secure file system - final meeting

Secure File System -Final Meeting

Industrial Project (234313)

Prof. Michael Elad

StudentsNoam HershtigYuri Bronshtein

04.02.13

SupervisorsBoris Dolgunov

Constantine Elster

Agenda

Goals Problem Description High Level solution

Demo Methodology

Technical Team Work Protocol

Conclusions

Motivation

Motivation (cont.)

Defcon 20 (July 2012): “Into The Droid” by Thomas Cannon Shows how easy is to crack the Android Encryption

“Into The Droid” DEFCON20 Slides from:https://viaforensics.com/mobile-security/droid-gaining-access-android-user-data.html

Goal: Prevent Brute Forcing Encryption Key Solution: 2 Stage Authentication Store Key in TrustZone™ (KeyDB) KeyDB Throttles key retrieval attempts Key management is transparent to user & applications.

Solution ComponentsOS kernel TrustZone

dm-crypt-skm

KeyDBKey

Manager

SFS Kernel Modules

(skm, skm-udp)

User mode

Screen lock application

SFS configuratio

n application

dm-crypt Unmodified

Optional Changes

Original

Demo

Our Process Study Android & Linux Encryption mechanisms:

Device-mapper, dm-crypt LUKS (key management alternative)

Create “proof of concept” encryption key manager Create modular design Define protocol Implement Separate components:

Divide labor by platform: Android Apps / Linux Kernel Use TDD principles:

Unit Tests before code (where applicable) Use “simulation” (python test scripts) to test interfaces in early stages.

Integration Verify separate modules work as expected together

Key Management

Runs in TrustZone

Login Attempt Throttling: Different Locking Schemes available

Long Term Locking “Burst Mode”

User Management: Multiple PIN/Key pairs

Useful for Tablets Administrative Rights Recovery Options

Kernel Modules

Implemented as part of the device-mapper framework <kernel>/drivers/md

dm-crypt-skm: device-mapper target. Wraps dm-crypt, the original crypto device service.

skm (secure key management) Implements the protocol generically. Uses “pluggable” modules for communication with KeyDB in TrustZone. Managed from usermode via ioctls. Creates “/dev/skm” device.

skm-udp Uses netpoll API to communicate with KeyDB via UDP packets.

TrustZone (KeyDB)skm-udp

skm/dev/skm

User: Settings

dm-crypt

dm-crypt-skm

dm (dmsetup)

User: Lock Screen

Development Platform and Languages Android TrustZone Simulator

Java + Android SDK (Eclipse) Testing: jUnit for Android, python for network simulation

Linux kernel modules (dm-crypt-skm, skm, skm-udp) ANSI C

Run on GNU/Debian as vmware guest Tested on 2.6.32 kernel, compatible with 3.3 kernel API.

Testing: python for network simulation Configuration Application

ANSI C Lock Screen Demo

Python and wxPython Source Control

git (assembla private repository)

Kernel TrustZone Protocol

Key Retrieval getKey getStatus

loadKey unloadKey

Misc. getVersion (For backward

compatibility)

User Management addID removeID changePIN setParams getParams unlockID

HW Support

Challenges

Minimal Architectural Changes An early goal was to minimize changes to Android OS & Apps. After studying the linux crypto services,

dm-crypt was chosen as the best subsystem to modify

Kernel Usermode Communications Unorthodox model (simulate ‘CPU mode’ as usermode process) Usually communication is initiated from usermode Options which were considered:

polling (easy to implement, breaks design for actual ARM chips) sysfs/proc (not secure enough) sockets (incompatible with dm) netpoll (modern API in kernel, used primarily for low level debugging)

Conclusions

Design Good design simplifies code stage Allows modularization

Modularization Very important for team based coding Allows easy testing & relatively smooth

integration Helps minimizing changes in porting to

another platform

Minimizing Kernel Code Debugging kernel code is non-trivial and

time consuming Linux APIs are changing all the time:

No current documentation available Version dependent code

Automatic testing is nearly impossible

Early Testing (Test Driven Development) Quick development Easy regression testing

Thank You!