
rvice
Sec
tor
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
19
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
17
Polic
ies &
Pl
ans
Wha
t are
the
plan
s and
st
rate
gies
for t
he se
ctor
?
2009
Act
ion
Plan
fo
r Ref
orm
; W
ater
Sec
tor
Polic
y an
d St
rat-
egy
2012
−203
2;
Wat
er S
ecto
r Re
form
Pla
n 20
16−2
018;
W
ater
Sec
tor
Stra
tegi
c Dev
el-
opm
ent P
lan;
2009
Act
ion
Plan
for
Refo
rm;
Natio
nal S
trat
egy
for
Solid
Was
te M
anag
e-m
ent i
n Pa
lest
ine
(201
0-20
14);
Upda
ted
Natio
nal
Stra
tegy
for S
olid
W
aste
Man
agem
ent
in P
ales
tine
(201
7 –
2022
) (dr
aft);
2011
-201
3 Na
-tio
nal H
ealth
Str
at-
egy;
Educ
atio
n De
vel-
opm
ent S
trat
egic
Plan
(201
4-20
19)
Regu
latio
n
Who
regu
late
s the
sect
or
incl.
the
licen
sing
regi
me,
pe
rmits
, sta
ndar
d se
ttin
g,
sanc
tion
mec
hani
sms,
etc.
WSR
C (d
u jo
ur),
Gap
(de
fact
o);
PWA
(sta
ndar
d se
ttin
g);
MoL
G, LG
U w
a-te
r dep
artm
ents
(w
ithin
LGU
ju-
risdi
ctio
n)
MoL
G; C
abin
et o
f M
inist
ers;
EQA;
MoH
; M
oNE
(Indu
stria
l w
aste
)
MoP
WH
Pale
stin
ian
Elec
-tr
icity
Reg
ulat
ory
Coun
cil (P
ERC)
; PE
NRA
MoH
M
oEHE
; UNW
RA
Supe
rvisi
on
Who
mon
itors
com
plia
nce
with
the
sect
or re
gula
tion
incl
verif
icatio
n of
lice
nses
, da
ta a
naly
sis, r
egul
ar in
-sp
ectio
n, a
nd o
ther
cont
rol
mea
sure
s.
WSR
C (d
u jo
ur);
*Sup
ervi
sion
gap
(de
fact
o);
MoL
G; E
QA;
MoH
; JS
Cs (w
ithin
JSCs
juris
-di
ctio
n); L
GUs (
with
in
LGU
juris
dict
ion)
*N
ote
ther
e is
a di
s-cr
epan
cy b
etw
een
the
role
as s
tate
d in
legi
s-la
tion
vers
us in
pra
c-tic
e.
MoP
WH;
MoL
G;
LGUs
PE
RC; P
ENRA
M
oH
MoE
HE; U
NWRA
Enfo
rcem
ent
Who
enf
orce
s san
ctio
ns in
ca
se n
on-c
ompl
ianc
e?
JSCs
and
LGUs
(with
in
own
juris
dict
ion)
in
coop
erat
ion
with
law
en
forc
emen
t e.g
. po-
lice;
PERC
; PEN
RA
MoH
M
oEHE
; UNW
RA
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
16
Func
tion
Desc
riptio
n W
ater
&
Sew
age
Solid
Was
te
Road
s El
ectr
icity
He
alth
Ed
ucat
ion
Polic
y m
akin
g W
ho se
ts th
e m
ain
polic
y gu
idel
ines
?
Pale
stin
ian
Wa-
ter A
utho
rity
(PW
A)
MoL
G; E
nviro
nmen
t Q
ualit
y Au
thor
ity
(EQ
A); M
inist
ry o
f He
alth
(MOH
); Na
tiona
l Com
mitt
ee
on S
olid
Was
te M
an-
agem
ent (
in a
dditi
on
to th
e ab
ove
inclu
des:
MoF
P; P
WA;
Min
istry
of
Nat
iona
l Eco
nom
y (M
oNE)
; Min
istry
of
Educ
atio
n an
d Hi
gher
Ed
ucat
ion
Min
istry
of P
ublic
W
orks
and
Hou
s-in
g (M
oPW
H);
MoL
G (w
ithin
LG
U ju
risdi
ctio
n)
Pale
stin
ian
En-
ergy
and
Nat
ural
Re
sour
ces A
u-th
ority
(PEN
RA)
MoH
; Su
prem
e M
edica
l Co
uncil
MoE
HE; H
ighe
r Co
uncil
of E
duca
-tio
n
Legi
slatio
n W
hat a
re th
e ke
y le
gal p
a-ra
met
ers i
n th
e se
ctor
?
2014
Wat
er
Law
; 201
7−20
22
(SDP
); Lo
cal
Gove
rnm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
JS
C By
law
201
6;
Tarif
f Reg
ula-
tions
Byl
aw
2013
; Uni
fied
Regu
latio
n fo
r W
ater
and
W
aste
wat
er T
ar-
iff a
nd C
onne
c-tio
n Se
rvice
s Fe
es 2
017
(dra
ft)
Loca
l Gov
ernm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
En
viro
nmen
tal L
aw
No. (
7) o
f 199
9;
Publ
ic He
alth
Law
of
2004
; JS
C By
law
s 201
6;
Pale
stin
ian
Min
ister
ial
Cabi
net D
ecisi
ons N
o 53
(200
8), 4
9 (2
010)
, 50
(201
5), 1
08 (2
016)
, 15
0 (2
017)
; JS
C By
law
201
6;
Natio
nal S
olid
Was
te
Man
agem
ent B
i-Law
(d
raft)
;
Loca
l Gov
ern-
men
t Act
(LGA
) of
1997
; Dr
aft R
oad
Law
20
00;
Road
Tra
ffic L
aw
(No.
5)
Gene
ral E
lect
ric-
ity La
w 2
009;
Re-
new
able
Ene
rgy
and
Ener
gy E
ffi-
cienc
y (R
E&EE
) La
w 2
015
Coun
cil o
f Min
ster
s
Com
miss
ion
for
Deve
lopi
ng
Teac
hing
Pro
fes-
sion;
Ac
cred
itatio
n an
d Q
ualit
y As
-su
ranc
e Co
mm
is-sio
n fo
r Hig
her
Educ
atio
n
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
20
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
18
MoH
(with
in LG
U bo
unda
ries f
or p
ublic
he
alth
issu
es);
Plan
ning
W
ho p
lans
impl
emen
tatio
n?
Who
app
rove
s pla
ns?
PWA
in co
nsul
-ta
tion
with
st
akeh
olde
rs
(Sec
tor s
trat
egy)
LG
Us (t
hrou
gh
SDIP
s);
Utili
ties (
Loca
l St
rate
gies
)
Natio
nal C
omm
ittee
on
Sol
id W
aste
Man
-ag
emen
t (Na
tiona
l Pl
ans)
, MoL
G, LG
Us, &
JS
Cs (L
ocal
and
Dis-
trict
Pla
ns)
MoP
WH;
LGUs
; Hi
gher
Pla
nnin
g Co
uncil
; PEC
DAR
PENR
A Pl
anni
ng
Depa
rtm
ent
MoH
M
oEHE
; UNW
RA
Fina
ncin
g
Who
fina
nces
serv
ice p
rovi
-sio
n? W
ho is
resp
onsib
le fo
r bu
dget
ing
incl.
capi
tal i
n-ve
stm
ents
, wag
es, o
pera
-tio
n &
mai
nten
ance
.
MoF
P; P
WA
(Na-
tiona
l Bud
get-
ing)
; Se
rvice
Pro
vid-
ers (
loca
l bud
g-et
s);
LGU
and
JSC
user
fees
& n
et
lend
ing
subs
i-di
es (O
PEX)
; CA
PEX
≥ 76
% e
x-te
rnal
fina
ncin
g *O
PEX
& C
APEX
fund
ing
gap
in
was
te w
ater
(no
user
fees
)
LGU/
JSC
User
fees
(O
PEX)
; Ex
tern
al fi
nanc
ing
(CAP
EX)
MoF
P;
LGU
reso
urce
s (tr
ansp
orta
tion
tax;
pro
ject
s bu
dget
); Ex
tern
al F
inan
c-in
g (C
APEX
)
User
fees
; Ext
er-
nal S
ourc
es;
Clea
ranc
e re
ve-
nues
MoF
P; U
NWRA
; lo-
cal N
GOs;
priv
ate
sect
or se
rvice
pro
-vi
ders
; ext
erna
l so
urce
s
MoF
P; U
NWRA
; pr
ivat
e se
ctor
se
rvice
pro
vid-
ers;
exte
rnal
so
urce
s
Adm
inist
ratio
n
Who
adm
inist
ers t
he se
r-vi
ce?
This
inclu
des b
iddi
ng,
cont
ract
ing,
& d
aily
resp
on-
sibili
ties
LGU
wat
er d
e-pa
rtm
ents
; JSC
s; Se
rvice
pro
vid-
ers
LGUs
; JSC
s; M
oLG;
M
DLF
(on
beha
lf of
ex
tern
al fi
nanc
ing
- Ga
za)
MoP
WH;
LGU;
PE
CDAR
Pale
stin
ian
Elec
-tr
icity
Tra
nsm
is-sio
n Co
mpa
ny
Ltd
(onc
e th
ey
beco
me
oper
a-
MoH
; UNR
WA;
lo-
cal N
GOs;
priv
ate
sect
or se
rvice
pro
-vi
ders
;
MoE
HE; U
NWRA
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
16
Func
tion
Desc
riptio
n W
ater
&
Sew
age
Solid
Was
te
Road
s El
ectr
icity
He
alth
Ed
ucat
ion
Polic
y m
akin
g W
ho se
ts th
e m
ain
polic
y gu
idel
ines
?
Pale
stin
ian
Wa-
ter A
utho
rity
(PW
A)
MoL
G; E
nviro
nmen
t Q
ualit
y Au
thor
ity
(EQ
A); M
inist
ry o
f He
alth
(MOH
); Na
tiona
l Com
mitt
ee
on S
olid
Was
te M
an-
agem
ent (
in a
dditi
on
to th
e ab
ove
inclu
des:
MoF
P; P
WA;
Min
istry
of
Nat
iona
l Eco
nom
y (M
oNE)
; Min
istry
of
Educ
atio
n an
d Hi
gher
Ed
ucat
ion
Min
istry
of P
ublic
W
orks
and
Hou
s-in
g (M
oPW
H);
MoL
G (w
ithin
LG
U ju
risdi
ctio
n)
Pale
stin
ian
En-
ergy
and
Nat
ural
Re
sour
ces A
u-th
ority
(PEN
RA)
MoH
; Su
prem
e M
edica
l Co
uncil
MoE
HE; H
ighe
r Co
uncil
of E
duca
-tio
n
Legi
slatio
n W
hat a
re th
e ke
y le
gal p
a-ra
met
ers i
n th
e se
ctor
?
2014
Wat
er
Law
; 201
7−20
22
(SDP
); Lo
cal
Gove
rnm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
JS
C By
law
201
6;
Tarif
f Reg
ula-
tions
Byl
aw
2013
; Uni
fied
Regu
latio
n fo
r W
ater
and
W
aste
wat
er T
ar-
iff a
nd C
onne
c-tio
n Se
rvice
s Fe
es 2
017
(dra
ft)
Loca
l Gov
ernm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
En
viro
nmen
tal L
aw
No. (
7) o
f 199
9;
Publ
ic He
alth
Law
of
2004
; JS
C By
law
s 201
6;
Pale
stin
ian
Min
ister
ial
Cabi
net D
ecisi
ons N
o 53
(200
8), 4
9 (2
010)
, 50
(201
5), 1
08 (2
016)
, 15
0 (2
017)
; JS
C By
law
201
6;
Natio
nal S
olid
Was
te
Man
agem
ent B
i-Law
(d
raft)
;
Loca
l Gov
ern-
men
t Act
(LGA
) of
1997
; Dr
aft R
oad
Law
20
00;
Road
Tra
ffic L
aw
(No.
5)
Gene
ral E
lect
ric-
ity La
w 2
009;
Re-
new
able
Ene
rgy
and
Ener
gy E
ffi-
cienc
y (R
E&EE
) La
w 2
015
Coun
cil o
f Min
ster
s
Com
miss
ion
for
Deve
lopi
ng
Teac
hing
Pro
fes-
sion;
Ac
cred
itatio
n an
d Q
ualit
y As
-su
ranc
e Co
mm
is-sio
n fo
r Hig
her
Educ
atio
n
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
21
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
19
tiona
l); D
istrib
u-tio
n Co
mpa
nies
(D
ISCO
s)
Ope
ratio
n W
ho d
eliv
ers (
“pro
duce
s”)
the
serv
ice?
Publ
ic or
pri-
vate
ope
rato
rs, o
r a m
ix.
Publ
ic (L
GU/ J
SC
wat
er d
epar
t-m
ents
, util
ities
) Bu
lk S
uppl
y:
Wes
t Ban
k W
a-te
r Dep
artm
ent
purc
hase
d fro
m
Mek
orot
; LG
U w
ells
Publ
ic; p
rivat
e op
era-
tors
MoP
WH;
LGU;
Hi
red
Priv
ate
Cont
ract
ors (
con-
stru
ctio
n &
m
aint
enan
ce
wor
k)
Publ
ic (D
ISCO
s, LG
Us);
Priv
ate
(JDEC
O; G
PP)
MoH
; UNR
WA;
NG
Os;
Priv
ate
Sect
or
MoE
HE; U
NRW
A;
Priv
ate
Sect
or
Mon
itorin
g
Who
mon
itors
serv
ice d
eliv
-er
y in
cl. re
gula
r rep
ortin
g,
eval
uatio
n of
out
puts
, dat
a co
llect
ion,
stat
istics
, & co
n-su
mer
feed
back
mec
ha-
nism
s.
WSR
C
MoL
G (m
ainl
y Gr
iev-
ance
Red
ress
); M
oH a
nd E
QA
(Out
-sid
e LG
U ju
risdi
ctio
n);
JSCs
(with
in ju
risdi
c-tio
n);
LGUs
(with
in ju
risdi
c-tio
n)
MoP
WH;
MoL
G;
LGUs
PE
RC; i
ndiv
idua
l DI
SCO
s
MoF
P; U
NWRA
; NG
Os; P
rivat
e Se
c-to
r; Pa
lest
inia
n Ce
ntra
l Bur
eau
of
Stat
istics
(PCB
S w
ith M
oH re
gula
rly
cond
ucts
the
Na-
tiona
l Hea
lth A
c-co
unts
and
oth
er
natio
nal h
ealth
sur-
veys
); Pa
lest
inia
n Pu
blic
Heal
th In
sti-
tute
MOE
HE; N
a-tio
nal I
nstit
ute
for E
duca
tiona
l Tr
aini
ng; H
ighe
r Ed
ucat
ion
Inst
i-tu
tes;
UNW
RA;
PCBS
Tabl
e II-
1: O
verv
iew
of t
he C
urre
nt In
stitu
tiona
l Arr
ange
men
ts b
y Se
rvice
Sec
tor
THE
PERF
ORM
AN
CE O
F PA
LEST
INIA
N L
OCA
L G
OVE
RNM
ENTS
. AN
ASS
ESSM
ENT
OF
SER
VICE
DEL
IVER
Y O
UTC
OM
ES A
ND
PER
FORM
AN
CE D
RIVE
RS IN
TH
E W
EST
BAN
K A
ND
GA
ZA.
16
Func
tion
Desc
riptio
n W
ater
&
Sew
age
Solid
Was
te
Road
s El
ectr
icity
He
alth
Ed
ucat
ion
Polic
y m
akin
g W
ho se
ts th
e m
ain
polic
y gu
idel
ines
?
Pale
stin
ian
Wa-
ter A
utho
rity
(PW
A)
MoL
G; E
nviro
nmen
t Q
ualit
y Au
thor
ity
(EQ
A); M
inist
ry o
f He
alth
(MOH
); Na
tiona
l Com
mitt
ee
on S
olid
Was
te M
an-
agem
ent (
in a
dditi
on
to th
e ab
ove
inclu
des:
MoF
P; P
WA;
Min
istry
of
Nat
iona
l Eco
nom
y (M
oNE)
; Min
istry
of
Educ
atio
n an
d Hi
gher
Ed
ucat
ion
Min
istry
of P
ublic
W
orks
and
Hou
s-in
g (M
oPW
H);
MoL
G (w
ithin
LG
U ju
risdi
ctio
n)
Pale
stin
ian
En-
ergy
and
Nat
ural
Re
sour
ces A
u-th
ority
(PEN
RA)
MoH
; Su
prem
e M
edica
l Co
uncil
MoE
HE; H
ighe
r Co
uncil
of E
duca
-tio
n
Legi
slatio
n W
hat a
re th
e ke
y le
gal p
a-ra
met
ers i
n th
e se
ctor
?
2014
Wat
er
Law
; 201
7−20
22
(SDP
); Lo
cal
Gove
rnm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
JS
C By
law
201
6;
Tarif
f Reg
ula-
tions
Byl
aw
2013
; Uni
fied
Regu
latio
n fo
r W
ater
and
W
aste
wat
er T
ar-
iff a
nd C
onne
c-tio
n Se
rvice
s Fe
es 2
017
(dra
ft)
Loca
l Gov
ernm
ent A
ct
(LGA
) of 1
997;
En
viro
nmen
tal L
aw
No. (
7) o
f 199
9;
Publ
ic He
alth
Law
of
2004
; JS
C By
law
s 201
6;
Pale
stin
ian
Min
ister
ial
Cabi
net D
ecisi
ons N
o 53
(200
8), 4
9 (2
010)
, 50
(201
5), 1
08 (2
016)
, 15
0 (2
017)
; JS
C By
law
201
6;
Natio
nal S
olid
Was
te
Man
agem
ent B
i-Law
(d
raft)
;
Loca
l Gov
ern-
men
t Act
(LGA
) of
1997
; Dr
aft R
oad
Law
20
00;
Road
Tra
ffic L
aw
(No.
5)
Gene
ral E
lect
ric-
ity La
w 2
009;
Re-
new
able
Ene
rgy
and
Ener
gy E
ffi-
cienc
y (R
E&EE
) La
w 2
015
Coun
cil o
f Min
ster
s
Com
miss
ion
for
Deve
lopi
ng
Teac
hing
Pro
fes-
sion;
Ac
cred
itatio
n an
d Q
ualit
y As
-su
ranc
e Co
mm
is-sio
n fo
r Hig
her
Educ
atio
n
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
22
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
20
31. IntheWestBank,two-fifthsofbulkwaterissuppliedfrominternalresources,largelyman-agedbytheWestBankWaterDepartment,andthree-fifthsispurchasedfromIsrael.11Bulkwaterpro-visionintheWestBankistheresponsibilityoftheWestBankWaterDepartment,whichmanageswellsandpurchaseswater fromthe Israelibulk supplier,Mekorot,anddistributesandsellsbulkwater toserviceproviders.InGaza,theCoastalWaterManagementUtilityoperatesasawaterprovidertothemunicipalitiesandasaprojectimplementer.Waterandsanitationretailserviceprovidersfallintosev-eralcategories.Thereareonlytwoformallyestablishedautonomous“utilities”:(i)theJerusalemWaterUndertakingprovideswaterservicestoEastJerusalemandsurroundingcommunities,andtomuchoftheRamallahandAlBirehGovernorates;and(ii)theWaterSupplyandSanitationAuthorityprovideswaterservicestotheBethlehemarea.Theothermainprovidersaredepartmentsofmunicipalities,VCs,andJSCs.ServicestosomerefugeecampsareprovidedbytheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestine(UNRWA).InboththeWestBankandtoagreaterextentinGaza,thereisanactiveprivatesectorofwaterpurifyingplantsandprivatewatertankers.Involvementofcivilsocietyandtheservedpopulationisthroughcitizengroupsandindividualconsumerswhoengageonwaterissues,althoughinalimitedway.
32. Institutionalassignmentsforsolidwastemanagementinvolvebothcentralandlocalstake-holders.Themainactorsinthesolidwastesectoratthecentral level include:(i)theMoLG,whichisresponsiblefortheNationalSolidWasteManagementStrategyandregulatesandmonitorsLGUperfor-manceinthesector;(ii)theEnvironmentalQualityAuthority(EQA),overseeingenvironmentalprotec-tion and ensuring enforcement of environmental laws, primarily through licensing, regulations, andmonitoring solidwastemanagement facilities including land fill sites;and (iii) theMinistryofHealth(MoH),whichcoordinateswiththeEQAandMoLGtoregulatethedisposalofcertainwasteandtheclosureand/orrehabilitationofdumpsites.Alsoinvolvedatthecentrallevelinlegislation,policy,andstrategydevelopment istheNationalCommitteeforSolidWasteManagement,whichreportstotheCabinetofMinisters(CoM).ThisbodyincludesinadditiontotheMoLG,EQA,andMoH,theMoFP,andrecentlyaddedthePWA,MinistryofNationalEconomy(MoNE),andtheMinistryEducationandHigherEducation(MoEHE).TheCommitteehasrecentlypreparedanupdateddraftoftheSolidWasteMan-agementStrategyfor2017–2022,andadraftSolidWasteManagementBylawproposedforapprovaltotheCoMandpublicdisclosureinsummer2017.Wastemanagementatthelocallevel,includingcol-lection,transport,andfinaldisposal,isadministeredbybothLGUsandJSCswithintheirrespectiveju-risdictions.ExamplesincludetheJeninJSCfortheJeninandTubasGovernoratesandtheHebron-Beth-lehemHigherJSCforSolidWasteManagement.However,thereisagapbetweenwhatisproscribedinthepoliciesregardingassignedrolesandtasks,andwhatdefactotakesplace.Thenewdraftbylawwilladdresstheconflictingrolesandprovideclaritytotheinstitutionalandimplementationarrangementsforthestakeholdersinthesector.
33. Similarly,LGUssharemandatesintheroadsectorwithcentralauthorities.AtthecentralleveltheMinistryofPublicWorksandHousing(MoPWH)isresponsibleforthedevelopment,maintenance,andrehabilitationofthemainandregionalroadsoutsidethejurisdictionofmunicipalitiesandVCs.Atthelocallevel,municipalitiesandVCsareresponsiblefortheroadswithintheirimmediatejurisdiction(masterplans),which includesplanning,development,andmaintenanceof thenetwork. In theWestBank,theauthorityoftheseagenciesislimitedtothePAcontrolledareas(AreasAandB),whiletheGoIhasfulladministrativecontrolofAreaCincludingmanagementoftheroadnetwork,whichrepresentsabulkof theexistingroads.Currently, there isa limitedrole for theprivatesector inmanagingandinvestinginthepublicroadnetworkinthePalestinianterritories.
11WorldBank.2017.WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic.
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34. Theroadnetwork,whichisthemostimportantanddominantmodeoftransportinWestBankandGaza,facesnumerouschallenges.Thestudyfoundthatbetterroadsremainoneofthemostde-siredservicesinWestBank(47percent)andGaza(74percent).FurtherindicationroadsremainahighpriorityforPalestinianslivingintheWestBankandGaza,undertheMDP,whichpoolsfundingfromtheBank,internationaldonors,andthePA,1251percentofCycle1and71percentofCycle2fundingformunicipalitieswenttoroads13.Thesectorhoweverfacesinstitutional,fiscal,andexternalchallenges.The current institutional arrangements, with the responsibilities for road planning, construction,maintenance, and funding split betweenmultipleministries and agencies depending on the typeofwork,fundingsource,androadcategory,areconfusingandoverlapping.14Thesectorlacksacompre-hensiveRoadMasterplan,whichcouldstreamlinetheorganizationalmanagementofthemultiplepro-jectsbyassortedstakeholdersandfacilitatethecoordinationofmaintenanceactivities.Similartotheother core services, the sector also lacks the sufficient funds for executing necessary projects andmaintenance.Roadsrepresentthebiggestpubliccapitalasset,andthereisacompleterelianceonthepublicsectorforthedevelopmentofthenetwork,sincecommercialinfrastructurefinancingisnotuti-lized.Lastly,theroleofthegeo-politicalsituationcannotbeignored.TheGoIseverelyrestrictsthePal-estiniansability toupgraderoadsorconstructnewroutes inAreaCwithoutpreviousconsent,mostoftennotgiven.Thishas leftareascutoffwith limitedaccesstoservices(e.g.solidwastecollection,healthandeducationservices)andconstrainedaccesstootherareasoftheWestBank.ThesituationhasalsocreatedarelianceonthedonorcommunitytoupgraderoadsinAreaCasitiseasierforthemtoobtainIsraelipermissionfortheinfrastructureworkneeded.
2.2 Water and Waste Water
35. LackingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesforhouseholdsinGazaremainsakeychal-lenge.FigureII-3demonstratesthatacrossregionsinthePalestinianterritories,significantdifferencesinaccesstodrinkingwatersourcesconsideredimprovedbytheWHO/UNICEFJointMonitoringPro-grammeexist.15Following a sharp deteriorationof access towater services in all five governorates,mainlyduetoover-exploitationoftheCoastalAquifer,Gaza’sonly internalrenewablewatersource,only1percentofthehouseholdsinGazahasaccesstoanimproveddrinkingwatersource.TheWorldBank’s2017WASHPovertyDiagnosticfindsthatthemajorityofthe260municipalwellsintheGazastripdonotmeet thesaltandnitratemaximumthresholdssetby theWorldHealthOrganization (WHO),forcing97percentofthepopulationinGazatoacquiredrinkingwaterfromprivatetankertrucks.IntheWestBankincontrast,accesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesreaches94percent,withVCshavingslightlyhigheraccessrates(95percent)thanmunicipalities(93percent).However,whendefiningaccessascontinuousaccesswithoutinterruptionforafulldayduringtheprevioustwoweeks,accesstoim-proveddrinkingwaterdropsto81percent,mainlydrivenbylargedecreasesinJenin,Nablus,andHeb-ron.
12AprogramwhichpoolsfundingfromtheBank,internationaldonors,andthePAthatincentivizesthedevelopmentofmu-nicipalmanagementcapacitythroughperformance-basedgrantstomunicipalities.13MDLF.2016AnnualReport.14WorldBank.2007.WestBankandGazaTransportSectorStrategyNote.15Thefollowingdrinkingwatersourcesareconsideredimproved:Pipedwaterintodwelling,yard,orplot;publictaporstand-pipe;tubewellorborehole;protecteddugwell;protectedspring;rainwatercollection;bottledwater.
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FigureII-3:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoImprovedDrinkingWater
36. AccesstopipedwateristhehighestinmunicipalitiesinthecentralWestBank.FigureII-4pro-videsanoverviewonspatialdifferencesinaccesstopipedwater,measuredattheLGUlevel.AccessratesarethehighestinLGUsinthecentralWestBank,withanaveragecoverageof99percent,andthelowestinthesouthWestBankandGaza,whereonaverage1outof10householdslacksaconnectiontoapipedwaternetwork.However,inneitherbetweentheWestBankandGaza,norbetweenregionswithintheWestBank,doestheoutcomegapexceed10percentagepoints.AcrossLGUsintheWestBank,accessratesareslightlyhigherinmunicipalities(94percent)thanVCs(92percent)butnoclearstructuralrelationshipbetweenLGUsizegroupandaccesstopipedwateremerges.
FigureII-4:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoPipedWater
1%
95%
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37. TheGazawatercrisisisfurtheraggravatedbythelackofregularenergysupply.Gazasuffersfromfrequentpowercutsandrationedsupplywhichonlyprovidesaround8hoursofelectricityperdaytocitizens.However,thelackofcoordinationbetweenelectricityandwaterdistributionschedulefur-theraffectshouseholdwatersupplyinadditiontoelectricityrestrictionsaffectingtheoperationofwellsthatfeedthepipednetwork.MostofFGDparticipantsinGazacomplainedbecausethey“donotreceivewaterandelectricityatthesametime”16orbecauseofwhatsomecitizenscalled“thelackofcoordina-tionbetween‘watersupplyschedule’andthe‘provisionofelectricityschedule.’”AFDGparticipantfromGazaexplainedwhythismatterstoalargenumberofGazaresidents:“Peopleneedelectricitytooperatetheirwaterpumpsandstorewaterintankslocatedontheirroofs.However,theycannotdothiswhentheyhavewaterwithouthavingelectricity.Sometimes,peoplestayupatnightwaitingforelectricitytobeabletofilltheirtanks…”ThesefindingsareconfirmedbythemayorofGazaCitywhoexplainedthereisa“difficultyofoperatingsomewaterwellsduetopoweroutages.”
38. SatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwaterishigherinthenorthandcentralthaninthesouthWestBankandGaza,anddiffersnotablywithLGUsize.FigureII-5providesanover-viewonspatialdifferencesinsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwater,conditionalonbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork.InthenorthandcentralWestBank,onaverage2outof3citizensaresatisfiedorverysatisfiedwithpipedwaterqualityandreliability,comparedtoonlyhalfofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBank.SatisfactionratesarethelowestinGaza,whereonly36percentofhouseholdsstatetheyaresatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityoftheirpipedwaterconnection.BothacrossmunicipalitiesandVCsintheWestBank,satisfactionisthehighestinsmallLGUs.
FigureII-5:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:PipedWater
39. Qualitativeanalysisunderlinessurveyfindingsthatdespitehighconnectionratestothewaternetwork,watershortagesandqualityremaincriticalchallenges.MostaffectedisthesouthernWest
16QuotesthroughoutthereportarefromKeyInformantInterviews(KIIs)andFocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs),andaretrans-latedfromArabic.SeeAnnex2foradetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyandanoverviewofthequotesusedinthisre-port.Araj,Bader.2017.QualitativeResearchReportFocusGroupDiscussionsandKeyInformantInterviews.
44%
South
60%
Central
36%
Gaza
58%
North
58%
41%
52%
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Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
62%
61%
47%
Small
Medium
Large
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Bank(e.g.Hebron,BethlehemandBeitSahour)wheresomeresidentsreportreceivingpipedwater,onaverage,onceeverythreeweeks.Incomparison,thepoorqualityofwateristhemostchallengingissueinGaza,becauseofthe lackoffreshwateravailablefromtheoverdrawncoastalaquiferand limitedwastewatertreatmentcapacitycausingfurtherpollutionfrominfiltrationofuntreatedsewage.Inad-dition,mostLGUsintheWestBankandGazasuffersignificantwater-lossesfromoldleakingwaternet-worksthatrequireexpensivemaintenanceandrenewal.
40. AthirdofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankandinGazareportadeteriorationinthequalityofpipedwaterduringthelast3years.FigureII-6demonstratesthatwhilethemajorityofhouse-holdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterritoriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofpipedsew-ageservices,qualityinthesouthWestBankandinGazadeterioratedforathirdofthepopulation.Incontrast,44percentofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankand43percentinthecentralWestBankreportanimprovementduringthelast3years.Incontrasttothesewageandsolidwastesector,servicequalityimprovedinsmallerVCsandmunicipalitiesintheWestBank,relativetolargerLGUs.InsmallmunicipalitiesandVCs,only1outof5and1outof8householdsreportadeterioration,respectively,comparedto1outof3inlargemunicipalities,and1outof4inlargeVCs.
FigureII-6:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofPipedWaterinLast3Years
41. ThevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritorieshaveaccesstoanunsharedim-provedsanitationfacility.FigureII-7illustratesthataccesstoimprovedunsharedsanitationfacilitiesasdefinedbytheWHO/UNICEFJointMonitoringProgramexceeds90percentinallregionsofthePales-tinianterritories.17With99percentand97percentcoverage,accesstoimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisuniversalinGazaandinthesouthWestBank,respectively.InthenorthandcentralwestBank,92per-centofhouseholdsarecoveredbyanimprovedsanitationfacility.IntheWestBank,accessratesarehigherinmunicipalities(95percent)thaninVCs(88percent).
17Thefollowingtypesofsanitationfacilitiesareconsideredimproved:flushorpour-flushtopipedsewagesystem,septictank,orpitlatrine;ventilatedimprovedpitlatrine(VIP);pitlatrinewithslab;compostingtoilet.Allsanitationfacilitiesthataresharedwithindividualsnotbelongingtotheownhouseholdareconsideredunimproved.
19
35
32
52
40
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25
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Bank(e.g.Hebron,BethlehemandBeitSahour)wheresomeresidentsreportreceivingpipedwater,onaverage,onceeverythreeweeks.Incomparison,thepoorqualityofwateristhemostchallengingissueinGaza,becauseofthe lackoffreshwateravailablefromtheoverdrawncoastalaquiferand limitedwastewatertreatmentcapacitycausingfurtherpollutionfrominfiltrationofuntreatedsewage.Inad-dition,mostLGUsintheWestBankandGazasuffersignificantwater-lossesfromoldleakingwaternet-worksthatrequireexpensivemaintenanceandrenewal.
40. AthirdofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankandinGazareportadeteriorationinthequalityofpipedwaterduringthelast3years.FigureII-6demonstratesthatwhilethemajorityofhouse-holdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterritoriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofpipedsew-ageservices,qualityinthesouthWestBankandinGazadeterioratedforathirdofthepopulation.Incontrast,44percentofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankand43percentinthecentralWestBankreportanimprovementduringthelast3years.Incontrasttothesewageandsolidwastesector,servicequalityimprovedinsmallerVCsandmunicipalitiesintheWestBank,relativetolargerLGUs.InsmallmunicipalitiesandVCs,only1outof5and1outof8householdsreportadeterioration,respectively,comparedto1outof3inlargemunicipalities,and1outof4inlargeVCs.
FigureII-6:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofPipedWaterinLast3Years
41. ThevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritorieshaveaccesstoanunsharedim-provedsanitationfacility.FigureII-7illustratesthataccesstoimprovedunsharedsanitationfacilitiesasdefinedbytheWHO/UNICEFJointMonitoringProgramexceeds90percentinallregionsofthePales-tinianterritories.17With99percentand97percentcoverage,accesstoimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisuniversalinGazaandinthesouthWestBank,respectively.InthenorthandcentralwestBank,92per-centofhouseholdsarecoveredbyanimprovedsanitationfacility.IntheWestBank,accessratesarehigherinmunicipalities(95percent)thaninVCs(88percent).
17Thefollowingtypesofsanitationfacilitiesareconsideredimproved:flushorpour-flushtopipedsewagesystem,septictank,orpitlatrine;ventilatedimprovedpitlatrine(VIP);pitlatrinewithslab;compostingtoilet.Allsanitationfacilitiesthataresharedwithindividualsnotbelongingtotheownhouseholdareconsideredunimproved.
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37. TheGazawatercrisisisfurtheraggravatedbythelackofregularenergysupply.Gazasuffersfromfrequentpowercutsandrationedsupplywhichonlyprovidesaround8hoursofelectricityperdaytocitizens.However,thelackofcoordinationbetweenelectricityandwaterdistributionschedulefur-theraffectshouseholdwatersupplyinadditiontoelectricityrestrictionsaffectingtheoperationofwellsthatfeedthepipednetwork.MostofFGDparticipantsinGazacomplainedbecausethey“donotreceivewaterandelectricityatthesametime”16orbecauseofwhatsomecitizenscalled“thelackofcoordina-tionbetween‘watersupplyschedule’andthe‘provisionofelectricityschedule.’”AFDGparticipantfromGazaexplainedwhythismatterstoalargenumberofGazaresidents:“Peopleneedelectricitytooperatetheirwaterpumpsandstorewaterintankslocatedontheirroofs.However,theycannotdothiswhentheyhavewaterwithouthavingelectricity.Sometimes,peoplestayupatnightwaitingforelectricitytobeabletofilltheirtanks…”ThesefindingsareconfirmedbythemayorofGazaCitywhoexplainedthereisa“difficultyofoperatingsomewaterwellsduetopoweroutages.”
38. SatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwaterishigherinthenorthandcentralthaninthesouthWestBankandGaza,anddiffersnotablywithLGUsize.FigureII-5providesanover-viewonspatialdifferencesinsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwater,conditionalonbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork.InthenorthandcentralWestBank,onaverage2outof3citizensaresatisfiedorverysatisfiedwithpipedwaterqualityandreliability,comparedtoonlyhalfofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBank.SatisfactionratesarethelowestinGaza,whereonly36percentofhouseholdsstatetheyaresatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityoftheirpipedwaterconnection.BothacrossmunicipalitiesandVCsintheWestBank,satisfactionisthehighestinsmallLGUs.
FigureII-5:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:PipedWater
39. Qualitativeanalysisunderlinessurveyfindingsthatdespitehighconnectionratestothewaternetwork,watershortagesandqualityremaincriticalchallenges.MostaffectedisthesouthernWest
16QuotesthroughoutthereportarefromKeyInformantInterviews(KIIs)andFocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs),andaretrans-latedfromArabic.SeeAnnex2foradetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyandanoverviewofthequotesusedinthisre-port.Araj,Bader.2017.QualitativeResearchReportFocusGroupDiscussionsandKeyInformantInterviews.
44%
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FigureII-7:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoImprovedSanitationFacilities
42. Whilecoveragewithimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisalmostuniversal,pipedsewagecoverageis low, differing significantly by LGU type and size, and is notably higher in Gaza. Fig-ureII-8demonstratesthesharpcontrasttothedistributionofpipedsewagecoverage.77percentofthehouseholdsinGazaandonly30percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankareconnectedtoapipedsewagenetwork.Drivenbyhighaccessinitslargecities,GazaclearlyoutperformstheWestBank:inthefivelargestcitiesinGaza,accessratesreach93percent,comparedtojust76percentinthefivelargestcitiesintheWestBank.AcrossthethreeregionsoftheWestBank,onaverageslightlylessthanathirdofcitizenshaveaccesstopipedsewage,withaccessratesdifferingnotablybyLGUtypeandsize.ThebestperformingLGUsarelargemunicipalitieswithaccessratesover70percent,whileinVCs,lessthan1outof10citizensisconnectedtopipedsewagesystem.
FigureII-8:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoPipedSewage
99%
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InthesmallestLGUsizegroup,VCswithlessthan1,000inhabitants,pipedsewageisvirtuallynotavail-able.ThemunicipalitiesintheWestBankwherepipedsewageispredominantlyonlyavailableincludeNablus,Qalqiliya,Salfit,Ramallah,Bethlehem,andHebron,ascanbeseeninFigureII-8
43. Amonghouseholdsthathaveaccesstoapipedsewagesystem,satisfactionisthehighestinthenorthandsouthWestBank.FigureII-9showsthegeographicalvariationofsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedsewageservicesforhouseholdsthatareconnectedtothesewagenet-work.SatisfactionishigheramongcitizensintheWestBank(86percent)thaninGaza(79percent)andthehighestinthesouthWestBank(89percent).Amaindeterminantofsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedsewageisthereliabilityofsewagepipes:whileofthehouseholdsthatdonotexperi-enceanoverflowingorcloggedpipeonaregularbasis,state91percenttobesatisfiedwithpipedsew-agequality;only17percentofthehouseholdsthatexperienceanoverfloworclogofsewagepipesatleastoncepermonthreporttobesatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityofsewageservices.
FigureII-9:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:PipedSewage
44. ThebroadmajorityofthehouseholdsintheWestBankandGazareportsanimprovementornochangeinthequalityofpipedsewageservicesinthelast3years.FigureII-10demonstratesthatthevastmajorityofhouseholdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterritoriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofpipedsewageservices.InthesouthWestBank,morethan4outof10householdsreportanimprovement,whileonly1outof4householdsinboththenorthWestBankandinGazaexperiencedan improvement.Compared to theoutcomes forpipedwater and solidwaste collection,only smallsharesofhouseholdsreportadeteriorationforpipedsewageservices.AcrossLGUs,householdsreporthigherratesofimprovementinmunicipalities(30percent)thaninVCs(29percent),andinlargerLGUs.
89%
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FigureII-10:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofPipedSewageinLast3Years
45. Comparingtrends inwaterandsanitationacrosscountries, thePalestinianterritorieshaveseenasubstantialdeclineinaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesinthetenyearsleadingupto2015. Through theWorldBank’sWorldDevelopment Indicators (WDI), informationonaccess to im-proveddrinkingwaterandsanitationispresentedbelowinFigureII-11andFigureII-12,respectively.TheserviceaccessratesforthePalestinianterritorieswerecomparedtotheneighboringcountriesofJordanandLebanonaswellastoregionalaveragesincludingforfragileandconflict-affectedsituations(FCS).Countriesofsimilarstructuralcharacteristicsincludingsize,geographicallocation,landlockedna-ture,havinglowlaborforceparticipationrates,andahighdependencyonaidandremittanceswerealsoconsidered.
FigureII-11:AccesstoImprovedDrinkingWaterSources(%ofPopulationwithAccess)
a. Selectedpeersbycountry b. Byregionexcludinghighincome
Source:WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsasofMarch15,2017.Note:Countrieswereselectedbyneighboringlocationandbywhichhavesimilarstructuralcharacteristicssuchassize,geographicallocation,landlocked,andhavinglowlaborforceparticipationratesinadditiontoahighdepend-encyonaidandremittances.Regionsexcludehigh-incomecountries.
404550556065707580859095
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Jordan LebanonBosniaandHerzegovina HaitiMali MoldovaPalestine
404550556065707580859095
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EastAsia&PacificEurope&CentralAsiaLatinAmerica&CaribbeanMiddleEast&NorthAfricaSub-SaharanAfricaFragileandconflictaffectedsituations
4
8
5
77
62
59
29
26
25
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Medium
Large
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0
5
2
100
73
80
28
29
25
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4
7
5
13
76
66
53
72
27
43
44
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Gaza
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AccordingtotheWDI’slatestfigures,thepercentofthepopulationwithaccesstoimproveddrinkingwaterhasdeclinedfrom78.2percentin2005toonly58.4percentwithaccessin2015.Thisissignifi-cantlymuchlowerthanforLebanon(99percent)andJordan(96.9percent),andtheregion(92.6per-centexcludinghighincomecountries).Therateisalsolowerthanthe67.8percentaverageforFCS.Thisispredominantlyattributable to thedeterioratingqualityofurbanwatersupply inGaza.18While theLGPAsurveyfoundhigheraccessratestopipedwater,accesstodrinkingwaterremainssignificantlylowforthePalestinianterritories.
46. Incontrast,access to improvedsanitation facilities in thePalestinian territorieshasslowlybeenontherise.TheWDInumbersindicatethatthepopulation’saccesstoimprovedsanitationhasincreasedfromalreadyhighnumbersto92.3percentby2015,10percentagepointshigherthanLeba-non(80.7percent)andclosertoJordanianaccessrates(98.6percent).ThisisverysimilartotheLGPA’sfindingthat96%ofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoanimprovedsanitationfacility.Accessratesin thePalestinian territoriesare significantlyhigher than theFCSaverage (43.5percent)andslightlyhigherthantheaveragefortheregion(89.6percent).
FigureII-12:AccesstoImprovedSanitationFacilities(%ofPopulationwithAccess)
a. Selectedpeersbycountry b. Byregionexcludinghighincome
Source:WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsasofMarch15,2017.Note:Countrieswereselectedbyneighboringlocationandbywhichhavesimilarstructuralcharacteristicssuchassize,geographicallocation,landlocked,andhavinglowlaborforceparticipationratesinadditiontoahighdepend-encyonaidandremittances.Regionsexcludehigh-incomecountries.
18WorldBank.2017.WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic.
20
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70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Jordan LebanonBosniaandHerzegovina HaitiMali MoldovaPalestine
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40
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70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EastAsia&PacificEurope&CentralAsiaLatinAmerica&CaribbeanMiddleEast&NorthAfricaSub-SaharanAfricaFragileandconflictaffectedsituations
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2.3 Solid Waste Management
47. AvailabilityofsolidwastecollectionservicesishigherinlargerLGUsandthehighestinthenorthWestBank.FigureII-13showsthegeographicaldistributionoftheavailabilityofsolidwastecol-lectionservicesattheLGUlevel.WhileintheWestBank,over90percentofhouseholdsarecoveredbyawastecollectionservice,almost1outof5householdsinGazaisnotcovered(17percent).IntheWestBank,nearly100percentofhouseholdsinmunicipalities,and90percentofhouseholdsinmediumandlargeVCshaveaccesstowastecollectionservices.InsmallVCshowever,oneoutoffourhouseholdsstilllacksaccesstoanyformofwastecollectionservice.Thereisanoticeablecorrelationbetweenlowaccesstosolidwastecollectionandlowaccesstopavedlocalroads,particularlyinthesouthernWestBankandareasinGaza.Itwouldbedifficultforsolidwastecollectiontruckstoaccessareaswithoutpavedroads,whichhighlightsagaintheinterdependenceofthecoreservicesandthecoordinationneededfortheirprovision.
FigureII-13:GeographyofServiceProvision:SolidWasteCollection
48. SatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservicesislowinthenorthWestBankandinsmallLGUs.InGaza,andintheCentralandsouthWestBank,2outof3householdsaresatisfiedwithwastecollectionservices,comparedtoonlyeverysecondhouseholdinthenorthWestBank.TheseresultsaremainlydrivenbydifferingfrequenciesofsolidwastecollectionacrossregionsandLGUsizegroups:inWestBankVCssolidwasteiscollectedlessthan2timesperweek,comparedto4timesinmunicipalitiesintheWestBankand5timesformunicipalitiesinGaza.
93%
South
97%
98%
98%
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
95%
Central
98%
North
83%
Gaza
74%
92%
87%
Small
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils- WestBank
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FigureII-14:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:SolidWasteCollection
49. Onaverage,morethanathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBank,andafourthofthehouse-holdsinGazaexperiencedanimprovementinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservicesinthelast3years.FigureII-15demonstratesthatthemajorityofhouseholdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterri-toriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileinthenorthWestBankandinGaza,only1outof4householdsreportsanimprovement,aclearlylargershareofhouseholdsexperiencedanimprovementinthecentralWestBank(43percent)andinthesouthWestBank(44percent).
FigureII-15:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofSolidWasteCollectioninlast3Years
Theshareofhouseholdsthatexperiencesadeteriorationinservicequalityrangesfrom13percentinthecentralWestBankto18and19percentinGazaandthenorthWestBank,respectively.AcrossLGUs,
65%
South
54%
North
69%
Central
70%
Gaza
59%
69%
70%
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
57%
50%
49%
Small
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils
17
14
18
50
40
40
34
47
43
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
14
19
20
59
51
54
27
31
26
Small
Medium
Large
VCs- WestBank
19
13
17
18
54
44
40
58
27
43
44
24
NorthWestBank
CentralWestBank
SouthWestBank
Gaza
Regions
Deteriorated NoChange Improved
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householdsreporthigherratesofimprovementinmunicipalities(39percent)thaninVCs(29percent),andinlargerLGUs.
2.4 Local Roads
50. AccesstopavedlocalroadsistwiceashighintheWestBankthaninGaza.IntheWestBank,9outof10householdsarelocatedbyapavedroad,whilelessthanhalfofthehouseholdsinGazahavedirectaccesstopavedroads.Asaconsequence,almostthreequartersof thecitizens inGazadesirebetterroads.Accesstopavedroads is26percenthigher inmunicipalitiesthanVCs,withthehighestpercentageofaccessfoundinthecentralWestBank.Resultsalsoindicatedconcernswiththeopera-tionsandmaintenanceofexistingroads.
FigureII-16:GeographyofServiceProvision:PavedRoads
Overhalfofthehouseholds(60percent)reportthattheyarenotsatisfiedwiththeconditionsofroadsoutsidestheirhouses.ThenumberissignificantlyhigherinGaza,whereonlyaquarterofhouseholdsreportsatisfaction.IntheWestBank49percentreporttobesatisfiedwithroads,withmorehouseholdsinmunicipalities(40percent)reportingsatisfactionthaninVCs(34percent).HalfofthehouseholdsinGazareportthattheroadoutsidetheirhousecannotbeusedduringheavyrainforwalkinganddriving,andoneoutof threehouseholdssurveyed inGazamentiondrainageduringrainasoneof themainproblemswithroadsintheircommunities.IntheWestBankincontrast,only1outof4householdsdonothaveaccesstoaroadwhichcanbeusedevenduringheavyrain,andonly1outof5householdsmentiondrainageduringrainasamainproblemwithlocalroads.ThepoorsituationforroadsinGazawasexacerbatedbythesignificantdamagetoinfrastructureduringthe2014GazaWar.
51. DespitetheprovisionofroadsbeingasharedservicebetweencentralgovernmentandLGUs,thereremainanumberofroadissuesinadditiontoinfrastructurewhichLGUsareresponsiblefor.HouseholdsinboththeWestBankandGazareportno/irregularstreetcleaningasthemostimportant
83%
South
88%
88%
91%
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
76%
85%
79%
Small
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils- WestBank
46%
Gaza 92%
Central
87%
North
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FigureII-14:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:SolidWasteCollection
49. Onaverage,morethanathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBank,andafourthofthehouse-holdsinGazaexperiencedanimprovementinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservicesinthelast3years.FigureII-15demonstratesthatthemajorityofhouseholdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterri-toriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileinthenorthWestBankandinGaza,only1outof4householdsreportsanimprovement,aclearlylargershareofhouseholdsexperiencedanimprovementinthecentralWestBank(43percent)andinthesouthWestBank(44percent).
FigureII-15:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofSolidWasteCollectioninlast3Years
Theshareofhouseholdsthatexperiencesadeteriorationinservicequalityrangesfrom13percentinthecentralWestBankto18and19percentinGazaandthenorthWestBank,respectively.AcrossLGUs,
65%
South
54%
North
69%
Central
70%
Gaza
59%
69%
70%
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
57%
50%
49%
Small
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils
17
14
18
50
40
40
34
47
43
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
14
19
20
59
51
54
27
31
26
Small
Medium
Large
VCs- WestBank
19
13
17
18
54
44
40
58
27
43
44
24
NorthWestBank
CentralWestBank
SouthWestBank
Gaza
Regions
Deteriorated NoChange ImprovedTHE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF
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householdsreporthigherratesofimprovementinmunicipalities(39percent)thaninVCs(29percent),andinlargerLGUs.
2.4 Local Roads
50. AccesstopavedlocalroadsistwiceashighintheWestBankthaninGaza.IntheWestBank,9outof10householdsarelocatedbyapavedroad,whilelessthanhalfofthehouseholdsinGazahavedirectaccesstopavedroads.Asaconsequence,almostthreequartersof thecitizens inGazadesirebetterroads.Accesstopavedroads is26percenthigher inmunicipalitiesthanVCs,withthehighestpercentageofaccessfoundinthecentralWestBank.Resultsalsoindicatedconcernswiththeopera-tionsandmaintenanceofexistingroads.
FigureII-16:GeographyofServiceProvision:PavedRoads
Overhalfofthehouseholds(60percent)reportthattheyarenotsatisfiedwiththeconditionsofroadsoutsidestheirhouses.ThenumberissignificantlyhigherinGaza,whereonlyaquarterofhouseholdsreportsatisfaction.IntheWestBank49percentreporttobesatisfiedwithroads,withmorehouseholdsinmunicipalities(40percent)reportingsatisfactionthaninVCs(34percent).HalfofthehouseholdsinGazareportthattheroadoutsidetheirhousecannotbeusedduringheavyrainforwalkinganddriving,andoneoutof threehouseholdssurveyed inGazamentiondrainageduringrainasoneof themainproblemswithroadsintheircommunities.IntheWestBankincontrast,only1outof4householdsdonothaveaccesstoaroadwhichcanbeusedevenduringheavyrain,andonly1outof5householdsmentiondrainageduringrainasamainproblemwithlocalroads.ThepoorsituationforroadsinGazawasexacerbatedbythesignificantdamagetoinfrastructureduringthe2014GazaWar.
51. DespitetheprovisionofroadsbeingasharedservicebetweencentralgovernmentandLGUs,thereremainanumberofroadissuesinadditiontoinfrastructurewhichLGUsareresponsiblefor.HouseholdsinboththeWestBankandGazareportno/irregularstreetcleaningasthemostimportant
83%
South
88%
88%
91%
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
76%
85%
79%
Small
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils- WestBank
46%
Gaza 92%
Central
87%
North
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problemwithroadsintheircommunity.However,attheLGUlevel,VCs(22percent)reportthatpot-holes/badroadsurfaceasthemostimportantissueoverno/irregularstreetcleaning(20percent).BothcategoriesfallunderthemandatesoftheLGUstoaddress.Accesstostreetlightsishigh(71percent)butagainsimilartopavedroadaccess,thereisalargegapbetweentheWestBankandGaza.Only51per-centofhouseholdsinGazareportthattheroadoutsidetheirhousehasfunctioningstreetlights,com-paredto84percentintheWestBank.AhigherpercentageofhouseholdsinVCs(79percent)reporttheroadhadfunctioningstreetlightstothaninmunicipalities(71percent),withthenorthWestBankre-portingthehighestpresenceofstreetlights(87percent).
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1920212223
19 This is a policy remaining and adopted from the British Mandate for Palestine’s Regional Master Planning Schemes of 1942 Jerusalem District RJ/5 and Samaria District 1945 S15. 20 Source: GeoMOLG 21 This excludes portions within Area C for which Israel has full control of security matters and all land-related civil administra-tion, including land allocation, planning and construction, and infrastructure. 22 There are also situations in which people build without permits in these areas and then pay a building fine post-construc-tion. 23 Palestinian Authority. 1994. Town, Village and Building Planning Law, No. 79, 1966.
Rapid urban growth is putting substantial pressures on service delivery systems. The Pal-estinian territories are facing rapid urbanization and spatially concentrated development with limited space to expand. Already today, 74 percent of the West Bank and Gaza is con-sidered urban. Frequently, spatial expansion outpaces administrative growth and capacities, coupled with incomplete and outdated local government laws, regulations, and systems. Building often precedes planning and service delivery, resulting in inefficient land use and infrastructure development.
LGUs are mandated to provide services within their masterplan boundaries, however there remain built-up areas requiring core services outside the boundaries. LGU adminis-trative boundaries (city limits) govern the expanse LGUs are responsible to provide services to, and these correspond with the approved masterplan borders.19 However, in most cases the LGU masterplan boundaries do not cover the full land area of the LGU, nor do they align and link with neighboring LGU masterplans as is typically standard for municipal demarca-tion. These boundaries also differ from the electoral boundaries which encompass further districts than the masterplans. This has resulted in sizeable in-between areas or spaces of exception across the West Bank, totaling 1,225.65 km2 (22.44 percent).20 The lands of these in-between areas, originally designated as “green” or for agricultural use, are associated with certain municipal or village lands, but do not fall within the LGU masterplans. There-fore, they do not come under the jurisdiction of the LGUs who in turn are not responsible to provide services to the areas.
Much of the land outside the masterplans was designated as green or agricultural use, however they are increasingly being used for multi-purpose use. According to the Town, Village and Building Planning Law, No. 79, 1966, since these areas were originally considered green land or for agricultural use, only agricultural buildings and roads were allowed. Ser-vices for the areas come under the administrative authority of the assorted PA line ministry departments or directorate offices – MoLG, MoPWH, PWA’s West Banks Water Depart-ment, and the EQA.21 In practice however, these locations are now going through more ex-panded development with building permits provided by the MoLG Directorate Offices.22 The core services should be connected to the closest LGU by the corresponding line ministry.23 The sites vary in levels of built environment. Some may be indistinguishable from city cen-ters which have built out to them, but as more often is the case, most of the land tends to be located on LGU peripheries. Additionally, regional planning is weak in Palestine; if the corresponding line ministries have regional plans including these spaces, which many do not, they are not developed or detailed for residential and mixed land-use.
Box II-1: Spaces of Exception
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24
24 As reported by the PWA.
Due to the lack of affordable centrally located urban land particularly in Area A, citizens of urban centers are opting to build in the peripheries of major urban centers. Much of the unbuilt and unplanned areas where expansion is taking place falls within the in-between spaces; however, line ministries and LGUs do not have the financial capacities nor invest-ment interest to provide off-site infrastructure to the areas. Citizens or private developers building in the unplanned peripheries cover the burden of installing the needed offsite in-frastructure and coordinate with line ministries and LGUs to connect to the main service lines. Despite the regulation requiring connection to the closest LGU, the process is in actu-ality done at the discretion of the individual citizens or private developers, and has resulted in service provision by different LGUs to one neighborhood and in extreme cases to the same home. This happens for various reasons, including: (i) interest in connecting to the more prominent LGU, which is perceived as providing more reliable services; (ii) weak ser-vice availability at the closest LGU requiring the service provision to be connected to another LGU or shared by multiple LGUs24; and (iii) interest by an LGU to increase its user fee reve-nue. Examples can be seen in: (i) the new neighborhoods between the Nablus Municipality and the VC of ‘Iraq Burin; (ii) the land area between Beit Kahil VC, Hebron Municipality, and Taffuh Municipality; and (iii) Al Rehan neighborhood between Ramallah Municipality and Surda-Abu Qash Municipality.
Despite some LGUs interested in increasing their user base, many are forced to respond to expanding peripheries and unplanned built-up areas with costly ad hoc service and in-frastructure provision as well as post-construction, de facto planning within outdated masterplans. Some see the provision of services to spaces beyond their masterplan bound-aries and mandate, as additional burdens to over utilized, under capacitated services. Also, LGUs, which provide the services, may not benefit from the property tax of these residents if they are on another LGU’s land. This further adds to municipal resource constraints, espe-cially for smaller LGUs with very limited financial sources.
Masterplan boundaries are hindered from sorely needed extensions due to Area C re-strictions. A significant lag in the extension of the masterplan boundaries is compounding the situation. Most require coordination and approval from the Israeli Civil Administration, and LGUs wait years for approval to expand, and if given, it is often lacking the needed ex-tent. This is because the majority of proposed municipal and VC expansions partially include Area C. It is very difficult for urban centers to proceed with natural expansion, since most are partially or entirely surrounded by it with a significant portion of unbuilt lands located there.
The PA can take steps to improve coordination and sectoral policies at the central level to address the spaces beyond masterplan boundaries. The situation will become increasingly problematic for the future, as the population continues to grow with limited available space and the geopolitical spatial divides of the West Bank remain unresolved. However, there are steps the PA can take to improve the situation. At the central level, the NPA that provides two- to five-year sector strategies and policies should have coordination and alignment with the National Spatial Plan (NSP). At this stage the NSP only provides an environmental pro-tection layer, and does not link with the existing built-up areas or infrastructure networks
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25
25 Formerly known as the National Development Plan, the National Policy Agenda was presented in 2016 as the follow-up to the NDPs of previous years.
at the local or regional scales. Additionally, while the NPA is regularly updated25, the NSP does not have a defined timeframe for development. This is a setback for short- to long-term development planning. Without an NSP in place, it becomes challenging to spatially analyze national sector policies holistically and their implications on the ground. Equally important is the need for clearly defined policy on the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential and mixed-use, which should take place at the central level in line with long-term strategic plans.
Regional and local level policies and procedures could be put in place to address the situation. Line ministry coordination and regional planning also play an important role in addressing the development of these transitional areas. There is no institutional structure to manage and implement regional development plans (RDPs), which could govern the lands outside of LGU masterplans. Additionally, there are conflicting and unclear man-dates for the line ministries, their regional offices, and the governorates. This vacuum has allowed for the irregular, ad hoc service delivery for these places. A clear cross-sectoral joint policy to govern regional development of these spaces needs to be agreed on by the PA. At the local level, a service delivery provision plan agreed upon or certified by the line ministries, and surrounding LGUs and JSCs, should be a prerequisite for the issuance of building permits in these locations. Until such a system and policy can be put in place, the MoLG Directorate offices should involve concerned LGUs and JSCs in the current permit-ting process. A joint committee of the involved LG stakeholders should predetermine the optimal course of service provision before approving building permits within these transi-tional areas.
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2.5 Socio-Demographics of Service Provision
52. Accesstocoreservicesislowerforthebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution,particu-larlyintheWestBank.Forthepovertyanalysis,awealthindexbasedon10durableassetswascon-structedtoidentifythebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution.Toaccountforthedivergentdis-tributionofassets,andtoallowforaclearidentificationofthebottom40percent,twoseparateindexeswereconstructedforboththeWestBankandGaza.FigureII-17showstheresultsoflogisticregressionmodelsthatmeasuretheoddsofserviceaccessforpoorhouseholdsandforfemale-headedhouseholds,comparedtotheoddsofserviceaccess fornon-poorandformale-headedhouseholds, respectively,whencontrollingforservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevelandVCandregionaleffectsintheWestBank.2653. InboththeWestBankandGaza,statisticallysignificantdifferencesintheoddsofaccesstopipedwaterandlocalroadsbetweenpoorandnon-poorhouseholdsexist.IntheWestBank,whenpredictingaccess,non-poorhouseholdsaremorethantwiceaslikely(115percent)tohaveaccesstopipedwaterthanhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution.InGaza,thelikelihoodofbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetworkismorethan1.6timeshigherforhouse-holdsintheupperthreewealthquintiles.WhileintheWestBank,non-poorhouseholdsare24percentmore likely to be located at a paved road, the difference between poor and non-poor householdsamountstomorethanathirdinGaza.FigureII-17:ImpactonthePoor:LikelihoodofServiceAccess
54. Accesstocoreservicesforfemale-headedhouseholdsisstatisticallynotsignificantlydifferentfrommale-headedhouseholds,exceptforpipedwaterinGaza.FigureII-18showstheresultsofthesameregressionmodelsasabove,measuringthelikelihoodofserviceaccessformale-headedhouse-holdscomparedtofemale-headedhouseholds,whilecontrollingforservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevel.27IntheWestBank,smalldifferences inthe likelihoodofaccesstothecoreservicesexist,
26Estimatesaretheoddratiosfromweightedlogitregressionsofanindicatorforserviceaccessonanindicatorforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution,andanindicatorforfemale-headedhouseholds,controllingforLGUperformance(measuredwithaperformancescorefortherespectiveserviceasoutlinedinsectionIV),indicatorsforthenorthandsouthWestBank,VCsandfemale-headedhouseholds.StandarderrorsareclusteredattheGovernoratelevel.DetailedoutputsforallregressionscanbefoundinAnnex4.27Estimatesarefromthesameregressionasabove.
0.53***
0.74 0.69**0.84 0.81
0.97 1.010.78
Higherforbottom40%households
Equal
Lowerfor
bottom40%households
WestBank Gaza
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
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whicharehoweverstatisticallynotsignificant.Male-headedhouseholdsonaveragehave1.58higheroddstohaveaccesstopavedroads.DifferencesinserviceaccessbetweengendersismorepronouncedinGazabuthardlystatisticallysignificant:female-headedhouseholdsareonaveragealmost1.5timesmorelikelytohaveaccesstopipedwater,whichistheonlystatisticallysignificantgendergapacrosssectors.
FigureII-18:GenderGap:LikelihoodofServiceAccess
55. BesideswastecollectionservicesintheWestBank,satisfactionwithservicequalityandrelia-bilityisstatisticallynotdifferentforhouseholdsofthebottom40percent.FigureII-19showsthere-sultsofregressionmodelsthatmeasurethelikelihoodofsatisfactionwithservicequalityandreliabilityfornon-poorhouseholdscomparedtopoorhouseholds,whencontrollingforservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevel.28
FigureII-19:ImpactonthePoor:LikelihoodofSatisfactionwithQualityandReliability
28Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorforsatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityoftherespectiveserviceonanindicatorforfemale-headedhouseholds,bottom40%households,LGUperformance,andindicatorsforthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.StandarderrorsareclusteredattheGovernoratelevel.
1.29 1.00 0.981.08
1.9*
0.79
1.41
1.09
Higherforfemale-headedhouseholds
Equal
Lowerforfemale-headedhouseholds
WestBank Gaza
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
0.99
1.131.3*
1.02 1.04
0.63
1.151.38Higherfor
bottom40%households
Equal
Lowerforbottom40%households
WestBank Gaza
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
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OnlyforsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesintheWestBankandGaza,statisticallysignificantdifferencesinthelikelihoodofsatisfactionexist:poorhouseholdsare13percentmorelikelytobesat-isfiedwithqualityandreliability.Comparingsatisfactionwithpipedsewagesystems,poorhouseholdshaveasmallerlikelihoodofbeingsatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinboththeWestBank(17percent)andGaza(40percent).
56. Satisfaction with core services is statistically not significantly different for female-headedhouseholds.FigureII-20showstheresultsofregressionmodelsthatmeasurethelikelihoodofsatisfac-tionwithservicequalityandreliabilityformale-headedhouseholdscomparedtofemale-headedhouse-holds,when controlling for service delivery outcomes at the LGU level.29In theWest Bank, female-headedhouseholdsareonaveragemorelikelytobesatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinallfourcoresectors,statisticallyhowevernotsignificant.InGaza,differencesinthesatisfactionlikelihoodforpipedwater(8percent),roads(5percent),andsewage(31percent)arelowtomoderate,whileastronggen-dergapinsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesexist:male-headedhouseholdsarealmost2timesaslikelytobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliabilitycomparedtofemale-headedhouseholds.
FigureII-20:TheGenderGap:LikelihoodofSatisfactionwithQualityandReliability
2.6 Citizen Willingness to Pay
57. InvestigatingthedriversofLGUcollectionefficiencyandcitizens’paymentbehaviorisofma-jorimportancetoimprovingbothLGUbudgetsandpublicservicedelivery.AsdemonstratedinChapter3,insufficientbudgets,oftenduetolowcollectionefficiency,arestronglyassociatedwithlowperfor-manceoutcomesandposeamajorconstraintforLGUsinenhancingservicedeliveryoutcomes.GiventhatthelargestshareofLGUrevenues,abouthalfofmunicipalities’revenuesandtwothirdsofVC’srevenues,comefromtheenterprisebudget,ismadeupprimarilybybillspaidforpublicutilityservices,suchaswaterandelectricity; investigatingcitizens’paymentbehaviorandfindingmeansto improvecollectionefficiencyprovidesacrucialsteptoachievesustainableLGUfinancingandthusbetterservicedeliveryoutcomes.
58. While the vastmajority of households in theWestBankpays for services, large shares ofhouseholdsinGazadonot.AmongthehouseholdsintheWestBankwithserviceaccess,onlyaminor29Estimatesarefromthesameregressionasabove.
1.14
1.35
1.021.26
0.96
1.42*
0.49
1.01
Higherforfemale-headedhouseholds
Equal
Lowerfor
female-headedhouseholds
WestBank Gaza
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
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fractionof6percent(pipedwater)to1percent(electricity)reportstonotpayforservices.InGazaincontrast,thenon-paymentsharesaremuchhigherforallservicesexceptinternet:43percentofhouse-holdsreportnopaymentforpipedwater,despitebeingconnected,andonlyeverythirdhouseholdre-portstopayforwastecollectionservices.Also,1outof4householdsinGazadoesnotpayforsewageservices,andforsewageservicesincludedjointlywithwaterbills,theshareofnonpaymentrisesto6outof7households(86percent).Insharpcontrasttothewater,wastewater,solidwaste,andelectricityservices,willingnesstopayforinternetisatsimilarlevelsinGazaasintheWestBank,witha96percentshareofhouseholdspaying.
FigureII-21:PaymentacrossSectors
59. Satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliability,andhouseholdwealtharekeydriversforthelikelihoodofcitizenstopayforservices.FigureII-22showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofseveralcovariatesonthe likelihoodthathouseholds’payforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,whencontrollingforgeographicalattributes.30Householdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionoftheWestBankandGazaareonaverageonlyhalfaslikelytopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservices,respectively.Strongerbutstatisticallynotassignifi-cant,satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliabilityalsocorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodforservicepayment.Inthewatersector,satisfiedhouseholdshave1.29timeslargeroddstopay,comparedto1.41timesinthesolidwastesector.Interestingly,householdsatisfactionwithLGUresponsivenesstocitizenconcernsandcomplaintscorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodofpayment,theeffectishoweverstatisti-callynotsignificant.LGUperformanceintherespectivesectordoesnothaveanotableimpactonthewillingnesstopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection.
30Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorforpaymentfor1)PipedWaterand2)SolidWasteCollection,indicatorsforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percent,aresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,andagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,andtheLGUperformancescoreforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,respectively,andforGaza,andthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
94%
57%
97%
76%
98%
38%
98%
96%
99%
70%
WestBank
Gaza
Electricity
PipedWater
Internet
SewageServices SolidWasteCollection
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fractionof6percent(pipedwater)to1percent(electricity)reportstonotpayforservices.InGazaincontrast,thenon-paymentsharesaremuchhigherforallservicesexceptinternet:43percentofhouse-holdsreportnopaymentforpipedwater,despitebeingconnected,andonlyeverythirdhouseholdre-portstopayforwastecollectionservices.Also,1outof4householdsinGazadoesnotpayforsewageservices,andforsewageservicesincludedjointlywithwaterbills,theshareofnonpaymentrisesto6outof7households(86percent).Insharpcontrasttothewater,wastewater,solidwaste,andelectricityservices,willingnesstopayforinternetisatsimilarlevelsinGazaasintheWestBank,witha96percentshareofhouseholdspaying.
FigureII-21:PaymentacrossSectors
59. Satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliability,andhouseholdwealtharekeydriversforthelikelihoodofcitizenstopayforservices.FigureII-22showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofseveralcovariatesonthe likelihoodthathouseholds’payforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,whencontrollingforgeographicalattributes.30Householdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionoftheWestBankandGazaareonaverageonlyhalfaslikelytopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservices,respectively.Strongerbutstatisticallynotassignifi-cant,satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliabilityalsocorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodforservicepayment.Inthewatersector,satisfiedhouseholdshave1.29timeslargeroddstopay,comparedto1.41timesinthesolidwastesector.Interestingly,householdsatisfactionwithLGUresponsivenesstocitizenconcernsandcomplaintscorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodofpayment,theeffectishoweverstatisti-callynotsignificant.LGUperformanceintherespectivesectordoesnothaveanotableimpactonthewillingnesstopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection.
30Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorforpaymentfor1)PipedWaterand2)SolidWasteCollection,indicatorsforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percent,aresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,andagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,andtheLGUperformancescoreforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,respectively,andforGaza,andthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
94%
57%
97%
76%
98%
38%
98%
96%
99%
70%
WestBank
Gaza
Electricity
PipedWater
Internet
SewageServices SolidWasteCollection
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OnlyforsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesintheWestBankandGaza,statisticallysignificantdifferencesinthelikelihoodofsatisfactionexist:poorhouseholdsare13percentmorelikelytobesat-isfiedwithqualityandreliability.Comparingsatisfactionwithpipedsewagesystems,poorhouseholdshaveasmallerlikelihoodofbeingsatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinboththeWestBank(17percent)andGaza(40percent).
56. Satisfaction with core services is statistically not significantly different for female-headedhouseholds.FigureII-20showstheresultsofregressionmodelsthatmeasurethelikelihoodofsatisfac-tionwithservicequalityandreliabilityformale-headedhouseholdscomparedtofemale-headedhouse-holds,when controlling for service delivery outcomes at the LGU level.29In theWest Bank, female-headedhouseholdsareonaveragemorelikelytobesatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinallfourcoresectors,statisticallyhowevernotsignificant.InGaza,differencesinthesatisfactionlikelihoodforpipedwater(8percent),roads(5percent),andsewage(31percent)arelowtomoderate,whileastronggen-dergapinsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesexist:male-headedhouseholdsarealmost2timesaslikelytobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliabilitycomparedtofemale-headedhouseholds.
FigureII-20:TheGenderGap:LikelihoodofSatisfactionwithQualityandReliability
2.6 Citizen Willingness to Pay
57. InvestigatingthedriversofLGUcollectionefficiencyandcitizens’paymentbehaviorisofma-jorimportancetoimprovingbothLGUbudgetsandpublicservicedelivery.AsdemonstratedinChapter3,insufficientbudgets,oftenduetolowcollectionefficiency,arestronglyassociatedwithlowperfor-manceoutcomesandposeamajorconstraintforLGUsinenhancingservicedeliveryoutcomes.GiventhatthelargestshareofLGUrevenues,abouthalfofmunicipalities’revenuesandtwothirdsofVC’srevenues,comefromtheenterprisebudget,ismadeupprimarilybybillspaidforpublicutilityservices,suchaswaterandelectricity; investigatingcitizens’paymentbehaviorandfindingmeansto improvecollectionefficiencyprovidesacrucialsteptoachievesustainableLGUfinancingandthusbetterservicedeliveryoutcomes.
58. While the vastmajority of households in theWestBankpays for services, large shares ofhouseholdsinGazadonot.AmongthehouseholdsintheWestBankwithserviceaccess,onlyaminor29Estimatesarefromthesameregressionasabove.
1.14
1.35
1.021.26
0.96
1.42*
0.49
1.01
Higherforfemale-headedhouseholds
Equal
Lowerfor
female-headedhouseholds
WestBank Gaza
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
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FigureII-22:LikelihoodofPayment:PipedWaterandSolidWasteCollectionServices
60. Across regionsandLGUtypes,payments forwaterandsolidwastediffernotably,andarehigherthanhouseholds’maximumwillingnesstopay.Thismaypotentiallyreflectlowlevelsofsatis-factionwithservicequality,reliability,andcosts.Comparingaveragemonthlypaymentsforpipedwateracrossregions,householdsinthecentralWestBankspendonaveragetwotimesmore(130NIS)thaninGaza(60NIS).PipedwaterpaymentsarehigherinmunicipalitiesthaninVCs,andthehighestinme-dium-sizedmunicipalities(136NIS).
FigureII-23:MaximumandActualWillingnesstoPay:PipedWater
61. Across the Palestinian territories, more than half of the households (52 percent) report a maximum willingness to pay for piped water that is lower than their actual payment.Thegap isthe largest inGaza and in largemunicipalities in theWestBank,where actual payments are almostover50percenthigher
0.46**
1.36*1.24
1.0
0.37**
1.4
1.01 0.99
Bottom40% SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability
AgreethatLGUisveryresponsive
1pointhigherLGUperformance
PipedWater SolidWasteCollection
Higher
Equal
Lower
35
79
100
75
61
114
130
89
Gaza
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CentralWestBank
NorthWestBank
ActualPayment(NISperMonth)
MaximumWillingnesstoPay(NISperMonth)
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104
136
102
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
81
79
93
97
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils- WestBank
PipedWater
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thanthereportedmaximumwillingnesstopay.Theseresultscorrespondtoaconsiderableamountofhouseholdsreportingdissatisfactionwithpipedwatercosts:39percentofhouseholdsinGazaand1out4householdsintheWestBankaredissatisfiedorverydissatisfiedwiththecostofpipedwater.
62. Alsointhesolidwastesector,paymentsarehigherintheWestBankthaninGazaandinmu-nicipalitiesthaninVCs,andtendtoexceedhouseholds’maximumwillingnesstopay.Comparingmax-imumandactualwillingnesstopayforsolidwastecollectionservicesacrossPalestinianregions,equallystrikingdifferencesareobserved:intheWestBank,theaverageamountspent(37NIS) ismorethantwotimeshigherthaninGaza(14NIS).WithintheWestBank,bothmaximumandactualwillingnesstopayisthehighestinthecentralWestBank(37and22NIS,respectively),andthelowestinthenorthWestBank(17and15NIS).ComparingmunicipalitiesandVCs,citizensinmunicipalitiesarebothwillingtoandcurrentlyspendmore(19and24NIS)thancitizensinVCs(16and21NIS).Similarlytothewatersector,householdsreporthigheractualpaymentsthanmaximumwillingnesstopay,whichispotentiallyassociatedwith1out5householdsbeingdissatisfiedwitheachquality,reliability,andcostofwastecollectionservices.
FigureII-24:MaximumandActualWillingnesstoPay:SolidWasteCollection
63. ReportedpaymenttimelinessishigherinGazathanintheWestBank,andhigherforinternetthanforanyotherservice.AmongthehouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesthathaveaccesstopipedwater,electricity,solidwastecollectionservicesandinternet,foreachserviceatleast2outof3house-holdsreportpayingontimewithoutmajorproblems.InboththeWestBankandGaza,paymenttimeli-nessisthelowestforpipedwater(68percentand80percent,respectively)andthehighestforinternet(82percentand89percent,respectively).Inthesolidwasteandelectricitysector,1outof4householdsintheWestBankreportstoatleastsometimesfacedifficultiesinpayingservicefeesontime,comparedtojust1outof7householdsinGaza.
8
20
22
15
14
27
37
17
Gaza
SouthWestBank
CentralWestBank
NorthWestBank
ActualPayment(NISperMonth)
MaximumWillingnesstoPay(NISperMonth)
17
19
21
23
33
22
Small
Medium
Large
Municipalities- WestBank
17
1618
24
Medium
Large
VillageCouncils- WestBank
SolidWasteCollection
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FigureII-25:TimelyPaymentwithoutMajorProblems
64. Householdwealthandsatisfactionwithbothservicequalityandreliability,andLGUrespon-sivenessarekeydriversforcitizenlikelihoodtopayontimeforservices.FigureII-26showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofseveralcovariatesontheprobabilitythathouseholdsreporttopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionontime,whencontrollingforgeographicalat-tributes.31Householdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionoftheWestBankandGaza,onaveragehave0.57timesand0.64timessmalleroddstopayontimeforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservices,respectively.
FigureII-26:LikelihoodofTimelyPayment:PipedWaterandSolidWasteCollectionServices
31Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorfortimelypaymentfor1)PipedWaterand2)SolidWasteCollection,indicatorsforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percent,aresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,andagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,theLGUperformancescoreforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,respectively,andforGaza,andthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
94%
57%
98%
38%
98%
96%
99%
70%
WestBank
Gaza
Electricity
PipedWater
Internet
SolidWasteCollection
0.57**
1.14
1.73***
1.0
0.64**
1.19
1.76**
1.02**
Bottom40% SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability
AgreethatLGUisveryresponsive
1pointhigherLGUperformance
PipedWater SolidWasteCollection
Higher
Equal
Lower
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Moreover,paymenttimelinessisstronglyassociatedwithcitizens’perceptionofLGUresponsiveness:householdsthataresatisfiedwiththeresponsivenessoftheirmunicipalityorVCtoconcernsandcom-plaints,onaveragehave1.73timesand1.76timeslargeroddstoreporttopayontimeforpipedwaterandwastecollectionservices.BothsatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityandtheLGUperformancescoreforsolidwastecollectioncorrespondtostatisticallysignificantlyhigherlikelihoodsoftimelypay-mentsinthesolidwastesector.
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III. Drivers of Service Delivery Performance
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III. Drivers of Service Delivery Performance
3.1 The LGPA Performance Index
65. TheLGPAPerformanceIndexusestenindicatorstomeasureoverallLGUperformanceinfoursectors.ThekeyobjectiveoftheLGPAperformanceindexistoconductcomparisonsoflocalgovern-mentperformanceacrossallLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,inordertogainbetterinsightsintothemaindriversofservicedeliveryandhowtocloseexistinggapsinLGUperformance.TheaimoftheIndexistoprovideatoolforbothpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartnerstoidentifyandtargetinterventionsinVCsandmunicipalities.Threedimensionsareusedtoconstructacomprehensivemeasure:method-ologically,theLGUperformanceismodeledasaCobb-Douglas-stylefunction,takingintoaccountcitizensatisfactionwithbothservicequalityandreliability.TheperformanceoutcomesattheLGUlevelareweightedbytheshareofcitizenswithserviceaccess,therebyrewardingLGUswithhigheraccessrates,whilepenalizingLGUs,inwhichonlysmallsharesofcitizensareprovidedaccesstothecoreservices.32
66. PerformanceoutcomesdiffersignificantlyacrossPalestinianLGUs.FigureIII-1illustratesthattheLGUPerformanceScoresrangefrom0to88.LGUsinGazaperformsignificantlylowerthanLGUsintheWestBank.WithintheWestBank,LGUsinthecentralWestBankoutperformLGUsinthenorthandsouth.ComparingdifferencesbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs,municipalitiesperformbetter,alsowhenrulingoutdifferencesinLGUsize.ThefollowingsectionsreviewinmoredetailwhatdrivesPalestinianLocalGovernmentPerformance.
FigureIII-1:LGUPerformanceIndex:HighandLowPerformers
67. LargedifferencesinLGUperformanceacrossregionsandbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCsex-ist.ThelowestperformingVCisMsafirYattaintheWestBank,wherecitizenlackaccesstoallofthefourkeyservices;thehighestperformingmunicipalityisSalfit,wherethevastmajorityofcitizenshasaccesstoallfourkeyservicesandissatisfiedwithbothservicequalityandreliability.Chapter3aimsto
32 TheLGUPerformanceindexforLGUicanbewrittenasLGUPerformanceScorei=Accessi(Qualityi
1/2
xReliabilityi
1/2
),whereAccessreferstotheshareofcitizensinLGUithathasserviceaccess,andqualityandreliabilitytotheshareofhouseholdsthatissatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,respectively.Thesub-indexforlocalroadsisbasedontheaccessrateonly.
0
79
4
82
10
50
84
10
85
13
88
0
20
40
60
80
100
LowPerformers Mean HighPerformers
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identifythedriversofthesubstantialvariationinLGUperformance,byconductingaregression-basedassessment of key LGU characteristics starting with geography and administrative setup (WestBank/Gaza,urban/rural,remoteness)(Chapter3.2).
68. Economiesofscale,householdwealth,andpopulationdensitydrivebetterserviceoutcomesinlargerLGUsandmunicipalities.LargerLGUsperformsignificantlybetter,particularlywhencompar-ingVCsinthecentralWestBank.TheeffectisnotaspronouncedinGazaandformunicipalities.More-over,LGUswithhigherpopulationdensityhaveonaveragebetterperformanceratings.Finally,servicedeliveryoutcomesaredrivenbyastrongwealthgradientatthehouseholdlevel(Chapter3.3).
69. Mayorsandcitizenfrequentlyrefertothe impactofAreaCandrestrictionsonmovementwhenexplainingservicedeliveryoutcomesdeficits.TheresultsshowthathouseholdsinAreaCorcloseto the separationbarrierare less likely tohaveaccess tobasic services.Moreover, satisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityofcoreservicesisalsonotablylowerinAreaCandnearthebarrier.Finally,AreaCisassociatedwithlowerLGUPerformanceScores,evenwhencontrollingforimportantdriversofper-formance,suchasremotenessandLGUsize(Chapter3.4).
70. Jointserviceprovisioncanserveasatoolofimprovingservicedeliveryoutcomes,particularlyforsmallandremoteVCs.ExcessivefragmentationoflocalservicedeliveryisakeychallengeforpublicservicesintheWestBankandGaza:163VCs,correspondingtomorethanathirdoftheLGUsinthePalestinianterritories,haveapopulationof4,000orless,and45VCsbelow1,000even.AsVCshaveonaverage40percentlesspercapitaoperatingrevenuescomparedtomunicipalities,manylackthecapac-itythatwouldenablethemtoserveasaccountableandfinanciallysustainablelocalgovernments.ToaffrontLGUfragmentation,jointadministrativestructureintheformofJSCs,bothamongseveralsmallVCsandwithmunicipalities,haveincreasinglybecomeaviablesolutionformeetingexistingdevelop-mentneedsandimprovingservicedelivery.WhilethenumberofactiveandfunctioningJSCsisstilllim-ited,overallJSCmembershipseemstobenefitindividualLGUs.Forexample,membershipinaJSCforplanning and development corresponds to strong performance gains, particularly for VCs. Formorespecifiedservices,institutionalcapacityandprofessionalmanagementofindividualJSCsbecomemoreimportant,howevermembershipcansignificantlydriveservicedeliveryperformance.Forexample,inthewater sector, JSCmembershipdoesnotguarantee satisfactory servicedeliveryoutcomesacrossJSCs,butremarkableperformancegainscanbeobserved,e.g.,inJenin(Chapter3.5).
71. AsbudgetsareinsufficienttofulfillthefunctionsassignedtoLGUs,improvingcollectioneffi-ciencyisofmajorimportancetoimprovepublicservicedelivery.FiscalsustainabilityisshowntobeakeydriverofLGUperformance,criticallyaffectingtheabilityofLGUstoprovideservices.Overall,percapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformanceandarobustrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperformanceexists,disproportionallyconstrainingsmallerLGUsandVCsduetotheir limitedrevenuebaseand institutionalcapacity.Giventhatthe largestshareofLGUrevenues,abouthalfofmunicipalities’revenuesandtwothirdsofVCs’revenues,comefromtheenter-prisebudgetprimarilymadeupbybillspaidforpublicutilityservices includingwaterandelectricity,assessingandimprovingcollectionefficiencyisacrucialsteptowardsmoresustainableLGUfinancing(Chapter3.6).33
72. Low satisfaction with LGU responsiveness and limited levels of political engagement arestronglyassociatedwithlowerperformanceoutcomes.ThisleavesroomforimprovementinLGUre-sponsivenesstocitizens’complaintsandconcerns.Intheliteratureoncitizenengagement,governmentresponsivenessisoftennamedthekeydeterminantforcitizens’participatorybehaviorandbelievedtobeapre-conditionforencouragingresponsiblecitizenry,regainingtrustingovernment,andenhancing
33WorldBank.2016.PublicExpenditureReview–Palestinianterritories.
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politicalparticipation.AthirdofthehouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesdonotbelievethatitslocalgovernment is very responsive to citizen concerns and complaints. As a consequence, equally highsharesofcitizensdonotbelievethatlocalelectionscanpositivelyimpactservicedeliveryoutcomesandindicatedthattheydonotplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections.GiventhatLGUresponsivenessandcitizenparticipationindicatorsarestronglyassociatedwithbetterLGUperformance,addressingthedisinterestofmajorsharesofthePalestinianpopulationinparticipatingintheirlocalpoliticalsystemisakeyfactorforimprovingservicedelivery(Chapter3.7).
3.2 Geography and Administrative Set-up
73. AlargeperformancegapbetweentheWestBankandGaza,andacrossregionsintheWestBankexists.LGUsintheWestBankonaveragehavea19-pointhigherperformancescorethanLGUsinGaza,evenwhenaccountingforperformancedifferencesattributabletopopulationsizeandLGUtype.34Thesizeoftheremainingperformancegapisstriking,particularlygiventhataccessratesforpipedsew-agearesignificantlyhigherinGazathanintheWestBank.AlsowhencomparingperformanceoutcomesacrossregionsintheWestBank,whilecontrollingforbothLGUsizeandstatus(municipalitiesandVCs),ampleperformancedifferencesbecomevisible:LGUsinthenorthWestBankhavea4-pointlowerper-formancescorethanLGUs inthecentralWestBank,andtheperformancegapbetweenLGUs inthecentralandsouthWestBankamountsto13points.
FigureIII-2:DifferencesinLGUPerformanceacrossRegionsandLGUTypes
74. MunicipalitiesperformbetterthanVCs,alsowhenrulingoutdifferencesinLGUsize.HoldingLGUsizefixed,municipalitiesonaveragehavea5-pointhigherLGUperformancescorethanVCs,whencontrollingforgeographicaldifferencesinLGUperformancebetweenGazaandthenorth,central,andsouthWestBank.Itisimportanttopointoutthatinthegivenanalyticalframework,thisperformance
34EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthe,thelogofLGUpopulation(basedonPCBS2016projections)andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
13*
4*
5*
-19***
Central(vs.southWestBank)
Central(vs.northWestBank)
Municipalities(vs.VCs)
Gaza(vs.WestBank)
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differencegoesbeyondapuresizeeffect,underliningthatamorein-depthanalysisiscrucialtodeter-minethefactorsthatdrivetheperformancegapbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs.
75. RemoteLGUsperformsignificantlylower.While1outof5PalestinianLGUsiswithina5kmradiusofitsgovernoratecapital,andmorethanhalfare10kmorcloser,thedistancebetweenthemostremoteVCsanditsgovernoratecapitalsamounttomorethan30km.UsingthegeographicalspreadofLGUsrelativetotheirgovernorateasremotenessproxyrevealsastrongcorrelationwithservicedeliveryoutcomes: the20percentmost remoteLGUsonaverageperform11points lower than the least20percent.35Theeffectisstatisticallymoresignificantandmorepronouncedinmunicipalities(18points)thaninVCs(10points).
FigureIII-3:Remoteness-DistancetoGovernorateCenterandLGUPerformance
76. Thecorrelationbetweenbuilt-upLGUareaandperformanceispositivebutmoderate.Usingbuilt-upLGUareashareasproxyallowsforananalysisoftherelationshipbetweenthedegreeofurban-izationandservicedeliveryoutcomes.AcrossthePalestinianterritories,theshareofLGUbuilt-uparearangesfrom0.2percentintheleasturbanizedVC,MarjalGhazalinJericho,tomorethan99percentinAdDohaintheWestBank.36
FigureIII-4:Remoteness-Built-UpAreaandLGUPerformance
ThesecondproxyforremotenessindicatesthatastatisticallysignificantnegativerelationshipbetweenLGU
35EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthedistancebetweentheLGUandGovernoratecenter,thelogofpopulationandindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.36Thebuilt-upareaclassificationfollowstheGeoMOLGdefinitionandincludesallbuildingsinLGUs.Insomeinstances,smallun-populatedareasthatareenclosedbybuilt-upareasareincluded.
Leastremotequintile(vs.mostremotequintile)
+10**
+18***
+11***Overall
Municipalities
VCs
Mostbuilt-upQuintile(vs.leastbuilt-upquintile)
+3
+15***
+6*Overall
Municipalities
VCs
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remotenessandperformanceoutcomesexists.37A10percentagepointhighershareofLGUareathatiscoveredbybuilt-upconstructionscorrespondstoa5.7-pointshigherperformancescore.Similartothepopulationdensityanddistancetogovernoratecapitalproxies,theeffectisstrongerandstatisticallysignificantonlyamongmunicipalities.
3.3 Population Size, Density, and Wealth
76. LargerLGUsperformsignificantlybetter,particularlywhencomparingVCsinthecentralWestBank.AcrossLGUs in theWestBankandGaza,a10percent increase inLGUpopulationonaveragecorrespondstoa20-pointhigherLGUperformancescore,whencontrollingforregionaldifferencesinLGUperformancebetweenGazaandthenorth,central,andsouthWestBank,andbetweenmunicipal-itiesandVCs.38TheresultssuggestthatthemarginaleffectofLGUsizeonperformanceoutcomesinthefourcoresectorsishigherintheWestBankthaninGaza,andstrongeramongmunicipalitiesthanVCs.
FigureIII-5:LGUPopulationandPerformance
77. Populationdensityisstronglyassociatedwithperformanceoutcomes.FigureIII-6showstheresultsfromregressionsassessingtherelationshipbetweenLGUperformanceandremoteness,proxiedby population density,when holding population size and geographical attributes fixed.39PopulationdensityvariessubstantiallyacrossPalestinianLGUs, ranging fromless than4 in thesmallVCMarjalGhazalintheJerichoGovernorate,tomorethan11,000peoplepersquarekminGazaCity.Inmorethan75percentofLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,theaveragepopulationpersquarekmislessthan1,000,andin34municipalitiesandVCs,itisbelow100.Thesewidegapsareseverelyaffectingservicedeliveryoutcomes,aspopulationdensityandLGUperformancearestronglycorrelated:themostpopulated20percentofLGUsonaverageperform6.2pointshigherthanthe leastpopulated20percentofLGUs.Assessingdifferences in theeffectbymunicipalitiesandVCs, theperformancedifference is strongeracrossmunicipalities(20points)thenVCs(7points),andstatisticallymoresignificantformunicipalities.Thisisduetothe40timeshigherstandarddeviationinpopulation,andmorethan5timeshigherstand-arddeviation inpopulationdensityacrossmunicipalities.Overallonaverage,a1percent increase inpopulationdensitycorrespondstoa3.3-pointshigherperformancescore.
37EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreontheshareofbuilt-upLGU,thelogofpopulationandindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.38EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthelogofLGUpopulation(Basedon2016populationprojectionsbythePCBS),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.39Estimatesare fromOLS regressionsof theLGUPerformanceScoreon the logofpeopleper squarekilometer LGUarea,controllingforthelogofpopulationandincludingindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
10%Increaseinpopulation
+8
+27*
+17
+20
+20*Overall
WestBank
Gaza
Municipalities
VCs
The second proxy for remoteness indicates that a statistically significant negative relationship between LGU remoteness and performance outcomes exists.37 A 10 percentage point higher share of LGU area that is covered by built-up constructions corresponds to a 5.7-points higher performance score. Simi-lar to the population density and distance to governorate capital proxies, the effect is stronger and statistically significant only among municipalities.
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FigureIII-6:PopulationDensityandPerformance
78. AstrongpositiverelationshipbetweenhouseholdwealthandLGUperformanceexists.FigureIII-7showstheresultsofregressionsmeasuringtheassociationbetweentheshareofhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionandLGUperformance,whencontrollingforLGUsizeandregionaleffects.40ThequintileofLGUswiththelowestshareofthebottom40percenthouseholds,onaveragehasa12-pointshigherperformancescore,comparedtothetopquintile.Onaverage,aLGUwitha1percenthighershareofbottom40percenthouseholdshasa2.4-pointslowerperformancescore.ThewealthgradientexistsinboththeWestBankandGazabutisstatisticallysignif-icantintheWestBankonly.Theeffectislargelydrivenbyanurban-ruralgapinwealthlevels:theshareofbottom40percenthouseholdsisnotablylargerinVCsthaninmunicipalities.
FigureIII-7:HouseholdWealthandLGUPerformance
40EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreon1)theshareofhouseholdsbelongingtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution,controllingforthelogofpopulationandincludingindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
Mostdenselypopulatedquintile(vs.leastdenselypopulatedquintile)
+7*
+20***
+21
+5
+6*Overall
WestBank
Gaza
Municipalities
VCs
Quintilewithlowestshareofpoorhouseholds(vs.quintilewithhighestshare)
+14***
+6
+12***Overall
Municipalities
VCs
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3.4 Area C and Separation Barrier
79. AreaCprovidesanumberofbarrierstotheprovisionofservicesforthePalestiniancitizensliv-ingintheWestBank.Sixty-onepercentoftheWestBank,AreaC, isundercomplete Israelimilitaryad-ministration and authority. Any construction ormaintenancework intheseareasrequiresapermitandapprovalfromtheICA,whichisextremelydiffi-cult,oftenimpossible,toobtain.41TheIsraelicontrolofAreaCandtheinabilitytocarryoutlegalconstruc-tiontherehavedirectimpactsonserviceprovision.Palestinians living in Area C, numbering approxi-mately279,00042, have less access to services, andpoorerqualityforthoseavailable.Theyrelyonout-dated, deteriorated infrastructure and, whengranted, the limited number of additions and up-grades,whicharewhollyinsufficienttoaddressPal-estinian’sneeds.AccordingtothelatestWestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic43,householdsintheWestBankunconnectedtowaterare largely inAreaC,wheremovementandaccessrestrictionspre-ventnetworkconnections.Itisestimated,thatover100,000AreaCresidentsdonothavewaternetworkaccess.
80. ServiceprovisioninAreasAandBoftheWestBankisalsohighlyconstrainedbyAreaCre-strictions.Theremaining39percentoftheWestBankisspatiallydividedintoanarchipelagoofurbanandperi-urbanlandpocketsterritoriallydisconnectedfromoneanotherbyAreaC.IntegratedservicenetworksacrossLGUsaredifficulttoestablishduetotheinabilitytophysicallyconnectinfrastructureacrossAreaC.Localcouncilsandlineministriesareunableimproveormaintainservicenetworks,orinstallneededinfrastructureinareasaffectedbyAreaC.ThisincludeslandswithinLGUscategorizedasAreaCandAreaClandsbetweenanddividingLGUs.(SeeBoxIII-1)Typicalurbandevelopmentneedsandbestpracticesbecomeuntenable, forexample: (i) theestablishmentofaccessandringroadstoconnectLGUs,easetraffic,facilitatesolidwastecollection;(ii)installationofwaterandsewagepipesinlinewiththephysicalnaturalenvironment(e.g.alongslopes); (iii)upgradeand/orrepairof faultyorbrokennetworklinesaffectingtheentirenetworkandqualityofserviceprovision;and(iv)theestab-lishmentofandconnectionstoservicetreatmentplants.Theseparationbarrierexacerbatesthesitua-tionbycreatingadditionalphysicalbarriers(e.g.concretewall,doublefencing,ditches)betweenLGUsseveringnaturalandhistoricalconnectionroutes.LGUsandlineministriesarepreventedfrombuildingoneconomiesofscaletoimproveservicedeliveryinareasheavilypermeatedbyAreaC.
81. ThePA,lineministries,andLGUsalsoloseoutfinanciallyduetoAreaC.Underthe1995interimagreement,theICAisexpectedtocollectrevenuesandtaxesinAreaCandremitthemtothePA,in-cludingpropertytax, incometax,andVATfromindividualsandbusinessesoperatinginAreaC.44Alt-houghtheICAcontinuescollectingthesetaxesfromPalestiniansintheseareas,itdoesnotremitthem
41UNOCHA.2009.RestrictingSpace:ThePlanningRegimeAppliedbyIsraelinAreaCoftheWestBank.42UNOCHA.2013.IntheSpotlight:AreaCVulnerabilityProfile.TheVulnerabilityProfileProject(VPP).43WorldBank.2017.WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic.44WorldBank.2016.EconomicMonitoringReporttotheAdHocLiaisonCommittee.
FigureIII-8:AreaCandSeparationBarrier
AreaA&B
SeparationBarrier
AreaC
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tothePA.PropertytaxinparticularrepresentsoneoffewtaxesandrevenuessharedwithLGUs,andAreaCdeprivesthemofthepotentialincreasedsourceofrevenue,whichissorelyneeded.ThesituationofAreaCalsodiscouragesprivatesectorinvestmentinpublicinfrastructureprojectsandserviceprovi-sionPPPs,suchassolarpanelprojects,largescaleroadprojects,andservicetreatmentsplants.A2015PPPassessmentfoundthattherestrictionsonaccess,controlovernaturalresources,landmanagement,andpermittingparticularlyinAreaCposesignificantchallengestothedevelopmentandimplementa-tionofinfrastructurePPPs.45LGUsandlineministriesasaresultmissoutfromserviceprovisionalter-nativeswhichwouldeasethefinancialburdenonthem.
BoxIII-1:RawabiCityDevelopmentConstraintsfromAreaC46
82. HouseholdslivinginAreaCorclosetotheseparationbarrierarelesslikelytohaveaccesstobasicservices.FigureIII-10showtheresultsofregressionsmeasuringthelikelihoodofserviceaccessandsatisfactionofhouseholdsthatareimpactedbytheIsraelirestrictions,proxiedbyproximitytothewallandadummyforAreaC.47Whencomparingthelikelihoodofserviceaccessforhouseholdsthatlivewithina1kmradiusoftheseparationbarrier,themodelsdonotyieldstatisticallysignificantcoeffi-cients. However, when narrowing the distance, significant differences in the water sector emerge:households that livewithina500moreven250mdistanceareonaverage justhalfas likely tohaveaccesstopipedwater,comparedtohouseholdsthatlivedonotliveasclosetothebarrier.ThiseffectisstatisticallysignificantforboththeentireWestBanksample,andthesub-sampleofLGUsthatareinter-sectedbythebarrier.WhilethecoefficientsfortheAreaCindicatorsuggestthatonaverage,householdslivinginAreaCarelesslikelytohaveaccesstoallofthefourkeyservices,onlytheindicatorforsolidwastecollectionyieldsastatisticallysignificantresult:householdsthatliveinAreaCareonlyathirdaslikelytobecoveredbywastecollectionservice.
45IFC/PPIAF.2015.WestBankandGaza-AssessingthePotentialforPublic-PrivatePartnerships.46Adaptedandupdatedfromthereport:WorldBank.2013.AreaCandTheFutureofthePalestinianEconomy.47EstimatesarefromseparatelogitregressionsofanindicatorforhouseholdsA)withserviceaccessandB)thataresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,onindicatorsforLGUsthatare1a)1km,1b)500m,1c)250morclosertothewall,and2)inAreaC,theLGUperformanceindexfortherespectivesector,andindicatorsforbottom40percenthouseholds,andthenorthandsouthWestBank.ThesampleislimitedtohouseholdsfromtheWestBankandstandarderrorsclusteredbyGovernorate.
Rawabiisanew,plannedcitynorth-westofRamallah,andthelargestrealestateinvestmentevermadeinthePalestinianterritories.ItwasbuiltalmostentirelyinAreaA(95%),how-ever,thedevelopmentofthecityfacedanumberofconstraintstoestablishingservicecon-nectionsrelatedtoAreaC.Theproject’sinvestorsalongwiththePAandtheinternationalcommunityspentmuchpoliticalcapitaltoobtainatemporarypermitfromtheICAforthemainaccessroadtothesouthofthecity,whichrunsfor3.8kmthroughAreaC.Thepermitmustberenewedeveryyear,andthetemporarinessofthepermitcreatesuncertaintyoverthefutureaccesstothecity.Otherutilityservicesarealsoaffected, includingwaterandwastewatertreatment.Thewaterconnectionwasdrasticallydelayedandincreaseddevel-opmentcostssignificantly.Partofthe9kmstretchconnectingRawabitotheexistingpipedsystem(inthevillageofAboud)liesinAreaC.RawabiappliedforapermitthroughtheJointWaterCommittee,butwaitedsixyearstoreceiveapproval,andtheopeningofthecitywasdelayedfortwoyears.Also,themostefficientsolutionforthewastewatertreatmentforthecitywouldbearegionalwastewatertreatmentplantservicing18villagesaroundthearea.Thisplantwouldallowtheexploitationofeconomiesofscale,whicharekeyforthistypeofutility.However,thesitewheretheplantshouldbelocatedisinAreaC,whichwouldrequirepermitfromtheICA.
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FigureIII-9:AreaCandSeparationBarrier:LikelihoodofServiceAccess
83. SatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityofcoreservicesisnotablylowerinhouseholdslivinginAreaCorclosetothebarrier.Similartothemodelsforserviceaccess,theeffectofproximitytotheseparationbarrierisnotsignificantforhouseholdsliving1kmorclosertothewall.Amonghouseholdsthatlivewithina500mradius,however,thelikelihoodofsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedsewageandroadsis38percentand28percentlower,respectively.Reducingtherangeto250m,themodelsyieldsignificantresultsforbothsolidwastecollectionandlocalroads:householdsthatlive250morclosertothewall,onaverageare28percent less likelytobesatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservices,and41percentlesslikelytobesatisfiedwithlocalroads.AssessingtheimpactofAreaC,themodelssuggestthathouseholdsinAreaCarealsolesslikelytobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability.However,onlythecoefficientfortheroadssectorisstatis-ticallysignificant:householdsinAreaCare45percentlesslikelytobesatisfiedwithlocalroads.
FigureIII-10:AreaCandtheSeparationBarrier:LikelihoodofServiceSatisfaction
0.81
0.53* 0.53***0.66
1.040.90
0.80 0.79
1.07 1.07
0.69
0.35***
1.000.89
1.00
0.62**
1,000m 500m 250m
Distancetoseparationbarrier AreaC
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
Higher
Equal
Lower
0.951.06
0.790.91
0.91
0.64***0.73 0.76
0.95 0.910.73*
0.89
0.830.71*
0.57*** 0.64*
1,000m 500m 250mDistancetoseparationbarrier AreaC
PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads
Higher
Equal
Lower
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84. Servicedeliveryoutcomesaresignificantly lower inLGUswithhighersharesofhouseholdslivinginAreaC.FigureIII-11showstheresultsofregressionsassessingtheimpactofAreaConLGUperformance.48Comparingthe20percentofLGUswiththehighestshareofhouseholdsthatliveinAreaCwiththe20percentwiththelowestshare,includingLGUsthatarenotpartofAreaC,theregressionresultsdonotyieldstatisticallysignificantperformancedifferences.However,whenlimitingthesampletoLGUsthatatleastpartlybelongtoAreaC,theregressionsindicatethatthequintileofLGUswiththehighestshareofAreaChouseholdsonaverageperform11.1-pointslower.
FigureIII-11:ShareofHouseholdsinAreaCandLGUPerformance
85. LGUperformanceislowerinLGUswithhighersharesofbuilt-upareathatbelongstoAreaC.MeasuringtheimpactofAreaCwiththeshareofbuilt-upLGUareathatispartofAreaC,notabledif-ferencesinLGUperformanceareobserved.Theresultssuggestthathighersharesofbuilt-upLGUAreathatispartofAreaCcorrespondtolowerperformanceoutcomes.However,onlywhencomparingLGUswithashareofAreaChouseholdshigherthan70percentwithLGUswithasharebelow70percent,theregressionsyieldastatisticallysignificantperformancedifferenceof8.1points.
FigureIII-12:ShareofBuilt-upLGUareainAreaCandLGUPerformance
86. Mayorsseeservicedeliveryfurthercomplicatedbytheexternalgovernancestructure,espe-ciallyforthewatersector.Manymayorsreportreceivingwaterdirectlyfromthenationalwatercom-panyofIsrael,Mekorot.Forexample,themayorofSalimreportsthatwaterfromMekorot“isdeliveredtousthroughapipethatfeedsthreevillages,Salim,Uzmout,andDeiral-Huteb.TheIsraeliscontroltheamountofwaterweconsume….wesufferespeciallyinsummer….therearehouseholdsinSalimthatdonotreceivewaterfor3-4daysaweek.”Inaddition,maintenanceischallenginginGazaduetothe10-
48EstimatesarefromregressionsoftheLGUperformanceindexon1)theLGUquintilesfortheshareofAreaChouseholds,and2)on1c)250morclosertothewall,and2)dummiesforLGUswithsharesofbuilt-upLGUareathatishigherthana)50percent,b)60percent,c)70percent,d)80percent,ande)90percent,indicatorsforthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs,thelogofLGUpopulation,andthelogofthedistancebetweenaLGU´scenteranditsgovernoratecapital.
-6.5
-8.6
-8.1*
-5.8
-2.6
>90%
>80%
>70%
>60%
>50%
QuintilewithhighestshareofAreaChouseholds(vs.lowest)
-11.1**
-1.4 AllLGUs
AreaCLGUs
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year-longIsraeliblockade,whichseverelylimitstheavailabilityofequipmentandneededpartsinthestrip.AstheGazaCityDirectorexplained:“Wehave75waterwellswhich lack[…]spareparts.”TheMayorofKhanYunisalsomentionedthat“thereare2,500watermetersthatarebrokendownandneedreplacement[…]however,theimportrestrictionsforGazamakeithardtoobtainthesepartsandotherequipmentneeded.”
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3.5 Joint Service Councils Capacity
87. JSCsprovideapromisingmeansforaddressingLGUfragmentationandimprovingservicede-liveryoutcomes,particularlyinsmallandremoteVCs.The1997LGAestablishedtheoptionforLGUstojoinforcesinplanningandserviceprovisionundertheumbrellaofaJSC,aimedatscalingupaccess,quality,andreliabilityoflocalpublicservices.Since1997,morethan80JSCshavebeencreated.Broadly,therearethreetypesofJSCs,eitherprovidingasingleservice,multipleservices,orthosebeingestab-lishedforplanninganddevelopment.AJointServicesProvisionAssessmentcarriedoutbytheBankin2015identifiedthatoutofthe82existingJSCsintheWestBankandthe10JSCsinGaza,onlyaround55areactive.MostoftheactiveJSCs,i.e.,32intotal,arecategorizedasPlanningandDevelopmentJSCs.16JSCswereestablishedforsolidwastemanagement,andsevenJSCsprovidewatersupplyandsanita-tionservices.ArespondentfromthecityofKhanYunisspokeenthusiasticallyabouttheimportanceofJSCsandtheirpositiveimpactonservicedelivery:“IseetheexistenceofJSCsassomethingimportantanduseful…forexample,[…]someservicesarebetterifwedealwiththemjointlysuchaswastecollectionwhichneedshugeinfrastructures,trucks,machines,andtransferstations.”
88. Membership ina JSCcanhavesignificant impactonperformance,particularly forVCs.Fig-ureIII-13showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageimpactofmembershipinaJSCforplanninganddevelopmentonLGUPerformanceScores,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.49ComparingoutcomesbetweenJSC-membersandnon-membersacrosstheWestBankandGaza,themodelyieldsstronglysignificantresults,suggestingthatJSC-membersonaveragehavea3.96-pointshigherperformancescore.TheperformancegainishigherinGaza,whereLGUsonaverageper-form13.2-pointshigherwhenbeingaJSC-member,thanfortheWestBank,whereLGUsseeaverageperformancegainsof3.37points.Moreover,theaverageincreaseinperformanceformemberLGUsishigheracrossVCs(5.21)thanmunicipalities(4.06),andsignificantforVCsonly.
FigureIII-13:JointServiceCouncilsI:MembershipinJSCforPlanning&Development
89. However,duringinterviewswithmayors,muchcriticismwasdirectedatJSCs.Forexample,theMayorofTamouncharacterizedhiscouncilexperiencewiththreeseparateJSCs–water,solidwaste,andplanninganddevelopment–aslosingcontroloverrevenuegenerationandservicedelivery,whilestillbeingaccountabletocitizens:“WearemembersofthreeJSCs;oneforwater,anotheroneforsolidwaste,aswellasaJSCforPlanningandDevelopmentwhichisinactive…beforewejoinedtheSolidWasteJSC,weusedtogeneraterevenueforourtown…butnowthesolidwasteservicecausesadeficit.Ourmunicipalityisagainstthesecouncils…”AdirectorfromKhanYuniswassimilarlycriticalandsaid:“The
49EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonanindicatorforLGUsthatarememberofaJSCforplanninganddevelopment,thelogofLGUpopulation(basedonPCBSprojectionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.Resultsfromthesecondandthirdmodelusethesameset-upbutarelimitedtothesub-samplesof1)municipalitiesand2)VCs.
+3.96**
+3.37*
+13.2*
+4.06
+5.21**
Overall
WestBank
Gaza
Municipalities
VCs
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SolidWasteJSCisaburdenbecausewestillhavetoprovidebins,trucksandworkers…[also]joiningthecouncilwasnotamatterofchoice…asamunicipalitywehadtobecomeamember…however,averagepeopledonotknowaboutit.”
90. Withincreasingdegreesofspecialization,thetechnicalandinstitutionalcapacityofJSCsdrivesservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthewatersector,JSC-membershipdoesnotguaranteesatisfactoryservicedeliveryoutcomes.Figure III-14showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverage impactofmembershipinaJSCforPipedWater/WasteWaterManagementonLGUPerformanceScoresinthewaterandwastewatersector,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.50ComparingoutcomesbetweenJSC-membersandnon-membersacrosstheWestBankandGaza,themodeldoesnotyieldstatisticallysignificantperformancedifferencesinthepipedwatersector.However,whenlim-itingthesampletotheJeninGovernorate,wheresomeLGUsbelongtoaJSCandothersdonot,JSCmembershipcorrespondstoaverystrongandstatisticallyhighlysignificantperformancegaininpipedwateroutcomes.Inthewastewatersectorincontrast,JSCmembershipisassociatedwithsignificantlylowerperformancescores,whencomparingallPalestinianLGUs.InJenin,JSCmembersperformslightlylowerthannon-members,theperformancedifferenceishoweverstatisticallynotsignificant.
FigureIII-14:JointServiceCouncilsII:MembershipinJSCforWaterandWasteWaterManagement
91. In the solid waste sector, the effect of JSC-membership on performance outcomes variesacrossregionsintheWestBank.FigureIII-15showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageimpactofmembershipinaJSCforSolidWasteManagementonLGUPerformanceScoresinsolidwastecollection,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.51Similartothenegativeresultsof
50EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScorefor1)PipedWaterand2)PipedSewage,onanindicatorforLGUsthatarememberofaJSCforwaterandwastewatermanagement,thelogofLGUPopulation(basedonPCBSprojec-tionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.TheoverallresultsusetheentiresampleofLGUs,whiletheregressionforJeninusesasamplethatislimitedtoLGUsinJeninGovernorate.51EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreforsolidwastecollection,onanindicatorforLGUsthatarememberofaJSCforsolidwastecollection,thelogofLGUPopulation(basedonPCBSprojectionsfortheyear2016),and
PipedWater
+30.82***
+4.38
Jenin
Overall
PipedSewage
-2.26
-6.26
Jenin
Overall
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thewastewatersector,servicedeliveryoutcomesofJSC-membersaresignificantlyworsethaninnon-memberLGUs.FocusingondifferencesinperformancelevelsbetweenSalfit,wherevirtuallyallLGUsbelongtothesameJSC,andQalqilya,wherenosuchassociationexists,JSCmembershipcorrespondstoastrongbutnotstatisticallysignificantperformancegaininsolidwastecollectionperformancescores.WhencomparingBethlehemandHebron incontrast,meanperformance levelsof JSC-membersandnon-membersarealmostidentical.
FigureIII-15:JointServiceCouncilsIII:MembershipinJSCforSolidWaste
3.6 Fiscal Capacity
92. RevenuesourcesforLGUsarelimitedandpublicbudgetsfallshortoftheirpotentialduetoineffectivecollectionoffeesandtaxes.ThemainsourcesofrevenueforLGUsarelocallycollectedrev-enuescomprisedof: (i)userfees,suchaspaymentsforelectricity,water,solidwastecollection,andwhereapplicable,publicmarketsandslaughterhouses;(ii)localfees,suchasbuildingpermitsandfeesforsigns;and(iii)taxes.Theeconomicallymostsignificantrevenuesources,suchasthepropertytax,professionalpermitfees,andtransportationfeesarecollectedandadministeredcentrallybythePA.Theserevenuesaresubjecttohighdeductionstooffsetmunicipalarrearsforelectricityandwaterfees,partlyowedtoIsrael,lacktransparencyinthecalculation,andaretransferredinanad-hocandopaquemanner,whichposesakeyconstrainttoLGUbudgetaryplanning.
93. FinancialsustainabilityoflocalserviceprovisionisacriticalissuethataffectsLGUsabilitytoprovide services in an accountable and efficientmanner, disproportionally constrainingVCs giventheirlimitedsize,revenuebase,andinstitutionalcapacity.VCsandmunicipalitiessharemostofthelocallycollectedrevenueassignments.Nevertheless,pronouncedhorizontaldisparitiesamongLGUsandparticularlybetweenmunicipalitiesandVCsexist,largelybecausethePropertyTaxisnotleviedinVCs.Asaresult,VCshaveonaverage40percentlesspercapitaoperatingrevenuescomparedtomunicipal-
indicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.ThefirstregressionmodelusestheentiresampleofLGUs,thesampleofthesecondmodelislimitedtoSalfitandQalqilyaGovernorates,andthethirdtoBethlehemandHebronGovernorates.
Salfit/Qalqilya
SolidWasteCollection
+4.44
-1.9 Overall
Salfit/Qalqilya
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
61
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
58
ities.In2012forexample,percapitaoperatingrevenueswereNIS63forVCsandNIS165formunicipal-ities.52WhileVCsreceiveahigherper-capitashareoftransferfundingduetoreallocationofTranspor-tationFees,thesefundsdonotfullycompensateforthelargertotalpercapitarevenuesmunicipalitiesreceive.Overall,VCslackastableandpredictablefinancingsourcethatwouldallowthemtomeetex-istingdevelopmentandcapitalinvestmentrequirements.Whilemunicipalitieshaveaccesstofundspro-videdbytheMDLF,nosystematicfundingmechanismexiststofinanceinvestmentsinVCs.Thisleavesafundinggapforthemajorityof266villagesandmarginalizedcommunities.
94. PercapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformance.FigureIII-16showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofLGUpercapitaoperatingrevenuesonLGUPerformanceScores,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.53Themodelsyieldhighlystatisticallysignificantcoefficients,emphasizingthatLGUfinancingisakeydriverforservicedeliveryoutcomes:a1percentincreaseinpercapitaoperatingrevenuesonaveragecorrespondstoa4.5-pointshigherperformancescore.Theeffectismorepronouncedamongmunicipalities,wherea1percentin-creaseinpercapitarevenuesisassociatedwithanonaverage6.5-pointhigherperformancescore.
FigureIII-16:LGUFinanceI:PerCapitaOperatingBudgetRevenues
95. Arobust,andevenstrongerrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperfor-manceexists.FigureIII-17presentsregressionresults,estimatingtheaverageimpactofLGUpercapitaoperatingexpendituresonLGUPerformanceScores,controllingforLGUsizeandgeographicalattrib-utes.54Theexpendituremodelyieldssimilarresultsastherevenuemodel,suggestingthatbothreve-nuesandexpendituresdriveservicedeliveryoutcomes:theaverageeffectofa1percentincreaseinpercapitaexpendituresisaperformancescoreincreaseof5.2points.Again,theeffectisnotablylarger,andonlystatisticallysignificantinmunicipalities.
52WorldBank.2016.PublicExpenditureReview–PalestinianTerritories.53EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthelogofpercapitalLGUoperatingbudgetrevenues,thelogofLGUPopulation(projectionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.54EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthelogofpercapitalLGUoperatingbudgetexpendi-tures,thelogofLGUPopulation(projectionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.
+3
+7**
+5***Overall
Municipalities
VCs
1%IncreaseinLGUrevenues
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
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THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
59
FigureIII-17:LGUFinanceII:PerCapitaOperatingBudgetExpenditures
96. Financial sustainability isakeydriverofLGUperformance.Goingbeyondoperatingbudgetexpendituresandrevenues,FigureIII-18showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheroleoffiscalsustainability,proxiedbyindicatorsforsatisfactorycollectionefficiencyandownrevenuesourcesfromtheMDP-II, andabasic surplus inbothoperational andenterprisebudgets, formunicipalityperfor-mance,whenholdingbothpopulationsizeandgeographicalattributesfixed.55Bothmodelsyieldposi-tive, and statistically significant coefficients:municipalitieswith satisfactory collectionefficiencyandownrevenuesources,onaveragehavea5.6higherperformancescore,andmunicipalitieswithasurplusinoperationalandenterprisebudgetsperformonaverage5.4pointshigher.
FigureIII-18:LGUFinanceIII:FiscalSustainability
3.7 Governance and Accountability
97. Assessingthedriversofcitizens’participatorypatternsandenhancinglocalgovernmentre-sponsiveness is crucial to increaseaccountabilityand improve servicedeliveryoutcomes.Growingempiricalevidencesuggeststhatcitizeninteractionswithlocalgovernmentsspurtheireffortsinachiev-ing improveddevelopment results, suchassustainablepublic financialmanagement, social inclusionandempowerment,andeffectivepublicservicedelivery.56Citizeninvolvementcancomeintheformsofparticipationinlocalgovernanceandinvolvementindecision-making,information-exchangeregard-ingserviceprovision,orthroughgrievanceredressal.
55EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonindicatorsfor1)SatisfactoryCollectionEfficiencyand2)SurplusinOperatingBudgetandEnterpriseFund,asdefinedintheMDP-II,thelogofLGUPopulation(2016projections),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.56WorldBank.2014.StrategicFrameworkforMainstreamingCitizenEngagementinWorldBankGroupOperations.
+3
+9***
+5***Overall
Municipalities
VCs
1%IncreaseinLGUexpenditures
+5*
+6*
SurplusinOperatingBudgetandEnterprise
Fund
SatisfactoryCollectionEfficiency
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
63
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
60
98. LessthanathirdofPalestiniancitizensagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizencon-cernsandcomplaints.Governmentresponsivenesshasbeenfoundtobeakeyfactorforcitizens’par-ticipatorybehaviorandbelievedtobeakeydriverforencouragingresponsiblecitizenry,regainingtrustingovernment,andenhancingpoliticalparticipation.InthePalestinianterritories,overallsatisfactionwiththeresponsivenessofLGUsislow:theassessmentfoundthatlessthanathirdofthehouseholdsagreewiththestatementthattheirmunicipalityorVCisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcom-plaints.WhilethenumberisslightlylowerintheWestBank(30percent)thaninGaza(37percent),itvariessubstantiallyacrossgovernorates:inTubas,only1outof10householdsagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,whileinTulkarmandQalqilyaalmosthalfthehouseholdsconsidertheirLGUtobeveryresponsive.ComparingsatisfactionwithresponsivenessacrossLGUtypesintheWestBank,theshareofhouseholdsreportingtoagreeishigherinmunicipalities(31percent)thaninVCs(24percent).
FigureIII-19:LGUResponsiveness
99. Higher LGU responsiveness corresponds tobetterperformanceoutcomes.Figure III-20andFigureIII-21showtheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageimpactoftwoproxiesforLGUresponsiveness when controlling for both LGU size and geographical attributes. 57 The first modelmeasurestheeffectoftheshareofhouseholdsthathaveusedaCSC;andthesecondmodeltheshareofhouseholdsagreeingwiththestatementthattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints.Bothmodelsyieldstatisticallysignificantandpositivecoefficients fortheresponsivenessproxies,suggestingapositiverelationshipbetweenLGUresponsivenessandservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevel.TheaverageperformanceofthequintileofLGUswiththehighestshareofhouseholdsreportingthattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaintsonaverageperform16.4pointshigher.Correspondingly,LGUsinthequintilewiththehighestshareofcitizenswhousedCSCs,includingOSSes,onaveragehavea5.39higherperformancescore.
57EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreona)thelogoftheshareofhouseholdsthatusedacitizenservicecenter,andb)thelogoftheshareofhouseholdsthatagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,includingindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs,andthelogofpopulation.
30%
37%
31%
24%
35%
27%
35%
39%
35%
36%
34%
37%
WestBank
Gaza
MunicipalitiesWestBank
VillageCouncilsWestBank
AgreeorStronglyAgree PartiallyAgree DisagreeorStronglyDisagree
“MymunicipalityorVillageCouncilisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints”
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
64
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
61
FigureIII-20:UsageofCitizenServiceCentersandPerformance
FigureIII-21:LGUResponsivenessandPerformance
100. Almost3outof4Palestinianhouseholdsthinksthatvotinginmunicipalelectionscanhaveapositive impacton localservicedelivery.Household trust in theroleofelections inservicedeliverydifferssignificantlyacrossthePalestinianterritories.FigureIII-22showsthatwhileinGaza,82percentofthehouseholdsbelieveinsucharelationship,almostathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBankdonotthinkthatvotingandserviceoutcomesareinterrelated.Trustintheroleofvotingisslightlyhigherinmunicipalities(69percent)thaninVCs(66percent),andintheCentralWestBank(75percent)thanintheNorth(63percent)andSouthWestBank(71percent).
+5.39*
LGUquintilewithhighestshareofhouseholdsthatusedcitizen
servicecenter(vs.lowestquintile)
+16.35***
LGUquintilewithhighestshareofhouseholdsagreeingthatLGUis
veryresponsive(vs.lowestquintile)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
65
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
62
FigureIII-22:TrustintheRoleofElectionsinImprovingServiceDelivery
101. AlmosttwothirdsofPalestiniancitizensreporttoplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections.ThewillingnessofhouseholdstovoteinthenextmunicipalelectionsdifferssignificantlybetweentheWestBankandGaza(FigureIII-23).Atthetimeofthesurvey,inGaza,75percentofhouseholdsreportedtoplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections,comparedtoonly56percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBank.TheresultfortheWestBankisveryclosetotheactualturnoutnumbersobservedbothinthelatestmunicipalelectionsinMay2017(53.4percent)and2012(52.15percent).Acrossmunicipali-tiesandVCs in theWestBank, theshareofhouseholds thatplannedtovote in the latestmunicipalelectionsissimilarat56and57percent,respectively.
FigureIII-23:ParticipationinFutureElections
102. CitizentrustintheimpactofvotingonservicedeliveryoutcomesandwillingnesstovoteinfutureelectionsarestronglyassociatedwithsatisfactionofLGUresponsiveness.FigureIII-24andFig-ureIII-25indicatethatcitizenswhoaresatisfiedwithLGUresponsivenessonaveragereportmoreoftenthatvotinghasanimpactonservicedelivery.AmongthehouseholdswhostronglyagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,86percentbelievethatvotinghasanimpactonpublicservices;andamongthosewhostronglydisagree,only59percentthinkthattheelectionsandservicesareconnected.Moreover,amongcitizenswhobelievethatvotinginmunicipalelectionsinfluencesservicedeliveryoutcomes,80percentplantovoteinthenextelection,comparedtojust28percentamongthosewhothinkvotingandpublicservicesarenotrelated.Similarly,amonghouseholdsthatstronglyagreethattheirLGUisresponsivetotheirconcernsandcomplaints,9outof10plantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections.
57%
75%
57%
56%
43%
25%
43%
44%
WestBank
Gaza
MunicipalitiesWestBank
VillageCouncilsWestBank
Plantovote Donotplantovote
69%
82%
69%
66%
31%
18%
31%
34%
WestBank
Gaza
MunicipalitiesWestBank
VillageCouncilsWestBank
Yes No
Canvotinginmunicipalelectionshaveapositiveimpactonservicedelivery?
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
64
aJSCforsolidwastecollectionisactive,only1out4householdsreportedsolidwastecollectionservicesbyaJSC.
104. MayorsinlargercitiesintheWestBankemphasizetheimportanceofexistingfeedbackmech-anisms.AstheMayorofRamallahexplained:“WehaveadivisionforcomplaintsatourCitizenServicesCenter.Eachcitizencanfileawrittencomplaint,andweaddressitwithinaknowntimeframethatde-pendsonthenatureofthecomplaint…wearecommittedtoexamineeachcomplaintandletthecitizensknowaboutthedecision…”Inthesamecontext,theCityManagerofNablususesaprogramtofollowuphoweachdepartmentofthemunicipalitydealswithcomplaintsreceivedbyphone.“Theprogramtellsmehowmanycomplaintseachdivisionreceivesandhowmanyofthemhavebeendealtwithbytherelevantdivision…onceInoticethereisadelayfromoneofthedivisionsIcallthesupervisorsthereandurgethemtospeeduptheprocess…”MayorsalsoemphasizedthatcitizensinlargeWBcitiescanfiletheircomplaintselectronicallythroughmunicipalwebsitesandFacebookpages.
105. Incomparison,duetotheabsenceofCSCsinGaza,municipalitiesdependonthetraditionalQulemAl-Jomhoursystem,“Pen-of-the-Public”,todealwithcitizencomplaints.QulemAl-Jomhourisadivisionincityhallsorawindowassignedtoreceivecitizenwrittencomplaintsandtoreferthemtorelevantdepartments.Forexample,accordingtotheCityDirectorofKhanYunis,“AnindividualcanfileacomplaintthroughQulemAl-Jomhour…thenitgoestotherelevantdivisiontobedealtwith…attheendwesendatextmessagetocitizensupdatingthemabouttheircomplaints.”Inthesamecontext,DirectorsatRafahmunicipalitysaidthatQulemAl-Jomhourinthatcityisbeing“computerized”and“soonpeoplewillbeabletowritetheircomplaintsfromhome.”
106. In LGUs that have a OSS, only 16 percent of households know about their existence, illustrating that citizens’ knowledge of available feedback instruments is very limited. Comparing LGUs in the West Bank in which a OSS exists, striking results about citizens’ information emerge. Only16 percent of surveyed households report knowing that a CSC, including OSS, is available in theirmunicipality, 37 percent report that they did not knowwhether a CSC exists, and 46 percent evenreport that they believe that no CSC is available. Knowledge about availability of a CSC is slightlyhigher in largemunicipalities,whereat least1out5households reports thatanCSCexists, than inmediumandsmallmunicipalities,whereonlyabout15percentofhouseholdsreportavailabilityofanCSC.
FigureIII-26:KnowledgeaboutExistenceofOne-Stop-Shops
“Doesyourmunicipality/VChaveaCitizenServiceCenter/One-Stop-Shopavailable?”
Sample:Municipalities,whereOne-Stop-Shopisavailable
19%
15%
14%
44%
43%
33%
36%
42%
52%
LargeMunicipalities
MediumMunicipalities
SmallMunicipalities
Yes Don'tKnow No
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
66
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
63
AmongthehouseholdswhoaredissatisfiedwithLGUresponsivenesshowever,onlyslightlymorethanhalfreporttheyplantoparticipateinthenextmunicipalelection.
FigureIII-24:LGUResponsivenessandTrustinRoleofElectionsforServiceDelivery
FigureIII-25:LGUResponsivenessandFutureVotingBehavior
103. ThemajorityofhouseholdsintheWestBankandGazaarewell-informedandsatisfiedwiththeirlevelofknowledgeonlocalserviceprovision,howevertheknowledgeaboutmodesofservicedeliveryislow.Foreachofthefourservices–pipedwater,pipedsewage,wastecollection,andelec-tricity–only1outof10householdsreportedtheneedtoacquireinformationregardingaccess,mainte-nance,servicequalityorpriceduringthelast12months.Theoutletsusedbycitizenstoseekinformationdifferbyservice.Forinformationregardingtheelectricgridconnection,lessthanhalfoftherespondents(48percent)reportedthattheywouldcontactthemunicipality/VC,while55percentwouldcontactapublicutilitycompany.Inturn,forpipedwater,pipedsewage,andsolidwastecollection,thevastma-jorityofhouseholdsreceiveinformationfromthemunicipalityorVC(90percent,97percent,and98percent,respectively).Interestingly,ofthehouseholdsthatarecoveredbyanactiveJSCforwaterandwastewater,only1outof3reportedthatpipedwaterisprovidedbyaJSC.Accordingly,inLGUswhere
86%
82%
79%
64%
59%
14%
18%
21%
36%
41%
StronglyAgree
Agree
PartiallyAgree
Disagree
StronglyDisagree
Yes No“LGUisveryresponsive”
Canvotinginmunicipalelectionshaveapositiveimpactonservicedelivery?
91%
74%
69%
53%
56%
9%
26%
31%
47%
44%
StronglyAgree
Agree
PartiallyAgree
Disagree
StronglyDisagree
PlanstoVote Doesn'tPlantoVote“LGUisveryresponsive”
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
64
aJSCforsolidwastecollectionisactive,only1out4householdsreportedsolidwastecollectionservicesbyaJSC.
104. MayorsinlargercitiesintheWestBankemphasizetheimportanceofexistingfeedbackmech-anisms.AstheMayorofRamallahexplained:“WehaveadivisionforcomplaintsatourCitizenServicesCenter.Eachcitizencanfileawrittencomplaint,andweaddressitwithinaknowntimeframethatde-pendsonthenatureofthecomplaint…wearecommittedtoexamineeachcomplaintandletthecitizensknowaboutthedecision…”Inthesamecontext,theCityManagerofNablususesaprogramtofollowuphoweachdepartmentofthemunicipalitydealswithcomplaintsreceivedbyphone.“Theprogramtellsmehowmanycomplaintseachdivisionreceivesandhowmanyofthemhavebeendealtwithbytherelevantdivision…onceInoticethereisadelayfromoneofthedivisionsIcallthesupervisorsthereandurgethemtospeeduptheprocess…”MayorsalsoemphasizedthatcitizensinlargeWBcitiescanfiletheircomplaintselectronicallythroughmunicipalwebsitesandFacebookpages.
105. Incomparison,duetotheabsenceofCSCsinGaza,municipalitiesdependonthetraditionalQulemAl-Jomhoursystem,“Pen-of-the-Public”,todealwithcitizencomplaints.QulemAl-Jomhourisadivisionincityhallsorawindowassignedtoreceivecitizenwrittencomplaintsandtoreferthemtorelevantdepartments.Forexample,accordingtotheCityDirectorofKhanYunis,“AnindividualcanfileacomplaintthroughQulemAl-Jomhour…thenitgoestotherelevantdivisiontobedealtwith…attheendwesendatextmessagetocitizensupdatingthemabouttheircomplaints.”Inthesamecontext,DirectorsatRafahmunicipalitysaidthatQulemAl-Jomhourinthatcityisbeing“computerized”and“soonpeoplewillbeabletowritetheircomplaintsfromhome.”
106. In LGUs that have a OSS, only 16 percent of households know about their existence, illustrating that citizens’ knowledge of available feedback instruments is very limited. Comparing LGUs in the West Bank in which a OSS exists, striking results about citizens’ information emerge. Only16 percent of surveyed households report knowing that a CSC, including OSS, is available in theirmunicipality, 37 percent report that they did not knowwhether a CSC exists, and 46 percent evenreport that they believe that no CSC is available. Knowledge about availability of a CSC is slightlyhigher in largemunicipalities,whereat least1out5households reports thatanCSCexists, than inmediumandsmallmunicipalities,whereonlyabout15percentofhouseholdsreportavailabilityofanCSC.
FigureIII-26:KnowledgeaboutExistenceofOne-Stop-Shops
“Doesyourmunicipality/VChaveaCitizenServiceCenter/One-Stop-Shopavailable?”
Sample:Municipalities,whereOne-Stop-Shopisavailable
19%
15%
14%
44%
43%
33%
36%
42%
52%
LargeMunicipalities
MediumMunicipalities
SmallMunicipalities
Yes Don'tKnow No
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
67
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
64
aJSCforsolidwastecollectionisactive,only1out4householdsreportedsolidwastecollectionservicesbyaJSC.
104. MayorsinlargercitiesintheWestBankemphasizetheimportanceofexistingfeedbackmech-anisms.AstheMayorofRamallahexplained:“WehaveadivisionforcomplaintsatourCitizenServicesCenter.Eachcitizencanfileawrittencomplaint,andweaddressitwithinaknowntimeframethatde-pendsonthenatureofthecomplaint…wearecommittedtoexamineeachcomplaintandletthecitizensknowaboutthedecision…”Inthesamecontext,theCityManagerofNablususesaprogramtofollowuphoweachdepartmentofthemunicipalitydealswithcomplaintsreceivedbyphone.“Theprogramtellsmehowmanycomplaintseachdivisionreceivesandhowmanyofthemhavebeendealtwithbytherelevantdivision…onceInoticethereisadelayfromoneofthedivisionsIcallthesupervisorsthereandurgethemtospeeduptheprocess…”MayorsalsoemphasizedthatcitizensinlargeWBcitiescanfiletheircomplaintselectronicallythroughmunicipalwebsitesandFacebookpages.
105. Incomparison,duetotheabsenceofCSCsinGaza,municipalitiesdependonthetraditionalQulemAl-Jomhoursystem,“Pen-of-the-Public”,todealwithcitizencomplaints.QulemAl-Jomhourisadivisionincityhallsorawindowassignedtoreceivecitizenwrittencomplaintsandtoreferthemtorelevantdepartments.Forexample,accordingtotheCityDirectorofKhanYunis,“AnindividualcanfileacomplaintthroughQulemAl-Jomhour…thenitgoestotherelevantdivisiontobedealtwith…attheendwesendatextmessagetocitizensupdatingthemabouttheircomplaints.”Inthesamecontext,DirectorsatRafahmunicipalitysaidthatQulemAl-Jomhourinthatcityisbeing“computerized”and“soonpeoplewillbeabletowritetheircomplaintsfromhome.”
106. In LGUs that have a OSS, only 16 percent of households know about their existence, illustrating that citizens’ knowledge of available feedback instruments is very limited. Comparing LGUs in the West Bank in which a OSS exists, striking results about citizens’ information emerge. Only16 percent of surveyed households report knowing that a CSC, including OSS, is available in theirmunicipality, 37 percent report that they did not knowwhether a CSC exists, and 46 percent evenreport that they believe that no CSC is available. Knowledge about availability of a CSC is slightlyhigher in largemunicipalities,whereat least1out5households reports thatanCSCexists, than inmediumandsmallmunicipalities,whereonlyabout15percentofhouseholdsreportavailabilityofanCSC.
FigureIII-26:KnowledgeaboutExistenceofOne-Stop-Shops
“Doesyourmunicipality/VChaveaCitizenServiceCenter/One-Stop-Shopavailable?”
Sample:Municipalities,whereOne-Stop-Shopisavailable
19%
15%
14%
44%
43%
33%
36%
42%
52%
LargeMunicipalities
MediumMunicipalities
SmallMunicipalities
Yes Don'tKnow No
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
68
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
65
107. Usageoffeedback/complaintinstrumentsacrossthePalestinianterritoriesisverylow,whilelevelsofsatisfactionaremoderate.Only16percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankand8percentofhouseholdsinGazareporttohaveusedaCSCincludingOSS,themunicipality’sorVC´swebsite,afeed-backsystemoftheLGUorserviceprovider,oraservicebooklettoaddressaserviceissue.6percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankreporttohaveusedafeedbacksystemoraLGU´swebsite,comparedto3percentand5percentinGaza,respectively.Whileonly4percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankhaveusedaservicecenter,includingOSSs,andjust2percentaservicebooklet,nohouseholdinGazareportstohaveusedaservicecenter,and lessthan1percentaservicebooklettoaddressaserviceissue.ComparingsatisfactionwithfeedbackinstrumentsintheWestBank,2outof3householdsthatusedservicebooklets,awebsite,orCSCweresatisfiedwiththerespectiveinstrumenttoresolveserviceproblems,whileonly40percentreportsatisfactionwithLGUandserviceproviderfeedbacksystems.InGaza,two-thirdsofthehouseholdsweresatisfiedwithresolvingaserviceissuethroughacomplaintontheirLGU´swebsite,whilelessthanhalfofhouseholdsweresatisfiedwithservicebookletsandfeedbacksystems.
108. Themajorityofcitizenswhoparticipated inqualitativeFGDsexpressedoverall satisfactionwithavailablemechanismstoresolveproblemswithpublicservices.However,thedegreeofsatisfac-tionamongcitizensisaffectedbyhoweffectivelylocalcouncilsaddresssubmittedcomplaints.CitizensinlargerWestBankLGUsexpressedhigherlevelsofsatisfactionwithcomplaintmechanismsandpro-cesses,especiallywhenfeedbacktimeframesaremadepublic.Also,thequalitativeanalysisshowsthatthelevelofsatisfactionishigherinLGUswhereneighborhoodcommitteesareavailableaschannelsforcitizenstofiletheircomplaints,especiallyinGaza.Electedneighborhoodcommitteestendtodealwithcomplaintsmoreeffectivelythanappointedones,accordingtorespondents.Villagesandsmalltownsareinclinedtoadoptlessinstitutionalizedcomplaintmechanisms.Theymostlyusean“open-door”pol-icyandencouragedirectcontactwithmayorsandcouncilmembersandstaff.However,evengoodcom-plaintsmechanismscannotaddressallissueswhenresourcesarelimited.Asexpressedbyonemayor,itdependsonthe“thenatureofthecomplaint,andtheavailabilityofresourcesdeterminehowwedealwithit.”
FigureIII-27:UsageandSatisfactionwithFeedbackInstrumentsacrossSectors
109. ThevastmajorityofcitizenswouldratherseektheirLGUdirectlytofileacomplaintinsteadofusingafeedbackorcomplaintsystemorCSC. Inthesituationofaproblemwiththeelectricgridconnection,48percentofrespondentswouldcontactthemunicipalityorVCoftheirLGU;howeverfar
2%
6%
6%
4%
<1%
3%
5%
0%
ServiceBooklet
FeedbackSystem
Website
ServiceCenter/One-Stop-Shop
WestBank Gaza
Instrumentusedtoaddressaserviceissue Satisfactionwithinstrumentused
67%
40%
68%
69%
46%
41%
67%
0%
ServiceBooklet
FeedbackSystem
Website
ServiceCenter/One-Stop-Shop
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morehouseholdswoulddosoforpipedwater,pipedsewage,orwastecollectionservices(79percent,79percent,and81percent,respectively).Forelectricity-relatedproblems,athirdoftherespondentswouldsubmitacomplaintataCSCorthroughafeedback/complaintsystemforproblems,butonlyaminornumber incaseofproblemswithpipedwater,pipedsewage,andwastecollectionservices(6percent,7percent,and5percent,respectively).Onaverageabout10percentofhouseholdsreportthattheywouldnotfileacomplaintatallincaseofaserviceissue,potentiallyreflectingdissatisfactionwiththeresponsivenessofLGUsandserviceproviders.
FigureIII-28:ChannelsforCitizens’FeedbackandComplaints
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Incaseofanyserviceproblem,howwouldyousubmitacomplaint?
SolidWasteCollection PipedWaterPipedSewageElectricity
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IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
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IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
4.1 Prioritize the Improvement of the Quality and Reliability of Services
110. Palestinianlocalgovernmentshavealmostachieveduniversalcoverageintermsofaccesstobasicservices.AccesstobasicservicesisremarkablyhighinthePalestinianterritories,althoughsatis-factionratesvarywidelyacrossLGUsandsectorsandthebottom40percentenjoyoveralllowerqualityofservices.However,householdincomeisnotamaindeterminantofservicedeliveryoutcomesandnogendergapexists.AllthoseareverypositiveachievementsunderextremelydifficultcircumstancesinahighlychallengingenvironmentoffragilityandconflictinthePalestinianterritories.Improvingthequal-ityandreliabilityofbasicserviceprovisionmustnowmovetothecenterofattentionforpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartners.
111. Increasingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatershouldbegiventhehighestpriority,particularlyinGaza.Withalmosttheentirepopulation inGazadependentonpotablewaterdeliveredbytankertrucks,solvingtheGazawatercrisiswillremainthegreatestchallengeforlocalservicedeliveryintheyearstocome.ImprovementsinLGUperformancewillnotsolvethecrisis,whichgoeswellbeyondlocalgovernmentissues.IncreasingaccesstodrinkingwaterinGazawillrequirecriticalactionsfromthePal-estinianAuthority,theGovernmentofIsrael,andtheinternationalcommunitytoincreasebulkwatersupplytotheGazaStrip;reducetechnicalandfinanciallossesinamoribundwaterdistributionnetwork;treatandpromotethereuseofwastewater;andincreaselocaldesalinationcapacity, includingfromprivatewaterpurifiers,toaddresstheshort-termneedsofagrowingpopulation.
112. ImprovingwaterqualityremainsakeypriorityacrosstheWestBankaswell.AmorestrategicapproachisneededincoordinationwiththeMinistryofLocalGovernmentandthePalestinianWaterAuthoritytoconsolidatehighlyfragmentedwaterserviceproviders.AlthoughtheinstitutionalstructureofthatapproachhasbeenagreedonandadoptedbythePalestinianAuthority,implementationpro-gressislaggingbehindandwillnotacceleratewithoutparallellocalgovernmentsectorreform.Asitua-tioninwhichmorethan260localwaterdepartmentsoperatetosupplydrinkingwaterinawater-scarceenvironmentwithlargetechnicalandcommerciallossesissimplynotviable.Itaffectsthefinancialsus-tainabilityofoneofthekeypublicservicesectors,causeswatershortagesandisadraintothePalestin-ianeconomy.ThePalestinianAuthorityandPalestinianLGUsneedtomovedecisivelyintoestablishingregionalwaterandsanitationutilities.CurrentfinancialincentivesbywhichLGUsretainwateruserfeestocross-subsidizetheirgeneralexpenditureneedtobereplacedwithalternativefundingsources,in-cludingconditionalgrantsinexchangeforimprovedfinancialdiscipline.
113. LGUsmust strive toconvergequalityand reliability standards forbasic services.While thelocalgovernmentmandateisbroaderthanbasicserviceprovision,citizensatisfactionrateswillnotin-creaseunlesslocalgovernmentsdeliverontheirkeytasksofsupplyingreliabledrinkingwaterandsan-itationservices,collectthegarbagefromhouseholds,andensureawellmaintainedlocalroadnetwork.PrevailingvariationsinbasicservicedeliveryoutcomesaffecttheoveralllivingstandardsofPalestinians.However,lowsatisfactionrateswithLGUresponsivenesshashadanadverseimpactonthewillingnesstopayforpublicservicesamongcitizens,whichiscrucialtoaddressingthePalestinianAuthority’sseverefiscalcrisis.Forexample,thequalityandsatisfactionlevelofsolidwastecollectioncontinuestovarysignificantly.LGUsfullycontrolthisbasicserviceandcangenerallyimprovegarbagecollectionserviceswithoutincurringsignificantadditionalcapitalexpenditures,e.g.,forcollectionequipment,byoptimiz-ingserviceoperations.Establishingfeedbackmechanismsandaddressingcitizens’complaints,e.g.,on
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routesandcollectionschedules,canbeasimplebuteffectivewaytoimprovesatisfactionrates.Overall,goodgovernanceandprofessionalmanagementwillbecriticaltomakingLGUsmoreresponsivetotheneedsofcitizens,andtheywillalsohelpmakeLGUsmorereliablepartners forprivatebusinessandpromotinglocaldevelopment.Adependablesupplyofbasicpublicservicesisnotonlyakeydeterminantforimprovinglivingstandardsbutalsoapre-conditionformoreprivate-sectordrivengrowththatreliesonastableandpredictablesupplyofservices.WhilefactorssuchasaccesstoAreaCandtheseparationbarrierareoutofthecontrolofthePalestinianAuthority,thereareanumberofimportantpoliciesthatthePalestinianAuthoritycanimplementtoimproveservicedeliveryperformanceacrossPalestinianlo-calgovernments.Bothcentralandlocalauthoritiesshouldnotlosesightofactionsthatcanbetaken,eveninthechallengingframeworkofmovementandaccessrestrictionsofthePalestinianterritories.Someofthemostimportantinterventionsaresummarizedbelow.
4.2 Reform the Local Government Financing System as a Pre-condition for Success
114. Asacriticalfirststep,theMinistryofLocalGovernmentmustreviewandreviseLGUrevenueandexpenditureassignments.TheLocalGovernmentActof1997doesnotdistinguishbetweendele-gatedresponsibilitiesandownresponsibilities.Inthecaseofdelegatedresponsibilities,thePAwouldultimatelyberesponsiblefortheregulationandfinancingofthosefunctionsbuttheywouldbeimple-mentedbyLGUs.However,forownresponsibilities,LGUswouldgenerallyberesponsiblefortheser-vices,includingtheraisingofsufficientrevenues.TheabsenceofconditionalgrantsfromthePalestinianAuthoritytoLGUsunderthecurrentsystemofintergovernmentalfinanceindicatesthattheLocalGov-ernmentActwasnotintendedtointroducedelegatedresponsibilities.Furthermore,theactdoesnotdistinguishbetweenmandatoryfunctions,i.e.,servicesthatLGUsmustprovideandvoluntaryfunctions,i.e.,thosethatmaybeprovidediffundsareavailableandtheservicedeemedconvenientbythelocalcouncil.However,thecurrentrevenueassignmentsarenotevensufficienttodeliveroncorefunctions.ThesearemajorshortcomingsthatneedtobejointlyreviewedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheMinistryofLocalGovernment.
115. PalestinianLGUsarelargelydependentonservicefeesandchargestocovertheiroperationalexpenditures.Whilepopulationsizeandgeographiclocationmatter,theirimpactonLGUperformanceismore limited than local fiscal capacity.AlthoughPalestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsareresponsibleforprovidingcriticalpublicservices,theyhavenotbeenassignedsufficientrevenuesources.TheLocalGovernmentActassigns27functionalresponsibilitiestoLGUs,butthosefunctionalassign-mentsarenotmatchedwithappropriaterevenuesources.Althoughtheactassigns16revenuesourcestomunicipalities,LGUsdependheavilyonuserfeestofinanceoperatingexpenditures,nottomentioncriticalcapital investments.Onaverage,chargesandservice feesaccount for50–70percentof totalrevenues,mostly frompublicutility services suchaselectricityandwater,butalso fromcharges forbuildingpermits,solidwastecollection,signboards,andcemeteryfees,amongothers.
116. Addressingverticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesiscriticaltoimprovinglocalservicedeliv-eryperformance.LGUsaresupposedtoreceiverevenuefrompropertytaxes,professionallicensefees,educationtaxes,andtransportationfees,buttherevenuebasevariesdramaticallyacrossLGUs,leadingtoconsiderablehorizontalimbalances.Noregularandpredictableintergovernmentalfiscaltransferex-iststocovergenerallocalexpendituresandfundbasiccapitalinvestments.
117. WhilethepropertytaxispotentiallyasignificantrevenuesourceforLGUs,itisonlycollectedinmunicipalitiesandnotvillages,and theMinistryofFinanceandPlanning retains10percent for
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administeringthetax.Inpractice,propertytaxhastraditionallybeencollectedonlyinaround30mu-nicipalities,althoughthisnumberhasbeenexpandingmorerecentlyandhasnowreached70munici-palitiesintotal.However,muchofthetaxrevenuesgetfullyorpartiallyinterceptedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningtocompensateforthearrearsaccumulated.Referredtoas“netlending,”thesearrearsareusuallyrelatedtoelectricityorlessoftentowatercharges.
118. Changingthefinancialincentivestructureforserviceprovisionwillneedtobeatthecoreofthereformagenda.Duetochronicunderfunding,LGUshavedevelopedapracticeofdivertingrevenuesfrom service fees tomeet their expenditures needs. Cross-subsidies andpayment arrears arewide-spreadandcommonpracticeacrossmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.Currentincentivesarestrong:datafortheyears2011–13showthattotalrevenuespercapitaforvillagecouncilsinchargeofelectricitydistributioncanbeuptofourtimeshigherthanthosewithoutthatresponsibility.VillageCouncilswithelectricitydistribution functionswereable to spendover twiceasmuch inper capitaoperatinganddevelopment expenditures than thosewithout the responsibility for each year during the period of2011–13.Formunicipalities, there isadifferenceofalmost100percentbetween the twogroupsofmunicipalitiesintermsoftotalrevenuepercapitaforeachyearduringtheperiodof2011-13.Despitetherecentseparationofelectricitydistributionfromlocalgovernments,LGUscontinuetoreceivedivi-dendsfromelectricityrevenuesthattheyrequestfromdistributioncompaniesintheirroleasshare-holders.Incentivesandcurrentpracticesof“netlending”aresimilarinthewatersector.Thosefinancialincentivesneedtobereplacedwithalternativerevenuesources.
119. Breakingthisviciouscirclewillrequiredecisiveactionatthelocalandnationallevel.Keypri-oritiesinclude:(i)increaselocalrevenuecollection;(ii)improvetransparencyofpaymentflows,includ-inginteragencyarrears;(iii)sanctionentitieswhichdivertfundsfornon-essentialorunproductiveuse;and(iv)providefinancialsupporttothoseLGUswithoutthefiscalcapacitytoensurebasicservicepro-vision.Someprogresshasbeenmadetoaddresstheseunderlyingissues,butmoreneedstobedone.TheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram,supportedbyseveralDevelopmentPartners,providesaperfor-mance-basedinvestmentgranttomunicipalitiesallocatedthroughatransparentandpredictablemech-anism, subject toamunicipality implementingkey reformssuchas increasing revenuecollection forlocalservicesandimprovingtransparencyinbudgetingandreporting,amongother.WithsupportfromtheLocalGovernanceandServicesImprovementProgram,reformstotherevenue-sharingmechanismofthetransportationfeeareunderwaytomakeitmoretransparent,predictable,andregular.Inparallel,theMinistryofFinanceandPlanninghas improvedtransparency inreportingtheannualamountsofpropertytaxandtransportationfeetransferredtolocalauthorities.However,muchlessprogresshasbeenmade inestablishingaregular fiscal transfer fromthePalestinianAuthorityto localauthoritiesbeyondthedonor-fundedMunicipalDevelopmentProgram.Accordingly,progressalsohasbeenverylimitedinexpandinganddecentralizingpropertytaxcollectioninmunicipalities;andintroducingaddi-tionalownsourcerevenuesforLGUs.
120. Establishafiscaltransfermechanismthateffectivelyaddresses imbalances.Buildingontheexistingrevenuesharingsystemforthetransportationfees,moreneedstobedonetoreduceverticalimbalances.Forexample,thefullamountofthetransportationfeerevenuesshouldbeassignedtolocalgovernmentsbasedonastable-over-timeformulaforthedistributionofthefunds,suchasthatpilotedundertheLocalGovernanceandServices ImprovementProgram. Inaddition, largehorizontal imbal-anceswillrequireintroducingequalizationgrantsacrossbothmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsbasedonasubstantialpoolofannuallystableandpredictablefunds,forexample,asapercentageshareoftotalcentraltaxcollections.Further,thePAneedstointroduceasystemofconditionalgrantsbeyondthedonor-fundedMunicipalDevelopmentProgramtofunddelegatedresponsibilitiesandprovideanincentiveforLGUstocomplementandimplementthePalestinianAuthority´ssectoralobjectivesatthelocallevel.AchievingthisambitiousobjectivewillrequireclosercollaborationacrossDevelopmentPart-nersandawillingnesstomovefromfundingbasedon individualprojectstomore localbudget-and
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program-basedfinancing.
121. ThemainfunctionalresponsibilitiesofLGUsmustbeprofoundlyrefocused.Thecorporatiza-tionofutilityservices,suchaselectricityandwatersupply,shouldbeapriorityoverthemediumtermtoimprovethefinancialsustainabilityandperformanceofservicedelivery.OtherlocalservicesassignedtoLGUswillneedtoberevisedandupdatedfollowingseveralbasicguidelines,suchas:(i)introducingadifferentiationinfunctionalassignmentsbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs;(ii)clearlydifferentiatingbe-tweenobligatoryandvoluntaryservicesandbetweendelegatedandownservices;and(iii)clarifyingforeachcaseofdelegatedandownserviceswhoisresponsibleforthevariousaspectsofconcurrentre-sponsibilitiessuchasregulation,financing,andactualservicedelivery.
122. Provideadditionalrevenuesources,andenhancetheefficiencyofcollection.LGUslacksuffi-cientown-taxandnontaxrevenuestoprovidethepublicservicestheyhavebeenassigned.IncreasedfinancingofLGUsshouldcomeinlargepartfromown-revenuesourcesinadditiontoconditionalandunconditionaltransfers.Increasingtransparencyandimprovingservicedeliverywillbekeytoincreasingthewillingnesstopayamongcitizens.Inaddition,inordertoimproveLGUrevenues,moreattentionshouldbegiventotheefficiencywithwhichtaxesarecollected.Thepropertytaxislikelythemostsig-nificantpotentialrevenuesourceforLGUs,andthereismuchroomtoincreaseitby,forexample,ap-plyingittoallmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils,butalsorevampingandsimplifyingthecurrentvalua-tionmethodology.Globalexperiencedemonstratesthatpropertytaxdecentralizationcanhelpincreaserevenuesfromthatsource.Afirststepcouldbetodecentralizecollectiontolargemunicipalitieswiththehighestpotentialyieldwhilekeepingvalueassessmentscentralized.Theprofessionaltaxshouldbemodernizedtoincreaseitscoverage,unifyitsadministration,andreviseitsrates.LGUsarebestplacedtoadministerandcollecttheprofessionaltaxbecausetheyhaveinformationadvantagesovercentralauthorities.Finally,thePalestinianAuthorityshouldexplorebettermentlevies, i.e.,one-timechargesontheincreasedvalueofpropertiesassociatedwithurbanimprovements;assignthelandandpropertytransfertaxcurrentlyraisedbythePalestinianLandAuthoritytoLGUs;andconsiderintroducingalocalflat-rate“piggyback”personalincometaxtobepaidtothelocalgovernmentwherethetaxpayerkeepsresidence.
4.3 Strengthen LGU Accountability and Responsiveness to Increase Citizens’ Willingness to Pay
123. Absentaregularfiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernment,improvinglocalfiscalcapacitywillrequireenhancingbothrevenuecollectionandexpenditureefficiency.AccordingtotheLGPAfind-ings,householdsinthebottom40percentarelesslikelytopayforservicesthanhigher-incomehouse-holds.GiventhedeterioratingeconomicconditionsofPalestinianhouseholds,overallwillingnesstopayisunlikelytoincreasesubstantiallyinthenearfuture.MoreresponsiveLGUsareinabetterpositiontocollectmorerevenuesfromserviceusers.
124. Threedeterminantsaffecttheabilityoflocalcouncilstocollectfeesfromcitizensforprovidedservices.First,highlevelsofunemployment,especiallyinGazaandinthepoorestWestBankareas,posereal challenges topoorhouseholds inpaying their fees.Second, local councilsdonothaveeffectiveinstrumentstoencourageornudgeunwillingcitizenstopay.VeryfewLGUsapplypro-poorpaymentmodalitiesthroughpaymentplansorallowvulnerablecitizenstopayreducedamounts.BoxIV-1pro-videsanoverviewofbestpracticesthatallowedsomeLGUstoenhancecollectionefficiency.Thethirddeterminant is the lack timelinessof fiscal transfers to local councils.The lackof support from localcouncilstoincreasethewillingnessofcitizenstopayhinderseffortstoincreasecitizencommitmentsto
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routesandcollectionschedules,canbeasimplebuteffectivewaytoimprovesatisfactionrates.Overall,goodgovernanceandprofessionalmanagementwillbecriticaltomakingLGUsmoreresponsivetotheneedsofcitizens,andtheywillalsohelpmakeLGUsmorereliablepartners forprivatebusinessandpromotinglocaldevelopment.Adependablesupplyofbasicpublicservicesisnotonlyakeydeterminantforimprovinglivingstandardsbutalsoapre-conditionformoreprivate-sectordrivengrowththatreliesonastableandpredictablesupplyofservices.WhilefactorssuchasaccesstoAreaCandtheseparationbarrierareoutofthecontrolofthePalestinianAuthority,thereareanumberofimportantpoliciesthatthePalestinianAuthoritycanimplementtoimproveservicedeliveryperformanceacrossPalestinianlo-calgovernments.Bothcentralandlocalauthoritiesshouldnotlosesightofactionsthatcanbetaken,eveninthechallengingframeworkofmovementandaccessrestrictionsofthePalestinianterritories.Someofthemostimportantinterventionsaresummarizedbelow.
4.2 Reform the Local Government Financing System as a Pre-condition for Success
114. Asacriticalfirststep,theMinistryofLocalGovernmentmustreviewandreviseLGUrevenueandexpenditureassignments.TheLocalGovernmentActof1997doesnotdistinguishbetweendele-gatedresponsibilitiesandownresponsibilities.Inthecaseofdelegatedresponsibilities,thePAwouldultimatelyberesponsiblefortheregulationandfinancingofthosefunctionsbuttheywouldbeimple-mentedbyLGUs.However,forownresponsibilities,LGUswouldgenerallyberesponsiblefortheser-vices,includingtheraisingofsufficientrevenues.TheabsenceofconditionalgrantsfromthePalestinianAuthoritytoLGUsunderthecurrentsystemofintergovernmentalfinanceindicatesthattheLocalGov-ernmentActwasnotintendedtointroducedelegatedresponsibilities.Furthermore,theactdoesnotdistinguishbetweenmandatoryfunctions,i.e.,servicesthatLGUsmustprovideandvoluntaryfunctions,i.e.,thosethatmaybeprovidediffundsareavailableandtheservicedeemedconvenientbythelocalcouncil.However,thecurrentrevenueassignmentsarenotevensufficienttodeliveroncorefunctions.ThesearemajorshortcomingsthatneedtobejointlyreviewedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheMinistryofLocalGovernment.
115. PalestinianLGUsarelargelydependentonservicefeesandchargestocovertheiroperationalexpenditures.Whilepopulationsizeandgeographiclocationmatter,theirimpactonLGUperformanceismore limited than local fiscal capacity.AlthoughPalestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsareresponsibleforprovidingcriticalpublicservices,theyhavenotbeenassignedsufficientrevenuesources.TheLocalGovernmentActassigns27functionalresponsibilitiestoLGUs,butthosefunctionalassign-mentsarenotmatchedwithappropriaterevenuesources.Althoughtheactassigns16revenuesourcestomunicipalities,LGUsdependheavilyonuserfeestofinanceoperatingexpenditures,nottomentioncriticalcapital investments.Onaverage,chargesandservice feesaccount for50–70percentof totalrevenues,mostly frompublicutility services suchaselectricityandwater,butalso fromcharges forbuildingpermits,solidwastecollection,signboards,andcemeteryfees,amongothers.
116. Addressingverticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesiscriticaltoimprovinglocalservicedeliv-eryperformance.LGUsaresupposedtoreceiverevenuefrompropertytaxes,professionallicensefees,educationtaxes,andtransportationfees,buttherevenuebasevariesdramaticallyacrossLGUs,leadingtoconsiderablehorizontalimbalances.Noregularandpredictableintergovernmentalfiscaltransferex-iststocovergenerallocalexpendituresandfundbasiccapitalinvestments.
117. WhilethepropertytaxispotentiallyasignificantrevenuesourceforLGUs,itisonlycollectedinmunicipalitiesandnotvillages,and theMinistryofFinanceandPlanning retains10percent for
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program-basedfinancing.
121. ThemainfunctionalresponsibilitiesofLGUsmustbeprofoundlyrefocused.Thecorporatiza-tionofutilityservices,suchaselectricityandwatersupply,shouldbeapriorityoverthemediumtermtoimprovethefinancialsustainabilityandperformanceofservicedelivery.OtherlocalservicesassignedtoLGUswillneedtoberevisedandupdatedfollowingseveralbasicguidelines,suchas:(i)introducingadifferentiationinfunctionalassignmentsbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs;(ii)clearlydifferentiatingbe-tweenobligatoryandvoluntaryservicesandbetweendelegatedandownservices;and(iii)clarifyingforeachcaseofdelegatedandownserviceswhoisresponsibleforthevariousaspectsofconcurrentre-sponsibilitiessuchasregulation,financing,andactualservicedelivery.
122. Provideadditionalrevenuesources,andenhancetheefficiencyofcollection.LGUslacksuffi-cientown-taxandnontaxrevenuestoprovidethepublicservicestheyhavebeenassigned.IncreasedfinancingofLGUsshouldcomeinlargepartfromown-revenuesourcesinadditiontoconditionalandunconditionaltransfers.Increasingtransparencyandimprovingservicedeliverywillbekeytoincreasingthewillingnesstopayamongcitizens.Inaddition,inordertoimproveLGUrevenues,moreattentionshouldbegiventotheefficiencywithwhichtaxesarecollected.Thepropertytaxislikelythemostsig-nificantpotentialrevenuesourceforLGUs,andthereismuchroomtoincreaseitby,forexample,ap-plyingittoallmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils,butalsorevampingandsimplifyingthecurrentvalua-tionmethodology.Globalexperiencedemonstratesthatpropertytaxdecentralizationcanhelpincreaserevenuesfromthatsource.Afirststepcouldbetodecentralizecollectiontolargemunicipalitieswiththehighestpotentialyieldwhilekeepingvalueassessmentscentralized.Theprofessionaltaxshouldbemodernizedtoincreaseitscoverage,unifyitsadministration,andreviseitsrates.LGUsarebestplacedtoadministerandcollecttheprofessionaltaxbecausetheyhaveinformationadvantagesovercentralauthorities.Finally,thePalestinianAuthorityshouldexplorebettermentlevies, i.e.,one-timechargesontheincreasedvalueofpropertiesassociatedwithurbanimprovements;assignthelandandpropertytransfertaxcurrentlyraisedbythePalestinianLandAuthoritytoLGUs;andconsiderintroducingalocalflat-rate“piggyback”personalincometaxtobepaidtothelocalgovernmentwherethetaxpayerkeepsresidence.
4.3 Strengthen LGU Accountability and Responsiveness to Increase Citizens’ Willingness to Pay
123. Absentaregularfiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernment,improvinglocalfiscalcapacitywillrequireenhancingbothrevenuecollectionandexpenditureefficiency.AccordingtotheLGPAfind-ings,householdsinthebottom40percentarelesslikelytopayforservicesthanhigher-incomehouse-holds.GiventhedeterioratingeconomicconditionsofPalestinianhouseholds,overallwillingnesstopayisunlikelytoincreasesubstantiallyinthenearfuture.MoreresponsiveLGUsareinabetterpositiontocollectmorerevenuesfromserviceusers.
124. Threedeterminantsaffecttheabilityoflocalcouncilstocollectfeesfromcitizensforprovidedservices.First,highlevelsofunemployment,especiallyinGazaandinthepoorestWestBankareas,posereal challenges topoorhouseholds inpaying their fees.Second, local councilsdonothaveeffectiveinstrumentstoencourageornudgeunwillingcitizenstopay.VeryfewLGUsapplypro-poorpaymentmodalitiesthroughpaymentplansorallowvulnerablecitizenstopayreducedamounts.BoxIV-1pro-videsanoverviewofbestpracticesthatallowedsomeLGUstoenhancecollectionefficiency.Thethirddeterminant is the lack timelinessof fiscal transfers to local councils.The lackof support from localcouncilstoincreasethewillingnessofcitizenstopayhinderseffortstoincreasecitizencommitmentsto
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payforservices(e.g.,supportenforcementorcourts).Notably,notonlyindividualusers,butalsogov-ernmentalauthoritiesandinstitutions,donotpayfortheservicestheyreceivefromLGUs.Forexample,thedeputymayorofNablusreportsthat“accumulativedebtwhichcitizensowethemunicipalityisaboutNIS310million,whilePalestinianAuthorityinstitutionslocatedinNablusoweNIS60million.”SimilararrearswerereportedinmunicipalitiesinGaza.
125. Responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentsarecriticaltobetterperformanceandtoin-creasingthewillingnesstopayamongcitizens.Inparalleltorevisingtheintergovernmentalfiscalar-chitecture,particularemphasismustbegiventostrengthening localgovernanceandcitizenengage-ment.RegardlessofthesizeandlocationofaLGUortheinstitutionalarrangementforserviceprovision,theLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentrevealsconsistentlybetterperformanceforresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernments.ThereisalargeandgrowingnumberofLGUsthathaveachievedhigher levels of service delivery performance through strengthening citizen engagement, improvingtransparency andaccountability, andenhancing local revenues.Rather thandiverting attention intonominaldebatesabouttheoptimalsizeofLGUs,moreattentionshouldbegiventosupportingeffectivegovernancearrangementsthatengagecitizensatallstagesofdevelopmentplanning,investmentprior-itization,andfeedbackonservicedeliveryperformance.
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BoxIV-1:HowdoSomeLGUsIncreaseRevenueCollectionEfficiency?
1
Duringthequalitativedatacollectionprocess,mayorsandcouncilmemberswereaskedabouttestedinnovationstoincreaseservicefeecollectionfromresidents.Theirinputissummarizedbelow.
i. Prepaidsystemsarethemosteffectivewayofincreasingcollectionrates,buttillposechallenges.Resultsfromthehouseholdsurveyaswellasthequalitativere-searchsuggestthatprepaidsystemscanhelptackletheproblemofalowlevelofwillingnesstopayforservices.Householdsusingaprepaidmeterforpipedwaterareonaverage2.85timesmorelikelytopay.Householdsusingaprepaidmeterforelectricityare20timesmorelikelytopayand1.39timesmorelikelytopayontime.Thereisalsoageneralagreementamongmayorsthattheprepaidapproachtoser-vicedeliveryishighlyeffectiveatensuringpayment.InthewordsoftheBeitKahilMayor,“payinginadvance…islikebuyingfromastore—ifyoudonotpayforit,youcannotgetit.”However,imposingaprepaidsystemisdifficultduetothecostofinstallingnewequipment.TheBeitKahilcouncil“decidedtoinstallprepaidwatermeters…itturnedoutthattheequipmentfor1,185householdsweneedforourtowncostsUSD160,000.MoLGwaswillingtoprovideUSD100,000butwecannotcovertheremainder[ofUSD60,000]…althoughweneedtheupgradeurgently.”Inaddition,imposingprepaymentforcoreservicessuchaswatercanprovokesocialbacklashformayorsandcouncils,aswasthecaseforBaniZeidalGarbiy,whereanongovernmentalorganizationgotinvolvedtopreventtheintroductionofprepaidmeters,arguingthat“waterisabasichumanrightandshouldnotbecutofffrompeoplebecausetheycannotaffordit,”accordingtothemayor.
FigureIV-1:Pre-paidMetersandCitizens’WillingnesstoPay
ii. Linking payments for different services can increase efficiency. For example,whenpayingforelectricity,citizensofSalimandBeitKahilautomaticallyhavetoalsopayforwastecollectionservices.AccordingtoacitizenfromBeitKahil,“with-outconnectingotherservicestoprepaidelectricitysupply…manypeoplewillnotpayforwastecollectionorschoolfees.”ThemayorofBeitKahilexplains:“becauseelectricityisaprepaidservicethecollectionrateis100percent.Connectingwaste
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2
collectionfeesallowsthecounciltoplanwithrevenuewithcertainty,whichwedependonheavilytopaysalariesandto improvesomeofourservices.”OthermunicipalitiessuchasBethlehemaretryingtodothesame.
iii. Discountsforpayingtotalannualfeesatonetimemobilizespaymentsandpro-videsmorestablerevenues.ManyLGUsintheWestBankandGazaoffersub-stantialreductionsinservicefeesifacitizenpaysthefullannualamountatonetime,suchasforwastecollectionorpropertytaxes.ThedeputymayorofBeth-lehemdescribesthemethodadoptedbyhismunicipality:“Peoplereceive20per-cent discountwhen they pay the fullannual amount in January,15 percent inFebruary,10percentinMarch,and5percentinApril.”Eventhoughthemethoddoesnotensurethatallcitizenspayforservices,itreducespaymentdelaysandmakeslocalgovernmentunit(LGU)revenuestreamsmorepredictable.Accord-ing to themayorof Khan Yunis: “In thepastweused tohave awrongpolicy,rewardingpeoplewhodidnotpaybyofferingdiscountstoencourage themtopay…however,nowweadoptedareversepolicyofencouragingthosewhoarecommittedandpaytheirfeesontime….”
iv. Socialpressurecanbeaneffectivemethodinsmallerandmid-sizeLGUs.Askedhowserviceprovidersshouldreactincasehouseholdsdonotpayforpipedwa-ter,solidwastecollectionservices,orelectricity,only1in20householdsintheWestBankandGazasuggestdisconnectingthehousehold,whilealmosthalfofthehouseholdssuggestasthemostviableoptionvisitingthehouseholdtoun-derstandtheproblemsit isfacing.Suchformsofsocialpressureareespeciallyusedinvillagesandsmallertownstoencouragelate-payerstosettletheirdebtsto local councils.Themayorof Salimdescribeshowhepersonallyhelped theelectricityutilitycollectfeesfromcitizensinthevillagebygoingfromhousetohouse.“Thecompanydidwanttotellthepoliceandweusedsocialpressuretosolvethisissue…wesolved50percentofit…wewentfromhousetohousewiththem.”Somevillagecouncilsorganizevisitstononpayinghouseholds totry to“understandtheirfinancialsituationandfindsomesolutionsaccordingly.”Simi-larly,thecityengineerofHebronreportsthat“wepreferfamilyinfluencemorethanresortingtothelaworpolice.Wegotoanareaoraneighborhoodandtalktoasocialor tribalfigure…whouseshispersonnelandfamilyconnectionstosolvetheissue.”
v. Offeringpaymentplanstosettledelayedpayments.AlargeshareofPalestinianhouseholds suggest that a service provider should offer a payment plan if ahouseholdisnotpayingforpipedwater(44percent),solidwastecollection(39percent),orelectricity(46percent).Infact,mostLGUstrytoreachsettlementsorsignpaymentplanswithhouseholdsthathaveoverduepayments.AccordingtotheGazaCitydirector,“wedevelopapaymentplanforpeoplewhocannotaffordpaying[but]wedonotapplyageneral-decreaseoffees…[becauseotherhouseholdswouldalsostoppaying].However,we resort tocourttodealwiththosewhodonotwanttopay.”Similarly,themayorofGazasaysthat“ifacitizenhasacumulativedebt,weask[thehousehold]topaythenextbillandpayapartofthedebt,suchasanadditional50NIS,everytimethefuturebillsarepaid.”
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3
And the Mayor of Ramallah notes: “Our municipality sent official letters tohouseholdsinformingthemofthedebttheyhavetopayandencouragingthemtocometoreachasettlementwiththemunicipality.Asettlementdoesnotin-cludeanydiscountbutisonlybasedonascheduledrepaymentapproach.”
FigureIV-2:Non-payment:HowShouldServiceProvidersRespond?
vi. CertificatesofclearanceareleveragedbyLGUstoencouragecitizenstopayservicefees.Amongthemosteffectiveapproachestonudgecitizensintopayingforservicesare"certificatesofclearance.Theselettersverifythatnofeesandtaxes are overdue. Local councils use the certificates as a pre-condition forprovidingcitizenswithofficiallettersandotherservices.
vii. Otherinnovations,suchasdecentralizedpaymentlocations,canhaveaposi-tiveimpactontheefficiencyoffeecollection.Providingcitizenswiththeoptionofmakingpaymentsatadecentralized location, suchasaCSC,OSS,or localshop,canincreasefee-collectionrates.ThecitymanagerofNablusisconsider-ingissuing"VIP"cardstorewardcitizenswhopayontime.“Thiscardwouldberenewedannuallyandallowsitsholdertoreceive‘fastertreatment’whentheyapproachthemunicipalityoroneofitsoffices…asarewardfortheircommit-ments.”
viii. Resorting tocourt. In someLGUs, especially in largecities suchasGazaCity(withapopulationof700,000),localcouncilssometimesresorttocourtasalastoptiontoforcepeopletopayfortheservicestheyreceive.However,itremainsunclearhoweffectivesuchanapproachis,particularlygiventhatdelayedandnon-paymentsareoftendrivenbyunemploymentandpoverty.Inaddition,lessthan4percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankandGazabelievethatserviceprovidersshouldtakecasesofhouseholdsnotpayingfortheservicestheyre-ceivetocourt.
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4.4 Consolidate and Professionalize Service Delivery
126. Aclearpolicyformoreprofessionalandcorporatizedservicedeliverymustbedeveloped.JointServiceCouncilsplayacriticalroleinconsolidatingservicedeliverybecausetheycangraduallyassumeserviceoperationfunctionsfromsmallandmostlyweakLGUs,providetheneededscale,anddevelopintothenucleusofafutureregionalpublicutility.However,JSCsdonotbythemselvesguaranteebetterservicedeliveryperformanceiftheyarenotmatchedwithmoreprofessionalmanagementandstrongaccountabilitymechanismsintermsofserviceusersaswellasthelocalauthoritiestheyrepresent.Largevariationsintheperformanceofsingle-andmultipleserviceJSCssuggestanurgentneedtoestablishaclearactionplanincoordinationwiththeresponsiblelineagencies,particularlythePalestinianWaterAuthority,toseparateandprofessionalizeserviceoperations,withclearlyassignedrevenuestreamsandmeasurableperformancestandardstooperateasindependentutilities.Overall,Palestinianpolicymak-ersshouldaimat integratingvillagesandmunicipalities intomoredenselypopulatedurbanareastoachievebetterperformanceoutcomes.Publicutilitiescanbeaneffectivemeansofregionalintegration.
127. CorporatizingpublicserviceutilitieswillrequireclearingLGUarrearsandstrengtheningthegovernancestructureforserviceprovision.Afirstcriticalsteptodisentanglefinancialflows,understandexpenditureefficiency,andeventuallysolvethenetlendingissueistoestablishseparatecostaccountsforutilityservices,particularlywaterandwastewaterandsolidwastemanagement.Theestablishmentofdistributioncompaniesintheenergysectorhasbeenadecisivepushintherightdirectiontoring-fenceandcommercializeelectricitydistributionfunctions,althoughrevenuescontinueflowingbackintheformofdividends.However,currentbudgetingandreportingpracticesdonotallowforconsistentandtransparenttrackingoffinancialflows;andoverallpaymentdisciplineislow.Inadditiontoseparat-ingaccountsandapplyingfunctionalbudgetclassificationtoimproveLGUbudgetingandreporting,ex-istingandwell-performingsingle-service JSCsshouldbetransformed intomore independententitieswiththegoalofbecomingutilitiesoverthemediumterm.Withanewbylawonjoint-serviceprovision,theMinistryofLocalGovernmenthasstartedadoptingamoreutility-drivenapproachtogoverningJSCs.However, implementationhasbeen slow, and there is no consensus yeton the trajectory that JSCsshouldaspiretobetweenthespectrumof“umbrella-LGU”to“commercialserviceoperator.”TheMoLGneedstodefineaclearpolicydirectivewithcross-PAbuy-in.
128. JSCsshouldbeheldtohigherstandards,buttheywillrequireadditionalsupport.MostoftheJSCssufferfromaweakfinancingstructureandhavelittleownrevenues.Feecollectionisweakandthetariffschargedrarelycoveroperatingcosts,letalonecapitalreplacementanddepreciation.Overall,bill-ingandaccountingsystemsneedanoverhaul.OnlyhalfoftheJSCsassessedbytheWorldBankwereablepresentabudgetthathadbeenapprovedbytheGeneralAssembly.AnnualJSCaccountsrarelyundergoanexternalaudit,especiallyPlanningandDevelopmentJSCs.Introducingmorerigidauditingrequirementsisanimportantsteptowardimprovingtransparencyandaccountability.Strongerclientorientationandcitizenfeedbackwillrequireestablishingcomplaintmechanisms,mostofwhicharecur-rentlyweakornonexistent.Mostimportantly,JSCsshouldbegivenmoreindependence,andtheirbot-tom-upaccountabilitylinkstothememberLGUsandserviceusersstrengthened,ratherthantop-downtotheMoLG,whichcurrentlyreviewsandapprovesJSCbudgets,hassignificantleewayintheallocationofdevelopmentfunds,andisconsideringestablishingadirectbudgetlinetofinanceJSCs.Inparallel,specifictechnicalcapacityandinstitutionalstrengtheningtosupportbetterperformingJSCsareneededtohelpthosethataretransformingintoprofessionalanddedicatedserviceoperators.Astrongerrolefortheprivatesectorneedstobeconsidered,drawingonrecentpositiveexperiences,forexampleintheHigherJSCforSolidWasteManagementinthesouthernWestBank.
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4.5 Increase Density and Connectivity, and Support the Marginalized that the PA Cannot Reach
129. PoliciestosupportincreaseddensitywillhaveanimpactonLGUperformanceandthecostofservicedelivery.Globalevidencesuggestsastrongcorrelationbetweenincreaseddensityandexpendi-tureefficiency,whichhasbeenconfirmedbytheLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentfindings.Percapitacostofservicedeliveryincreaseswithdecliningdensity,giventhatthenumberofhouseholdsservedismuchlowerinlessdenselypopulatedareas.Thishasadirectimpactonthecapitalandoper-atingcostofinfrastructurenetworksandserviceprovision,suchasthewaterandsewagepipemeters,andoperatinghoursforsolidwastecollectiontrucksthathavetocoveralargeserviceareawithfewusers.ThepoliciesofthePalestinianAuthoritycanhelpinfacilitatingdenserdevelopmentincitiesandmunicipalities,includingbutnotlimitedto:adjustingcurrentfloor-to-arearatiosforbuildingpermits,whichcurrentlycurtailnewdevelopmentstoeight-storybuildings;introducingvacantlandfeestopro-videanincentiveforbringingidlelandbacktomarket;andotherzoningregulationstoallowfordenser,mixed-useddevelopments.
130. Reducingthecostof remotenessand improvingconnectivitycanalso improveLGUperfor-mance.PalestinianLGUsareconstrainedbytheterritorialfragmentationimposedasaresultofAreaCrestrictions,severelylimitingtheextenttowhichinvestmentsintheregionalroadsnetworkcanimproveconnectivityandaccessforremotecommunities.Selectedimprovementsinthetransportationnetworkandbettertrafficmanagement,particularlyinlargerurbanagglomerations,maycontributetothere-ductioninthecostofremotenessandimproveconnectivity.However,thedirectimpactofthePalestin-ianAuthority'spoliciesandinvestmentdecisionsisrathermarginalduetotheconstraintsinthePales-tinianterritories,andaddressingissuesofremotenesstoimproveLGUperformancewillrequireactionsbytheIsraeliCivilAdministration(ICA).Nevertheless,basedonselectpositiveexamples,thePalestinianAuthority,incoordinationwithDevelopmentPartners,shouldconsidermakingspecificproposalstotheICAforexpandingcriticalaccessroadsordevelopingotherpracticalsolutionstobetterserveremotecommunities.Since2012,around113masterplanshavebeenpreparedtosupportcapitalinvestmentandservicedeliveryimprovementsin77LGUswithPalestiniancommunitieslivinginAreaC.However,todate,onlyfiveoftheplanshavebeenapprovedbytheICA.Theothermasterplansthatweresubmit-tedforapprovalarestillawaitingadecision,81ofthemhavebeenpendingformorethan18months.
131. Complementaryandtargetedpoliciestosupportcitizensinmarginalizedcommunitiesmustbedeveloped.LocalgovernmentsectorsupportalonewillnotsufficetoaddressthelargedifferencesinlivingstandardsacrossPalestine,particularlyunderthecurrentregimeofmovementrestrictions.AsignificantgroupofLGUshavereceivedsubstantialexternalsupport,butremainatlowlevelsofservicedeliveryoutcomes,includingmarginalizedLGUswithhighratesofpovertyand/orthatareheavilyaf-fectedbytheprevailingmovementandaccessrestrictions.Socialprotectionpolicies,suchascashtrans-fersorothertargetedinterventionstodirectlyreachthepoorarecriticalgiventhestrongcorrelationbetweenincreasinghouseholdwealthandbetterLGUperformance.Localgovernmentsupportcannotfullysubstitutecorefunctionsthataretheresponsibilityofthecentralgovernment.
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4.6 Benchmarking for Improving Local Government Performance
132. Finally,theMinistryofLocalGovernmentshouldinstitutionalizeperformancebenchmarkingandmakeitanintegralinstrumentforevidenced-basedpolicymaking.TheLocalGovernmentPerfor-manceAssessmenthasdevelopedaninstrumentthatcanbereplicatedinthefuturetotrackperfor-mancetrendsandimprovements,assessefficacyofpolicymeasures,andregularlyevaluatedonorsup-port.FollowingthesuccessfulexampleofbenchmarkingundertheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram,theMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheMoLGshouldconsiderlinkingcapitalgrantallocationstoclearperformancetargetsinLGUs.Regularnationalbenchmarkingoflocalservicedeliveryperformancecan serveas thebasis fora conditional grant transferprogram, linkinggrantallocation to theclear,sector-specificpolicyobjectivesofthePalestinianAuthority,e.g.,intheenergyandwatersector.Fur-thermore,thedataofLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentcanassistinmeasuringexpenditureefficiencytobetterunderstandtheuseofscarcepublicresourcesatthelocallevel.TheMinistryofLocalGovernmenthasalreadyestablishedaneffectivegeospatialdepartmentthathasdevelopedanonlinelocalgovernmentinformationsystem.Inaddition,theMunicipalDevelopmentandLendingFundhasuniqueexperienceinmanagingaperformance-basedgrantmechanismandprovidingtargetedcapacity-buildingsupporttomunicipalities.ThesearetremendousassetsthatPalestinianlocalgovernmentscanrelyonastheystrivetocontinueimprovingperformanceforthebenefitoftheircitizens.
133. Thedatacollectedforthisanalysiscanhavewidespreaduseinongoingorplanneddevelop-mentprograms.TheyprovidethePalestinianAuthorityandDevelopmentPartnerswithauniqueop-portunitytocomplementthesupply-sidedatathattheMunicipalDevelopmentLendingFundcollectsfrommunicipalitiesfortheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram’sperformancerankingwithdemand-sideinformationonservicedeliveryoutcomes.Particularly,dataonLGUresponsivenessandcitizensatisfac-tioncanstrengthenthecurrentassessmentof localaccountability,providingamorecomprehensivewaytoassessLGUperformanceinthiscriticalfocusarea.TherecentlylaunchedUSAID-financed“Com-munitiesThrive”ProgramwilluseLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentfortheirbaselineassess-mentandimpactmonitoringovertheprogram'slifetime.Furthermore,theMinistryofLocalGovern-mentshouldusetheLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmenttomonitorservicedeliveryimprove-mentsintheprogramvillagessupportedbytheLocalGovernanceandServicesImprovementProgram.
134. Citizenscorecards.Atthelocallevel,theLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentallowsforabroaderapplicationofcitizenscorecards.EachLGUcouldbeprovidedwithascorethatcouldbemadepubliclyavailabletohelpcitizenandcommunity-basedorganizationsunderstandtherelativepositionoftheirLGUcomparedwithotherlocalauthorities.Substantialglobalexperienceexistsdemonstratingthe positive impact of strengthening citizen engagement at the local level, spurring innovation andknowledgeexchangeamongLGUs,providingadditionalincentivesforimprovement,andtrackingpro-gressovertime.
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References
Araj,Bader.2017.“QualitativeResearchReportFocusGroupDiscussionsandKeyInformantInterviews.”WestBankandGaza:LocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessment.WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.BritishMandateofPalestine.1942.“JerusalemDistrictOutlineRegionalPlanningSchemeRJ/5.”BritishMandatePalestine.BritishMandateofPalestine.1945.“SamariaDistrictRegionalOutlinePlanningSchemeS15.”BritishMandatePalestine.IFC/PPIAF (International Finance Corporation/Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility). 2015.“West Bank andGaza - Assessing the Potential for Public-Private Partnerships.”World BankGroup.WashingtonD.C.MDLF(MunicipalDevelopmentLendingFund).2016.“AnnualReport2016.”Ramallah.Niksic,Orhan,andNurNasserEddin.2016.“PublicExpenditureReview-Palestinianterritories.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.Niksic,Orhan,NurNasserEddin,andMassimilianoCali.2013.“WestBankandGaza-AreaCandtheFutureofPalestinianEconomy.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.PalestinianNationalAuthority.1994.“Town,VillageandBuildingPlanningLaw,No.79,1966.”Ramallah.PalestinianNationalAuthority.1997.“LocalAuthoritiesLaw,1997.”Ramallah.PalestinianNationalAuthority.2014.“WaterLaw,2014.”Ramallah.PalestinianNationalAuthority.2016. “PalestinianNationalPolicyAgenda2017-2022PuttingCitizensFirst.”Ramallah.PalestinianCentralBureauof Statistics,Various years. PopulationsProjections (database).Ramallah,http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/803/default.aspxUNOCHA(UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs).2009.“RestrictingSpace:ThePlanningRegimeAppliedbyIsraelinAreaCoftheWestBank.”UnitedNations.NewYork.UNOCHA(UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs).2013.“IntheSpotlight:AreaCVulnerabilityProfile.”UnitedNations.NewYork.WHO/UNICEF(WorldHealthOrganization/UnitedNationsChildren'sFund).Variousyears.JointMoni-toringProgramme(JMP)forWaterSupplyandSanitation.Geneva,https://www.wssinfo.org/WorldBank.Variousyears.WorldDevelopment Indicators (database).WashingtonD.C.,http://data-bank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicatorsWorldBank.2007.“WestBankandGazaTransportSectorStrategyNote.”WorldBankGroup.Washing-tonD.C.
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WorldBank.2014.“StrategicFrameworkforMainstreamingCitizenEngagementinWorldBankGroupOperations.”Washington,DC.WorldBank.2015.“JointServicesCouncilAssessmentintheWestBankandGaza.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.WorldBank.2016.“EconomicMonitoringReporttotheAdHocLiaisonCommittee:mainreport.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C. WorldBank.2017.“TowardWaterSecurityforPalestinians,WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiag-nostic”.WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.
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Annex
Annex 1: Methodology of Household Survey
BackgroundandObjectiveAsexistingmunicipaldataisverylimitedinitsscopeandonlycoversminimalinputsintoservicedelivery,ahouseholdsurveycoveringmorethan380PalestinianLGUSwasconducted.ThemaingoaloftheLGPAsurveyistoestablishthequantitativebasisforanalyzingperformanceofPalestinianlocalgovernmentsandabaselineforfuturebenchmarkingtotargetinvestmentandpolicyinterventions.Thehouseholdsurveydata for thefirst timeallowsforanassessmentonthe ‘demandside’ofservicedeliveryout-comes,suchasaccess,qualityandreliability,responsiveness,andwillingnesstopayforservicesman-datedtomunicipalitiesandVCs.DataCollectionThequantitativedatacollectionfortheLGPAwasconductedbyAlphaInternationalforPolling,ResearchandInformatics,aPalestinianenterprisethatoperatesthroughouttheWestBankandGaza.ThedatacollectionwasconductedbetweenAugust15,2016andFebruary9,2017,usingTabletAssistedPersonalInterviewing(TAPI),andconsistedoftwoparts:
1) HouseholdSurvey(longinterview)
Thehouseholdsurveydatafocusesonaccesstopublicservices,qualityandreliabilityofservicedelivery,andcitizens’participationandwillingnesstopay,whichallowsforanin-depthanalysisofthedriversofLGUperformanceinservicedelivery.Thesurveymodulesincludeaservicedeliveryassessmentofthefollowing sectors: (i) water supply; (ii) waste water; (iii) electricity; (iv) solid waste collection; (v)education; (vi)public transport; (vii)healthcare;and (viii) local roads. Inaddition, themodulesalsocollecteddataon(ix)householddemographicsandsocio-economics;(x)citizenparticipation;and(xi)willingnesstopay.
2) ServiceDeliveryPoll(shortinterview)
Theservicedeliverypollisusedtocollectacoresetofservicedeliveryoutcomeindicatorsduringarapidface-to-facepollingassessmentforallmunicipalitiesandVCs.Thepollingdatacomplementsthemorecomprehensivehouseholdsurvey.SamplingThe survey sample is representative for the entire population. The household sample of N=11,970householdsisdesignedtoberepresentativeattheGovernorateandtheLGUlevel.Thesampleispopu-lationweightedandbasedonaremotesensingsamplingframework.ThetotalavailablesampleincludesN=9,562longinterviewsandanadditionalN=2,408shortinterviews.
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Annex 2: Methodology Qualitative Analysis
FocusGroupsandStakeholderInterviewswereconductedin8majorcitiesandin10small&medium-sizeLGUsinboththeWestBankandGaza.Theselectionwasconductedbasedon:
• Size(PCBSpopulationdata)
• LGUtype(municipality/villagecouncil)
• Modeofservicedelivery(individualvs.jointservicecouncil)
• Incomelevel(MDLFData)
• Performanceinservicedelivery(LGPAhouseholdsurveyresults)
AparticularfocusofthequalitativeanalysiswastoidentifythedriversofLGUperformance,particu-larly(i)theeffectivenessofJointServiceCouncils,(ii)theroleofinstitutionalcapacity,and(iii)theim-pactofimprovementintransparencyandaccountability.
FigureA2-1:MunicipalitiesandVCsSelectionforQualitativeAnalysis
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Annex 3: Methodology LGPA Performance Index
ThekeyobjectiveoftheLGPAperformanceindexistoconductcomparisonsoflocalgovernmentper-formanceacrossallLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,inordertogainbetterinsightsintothemaindriversofservicedeliveryandhowtocloseexistinggapsinLGUperformance.TheaimoftheIndexistoprovideatoolforbothpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartnerstoidentifyandtargetinterventionsinVCsandmunicipalities.Threedimensionsareusedforeachofthefourcoresectorstoconstructacomprehen-sivemeasure:methodologically,fortheservicespipedwater,pipedsewage,andsolidwastecollectionservice,LGUperformanceismodeledasaCobb-Douglas-stylefunction,takingintoaccountcitizensat-isfactionwithbothservicequalityandreliability,
FigureA3-1:MethodologyLGPAPerformanceIndex
,whereAccessreferstothepercentshareofcitizensinLGUithathasaccesstoservices,QualitytothepercentshareofcitizensinLGUithatissatisfiedwithqualityofservices,andReliabilitytothepercentshareofcitizensinLGUithatissatisfiedwithreliabilityofservices.Forroads,theLGUperformancescoreisdefinedastheshareofcitizensinLGUithatarelocatedatapavedroad.
TheoverallLGUperformanceindexscoreisthenobtainedbycalculatingtheaverageofthefourindi-vidualservicescores,normalizedtoarangeof0to100.Byweightingthesatisfactionoutcomeswiththeshareofcitizenswithaccesstothecoreservices,theindexrewardsLGUswithhigheraccessrates,whilepenalizingLGUs, inwhichonlysmallsharesofcitizensareprovidedaccesstothecoreservices.Asaresult,onlythoseLGUsreachhighscoresthat(i)achievestrongscoresinmultipledimensionsand(ii)provideservicesforasignificantshareofcitizens.
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Annex 4: Regression Results
Service Access
Sample: West Bank
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Household Head 1.288 0.998 0.975 1.081
(0.499) (0.245) (0.190) (0.115)
Village Council 0.795 0.642** 0.593* 1.222***
(0.172) (0.109) (0.147) (0.062)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 3.057 1.025 0.174** 1.185
(1.928) (0.280) (0.097) (0.120)
- South West Bank 0.981 0.555* 0.183*** 1.000
(0.372) (0.148) (0.089) (0.078)
Bottom 40% Household 0.529*** 0.741 0.686** 0.844
(0.084) (0.135) (0.094) (0.074)
LGPA Performance Index 1.043*** 1.087*** 1.048*** 1.078***
For Sector (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
Pseudo R-squared 0.192 0.674 0.223 0.119
Number of Observations 9,048 9,028 9,050 9,052
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 1: Likelihood of Service Access - West Bank (Figure II-17 & Figure II-18)
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Service Access
Sample: Gaza
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Household head 1.865* 0.793 1.410 1.087 (0.551) (0.286) (0.342) (0.231)
Bottom 40% Household 0.805 0.967 1.005 0.778 (0.166) (0.263) (0.143) (0.105)
Performance Index 1.039** 1.091*** 1.058*** 1.041**
For Sector (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002)
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.340 0.136 0.031
Number of Observations 1,455 1,453 1,455 1,455
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to Gaza. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 2: Likelihood of Service Access - Gaza (Figure II-17 & Figure II-18)
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Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability
Sample: West Bank
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Household head 1.143 1.352 1.023 1.258 (0.090) (0.497) (0.127) (0.231)
Village Council 1.021 1.289 1.023 0.638** (0.048) (0.268) (0.050) (0.096)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 1.132 1.251 1.160** 1.436(0.116) (0.335) (0.064) (0.344)
- South West Bank 1.157 1.731*** 1.081 1.558 (0.168) (0.241) (0.050) (0.450)
Bottom 40% 0.987 1.127 1.283* 1.019 (0.115) (0.449) (0.136) (0.090)
Performance Index 1.051*** 1.009* 1.049*** 1.032***
For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008)
Pseudo R-squared 0.212 0.013 0.120 0.029
Number of Observations 8,331 1,233 8,394 7,401
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 3: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - West Bank (Figure II-19 & Figure II-20)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
90
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
86
Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability
Sample: Gaza
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Household head 0.964 1.417* 0.488 1.008 (0.136) (0.230) (0.249) (0.416)
Bottom 40% Household 1.042 0.626 1.145 1.379 (0.141) (0.184) (0.305) (0.431)
Performance Index 1.042*** 0.997 1.027*** 1.032**
For Sector (0.007) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012)
Pseudo R-squared 0.069 0.010 0.035 0.018
Number of Observations 1,227 861 1,064 1,140
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to Gaza. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 4: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - Gaza (Figure II-19 & Figure II-20)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
91
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
87
Likelihood of Payment Piped Water
Solid Waste Collection
(1) (2)
Bottom 40% Household 0.460* 0.373*** (0.157) (0.076)
Village Council 0.705 2.571 (0.269) (1.302)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank 0.931 3.629 (0.998) (2.754)
- South West Bank 0.370 1.391 (0.312) (1.032)
- Gaza 0.0310*** 0.0424***
(0.026) (0.024)
Satisfaction with Quality and Relia-bility
1.362* 1.396 (0.196) (0.266)
Agrees that LGU Is very Responsive 1.238 1.001
(0.205) (0.178)
Performance Index 0.994 0.985
For Sector (0.006) (0.010)
Pseudo R-squared 0.266 0.421
Number of Observations 6,572 5,550
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Governorate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 5: Likelihood of Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services (Figure II-22)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
92
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
88
Likelihood of Timely Payment Piped Water
Solid Waste Collection
(1) (2)
Bottom 40% 0.567*** 0.635** (0.045) (0.088)
Village Council 0.789 1.037 (0.161) (0.223)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank 0.932 1.683 (0.372) (0.779)
- South West Bank 0.439*** 0.641 (0.088) (0.155)
- Gaza 1.245 1.314
(0.324) (0.245)
Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability 1.140 1.186
(0.231) (0.111)
Agrees that LGU Is very Responsive 1.728*** 1.758** (0.226) (0.341)
Performance Index 1.004 1.019**
For Sector (0.005) (0.006)
Pseudo R-squared 0.061 0.062
Number of Observations 6,841 6,850
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Governorate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 6: Likelihood of Timely Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services (Figure II-26)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
93
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
89
Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: 1,000 m Distance to
Separation Barrier
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m)
0.806 1.038 1.065 0.998
(0.319) (0.227) (0.323) (0.137)
Village Council 0.795 0.702* 0.620 1.230*** (0.160) (0.119) (0.172) (0.058)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 3.328* 1.155 0.206* 1.190*(1.942) (0.340) (0.128) (0.102)
- South West Bank 1.020 0.615* 0.214** 0.986 (0.404) (0.144) (0.106) (0.076)
Bottom 40% Household 0.536*** 0.817 0.751** 0.849 (0.072) (0.154) (0.076) (0.072)
Performance Index 1.045*** 1.086*** 1.047*** 1.080***
For Sector (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.665 0.205 0.129
Number of Observations 10,270 10,270 10,270 10,270
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 7: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) (Figure III-9)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
94
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
90
Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: 500 m Distance to
Separation Barrier
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to Separation Barrier (500m)
0.532* 0.900 1.071 0.891
(0.164) (0.174) (0.314) (0.080)
Village Council 0.796 0.696* 0.617 1.228*** (0.174) (0.116) (0.166) (0.056)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 3.406* 1.195 0.207** 1.203*(1.921) (0.389) (0.126) (0.098)
- South West Bank 1.018 0.612* 0.214** 0.982 (0.397) (0.140) (0.106) (0.071)
Bottom 40% Household 0.537*** 0.815 0.751** 0.847 (0.075) (0.155) (0.076) (0.072)
Performance Index 1.045*** 1.086*** 1.047*** 1.080***
For Sector (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
Pseudo R-squared 0.202 0.665 0.205 0.130
Number of Observations 10,270 10,270 10,270 10,270
Table A4 - 8: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) (Figure III-9)
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
95
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
91
Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: 250m Distance to
Separation Barrier
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to Separation Barrier (250m)
0.529** 0.796 0.692 0.997
(0.103) (0.295) (0.195) (0.183)
Village Council 0.788 0.697* 0.609 1.230*** (0.177) (0.116) (0.159) (0.055)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 3.315* 1.191 0.212** 1.190(1.925) (0.372) (0.127) (0.107)
- South West Bank 1.016 0.613* 0.213** 0.986 (0.395) (0.141) (0.106) (0.071)
Bottom 40% Household 0.539*** 0.815 0.749** 0.849 (0.076) (0.155) (0.077) (0.071)
Performance Index 1.045*** 1.086*** 1.046*** 1.080***
For Sector (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.665 0.205 0.129
Number of Observations 10,276 10,276 10,276 10,276
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 9: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) (Figure III-9)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
96
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
92
Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: Area C
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Area C Household 0.692 0.792 0.348*** 0.611** (0.194) (0.621) (0.078) (0.100)
Village Council 0.806 0.701* 0.610* 1.251*** (0.173) (0.120) (0.148) (0.062)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central WB 3.306* 1.196 0.240* 1.223* (1.893) (0.356) (0.138) (0.097)
- South West Bank 1.030 0.618* 0.227** 1.002 (0.398) (0.142) (0.111) (0.071)
Bottom 40% Household 0.541*** 0.821 0.768* 0.853 (0.075) (0.166) (0.083) (0.074)
Performance Index 1.045*** 1.086*** 1.044*** 1.080***
For Sector (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.665 0.221 0.132
Number of Observations 10,276 10,276 10,276 10,276
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 10: Likelihood of Service Access: Area C (Figure III-9)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
97
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
93
Likelihood of Service Sat-isfaction: 1,000m to Sep-
aration Barrier
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m)
0.947 0.908 0.954 0.828
(0.087) (0.136) (0.037) (0.133)
Village Council 1.030 1.338 1.001 0.648** (0.048) (0.217) (0.042) (0.094)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 1.058 1.042 1.214*** 1.405(0.079) (0.186) (0.054) (0.329)
- South West Bank 1.141 1.467** 1.073 1.463 (0.152) (0.197) (0.046) (0.417)
Bottom 40% Household 0.978 0.991 1.254* 1.037 (0.081) (0.294) (0.127) (0.091)
Performance Index 1.051*** 1.013** 1.048*** 1.031***
For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007)
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.012 0.121 0.028
Number of Observations 9,467 1,467 9,525 8,298
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 11: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) (Figure III-10)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
98
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
94
Likelihood of Service Sat-isfaction: 500m to Sepa-
ration Barrier
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to Separation Barrier (500m)
1.060 0.638*** 0.907 0.708*
(0.112) (0.075) (0.059) (0.108)
Village Council 1.034 1.309 1.001 0.649** (0.049) (0.207) (0.043) (0.094)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 1.041 1.113 1.218*** 1.417(0.073) (0.179) (0.062) (0.328)
- South West Bank 1.142 1.451** 1.073 1.471 (0.156) (0.203) (0.045) (0.423)
Bottom 40% Household 0.980 0.982 1.253* 1.036 (0.081) (0.287) (0.127) (0.091)
Performance Index 1.051*** 1.013** 1.048*** 1.031***
For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008)
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.015 0.121 0.028
Number of Observations 9,467 1,467 9,525 8,298
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 12: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) (Figure III-10)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
99
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
95
Likelihood of Service Satis-faction: 250m to Separa-
tion Barrier
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to Separation Barrier (250m)
0.788 0.726 0.729* 0.573***
(0.100) (0.142) (0.095) (0.059)
Village Council 1.030 1.352* 1.001 0.651** (0.048) (0.199) (0.042) (0.096)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 1.057 1.052 1.218*** 1.389(0.081) (0.188) (0.063) (0.319)
- South West Bank 1.143 1.479** 1.075 1.483 (0.153) (0.193) (0.043) (0.428)
Bottom 40% Household 0.978 0.990 1.252* 1.038 (0.080) (0.290) (0.127) (0.091)
Performance Index 1.051*** 1.013** 1.048*** 1.031***
For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008)
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.012 0.121 0.028
Number of Observations 9,467 1,467 9,525 8,298
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 13: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) (Figure III-10)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
100
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
96
Likelihood of Service Satis-faction: Area C
Piped Water
Piped Sewage
Solid Waste Collection
Local Roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Area C Household 0.904 0.765 0.889 0.631* (0.107) (0.432) (0.057) (0.123)
Village Council 1.036 1.354* 1.004 0.654** (0.047) (0.203) (0.043) (0.096)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 1.053 1.071 1.209*** 1.385(0.080) (0.170) (0.056) (0.312)
- South West Bank 1.148 1.501** 1.081 1.501 (0.156) (0.194) (0.045) (0.438)
Bottom 40% Household 0.981 1.000 1.256* 1.048 (0.079) (0.288) (0.126) (0.088)
Performance Index 1.051*** 1.013*** 1.048*** 1.031***
For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 1.031***
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.013 0.121 0.030
Number of Observations 9,467 1,467 9,525 8,298
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 14: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Area C (Figure III-10)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
101
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
97
Likelihood of Payment Piped Water
Electricity
(1) (2)
Bottom 40% Household 0.414*** 0.320** (0.093) (0.116)
Village Council 0.0336*** 0.739 (0.025) (0.208)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank 0.502 0.556 (0.447) (0.552)
- South West Bank 0.324 0.882 (0.241) (0.714)
- Gaza 0.0336*** 0.164
(0.025) (0.340)
Pre-Paid Meter 2.847** 19.71*** (0.960) (16.703)
Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability 1.369* 1.623 (0.212) (0.518)
Performance Index for 0.996 1.007
Sector (0.006) (0.022)
Pseudo R-squared 0.243 0.328
Number of Observations 8,330 7,655
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 15: Likelihood of Payment - Pre-Paid Meters and Citizen Willingness to Pay (Figure IV-1)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
102
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
98
Likelihood of Timely Payment Piped Water
Electricity
(1) (2)
Bottom 40% Household 0.561*** 0.575*** (0.040) (0.054)
Village Council 1.791 0.861 (0.636) (0.225)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank 1.105 1.579 (0.460) (0.758)
- South West Bank 0.496*** 0.589* (0.086) (0.152)
- Gaza 1.791 12.77***
(0.636) (9.332)
Pre-Paid Meter 1.233 1.394*
(0.142) (0.222)
Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability 1.190 1.242
(0.277) (0.187)
Performance Index 1.004 1.020*
For Sector (0.005) (0.008)
Pseudo R-squared 0.059 0.059
Number of Observations 7,510 8,698
Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 16: Likelihood of Timely Payment - Pre-Paid Meters and Citizen Willingness to Pay (Figure IV-1)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
103
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
99
LGU Performance Index Total
Sample Total Mu-nicipalities
WB Munici-palities
Gaza Munic-ipalities
Village Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population 1.958* 2.701 3.428* 1.664 0.783
(0.962) (1.374) (1.617) (2.337) (1.387)
Village Council -5.043*
(2.074)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -4.465** -3.000 -3.083 -5.517**
(1.646) (2.616) (2.597) (2.082)
- South West Bank -12.64*** -9.037** -9.588** -15.38***
(2.052) (2.960) (3.012) (2.730)
- Gaza -18.69***
(3.856)
Adj R-Squared 0.146 0.129 0.056 -0.024 0.110
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 17: Differences in LGU Performance across Regions and LGU Types (Figure III-2)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
104
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
100
LGU Performance Index Total
Sample
(1)
Total Munici-palities
(2)
WB Munici-palities
(3)
Gaza Munici-palities
(4)
Village Councils
(5)
Log LGU Population 1.210 0.0270 -0.617 1.712 0.350
(0.952) (1.632) (1.705) (3.669) (1.356)
Village Council -4.919*
(2.058)
Distance to Gov. Center (Reference: 1st Quintile):
- 2nd Quintile -4.898 -11.32* -15.76*** -2.458 -4.425
(2.492) (4.442) (4.491) (10.019) (3.174)
- 3rd Quintile -4.958* -9.433* -13.07** 6.574 -3.460
(2.476) (4.430) (4.550) (11.234) (3.090)
- 4th Quintile -6.285** -12.13** -15.05*** -5.005
(2.345) (4.137) (4.237) (2.968)
- 5th Quintile -10.90*** -17.68*** -20.55*** -9.709**
(2.482) (4.074) (4.184) (2.977)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 5.278** 3.162 2.884 7.041***
(1.639) (2.502) (2.519) (2.084)
- South West Bank -7.659*** -4.695 -4.336-
9.289***
(1.907) (2.542) (2.451) (2.531)
- Gaza -16.09*** -16.66***
(3.861) (4.419)
Adj. R-Squared 0.183 0.239 0.239 -0.101 0.135
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 18: Remoteness - Distance to Governorate Center and LGU Performance (Figure III-3)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
105
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
101
LGU Performance Index Total
Sample Total Munici-
palities WB Munici-
palities Gaza Munici-
palities Village
Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population 1.648 1.814 1.053 3.879 0.916
(0.974) (1.594) (1.764) (3.003) (1.423)
Village Council -4.801*
(2.041)
Built-up Area Share: (Reference: 1st Quintile)
- 2nd Quintile 1.793 2.439 1.299 3.464
(2.378) (3.232) (3.143) (2.992)
- 3rd Quintile -0.654 -0.960 -2.254 -18.36** -2.544
(2.219) (2.773) (2.722) (6.363) (3.360)
- 4th Quintile -2.793 5.033 4.901 -26.17* -3.210
(2.180) (4.064) (4.170) (11.149) (2.962)
- 5th Quintile 5.668* 8.079 14.90*** -32.82** 2.431
(2.750) (4.678) (4.213) (9.404) (3.232)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 4.628** 2.760 2.200 4.864*
(1.617) (2.485) (2.474) (2.079)
- South West Bank -8.401*** -6.864* -6.916* -9.826***
(2.000) (3.295) (3.203) (2.623)
- Gaza -17.59*** -18.45***
(4.367) (5.372)
Adj. R-Squared 0.167 0.143 0.149 0.049 0.124
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 19: Remoteness - Built-Up Area and LGU Performance (Figure III-4)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
106
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
102
LGU Performance Index Total
Sample Total Mu-nicipalities
WB Munici-palities
Gaza Munici-palities
Village Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU population 1.110 0.733 1.575 -1.790 0.0822
(1.016) (1.458) (1.759) (2.857) (1.450)
Village Council -5.098*
(2.084)
Population Density: (Reference: 1st Quintile)
- 2nd Quintile 2.589 -3.364 -3.002 4.515
(2.489) (4.355) (4.366) (2.859)
- 3rd Quintile -0.690 -1.065 -1.000 -0.0379
(2.292) (3.578) (3.593) (2.821)
- 4th Quintile 3.447 -1.416 -0.514 7.349*
(2.346) (3.079) (3.037) (2.964)
- 5th Quintile 6.174* 7.167* 5.925 19.05 1.843
(2.693) (3.346) (3.406) (9.840) (3.595)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 4.793** 2.165 2.527 6.846**
(1.685) (2.737) (2.740) (2.097)
- South West Bank -8.683*** -7.874* -7.849* -9.459***
(2.069) (3.033) (3.067) (2.671)
- Gaza -15.95*** -17.21***
(3.946) (4.443)
Adj. R-Squared 0.157 0.167 0.073 0.137 0.128
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 20: Population Density and Performance (Figure III-6)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
107
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
103
LGU Performance Index Total Sam-
ple Total Munici-
palities WB Munici-
palities Gaza Municipal-
ities Village
Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population 1.201 2.427 3.057 1.089 -0.658
(0.934) (1.302) (1.650) (2.106) (1.373)
Village Council -4.434*
(2.060)
Share of bottom 40% HHs: (Reference: 1st Quintile)
- 2nd Quintile -3.963 -6.499* -5.162 -14.28 -0.702
(2.191) (3.116) (3.280) (9.210) (3.080)
- 3rd Quintile -3.988 -3.895 -3.231 -6.867 -3.364
(2.103) (3.138) (3.474) (7.890) (2.875)
- 4th Quintile -7.911*** -7.911* -4.462 -22.41 -7.565*
(2.312) (3.730) (3.764) (10.672) (3.003)
- 5th Quintile -11.78*** -6.449 -6.631 -8.597 -12.75***
(2.493) (4.633) (4.311) (17.766) (3.032)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -3.387* -1.270 -2.041 -4.331*
(1.668) (2.888) (2.842) (2.062)
- South West Bank -9.058*** -7.146* -7.915* -11.04***
(2.150) (3.144) (3.254) (2.814)
- Gaza -15.78*** -15.55***
(3.728) (4.371)
Adj. R-Squared 0.195 0.144 0.050 0.040 0.182
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 21: Household Wealth and LGU Performance (Figure III-7)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
108
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
104
LGU Performance Index WB LGUs Area C LGUs
(1) (2)
Log LGU Population 0.0778 -1.031
(1.093) (2.004)
Village Council -5.153* -5.922
(2.109) (3.237)
Log Distance to Gov. Center -5.388*** -6.821***
(1.306) (1.490)
Share of Area C households: (Reference: 1st Quintile)
- 2nd Quintile -1.121
(3.079)
- 3rd Quintile 3.778 -0.778
(2.253) (2.487)
- 4th Quintile 3.210 -2.038
(1.804) (2.899)
- 5th Quintile -1.391 -11.07**
(2.012) (4.154)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 5.309** 4.998*
(1.641) (2.259)
- South West Bank -7.363*** -6.345*
(1.930) (2.751)
Adj. R-Squared 0.170 0.276
Number of Observations 346 166 Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 22: Share of Households in Area C and LGU Performance (Figure III-11)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
109
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
105
LGU Performance Index WB LGUs WB LGUs WB LGUs WB LGUs WB LGUs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population 0.0634 -0.353 -0.612 -0.501 -0.172
(1.157) (1.104) (1.087) (1.072) (1.128)
Village Council 0.0634 -0.353 -0.612 -0.501 -0.172
(1.157) (1.104) (1.087) (1.072) (1.128)
Log Distance to Gov Center -5.416*** -5.467*** -5.429*** -5.280*** -5.309***
(1.301) (1.282) (1.269) (1.269) (1.274)
Share of Built-Up Area Belonging to Area C
- more than 50% -2.639
(2.690)
- more than 60% -5.757
(3.043)
- more than 70% -8.047*
(3.625)
- more than 80% -8.549
(4.837)
- more than 90% -6.523
(4.834)
Regions (Reference: North)
- Central West Bank 5.644*** 5.546*** 5.679*** 5.716*** 5.775***
(1.631) (1.618) (1.608) (1.617) (1.621)
- South West Bank -7.301*** -7.008*** -6.828*** -6.951*** -7.079***
(1.957) (1.929) (1.913) (1.893) (1.861)
Adj. R-Squared 0.165 0.173 0.179 0.176 0.169
Number of Observations 346 346 346 346 346
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 23: Share of Built-up LGU area in Area C and LGU Performance (Figure III-12)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
110
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
106
LGU Performance Index Total Sam-
ple Total Munic-
ipalities WB Munici-
palities Gaza Mu-
nicipalities Village
Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population 2.095* 3.130* 3.760* 2.342 0.421
(0.958) (1.347) (1.622) (2.167) (1.360)
Village Council -5.103*
(2.059)
JSC for Planning & Dev. 3.962** 4.109 2.341 13.20* 5.202**
(1.470) (2.240) (2.402) (6.058) (1.974)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -4.731** -3.305 -3.266 -6.001**
(1.662) (2.577) (2.576) (2.153)
- South West Bank -13.06*** -8.466** -9.329** -16.99***
(2.090) (3.039) (3.068) (2.927)
- Gaza -19.12*** -18.15***
(3.720) (4.397)
Adj. R-Squared 0.161 0.143 0.055 0.120 0.133
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 24: Joint Service Councils I: Membership in JSC for Planning & Development (Figure III-13)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
111
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
107
LGU Performance Index
(Piped Water)
Total Sam-ple
Total Mu-nicipalities
WB Munici-palities
Gaza Munici-palities
Village Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population -2.964 -3.545 -2.942 -3.903 -2.375
(1.947) (2.245) (3.401) (2.647) (3.129)
Village Council -6.708
(4.673)
JSC for Water and Waste Water
4.389 1.638 -2.925 16.23* 5.535
(5.071) (6.703) (8.206) (6.194) (7.592)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -2.068 4.873 5.785 -5.165
(3.815) (6.452) (6.481) (4.666)
- South West Bank -13.25** -11.53 -12.12 -13.78*
(4.630) (7.147) (7.362) (6.128)
- Gaza -16.95** -12.70*
(5.220) (6.188)
Adj. R-Squared 0.034 0.088 0.050 0.162 0.008
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 25: Joint Service Councils II: Membership in JSC for Water and Waste Water Management (Figure III-14)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
112
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
108
LGU Performance Index
(Piped Sewage)
Total Sample
Total Munici-palities
WB Munici-palities
Gaza Munici-palities
Village Councils
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log LGU Population 6.377*** 10.97*** 14.14*** 5.483 2.205*
(1.464) (2.866) (3.375) (3.986) (1.102)
Village Council 1.430
(3.252)
JSC for Water and Waste Water
-6.256 -10.63 -2.698 -39.47*** 0.0636(4.050) (6.481) (7.031) (10.088) (4.913)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank 2.812 -0.480 -2.546 3.407
(2.564) (5.373) (5.296) (2.755)
- South West Bank -0.710 -5.158 -7.321 -1.477
(2.841) (7.065) (7.254) (2.307)
- Gaza 24.19*** 17.92
(7.269) (9.352)
Adj. R-Squared 0.192 0.226 0.134 0.235 0.009
Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 26: Joint Service Councils II: Membership in JSC for Water and Waste Water Management (Figure III-14)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
113
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
109
LGU Performance Index Jenin
Piped Water
Jenin
Piped Sewage
(1) (2)
Log LGU Population -7.966 2.548
(5.389) (1.973)
Village Council -14.92 2.334
(12.275) (2.000)
JSC for Water and Waste Water (Jenin)
30.82*** -2.269(7.415) (1.552)
Adj. R-Squared 0.152 0.059
Number of Observations 59 59
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 27: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste (Figure III-15)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
114
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
110
LGU Performance Index
(Solid Waste Collection)
Total Sample Salfit, Qalqiliya
(1) (2)
Log LGU Population 2.735 -3.747
(1.492) (5.822)
Village Council -10.81** -2.687
(3.392) (11.365)
JSC for Solid Waste Coll. -1.903 4.436 (5.213) (7.722)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -12.55***
(3.248)
- South West Bank -19.57***
(3.833)
- Gaza -27.85***
(5.781)
Adj. R-Squared 0.128 -0.067
Number of Observations 380 38
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 28: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste (Figure III-15)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
115
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
111
LGU Performance Index West Bank WB Municipal-
ities WB Village
Councils
(1) (2) (3)
Log LGU Population 0.995 0.862 0.0189
(1.303) (1.934) (1.911)
Village Council -2.514
(2.287)
Log per Capita Operating Budget Revenues
4.510* 6.485** 3.148
(1.879) (2.157) (2.608)
Regions (Reference: Cen-tral)
- North West Bank -2.531 -0.912 -3.696
(1.723) (3.034) (2.170)
- South West Bank -9.279*** -6.150 -12.14**
(2.443) (3.463) (3.644)
Adj R-Squared 0.146 0.141 0.082
Number of Observations 274 110 164
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 29: LGU Finance I: Per Capita Operating Budget Revenues (Figure III-16)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
116
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
112
LGU Performance Index West Bank WB Municipal-
ities WB Village
Councils
(1) (2) (3)
Log LGU Population 1.552 0.404 0.790
(1.263) (1.785) (1.887)
Village Council -0.195
(2.383)
Log per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures
5.157*** 8.977*** 2.887
(1.513) (2.262) (1.964)
Regions (Reference: Cen-tral)
- North West Bank -5.267** -4.996 -5.226*
(1.720) (2.674) (2.274)
- South West Bank -9.954*** -7.103* -12.11***
(2.234) (2.951) (3.503)
Adj R-Squared 0.157 0.195 0.078
Number of Observations 274 110 164
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 30: LGU Finance II: Per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures (Figure III-17)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
117
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
113
LGU Performance Index Total Sample Total Sample
(1) (2)
Log LGU Population 2.913* 2.562*
(1.196) (1.283)
Satisfactory Collection Efficiency (MDP-II) 5.494*
(2.689)
Surplus in Operating Budget & Enterprise Fund (MDP-II)
5.444*
(2.377)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -1.961 -2.398
(2.695) (2.708)
- South West Bank -9.138** -8.023*
(3.097) (3.250)
- Gaza -17.12*** -16.74***
(4.526) (4.391)
Adj. R-Squared 0.172 0.174
Number of Observations 133 135
Table A4 - 31: LGU Finance III: Fiscal Sustainability (Figure III-18)
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
118
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
114
LGU Performance Index Usage of Citizen Service Centers
(1)
LGU Respon-siveness
(2)
Log LGU Population 1.641 2.138 (1.296) (1.164)
Village Council -5.507* -4.813*(2.261) (2.090)
Share of Households that Used Citizen
Service Center (Reference: 1st to 3rd Quin-tile)
- 4th Quintile 0.364 (2.450)
- 5th Quintile 5.388* (2.594)
Share of Households Agreeing that LGU is very Responsive (Reference: 1st Quintile)
- 2nd Quintile 3.330 (2.891)
- 3rd Quintile 7.115** (2.630)
- 4th Quintile 12.41*** (2.647)
- 5th Quintile 16.23*** (2.742)
Regions (Reference: Central)
- North West Bank -4.582* -5.804**(2.093) (1.906)
- South West Bank -9.408*** -10.32***(2.556) (2.700)
- Gaza -16.36*** -20.56***(4.708) (3.819)
Adj. R-Squared 0.154 0.302
Number of Observations 223 223
Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4 - 32: Usage of Citizen Service Centers, LGU Responsiveness, and Performance (Figure III-20 & Figure III-21)
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
119
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
115
Annex 5: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
# LGU Name Date Focus Group Discussion
Key Informant In-terviews
1 Kufer Kadoum December 28, 2016 1 2
2 Dier-al Assel Al-Fouqa December 29, 2016 1 2
3 Rafah December 29, 2016 1 2
4 Khan Yunis December 31, 2016 1 2
5 An Nuseirat January 3, 2017 1 2
6 Jabalya January 9, 2017 1 2
7 Gaza City January 12, 2017 1 2
8 Salim January 15, 201 1 2
9 Irtas January 22, 2017 1 2
10 Tamoun January 23, 2017 1 2
11 Beit Kahil January 27, 2017 1 2
12 Bani Zeid al Garbiy January 29, 2017 1 2
13 Hebron February 1, 2017 1 2
14 Bethlehem February 2, 2017 1 2
15 Beit Sahour February 3, 2017 1 2
16 Ramallah February 4, 2017 1 2
17 Nablus February 5, 2017 1 2
Table A5-1: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
120
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
116
Annex 6: Key Informant Interviews and Focus Groups Discussions Referenced
Key Informants Interviews (KKIs)
# Quote Date Location #Paragraph #Page 1 [water from Mekorot] “is delivered to us
through a pipe that feeds three villages, Salim, Uzmout, and Deir al-Huteb. The Israelis control the amount of water we consume….we suffer especially in sum-mer….there are households in Salim that do not receive water for 3-4 days a week.”
January 15, 2017
Salim 86 53
2 [there is a] “difficulty of operating some water wells due to power outages.”
January 12, 2017
Gaza City 37 23
3 “We have 75 water wells which lack […] spare parts.”
January 12, 2017
Gaza City 86 54
4 “there are 2,500 water meters that are broken down and need replacement […] however, the import restrictions for Gaza make it hard to obtain these parts and other equipment needed.”
December 31, 2016
Khan Younis
86 54
5 “I see the existence of JSCs as something important and useful…for example, […] some services are better if we deal with them jointly such as waste collection which needs huge infrastructures, trucks, machines, and transfer stations.”
December 31, 2016
Khan Younis
87 55
6 “We are members of three JSCs; one for water, another one for solid waste, as well as a JSC for Planning and Develop-ment which is inactive…before we joined the Solid Waste JSC, we used to gener-ate revenue for our town… but now the solid waste service causes a deficit. Our municipality is against these councils…”
January 23, 2017
Tamoun 89 55
7 “The Solid Waste JSC is a burden because we still have to provide bins, trucks and workers…[also] joining the council was not a matter of choice…as a municipality we had to become a member…however, average people do not know about it.”
December 31, 2016
Khan Younis
89 56
8 “We have a division for complaints at our Citizen Services Center. Each citizen can file a written complaint, and we ad-dress it within a known timeframe that depends on the nature of the com-plaint…we are committed to examine
February 4, 2017
Ramallah 104 64
Table A6 - 1: Key Informant Interviews Referenced
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each complaint and let the citizens know about the decision…”
9 The program tells me how many com-plaints each division receives and how many of them have been dealt with by the relevant division…once I notice there is a delay from one of the divisions I call the supervisors there and urge them to speed up the process…”
February 5, 2017
Nablus 104 64
10 “the nature of the complaint, and the availability of resources determine how we deal with it.”
January 23, 2017
Tamoun 108 65
11 “accumulative debt which citizens owe the municipality are about NIS 310 mil-lion, while PA institutions located in Na-blus owe NIS 60 million.”
February 5, 2017
Nablus 124 70
12 “paying in advance…is like buying from a store - if you do not pay for it cannot get it.”
January 27, 2017
Beit Kahil Box IV-1/ i 72
13 [council] “decided to install pre-paid wa-ter meters…it turned out that the equip-ment for 1,185 households we need for our town costs USD 160,000. MoLG was willing to provide USD 100,000 but we cannot cover the remainder [USD 60,000]…although we need the upgrade urgently.”
January 27, 2017
Beit Kahil Box IV-1/ i 72
14 “water is a basic human rights and should not be cut off from people be-cause they cannot afford it”
January 29, 2017
Bani Zeid al Garbiy
Box IV-1/i 72
15 “because electricity is a pre-paid service the collection rate is 100 percent. Con-necting waste collection fees allows the council to plan with revenue with cer-tainty, which we depend on heavily to pay salaries and to improve some of our services.”
January 27, 2017
Beit Kahil Box IV-1/ii 72
16 “People receive 20 percent discount when they pay the full annual amount in January, 15 percent in February, 10 per-cent in March, and 5 percent in April.”
February 2, 2017
Bethlehem Box IV-1/iii 73
17 “In the past we used to have a wrong pol-icy, rewarding people who did not pay by offering discounts to encourage them to pay…however, now we adopted a reverse policy of encouraging those who are committed and pay their fees on time…”.
December 31, 2016
Khan Younis
Box IV-1/iii 73
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18 “The company did want to tell the police and we used social pressure to solve this issue […] we solved 50 percent of it […] we went from house to house with them.”
January 15, 2017
Salim Box IV-1/iv 73
19 “we prefer family influence more than resorting to the law or police. We go to an area or a neighborhood and talk to a social or tribal figure - […] who in uses his personnel and family connections to solve the issue.”
February 1, 2017
Hebron Box IV-1/iv 73
20 “we develop a payment plan for people who cannot afford paying […but] we do not apply a general-decrease of fees […] because other households would also stop paying]. However, we resort to court to deal with those who do not want to pay.”
January 12, 2017
Gaza City Box IV-1/v 73
21 “if a citizen has a cumulative debt we ask [the household] to pay the next bill and pay a part of the debt, such as an additional 50 NIS, every time the future bills are paid.”
January 12, 2017
Gaza City Box IV-1/v 73
22 “our municipality sent official letters to households informing them of the debt they have to pay and encouraging them to come to reach a settlement with the municipality. A settlement does not in-clude any discount but is only based on a scheduled re-payment approach.”
February 4, 2017
Ramallah Box IV-1/v 73
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Focus Group Discussions (FDGs)
# Quote Date Location #Para-graph
#Page
1 [we] “do not receive water and electric-ity at the same time”
January 12, 2017
Gaza City 37 7 (38)
2 “the lack of coordination between ‘wa-ter supply schedule’ and the ‘provision of electricity schedule.’”
January 12, 2017
Gaza City 37 7 (38)
3 “People need electricity to operate their water pumps and store water in tanks located on their roofs. However, they cannot do this when they have water without having electricity. Sometimes, people stay up at night waiting for elec-tricity to be able to fill their tanks…”
January 3, 2017
An Nusei-rat (Gaza)
37 7 (38)
4 “without connecting other services to pre-paid electricity supply […] many people will not pay for waste collection or school fees”.
January 27, 2017
Beit Kahil Box 6/ii 59
Table A6 - 2: Focus Group Discussions Referenced
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Annex 7: LGU Performance Ranking
Performance Rank
Performance Score LGU Name Governorate Municipality/VC
1 89 Salfit Salfit Municipality
2 85 Anabta Tulkarm Municipality
3 85 Zeita Tulkarm Municipality
4 84 Iktaba Tulkarm VC
5 82 Shuyukh al Arrub Hebron VC
6 80 Ramallah Ramallah Municipality
7 80 Al Bireh Ramallah Municipality
8 79 Qalqiliya Qalqilya Municipality
9 77 Sarra Nablus VC
10 77 Dura al Qar Ramallah VC
11 77 Deir Sharaf Nablus VC
12 76 Tulkarm Tulkarm Municipality
13 75 Jilijliya Ramallah VC
14 74 Shabtin Ramallah VC
15 74 Habla Qalqilya Municipality
16 74 Anata Jerusalem Municipality
17 74 Ar Ram Jerusalem Municipality
18 73 Nablus Nablus Municipality
19 73 Beit Jala Bethlehem Municipality
20 73 Kafr Malik Ramallah VC
21 72 Beit Iba Nablus VC
22 72 At Tira Ramallah VC
23 72 Hebron Al Khalil Hebron Municipality
24 72 Al Walaja Bethlehem VC
25 72 Bir Nabala Jerusalem Municipality
Table A7 - 1: LGU Performance Ranking
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26 71 Bani Zeid al Garbiya Ramallah Municipality
27 71 Kafr al Labad Tulkarm Municipality
28 71 Qaryut Nablus VC
29 71 Ad Doha Bethlehem Municipality
30 70 Bethlehem Bethlehem Municipality
31 70 Rammun Ramallah VC
32 70 Kifl Haris Salfit Municipality
33 70 Mas Ha Salfit VC
34 70 Baqa ash Sharqiya Tulkarm Municipality
35 69 Bala Tulkarm Municipality
36 69 Beit Surik Jerusalem Municipality
37 69 Al Janiya Ramallah VC
38 69 Falamya Qalqilya VC
39 69 Alfondoq Qalqilya VC
40 69 Nisf Jbayel Nablus VC
41 68 Saffarin Tulkarm VC
42 68 Hajja Qalqilya VC
43 68 Sir Jenin VC
44 68 Jericho Ariha Jericho Municipality
45 68 Zawata Nablus VC
46 67 Illar Tulkarm Municipality
47 67 Attil Tulkarm Municipality
48 67 Odala Nablus VC
49 67 An Naqura Nablus VC
50 67 Ein Qiniya Ramallah VC
51 67 At Tuwani Hebron VC
52 67 Budrus Ramallah VC
53 66 Beit Anan Jerusalem Municipality
54 66 Azmut Nablus VC
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55 66 Almaghazi Deir al Balah Municipality
56 66 Farun Tulkarm VC
57 66 Abud Ramallah VC
58 66 Biet Sakaria Bethlehem VC
59 66 Deir Qaddis Ramallah VC
60 66 Beit Amin Qalqilya VC
61 65 Um Al-Naser North Gaza Municipality
62 65 Osarin Nablus VC
63 65 Ein Siniya Ramallah VC
64 65 Almusaddar Deir al Balah Municipality
65 65 An Nabi Elyas Qalqilya VC
66 65 Deir Ballut Salfit Municipality
67 64 Jibiya Ramallah VC
68 64 At Tayba Jenin VC
69 64 Tura Jenin VC
70 64 Deir al Hatab Nablus VC
71 64 Beit Ur al Fauqa Ramallah VC
72 64 As Sawahira ash Sharqiya Jerusalem Municipality
73 63 Deir Istiya Salfit Municipality
74 63 Marda Salfit VC
75 63 Sarta Salfit VC
76 63 Beit Liqya Ramallah Municipality
77 63 Beit Lid Tulkarm Municipality
78 63 Abu Dis Jerusalem Municipality
79 63 Al Kafreiat Tulkarm Municipality
80 63 Deir al Ghusun Tulkarm Municipality
81 62 Nilin Ramallah Municipality
82 62 Al Khas Bethlehem VC
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83 62 Ein Arik Ramallah VC
84 62 Biddya Salfit Municipality
85 62 Kharbatha al Misbah Ramallah VC
86 62 Sabastiya Nablus Municipality
87 62 Beit Sahur Bethlehem Municipality
88 61 Qatanna Jerusalem Municipality
89 61 Kafr Qallil Nablus VC
90 61 Beit Hanoon North Gaza Municipality
91 61 Nuba Hebron Municipality
92 61 Al Midya Ramallah VC
93 61 Majdal Bani Fadil Nablus VC
94 61 Ras Karkar Ramallah VC
95 61 Dar Salah Bethlehem VC
96 60 Al Riyad/Nazlat Zeid Jenin VC
97 60 Rujeib Nablus VC
98 60 Battir Bethlehem Municipality
99 60 Al Qubeiba Jerusalem VC
100 60 Ramin Tulkarm VC
101 60 Beit Sira Ramallah VC
102 60 Kafr Ein Ramallah VC
103 60 Beit Fajjar Bethlehem Municipality
104 59 Rantis Ramallah VC
105 59 Beit Wazan Nablus VC
106 59 Haris Salfit VC
107 59 Kafr Laqif Qalqilya VC
108 59 Gaza Gaza Municipality
109 59 Kafr Rai Jenin Municipality
110 58 Yasuf Salfit VC
111 58 Kharbatha Bani Harith Ramallah VC
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112 58 Az Zawiya Salfit Municipality
113 58 Az Zubeidat Jericho VC
114 58 Ajjul Ramallah VC
115 58 Beit Duqqu Jerusalem VC
116 58 Bir Zeit Ramallah Municipality
117 58 Al Lubban al Gharbi Ramallah VC
118 58 Al Ettihad Ramallah Municipality
119 58 Farkha Salfit VC
120 57 Halhul Hebron Municipality
121 57 Elezaria Jerusalem Municipality
122 57 Jalood Nablus VC
123 57 Kharas Hebron Municipality
124 57 Azzun Qalqilya Municipality
125 57 Deir Ghazala Jenin VC
126 57 Bilin Ramallah VC
127 57 Al Judeira Jerusalem VC
128 57 Huwwara Nablus Municipality
129 57 Beita Nablus Municipality
130 57 Aqraba Nablus Municipality
131 57 Seida Tulkarm VC
132 57 Beit Imrin Nablus VC
133 56 Kafr Aqab Jerusalem Municipality
134 56 Wadi Fukin Bethlehem VC
135 56 Beituniya Ramallah Municipality
136 56 Burham Ramallah VC
137 56 Kardala Tubas VC
138 56 Zatara Bethlehem Municipality
139 56 Jabalya North Gaza Municipality
140 56 Al Bureij Deir al Balah Municipality
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141 56 Beit Hasan Nablus VC
142 56 Qarawat Bani Hassan Salfit Municipality
143 55 Jannatah Bed Flouh Bethlehem Municipality
144 55 Tubas Tubas Municipality
145 55 Azzun Atma Qalqilya VC
146 55 Shufa Tulkarm VC
147 55 Al Kfeer Jenin VC
148 55 Beitin Ramallah VC
149 55 Deir Ibzi Ramallah VC
150 55 Jammain Nablus Municipality
151 55 Talfit Nablus VC
152 55 An Nassariya Nablus VC
153 54 Al Azb Al Gharby Qalqilya VC
154 54 Qusra Nablus Municipality
155 54 Ras Atiya Qalqilya VC
156 54 Nahhalin Bethlehem VC
157 54 Tarqumiya Hebron Municipality
158 54 An Nazla ash Sharqiya Tulkarm VC
159 54 Jinsafut Qalqilya VC
160 54 Baqat al Hatab Qalqilya VC
161 54 Jurish Nablus VC
162 53 Urif Nablus VC
163 53 Kafr Thulth Qalqilya Municipality
164 53 Hizma Jerusalem Municipality
165 53 Qalandiya Jerusalem VC
166 53 Al Minya Bethlehem VC
167 53 Beit Tamir Bethlehem VC
168 53 Biddu Jerusalem Municipality
169 53 Al Jarushiya Tulkarm VC
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170 53 Al Badhan Nablus VC
171 53 Turmusayya Ramallah Municipality
172 53 Al Jalama Jenin VC
173 52 Sinjil Ramallah Municipality
174 52 Silwad Ramallah Municipality
175 52 Deir as Sudan Ramallah VC
176 52 Ein el Beida Tubas VC
177 52 Shuqba Ramallah VC
178 52 Sair Hebron Municipality
179 52 Deir Dibwan Ramallah Municipality
180 52 Husan Bethlehem VC
181 52 Awarta Nablus VC
182 52 Madama Nablus VC
183 51 Taffuh Hebron Municipality
184 51 Yabad Jenin Municipality
185 51 Jit Qalqilya VC
186 51 Immatin Qalqilya VC
187 51 Al Mazraa ash Sharqiya Ramallah Municipality
188 51 Mithlon Jenin Municipality
189 51 Anza Jenin VC
190 51 Jayyus Qalqilya Municipality
191 50 Deir al Balah Deir al Balah Municipality
192 50 Al Zaytouneh Ramallah Municipality
193 50 At Tayba Ramallah Municipality
194 50 Madinat Ezahra Gaza Municipality
195 50 Al Asaesah Jenin VC
196 50 Sanniriya Qalqilya VC
197 50 Beit Ur at Tahta Ramallah VC
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198 50 Qusin Nablus VC
199 50 Ash Shuyukh Hebron Municipality
200 50 Abwein Ramallah Municipality
201 49 Arrana Jenin VC
202 49 Tammun Tubas Municipality
203 49 Deir Jarir Ramallah VC
204 49 Ein Yabrud Ramallah VC
205 49 Dura Hebron Municipality
206 49 As Sawiya Nablus VC
207 49 Beit Ula Hebron Municipality
208 49 Qaffin Tulkarm Municipality
209 49 Al Khadr Bethlehem Municipality
210 49 Al Nowaaima Jericho VC
211 49 Tuqu Bethlehem Municipality
212 49 Qarawat Bani Zeid Ramallah VC
213 48 An Nuseirat Deir al Balah Municipality
214 48 Beit Lahiya North Gaza Municipality
215 48 Bani Naim Hebron Municipality
216 48 Al Jaba Bethlehem VC
217 48 Ejnasnia Nablus VC
218 48 Anin Jenin VC
219 48 Khuzaa Khan Yunis Municipality
220 48 Zeita Jammain Nablus VC
221 47 Burin Nablus VC
222 47 Rafah Rafah Municipality
223 47 Kisan Bethlehem VC
224 47 Umm Salamuna Bethlehem VC
225 47 Salim Nablus VC
226 47 Beit Kahil Hebron VC
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227 47 Beit Ummar Hebron Municipality
228 46 Tell Nablus VC
229 46 Marah Maalla Bethlehem VC
230 46 Burqa Ramallah VC
231 46 Beit Dajan Nablus VC
232 46 Qabatiya Jenin Municipality
233 46 Ein Shibli Nablus VC
234 46 Hindaza and Braidah Bethlehem VC
235 46 Iskaka Salfit VC
236 45 Al Araqa Jenin VC
237 45 Az Zababida Jenin Municipality
238 45 Duma Nablus VC
239 45 Aqqaba Tubas Municipality
240 45 Al Yamun Jenin Municipality
241 45 Jenin Jenin Municipality
242 45 Atuf Tubas VC
243 45 Idhna Hebron Municipality
244 45 Al Jadida Jenin VC
245 45 Jaba Jerusalem VC
246 45 Al Lubban ash Sharqiya Nablus VC
247 45 Silat adh Dhahr Jenin Municipality
248 45 Mikhmas Jerusalem VC
249 44 Jurat ash Shama Bethlehem VC
250 44 Al Hashimiya Jenin VC
251 44 Al Majd Hebron VC
252 44 Al Mughayyir Jenin VC
253 44 Yasid Nablus VC
254 44 Kobar Ramallah VC
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255 44 Saffa Ramallah VC
256 44 Thahr Al Abed Jenin VC
257 44 Rafat Salfit VC
258 44 Khirbet Abu Falah Ramallah VC
259 44 Yabrud Ramallah VC
260 43 Asira ash Shamaliya Nablus Municipality
261 43 Surda o Abu Qash Ramallah Municipality
262 42 Surif Hebron Municipality
263 42 Atara Ramallah Municipality
264 42 Rafat Jerusalem VC
265 42 Burqa Nablus VC
266 42 Bir al Basha Jenin VC
267 42 Hitta Hebron VC
268 41 Asira al Qibliya Nablus VC
269 41 Misliya Jenin VC
270 41 Deir Nidham Ramallah VC
271 41 Ajja Jenin Municipality
272 41 Yatma Nablus VC
273 41 Al Mughayyir Ramallah VC
274 41 Kafr ad Dik Salfit Municipality
275 41 Al Ubeidiya Bethlehem Municipality
276 41 Al Burj Biet Marsim Hebron VC
277 41 Khallet al Haddad Bethlehem VC
278 41 Al Ramah Jenin VC
279 40 Bani Suheila Khan Yunis Municipality
280 40 Fahma Jenin VC
281 40 Sanour Jenin VC
282 40 Bani Zeid ash Sharqiya Ramallah Municipality
283 40 Arraba Jenin Municipality
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284 40 Kafr Qud Jenin VC
285 40 Al Masara Bethlehem VC
286 40 Kafr Qaddum Qalqilya VC
287 40 Kafr Nima Ramallah VC
288 40 As Samu Hebron Municipality
289 39 Zububa Jenin VC
290 39 Az Zawayda Deir al Balah Municipality
291 39 Bardala Tubas VC
292 39 Karma Hebron VC
293 39 Al Aouja Jericho Municipality
294 39 Yatta Hebron Municipality
295 38 Bizzariya Nablus VC
296 38 Kafr Dan Jenin Municipality
297 38 Deir Abu Mashal Ramallah VC
298 38 Rummana Jenin VC
299 38 Al Fandaqumiya Jenin VC
300 38 Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Municipality
301 38 Qibya Ramallah VC
302 38 Marah Rabah Bethlehem VC
303 37 Wadi al Fara Tubas VC
304 37 An Nabi Salih Ramallah VC
305 37 Birqin Jenin Municipality
306 37 Qira Salfit VC
307 37 Adh Dhahiriya Hebron Municipality
308 37 Beit Furik Nablus Municipality
309 36 Tayasir Tubas VC
310 36 Em Al Khair Hebron VC
311 36 Silat al Harithiya Jenin Municipality
312 36 Absan al Kabira Khan Yunis Municipality
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313 36 Fahma al Jadida Jenin VC
314 35 Talluza Nablus VC
315 35 Qabalan Nablus Municipality
316 34 Ash Shawawra Bethlehem VC
317 34 Aqqaba Tubas VC
318 34 Raba Jenin VC
319 34 Tiinnik Jenin VC
320 34 Wadi Rahhal Bethlehem VC
321 34 Marj Naja Jericho VC
322 34 Deir al Asal al Fauqa Hebron VC
323 34 Marj al Ghazal Jericho VC
324 34 Fasayil Jericho VC
325 33 Imreish Abda Hebron VC
326 33 Khursa Hebron VC
327 33 Arabbuna Jenin VC
328 32 Sikka Tawwas Hebron VC
329 32 Al Aqrabaniya Nablus VC
330 32 Sireec Jenin VC
331 32 Einabus Nablus VC
332 32 Wadi an Nis Bethlehem VC
333 31 Al Qarara Khan Yunis Municipality
334 31 Jifna Ramallah VC
335 31 Deir Abu Daif Jenin VC
336 31 Bruqin Salfit Municipality
337 31 Ar Rihiya Hebron VC
338 31 Jaba Jenin Municipality
339 31 Jalqamus Jenin VC
340 31 Arab ar Rashayida Bethlehem VC
341 30 Hadab al Fawwar Hebron VC
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342 29 Furush Beit Dajan Nablus VC
343 29 Imneizil Hebron VC
343 29 Kharbat Al-deir Hebron VC
343 29 Beit Qad ash Shamali Jenin VC
346 28 Artas Bethlehem VC
347 28 Al Karmil Hebron Municipality
348 27 Al Rayan Jenin VC
349 26 Ar Ramadin Hebron VC
350 26 Al Fukhkhari Khan Yunis Municipality
351 26 Absan as Saghira Khan Yunis Municipality
352 26 Al Attara Jenin VC
353 25 Al Naser Rafah Municipality
354 25 Jalbun Jenin VC
354 25 Al Najada Al Kaabna Hebron VC
354 25 Al Zwaydieen Hebron VC
357 25 Al Yasreiah Hebron Municipality
358 24 As Sura Hebron VC
359 24 Az Zawiya Jenin VC
360 24 Beit Qad al Janubi Jenin VC
361 23 Abu al Asja Abu al Ghozlan Hebron VC
362 23 Khallet al Maiyya Hebron VC
363 22 Faqqua Jenin VC
364 22 Kufeirit Jenin VC
365 22 Beit Amra Hebron VC
366 21 Al Hathalin Khshm Al Daraj Hebron VC
366 21 Aba ash Sharqiya Jenin VC
368 21 Al Jiftlik Jericho VC
369 20 Ash Shuhada Jenin VC
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370 19 Deir al Asal at Tahta Hebron VC
371 19 Mirka Jenin VC
372 19 Biet Al Roush Alfouqa Hebron VC
373 17 Beit ar Rush at Tahta Hebron VC
374 16 Wadi as Salqa Deir al Balah Municipality
375 14 Zibda Al Jadida Jenin VC
376 13 Umm at Tut Jenin VC
377 10 Deir Razih Tarrama Hebron VC
378 10 Shokat as Sufi Rafah Municipality
379 4 Almaleh Tubas VC
380 0 Msafir Yatta Hebron VC
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Annex 8: LGU Revenue Assignment, Management Responsibility, and Final Destination of Funds
Whosetsthebase
Whosetstherate
Whocollects
Whoretains/howmuch(%)
PropertyTax(O) MoFPforWestBank,Municipali-tiesforGaza
MoFPforWestBank,Municipali-tiesforGaza
MoFPforWestBank,Municipali-tiesforGaza
MoFP-10%(WestBank)
Municipalities–90%(WestBank)
Municipalities–100%(Gaza)
ButMoFPinterceptsrevenuesformunicipalarrears
ProfessionPermitFees(O) MoFP MoFP MoFP MoFP-10%
Municipalities–90%
ButMoFPinterceptsrevenuesformunicipalarrears
CraftandIndustrialFees(O)
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
TransportationTax(O) MinistryofTransport(MoT)
MoT MoTanden-tersamountsinSingleTreasuryAc-count
Thedistributionformulachangesfromyeartoyearaccordingtothedecisionofthe"TransportationTaxDistributionCommittee"attheMoLG.Thepercentageoffundsallocatedaccordingtopop-ulationrangedbetween55-75%ofthetotalappropriatedfundsfrom2008to2013.
ButMoFPinterceptsrevenuesformunicipalarrears
Educationtax(7%taxlev-iedonpropertytaxbase)(O)
MoFP MoFP Municipali-ties
EarmarkedtoSchoolsmainte-nance
SolidWasteCollectionFee(O)
Municipali-tiesorJointServiceCoun-cil
Municipali-tiesorJointServiceCoun-cil
Municipali-tiesorJointServiceCoun-cil
MunicipalitiesorJointServiceCouncil
Officialdocumentprepara-tionfee(O)
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
BuildingLicenseFee(O) Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
TableA8-1:LGURevenueAssignment(intheLGA),ManagementResponsibilityandFinalDestina-tionoftheFunds
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
139
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
145
Signboardfees(O) Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
Fines(municipalcourt,transportation)(O)
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
Ceilingtax(O) VC VC VC VC
Personaltax(O) VC VC VC VC
ElectricityFee(E) PA PA UtilitiesorMunicipali-ties
UtilitiesorMunicipalities
WaterFee(E) PWA PWA UtilitiesorMunicipali-ties
UtilitiesorMunicipalities
WasteWaterFee(E) Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
SlaughterhousesFee(E) Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
VegetableMarketsFee(E) Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
PublicParkingFee(E) Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
Otherfees(O)includingbuildingpermitfee;waterandelectricityconnectionfees;wastewaterandsew-ageconnectionfee;gar-bagecollectionfee;signboardfees;cemeteryfees;andsomefarmingfeesforroads
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipali-ties
Municipalities
Source:UpdatedfromWB(2014A).“O”standsforOperatingRevenueand“E”forEnterpriseRevenue
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
140
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
146
Assignment
1.Townplanning
2.Streetconstruction,rehabs,paving,androads
3.Rainwaterdrainagesystem*
4.Streetnamesandnumbering
5.Sidewalks
6.Streetlighting
7.Publictransportstandsandterminals
8.Watersupply
9.Electricitysupply
10.Sewersystem
11.Wastewatertreatment
12.Publiclavatories
13.Solidwastecollectionanddisposal
14.Solidwastetreatment
15.Fruitandvegetablemarkets
16.Publicparks
17.Socialassistanceprograms**
18.Sportsfacilities
19.Libraries
20.Museumsandculture
21.Regulation,controlandmonitoring***
22.Cemeteries
23.Schools
24.Healthcenters
TableA8-2:ExpenditureAssignmentsAccordingtoLocalGovernmentLaw
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
141
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
147
25.Slaughterhouses
26.Firefighting
27.Transitmanagement(trafficlights,signs,meters,andothers)
28.Other(thelawexplicitlyallowsforotherfunctions)
(Art.15oftheLGAof1997)
*Thesefunctionsarenotexplicitinthelaw;however,theyareunderstoodtobepartoftheexpendi-tureresponsibilitiesofthelocalcouncils.
**Suchasshelterforthehomeless,fooddonations,andotherlocalsocialprograms.
***Regulation,controlandmonitoringof:publichealthstandards,slaughterhouses,foodsafety,res-taurants,hotels,andpublicfacilities,weightandscalescontrol,craftandindustryhazards,clinicandhealthcenterstandards,streetvendorsandstands,publictransportation.
THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.
142
The data collection, analysis, and production of this report was supported by the Representative Of-fice of Denmark, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the World Bank. Co-financing was provided through the Palestinian Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund (PID MDTF) and the Palestinian Recovery and Development Program Trust Fund (PRDP) managed by the World Bank. The PID MDTF is currently being supported with contributions from: Croatia; Den-mark; Finland; France; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; and Sweden. The PRDP is financed by: Australia; France; Japan; Kuwait; and Norway. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the contributing donors.
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