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SECTION - II
BUDDHIST VIEW OF PURE SENSATION
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SECTION - II
BUDDHIST VIEW OF PURE SENSATION
The Buddhist logicians introduce the theory of logic in
their scheme with a view to establishing their category. The
Buddhist logic which is generally known as epistemological logic
seeks to place its concept of category on a firm footing. The
Buddhist holds the opinion that the source of knowledge admits
only of two varieties, since the knowable objects are of two
types and siRce the difference in the type of knowable objects
25 alone a~counts for the variety of the means of proof.
While most of the branches of Indian Philosophy consider
nirvikarpaka and savikalpaka as two forms of perception, the
Buddhist philosophers, particularly the Yogacara school, main-
tains that nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are two for;ms of
26 knowledge.
The Buddhist Philosophers headed by Dihnaga, take great
pains to make an essential distinction between svalaksana and • •
25. prameyadvaividhyat pramanam dvividhain jagut'l I nany~ prama!labhedasya h~etur vifayabhedat~ II - Nyayamanjari, Part-1, Page 27, lines 3-4, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1971.
2 6 • d vi vidham s amy ag jnanam. Praty ak~ am anumanan ce ·• ti • •
- Nyayabindu 1.2-3, Pages 35-37, edited by Pandit
Dal~sukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1955.
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samanyalaksana - one is perceptible and the other is imper-• •
ceptible, - one is exclusively particular and the other is
universal. As these two objects mutually exclude each other, 27
existence of the third type of object is not possible. While
svalak~a~as are the unique particulars, s-amanyalak~a~as being
the universals are conceptually constructed by the mind. The
former is an ultimate reality while the latter lacks it.26
Svalaksana is pure; it consists of bare point instant and exists • •
beyond space and time. Samanyalaksana is a figment of • •
imagination, but is a real object from empirical point of
view which has nothing to do with the ultimate reality. Dharma-
klrti spends substantial energy in making a distinction between
svalaksana and samanyalaksana. Svalaksana, as Dharmakirti • • • • • • - , 29
views, has a power to produce effects (arthakriya-sakti),
it is specific (asadr~a). 30 It is not denotable by a •
2 7. dve eva samyagjnanavyakti i ti.
- Nyayabindutika, page 36, line 1, ibid.
28. arthakriyasamartham yat tad atra paramarthasat I . - -anyat samvrtisat proktante svasamanyalaksane // • • • •
- Prama~avarttika 3.3t edited by Rahul Sankritayana,
K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1953.
29. arthakriyasamarthyalaksanatvad vastunah. • • • - Nyayabindu 1.15; Pratyaksavisayad arthakriya
• • prapyate na vikalpavi~ayat.
- Nyayabindutlka, page 79, line 34, edited by Pt. Dal sukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute,Patna, 1955.
- - . . . 30. svam asadharanam laksanam tattvam svalaksanam. • • • • • - Ibid., page. 70, line 78.
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I - i word (sabdasyavi?aya}, and it is apprehensible without requir ng
the help of other agencies like verbal convention. On the
other hand, sam1anyalaksana has no power to produce effects; i£ . . 31 is common to many particulars. It is de notable by a word
and is not capable of being cognised without depending upon
verbal convention. 32 As each being the negation of the other
they exhaust the entire universe and exclude the third type of
object.
corresponding to this essential distinction between
these two types of prameyas, a radical distinction between
two sources of knowledge has been taken into consideration
33 . in the Buddhist system. ·The Buddhist logician advocates
the settled theory (pramanavyavastha) and with all emphasis •
at its command asserts that sources of knowledge have settled
31. samaropyamanam hi rupam sakalavanhisadh-aranam. . . tatah tat samanyalaksanam.
• • • - Nyayabindutika, Page 77, line 14, ibid.
32. vikalpavijnanam hi samket~aladrastatvena vastu . " . .
33.
- • • ""r grhanac chabdasamsargyogyam grhn1yat. • •
- Ibid, page 69, lines 3-4.
I ' manain dividham meyadvaividhyat saktyasaktitah
• arthakriyay-ain • • • II
Pramapavarttika 2.1, edited by Rahula sankritayana, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953.
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and clear limits. One source of knowledge never acts in the
sphere of another. A source of knowledge is either direct
or indirect. It either means a source of cognizing ultimate
reality, or it is a source of cognizing condition reality.
The direct one is Pratyaksa or pure sensation, and the • indirect one is anuma~a or conception. The former grasps
- - 34 svalaksana and the latter samanyalaksana. Pratyaksa grasps • • • • •
the object and anumana-imagi~the same object. The former
is that aspect of reality which appears directly in the
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first moment. The latter is the form of it which is construe-
ted in a distinct apperception. What is immediately cognized
in Pratyaksa is only one moment but what is distinctly • conceived is always a change of moment cognized in a cons-
truction on the basis of some sensations. 35
It may be profitable at this point of time to
discuss the point of view of the Buddhist on the problem
of pratyaksa. It is the Buddhist philosopher alone who • equates Pratyaksa with indeterminate perception. While the • champions of the other systems of Indian philosophy prefer
34. svalak~anavisyam pratyaksam. samanyalaksanavisyam • I e e e e e -anum an am • •
- Pra.n\anavarttikabhasya on Pramanavarttika 3 .1. . ' . 35. Pratyaksasya hi ksana eko gr-ahyah. adhyavaseyastu ' . . .
I -pratyak~avalotpannena niscayena santana eva.
- Nyayabindu 1.12, Nyayabindut1ka, page 71, lines 2-3, edited by Pt. Dalsukhabhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal
Research Institute, Patna 1955.
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to refer indeterminate perception by the word alocana jnana
in their early treatises, the Buddhist logician uses the
word nirvikalpaka to denote indeterminate perception. The
word vikalpa or nirvikalpaka was first used in the philo-
sophical literature probably by Dinnaga who is known as the
father of logic. In his pramanasamuccaya, Dinanga defines •
pratyak~a as a knowledge free from conceptual construc-
tion (kalpanapo~ha) and having no connection with name,
genus and the like (namajatyadyas~yuta). In his Nyayamukha . -Dinnaga provides an etymological explanation of the word
·-Pratyaksa. The word Pratyaksa, Dinanga holds, is so named • • inasmuch as, it occurs in close connection with (Prati)
each sense faculty {aksa). But some later Buddhist logicians, •
do not favour this etymology of Pratyaksa, simply because it • can lead to an undesirable conclus1on that knowledge having
sense organs (ak~a) for its object_is Pratyak~a.
The Buddhists are of opinion that the definition of a
known object is useless and that of a unknown object is still
more useless, because it is impossible. This does not mean
that the Buddhists do not resort to definition on every step
of their investigation, but it means that what a thing in
itself, what its essence is, one can never express, one
only knows its relation. Every word or every conception,
according to the Buddhist, is correlative with its counter-
part, and that is the only definition that can be given. So
an object may be defined negatively. The Buddhist classifies
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knowledge under two heads - sak~at or direct and parok~a or
indirect. The direct experience is. not indirect and is other
than the direct. The Buddhist epistemology has been built
up on the foundation of this classification of knowledge.While . -explaining the definition of pratyak~a Dinnaqa follows this
principle. He proposes that perception is Kalpanapodha or • •
non-constructive which means that this source of direct
knowledge is virtually not indirect. By the requirement Kal-
panapodha Dinniga seeks to define perception negatively and ••
this is the only way to define it. While Kalpana or conceptual
construction is other than perception or sensibility, Kalpa-
nap~~a or nirvikalpaka signifies that perception is other
than the inferential cognition or understanding. It is
perhaps Vindhyavasin who endeavours to define Pratyak~a
negatively. It appears from Jayanta•s Nyayamanjar"l that
- I -Vindhayavasin defines Pratyaksa as Srotradivrttir avikal-• . pika. 36 Subsequently, Oirmaga provides a log.ical basis for
this definition by distinguishing svalaksana from samanya-• •
laksana. • •
I -36. Srotradivrttir aparair avikalpike' ti pratyaksa-• . laksanam aparair •••• I • • - Nyayamanjari Part I, p. 93, edited by Pandit Surya Narayan Sukla, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi,
1971; also vide P.B. Chakraborty's Origin and Develop-ment of the Samkhya System of Thought, P. 146,149,
Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, Delhi 1975.
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Di~naga in his Prama~asamuccaya defines Kalpana as
the association of name (nama), genus (jati) and the like
with a thing perceived resulting verbal designation of the
thing. A thing which is essentially inexpressible comes to
be expressed by a word when it is associated with a name
(naman) and other factors. Kalpana or conceptual construction
signifies nothing other than this process of associating a
. -name etc. with a thing. Dinnaga classifies the factors to be associated with a thing for the sake of verbal designation
into five categories - naman, jati, guna,kriya and dravy.a • •
These five types of construction respectively function in I - I I - I
producing yad~chasabda, jati-sabda, gu~a-sabda,kriya~sabda I - I
and dravya-sabda. But Santaraksita and Kamalasila hold the •
opinion that the word naman in Dinnaga's definition of Kalpana
must be distinguished from jatyadi. Since jatyadi are not
recognised by Dinnaga as real entities, jatyadiyojana is a
heretical theory. Both santaraksi ta and Kaaalasila are of • . -opinion that Dinnaga's own interpretation of Kalpana is namayojana. The compound n-amayojana in the definition of
perception given by Dinnaga has been explained by Kalmala~ila
in his Panjika as ''that whereby the connection of the two
things are brought about." 37 The compound may also be
37. n-amadlnam yojana yato bhavati sa tathokta.
- Panji}(a on Tattvasamgraha, Verse No. 1221, edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi,
1968.
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explained on the basis of the assumption that the cause is
spoken of as the effect. The purpose served by the indirect
expression is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of
the cause as bringing about an effect different from other
I - - - -causes. Kamalasila further proposes that namajatyadiyojana
may also be explained in another way as standing for kalpana
or conceptual construction itself. Here yojana means 'wherewith
one is connected' - and this yojana of name, class etc. would
be the same conceptual content as "idea associated with verbal
expression."
Santaraksita in his Tattvasamgraha asserts that by the •
phrase 'namayatyadiyojana Dinnaga makes it clear that things
qualified by the qualification and the like, are also
denoted by the word. When proper names are pronounced, what
is denoted is the 'object• ·qualified by the name. In a
similar manner, when a universal like 'cowness• is pronounced
what is denoted is the object •qualified by that name.•
Similarly in all other cases, what are denoted are the
objects qualified by or connected with a respective name.
So namayojana, as KamalaSila thinks, is the only conceptual
construction and all other constructions may be brought under
the shade. 38 In view of this consideration Santaraksita •
38. yadva svamat.asiddhaiva kevala kalpanadita 1 sarvatra namna yukto• rtha ueyata iti yojanat //
• - Tattvasamgraha, Vol. 1, Chapter on Pratyak~a verse 1223, p. 452, ibid.
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I and Karnalasila hold that the association of the word
namayojana is the distinctive feature of Dinnaga' defi-
nation of Kalpana.
Dharmaklrti is more cautious in defining Kalpana.
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Kalpana or conceptual construction implies a distinct cogRi-
tion of a mental reflex which is capable of being associated
39 with verbal designation. By verbal designation is meant
a word or speech through which something is denoted. To
'associate' with a word means such a cognition when the
denoted aspect of the object and its verbal aspect are
mixed up in its apprehended aspect. When the denoted fact
and the word denoting it enter into one act of cognition
40 then the association of the object with the word happens.
This definition of kalpana as given by Dharmakirti includes
the conceptual construction of infant and dump persons who
have the potentiality of verbal expression although they
do not utter an actual word. Though the mental constructions
of a newly born infant are not accompanied by words, they
39. abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasa pratiti~ kalpana.
- Nyayabindu 1.5.
40. yadai'kasmin. jnane' bhidheya' bhidhanayorakarau
sannvistau bhavatas tada samsrste abhidhanabhidheye • • •• bhavatah • • - Ibid, Nyayabindutika, p. 48, lines 1-2, edited by
Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Research
Institute, Patna 1955.
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certainly are suitable for such a connection. 41 A newly
born infant does not stop crying and does not press his lips
upon his mother's breast, so long as it does not produce a
synthesis of the breast it sees before him with the breast
it has experienced in the foregoing existence, by thinking
'there it is.' A cognition that unifies former experience
with later experiences does not have its object present to
it, inasmuch as, the former experience ceases to exist at
the time of present experience. So a synthetic image is
capable of ~eing associated with a word. But Pratyaksa or •
sense-perception strictly depends on its object. It is receP-
tive only in regard to what is exactly present before it. 42
Since Svalaksana or real object is a cause of confining per-• . ception to itself, rather to something unique particular,
perception is not therefore, capable of being associated with
a word. 43 Kalpana, thus, corresponds to a judgement in
which something indefinite to be made definite by the pre-
dicate. And it is a judgement of the form • this is that' and
the like. This can be called epistemological form of judgement.
41. tatra 'abhilapasamsrstavabhasa kalpana' ityuktav ••• . . - . avyutpannasamketasya kalpana na samgfhyeta~ . Yogyagraha~e
tu sa'pi samgrhyeta; Yadyapi abhilapasamsrstavabhasa • • ••
na bhavati tadaharjatasya balakasya kalpana, abhilapasam-sargayogyapratibhasa tu bhavaty eva.- Ibid., lines 6-9.
42. indriyavijnanain tu sainnihi tarthamatragr~i tvad arthasapeksam - Ibid, page 52, line 1 • •
43. svalak~a~asya. pi vacyavacakabhavam abhyupagamyai. tad avikalpakatvam ucyate. - Ibid, line 3.
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Thus. it appears that all the Buddhist logicians headed
by Dinnaga and Dharmaklrti endeavour to make a distinction
between perception and conception by inserting the wovd
namayojanarahitam or kalpanapodham in the definition of .. perception.
Though Dharmakirti generally follows the footprints
left by his great teacher Dihnaga, he does not follow his
master in toto in defining perception. Dharmaklrti defines
• - - 44 perception as tatrapratyaksam kalpanapodham abhrantam. . . .. i.e.. perception is the cognition quite different from
productive imagination and sense-illusion. Absence of cons-
truction and absence of illusion as Dharmak1rti views. cons-
titute the definition of perception taken together.and not
separately. Knowledge which is free from construction and
does not produce an illusion. is Sense Perception. Thus.
both these characteristics combined with one another deter-
mine the essence of perception. While perception is generated
by the particular innocent or Syalaksal}Ci object, a construction . -of productive imagination is not produced by the object.
inasmuch as. it does not exclusively depend upon what is
present. Perception is an independent cognition as the
assembled factors which correspond to the synthetic images
are absent here • Sense perception does strictly depend
.... 44. Nyayabindu. 1.4.
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upon its object, since it is receptive only in regard to
what is really present before it. Dharmakrrti further
announces that like the unique particulars (svalaksena) • •
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every particular sound of the speech is free from construe-
tion, and naturally the unique sound is apprehended by
perception. Though every particular sound constitutes the
content of non-constructive knowledge the cognition of an
object associated with verbal expression is a synthetic
cons true tion.
A' question may be raised against this view that an
auditive sensation apprehends unique particular sound. This
particular sound has a double character. While it is a sound
it can have a meaning also. So it may be argued that sensation
of a strictly particular sound that corresponds to a mentally
constructive knowledge, is capable of being associated with
a word. To meet this objection Dharmakirti and his commenta-
tors proclaim that the unique particular sound may have this
double character of a sound and a meaning, and that meaning
involves synthesis. In spite of this it is really apprehended
in this double aspect, not as a present fact but as something
which has experience at the time of formation of language.
An entity that has been experienced at the past ceases to
exist at present. As the past experience does not continue
at present the present object is not capable of being cog-
nized by that experience. In the same manner an auditive
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sensation fails to grasp the sound and meaning simultaneously,
simply because it cannot apprehend at present what has been
45 experienced long ago.
Dharmak!rti inserts the word • abhranta • in the defini-
tion of Perception as an essential requirement of sensation.
He proposes that sense perception does not contain an
illusion of the senses. But there is a storm of controversy
among the Buddhist logicians over the insertion of the word
'abhranta• in the definition of perception. 0
Asanga intra-
duces the second feature of non-illusiveness in the definition
of perception but Dinnaga does not feel it necessary to
admit it as an essential feature of sensation, and naturally
he drops the word. Subsequently ,Dharmakirti reintroduces
the word in the definition, but his followers do not always
join their hands on this point. While a large section refuses
to accept the word 'abhranta• in the definition of Pratyaksa, • Dharmottara a later Buddhist logician with all emphasis at
his command establishes the necessity for addition of the
word in the definition.
45. tatah purvakaladrstatvam apasyae chrotrajnanam • • •• na vacyavacakabhavagr~i.
- NyayabindutTka, p. 11, lines 18-19, edited
by Peter Paterson, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1929.
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Dinnaga holds the opinion that perception or sensibility
is a knowledge distinguished from consistent thought-
construction. Illusion, he thinks, contains an illusive
perceptual judgement and every judgement is a construction
of the intellect. He considers all empirical knowledges
or concepts as transcendental illusions. Even memory and
desire also are produced by understandinQ, since they are
called for by former experience. So perception, according to
Dinnaga, is pure sensation free from all mnemi~ elements.
As Dinnaga equates conception of an illusion with empirical
illusion he does not recognize the necessity for addinq
the word 'abhranta• in the definition of perception which
would be mere repetition of the word Kalpanapodha. . . But Dharmakirti adds the word • abhranta • in the definition
with a view to distinguishing it from all types of empirical
illusion - illusion produced by colour blindness, rapid
motion, travelling on a boat, physical disorder and the
like. 46 Blindness is an eye disease. This is a cause of
illusion located in the sense organ. Rapid movement sometimes
causes an illusion. When one rapidly swings a firebrand one
46. --- . _, - .
taya rahitam timirasubhramananauyanasamkso-• . - -- . ~-bhadyanahitavibhramam jnanam pratyaksam •
Nyayabindu 1.6.
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have the illusion of a firy circle. Travelling on a boat
also cause illusion. When a boat moves, a person standing
on the boat has the illusion of moving tree on the shore.
Here illusion depends on the place where one is situated.
Similarly, disease also sometimes, disturbs one of the
three humours of the body the gaseous, the bilious
and the phlegmy whose equipiose is equivalent to health
and whose disturbed equipiose is equivalent to sickness.
All physical diseases are attributed to an abnormal con-
dition of the gaseous principles. Each of these causes
invariably affects the sense-organs, inasmuch as, when
the organs of senses are normal there can be no illusive
sensation. To exclude all th~se sense illusions Dharmakirti
feels it necessary for insertion of the word 'abhranta'
in the definition. Dharmottara, the great commentator of
Nyayabindu, also is of opinion that the addition of the
word 'abhranta• to the definition of Pratyaksa is neceessary •
to exclude illusion of the moving tree on the shore and the
like. An opponent may argue that illusion of moving tree
is a right knowledge, inasmuch as, it leads to a success-
ful activity. The illusion may again be considered as
perception, since it is free from mental construction. To
exclude sense-illusion, Dharmaklrti, as Dharmottara
interprets, has done quite right by adding the word 'al:ilranta'
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in the definition of perception. 47
I • Kamalasila in his commentary on Tattvasangraha
supports the view of Dharmaklrti and asserts that the word
'abhranta' or non-erroneous has been added to the defi-I
nition for the purpose of excluding such illusion, inasmuch
as all these illusions are not regarded as valid cognition
48 on the ground of being erroneous. He further points out
that the question what is the use of mentioning the word
'kalpanapodha •, does not stand to reason, as in that case ••
the inferrential cognition also would have to be regarded
49 as sense perception also.
•1. tatra• satyabharantagrahane gacchadvrksada-• . .
48.
rsanadipratyaksam kalpanapodhatvat syat. • • • tato hi pravrttena vrksamatram avapyate iti
• • . - - """- -samvadakatvat samyagjnanam, kalpanapodhatvac •• - - ~ . -ca pratyaksam iti syad asanka. tannivrtyartham • •
abhrantagrahanam • •
Ibid, Nyayabindutlka, p. 45, lines 1-3. I - • V'- • •
kesondrakad~vijnanamvrtyartham idam krtam I • • • • - . . - . -abhrantamgrahapam taddhi bhrantatvam ne~yate prama // • - Tattvasamgraha, Part I, Chapter on Pratyaksa verse
• 1311, Part-!, edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri,
Bauddha Bharati, varanasi 1960.
49. Yady evam abhrantagrahanam eva' stu, kim kalpana-•
podhagrahanene• iti ? na;anumanavikalpasya'pi • • • . -pratyaksatvaprasangat • ...... - . Panjika on Tattvasamgraha, Verse 1311, P. 480, lines 8-10, ibid.
31
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A fresh question may be raised here that illusion
iS purely mental, it can never be a sense perception. So
the addition of the word 'abhranta• in the definition of
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perception for the purpose of excluding illusion is meaning-
' less. In reply to this objection Kamalasila reminds that the definition of perception under reference does not refer
to a definition of only sense perception which is brought
about by the sense organ, but also of that sense perception
which appears in the mystique which is purely mental.
Dream-cognition also is non-conceptual as it appears quite I
distinctly and yet it is not non-illusive. So Kamalasila .
proposes that for the exclusion of drearn-cogni tion the
inclusion of the word • abhr"~mta • in the definition is
so necessary.
A section of the Buddhist logician may argue that
the word • abhranta • in the definition of Pratyaksa is not • necessary at all, inasmuch as, even the illusion of "yellow
conch-shell• is sense perception. Since it is not brought
about by an inferential indicative, it cannot influence the
idea of conch-shell is valid, is clear from the fact that
it is not incongruent with reality. It is perhaps for this . -reason the great logician Dinnaga does not introduce the word • abhranta • in the definition of sense perception.
so. see Panjika on Tattvasamgraha, verses 1312-13.
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I But Karnalasila does not favour this argument and
holds the opinion that the validity of a cognition is of
two types when there is compatibility with the
appearance and when there is compatibility with the appre-
hension. But in the case of the idea of yellow conch-
shell compatibility is not in accordance with the appea-
ranee because what appears is the yellow conch-shell and
yet what is perceived on touching is not the yellow
thing. 51 Karnalasila further declares that compatibility
is not pos'sible here in accordance with the apprehension,
simply because it is the yellow thing in itself that is .
apprehended as capable of a successful activity, and 52 no successful activity in that form is actually found.
I With these arguments Kamalasila endeavours to establish
that the insertion of the word 'abhranta • in the definition
of Pratyaksa as given by Dharmaklrti is meaningful • •
51. tatre• ha na yathapratibhasam avisamvadah; • p~tasya pratibhasanat tasya tathBbhutasya prapteh •
•
52.
~ - . Panjika on Tattasarngraha, verse 1324,
P. 483, lines 15-16, ibid. - - - . -na pi yathadhyavasayam avisamvadah;
• - ~ - - - -pitasyai va visi~~arthakriyakaritvena• dhyavasayat, na ca tadruparthakriyapraptir asti - Ibid, lines 16-18.
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Dharmak1rti and his followers argue that hallucination,
appearance of flower on the sky and vivid dream fall under
the definition of perception, inasmuch as, they are not
constructions on the basis of a real cognition. So in all
these cases the visions are present with all that vividness
which is a special feature of perception. Hallucinations
and vivid dreams lack that vagueness and generality which
is the characteristic feature of conceptual thought. To
avoid this problem the addition of .the qualification
'abhranta•, as Dharmaklrti thinks, is necessary.
Thus, it appears that Dharmak1rti draws a line of
demarcation between a sense illusion and an illusion of
the understanding. He includes the word 'kalpanapoqQa'
in the definition of Pratyak~a to distinguish it from
an illusion of the understanding or 'kalpana•, while he
includes the word 'abhranta• with a view to distinguishing
pratyaksa from a sense-illusion. The causes of illusion • may lie either in the external objects or in the com-
prehender. They may be called forth by a disease of sense
organs, and sometimes they may also be entirely physical.
It is a fact that the senses contain no judgement neither
the right one, nor the wrong. But the senses in an abnormal
condition may influence the faculty of understanding regu-
lating thereby an erroneous cognition.
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Mention may be made in this connection that Dinnaga
considers sensation as the only variety of direct cognition.
But Dharmaklrti maintains that sensation is not the only -
variety of direct perception. The word pratyak~a is much
wider in extension than sensation. It signifies direct
knowledge different from indirect knowledge or concept. He
classifies pratyak~ajnana under four heads - indriyajnana,
manovijnana, yogijnana and atmasaffivedana. Indriyajnana
or sensuous perception is direct experience of unique
particulars which is brought about by the contact of the
senses with the object. This type of perception has been
taken into consideration in great detail. Though the
Buddhist Philosophers distinguish between a percept and a
concept still they endeavour to reunite them. The first
moment of perception is followed by a second moment of
perception. This is an intermediate state of pure sensation
and the work of understanding. This kind of perception is
entirely mental, not at all sensuous. 53 This manasapratyak~a
or intelligible intuition can be assimilated to sense
perception because of the vividness with which the con-
templated pictures present itself to the imagination. A
section of the Buddhist recognizes intelligible intuition
53. svavisayanantaravisayasahakarinendriyajnanena • • • samanantarapratyayena janitam tan manovijnanam
Nyayabindu 1. 9.
-
as the mystic intuition of the Buddhist saints by which
they seek to completely change all ordinary habits or
thoughts.
36
Vinitadeva in his commentary on Nyayabindu defines
manasapratyaksa as the knowledge brought about by sense 0
cognition - as being the immediate and homogeneous cause
(samanantara pratyak~a) - which has for its accessory the
object that follows the same object of the first moment.
Since manovijnana or mental perception is preceded by a
sense perception and since the deaf and dumb persons can
never have respective previous sense cognition, such
persons can never be assumed to have the mental perception
of colour, sound and the like. Since the object of
""'-manovijnana reveals an exact reproduction that appears
immediately in the second moment, the object of mental
perception is not identical with that of preceding sense
cognition. Dharmottara, the great commentator of Nyayabindu,
observes that in the case of mental perception the sense
after cognizing at first moment ceases to function in
respect of the same object. But if the same sense continues
to function in respect of the same object in the following
moments, the subsequent cognition would be nothing other
-
37
th · i 54 s b th pe e t · nd mental an sense cogn~t on. o o sense rc p ~on a
perception belong to the same stream (santana) of
consciousness.55 Atrnasamvedana or svasamvitti, the third
variety of pratyak~a has already taken into consideration
in great detail. Yogajajnana, as Dharmakirti holds, is a
kind of perception (pratyak~a) which is entirely mental but
not sensuous.56 It can be assimilated to perception because
of the vividness with whi.ch the contemplated pictures presents
itself to the imagination.57 Yogic perception or mystic
intuition is a faculty of the Buddhist Yogin who acquires
the habits of realising the relativity (sunyata) and unreality
54.
55.
56.
tatas ca 1 ntare pratisiddhe samanajatiyo dvitiyaksana-• • • bhavyupadeyaksana indriyavijnanavisayasya grhyate. • • • •
Nyayabindu. 1.9, Nyayabindutlka, p. 58, lines
2-3, edited by Pater Paterson, ASiatic Society of
Bengal, 1929.
tadanenaikasantanantarbhutayor eve• ndriyajnana-'""- - """- . manovijnanayor janyajanakabhave manovijnanam
pratyak~am ity uktam bhavati - Ibid, p. 69, lines
1-2.
- - - . """- . bhutarthabhavanaprakarsyaparyantajam yosijnanam ci 1ti-
Nyayabindu 1.11.
57. karatalamalakavat bhaveyamanasyarthasya yad, I •
darsanam tad yoginah pratyaksam. • • taddhi sphutavam
• - Ibid, Nyayabindutlka, p. 69, lines 1-2.
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38
of the phenomena. It is an intuition of a condition which
is not capable of being cognised. A Yogin apprehends
something that does not or may not really exist. Actually
Yoga pratyak~a does not apprehend its object something
present before the comprehender. It refers to the
transcendental unique particulars (svalaksanas). A Yogin • •
may have also the direct knowledge of the sense-cognition
of even another person through the supernormal po'tlll'er.
In the case of the intuition of a Yogin the sense cog-
nition would be considered as alambana pratyak~a. Further-
more, the cognitlon of a yogin and that of another person
belongs to two different streams of consciousness. It
is perhaps for this reason Dharmakirti makes a dis-
tinction between manasa pratyak~a and yogaja pratyak~a.
Thus, it reveals that the nirvikalpaka pratyak~a,
according to the Buddhist logicians, is a simle, homo-
geneous unitary cognition in which the subject and the
object, perception and perceptual matter are not distin-
guished by giving in a lump, as it were. But such
knowledge is entirely useless and has no pragmatic value.
It is only when perceptual knowledge is interpreted.by
a subsequent act of relation which analyses it into a
subjective and objective elements and imposes a relation
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39
upon them, that can be made useful in our practical life.
It is however, the primary homogeneous experience
(nirvikalpaka) that can be accepted as reliable testimony
of the external reality and the reflective result of it
are purely subjective thought. The Vikalpa which is
imagination, pure and simple is absolutely without touch
with a reality.
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