the olympics as a public relations strategy: americans views about china before and after the 2008...

The Influence of Media on BeliefsThe Olympics As A Public Relations Strategy: Americans Views About China Before And After The 2008 Beijing Olympics

Pamela B. RutledgeFielding Graduate University

Purpose

To address a gap in the literature on belief formation and conflict by examining the impact of information sources on the beliefs that predispose individuals toward conflict

Globalization Communication technologies McLuhan’s global village New definitions of

identity and culture are no longer confined by geographic boundaries

Globalization will not go away

New Relationship with China

Technology has led to rapid economic growth with global implications Jobs Energy

Loss of Soviet Union as enemy ‘promotes’ China

Media Makes China the Enemy

Media defines nations through images and symbols

Americans know very little about China and culture is difficult to understand Easy to stereotype

Information about China is often inaccurate Government control Journalistic license and old

metaphors

Consistent negative framing

The 2008 Beijing Olympics Olympics bring increased media

attention Intangible benefits Qualitative features of media

coverage

Information Sources

Media is pervasive

Qualitatively different channels elicit different cognitive and affective responses

Measurements of media consumption still being developed

What do we want to measure? Attention Time Recall Meaning

Psychology of Fear

What Gets our Attention?

The human brain uses economy measures to process information Salience Relevance Mental models (stereotypes)

Fear an effective way of eliciting an affective response Triggered by perceptions of

significant and personally-relevant threat

Fear of Threats Risk assessed against

perceived efficacy rather than prior experience

Mass perceptions of threat influence national policy and international relations

Fear increases the need to affiliate

The Role of Identity in Conflict

Social psychology conflict literature originally focused on group identity and affiliation

Returning to role of self and individual Freud, Vygotsky, Personality theorists, Evolutionary Psychology

From self to social More system-oriented Self and social identity conflictual in nature

COSMIDES, PINKER, TOOBY, FREUD, VYGOTSKY, TAJFEL, ASCH, KELMAN, SEN, BREWER

Why Affiliate?

Motivations for affiliation Self-esteem, status, value Uncertainty reduction, terror reduction

Shift focus from self-esteem to order-seeking Biological and psychological need for order

Internal consistency Biological imperative for survival

Evaluative filters to process information and experience

Continually reconstructed through interaction with the wider social system

Core beliefs serve need for internal consistency

Social psychology articulates interaction of the individual with social structures Social identity theory Self-categorization theory Relative deprivation

theory

Core beliefs operate at both individual and group levels

Definition Integration

Core Beliefs

Cognitive psychology distills conflict into core beliefs that establish the themes that drive human behavior

Five Domain Framework

Central beliefs to group conflict Vulnerability Injustice Helplessness Distrust Superiority

Operate at three levels: Individual view of personal world Individual’s beliefs about their group Individual’s perceptions about the group worldview

• IGBI, Roy J. Eidelson & Eidelson (2003)

Information SourcesExplanator

y Style

Core Beliefs

Subjective Well-Being

Attitudes toward ChinaGroup

Affiliation

Conflict Strategies

Theoretical model

Information sources and explanatory style influence conflict strategies through core beliefs, group affiliation, and attitudes

toward China.

Media-Saturated Environment

Prevalence 98% of homes have

TV 50% of Americans

text message Virtually all

teenagers play video games

Cell phone subscribers equal 75% of population

Source: Pew Research Center (2008) http://pewresearch.org/pubs/928/key-news-audiences-now-blend-online-and-traditional-sources

Methodology

Internet survey-based study Participants provided by

Zoomerang (N=896) Likert-type questions Data collected

June 27, 2008 (N=418), August 27, 2008 (N=478)

Demographics: Approximation of U.S. Census Minimum high school

education 50/50 Male/Female Ages 18 to 44 Racial distribution

Assessment instruments Individual and Group Beliefs

Inventory Life Orientation Test Satisfaction with Life Survey Group Affiliation Conflict Strategies Attitudes toward China Media measures

Preference Percentage use Political orientation

Analysis Bivariate correlation Multiple regression

The Hypotheses

More television increases core beliefs

New media decreases core beliefs

Optimism decreases core beliefs

Olympics media increases core beliefs

Core beliefs increase group affiliation, attitudes toward China and conflict strategies

Results

Empirical Analysis

Empirical analysis conducted in 2 stages:

1st stage: Correlations between media use, explanatory style, core beliefs and conflict measures

2nd stage: Regression analyses to estimate the model

Correlation Analysis In general, optimism proved to be

significantly correlated with core beliefs at both the personal and group levels

Broadcast media was significantly correlated with most core beliefs and conflict measures at the group level

Broadcast media split into liberal and conservative programming proved to be significantly correlated with most core beliefs at the individual and group levels

IGBI-IG Vulnerabilit

yIGBI-IG Injustice

IGBI-IG Helplessnes

sIGBI-IG Distrust

IGBI-IG Superiority

Group Negativity SWLS IG

LOT-R Scale -.20** -.071* -.263** -.074* -0.042 -.201** .203**

Broadcast 1st Choice .113** .121** 0.059 0.064 0.045 .118** 0.048

New Media 1st Choice -.098** -.118** 0.033 -.069* -0.059 -.085* -0.04

% Television .076* .156** -0.013 0.058 .122** .093** .066*

% Internet -.070* -.148** -0.028 -.10** -.09** -.12** -0.052

Liberal Television -0.054 -.100** 0.054 -.097** -0.063 -.068* 0.011

Conservative

Television.143** .144** 0.022 .111** .132** .140** .148**

N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Correlations Group Level: Optimism

IGBI-IG Vulnerability

IGBI-IG Injustice

IGBI-IG Helplessnes

sIGBI-IG Distrust

IGBI-IG Superiority

Group Negativity SWLS IG

LOT-R Scale -.20** -.071* -.263** -.074* -0.042 -.201** .203**

Broadcast 1st

Choice.113** .121** 0.059 0.064 0.045 .118** 0.048

New Media 1st Choice -.098** -.118** 0.033 -.069* -0.059 -.085* -0.04

% Television .076* .156** -0.013 0.058 .122** .093** .066*

% Internet -.070* -.148** -0.028 -.10** -.09** -.12** -0.052

Liberal Television -0.054 -.100** 0.054 -.097** -0.063 -.068* 0.011

Conserv. Television .143** .144** 0.022 .111** .132** .140** .148**

N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Correlations Group Level: Broadcast Media

IGBI-IG Vulnerabilit

yIGBI-IG Injustice

IGBI-IG Helplessnes

sIGBI-IG Distrust

IGBI-IG Superiority

Group Negativity SWLS IG

LOT-R Scale -.20** -.071* -.263** -.074* -0.042 -.201** .203**

Broadcast 1st Choice .113** .121** 0.059 0.064 0.045 .118** 0.048

New Media

1st Choice

-.098** -.118** 0.033 -.069* -0.059 -.085* -0.04

% Television .076* .156** -0.013 0.058 .122** .093** .066*

% Internet -.070* -.148** -0.028 -.10** -.09** -.12** -0.052

Liberal Television -0.054 -.100** 0.054 -.097** -0.063 -.068* 0.011

Conservative

Television.143** .144** 0.022 .111** .132** .140** .148**

N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Correlations Group Level: New Media

Information Sources

Explanatory Style

Core BeliefsWell-Being

Attitudes toward

ChinaGroup

Affiliation

Conflict Strategie

s

1.Conservative TV

2.Liberal TV

3.New Media 1st Choice

4.LOT-R

Regression Analysis Phase 1 Variables

1.Vulnerability2.Injustice3.Helplessness4.Distrust5.Superiority6.SWLS

Belief = 0 + 1ICTV + 2I1stNM + 3ILTV + 4SWLS + 8PCON +

Regression Analysis Phase 1 Results

In general, optimism was a significant negative predictor for core beliefs at the personal and group levels as hypothesized by the model

New media was a significant negative predictor for most core beliefs at the group level

Broadcast media, split into liberal and conservative programming, proved to significant predictors with most core beliefs at the group level

Regression Analysis Group Level: Conservative and Liberal Programming

β Vulnerability Injustice Helplessnes

s Distrust Superiority Well-Being

Conservative TV 0.143** 0.135** 0.108** 0.120** 0.122**

Liberal TV -0.107* -0.100** -.060*

New Media 1st Choice -0.082** -0.107* -0.061*Conservative Political Beliefs

0.105** 0.207** -0.104** 0.154** 0.206** 0.188**

Lot-R -0.203** -0.073* -0.266** -0.076* 0.192**

N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Belief = 0 + 1ICTV + 2I1stNM + 3ILTV + 4SWLS + 8PCON +

N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01, predictors are in left column

Significant changes in first choice preference from Internet toward television

Changes in media use had no impact on core beliefs at any level

No significant change in core beliefs pre- to post-Olympics

Pre- to Post-Olympic Measures

Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

Broadcast 1st ChoiceNew Media 1st Choice

N = 896

Us versus Them

Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics3.80

3.85

3.90

3.95

4.00

Group Affiliation

Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics3.08

3.10

3.12

3.14

3.16

3.18

3.20

3.22Enemy Image of China

N = 896, Mean

Information SourcesExplanator

y Style

Core BeliefsWell-Being

Attitudes toward ChinaGroup

Affiliation

Conflict Strategies

Regression Analysis Phase 2 Variables

1.Group Affiliation

2.PositiveRegard for China

3.China as the Enemy

1. Aggressive or Cooperative Conflict Strategies

1.Vulnerability2.Injustice3.Helplessness4.Distrust5.Superiority6.SWLS

Conflict Measure = 0 + 1BVUL + 2BINJ + 3BHELP + 4BDIS + 8BSUP + SWLS +

Regression Analysis Phase 2 ResultsPredictor Dependent VariableConservative ProgrammingConservative Political Views

U.S. Vulnerability (IG)Unjust treatment of U.S. (IG)U.S. Superiority (IG)

U.S. Vulnerability (IG)Unjust treatment of U.S. (IG)U.S. Superiority (IG)

Group AffiliationChina as an EnemyConflict Strategies

Subjective well being (IG)Group AffiliationChina as an EnemyConflict Strategies

Conservative Political Beliefs Conflict Strategies

Group Affiliation

Enemy Image of China

Attitudes toward China

Conflict Strategies

Vulnerability IG .201** .119** -.200**Injustice IG .199** .233** .119**

Helplessness IG -.361** .164**Distrust IG -.354** -.350**

Superiority IG .103** .242**Well-Being IG .191** .178** .182**Conservative

Political Beliefs .108** .057* .087**

Regression Analysis: Group Beliefs and Conflict Measures

Conflict Measure = 0 + 1BVUL + 2BINJ + 3BHELP + 4BDIS + 8BSUP + SWLS + N = 896, * p < .05, ** p < .01, predictors are in left column

Additional Findings Differences between belief levels were

significant for all core beliefs

84% said Olympics did not change view of China

4% had traveled to China

For 96% the Olympics had no change on their attitudes about China

Beliefs Differences Among Levels

Vulnerability Injustice Helplessness Distrust Superiority4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Personal Beliefs Personal Beliefs about the U.S.Perceptions of Most Americans Beliefs

Changing Views of China

Country People Culture Government2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

Opinions of Chinese People and Culture Significantly More Positive than Perceptions of Chinese Government

N = 478; Higher scores equal more positive perception

The Impact of Personal Experience on Perceptions

Group Affili-ation

Attitudes Toward China

Enemy Image

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3.0

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4.0

Have Traveled to ChinaHave Not Traveled to China

4% of sample have traveled to China (N=36)

Mean differences between group means significant, p < .01

Note: N=896. Higher scores for Attitudes Toward China indicates more positive feelings.

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Trav

elN

o Tr

avel

2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Attitudes Toward China

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Trav

elN

o Tr

avel

3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0

Group Affiliation

Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Trav

elN

o Tr

avel

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0

Enemy Image

Never Traveled to ChinaGroup affiliation

increasedAttitude and enemy

views either did not change or became more negative

Have Traveled to ChinaPositive regard

increased Image of China as an

enemy decreased

Change in Views Pre- and Post-Olympics

Changes in perceptions of media accuracy from before to after the Olympics

Perceptions of Media Accuracy

N = 896

Pre-Olympics Post-Olympics2.35

2.45

2.55

2.65

2.75

2.85

US Media Accuracy

China's Media

Accuracy

Conclusions

Overall model confirmed by correlations

Regression results not consistent Only at the IG level did the information

predictors confirm the model TV predicted stronger beliefs, new media

predicted decrease Explanatory style was strong predictor

Programming content and political views emerged as strong predictors Ideological buffer, just-world, security,

biology Well-being consistently aligned

Do Media Choices Matter?<

Strong predictors for conflict: Conservative political views Group affiliation Enemy Image

Do people choose media based on their beliefs rather than the other way around? Basic assumptions of media effects research

Programming and media content Validate personal identity, group affiliation, tribal allegiance Restore order to uncertain world Identify scapegoat

Orange Alert

Escalation in negative beliefs from personal to group levels Fear as normalizing? Projections to externalize fear Climate of “orange alert”

Media emphasis Biological reaction Psychological response

Olympics television coverage benign to positive Negative attitudes increased

Gated Communities of Ideology

Frightened people build gated communities

Media becomes ritual for affirmation not a quest for knowledge

Increased measures of subjective well-being indicates successful wall building

Media producers are driven by economics not ideology

Challenge to create messages that break through walls

Limitations

Population: self-selected from Zoomerang market poll Apathetic or representative? Media measures

Conflict identified as U.S. versus China

Television coverage distracted by Russia-Georgia military confrontation

No true repeated measures (pre-post) design, although samples were similar in demographics

Future Research

Technical issues: survey data, sample

Cross-cultural comparison, i.e. China’s point of view Perceptions of conflict and the “other” Effectiveness of global media event

Media choice with core beliefs and social zeitgeist

Effect of media events and content on nation brands

Media content compared with viewer perceptions and beliefs

Types and strength of belief clustering as precursors to conflict

Reflections

Importance of recognizing simultaneity in media psychology Needs system analysis

Disconnected research across disciplines Analytical frameworks, jargon, measures Ivory Silos

Media is not a “thing.” It is a conduit for who we are and what we do

Media reinforces beliefs does not create them

Conclusion Perceptions of China were not significantly changed by

Olympic coverage

Viewers’ beliefs about their own and their countries vulnerabilities were the stronger predictors of perceptions of China as an enemy, regardless of programming

Viewers’ programming choices reflected their beliefs, not the other way around

The only significant positive change in perceptions of China came from people who had visited China in person

Implications The massive financial investment in the Olympics does

not results in negative perceptions turning positive

Brands should consider their own goals and potential halo effects in where and how they choose to make sponsorship investments

Increased fear and the sense of vulnerability increases the need for us vs. them thinking and the creation of villains

No easy solutions: Increase sense of safety of home populations Increase opportunities for personal contact and exchange

Thank You